|      | Assessed Fas Da   |   | DDD00D04000D00070000040404   |  |  |  |
|------|---|---|--|--|--|--|
| 25X1 | Approved For Re   | TOP SECRE   | RDP92B01090R002700030040-1   | ile  |  |  |
|      |   |   | COMOR-D-56/15  |  |  |  |
| NRO  | REVIEW COMPLETED  |   | 16 August 1963   |  |  |  |
|      | MEMORANDUM FOR:   | Committee on Ove  | erhead Reconnaissance  |  |  |  |
|      | SUBJECT: 25X1   | Targeting for the   |  |  |  |  |
| 25X1 | the above subject, incluject, "Points to Be Con (COMOR-D-56/14) and COMOR-M-190, para 6 COMOR would be unwis areas not related neces since additional progra operations of the vehicl Government to use the junction with the principadvise the Board and to fundamentally its on the gramming, the Chair sideration to send to the | ading the two recent is idered in Targeting the discussion of the property of | his belief that the ogramming of critical ack on the United States without encumbering the gency might impel this rposes whether in concrwise. As a means to e decision which is included in the propaper for COMOR conpaper for COMOR concrete only made this paper NIC, but has also invited | 25X1   |  |  |
| 25X1 |   | Wam   | es Q. Reber  |  |  |  |
| ·    | Chairman Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance   |   |  |  |  |  |
|      | Attachment: Subject dr  | aft   |  |  |  |  |
| 25X1 | Copies 2, 3 State TC  4 DIA  5, 6, 7, 8 DIA TCC  9 OACSI TCC  10, 11 ONI TCC  12-15 AFNIN T  16, 17 NSA TCC  18, 19 NRO TCC  Approved For Re  | CO<br>CO<br>TOP SECRE   | -<br>RDP92B01090R002700030040-1  | GROUP 1 Juded from outcometric Jing and declassification |  |  |

| , ,  | Approved For Relea   | ise 2008/03/03 : CIA-RDP92B01090R002700030040-1    |  |  |  |  |
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| 25X1 |  | CORONA   |  |  |  |  |
|      |  | COMOR-D-56/15                                      |  |  |  |  |
|      |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|      | MEMORANDUM FOR:  | United States Intelligence Board                   |  |  |  |  |
|      | SUBJECT:   | Targeting for the 25X1                             |  |  |  |  |
|      | 1. The United States Intelligence Board has requested the                  |  |  |  |  |  |
|      | NRO to provide a standby satellite capability for use in emergenc          |  |  |  |  |  |
|      | situations for the assessment of indicators of hostile military activities |  |  |  |  |  |
|      | on the part of the USSR a  | gainst the U.S. and its Allies. The NRO has        |  |  |  |  |
|      | undertaken to provide a standby capability which can be launched within    |  |  |  |  |  |
|      | 7 days after notice. The   | COMOR has devised a target list to be program-     |  |  |  |  |
| 25X1 | med into and has procedures for updating this target list as               |  |  |  |  |  |
|      | required so that the program will be current at the moment of need and     |  |  |  |  |  |
|      | current when the film rea  | aches NPIC.  |  |  |  |  |
|      | 2. COMOR ha  | as selected those targets which appear to it to be |  |  |  |  |
|      | most readily responsive to the satellite collection capability and to be t |  |  |  |  |  |
|      |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|      |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 25X1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|      |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|      | 4. In view of the fact that additional programming is possible,            |  |  |  |  |  |
|      | COMOR has elected to include targets in areas of the world which in a      |  |  |  |  |  |
|      | given emergency or set of circumstances could relate to hostile activity   |  |  |  |  |  |
|      | or intentions, as for example between the Soviet Union or China. It is     |  |  |  |  |  |

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recognized that such a military activity would be of secondary concern as compared with Soviet hostile action against the U.S. or its Allies. In this regard, COMOR has identified and arranged the following areas

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- a. Sino-Soviet border;
- b. Sino-Indian border;
- c. Etc.
- 5. COMOR is submitting this memorandum to USIB for the following reasons:
  - a. To advise USIB and higher authority if the Board deems necessary that the programming includes certain targets in addition to those considered to be most pertinent to indications of possible hostile action against the U.S. or its Allies.
  - b. To point out that coverage of other areas is somewhat restricted by the angle of inclination considered best for the primary targets.
  - c. To permit USIB to advise other appropriate subcommittees of the existence, capability, and present programming of the standby. (Tab A listes the present targets)
  - d. To permit USIB adequate time to direct other agencies to plan in advance for receipt and analysis of the NPIC product, in order to achieve the most rapid judgment as to the existence of indicator FOP SFGRFT

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|       | 1<br>- 21<br>- 30 | DCI TCO for USIB/S<br>TSO CIA<br>Asst/OPS(NPIC) |  |
|-------|-------------------|---|--|
|       | 31                | LS/PID(NPIC)                                    |  |
|       | 32                | TCO DDI/Spe Center                              |  |
| 33,34 |                   | CGS   |  |
| 35,36 |                   | CIA Member COMOR                                |  |
|       | 37                | DGS/ReqBr/ReconGrp                              |  |
|       | 38                | Ch/COMOR WkgGrp                                 |  |
|       | 39                | AD/SI   |  |
|       | 40                | DDP TCO   |  |
|       | 41                | $\mathrm{DDS}\&\mathrm{T}$                      |  |
|       | 42                | AD/OSA  |  |
|       | 43                | FA/OSA  |  |
|       | 44                | Intel/OSA                                       |  |
|       | 45                | SO/OSA  |  |
|       | 46                | SAL/OSA   |  |
| 47 -  | -50               | SA/DDS&T  |  |

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