
Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505



OCA 3785-89 October 30, 1989

Mr. Boyd Hollingsworth Deputy Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs, Senate The White House 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Hollingsworth:

I am enclosing for your information a copy of a statement by Senators Hollings, Bradley, Danforth and Murkowski opposing the creation of a statutory I.G. The statement has been added as an addendum to the report of the Senate Intelligence Committee on the fiscal year 1990 Intelligence Authorization Bill.

Office of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

Distribution: OCA Records OCA/LEG Subject File **STAT**

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505



OCA 3785-89/i October 30, 1989

Ms. Virginia A. Lampley
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director
Legislative Affairs
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
17th St. & Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Ms. Lampley:

I am enclosing for your information a copy of a statement by Senators Hollings, Bradley, Danforth and Murkowski opposing the creation of a statutory I.G. The statement has been added as an addendum to the report of the Senate Intelligence Committee on the fiscal year 1990 Intelligence Authorization Bill.

Office of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

Distribution: OCA Records OCA/LEG Subject File STAT

VIEWS OF SENATORS BRADLEY, DANFORTH, HOLLINGS, AND MURKOWSKI

We see no compelling need for or great value in a statutory Inspector General (IG) at CIA, but we do see some real risks and disadvantages. This legislation makes major structural changes inside the CIA and would also change CIA's relationship with Congress and the President. Yet the committee held only one hearing on this issue, over a year ago, and that hearing barely scratched the surface.

We remain unpersuaded that a statutory IG is appropriate for the CIA simply because all other major executive agencies have one. The CIA is not a typical line agency or department. It deals with clandestine sources and foreign intelligence services whose confidence is important. The DCI must have clear and sole control over dissemination of sensitive information.

A statutory IG represents a break with 42 years of tradition in which only two positions at CIA have been appointed by the President and subject to Senate confirmation, the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. (In all other executive branch agencies and departments, the IG is just one of a sizable number of Presidential appointees.) A Presidentially appointed IG at CIA would thus outrank all line managers below the head of the agency and his principal deputy, including the Deputy Directors for Intelligence, Operations, Administration, Science and Technology, and Planning and Coordination.

We have a dim view of giving the CIA's Inspector General more political status and bureaucratic clout than any of the five Deputy Directors of CIA who are responsible for making the agency work. It is bad management policy to elevate the nay-sayers, inquisitors, and evaluators — i.e. management inspectors, criminal investigators, and financial auditors—over the line managers. A statutory IG would inevitably mean more bureaucracy, more regulation, more outside intervention, when the real need is to make CIA more productive, more skilled and more useful in confronting a variety of difficult national challenges.

This action would set up a separate organization and power base within the CIA, with a separate personnel structure, separate lines of authority and communication. The result would be the establishment of an "outsider" group within the CIA. For this reason, DCI Webster has said that "the imposition of a statutory Inspector General may actually prove to be counterproductive to the effective inspection and investigation process at CIA."

When Judge Webster became DCI, he initiated a series of reforms to strengthen the role and functions of the office of the CIA IG. Reforms are still underway, and DCI Webster has pledged further improvements in training and staffing the IG's

office. Last year, when the committee considered a statutory IG, it endorsed the DCI's plan and deferred action on legislation in order to give the DCI's initiatives time to take effect. We believe the committee should continue to work with DCI Webster in reforming the current CIA IG's office.

The committee's interest in this legislation is purportedly due to its dissatisfaction with the performance of the IG's office at CIA. Yet there has been no clear or convincing diagnosis by this committee of a problem that can only, or best, be solved by creating a statutory IG. The committee has not conducted a review of the improvements to the CIA IG under DCI Webster. Nor has the committee sought any testimony from the current or previous Inspectors Generals in the CIA concerning their performance or what is needed most to improve it. Nor has the committee made recommendations about how to further improve the IG, short of this legislation. Indeed, the committee has only reviewed a tiny fraction of the reports that the IG's office has produced since 1986. The quality of work by the IG has been uneven, so far as we know, but it seems to have improved significantly since Judge Webster initiated reforms.

We therefore voted in opposition to the creation of a statutory Inspector General at CIA.