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The Israel Defense Forces and the Palestinian Uprising (U)

A Defense Research Assessment



Defense Intelligence Agency

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The Israel Defense Forces and the Palestinian Uprising (U)

A Defense Research Assessment

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KEY JUDGMENTS

(C/NF) The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) faces one of the most severe challenges of its 40-year existence. Its training, equipment, and doctrine had not prepared it for the large-scale Palestinian uprising that began on 9 December 1987. In addition:

- The IDF's leadership consistently underestimated Palestinian popular resolve and steadily resisted efforts to turn the Army into a policing force.
- IDF readiness was marginally reduced in the early phases of the uprising, and was regained principally through extensive use of reserve forces in the Occupied Territories.
- IDF troop morale has suffered from ambiguities on acceptable uses of force. Future morale levels will be determined by levels of public support and the length of units' duty in the Occupied Territories.
- The potential exists for a much higher level of violence, with the greatest danger coming from Palestinian use of firearms and the IDF's likely severe response.
- The uprising has exacerbated tensions between civilian and military authorities. These tensions will probably increase as the uprising continues.
- The IDF will be able to contain major disturbances as they occur and fulfill its primary duty of defense against outside threats, but it will not be able to guarantee a permanent return to the status quo ante in the Occupied Territories.

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
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(C) IDF commands, each led by a major general. The occupied West Bank is the responsibility of Maj Gen Mitzna's Central Command, the occupied Gaza Strip that of Maj Gen Mordechai's Southern Command.

(C) A demonstration in the West Bank town of Nablus in February. Bold individual initiative, an IDF attribute that had brought repeated success on the battlefield, was ill suited to combat rock- and bottle-throwing youths without resort to lethal force.



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The Israel Defense Forces and the Palestinian Uprising (U)

(C/NF) The IDF is the most powerful military force in the region, with the capability of defeating any combination of Arab forces arrayed against Israel. IDF troops have been organized, trained, and equipped to combat Arab armies in conventional warfare and Arab guerrillas in low-intensity conflict. The IDF has soundly defeated its enemies in several wars and has over time greatly reduced the guerrilla threat to Israel. Israeli soldiers have not, however, been adequately trained or equipped to deal with large-scale civil disturbances.

(C/NF) Although Israeli intelligence and security services suspected in November 1987 that increased tensions in the Occupied Territories were leading to a new round of unrest, they were surprised by the intensity and scope of the uprising that began in December. For the most part spontaneously and through experimentation, Palestinian children and youths hit upon methods of successfully challenging Israeli occupation forces which the IDF proved ill equipped to handle.

Tactical Evolution

(C/NF) From its beginning on 9 December 1987 through the end of January 1988, the Palestinian uprising came in waves of violence usually lasting for about 2 weeks, interspersed with relative calms of about 10 days. Periods of intense rioting died out, due to such factors as fatigue, weather, and religious holidays, and usually reappeared in response to specific events, such as the announcement of impending deportations or the visit to Israel of the US Secretary of State. By February, after each side had measured the strengths and weaknesses of the other, the uprising settled into a pattern of frequent flashes

of violence with much shorter periods of relative quiet.

(C/NF) Measured in terms of intensity of violence and numbers of Palestinian fatalities, the uprising unfolded in six fairly distinct phases through late March. Phase I, from 9 to 23 December, was a period of violent demonstrations on a daily basis. In Phase II, from 24 December to 2 January, the unrest diminished and a tense calm prevailed. Widespread violence returned during Phase III, from 3 to 15 January, initially more intense than in Phase I. Another decrease in violence came during Phase IV, from 16 to 28 January, a period marked by a few large disturbances interspersed with periods of tense calm. During Phase V, beginning on 29 January and continuing through 22 February, violent confrontations increased and the Palestinian death toll rose again. Phase VI started on 23 February with the first reported Palestinian use of firearms against the IDF since the uprising began.

(C/NF) The response of the IDF's leadership to the initial stages of the uprising can be characterized as consistent underestimation of Palestinian popular resolve and steady resistance to the government's perceived attempts to turn the Army into a police force. The IDF, which in the October 1973 War had within days adapted its armor and air tactics to lessons learned at heavy cost, was slow to make the adjustments necessary to meet large-scale civil unrest in the winter of 1987-88. No Israeli troops were dying, the cost in readiness seemed manageable, and it appeared that calm would return before long. The IDF's leadership continued to oppose the establishment of a large military internal security apparatus, believing that such an organization would be prone to corruption and morale problems. Senior

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commanders also wanted to remain leaders of fighting men, not police chiefs.

(C/NF) Although the IDF had traditionally maintained a small security presence in the Occupied Territories, the maintenance of order had primarily been the responsibility of the Border Police — a 4,500-man force most IDF leaders held in mild contempt. At the outbreak of the uprising, the ranks of the Border Police were about 73 percent Jewish, 23 percent Druze, and 4 percent other minorities. The quality of the Jewish conscripts directed to the Border Police is considered low, the force being a convenient dumping ground for delinquents and the undereducated. Maj Gen Amram Mitzna, commander of the IDF's Central Command, had for some time seen the need to improve the force and direct higher quality conscripts in larger numbers to its ranks. His program was moving slowly when the uprising began. To IDF leaders, policing the West Bank and Gaza Strip was a task to which the Border Police, not frontline troops and reservists, were best suited.

Phases I and II (9 December-2 January)

(C/NF) Maj Gen Mitzna admits that the IDF had no doctrine for dealing with the uprising when it began. The IDF confronted rock-throwing crowds with old tactics of small foot patrols; small, often single-vehicle, mounted patrols; and reliance upon the threat or use of firepower in times of trouble. These methods had been sufficient to show IDF presence and to respond to isolated bombing incidents, Molotov cocktails, stabbings, stones thrown at Israeli vehicles by small groups of boys, and occasional medium-size student demonstrations. Throughout Phase I of the uprising and into Phase II, the IDF was reacting to the unrest as it would have to widespread terrorism. The Army tried to project its presence at every sign of trouble and bring every incident under control by force.

(C/NF) IDF training programs have centered on the use of firearms. IDF rules of engagement (ROE) for confronting hostile crowds were specific: In life-threatening situations troops were to fire in the air, then to shoot at the legs of demonstrators, and to resort to direct fire only when

they were in clear and present danger of harm or death. Interpretation of the ROE by junior commanders on the ground differed widely, however. In addition, the IDF and Israeli courts have long classified the throwing of Molotov cocktails as terrorism, and the IDF's ROE have sanctioned the use of live fire against firebomb throwers and against fleeing "terrorists." When it became evident in the early days of the uprising that targeting firebomb throwers in large crowds was leading to more politically damaging Palestinian deaths, the IDF withdrew the authorization to shoot anyone throwing a Molotov cocktail.

(C/NF) Small patrols of four to six men, without riot gear and often dismounted, were easily isolated by large Palestinian crowds and resorted quickly to lethal force. By the end of the uprising's first phase, 22 Palestinians had been killed by IDF fire — 15 in the Gaza Strip and 7 on the West Bank. The deaths were giving rise to further violent outbreaks, and Israel's and the IDF's images were suffering worldwide. The logic of the situation clearly dictated the commitment of larger forces, the employment of new tactics, crowd-control training for all troops involved, and large quantities of riot gear.

(C/NF) By the end of Phase I of the uprising, IDF strength had doubled on the West Bank and tripled in Gaza. Elements of all three active-duty infantry brigades were committed to the Occupied Territories, with the Givati (84th) Infantry Brigade concentrating on the Gaza Strip, and the Golani (1st) Infantry and 35th Para Brigades concentrating on the West Bank. These forces and territorial units were supplemented by troops undergoing training at IDF schools. Some effort was made to move about in larger formations, but small patrols still predominated. There was not enough riot gear to go around. By the end of the month, the IDF's stockpiles of visored helmets, batons, rubber bullets, and tear gas were depleted, and efforts were underway to acquire new gear. Although the IDF announced a special program for riot-control training at its schools and training installations, no comprehensive training for troops committed to the security mission was begun. Extended curfews, mass arrests, and fatigue brought the lull of the last week of December, and 1 January — the dreaded "Fatah Day" — passed without large-scale violence.

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Secret***Phases III and IV (3-28 January)***

(C/NF) As the IDF's leadership congratulated itself on keeping the lid on through Fatah Day, it planned a gradual reduction in forces committed to the Occupied Territories. Phase III of the uprising, almost 2 weeks of renewed widespread rioting, interrupted these plans beginning on 3 January. It was at this point the "beatings" policy was put into effect, although it was not until 19 January that Minister of Defense Yitzhak Rabin outlined it publicly in response to a reporter's question. Tactics were now to charge and disperse demonstrators with baton blows. The objective was to seize control of the situation and break the will of the crowd to advance. The new tactic led to widespread abuse and world condemnation as intense as that during the shootings early in the uprising.

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(C/NF) Minister of Defense Yitzhak Rabin, retired general and Labor Party member.

Rabin has primary responsibility for dealing with the uprising. IDF soldiers, he said, "are not trained to discharge police duties that place them in confrontation with women and children."

(C/NF) Troop levels in the Occupied Territories grew. Reservists had been used in the Occupied Territories since the beginning of the uprising, but with the activation and deployment to security duty of at least some elements of the 609th Infantry Brigade in mid-January, the IDF reluctantly crossed a threshold in commitment. Scheduled training for units of the 609th was canceled; instead, the units received perfunctory crowd-control training and were committed to the Occupied Territories. Total forces on the Gaza Strip increased to at least 42 companies from 10 separate units — both active-duty and reserve.

(C/NF) The unprecedented troop levels, however, created an unmanageable command situation. The old territorial brigade structure provided for a brigade commander of colonel rank

with three subordinate lieutenant colonels. As a remedy, the IDF now divided the West Bank into three areas of operations, two with a brigadier general and one with a colonel in command, and put the Gaza Strip under the operational command of a single brigadier. Each had his own brigade structure. Most of these officers were appointed on such short notice that they had little time to study the situations in their areas and commands or develop methods of operation. Over time, however, the presence of these senior officers contributed to a measure of continuity and stability as reservists rotated into the Occupied Territories.

(C/NF) It appeared to the IDF that the policy of blows, together with the massive troop presence and collective punishments, had quieted the unrest. The second wave of widespread rioting, the uprising's third phase, had run its course by 15 January. During this phase, 17 Palestinians were killed by IDF fire — 11 in the Gaza Strip and 6 on the West Bank. Phase IV of the uprising, from 16 to 28 January, was a period of infrequent disturbances and reduced shooting incidents.

Phase V (29 January-22 February)

(C/NF) The advent of Phase V of the uprising and renewed, large-scale demonstrations at the end of January found the IDF better prepared to deal with large crowds. The Palestinians were also learning, however, and were less intimidated by batons and rubber bullets. Widespread, often indiscriminate or vengeful beatings increased, and shooting deaths rose, as well. The use of riot gear was common, but troops were getting only 1 day's crowd-control training before deployment. A definite correlation could be discerned between the number of shooting deaths and units' experience in the Occupied Territories. The use of deadly force was higher when a unit first reached its area of operations, and diminished after it had been on station for a week or more.

(C/NF) By the first week of February, the IDF felt confident enough to reduce its forces in some areas of the Occupied Territories. In the Gaza Strip, for example, troop levels plummeted from a high of about 42 companies to about 15.

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(C) "We recognize each [Palestinian] casualty as a failure for Israel," said an IDF general in mid-January. Despite the "beatings" policy, Palestinian shooting deaths — like this one in late February — increased, as did international criticism of Israel.

Reservists now made up about half of the forces committed to security duty. Although a contingency plan probably existed for a general callup of reserves, the need for reservists to release active-duty troops for regular training and duty in the north was met by extensive use of "Order 8" callups. This order provided the IDF with a mechanism by which it could avoid the legal requirement that individual reservists receive 30 days' warning before activation other than in emergencies. The order, which requires reservists to appear within 24 hours for duty of indefinite duration, allows for callups without the publication of an emergency situation.

(C/NF) With four to five times the normal complement of troops in the Occupied Territories but less force presence than in January, the IDF's tactics had evolved in February. Mounted patrols of 10 or more riot-equipped soldiers moved through populated areas, and large formations stood watch around targeted refugee camps. The IDF would not get involved when

it was not necessary, but when involved would move in force. It abandoned much of its attempt to reopen shops closed in observance of com-

Drawdown of IDF Troops in the Gaza Strip (U)

Number of Companies

Unit	26 Jan 1988	9 Feb 1988
Golani (1st) Bde	3	2
Givati (84th) Bde	9	3
609th Inf Bde (Reserve)	3	3
ADA School	1	0
646th Armored Bde	3	0
643d Inf Bde	9	0
401st Armored Bde	4	4
460th Armored Bde	1	0
828th School Bde	6	3
933d Nahal Bde	3	0
Total	42	15

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mercial strikes, and put emphasis on quick response to disturbances, heliborne dispatch of riot-breaking squads, and better intelligence work.

(C/NF) Some differences existed between tactics and deployments in the Gaza Strip and on the West Bank, principally due to relative population densities, amount of area to be covered, and differences in approach between commanders of the Southern and Central Commands. Maj Gen Mitzna, with a few large towns and about 450 small villages to contend with on the West Bank, emphasized small patrols and quick reaction to large disturbances. Maj Gen Yitzhak Mordechai, with two major towns and a few densely packed refugee camps to oversee in the Gaza Strip, employed larger concentrations of force.

(C/NF) The IDF, which had been unable or unwilling to devise tactics synchronized to the government's policy, had changed the mission from ending the uprising to containing it. It seemed always, however, to be one step behind the Palestinians, from whom it was unable to regain the initiative.

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nation of resistance between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The government placed limitations on the import of money from Jordan to the West Bank in an effort to dry up outside financial support for the uprising. The major Palestinian youth group was outlawed, procedures for detention were streamlined, and lower level commanders were authorized to rule on administrative detentions for up to 6 months without trial. Roundups of suspected organizers so increased the number of Palestinian prisoners that another IDF prison had to be established in the Negev. Sporadic restrictions on the media were designed to reduce Palestinian incentives to demonstrate, as well as to give the IDF a freer hand and mitigate the effects of world criticism.

(C/NF) Deliberate steps to break the spirit of the uprising were principally economic. Fuel deliveries to the West Bank were interrupted following the burning of a tanker truck, forcing the closure of service stations. Full payments of taxes were demanded before issuance of the many documents and permits necessary for business in the Occupied Territories. The IDF closed produce markets, prohibited the movement of goods from selected villages, and welded shut shops participating in commercial strikes or merely located in the neighborhood of violent incidents. Additional measures to make life difficult for the ordinary Palestinian supporters of the uprising included the cutting of direct telephone links to foreign countries, electricity outages to selected communities, and frequent night raids for searches and mass arrests.

(C/NF) Uncoordinated and ad hoc IDF responses characterized the earlier phases of the uprising. Coordination and calculated intensification were essential features of government and IDF measures in the sixth phase. By March, a significant portion of the IDF had made the transition from bewildered and hastily deployed troops to a full-fledged army of occupation. The Israelis had become accustomed to international censure for their handling of the uprising, and had long experience with the shortness of media-fed Western memories. In March, the IDF was exhibiting new determination to cut off the uprising at its roots. In Chief of the General Staff Lt Gen Dan Shomron's view, the IDF had regained the initiative on the tactical level, but the Palestinians retained the strategic initiative. As long as the IDF could not fire at anyone who entered the street, he maintained, that basic situation would not change.

(C/NF) By late March, after more than 3 months of unrest in which scores of Palestinians had been shot dead in the streets, hundreds had been wounded by IDF fire, and thousands had been beaten, only one Israeli soldier had died in the Occupied Territories at Palestinian hands. There had been and will continue to be, however, costs to the IDF. Some of these costs are minor, short-term, and readily observable. Others may be major, long-term, and less discernible.

Readiness

(C/NF) The IDF's readiness was marginally reduced in the early phases of the uprising. Active-duty units normally training or on duty on the northern borders and in the occupied "security zone" in southern Lebanon bore the brunt of the first weeks of the unrest. The loss in training averaged 3 weeks per unit, and during the deployment in the Occupied Territories of active-duty formations — particularly elements of the Givati, Golani, and 35th Para Brigades — forces in the north were thinly stretched. Observers reported that no infantry brigade was present on the Golan Heights for surprisingly long periods of time.

(C/NF) According to Maj Gen Uri Sagi, commander of IDF Ground Forces Command, the active-duty units were already in a high state of training when deployed to duty in the Occupied Territories, and the time served there was not sufficient to reduce their fighting edge appreciably. His assertion is in line with the view that conflict situations contribute to units' performance in combat. Although another view contends that skills deteriorate without combined arms training, it would probably require a number of months of unrelieved duty in the Occupied Territories before a significant degradation in a unit's combat capability would become evident. By its rotation of reservists and reserve units into duty the IDF showed its determination not to let that happen. The reserve units lost an estimated 2 or 3 days' training by deployment to the Occupied Territories. Normally, reservists spend much of their 40 to 45 days of annual active duty in operational roles rather than training. In early March, reservist duty was extended to 50 days. Later in the month, the IDF was considering extending reserve duty even further and calling reservists for special duty in the Occupied Territories for several months at a time to help ease the pressure on active-duty units. Precedents for this type of callup were set

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during the War of Attrition along the Suez Canal two decades earlier.

Leadership Grumblings

(C/NF) The Palestinian uprising has not been the IDF's finest hour, and has given rise to or exacerbated a measure of resentment and dissatisfaction among the senior leadership. The IDF's leaders believed from January on that current tactics were working in the short term. Most senior commanders appeared convinced, however, that the mission of restoring calm or containing unrest only kept the lid on the pressure cooker created by more than 20 years of Israeli occupation and would be no substitute for the required political solution in the long term.

(C/NF) Chief of the General Staff Lt Gen Dan Shomron. His early months as the IDF's top commander were consumed by the Lavi fighter aircraft controversy. Shomron has been faulted by officers for sitting on the sidelines while Defense Minister Rabin made crucial decisions on the IDF and for contributing to a sense of drift on crucial IDF issues. Of the uprising, Shomron has said, "There is no magic trick to end the situation."

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(C/NF) Although the IDF enjoyed an excellent security posture against external threats in December 1987, no time was a good time to have to deal with a popular uprising in the Occupied Territories. From an internal perspective, its coming when it did was particularly unpropitious. IDF leaders had hoped that the tenure of Lt Gen Shomron as Chief of the General Staff would reinvigorate the services and bring progress on important questions of doctrinal changes, procurement priorities, and force modernization. Shomron's first months on the job, however, were consumed in preoccupation over the Lavi fighter program. They were also characterized by such image-tarnishing incidents as an IDF commando operation in Lebanon that hit Lebanese militiamen instead of its Palestinian target, an hours-long ambush of a Givati patrol in the "security zone" in

southern Lebanon by a guerrilla band that withdrew in good order, and a single guerrilla's hang-glider attack inside Israel proper that killed six IDF soldiers in a Nahal militia camp. Some senior IDF commanders were also disturbed by Shomron's tendency to allow Defense Minister Rabin to make decisions they believed were the province of the IDF's top general.

(C/NF) Many commanders believe that the IDF is putting its reputation on the line to buy the politicians more time to avoid facing the difficult questions of the exchange of land for peace connected with the peace process. Their instinctive reaction to protect their troops from the abuses of the civilian leadership has caused some strain. When stories of indiscriminate beatings mounted, for example, the commander of the IDF's Southern Command went on record with a comment that it was the politicians who sent the soldiers to the Occupied Territories and who were now picking on "exceptional cases" to attack the IDF.

(C/NF) IDF leaders find themselves in a no-win situation. They have the ability to project force into any area of the Occupied Territories and to suppress any disorders, but this is only military and geographical control — not a victory that produces even an interim solution. There are, to be sure, IDF commanders at all levels who relish the opportunity to punish Palestinians. As the commander of Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip put it, however, "Each death of a demonstrator is a defeat for the IDF." And each defeat for the IDF is a defeat for its leaders.

Morale and Discipline

(C/NF) The IDF has traditionally been the most respected institution in Israeli society, immeasurably affecting the individual soldiers' self-image. The IDF is, however, a fighting force, not a quasi-police force. Since the beginning of the uprising, the IDF's young troops — trained to confront armed enemies on the battlefield — have been humiliated in confrontations with Palestinian women and children. For some, the beatings policy acted as a safety valve short of lethal force for venting their frustrations and the anti-Arab passions that the uprising has exacerbated. Others reported a sense of shame and debasement.

(C/NF) Reports of widespread physical abuse of Palestinians became more frequent beginning

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in January, when the beatings policy was instituted. Troops had been instructed to conduct themselves with both firmness and restraint, an apparent contradiction in terms. Signals to the troops were mixed. On some occasions, Defense Minister Rabin issued statements that force was to be used only to disperse rioters, while on another he said that, "Anyone who tries to attack a soldier should know that the soldiers have license to use all the means at their disposal to defend themselves." Senior officers in the Gaza Strip privately outlined a rationale for bone-breakings — to "treat the rioter like a dog, not a symbol to his people" — and Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir commented publicly that the only reason the uprising had lasted as long as it had was the restraint shown by soldiers. None of this confusion contributed to high troop morale.

(C/NF) Toward the end of February, after worldwide reporting of such notorious cases as the burying alive of four Palestinians, Attorney General Harish informed Defense Minister Rabin that the excesses had become too widespread to be dismissed as "exceptional irregularities," and instructed him to issue precise guidelines on the use of force. On the 23d, Lt Gen Shomron issued a directive that under no circumstances was force to be used as punishment, and that deliberate humiliation and damage to property was forbidden. Abuses continued, but now the IDF — particularly commander of the Central Command, Maj Gen Mitzna — began to remove from command, detain, and prosecute transgressors more frequently, especially in cases that drew press attention. The troops only gradually learned what was expected of them. Both the political leadership and the majority of IDF commanders were willing to turn a blind eye to the excesses as long as results were being achieved. The absence of broad disciplinary measures against large numbers of soldiers is further evidence that the conduct of the troops was not contrary to the wishes of either the civilian or the military leadership. Adverse foreign publicity and the resulting pressure from Rabin were the major factors in pushing the IDF toward removing the ambiguities on how troops should conduct themselves.

(C/NF) Outright refusals to obey orders have been few. On 31 December, 160 reservists up to the rank of major collectively refused to serve in the Occupied Territories — a development that had begun before the uprising and for which precedents had been set in the Lebanon war. Se-

nior officers are more concerned about "the wild ones" who will resist control on their use of force than about soldiers who refuse to serve or who are morally torn about their duties.

(C/NF) An early February report by the IDF's Behavioral Sciences Department concluded that if troops continued to carry out their current duties in the Occupied Territories, their behavioral patterns would be affected. Senior officers disagreed. They admitted that the morale of one unit, the 933d Nahal Brigade, was low, but because of the 25 November 1987 hang-glider attack, not because of duty in the Occupied Territories. On 22 February the IDF's chief psychologist released the results of a survey of troops serving in the Gaza Strip and on the West Bank. Seventy percent did feel that their fighting ability was impaired by their policing role, and 65 percent reported witnessing harsh actions against Palestinians. Significant as a measure of morale, however, was the fact that fully 92 percent expressed full confidence in their officers.

(C/NF) Aside from unit cohesion and confidence in officers, there appear to be two principal determinants to the future morale of IDF soldiers in the Occupied Territories: the feeling that they are carrying out a necessary task that represents the will of the nation, and the duration of their security duty. Opinion polls in February and March determined that a majority of Israelis believed that the current policy or an even harsher policy should be pursued in the Occupied Territories, and that the IDF should do the job. The chief psychologist's survey found, however, that 60 percent of the soldiers surveyed believed that they would have difficulty with duty in the Gaza Strip and on the West Bank if it continued for 6 months or more. In early March, the IDF limited individual tours in the Occupied Territories to 40 consecutive days.

Money

(C/NF) The Palestinian uprising is costing Israel money — in lost revenues, lost tourism, lost Arab and reservist labor, and increased expenditures. By the end of February IDF leaders realized that they were committed to a long stay in the Occupied Territories and that new funds were required. No precise estimate of costs had been made, however. The defense establishment had already reportedly estimated that it would fall \$600 million short of what it needed to meet IDF

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requirements over the next 3 Israeli fiscal years — even after cancellation of the Lavi program.

(C/NF) In addition to line items such as emergency procurements of riot-control equipment, expenses will mount for realignment of training schedules and the commitment of individual reservists and reserve units. Military vehicles, food, fuel, spare parts, and the building of temporary structures all require support.

(C/NF) The financing of additional reserve callups is particularly nettlesome. The IDF is allotted a maximum number of reservists' days that can be paid for by Israel's social security system. Days in excess of this amount are supposed to be funded from IDF and Ministry of Defense funds. The IDF's budget proposal for Fiscal Year 1988-89 actually called for a 3-percent reduction in reserve callups compared to Fiscal Year 1987-88. This forecast has now been overcome by events. In February, the IDF reportedly demanded an additional \$30 million to cover expected expenses. According to the Israeli press, treasury circles initially scoffed at the demand. The IDF does not want the cost of its duty in the Occupied Territories to be taken from its already tightened scheduled procurement and training budget.

(C/NF) The Ministry of Finance realizes that it will not be able to resist a demonstrable IDF need for additional funds. The costs, when viewed in perspective, are not catastrophic. They do not entail the expensive ordnance and equipment of armored warfare with artillery and air support. As Defense Minister Rabin commented, "What does one need here? Sticks and more soldiers, that is all... The matter is unpleasant but cheaper than any other military action." Despite initial Finance Ministry resistance, by March the groundwork had been laid for supplemental IDF appropriations for the next budget year.

Outlook

(C/NF) There have been several recent regional examples of military forces using all the means at their disposal — including artillery, armor, and airpower — to suppress rebellions and popular uprisings quickly, resulting in often appallingly high civilian casualties. However high the number of Palestinian deaths through March, IDF measures in response to the uprising have not been excessive by the standards of the Middle East — where Israel is located. IDF measures have,

however, been excessive by the present standards of the West — with the democracies of which Israel wishes to be identified.

(C/NF) The IDF's senior leadership is in agreement that the Army could have put down the disorders within days even if it had met the uprising with significantly less force than the Jordanian or Syrian armies have employed against internal threats. Most of them are also in agreement that they do not want to lead an IDF that would employ such methods. The price of the IDF's relative restraint is that the uprising will not end quickly. Conversely, the longer the uprising lasts the greater the possibility that it will progress to higher and higher levels of violence, escalating from widespread disorders to armed insurrection.

(C/NF) The IDF will be able to contain disturbances of the sort it has already dealt with as they occur and even prevent some before they occur, but it will not be able to force a return of the Occupied Territories to their pre-December relative tranquility. Temporary lulls in the unrest and even long periods of relative quiet are likely to occur, but a page has been turned and the Occupied Territories will never be the same. As an IDF colonel put it, "These people have discovered their power. They will never forget it." Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza — for more than 20 years maintained at relatively low cost — will become more costly. The costs, not all monetary, will weigh most heavily on the IDF.

(C/NF) The IDF's offensive and defensive readiness will be degraded, but probably not significantly, even if the level of unrest increases. The unrest has had no appreciable impact, it should be remembered, on two key elements of Israel's military superiority — its airpower and armored forces. Although the Army's operational staying power can continue for months, the IDF will encounter problems. The IDF is in the Occupied Territories for the duration, and its large commitment there will complicate deployments in the north and reserve callup and training schedules. Hardest hit in the long term may be reserve unit training, as the IDF places priority on training for active-duty units. Reserve training had already been negatively affected by budget constraints before the uprising began. Mobilization of large reserve forces is central to IDF doctrine for conventional warfare, and the IDF will strive to prevent significant degradation of reserve unit readiness. The extension of reservists' duty from

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the previous 40-45 days to 50 days in early March was as much an attempt to maintain training levels as it was a way to provide manpower for occupation duty and free active-duty units for other assignments. The IDF will also attempt to proceed with large, planned exercises, as it did in the Southern Command in March.

(C/NF) The IDF will have to assign priority to equipping and training troops for crowd control — an issue the IDF has long avoided. It will have to devise intelligence methods and apparatuses more suitable to its current mission in the Occupied Territories than those of the Shin Bet. The IDF will continue to seek technological crowd control solutions, although exotically equipped command cars and heliborne nets are probably not effective answers to low-tech Palestinian stones in narrow alleys. "The gravel launcher," wrote a respected Israeli military correspondent, "will not bring us salvation." The IDF will design its deployment of forces in the Occupied Territories in a manner that ensures that the maximum number of active-duty units are available for duty in the north and for combined arms training. Throughout February and into March, units along the Lebanese border, on the Golan Heights, and in the "security zone" were still thinly stretched. Competing Palestinian factions outside the Occupied Territories are likely to increase infiltration attempts in efforts to show they are bearing their share of the struggle, in which case IDF resources will be further stretched along the Jordanian and Egyptian borders, as well as in the north.

(C/NF) The IDF will continue to seal off villages and refugee camps, arrest large numbers of suspected agitators, impose long curfews and collective punishments, and make additional efforts to limit press activities — all to prevent demonstrations before they happen. In cooperation with other elements of the state, it will take additional steps to break the will of the Palestinian population to sustain the uprising. These measures are likely to expand from relatively limited to massive scopes, especially in anticipation of commemorations — both Palestinian and Israeli. The IDF will continue to resist movement toward the formation of a large, permanent internal security force other than the Border Police, which it will endeavor to strengthen.

(C/NF) The government expects some spillover of West Bank and Gaza Strip unrest to Is-

raeli Arabs within the pre-1967 borders, and some has already occurred. The IDF must plan for the possibility of significant Israeli Arab involvement in the uprising in the future, a development that could severely tax the Army's already strained resources. The IDF must also consider that, in the event of conventional warfare, its rear areas will not be as secure as previously.

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(C/NF) The first IDF death in the Occupied Territories since the uprising began in Bethlehem on 20 March. Increased Palestinian use of firearms will bring a severe IDF response and change the nature of the uprising.

(C/NF) The potential exists for a much higher level of violence. The danger increases daily that a small patrol of inexperienced troops, cut off in a narrow alley, will unleash a fusillade that will kill and wound large numbers of people. As IDF tactics have been evolving on the basis of lessons learned, so have Palestinian tactics. The Palestinians must maintain the uprising's momentum, and once the IDF develops measures that effectively counter one method of resistance, the Palestinians will develop another. Commanders and troops will face difficult choices in the event, for example, of a massive curfew violation by men, women, and children.

(C/NF) Settler activity constitutes another potentially explosive ingredient. Militant Jewish settlers were already involved in some shootings of Palestinians, vigilantism, and other provocative acts before mid-March. Keeping the roads to set-

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tlements open is burdensome for the IDF, and settlers have been dissatisfied with IDF performance in this area. Palestinian violence against settlements may not be far off, and the IDF will find itself in the middle. Conscripts and reservists from Tel Aviv and Haifa may come to identify their hardships in the Occupied Territories with settler demands for protection. Some Jewish extremists, particularly Kach party members and some settler groups, see in the provocation of more lethal Palestinian violence eventual justification for mass expulsions of Arabs from the Occupied Territories.

(C/NF) The most ominous potentiality is Palestinian use of firearms against the IDF. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which has come to play an important role in the uprising since its spontaneous beginnings, tried to take the high road and ruled out the use of firearms in the Occupied Territories during its initial phases. Although Palestinian use of firearms was sporadic and uncoordinated through March, a variety of factors — such as fatigue, frustration with methods so far employed, IDF successes, or competition between factions — could contribute to a rise in armed incidents. The IDF response to the killing of the Israeli soldier on 20 March was relatively restrained. More IDF deaths will doubtless bring a higher Palestinian death toll, as reservists become more apprehensive of any Palestinians approaching them and some troops seek revenge. In addition, mainstream or dissident PLO operations within Israel could cause a spillover of IDF ire into the Occupied Territories.

(C/NF) If and when the Palestinians resort to the widespread use of firearms or clearly terrorist acts against Israelis, the IDF's use of lethal force will increase. Public support for IDF actions — already strong — would most likely also increase, as would the Army's resolve. "The patience we exercise in handling disturbances will not apply to war against terror," commented Lt Gen Shomron. "A war against terror will be waged with all the power at the IDF's disposal." Some commanders and policymakers might even welcome such a development. As Minister of Defense Rabin observed, "On television screens it would then no longer look like a revolt of civilians against the military, but like a battle of terrorists against the military." Fighting an armed insurrection while simultaneously suppressing demonstra-

tions and controlling a hostile population would, however, pose profound new problems for the IDF and for Israel.

(C/NF) The external military threat to Israel has diminished significantly since the 1970s. The state of war between Israel and Egypt ended in 1979, Iraq is immersed in war with Iran, Syria is debilitated by economic problems, and Jordan is too weak to take on Israel alone. The IDF enjoys qualitative superiority over its actual and potential Arab enemies, and the gap is expected to widen. As the IDF's role as an army of occupation acquires an importance to the political leadership ranking with its role as defender of the state against outside threats, however, the IDF's self-esteem will decline. In the words of an Israeli officer, "The damage to our reputation has been done." The Israeli doctrine of *havlagah*, a concept that called for the use of force only when absolutely necessary, seemed but a dim memory in Lebanon in 1982. The IDF's already sullied ideal of *tohar hanehsek*, the "purity of arms" governing soldierly behavior, may not survive a long Palestinian uprising. Ultimately, the tensions associated with occupation duty could affect unit cohesion.

(C/NF) Whatever the course of events in the Occupied Territories, the IDF's leadership will do its duty and will not overstep the limits placed upon it by the civilian authority. Senior IDF commanders, however — many of them oriented toward the Labor Party and in favor of territorial compromises — will find ways of making their views known. Tension between the government and the IDF will probably increase as the uprising continues. Political figures, especially on the right, have already found and will continue to find in the IDF a convenient scapegoat open to criticism for not ending the uprising quickly. Some IDF commanders who have previously offended prominent politicians, such as Maj Gen Mitzna, may be particularly vulnerable.

(C/NF) According to the IDF's Chief of the General Staff, "There is no chance of reaching a solution through military force with the limitations we impose on ourselves." At present, virtually the entire IDF leadership believes that the causes of the uprising require a long-term political solution. None is optimistic that such a solution is coming any time soon.

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(U) Each classified title and heading has been properly marked; all those unmarked are unclassified.

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(U) This study has been fully coordinated with the Directorates for Estimates and Current Intelligence.

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
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