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World War II demonstrated the decisive role that air power can play in military operations. It also demonstrated the potential of radar as a primary means of detecting aircraft and directing fire against them. On balance, though, the advantage clearly was with the aircraft. Subsequent to World War II, defensive missiles -- both ground launched and air launched -- were developed and "married" with radar fire control systems. This substantially increased the effectiveness of air defense systems, shifting the balance against aircraft. For the last few decades we have been working on techniques to defeat such air defense systems. At present, our military aircraft make substantial use of electronic countermeasures (jamming) and flying low to place themselves in "ground clutter," both of which degrade the effectiveness of air defense radars. By these means we have maintained the effectiveness of our military aircraft in the face of radar-directed defensive missiles.

However, the Soviets continue to place very heavy emphasis on the development and deployment of air defense missiles in an attempt to offset the advantage we have in air power. They have built thousands of surface-to-air missile systems, they employ radars with high power and monopulse tracking circuits which are very difficult to jam, and in the last few years they have developed air-to-air missiles guided by "look-down" radars which are capable of tracking aircraft flying in "ground clutter."

Because of these developments and because of the importance we attach to maintaining our air superiority, we have for years been developing what we call "penetration" technology: the technology that degrades the effectiveness of radars and other sensors used by air defense systems. A particular emphasis has been on developing that technology which makes an aircraft "invisible"* to radar. In the early 60's, we applied a particular

* "invisible" is of course a figure of speech

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version of this technology to some of our reconnaissance aircraft. In the mid-70s we applied it to the cruise missiles then being developed (Tomahawk and ALCM). By the summer of 1977 it became clear that this technology could be considerably extended in its effectiveness and could be applied to a wide class of vehicles including manned aircraft. We concluded that it was possible to build aircraft so difficult to detect that they could not be successfully engaged by any existing air defense systems. Recognizing the great significance of such a development we took three related actions: first, we made roughly a ten-fold increase in our investment to advance this technology; second, we initiated a number of very high priority programs to apply this technology; and third we gave the entire program extraordinary security protection, even to the point of classifying the very existence of such a program.

Initially we were able to limit knowledge of the program to a very few Government officials in both the Executive and Legislative Branches and succeeded in maintaining complete secrecy about the program. However, as the program increased in size -- currently the annual funding is 100 times greater than when we decided to accelerate the program in 1977 -- it became necessary to brief more people. The existence of a stealth program has now become public knowledge. But even as we acknowledge the existence of a stealth program, we will draw a new security line to protect that information about the program which could facilitate a Soviet countermeasures program. We will continue to protect at the highest security level information about:

- a. the specific techniques which we employ to reduce detectability;
- b. the degree of success of each of these techniques;
- c. characteristics of specific vehicles being developed;
- d. funds being applied to specific programs; and
- e. schedules of specific programs.

With those ground rules, I think you can see that I am extremely limited in what I can tell you about the program. I will say this. First, stealth technology does not involve a single technical approach, but rather a complex synthesis of many. Even if I were willing to describe it to you, I could not do it in a sentence or even a paragraph. Second, while we have made remarkable advances in the technology in the last three years, we have been building on excellent work done in our defense technology program over the last two decades. Third, this technology -- theoretically at least -- could be applied to any military vehicle which can be attacked by radar-directed fire. We are considering all such applications and are moving with some speed to develop those applications which are the most practical and which have the greatest military significance. Fourth, we have achieved excellent success on the program, including flight tests of a number of different vehicles.

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