

TOP SECRET

[Redacted]

25X1

Copy 13 of 20

ARC-M-56

**AD HOC REQUIREMENTS COMMITTEE ON PROJECT AQUATONE (ARC)**

**Minutes of Meeting Held in Room 154  
Administration Building, Central Intelligence Agency  
at 10:00 a.m., 13 September 1957**

**P R E S E N T**

**James Q. Reber  
Chairman**

- Colonel William A. Dodds, OACSI**
- Colonel Quintin S. Lander, OACSI**
- Mr. Ray E. Adcock, OACSI**
- Comdr. Julius M. Larsen, ONI**
- Comdr. Edward J. Cummings, Jr., ONI**
- Major Donald Conroy, ONI**
- Lt. (jg) James M. Carr, Jr., ONI**
- Mr. Edward C. Neilson, ONI**
- Lt. Col. Raymond B. Holden, AFCIN**
- Lt. Col. George J. Keithley, AFCIN**
- Mr. Paul J. Nelson, AFCIN**

[Redacted]

25X1

**Requirement for Coverage of Current  
Soviet Weapons Test in Arctic Waters  
(12 September 1957)**

25X1

1. The Chairman reported that the referenced paper was submitted by OCI CIA and the Navy. The proposal for coverage in connection with the Soviet weapons test in arctic waters was broken into three parts: first, a peripheral flight; second, an overflight of the island NOVAYA ZEMLYA in the KARA Sea; third, an overflight of Naval installations of highest priority, SEVEROMORSK and MOLOTOVSK. It was the consensus of the group that the potential from

25X1

25X1

[Redacted] The Air Force representative agreed to arrange a meeting of that committee this afternoon. It was the opinion of the [Redacted] that the best facility for such collection.

TOP SECRET  
NO FORN DISSEM  
EYES ONLY

if indeed desired, would be the System Four (it being expected that System One would not be particularly useful) from among those [redacted] systems available to the US Government with which he was familiar. He pointed out, however, that while it might be possible it would be extremely difficult to get System Four activated within two weeks.

25X1

2. It was the sense of the meeting that whereas hopefully AQUATONE photography of a ship or submarine with surface-to-air missiles or surface-to-surface missiles might be instructive the possibility of finding the fleet at sea for such photography would be extremely difficult if possible at all. (Subsequent to the meeting, Project Operations advised the Chairman that unless the fleet could be pin-pointed this requirement would be operationally infeasible.)

3. It was reported to the Chairman after the meeting by the Project Intelligence Officer, [redacted] that sun angle would prevent useful coverage of the island of NOVAYA ZEMLYA.

4. The remaining requirement, i. e., SEVEROMORSK and MOLOTOVSK, being highest priority targets bearing on the guided missile and atomic energy weapon problems, would be subject to coverage from the point of view of sun angle in the course of the next two weeks; the justification for coverage of these lay in whatever contribution coverage of them would make to the problems in the AE and GM estimative fields. It was recognized that it would be wisest to give final consideration to this requirement after the results of KAPUSTIN YAR have been examined despite the fact that these proposed areas would be noted for their surface-to-surface and surface-to-air guided missiles as against ICBM at KAPUSTIN YAR. The fact was noted that surface-to-surface and surface-to-air guided missiles rank with the ICBM in terms of National Intelligence priority objectives.

5. The case for these requirements was admittedly weakened by the anticipation that submarines or other vessels equipped with GM launch facilities would be most likely in the current exercises to be at sea rather than in their ports.

6. Whereas the Navy supported the proposed venture with the comment that they still believed "worthwhile intelligence" would be obtained and the Army was prone to support their view, OBI CIA could not do so (though they interposed no objection), and the Air Force reserved its position pending an examination as to the applicability of Air Force peripheral photography to these targets within the past year.

TOP SECRET

3

TCS-1997-57

7. The Chairman stated that this matter would be re-examined promptly as soon as a preliminary report on KAPUSTIN YAR was available, seeking at that time to get a firm ARC recommendation.

Security

8. The Chairman referred to recent discussions with regard to additional security measures which might be engaged in to protect mission approaches and sensitive subject matter. He read two papers as possible means of meeting General Cabell's concern. He noted that he would report General Cabell's views as soon as Mr. Bissell had had an opportunity to talk the matter over.

25X1



JAMES Q. REBER  
Chairman

TOP SECRET HANDED BY NIGHT  
CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY