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USIB-D-41.15/17
(COMOR-D-48/45)
20 September 1963

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Needs for KH-4 Coverage through 1963

The attached COMOR study of the needs for KH-4 satellite coverage during the remainder of 1963 has been placed on the agenda of the 25 September USIB meeting for Board consideration and action on the recommendation in paragraph 7.

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[Redacted Signature]

Acting Executive Secretary

Attachment

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NRO review(s) completed.

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(COMOR-D-48/45)
20 September 1963

Needs for KH-4 Coverage through 1963

1. The COMOR has conducted a review of the amount of satellite photography recently acquired and attempted to project on the basis of past experience the likelihood of successes in the future and the quantitative as well as qualitative effects of such success on the intelligence community's exploitation and research processes. In this review, COMOR has excluded consideration of the KH-6 [redacted] because the missions to date have been essentially R&D in nature. In addition, ARGON has been excluded since its purposes are not principally the collection of intelligence information but rather information for specific geodetic and mapping programs.

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2. The COMOR has reviewed recent history on KH coverage. It notes first of all that, after review of a schedule submitted by NRO on 24 January, it requested revision of the NRO 1963 schedule to insure one J in May and June, 2 in July, 1 in August, 2 in September, and 1 in each of the 3 remaining months of the year. This scheduling became the official USIB recommendation in USIB-D-41.14/7 (COMOR-D-48/21) of 11 February 1963. Since February there has been slippage in the schedule. In July, Dr. McMillan submitted a revised schedule which was confirmed on 18 July by USIB-D-41.15/14 (COMOR-D-48/42) of 18 July 1963. This schedule called for the first J to be fired on 29 July, the second on 30 August, the third on 17 September, the fourth

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on 27 September, the fifth on 15 October, and the sixth on 24 October. The seventh and eighth J packages were scheduled for November and December. There has been further slippage in the program since that time. There are still 6 Js scheduled for 1963.

3. The attached Tabs A, B, and C summarize the success we have had since June 1961 (a period of 2 1/4 years) in obtaining coverage of the critical targets on the following major target categories: ICBM complexes and missile R&D installations, missile production facilities, submarine bases, anti-ballistic missile sites, long-range airfields, nuclear energy facilities, and biological/chemical warfare facilities. These target categories will remain, for the most part, our major concern. If our launches are pointed toward coverage of these installations, we will almost certainly satisfy a very great number of our secondary target concerns and we are quite likely, through the manner in which the photographic capability is programmed, to achieve acquisition of the greater portion of the Soviet land mass.* Our long-range launch schedule should be based on the premise that we need quarterly coverage, at a minimum, of at least 50% of the targets in each category (which are the subject of the 3 tabs) and coverage of the whole of the Sov Bloc once a year.

4. We must take into account the scheduling and slippage

*At Tab D is a tabulation of successful missions flown since August 1960 showing the unique area coverage of the Soviet rail net as (expressed in percent of total) as obtained by each mission.

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which is outlined in the first 2 paragraphs of this paper (which we must assume will in some degree continue as evidenced by the fact that within a period of one week the J 1002 slipped from 14 to 21 September and subsequently to 23 September) and that what is scheduled cannot be definitely anticipated to be successful.

5. The circumstances which we now face are as follows:

a. That our situation in regard to coverage has greatly changed since the spring and summer, a period during which difficulties in KH-4 satellite collection occurred. We have not only received good coverage in terms of quantity but we have had improvements in quality and we have been favored by repeated coverage of many of our highest priority targets. Thus our intelligence base has been very materially improved over what it was when the schedule for 1963 KH-4 missions was compiled.

b. The slippage in the schedules has now caused a bunching of missions in a season of the year less favorable to collection. There is a continuing need not only to be prudent with regard to avoiding unnecessary missions because of those costs involved

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but also to be prudent with regard to the proper utilization of the United States Government's limited PI assets.


Conclusion:

6. That the intelligence requirements for KH-4 coverage can be met by a reduced number of missions for the remainder of 1963.

Recommendation

7. That NRO plan 4-day KH-4 missions at approximately 20-day intervals during the remainder of 1963.

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James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Attachments (4)
Tabs A, B, C, and D

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