



**Directorate of
Intelligence**

~~Secret~~

25X1

**Soviet Bloc and Neutral/Nonaligned
Country Statements at the
CSCE Stockholm Conference on
Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament
in Europe (CDE)
(CDE-XI & CDE-XII)**

10 June – 18 July 1986

19 August – 19 September 1986

Volume I

25X1

A Reference Aid

~~Secret~~

*IR 86-10002
November 1986*

Copy 34

Page Denied



**Directorate of
Intelligence**

Secret

25X1


**Soviet Bloc and Neutral/Nonaligned
Country Statements at the
CSCE Stockholm Conference on
Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament
in Europe (CDE)
(CDE-XI & CDE-XII)**

**10 June – 18 July 1986
19 August – 19 September 1986**

Volume I

25X1

A Reference Aid



25X1

Secret

*'R 86-10002
November 1986*

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

25X1

Soviet Bloc and Neutral/Nonaligned
Country Statements at the
CSCE Stockholm Conference on
Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament
in Europe (CDE)

(CDE-XI & CDE XII)
10 June-18 July 1986
19 August-19 September 1986

25X1

FOREWORD

This reference aid contains a chronological history and index of topics discussed during the Eleventh and Twelfth Rounds of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) which commenced in Stockholm on 10 June and recessed on 19 September 1986. It is indexed according to subjects and countries. In the case of the Soviet Union the individual delegate speaking, if identified, is also specified. Furthermore, the forum in which the statement(s) occurred is noted.

25X1

The conference record has been retained in straight chronological order. The index, located at the beginning, is designed to guide the user to pages for specific topics, countries, and in the case of the Soviet Union, personalities. By using the type of entry key located at the front of the index, users can determine whether the references are from cables reporting on plenary, post-plenary, or working group meetings and limit their searches by these types of references when desired. Users interested in statements by a particular country are directed to the country index where each country has its own subject index. In the case of the Soviet Union, an additional letter code will identify the individual delegate who made the statement, if noted in the text. Each Soviet delegate who spoke is also included in the main subject index.

25X1

Statements by the following countries are indexed: Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Finland, German Democratic Republic (GDR), Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and Yugoslavia. Please note that there is also a separate entry for the "East" and one for the NNA. In these sections are found statements which were attributed to the East or NNA in general but to no country in particular. In addition,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

25X1

when a delegate from one country speaks on behalf of one or more countries, his statements are cited in each of the various countries' indexes. [redacted]

25X1

All statements made by participating countries during plenary and working group AB meetings are summarized in the "Statement Summaries" section of this reference aid. [redacted]

25X1

Two items of note which might otherwise be overlooked are brought to the user's attention: "weekly wrap-up" cables summarizing developments in all CDE forums are included chronologically and can be located by referring to the subject index; a group of miscellaneous cables are referenced in the subject index as "miscellaneous cables" and cover such topics as delegation personnel changes, analyses of delegation and group positions or motives at CDE, and procedural issues and similar subjects. [redacted]

25X1

25X1



CONFIDENTIAL

CONTENTS

Soviet Bloc and Neutral/Nonaligned
Country Statements at the
CSCE Stockholm Conference on
Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament
in Europe (CDE)
(CDE-XI & CDE-XII)

10 June - 18 July 1986
19 August - 19 September 1986

CONTENTS

FOREWORD

DELEGATION LISTS

STATEMENT SUMMARIES

	Pages
Summaries of Plenary Statements.....	1-3
Summaries of Working Group AB Statements.....	4-6

SUBJECT INDEX

Main Subject Index.....	1-6
-------------------------	-----

COUNTRY INDEXES

Austria.....	1-2
Cyprus.....	3
East.....	4-5
GDR.....	6
Hungary.....	7
Ireland.....	8
Malta.....	9
NNA.....	10
Poland.....	11
Romania.....	12
Switzerland.....	13
USSR.....	14-17

Session Cables

DELEGATION LISTS

CSCE

CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE-
AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE
STOCKHOLM 1984

22 August 1986 */

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
(as communicated by Delegations)

*/ The previous edition was printed
on 13 June 1986

A U S T R I A

Dr Wolfgang LOIBL	Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Dr Werner DRUML	First Secretary, Deputy Head of Delegation
Dr Thomas NADER	. Delegate

Mr Karl LIKO	General, Military Adviser
Mr Josef BERNECKER	Brigadier, Military Adviser

Ms Evelyne GRIESLER	Administrative Officer
---------------------	------------------------

Dr Ingo MUSSI	Ambassador
Mr Wolfgang JUNG	Lieutenant Colonel, Defence Attaché

B E L G I U M

Mr Felix STANDAERT	Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Ms Lucie de MYTTENAERE	Minister-Counsellor, Deputy Head of Delegation
Colonel Franz LEBLANC	Military Expert
Ms E. JANSSENS	Attaché to the Delegation
Ms L. CAFMEYER	Attaché to the Delegation

Mr Louis ENGELEN	First Secretary at the Embassy
------------------	--------------------------------

Mr Demetrio ORTIGUEIRA

Mr Rogerio MARQUES

B U L G A R I A

Mr Stephan TODOROV	Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Mr Zahari RADOUKOV	Member of Delegation
Lieutenant Colonel Stoyan STOYANOV	Member of Delegation
Mr Ivan KOEDJIKOV	Member of Delegation
Mr Georgy GOTEV	Member of Delegation

Mr Todor STOYANOV	Ambassador of the People's Republic of Bulgaria in Stockholm
Mr Dobrin ANASTASOV	First Secretary at the Embassy
Mr Lalo LALOV	Second Secretary at the Embassy

C A N A D A

Mr W.T. DELWORTH	Ambassador, Permanent Head of Delegation
Mr C.J. ANSTIS	Counsellor, Deputy Head of Delegation
Colonel C. NAMIESNIEWSKI	Military Adviser
Mr R. VANIER	Adviser

Administrative and Technical Staff

Mrs Sharon MALOTT	Administrative Assistant
Miss T. NEWTON	Secretary
Miss B. SCHULTZ	Communicator
Mr Roy F. SOUTHERN	Security Guard
Mr Joakim SUNESON	Driver

Mr William J. ROBERTS	Counsellor
Mr D'Arcy THORPE	Counsellor
Mr Marc LEPAGE	First Secretary
Mr Alan KESSEL	Third Secretary

Administrative and Technical Staff

Mr J. BERANGER	Office Manager
Mr Sven CLAUG	Administrative Assistant
Mr G. CLERMONT	Communicator
Miss Joan BURKE	Secretary
Mr T. LINDELL	Driver
Mr Benny KARLSTRÖM	Driver

C Y P R U S

**Dr Andrestinos N. PAPADOPOULOS Minister-Counsellor,
Head of Delegation**

C Z E C H O S L O V A K I A

Mr Alois ŘEZNIK	Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Mr Ján KUBIŠ	Member of Delegation
Lieutenant Colonel Vladimír MOHYLA	Member of Delegation
Mr Zdeněk SKOBA	Member of Delegation

Mr Josef KRUŽELA	Ambassador of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to the Kingdom of Sweden
------------------	--

Administrative and Technical Staff

Ms Miroslava JELINKOVA

Mr Josef HARIGEL

D E N M A R K

Mr Skjold G. MELLBIN	Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Mr Bent ROSENTHAL	Minister-Counsellor, Deputy Head of Delegation
Mr Lars FAABORG-ANDERSEN	Secretary of Embassy
Commander Patrick HOWARD	Military Adviser
Ms Charlotte PEKKARINEN	Administrative Officer
Ms Grethe HEERING	Administrative Officer
Mr Niklas BECKER	Chauffeur

Mr Niels AADAL RASMUSSEN	Counsellor, Danish Embassy
Mr Flemming André LARSEN	Press Counsellor, Danish Embassy
Ms Kirsten LARSEN	Administrative Officer, Danish Embassy

F E D E R A L R E P U B L I C O F G E R M A N Y

Dr Klaus CITRON	Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Mr Johann Georg DREHER	Counsellor, Deputy Head of Delegation
Mr Werner SCHMIDBAUER	Brigadier General, MOD Representative
Mr Jürgen Hans ÜTTINGER	Colonel
Mr Gunter KOLBECK	Captain (Navy)
Mr Klaus METSCHER	Counsellor
Mr Detlef WEIGEL	First Secretary
Mr Horst GRZEGORZ	Attaché
Mr Oliver NOWAK	Attaché (Communication Officer)
Mr Günter KANDLER	Senior Master Sergeant
Mrs Ines OETLING	Language Secretary
Ms Gisela SCHRÖDER	Secretary
Ms Corinna PAUL	Secretary
Mrs Brunhild LARSSON	Secretary
Mr Herbert KEMPER	Administrative Staff
Mr Hans JÄGER	Technical and Administrative Staff
Mr Anton KERP	Technical and Administrative Staff
Mr Dirk FÄTH	Technical and Administrative Staff

Dr Gerhard RITZEL	Ambassador
Dr Claus von KAMEKE	Counsellor
Mr Rolf-Eckart ROLFS	Commander S.G.
Mr Kay SCHUHR	Political Adviser
Mr Friedrich Wilhelm CATOIR	Counsellor (Press Affairs)

Mr Manfred KÖSTNER

**Second Secretary
(Administrative Affairs)**

F I N L A N D

Mr Matti KAHILUOTO	Ambassador, Head of Delegation, Special Mission of Finland
Dr Markku REIMAA	Minister-Counsellor, Delegate, Special Mission of Finland
Mr Jussi LÄHTEINEN	Commander, Delegate, Special Mission of Finland
Mr Tuomas PEKKARINEN	First Secretary, Delegate, Special Mission of Finland
Mr Yrjö KUKKO	Major, Expert, Special Mission of Finland

Mr Seppo PIETINEN	Director for Political Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Mr Björn-Olof ALHOLM	Ambassador of Finland to Sweden
Mr Jukka VALTASAARI	Deputy Director for Political Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Mr Pertti TORSTILA	Assistant Director, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Mr Ilkka HEISKANEN	First Secretary, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Dr Pauli JÄRVENPÄÄ	Expert, Ministry of Defence

Miss Pirjo LEINO	Special Mission of Finland
Miss Riitta GUSTAFSSON	Special Mission of Finland
Miss Sinikka FLINK	Special Mission of Finland
Mr Pertti AIRIKAINEN	Special Mission of Finland

F R A N C E

Mr Paul GASCHIGNARD	Ambassador, Chief of Delegation
Mr Jean FELIX-PAGANON	Deputy Chief of Delegation
Colonel Christian MERIC	Military Counsellor
Mr Gérard FAUVEAU	First Secretary
Lieutenant Colonel Pierre MACE	Military Counsellor
Miss Monique GUILLAOUET	Secretary
Miss Lyliane CHAPELLET	Secretary
<hr/>	
Mr Benoit d'ABOVILLE	Deputy Director, Arms Control and Strategic Affairs Division. Ministry for External Affairs, Special Adviser
Mr Serge SMESSOW	Arms Control and Strategic Affairs Division, Ministry for External Affairs, Special Adviser
Mr Henri ZIPPER	Arms Control and Strategic Affairs Division, Ministry for External Affairs, Special Adviser
<hr/>	
Mr Robert MAZEYRAC	Ambassador of France to Sweden
Mr Claude LOSGUARDI	Counsellor at the Embassy
Lieutenant Colonel André LAURENT	Military Adviser
Adjudant chef Hervé LAUDREN	Deputy Military Adviser
Mr Francis HURTUT	First Secretary of Embassy
Mr Gabriel SAUVEZON	Consul

Mr Christophe DESSOUDE	Communicator
Mr Jean-Christophe SPORTIELLO	Communicator
Mrs Bodil PERSSON	Press Attaché of Embassy
Mr Julien QUARTINO	Administrative Assistant
Mr Claude QUARTINO	Administrative Assistant
Mr Claude MEDARD	Security Guard
Mrs FREMERY	Security Guard
Mr René DESVAGERS	Security Guard
Mr Emile SOULIER	Security Guard

G E R M A N D E M O C R A T I C R E P U B L I C

Dr Günter BÜHRING	Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Mr Manfred GRACZYNSKI	Captain of the Navy, Member of Delegation
Mr Günter FUNK	Lieutenant Colonel, Member of Delegation
Mr Thomas GEORGI	First Secretary, Member of Delegation
Dr Erika BÜHRING	Member of Delegation
Mr Herwig KAISER	Technical Staff Member
Mr Bodo BAUMGARTEN	Technical Staff Member

Mr Manfred SCHMIDT	Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic to Sweden
Mr Eberhard GLÖCKNER	First Secretary at the Embassy
Mr Bernd HÜBNER	Third Secretary at the Embassy

G R E E C E

Mr Dimitri PAPANAKIS	Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Lieutenant Colonel Emmanuel KYRKAS	Military Adviser
Ms Marina Nicoletta IOANNOU	Administrative Officer

Mr Emmanuel PONIRIDIS	Ambassador
Mr Efthymios PARASHOS	First Secretary
Mr Ilias KOUVELAS	Attaché
Miss Simerouda GIANNOULI	Administrative Officer
Mr Anastasios TSIAPALIS	Administrative Officer
Mr Kyriakos GAVRILIDIS	Administrative Officer

H O L Y S E E

Archbishop Henri LEMAITRE	Apostolic Pro-Nuncio to the Kingdom of Sweden, Head of Delegation
Monsignor Francois BACQUE	Counsellor, Deputy Head of Delegation
Reverend Jan SMITH	Attaché
Reverend Raymond CROCHET	Attaché

H U N G A R Y

Mr Károly SZIGETI	Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Dr István KÖRMENDY	Counsellor, Deputy Head of Delegation
Lieutenant Colonel Lajos IMRE	Military Expert
Ms Maria KANYORSZKY	Administrative Officer
Mr István KOMOROCZKI	Attaché of the Embassy

I C E L A N D

Mr Benedikt GRÖNDAL

Ambassador, Permanent Head
of Delegation

Mrs Sigrídur Berglind
ASGEIRSDÓTTIR

Counsellor, Deputy Head of
Delegation

Ms Aslaug SKÚLADÓTTIR

Administrative Secretary

Ms Elin ÓSKARSDÓTTIR

Administrative Secretary

Mr Bert HARNELL

Administrative Assistant

I R E L A N D

Mr Gearóid O BROIN

Ambassador of Ireland to
Sweden and Poland,
Head of Delegation

Mr Philip Mc DONAGH

First Secretary, Deputy Head
of Delegation

Mr Keith MCBEAN

Second Secretary

Colonel Donal O'CARROLL

Military Adviser

Ms Yvonne ANDERSSON

Secretary

Ms Lena DAHLBERG-TUNANDER

Secretary

Mr Johan MOLIN

I T A L Y

Mr Antonio CIARRAPICO	Ambassador, Permanent Head of Delegation
Mr Sandro DE BERNARDIN	Counsellor, Deputy Head of Delegation
Mr Mauro CARFAGNINI	Counsellor

Brigadier General Giorgio BLAIS	Military Adviser
Navy Captain Ettore DI GIOVANNI	Military Adviser

Administrative and Technical Personnel

Mrs Albertina BARBIERI
Mrs Margherita BENZAIA
Mrs Diana MARIANO
Mr Venanzio DI NINO
Mr Alessandro PUZIO

Mr Ruggero VOZZI	First Counsellor at the Italian Embassy
Mr Manlio GIUFFRIDA	Counsellor at the Italian Embassy

Administrative and Technical Personnel at the Italian Embassy

Mr Giovanni PAPA
Mrs Carla DI PAOLO
Miss Maria Pia PAGLINO
Mr Francesco D'ORTA

L I E C H T E N S T E I N

Count Mario LEDEBUR

Head of Delegation

Mr Daniel OSPELT

Member of Delegation

Mrs Claudia FRITSCHÉ

Member of Delegation

L U X E M B O U R G

Mr Robert BLOES

Ambassador, Head of Delegation

Mr Robert KAYSER

Deputy Head of Delegation

Mr Alphonse BERNS

Counsellor of the Embassy

Mr Raymond PETIT

Secretary of the Embassy

M A L T A

Mr Victor J. GAUCI

Ambassador, Head of Delegation

Mr Vincent L. CAMILLERI

First Secretary

M O N A C O

Mr Hans Bertil WESTERBERG

Consul General of Monaco
in Stockholm

N E T H E R L A N D S

Mr Petrus BUWALDA	Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Dr Jan SIZOO	Minister-Counsellor, Deputy Head of Delegation
Brigadier General Henny J. van der GRAAF	Delegate
Mr Laurens V.M. van GORP	Delegate

Technical and Administrative Personnel

Mr J.H. OOMS
Miss Gwendolyn MACLEOD MANUEL
Miss Willy E.R. TOMLOW
Mr A.J.M. van MEER

Watze J.J.D. Baron thoe SCHWARTZENBERG	Counsellor, Embassy of the Netherlands
Mr Siewert H. STEENWIJK	Accounting Officer, Embassy of the Netherlands
Miss Madelon MOSK	Secretary, Embassy of the Netherlands

N O R W A Y

Mr Leif MEVIK	Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Mr Hans Jacob BIØRN LIAN	Minister-Counsellor, Deputy Head of Delegation
Mr Morten AASLAND	Second Secretary
Colonel Carl O.S. LANGLIE	HQ Defence Command
Ms Anne Elise NORDVIK	Secretary-Archivist, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr Knut Arne HOLTHE	Communications Officer, HQ Defence Command

P O L A N D

Mr Wlodzimierz KONARSKI	Ambassador, Head of the Permanent Delegation
Colonel Edmund STANIEWSKI	Delegate
Mr Krzysztof OPALSKI	Delegate
Mr Piotr ŚWITALSKI	Secretary

Dr Maria REGENT-LECHOWICZ	Ambassador of the Polish People's Republic in the Kingdom of Sweden
Mr Slawomir PETELICKI	Counsellor at the Embassy of the Polish People's Republic in Stockholm

Ms Grazyna BIERUT	Technical Secretary
Mr Wladyslaw STASZEWSKI	Administrative Assistant
Mr Jerzy MOZDZENSKI	Administrative Assistant

P O R T U G A L

Mr José CUTILEIRO Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Dr José Maria BRANCO ALEIXO Deputy Head of Delegation
Dr João de MATOS SEQUEIRA Second Secretary

Lieutenant Colonel Military Adviser
Antônio PINTO GUEDES

Mrs Glória MORALES DE Administrative Officer
LOS RIOS
Mrs Luisa Cristina HAMMARBERG Administrative Officer
Ms Maria Madalena PEREIRA Administrative Officer
RAIMUNDO
Mr Carlos Manuel ZACARIAS Administrative Officer
FRANCO

Mr José de Noronha GAMITO Ambassador of Portugal
to Sweden
Mr Antônio BOTELHO DE SOUSA Secretary of Embassy
Ms Arminda Albarran BARATA Administrative Officer

R O M A N I A

Mr Ioan CETERCHI	Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Mr Nicolae IORDACHE	Counsellor, Deputy Head of Delegation
Mr Ovidiu IONESCU	Counsellor, Member of Delegation
Mr Nicolae CORDUNEANU	Colonel, Member of Delegation
Mr Vasile ILIEȘ	Major, Member of Delegation

Mr Petre MOGOSEANU	Counsellor, Embassy of the Socialist Republic of Romania
Mr Petru-Dumitru BORDEA	Counsellor, Embassy of the Socialist Republic of Romania
Mr Mihai ALBU	Second Secretary, Embassy of the Socialist Republic of Romania

Mrs Floarea STOENICA	Secretary of the Delegation
Mrs Ana-Mariana MOGOSEANU	Secretary of the Delegation

S A N M A R I N O

Mr Gabriele GATTI	Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mrs Maria Antonietta BONELLI	Director, Office for Political and Diplomatic Affairs
Mr Oscar PASQUINI	Minister
Mr Fredrik W. LETTSTRÖM	Consul General of San Marino, Stockholm

S P A I N

Mr José Manuel ALLENDESALÁZAR	Ambassador of Spain in Stockholm, Head of Delegation
Mr Joaquin PÉREZ-VILLANUEVA	Deputy Head of Delegation
Captain José Luis RIPOLL	Defence International Affairs Division, Ministry of Defence, Adviser
Mr Servando de la TORRE	Delegate
Mr Emilio LORENZO	Delegate

Mr Carlos MIRANDA y ELIO	Director General for International Security and Disarmament in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Madrid, Adviser
Mr Juan DURAN-LORIGA	Adviser

Administrative and Technical Staff

Miss Maria Isabel SANZ REGATERO
Mr José Manuel GONZALEZ ROSSI

Mr José TOLEDANO	Administrative Officer
Mr Francisco REVUELTA	Administrative Officer
Mr Mats ERIKSSON	

S W E D E N

Mr Sten ANDERSSON	Minister for Foreign Affairs - Head of Delegation - <u>ex officio</u> when in attendance
Mr Pierre SCHORI	Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Delegate
Mr Curt LIDGARD	Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Mr Björn ELMÉR	Minister Plenipotentiary, Deputy Head of Delegation
Mr Gustav EKHOLM	Minister Plenipotentiary, Delegate
Dr Lars-Erik LUNDIN	Head of Section, Delegate
Mr Arne KALLIN	First Secretary, Delegate

Mrs Maj Britt THEORIN	Chairman of the Swedish Disarmament Commission, Ambassador, MP, Delegate
Mrs Gunnel JONÄNG	Member of Parliament, Delegate
Mr Sture ERICSON	Member of Parliament, Delegate
Mr Rune ÅNGSTRÖM	Member of Parliament, Delegate
Mr Stig ALEMYR	Member of Parliament, Delegate
Mrs Anita BRÄKENHIELM	Member of Parliament, Delegate
Mr Jan ELIASSON	Ambassador, Under-Secretary for Political Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Delegate
Mr Carl-Magnus HYLTIENIUS	Assistant Under-Secretary, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Delegate

General Nils SKÖLD	Ministry of Defence, Expert
Mr Jan PRAWITZ	Special Adviser on Disarmament, Ministry of Defence, Expert

Colonel Bertil JOHANSSON	Ministry of Defence, Expert
Captain (Navy) Jan AKERHIELM	Defence Staff, Expert
Lieutenant Colonel Crister STERNING	Ministry of Defence, Expert
Mr Johan TUNBERGER	Senior Security Policy Analyst, National Defence Research Institute, Expert
Mr Lars-Erik WINGREN	Deputy Assistant Under- Secretary, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Mr Ove BRING	Doctor of Laws, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Mr Lars LÖNNBACK	Ambassador, Assistant Under- Secretary, Head of Press and Information Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Expert
Mr Herman GYLLENHAAL	Press Officer, Head of Section, Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Ms Christina BERGSTRÖM	Senior Administrative Officer
------------------------	-------------------------------

S W I T Z E R L A N D

Mr Blaise SCHENK	Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Mr Benoit JUNOD	Counsellor, Deputy Head of Delegation
Mr Josef SCHÄRLI	Major EMG, Military Adviser
Mr Urs STEMMLER	First Secretary
Miss Susanna JUTZI	Secretary of the Delegation

Mr Jean-Claude JOSEPH	Counsellor (non-permanent)
Mr Gérard STAUDMANN	Second Secretary (non-permanent)
Ms Marianne ENGLER	Second Secretary (non-permanent)

Mr Fritz BOHNERT	Ambassador of Switzerland to Sweden
Mr Daniel WOKER	Counsellor
Colonel Hans STÖSSEL	Defence Attaché

T U R K E Y

Mr Ömer ERSUN

Ambassador, Head of Delegation

Mr Deniz BÖLÜKBASI

Counsellor, Deputy Head
of Delegation

Administrative Staff

Mr Duran AYDOĞMUS

Mrs Güner ERCETIN

Mr Mustafa TÜRKKAN

Mr Mehmet KUTLU

Mr Yasin GÜZEL

Mr Faruk DARENDELIÖGLU

U N I O N O F S O V I E T
S O C I A L I S T R E P U B L I C S

Mr O.A. GRINEVSKY	Head of Delegation
Mr V.M. TATARNIKOV	Member of Delegation
Mr I.S. ROZANOV	Member of Delegation
Mr Y.N. RAHMANINOV	Member of Delegation
Mr V.I. EROFEEV	Member of Delegation
Mr Y.D. NOVIKOV	Counsellor
Mr I.S. BOGDANOV	Counsellor
Mr B.B. KAZANTSEV	Counsellor
Mr V.A. VOLOSSATOV	Counsellor
Mr V.V. LEJEN	Expert
Mr E.S. VOLK	Expert
Mr E.V. RAZORENOV	Expert
Mr A.S. ANDROSSOV	Expert
Mr A.N. GROCHEV	Expert
Mr A.V. PIROGOV	Expert
<hr/>	
Mr B.D. PANKIN	Ambassador to Sweden
Mr N.S. CHAMORTSEV	Minister-Counsellor
Mr N.S. SELIVERSTOV	Counsellor
Mr Y.V. KISSILEV	Counsellor
Mr P.N. KOUGOUENKO	Counsellor
Mr A.J. AXENOV	Military Attaché
Mr A.V. ZOLOTAREV	Deputy Military Attaché
Mr G.S. BAKHTINE	Second Secretary
Mr V.I. BAIKOV	Third Secretary

Mr V.I. TATARINTSEV

Attaché

Mr D.V. BONDAR

Attaché

Mr V.G. GROMOVIK

Secretary to the Ambassador

Administrative and Technical Personnel

Mrs T.A. PLOKHOVA

Miss N.J. CHOULIAK

Mr V.A. GOGATCHEV

Mr I.V. MININE

Mr B.S. SEROV

Mr A.F. TOUPCHI

Mr M.V. CHALNEV

Miss N.J. ANTOCHKINA

U N I T E D K I N G D O M

Mr J.M. EDES, CMG	Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Mr I.W. MACKLEY	Counsellor
Colonel R.W. BACK	Military Adviser
Dr J.P.G. FREEMAN	First Secretary
Mr S.R.H. PEASE	First Secretary
Mr J.N. POWELL	First Secretary
Miss S.A. CHURCHLEY	Personal Assistant
Miss L. MOXHAM	Personal Assistant
Miss K.E. GILLMORE	Administrative and Technical Assistant
Mr I. JONDORF	
Mr J. BERG	

Sir Richard PARSONS, KCMG	HM Ambassador
Mr R.M. JACKSON, CVO	Counsellor
Mr B.S. ROBERTS	Counsellor
Mr J. WHITE	First Secretary
Mrs M. BRADFIELD, MBE	First Secretary
Mr S. CATLIN	Attaché

Administrative and Technical Staff

Mr C. GLASS	Administrative Officer
Mr J. BENTLEY	Administrative Officer
Miss N. TETLOW	Personal Assistant
Miss H. DONALDSON	Personal Assistant

U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A

Mr Robert L. BARRY	Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Dr Lynn HANSEN	Ambassador, Deputy Head of Delegation
Mr Gregory J. NEWELL	Ambassador of the United States to Sweden, Delegate
Major General Jonas BLANK	Delegate
Ms Katharine C. CRITTENBERGER	Delegate
Mr Jeremy F. CURTIN	Delegate
Ms Priscilla GALASSI	Delegate
Mr Jon GUNDERSEN	Delegate
Mr Kenneth HUCK	Delegate
Colonel William W. LOFGREN Jr	Delegate
Major Evan C. MACGIBBON	Delegate
Mr Rolf MOWATT-LARSEN	Delegate
Mr Edwin NOLAN	Delegate
Ms Suzanne PARRY	Delegate
Lieutenant Colonel Joseph TYO	Delegate

Administrative and Technical Personnel

Ms Mary CARDOSO
Ms Marie FRYE
Ms Janette HILL
Ms Cameron McCALL
Ms Donna PETRICH

Ms Nancy WALKER

Ms Sonja WALSH

Ms Marlou WOODWARD

Mr John D. DANIELS

Counsellor for Administrative
Affairs, American Embassy,
Stockholm

Colonel Leo J. WEEKS

Army Attaché

Mr Allen F. SCHEEL

Attaché (Security)

Mr Jan FRIBERG

Mr Karl-Erik STENBÄCK

Mr Guy ROSENQVIST

Ms Marie JÄGLUND

Mr David L. BLEYLE

Y U G O S L A V I A

Mr Aleksandar BOZOVIC	Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Colonel Branislav MIHAILOVIC	Deputy Head of Delegation
Dr Ljubivoje ACIMOVIC	Special Adviser
Colonel Milutin CIVIC	Member of Delegation
Dr Vladimir BILANDZIC	Member of Delegation
Mr Jure GAŠPARIC	Member of Delegation

Mr Marjan OSOLNIK	Ambassador to Sweden
Mr Dobrosav VEIZOVIC	Counsellor of the Embassy, Stockholm

Administrative and Technical Staff

Mr Milorad DIMITRIJEVIC	Administrative Secretary to the Delegation
Mrs Ratimirka DJORDJEVIC	Secretary
Mr Vojislav DJORDJEVIC	

STATEMENT SUMMARIES

SECRET

25X1

SUMMARY OF
PLENARY STATEMENTS

20 June 1986

USSR

- Calls for a "flexible and elastic" approach to air based on specific parameters.
- Claims that the USSR's 700-sortie parameter would capture 20 NATO air exercises a year as well as such Soviet exercises in 1985 as "Kavkaz," "Zapad," "Granit," and air defense exercises, but not routine daily training exercises.
- Suggests that verification of air exercises is simpler than that of ground force exercises.
- Proposes that the conference return to the NNA-sponsored formula.

18 July 1986

United Kingdom

- Stresses the importance of a CDE agreement within the context of the future CSCE process.
- Warns that there must be substantive agreement.
- Asserts that there be a guarantee of inspections taking place.
- Declares verification be proportionate to preclude the possibility of abuse.
- Urges that "Third Party" participation in the inspection regime is worth exploring.
- Requests that restricted areas be limited in size and number.
- Emphasizes access to territory be limited as "absolutely necessary."

USSR

- Maintains that success in Stockholm could be the key to future fora.
- Suggests an air parameter of 200 sorties.
- Proposes a formulation for ground forces.
- Urges agreement on notification of transfers.
- Advocates exchange of annual calendars between 15-20 November of the preceding year.
- Requests using the NNA proposal on constraints as a basis for negotiations.
- Endorses finalizing NUF, using the NNA document and elements of NUF text.
- Emphasizes ensuring adequate verification.
- Reaffirms inspection be implemented in connection with CSBM's.

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

United States

- Suggests momentum is right for a possible agreement.
- Welcomes Grinevskiy's reply on 30 June NATO statement.
- Stresses air activities as an important issue.
- Accepts Grinevskiy's introduction to a 200 air sortie threshold.
- Denies that the West is thinking of ten to twelve thousand troops as a starting point for negotiating the numerical aspect of the Ground-Force notification formula.
- Asserts that transfers should be included in notifications of ground activities.
- Emphasizes that inspection must be part of any agreement adopted.

19 August 1986

USA

- Stresses the importance of reaching an agreement by the September 19 deadline.
- Welcomes the Soviet statement of July 18.
- Argues that a notification threshold must contain structural, numerical and equipment elements.
- Claims that agreement on the exchange of annual forecasts of military activities will be one of the most important measures decided upon.
- Stresses the importance of verification in any agreement and the need for a "complete and effective inspection regime."

19 August 1986

USSR

- Asserts that verification is the most serious obstacle to agreement.
- Praises the proposal of the NNA states on observation of notifiable military activities.
- Accepts possible compromise on inspections using a quota system.
- Rejects the "out-of-garrison" concept.
- Reiterates importance of the Stockholm conference in creating favorable prerequisites for the CSCE meeting in Vienna.

29 August 1986

USSR

- Highlights the military build-up in Europe and the need for CSBMS.
- Stresses the importance of the Helsinki Final Act in laying the foundation for a reduction of tension.
- Assesses positively the agreement on transfer of forces.
- Emphasizes that mobilization activities should not be included in conference discussions.
- Rejects the "out-of-garrison" concept.
- Proposes that a quota system be used for limiting inspections, and that closed areas be exempted from inspections.
- Agrees to a system of air ground inspection with the inspected state supplying air and ground transportation.

- 2 -
SECRET

SECRET

25X1

22 September 1986

USA

- Welcomes the adoption of the Final Document.
- Calls for improved sharing of military information in the future.
- Reaffirms the West's commitment to aerial inspection using neutral aircraft.
- Calls the Stockholm conference a positive step toward arms control and better East-West relations.

- 3 -
SECRET

SECRET

25X1

Working Group AB**June 16****France**

- Rejects applying the zone of application of Warsaw Pact proposals to nuclear weapons.
- Suggests a step-by-step CSCE approach to conventional disarmament outside the context of blocs.
- Stresses that CSBM'S must respect the Madrid Mandate, apply to the entire zone, and be verifiable.

Hungary

- Declares the Budapest documents an integral part of the CSCE process.
- Elaborates Warsaw Treaty member-states proposals on reductions in land and tactical forces.
- Agrees to convening a special forum on reducing military confrontation in Europe, which includes all European states, the United States, and Canada.
- Advocates widening the framework of the Vienna negotiations.

July 14**France**

- Appeals to conference participants to work between round XI and XII.

USSR

- Emphasizes resolving the key questions which deadlock the conference.
- Urges an intensification of work during the last week of round XI.
- Informs conference participants of Soviet wishes to hold informal contacts and negotiations during the break.

United States

- Suggests that an understanding exists between all participating states on accepting inspections in a CSBM regime.
- Emphasizes defining an inspection regime.

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

FRG (Along with Italy and Portugal)

- Questions the extension of work.

Italy

- Asks the USSR for comment on concessions or a response to the 30 June NATO Statement.

Malta

- Opposes a work extension on procedural, precedential, and legal grounds.

Cyprus

- Questions French appeal.

Spain

- Stressed that CSBM'S would be incomplete without OSV.
- Asserts that OSV should only be used in serious situations.

SECRET

25X1

Working Group AB

September 1, 1986

Ireland

- Welcomes FRG's proposal for a prohibition on exercises involving more than 75,000 troops unless announced two years in advance.
- Applauds Marshall Akhromeyev's acceptance of aerial inspection.
- Expresses the hope that the conference can overcome the differences regarding the nationality of aircraft used in inspection and that the conference will achieve concrete results.

September 15, 1986

Sweden

- Proposes on behalf of Sweden, Austria, Finland and Switzerland, that a system of neutral air transport be established for conducting inspections
- Suggests several practical measures to facilitate such a system.

SECRET

SUBJECT INDEX

SECRET

25X1

MAIN SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

p - plenary meeting

a - working group A

b - working group B

c - working group AB

d - post-plenary or other informal conversations

e - NATO caucus

x - bilateral discussion

ADJOINING SEA AND AIRSPACE: 224b, 432-433c

AKHROMEYEV, S.F. 265-272p, 290-293d

AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES: 82x, 148p, 188x

CDE-XI:

General references to: 126-127c, 172x

Duration of round: 151p

Expressions of dissatisfaction: 48d

Personnel issues:

Resumption date:

Scheduling matters:

CDE ZONE: see also ZONAL CONSTRAINTS: 223a, 224b, 432c

COMMUNICATIONS: see DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS

COMPLIANCE: see also MEASURE 5: 200p

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 1a, 147p, 214-216p, 222a, 343a, 417c

CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 155p, 292d

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES

DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS: see also MEASURE 6

EQUAL SECURITY: 147p

EQUALITY OF RIGHTS: 147p, 200, 222a, 418c

EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS: 118-119x, 149p, 173x

EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS (of Activities Notifiable in Advance): see also MEASURE 2

General references to: 360, 426c

Military calendars: 84x, 155p, 223a, 344a, 360

Exercise schedules: 360, 426c

Annual forecasts of military activities: 147p, 149p, 215p, 263a, 267p, 360, 426-427c, 433c

EXERCISE SCHEDULES: 360, 426c

FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

FINAL DOCUMENT: 200, 214p, 438-447c

GRINEVSKIY, O.A. 3d, 16, 27, 29, 38d, 40d, 69e, 71x, 118-120x, 126-127c, 147-151p, 154-155p, 172-174x, 185p, 188x, 213-216p, 349x-351x, 362d, 394c

HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 3d, 122a, 200, 224b, 418c, 433c

HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

IMMUNITIES FOR INSPECTORS AND OBSERVERS: see subheadings under INSPECTIONS; OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES

INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: 268p

INSPECTIONS:

General references to: 71x, 89-90x, 150p, 155p, 186p, 214p, 241c, 290d, 343a, 428c

Aerial inspection: 43-44, 271p, 275d, 291d, 320-321, 333x, 391c-394c, 430-431c

Areas of inspection: 120x, 185a, 271p, 291d

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

Communications provisions for inspectors: 431c
Composition of inspection teams: 430c
Coordination of inspections: 155p, 244-246c, 343a
Exceptions: 241c, 271p, 429c
Logistic support for inspectors: 290d, 320, 343a, 392c, 430-431c
Methods: 271p, 290d, 349x
Protection and immunities for inspectors: 343a, 429c, 430c
Quotas: 119-120x, 214p, 241-246c, 271p, 428c
Timing of inspections: 290d, 430c
MADRID MANDATE: 90x, 200, 214p, 222a, 224b, 246c, 417c, 428c, 432c
MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXERCISES (including discussion of differences):
General references to: 150p, 292d
Of ground forces: 148p, 292d
Of naval forces: 148p, 292d
Of air forces: 148p, 292d
MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 30-31b, 48d, 71x, 83x, 84x, 118-119x, 148-149p, 173x, 188x
MBFR: see MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS
MEASURE 1: see also EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION
MEASURE 2: see also EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS
MEASURE 3: see also NOTIFICATIONS
MEASURE 4: see also OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES
MEASURE 5: see also COMPLIANCE; VERIFICATION
MEASURE 6: see also DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS
MISCELLANEOUS CABLES:
CDE and the Warsaw Pact "Appeal": p. 3-5

SECRET

Soviet MFA reorganization: p. 16

The Budapest Appeal from the CDE perspective: pp.20-25

Polads paper on Vienna meeting: p. 26

CDE and the Mitterand visit to Moscow: p. 29

French consultations in Moscow: pp. 53-54

Consultations with French on CDE: pp. 55-56

CDE: What's in a name? p. 80-81

CDE: Ambassador Barry's end-of-round press briefing: pp. 138-142

Jockeying on the Soviet delegation: pp. 177-184

Bonn meeting: pp. 190-196

CDE Round XII: U.S. delegation goals: pp. 197-199

Nato brainstorming meeting: pp. 204-207

Translation problems with a CDE concluding document: pp. 252-254

Consultations with the Swiss military: pp. 273-274

CDE: Aerial inspection: pp. 365-366

CDE: Leaks: p. 397

Options for future handling of conventional arms control: p. 406

CDE fact sheet: pp. 413-415

Ambassador Barry's speech to Chatham House: pp. 459-466

MOBILIZATION: 267p

NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS: see also INTERFERENCE WITH NTM; VERIFICATION
428c

NON-FIRST-USE (OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS): 266p-267p

NON-USE-OF-FORCE:

General references to: 48d, 90-91x, 147p, 213-214p, 216p, 417c

Legally binding reaffirmation of NUF: 222a, 342-343a

SECRET

25X1

Politically binding reaffirmation of NUF: 222a, 342-343a, 417-418c

Reaffirmation of NUF: 222a, 342-343a

NOTIFICATIONS: see also MEASURE 3; PRENOTIFICATION;
PRIOR NOTIFICATION

General references to: 9b, 38d, 50x, 83x, 147p, 173x, 188x, 213-216p,
223b, 344-346b, 359, 369x, 419c, 423c

Designation of the activity: 9b, 225b, 345b, 370b, 420-422c

Duration of the activity: 225b, 345b, 421-422c

Geographic coordinates of the location of the activity: 346b, 421c

Names of participating states: 9b, 225b, 345-346b, 421c

Purpose of the activity: 9b, 423c

Type of forces involved: 173x, 345-346b, 359, 420c

Number of main battle tanks or armored carriers: 225b, 359, 420-422c

Number of regiments or brigades: 225b, 359, 420-422c

Number of troops participating: 48d, 50x, 84x, 148-149p, 188x, 225b,
345b, 359, 420-423c

Number of naval vessels involved: 148p, 225b

Number of military aircraft involved: 27, 39p, 48d, 50x, 71x, 148p, 155p,
188x, 345b, 420c, 423c

Transfer/movement of troops, naval vessels or aircraft: 30b, 119x, 149p,
155p, 173x, 188x, 213p, 255b, 345b, 370b, 420c, 422c

Information to be included: 9b, 30b, 225b, 359

NTM: see NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS

NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE

NUF TREATY: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY

NWFC: see NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE CORRIDOR

NWFZ: see NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE

OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES: see also MEASURE 4

SECRET

25X1

General references to: 90x, 264b, 370b, 424c, 426c

Coordination of observation with other states:

Duration of observers' stay: 424c

Host country responsibilities: 226b, 228b, 264b, 346-347b, 370b, 424-426c

Invitations of observers: 147p, 213p, 226b, 228b, 267p, 346-347b, 424-426c

Logistical arrangements for observers: 77b, 226b, 227b, 346-347b, 424-426c

Personnel matters (numbers, protection, immunities): 226b, 227b, 346-347b, 424-425c

Scope of observation:

OOG: see OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES:

OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES (including discussion of differences): 120x, 214p, 269-270p

PRENOTIFICATION:

PRIOR NOTIFICATION:

RAKHMANINOV, Yu.N. 89x-91x

ROZANOV, I.S. 29, 185a

STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS: 118-119x, 149p, 155p, 173-174x

TATARNIKOV, V.M. 32b, 38d, 39p, 50x, 82x, 118x

THRESHOLDS: see EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS; MANPOWER THRESHOLDS; STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS.

VERIFICATION: see also MEASURE 5; NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS

General references to: 1a, 71x, 89-90x, 147p, 150p, 213p, 222a, 241-242c, 267p, 270p, 428c

Verification by cadres:

WEEKLY WRAP-UP CABLES: 11-15, 33-37, 60-63, 92-96, 111-115, 161-165, 229-232, 277-281, 328-332, 374-377

ZONAL CONSTRAINTS: see also CDE ZONE

ZONE OF PEACE: see MALTESE MEDITERRANEAN ZONE OF PEACE

SECRET

COUNTRY INDEXES

SECRET

25X1

AUSTRIA SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

- p - plenary meeting**
- a - working group A**
- b - working group B**
- c - working group AB**
- d - post-plenary or other informal conversations**
- e - NATO caucus**
- x - bilateral discussion**

INSPECTIONS:

General references to: 241c

Aerial inspection: 320

Coordination of inspections: 244-246c

Exceptions: 241c

Quotas: 241-246c

MADRID MANDATE: 246c

MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 8b

NOTIFICATIONS: see also PRENOTIFICATION; PRIOR NOTIFICATION

Number of troops participating: 8b

OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

Logistical arrangements for observers: 77b

VERIFICATION: see also MEASURE 5; NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

General references to: 241-242c

ZONAL CONSTRAINTS: see also CDE Zone

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

CYPRUS SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

- p - plenary meeting**
- a - working group A**
- b - working group B**
- c - working group AB**
- d - post-plenary or other informal conversations**
- e - NATO caucus**
- x - bilateral discussions**

CDE-XI:

General references to: 127c

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

EAST SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

p - plenary meeting

a - working group A

b - working group B

c - working group AB

d - post-plenary or other informal conversations

e - NATO caucus

x - bilateral discussion

CHEMICAL WEAPONS FREE ZONE: 23

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 4d, 21

HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 122a

INSPECTIONS:

Aerial inspections: 275d, 320

MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 30-31b, 84x

MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS: 4d

NON-USE-OF-FORCE:

General references to: 48d

NOTIFICATIONS:

Number of troops participating: 84x

Transfer/movement of troops, naval vessels, or aircraft: 30b

Information to be included: 30b

NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE: 23

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

General references to: 84x

VERIFICATION:

General references to: 1a, 4d, 84x

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

GDR SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

p - plenary meeting

a - working group A

b - working group B

c - working group AB

d - post-plenary or other informal conversations

e - NATO caucus

X - bilateral discussions

INSPECTIONS:

Aerial inspections: 362d

MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 30-31b

NOTIFICATIONS:

Transfer/movement of troops, naval vessels, or aircraft: 30b

Information to be included: 30b

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

HUNGARY SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

- p - plenary meeting**
- a - working group A**
- b - working group B**
- c - working group AB**
- d - post-plenary or other informal conversations**
- e - NATO caucus**
- x - bilateral discussion**

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 4d

INSPECTIONS: 320

MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS: 4d

VERIFICATION:

General references to: 4d

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

IRELAND SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

- p - plenary meeting**
- a - working group A**
- b - working group B**
- c - working group AB**
- d - post-plenary or other informal conversations**
- e - NATO caucus**
- x - bilateral discussions**

INSPECTIONS:

Aerial inspections: 308-309c

MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 307c

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

MALTA SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

- p - plenary meeting**
- a - working group A**
- b - working group B**
- c - working group AB**
- d - post-plenary or other informal conversations**
- e - NATO caucus**
- x - bilateral discussions**

CDE-XI

General references to: 127c

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

NNA SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

- p - plenary meeting
- a - working group A
- b - working group B
- c - working group AB
- d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
- e - NATO caucus
- x - bilateral discussions

CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 106a

EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS (of Activities Notifiable in Advance):

Military calendars: 106a

INSPECTIONS:

Aerial inspections: 275d

MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 8b

NOTIFICATIONS:

Number of troops participating: 8b

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

POLAND SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

- p - plenary meeting**
- a - working group A**
- b - working group B**
- c - working group AB**
- d - post-plenary or other informal conversations**
- e - NATO caucus**
- x - bilateral discussions**

CDE-XI:

Expressions of dissatisfaction: 48d

INSPECTIONS:

Aerial inspections: 362d

MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 48d

NOTIFICATIONS: see also PRIOR NOTIFICATION

Number of troops participating: 48d

Number of military aircraft involved: 48d

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

ROMANIA SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

p - plenary meeting

a - working group A

b - working group B

c - working group AB

d - post-plenary or other informal conversations

e - NATO caucus

x - bilateral discussions

INSPECTIONS:

General references to: 159d

MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 159d

NOTIFICATIONS:

Number of troops participating: 159d

THRESHOLDS: see MANPOWER THRESHOLDS

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

SWITZERLAND SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

- p - plenary meeting**
- a - working group A**
- b - working group B**
- c - working group AB**
- d - post-plenary or other informal conversations**
- e - NATO caucus**
- x - bilateral discussions**

INSPECTIONS:

Aerial inspections: 275d, 320

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

USSR SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key	Speaker Key
p - plenary meeting	A - Grinevskiy
a - working group A	B - Rakhmaninov
b - working group B	C - Rozanov
c - working group AB	D - Solomenko
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations	E - Tatarnikov
e - NATO caucus	F - Mikhaylov
x - bilateral discussion	G - Akhromeyev

AKHROMEYEV, S.F. 265-272p, 290-293d

AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES: 82x, 148p/A, 188x/A

CDE-XI:

General references to: 172x/A,

Duration of round: 151p/A

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 1a, 147p/A, 214-216p/A, 265p/G

CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 155p/A, 292d/G

CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES

EQUAL SECURITY: 147p/A

EQUALITY OF RIGHTS: 147p/A

EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS (of Activities Notifiable in Advance): see also
MEASURE 2;

Military calendars: 84x, 155p/A

Annual forecasts of military activities: 147p/A, 149p/A, 215p/A, 267p/G

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

FINAL DOCUMENT: 214p/A

GRINEVSKIY, O.A.: 3d, 29, 38d, 40d, 69c, 71x, 118-120x, 147-151p, 154-155p, 172-174x, 185p, 188x, 213-216p, 349-351x, 362d, 394c

HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 3d, 265p/G

HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: 268p/G

INSPECTIONS:

General references to: 71x/A, 89-90x/B, 150p/A, 155p/A, 186p/A, 214p/A, 271p/G, 290d/G

Aerial inspection: 271p/G, 291d/G, 349-351x/A, 362d/A, 394c/A

Areas of inspection: 120x/A, 185a/A, 271p/G, 291d/G, 350x

Coordination of inspections: 155p/A

Exceptions: 271p/G

Logistic support for inspectors: 290d/G, 349x/A

Methods: 271p/G, 290d/G, 349x/A

Quotas: 119x/A, 214p/A, 271p/G

Timing of inspections: 290d/G

MADRID MANDATE: 90x/B, 214p/A

MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXERCISES (including discussion of differences):

General references to: 150p/A, 268p/G, 292d/G

Of ground forces: 148p/A, 268p/G, 292d/G

Of naval forces: 148p/A, 268p/G, 292d/G

Of air forces: 148p/A, 268p/G, 292d/G

MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 71x/A, 83x/E, 118-119x/A, 148-149p/A, 173x/A, 188x/A, 350-351x/A

MEASURE 1: see also EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

MEASURE 2: see also EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS

MEASURE 3: see also NOTIFICATIONS

MEASURE 5: see also COMPLIANCE; VERIFICATION

MOBILIZATION: 267p/G

NFU: see NON FIRST USE (OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS)

NON-FIRST-USE (OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS): 266-267p/G

NON-USE-OF-FORCE:

General references to: 90-91x/B, 147p/A, 213-214p/A, 216p/A

NOTIFICATIONS: see also MEASURE 3; PRIOR NOTIFICATION

General references to: 38d/A, 50x/E, 83x/E, 173x/A, 188x/A, 213-216p/A, 267p/G, 269p/G

Purpose of the activity: 271p/G

Type of forces involved: 173x/A

Number of troops participating: 84x/E, 148-149p/A, 188x/A,

Number of naval vesssels involved: 148p/A

Number of military aircraft involved: 8a, 39p/E, 50x/E, 71x/A, 148p/A, 155p/A, 188x/A

Transfer/movement of troops, naval vessels or aircraft: 83x/E, 119x/E, 149p/A, 155p/A, 173x/A, 188x/A, 213p/A, 267p/G

NTM: see NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS

NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE

NUF TREATY: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY

NWFZ: see NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE

OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

General references to: 90x/B

Invitations of observers: 147p/A, 213p/A, 267p/G

OOG: see OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES: 120X/A, 173X/A, 214P/A, 269-270p/G
RAKHMANNINOV, Yu.N.: 89-91x
ROZANOV, I.S.: 29, 185a
SC.1 (also SC.1/Amplified): 32b/E
STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS: 118-119X/A, 149p/A, 155p/A, 173-174x/A, 350-351x/A
TATARNIKOV, V.M.: 8a, 32b, 38d, 39p, 50x, 82-84x, 118x
THRESHOLDS: see EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS, MANPOWER THRESHOLDS, STRUCTURAL
THRESHOLDS.
VERIFICATION: see also MEASURE 5; NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
General references to: 71x/A, 89-90x/E, 147p/A, 150p/A, 213p/A,
267p/G, 270p/G
ZONAL CONSTRAINTS: see CDE ZONE

SECRET

SESSION CABLES

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 04670

SUBJECT: CDE: LANGUAGE "NOTED" IN WORKING GROUP
ON VERIFICATION

1. CDE IX - 003.

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. AT THE FIRST MEETING THIS ROUND OF WORKING GROUP A
ON "INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, COMMUNICATION,"
JUNE 11, 1986, AGREEMENT WAS REACHED TO PROVISIONALLY
NOTE THE FOLLOWING VERIFICATION SENTENCE IN THE
COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK:

BEGIN TEXT.

"THE REQUEST WILL BE ADDRESSED TO THE PARTICIPATING
STATE (S) ON WHOSE TERRITORY IN THE ZONE OF
APPLICATION FOR CSBMS COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREED
CSBMS IS IN DOUBT. (FULL STOP) . . ."

END TEXT.

4. COMMENT. AGREEMENT TO PROVISIONALLY NOTE THIS
SENTENCE FOLLOWS FOUR TO FIVE WEEKS OF ARDUOUS
DISCUSSIONS; THIS SENTENCE, INTRODUCED BY THE
COORDINATOR, REFLECTED HIS BEST JUDGEMENT AS TO WHAT
MIGHT ACHIEVE AGREEMENT. ITS IMPORTANCE FROM OUR
PERSPECTIVE IS THREEFOLD: (1) PROCEDURALLY, WE
HAVE BEGUN TO DRAFT ON VERIFICATION "MODALITIES";
(2) IT CONTAINS THE IMPORTANT NOTION OF TERRITORY;
AND (3) IN THAT CONTEXT IT RECOGNIZES EACH STATE'S
SOVEREIGNTY AS WELL AS RESPONSIBILITIES.5. DURING DISCUSSION THE USSR AND ITS COHORTS HAVE
VOICED TWO CONCERNS ABOUT THIS SENTENCE: (1) THEY
BELIEVE THE NOTION OF "TERRITORY" IS UNCLEAR, PARTI-
CULARLY AS IT RELATES TO THE AGREED UNDERSTANDING OF
THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS. THEY ARE CLEARLY
CONCERNED THAT IT COULD BE INTERPRETED AS APPLYING
SIMPLY TO GROUND ACTIVITIES, AND EXCLUDE APPLICATION
IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE. SEVERAL
ATTEMPTS BY THE EAST TO QUALIFY "TERRITORY," SUCH
AS TRYING TO ENSURE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
UNDERSTANDING OF "TERRITORY" APPLIED IN THIS CASE,
WERE REJECTED BY THE WEST, PARTIALLY ON THE GROUND
THAT THE NOTION OF "TERRITORY" HAS BEEN USED
IN OTHER WORKING GROUPS WITHOUT QUALIFICATION.
IN ACCEPTING THE ABOVE MENTIONED LANGUAGE FOR NOTATION,
THE EAST AGAIN EXPRESSED THIS CONCERN, AND
SUGGESTED, BUT DID NOT PRESS, THAT THE CONFERENCE
DEVELOP AN "AUTHORITATIVE" DEFINITION OF THE TERM
"TERRITORY" TO BE APPLIED EACH TIME THE WORD IS USED. THEY
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEIR CONCERNS WERE BROADER THAN
JUST VERIFICATION BUT DID NOT MAKE ACCEPTANCE OF THIS
LANGUAGE FOR NOTATION CONDITIONAL UPON ACCEPTANCE
OF THE USSR IDEA, WHICH WAS NOT CONSIDERED.' (2) THE SECOND USSR CONCERN RELATES TO WHICH
COUNTRY A REQUEST IS ADDRESSED. AS CURRENTLY

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

PHRASED, THE REQUEST GOES TO THAT COUNTRY WHICH HAS SOVEREIGN RESPONSIBILITY FOR SOMETHING TAKING PLACE ON ITS TERRITORY. THE USSR WANTED TO EXPAND THIS NOTION SO THAT REQUEST COULD BE ADDRESSED TO STATES PARTICIPATING IN AN ACTIVITY NOT ON THEIR OWN TERRITORY (I.E., TO THE USSR IF ON GDR TERRITORY). WEST AGAIN REJECTED SOVIET PROPOSALS TO INCLUDE SUCH A NOTION FOR TWO REASONS: IT WOULD UNDERMINE THE SOVEREIGN RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR ACTIVITIES ON THEIR OWN TERRITORIES, AND, PARTICULARLY IN THE CASE OF A NON-NOTIFIED ACTIVITY, THE NATIONALITY OF THE STATE CONDUCTING A SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY COULD BE DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 04692

SUBJ: CDE AND THE WARSAW PACT "APPEAL"

1. CDE XI -04
2. CONFIDENTIAL-ENTIRE TEXT
3. SUMMARY: IN CONTRAST TO THEIR NEAR-SILENCE ABOUT THE APRIL 18 GORBACHEV PROPOSAL, THE SOVIETS IN CDE HAVE HEADLINED THE WARSAW PACT JUNE 11 "APPEAL" WITH A FORMAL PRESS CONFERENCE HERE (06/12/86). IMMEDIATE IMPLICATIONS OF THE APPEAL FOR STOCKHOLM ARE UNCLEAR, BUT SOVIET COMMENTS REINFORCE OTHER INDICATORS TO SUGGEST STRONGLY THAT THE SOVIETS INTEND TO DEVELOP THEIR CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTION INITIATIVE THROUGH A CDE STAGE II. THE MESSAGE FROM THE WEST, CONSIDERATION OF CDE STAGE II MAKES NO SENSE IF STAGE I FAILS IN STOCKHOLM. END SUMMARY.
4. IN CONTRAST TO THE LOW PROFILE GIVEN HERE TO THE APRIL 18 GORBACHEV PROPOSAL, THE SOVIET CDE DELEGATION THURSDAY HELD A FORMAL PRESS CONFERENCE TO HIGHLIGHT THE WARSAW PACT'S BUDAPEST "APPEAL" ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS. NEAR THE END OF AN OTHERWISE ROUTINE PRESS CONFERENCE, IN WHICH HE REVIEWED THE BUDAPEST APPEAL AND BLAMED THE WEST FOR STALLING CDE, SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR OLEG GRINVESKY MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS ABOUT THE IMPACT OF THE APPEAL ON CDE.
 - BUDAPEST PROVIDES A PERSPECTIVE FOR CDE, IN BOTH THE SHORT TERM AND THE LONG TERM;
 - BUDAPEST CREATES DEFINITE (THOUGH UNSPECIFIED) OBJECTIVES FOR CDE;
 - CDE IS PART OF THE WHOLE HELSINKI PROCESS;
 - PRESENT-DAY "EUROPEAN POLICIES MAKE IT PARAMOUNT" TO END THE FIRST STAGE OF CDE POSITIVELY;
 - SUCCESS OR FAILURE IN CDE IS A "TOUCHSTONE" OF THE (WEST'S) DESIRE FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE; CDE IS IMPORTANT IN ITSELF AND AS IT HELPS THE VIENNA CSCE MEETING TO MOVE TO A SECOND STAGE, DISARMAMENT.
 - BUDAPEST SHOULD GIVE A NEW IMPULSE TO THE HELSINKI PROCESS IN ALL ITS DIMENSIONS.
5. COMMENT: THE HIGH PROFILE GRINEVSKY HAS GIVEN TO THE BUDAPEST APPEAL IN CONNECTION WITH A CDE STAGE II REINFORCES OTHER INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIETS INDEED SEE THE APRIL 18 INITIATIVE AND THE BUDAPEST APPEAL BEING PLAYED OUT IN THE CDE CONTEXT. LAST WEEK, AMBASSADOR MENDELEVICH OF THE SOVIET MFA TOLD SWEDISH CDE AMBASSADOR LIDGARD THAT THE SOVIET PREFERENCE WAS TO NEGOTIATE CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS IN A CDE STAGE II. INDEED, THIS SEEMS THE ONLY LIVE OPTION FOR MOSCOW; THE FRENCH WILL NEVER JOIN AN EXPANDED MBFR, AND THE WEST WOULD NEVER AGREE TO A "NEW FORUM" WHICH WOULD DEAL SOLELY WITH SECURITY QUESTION AND, THEREBY, TAKE THE EUROPEAN FOCUS AWAY FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

CSCE PROCESS, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS. END COMMENT
6. HUNGARIAN CDE DEPUTY KORMENDY, SPEAKING "PERSONALLY," SPECULATED TO USDEL MEMBER THAT THE EAST WOULD PREFER BEGINNING WITH TWO FORUMS CONCURRENTLY, ONE IN VIENNA WHERE ALL MEMBERS OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT WOULD NEGOTIATE THE INITIAL ARMS CUTS AND ONE IN STOCKHOLM WHERE ALL THIRTY-FIVE CSCE STATES COULD NEGOTIATE SECOND GENERATION CSBM'S. FOLLOWING THE INITIAL CUTS OF 100,000 - 150,000, THE TWO NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BE MERGED.

7. COMMENT: EVEN WHILE ADVANCING CDE STAGE II AS THE PREFERRED FORUM FOR NEGOTIATING CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS, THE SOVIETS APPEAR TO BE TRYING TO DISTANCE STAGE II FROM ANY SPECIFIC REQUIREMENT FOR SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM, STAGE I. THE BUDAPEST APPEAL LUMPS STOCKHOLM WITH MBFR IN THE BRIEFEST MENTION. IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE, GRINEVSKY WITHHELD COMMENT ON THE RELATION BETWEEN THE BUDAPEST APPEAL AND STOCKHOLM UNTIL ASKED DIRECTLY; THEN HE SPOKE VAGUELY ABOUT ITS BEING A "TOUCHSTONE" OF WESTERN INTENTIONS, CLEARLY AVOIDING MAKING SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM A PREREQUISITE FOR CDE STAGE II. ALTHOUGH TOO EARLY TO TELL ALL THE IMPLICATIONS, INITIAL SIGNS SUGGEST THAT THE SOVIETS ARE TRYING TO LAY THE GROUND FOR A MAJOR PUSH IN THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP TO ESTABLISH CDE STAGE II REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME IN STOCKHOLM. SUCH A TACTIC WOULD REDUCE WESTERN LEVERAGE FOR SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS HERE AND THUS REDUCE PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS TO MAKE MEANINGFUL CONCESSIONS, FOR EXAMPLE, ON VERIFICATION. EVEN BEFORE JUNE 11, WE HAD BEGUN TO HEAR WHISPERS FROM OTHER DELEGATIONS, ESPECIALLY AMONG THE NNA, THAT ENDING STOCKHOLM WITHOUT A FINAL DOCUMENT SHOULD NOT PREJUDICE VIENNA'S CONSIDERATION OF STAGE II. END COMMENT.

8. THE MESSAGE WE AND OUR ALLIES ARE SENDING IS THAT PROPOSING A CDE STAGE II IN VIENNA MAKES NO SENSE AT ALL UNLESS SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS ARE ACHIEVED IN STOCKHOLM; EVEN THEN, A MOVEMENT TO STAGE II IS FAR FROM BEING A FOREGONE CONCLUSION. WHATEVER SOVIET OBJECTIVES FOR THE BUDAPEST APPEAL RELATIVE TO STOCKHOLM, SOME EASTERN DELEGATIONS, AT LEAST, RECOGNIZE THE NECESSARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM AND CONSIDERATION OF FURTHER CDE MEETINGS: IN CONVERSATION WITH POLISH AMBASSADOR KONARSKI, U.S. AMBASSADOR BARRY SAID THAT THE MESSAGE OF THE BUDAPEST APPEAL SEEMED TO BE THAT THE WARSAW PACT HOPED TO "ESCAPE FORWARD" FROM BOTH CDE STAGE I AND MBFR WITHOUT RESULTS IN EITHER. KONARSKI RESPONDED THAT THAT WAS NOT THE CASE, THAT THE EAST UNDERSTOOD THE WESTERN POSITION THAT STOCKHOLM MUST SUCCEED IN PRODUCING A MEANINGFUL RESULT IF REALISTIC

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

CONSIDERATION OF CDE STAGE II WAS TO BE POSSIBLE IN
VIENNA. BARRY SAID HE WAS GLAD THE EAST WAS GETTING
THAT MESSAGE.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 04713

SUBJECT: UK VIEWS ON AIR ACTIVITIES

1. CDE IX - 005.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. UK AMBASSADOR EDES, READING FROM INSTRUCTIONS, INFORMED US DELEGATION AND OTHERS THAT LONDON FEELS THERE IS WESTERN ADVANTAGE IN TRYING TO DEAL SERIOUSLY WITH SOVIET CONCERNS ON AIR ACTIVITIES, IRRESPECTIVE OF SOVIET MOTIVES. HE EMPHASIZED THAT LONDON BELIEVES ANY POSSIBLE ACCOMMODATION SHOULD BE FIRMLY EMBEDDED IN THE WESTERN APPROACH. LONDON HAS INSTRUCTED THAT THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE, AS A POTENTIAL SOLUTION TO THE AIR IMPASSE, BE CONSIDERED FOR INSERTION AS A THIRD ELEMENT IN THE WESTERN THRESHOLD. THE LANGUAGE:
BEGIN TEXT
-- "AN AIR COMPONENT OF AT LEAST ... SORTIES BY FIXED WING AIRCRAFT." END TEXT.
THE ALLIED APPROACH TO THRESHOLDS WOULD THEN BE GROUND FORCE STRUCTURE (AT LEAST TWO MOBILE COMBAT UNITS) AT REGIMENT/BRIGADE LEVEL WITH . . . TROOPS, INCLUDING SUPPORT TROOPS OR . . . BATTLE TANKS OR AN AIR COMPONENT OF AT LEAST . . . SORTIES BY FIXED WING AIRCRAFT.
4. EDES NOTED THAT LONDON WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THIS APPROACH AS TRIGGERING THE NOTIFICATION OF A COMBINED ARMS ACTIVITY UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, E.G. 700 SORTIES BUT ONLY 9,000 TROOPS. DISCUSSION INDICATED THAT THERE IS A RISK OF THIS APPROACH ACTUALLY TRIGGERING NOTIFICATION OF AN ACTIVITY, WHICH WOULD NOT OTHERWISE BE NOTIFIABLE. THIS RISK MIGHT BE MINIMIZED AS LONG AS THE STRUCTURAL REQUIREMENT FOR TWO COMBAT UNITS (VICE COMBAT SUPPORT UNITS) WAS MAINTAINED AND THE NUMERICAL VALUES FOR TROOPS AND TANKS WERE LOW WITH A RELATIVELY HIGH NUMERICAL VALUE FOR AIR SORTIES. THE DIFFICULTIES IN VERIFYING A SEPARATE AIR TRIGGER WERE ALSO RAISED.
5. AFTER MEETING, FRENCH REP ADVISED DEPUTY THAT FRENCH GENERALLY SUPPORT THIS SOLUTION, ALTHOUGH THE ADDITION OF AN AIR SORTIES ELEMENT TO THE THRESHOLD COULD RESULT IN FRENCH NOTIFYING OTHERWISE INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES. THIS IS BECAUSE TWO REGIMENTS COULD BE OUT OF GARRISON PERFORMING DUTIES RELATED TO THE AIR EXERCISE RATHER THAN CONDUCTING A GROUND FORCE EXERCISE. PARIS IS STILL CONSIDERING THIS APPROACH.
6. DELEGATION WILL DISCOURAGE USE OF THIS APPROACH TO THE AIR ISSUE PENDING REVIEW BY WASHINGTON. THE IMPLICATION THAT AN AIR ACTIVITY COULD TRIGGER NOTIFICATION OF A JOINT (COMBINED ARMS) ACTIVITY WITHOUT THE PERSONNEL OR TANK THRESHOLDS BEING REACHED

6

SECRET

SECRET



25X1

**-- AS ILLUSTRATED IN THE FRENCH CASE -- NEEDS
CAREFUL STUDY.**

**HANSEN
END OF MESSAGE**

**CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN**

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 04714
 SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION TEXTS

1. CDE XI - 006.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: AUSTRIA, ACTING FOR ALL THE NNA, SUBMITTED A PROPOSAL FOR A NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD FOR GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES. MODEST INITIAL TEXT ON THE INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED IN A NOTIFICATION WAS NOTED IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK. THREE ADDITIONAL WESTERN PROPOSAL TEXTS ARE ON THE TABLE. ALL THREE TEXTS ARE PROVIDED BELOW. END SUMMARY.
4. ON 13 JULY, AUSTRIA (GEN LIKO), SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF ALL THE NNA STATES PRESENT IN STOCKHOLM, INTRODUCED A NEW THRESHOLD FORMULA WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS A TIGHTENING AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE SC-7 THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFYING GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES. HE ALSO NOTED THAT THIS NEW NNA FORMULA TOOK INTO CONSIDERATION THE DISCUSSIONS HELD TO DATE ON THIS TOPIC AND ATTEMPTED TO BUILD UPON POSSIBLE CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS; HE ALSO STRESSED THAT IT REPRESENTED SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS ON THE PART OF SOME NNA. THE FORMULA IS:
 BEGIN TEXT.
 "THE MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO ... WHENEVER IT INVOLVES AT LEAST ONE DIVISION, OR AN EQUIVALENT FORCE, DEFINED FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS AGREEMENT AS 2 - 5 MOBILE COMBAT UNITS (THAT IS, TANK, MECHANISED INFANTRY, MOTORISED RIFLE, AIRMOBILE OR AIRBORNE) ON BRIGADE/REGIMENT LEVEL OR A FORMATION OF EQUIVALENT CAPABILITY
 WITH A TOTAL NUMBER OF AT LEAST
 - ... TROOPS, INCLUDING SUPPORT TROOPS, OR
 - ... BATTLE TANKS"
 END TEXT.
5. THE SOVIET UNION (GEN TATARNIKOV) INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO WORK ON THIS FORMULA BUT QUICKLY CHANGED THE SUBJECT TO AIR ACTIVITIES -- EVEN THOUGH AN AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED TO REMAND THIS ISSUE TO THE HEADS OF DELEGATION. TATARNIKOV WANTED TO TAKE UP THE FORMULA HE REJECTED BEFORE THE LAST BREAK SUB-CEILING ON AIR ACTIVITIES) NOTING THAT THE FIRST PARAGRAPH HAD BEEN VIRTUALLY ADOPTED AND THAT WE WERE CLOSE TO AGREEMENT ON THE SECOND.
6. TATARNIKOV ALSO GAVE A SOVIET ACCOUNTING OF NATO'S 1985 AIR ACTIVITIES WHICH, ACCORDING TO HIM WOULD HAVE SURPASSED THE LEVEL OF 700 SORTIES. ALTHOUGH HE ARGUED THERE WERE 18 SUCH ACTIVITIES, HE LISTED ONLY SIX (WITH THE SIXTH, THE FRENCH EXERCISE DATEX QUESTIONABLE, EVEN IN THE SOVIETS MIND). THE OTHER FIVE WERE COLD FIRE (PHASE I), CENTRAL ENTERPRISE, COLD FIRE (PHASE II), DISPLAY DETERMINATION, AND A UK EXERCISE PRIORY. NEITHER THE WEST NOR THE NNA ENJOINED ON THE AIR

3

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

QUESTIONS AND THE MEETING WAS ADJOURNED.

7. A BRIEF MEETING OF THE NATO NOTIFICATION CLUSTER, AFTER THE WORKING GROUP MEETING, SHOWED GENERAL SUPPORT FOR THE NNA FORMULATION, ALTHOUGH THE DUTCH AND ITALIANS VOICED SOME RESERVATION.

8. IN THE WORKING GROUP, THE FOLLOWING TEXT OF THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION, I.E., THE INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED, WAS ALSO NOTED.

BEGIN TEXT.

"... WILL BE GIVEN IN WRITING IN THE FOLLOWING AGREED FORM OF CONTENT:

...

- THE DESIGNATION OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
- THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
- THE NAMES OF THE STATES INVOLVED IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
- ... OF COMMAND, ORGANIZING AND COMMANDING THE MILITARY ACTIVITY

..."

END TEXT.

THIS TEXT REPRESENTS ONLY THE INTRODUCTORY OR GENERAL SECTION OF THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION. WE WERE RELUCTANT TO AGREE TO THE WORD "ORGANIZING" IN THE FOURTH TICK BUT WERE ASSURED BY THE VISITING IMS REP THAT THIS DID NOT REPRESENT A MAJOR DIFFICULTY. THE FIRST ELLIPSES SHOULD CONTAIN THE WORD "NOTIFICATION", THE SECOND PROVIDES SPACE FOR A SECTION HEADING, E.G., GENERAL, THE THIRD TO INSERT THE NOTION OF THE HEADQUARTERS CONDUCTING THE ACTIVITY, AND THE LAST TO INDICATE MORE FOLLOWS.

9. WHEN LIKO INTRODUCED THE NNA THRESHOLD FORMULATION, HE NOTED THAT THEY WOULD BE INTRODUCING AT A LATER DATE A SEPARATE SECTION ON AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE ACTIVITIES. (COMMENT: PRIVATELY, HE CONFIRMED THAT THE MENTION OF AIRBORNE WAS TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF THE NNA POSITION IN ORDER TO GET ALL NNA ON BOARD WITH THE GROUND FORCE THRESHOLDS. END COMMENT). THE WEST NOW HAS ON THE TABLE FOR TACTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE REASONS THE FOLLOWING PROPOSALS:

BEGIN TEXT.

"ASSAULT TYPE LANDINGS FROM THE SEA IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS, WHICH ARE NOT PART OF A LARGER NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY, BY GROUND FORCES, NAVAL INFANTRY, OR MARINES.

NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN WHENEVER THE LANDING INVOLVES AT LEAST ... BATTALIONS OR ... TROOPS. RECALL OF RESERVISTS WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS FOR A PERIOD EXCEEDING ... HOURS.

NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN WHENEVER THE ACTIVITY INVOLVES EITHER RESERVISTS ALONE OR IN COMBINATION WITH REGULARS, THE MOBILISATION OF ... OR MORE DIVISIONS (OR

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

EQUIVALENT FORMATIONS) WITH THE RECALL OF AT LEAST ...
TROOPS.

PERIODIC ROTATION OF TROOPS WITHIN THE ZONE OF
APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.

NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN WHENEVER THE ACTIVITY
INVOLVES AT LEAST ... DIVISIONS OR EQUIVALENT FORMATIONS
OR ... TROOPS WITHIN A PERIOD OF"

END TEXT.

WITH THE EXCEPTION OF AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES, THESE ARE
IMPORTANT NOT ONLY FOR REASONS OF SUBSTANCE BUT ALSO A
TACTICAL COUNTER TO OTHER PROPOSALS FROM THE EAST AND
THE NNA.

HANSEN

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 04716
 SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, JUNE 9-13, 1986
 REF: STOCKHOLM 4670

1. CDE XI - 007
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

-

3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE OPENED ITS 11TH -- AND MOST CRUCIAL -- SESSION IN A MOOD OF NERVOUS EXPECTANCY. CLEARLY, NO ONE WANTS TO BE THE SKUNK AT THE STOCKHOLM GARDEN PARTY AND, THUS, THE WORKING GROUPS BEGAN IN AN UNCHARACTERISTICALLY AMIABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE FASHION. UNCONTENTIOUS LANGUAGE WAS NOTED, FOR EXAMPLE, ON THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION AND ON VERIFICATION MODALITIES. IN THE NON-USE OF FORCE GROUP, THE WEST INTRODUCED ITS THIRD AND FINAL "COHERENT BLOCK" WHICH CONTAINED LANGUAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TERRORISM AND COMPLIANCE. DISAPPOINTED AT THE RESULTS IN BERN, MOST OF THE NATO ALLIES ARE MORE ANXIOUS THAN EVER FOR A SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM. THE SOVIETS, TOO, WOULD LIKE TO SEE AN AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM, IF ONLY TO JUSTIFY MOVING ON TO A PHASE II, WHICH WOULD DEVELOP THE GORBACHEV CONVENTIONAL ARMS INITIATIVE. HOWEVER, THEY DO NOT WANT TO APPEAR TOO EAGER FOR FEAR OF DRIVING UP THE PRICE OF THE AGREEMENT, I.E., A MORE SUBSTANTIAL SET OF CSBM'S, INCLUDING INSPECTION. PROGRESS WAS MADE IN MOST WORKING GROUPS, INCLUDING, BARELY, ON THE CRUCIAL ISSUE OF NOTIFICATION. END SUMMARY.

4. THE MOOD AND GENERAL ASSESSMENT: THE SOVIETS ARE IN A LISTENING MODE; THEY CLEARLY WANT PROGRESS IN STOCKHOLM -- BUT NOT AT ANY PRICE. THEREFORE, MOSCOW DOES NOT WANT TO APPEAR TOO EAGER -- OR SHOW ITS SUBSTANTIVE CARDS TOO EARLY -- FOR FEAR OF DRIVING UP THE NEGOTIATING STAKES. IN OTHER WORDS, THE SOVIETS WANT TO PAY THE MINIMUM PRICE NECESSARY IN TERMS OF MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT CSBM'S IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY MOVING TO A CDE PHASE II TO DEVELOP THE GORBACHEV CONVENTIONAL ARMS INITIATIVE, AND EVEN HOLD OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF CDE PHASE II REGARDLESS OF RESULTS HERE (CF. SEPTEL ON CDE AND THE BUDAPEST APPEAL). THE ALLIES ENTER THIS SESSION LOOKING NERVOUSLY OVER THEIR SHOULDERS AT THE PERCEIVED LESSONS OF BERN. FROM A U.S. PERSPECTIVE, THE BAD NEWS EMERGING FROM THE HUMAN CONTACTS MEETING IS THAT OUR WEST EUROPEAN ALLIES FEAR THAT THE U.S. MIGHT GO IT ALONE IN STOCKHOLM, TOO. THE

-
 GOOD NEWS IS THE SAME. WHILE THERE IS ALWAYS THE POSSIBILITY OF A MAJOR SPLIT IN THE WESTERN RANKS WHICH THE SOVIETS COULD -- AND WOULD -- EAGERLY EXPLOIT, IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY, GIVEN CLOSE ALLIED COMMUNICATION AND COOPERATION IN STOCKHOLM. AT THE SAME TIME, THE DEMONSTRATED WILLINGNESS OF THE U.S. TO ACCEPT NOTHING LESS THAN MEANINGFUL RESULTS IN CSCE FORA WILL MAKE IT

11

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

LESS LIKELY THAT THE ALLIES WILL PRESS FOR ACCEPTANCE OF A MINI-PACKAGE IN STOCKHOLM. INDEED, AT THE FIRST CAUCUS OF THE SESSION FRG, DENMARK, NORWAY AND OTHERS EXPRESSED THEIR STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. INSISTENCE ON MEANINGFUL VERIFICATION AND REJECTION OF A MINI-PACKAGE. FOR OUR PART, THE U.S. IS MAKING IT CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT WE CAN ONLY AGREE TO A CONCRETE AND MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT RESULT IN STOCKHOLM. WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT WE ARE STRESSING OUR BOTTOM LINE POSITIONS ON VERIFICATION/INSPECTION, STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS AND INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES. FURTHERMORE, IF THE SOVIETS ARE REALLY INTERESTED IN THE NEGOTIATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTION IN EUROPE, INCLUDING THEIR STATED WILLINGNESS TO INCLUDE ON-SITE INSPECTION IN SUCH A REGIME, THE NEXT FEW WEEKS IN STOCKHOLM PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEMONSTRATE THE SERIOUSNESS BEHIND SOVIET STATEMENTS.

THE FIRST WEEK OF THE PENULTIMATE CDE SESSION PROVIDED A GLIMMER OF HOPE THAT SERIOUS DRAFTING HAD BEGUN AS THE CONFERENCE IMMEDIATELY MADE SOME PROGRESS ON A NUMBER OF TOPICS, INCLUDING, IF BARELY, ON THE CRUCIAL ISSUE OF NOTIFICATION.

5. NOTIFICATION: DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF THIS ROUND, THE CONFERENCE SEARCHED FOR WAYS TO SOLVE THE SEEMINGLY INTRACTABLE PROBLEM CAUSED BY CONTINUED SOVIET INSISTENCE ON NOTIFICATION OF ALL AIR ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING INDEPENDENT AIR. IN AN ATTEMPT TO UNBLOCK DRAFTING ON GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS, THE AIR ISSUE WAS RAISED TO THE HEADS OF DELEGATION (HOD) LEVEL WITH A COFFEE GROUP

-

ESTABLISHED TO EXPLORE SOLUTIONS FOR THE AIR PROBLEM, I.E., NOT TO DRAFT LANGUAGE BUT RATHER TO DRAW THE POISON OUT OF THE CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE. THERE WERE NO SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS AT THE FIRST MEETING OF THIS GROUP. THE FIRST MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUP WAS ABLE TO NOTE SOME LANGUAGE ON THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION (TEXT SENT SEPARATELY), A DEFINITE IMPROVEMENT OVER THE DRAFTING TEMPO DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF PREVIOUS ROUNDS. THE NNA FOCUSED ON GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES WITH AUSTRIA INTRODUCING, ON BEHALF OF THE NNA, A NEW PROPOSAL ON GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS (FULL TEXT REPORTED SEPARATELY) WHICH, WHILE BASED ON SC.7 (THE NNA PROPOSAL), MOVES TOWARD OUR CONCEPT: A STRUCTURAL TRIGGER COMBINED WITH A NUMERICAL (NUMBER OF TROOPS) OR EQUIPMENT (NUMBER OF TANKS) PARAMETER. THE USSR INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO WORK ON THE NNA PROPOSAL BUT REMINDED THE CONFERENCE THAT THERE WERE OTHER ISSUES TO SETTLE, SUCH AS DEFINITIONS OF TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED. THE SOVIET UNION ALSO DEFENDED ITS PROPOSAL TO PROVIDE SEPARATE NOTIFICATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES BY DESCRIBING SOME OF THE EXERCISES (18) WHICH IN THE SOVIET VIEW

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

WOULD BE CAPTURED UNDER THE SOVIET 700-SORTIE AIR PARAMETER. THE SOVIET UNION HINTED AT ITS PREFERENCE FOR RESURRECTING A FORMULATION WHICH HAD ENJOYED CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT IN THE CONFERENCE BUT WHICH IT (THE USSR) HAD REJECTED AT THE END OF THE LAST ROUND. THIS APPROACH HAD INCLUDED A SUBTHRESHOLD FOR AIR ACTIVITIES WHICH WAS IMBEDDED IN THE GROUND FORCE PARAMETER. IT WOULD NOT HAVE TRIGGERED ANY NOTIFICATION BUT WOULD HAVE TRIGGERED THE PROVISION OF INFORMATION ON AIR PARTICIPATION ABOVE A CERTAIN SORTIE LEVEL. IT THUS WOULD ENABLE THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO TELL MOSCOW THAT IT HAD OBTAINED AN AIR PARAMETER (WITHOUT THAT PARAMETER ACTUALLY TRIGGERING NOTIFICATIONS). THERE IS INTEREST IN NATO IN RETURNING TO THE EARLIER FORMULA, WHICH IS PERCEIVED BY MANY AS THE BEST SOLUTION TO THE AIR PROBLEM THAT NATO WILL BE ABLE TO EXACT FROM THE EAST.

-
6. NON-USE OF FORCE: THE "COFFEE GROUP" MOVED CLOSE TO AGREEMENT ON THE ACTUAL NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE, THE HEART OF THE NUF SECTION. THE FORMULA IS SHORT AND SWEET: IT RECALLS THE UN OBLIGATION AND REAFFIRMS THE FINAL ACT COMMITMENT; IT DOES NOT INCLUDE REFERENCE TO "MILITARY" FORCE OR ANY NORMATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE, AS INITIALLY DEMANDED BY THE EAST. THE TEXT SHOULD BE REGISTERED IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK ON TUESDAY, JUNE 17. THE "COFFEE GROUP" ALSO DISCUSSED A SELF-DEFENSE TEXT. EAST AND WEST ARE STRANGE BEDFELLOWS ON THIS ISSUE, BOTH ARGUING THAT THE TEXT MUST MENTION THE UN CHARTER. THE NNA, LED BY NON-UN MEMBER STATE SWITZERLAND, INSISTED THAT SELF-DEFENSE BE PLACED IN THE CONTEXT OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, NOT ANY PARTICULAR DOCUMENT.

IN THE WORKING GROUP, THE WEST INTRODUCED ITS THIRD AND LAST "COHERENT BLOCK" CONTAINING HFA PRINCIPLES AND COLLATERAL CONSIDERATIONS, INCLUDING PASSAGES ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TERRORISM AND COMPLIANCE. THE ALLIANCE IS NOW IN A GOOD POSITION TO FASHION THE NUF DRAFTING AGENDA. THE INTRODUCTION OF THIS BLOCK WAS WELCOMED BY ALL SIDES, INCLUDING THE EAST. THE SOVIETS DID LAY DOWN A MARKER THAT, CONTRARY TO THE WESTERN DOCUMENT, THE USE OF "MILITARY" OR "ARMED" FORCE MUST BE REFLECTED SOMEPLACE IN THE NUF SECTION OF A STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT.

7. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION/COMMUNICATIONS: THE EAST SIGNALLED ITS WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE TO DRAFT ON A FRAMEWORK FOR VERIFICATION AND TO BEGIN TO DRAFT ON VERIFICATION MODALITIES BY AGREEING TO NOTE PROVISIONALLY A SENTENCE STATING THAT A REQUEST (FOR VERIFICATION) WILL BE ADDRESSED TO THE STATE(S) ON WHOSE TERRITORY COMPLIANCE IS IN DOUBT. AGREEMENT TO THIS SENTENCE WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT BECAUSE THE EAST ACCEPTED THE WORD "TERRITORY" WITHOUT QUALIFICATION (THE

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

EAST HAD BEEN ARGUING EITHER FOR USING THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL DEFINITION OF "TERRITORY," WHICH WOULD HAVE INCLUDED TERRITORIAL WATERS, OR FOR DEVELOPING A

-
CONFERENCE-WIDE DEFINITION, AN IDEA WHICH THEY ARE LIKELY TO RESURFACE). (SEE REFTTEL FOR FULL TEXT AND ANALYSIS.) IN DISCUSSION OF A MAY 21 HUNGARIAN PROPOSAL FOR A TEMPORARY CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION, THE ALLIANCE FIRMLY OPPOSED CONSULTATIONS AS A FORM OF VERIFICATION. IN FACT, THE COORDINATOR (SCHENK - SWITZERLAND) HAS SUGGESTED LANGUAGE AS THE NEXT CANDIDATE FOR DRAFTING, I.E., "THE STATE REQUESTING THE . . . WILL DEFINE THE AREA IN WHICH THE . . . WILL TAKE PLACE . . .," THAT COULD HELP US RESIST CONSULTATIONS SINCE IT IS CLEARLY ILLOGICAL TO REPLACE THE ELLIPSES WITH ANYTHING OTHER THAN SOME FORM OF ON-SITE VERIFICATION. THE EAST CONTINUES TO ARGUE THAT THERE MUST BE MORE THAN ONE FORM OF VERIFICATION, AND THE SOVIET STATEMENT THAT EACH STATE HAS A RIGHT TO CHOOSE THE FORM OF VERIFICATION APPROPRIATE FOR THE SITUATION LEFT IN DOUBT WHO MAKES THAT CHOICE -- THE REQUESTING STATE OR THE STATE RECEIVING THE REQUEST. (A SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE (ROZANOV) TOLD US PRIVATELY THAT THE CHOICE WOULD BE LEFT TO THE REQUESTING STATE.) OF COURSE, IN THE PRESENT EASTERN THINKING ANY VERIFICATION LIST WOULD NOT INCLUDE INSPECTION, BUT COULD INCLUDE A VERSION OF SC.7'S OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST.

ALTHOUGH A-2 WAS DOMINATED BY VERIFICATION THIS WEEK, ITALY DID MAKE A STATEMENT ON THE IMPORTANT PURPOSES SERVED BY AN EXCHANGE OF STRUCTURAL INFORMATION IN ORDER TO EXPRESS THE WEST'S CONTINUED INTEREST IN MEASURE 1 TYPE INFORMATION.

8. OBSERVATION: IN THE ROUND'S FIRST MEETING, ALL PARTICIPANTS AGREED TO ACCEPT THE COORDINATOR'S (KAHILUOTO - FINLAND) NON-PAPER PROVIDING AN OBSERVATION FRAMEWORK AS THE BASIS FOR FUTURE DRAFTING. ALL SIDES, HOWEVER, ALSO INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD BE SUGGESTING CHANGES, ADDITIONS AND DELETIONS TO THIS FRAMEWORK WHICH, OF NECESSITY, AVOIDS TACKLING SOME FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES. THE EAST POINTED TO THE NEED TO INCLUDE OBSERVATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES AND TRANSFERS, WHILE THE

-
WEST AND IRELAND HIGHLIGHTED THE NECESSITY OF FURTHER DEFINING WHAT OBSERVERS WILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO SEE AND DO DURING AN OBSERVATION PROGRAM. EVEN WITH ITS GAPS, HOWEVER, THIS FRAMEWORK SHOULD BE A USEFUL TOOL FOR B-2'S WORK WHICH IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE WILL FOCUS ON INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED TO OBSERVERS.

9. CONSTRAINTS: THE YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR (BOZOVIC) RETURNED TO STOCKHOLM THIS ROUND INSISTING THAT CONSTRAINTS MUST FIGURE IN A STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT. HE

SECRET

25X1

WENT SO FAR AS TO WARN HIS NNA COLLEAGUES THAT HE WOULD SABOTAGE THE CONFERENCE IF HIS CONCERNS WERE NOT TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION. APPARENTLY DISSATISFIED BY OTHER NNA'S PASSIVITY ON THIS ISSUE, BOZOVIC FOR THE MOMENT IS DIRECTING HIS IRE AT THE NNA OBSERVATION-ON-REQUEST PROPOSAL, LINKING ITS FATE WITH THAT OF CONSTRAINTS; IT IS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT HE WILL SHED NO TEARS IF NATO'S INSPECTION MEASURE ALSO FALLS VICTIM TO THIS LINKAGE. THE SWISS COORDINATOR (JUNOD), UNDER INCREASING EASTERN AND YUGOSLAV PRESSURE, WILL INFORMALLY CIRCULATE LANGUAGE ON THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSTRAINTS; THIS COULD BE USED AS AN INTRODUCTION TO BOTH THE CALENDAR AND CONSTRAINING MEASURES (IT WILL PROBABLY EVEN AVOID USE OF THE WORD "CONSTRAINTS"). HOWEVER, THE EXISTENCE OF LANGUAGE ON CONSTRAINTS WILL MAKE NATO'S JOB MORE DIFFICULT. THE WORKING GROUP THIS WEEK, MOREOVER, FOCUSED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON CONSTRAINTS. THE SOVIETS HAMMERED AT WESTERN OPPOSITION TO CEILINGS WHILE THE NNA, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE NNA'S ODD COUPLE, YUGOSLAVIA AND MALTA, WATCHED FROM THE SIDELINES.

10. ANNUAL FORECASTS: ALTHOUGH ANNUAL FORECASTS WERE NOT DISCUSSED IN ANY DETAIL IN THE WORKING GROUP THIS WEEK, THE BULGARIANS MADE MILDLY POSITIVE NOISES ABOUT THE CONSTRAINING EFFECTS OF THIS MEASURE. WHILE NATO HAS AGREED ON ITEMS TO INCLUDE IN THE CONTENT OF THE FORECAST, THE DELICATE ISSUE OF HOW TO DEAL WITH STATIC INFORMATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FORECAST AND ITS OVERLAP WITH THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION HAS NOT YET BEEN RESOLVED.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 04781

SUBJECT: SOVIET MFA REORGANIZATION

REF: MOSCOW 10167

1. CDE XI - 008.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

-

3. IN DISCUSSIONS OF CHANGES IN THE MFA, SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR OLEG A. GRINEVSKY HAS PROVIDED US THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WHICH SUPPORTS AND SUPPLEMENTS THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY REFTEL:

- -- VLADIMIR F. PETROVSKIY HAS BEEN ELEVATED TO DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER. ACCORDING TO A MID-LEVEL MEMBER OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION, BORIS KAZANTSEV (PLEASE PROTECT), PETROVSKIY'S PORTFOLIO INCLUDES INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, OUTER SPACE ISSUES, AND PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY.

- -- VIKTOR KARPOV, HEAD OF THE NEW ARMS CONTROL GROUP WITHIN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, REPORTS DIRECTLY TO THE NEW FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER VORONTSOV, NOT TO BESSMERTNYKH.

- -- LEV I. MENDELEVICH IS NOW IN CHARGE OF CSCE/CDE MATTERS. MENDELEVICH REPORTS TO DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KOVALEV.

- -- IT APPEARS THAT A NEW SECTION DEALING WITH HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS IS IN THE PROCESS OF BEING ORGANIZED. KAZANTSEV (PROTECT) INDICATED THAT SOVIET HEAD OF DELEGATION TO THE CSCE HUMAN CONTACTS EXPERTS MEETING IN BERN, KASHLEV, WAS A LIKELY CANDIDATE TO HEAD THIS SECTION.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 04761
 SUBJECT: FRENCH REACTION TO THE BUDAPEST APPEAL

1. CDE XI - 009.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

-

3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE JUNE 16 WORKING GROUP AB MEETING, FRENCH CDE AMBASSADOR GASCHIGNARD DELIVERED A STATEMENT PROVIDING AN OFFICIAL FRENCH REACTION TO THE WARSAW PACT'S BUDAPEST APPEAL (UNOFFICIAL USDEL TRANSLATION OF FULL TEXT FOLLOWS IN PARA 4). THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR MADE THREE POINTS: 1) GIVEN THAT THE ZONE OF APPLICATION OF THE WARSAW PACT PROPOSALS CLEARLY IS EUROPE, THEY CANNOT APPLY TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS SINCE NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS COULD NOT BE LIMITED TO EUROPE; 2) RECALLING ITS LONGSTANDING RESERVATIONS REGARDING THE BLOC-TO-BLOC APPROACH OF MBFR, FRANCE IMPLICITLY REJECTED AN ENLARGED MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, PREFERRING INSTEAD A STEP-BY-STEP CSCE APPROACH TO CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT OUTSIDE THE CONTEXT OF BLOCS, I.E., PARTICIPATION OF ALL 35 CSCE STATES ON EQUAL FOOTING; AND 3) FRANCE WILL NOT ACCEPT AGREEMENT FOR THE SAKE OF AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM; CSBM'S MUST RESPECT THE MADRID MANDATE, APPLY TO THE WHOLE ZONE AND BE VERIFIABLE. IN CONCLUSION, GASCHIGNARD MADE THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE THE FIRST TEST OF BUDAPEST APPEAL'S CREDIBILITY.

4. BEGIN TEXT:

WE ARE STUDYING WITH INTEREST THE PROPOSALS FORMULATED ON THE 11 OF JUNE IN BUDAPEST REGARDING CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE. FRANCE IS SATISFIED TO SEE THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTROLLING ("LA MAITRISE") OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS RECOGNIZED IN THIS WAY BY THE MEMBER STATES OF THE WARSAW PACT . THE ISSUE HERE FOR MY COUNTRY IS AN OLD PREOCCUPATION SINCE, IN TAKING THE INITIATIVE OF THE CDE, IT (FRANCE) ALREADY WAS AIMING AT PROGRESSING IN THIS COURSE ("VOIE") BY STAGES. THE DECLARATION PUBLISHED IN HALIFAX ON THE 29TH OF MAY MADE IT POSSIBLE TO UNDERLINE THE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED, AND I QUOTE, "TO STRENGTHENING STABILITY AND SECURITY THROUGHOUT EUROPE, BY MEANS OF A GREATER TRANSPARENCY, AND (BY MEANS OF) THE BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES

-

WHICH WOULD BE AT LOWER LEVELS AND WOULD BE VERIFIABLE" END OF QUOTE. (BEGIN FYI: THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE VERSION OF THE HALIFAX STATEMENT ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL READS AS FOLLOWS: "OUR OBJECTIVE IS THE STRENGTHENING OF STABILITY AND SECURITY IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE, THROUGH INCREASED OPENNESS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A VERIFIABLE, COMPREHENSIVE AND STABLE BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES AT LOWER LEVELS." END FYI). THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A HIGH LEVEL WORKING GROUP ON THESE ISSUES HAS BEEN DECIDED. IT

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

WAS FORESEEN THAT IT (THE WORKING GROUP) WOULD EXAMINE THE PROPOSALS OF MR. GORBACHEV AT POTSDAM (APRIL 18). IT FOLLOWS THAT IT ALSO WILL FOCUS ON ("SE PENCHER SUR") THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE BUDAPEST COMMUNIQUE.

THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THIS IDEA DOES NOT PREVENT ME FROM PRESENTING FROM NOW ON AND IN A COMPLETELY PRELIMINARY WAY, THREE IDEAS WHICH THE BUDAPEST COMMUNIQUE PROMPTS:

- -- FIRST, THIS COMMUNIQUE ADVOCATES, IN PARALLEL WITH CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT, THE REDUCTION OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITH A RANGE OF LESS THAN 1,000 KILOMETERS. GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE WARSAW PACT PROPOSALS ARE REGISTERED (S'INCRIVENT) IN THE FRAMEWORK OF EUROPE, THEY MUST EXCLUDE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHATEVER THEY ARE, SINCE IN OUR VIEW ONE COULDN'T HAVE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT LIMITED TO EUROPE.

- -- SECOND, WE HAVE NOTED THAT THREE PROCEDURES HAD BEEN ENVISAGED FOR ARRIVING AT THE DESIRED ENDS. TWO OF THEM TAKE PLACE OUTSIDE THE CSCE PROCESS AT 35 TO WHICH OUR CONFERENCE BELONGS; THERE IS MENTION MADE OF "ENLARGED MBFR" (NEGOTIATIONS) OR OF A NEW FORUM. I WOULD LIKE TO RECALL OUR POSITION ON THIS SUBJECT. FRANCE, FROM THE BEGINNING, IN THE COURSE OF CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN MR. BREZHNEV AND MR. POMPIDOU, AT MINSK IN JANUARY 1973, HAS EXPRESSED ITS RESERVATIONS REGARDING THE BLOC-TO-BLOC APPROACH OF MBFR. IT (FRANCE) DOES NOT SEE A PRIORI ANY REASON TO CHANGE ITS ATTITUDE, EVEN REGARDING "ENLARGED MBFR", WHILE ALL THE EUROPEAN STATES AGREED IN MADRID IN 1983 ON A PROGRESSIVE STAGED APPROACH TO CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT, OUTSIDE BLOCS, THAT IS TO SAY, WITH THE PARTICIPATION ON EQUAL FOOTING OF THE 35 SIGNATORY STATES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

- -- THIRD, FINALLY, FRANCE NOTED WITH INTEREST THE WILL REAFFIRMED BY THE MEMBER STATES OF THE WARSAW PACT TO ARRIVE AT A FAVORABLE ("HEUREUSE") CONCLUSION OF THE WORK OF OUR CONFERENCE. I HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO SAY AGAIN IN THE MAY 23 PLENARY MEETING THAT THIS IS THE GOAL OF THE FRENCH DELEGATION AND IN STRICT RESPECT FOR THE DEADLINES WHICH WE HAVE SET FOR OURSELVES. BUT THE ISSUE IS NOT THAT OF HAVING AN AGREEMENT TO HAVE AN AGREEMENT. THE CSBM'S WHICH WE MUST ADOPT WILL HAVE TO RESPECT OUR MANDATE AGREED IN MADRID AND, IN PARTICULAR, APPLY TO THE WHOLE ZONE -- FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS -- AND BE VERIFIABLE. IF IT WERE NOT TO PROVE POSSIBLE TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM ON SUCH CSBM'S, HOW COULD WE IMAGINE THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ENVISAGE NEGOTIATING REALISTICALLY ON OTHER FAR MORE CONSTRAINING LIMITATIONS ON FORCES? CONSEQUENTLY, THE RESULT OF OUR CONFERENCE IS THE FIRST TEST OF THE CREDIBILITY OF THE NEW PROPOSALS ADVANCED IN BUDAPEST.

SECRET

SECRET



25X1

**END TEXT
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE**

**CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN**

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 04816
 SUBJECT: THE BUDAPEST APPEAL FROM THE CDE PERSPECTIVE
 REF: A) STOCKHOLM 3163, B) STOCKHOLM 3398,
 - C) STOCKHOLM 3684, D) STOCKHOLM 4692
 - E) MBFR VIENNA 532, F) USNATO 3388
 1. CDE XI - 010
 2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
 -
 3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE JUNE 11 BUDAPEST APPEAL ELABORATING GORBACHEV'S APRIL 18 CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT INITIATIVE CLEARLY FOCUSES ON THE CSCE AS THE MOST LIKELY FORUM FOR ITS FUTURE CONSIDERATION. USDEL VIEWS THE APPEAL, LIKE GORBACHEV'S APRIL 18 PROPOSAL, PRIMARILY AS A PROPAGANDA EFFORT AIMED AT WESTERN EUROPEAN PUBLICS; IT SEEMS TO BE A NICELY PACKAGED GRAB BAG OF EXISTING SOVIET PROPOSALS FROM A VARIETY OF FORA WRAPPED AROUND THE CORE REDUCTION OFFER FROM "THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS." THE APPEAL IS CAREFULLY DESIGNED TO CAPTURE ALL EXISTING SOVIET POSITIONS, ALTHOUGH IN SOME CASES IT SEEMS TO PROVIDE BOTH EAST AND WEST A "JUNKYARD" FOR DUMPING NON-NEGOTIABLE PROPOSALS THEY ARE NOT PREPARED TO OUTHRIGHT ABANDON. THE APPEAL'S RENDERING OF THE MADRID MANDATE'S "THE WHOLE OF EUROPE" AS "THE TERRITORY OF THE WHOLE OF EUROPE" FOR THE REDUCTIONS AREA COULD SIGNAL RENEWED SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO ALTER THE CDE'S ZONE OF APPLICATION IN PHASE II AND DESTROY THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. THE CLEAR SIGNAL THAT INSPECTION WILL ONLY BE ACCEPTED FOR THE VERIFICATION OF REDUCTIONS AND NOT FOR MEASURES CONCERNING RESIDUAL FORCES COULD DENOTE A HARDENING OF THE EASTERN POSITION AGAINST INSPECTION FOR VERIFICATION OF CSBM'S AGREED IN STOCKHOLM (ALTHOUGH WE WILL ARGUE THE OPPOSITE, I.E., CDE IS THE TEST OF STATED SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE ON-SITE INSPECTION). THE EAST WILL CERTAINLY PURSUE THE CAMPAIGN FOR CDE II AT THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME IN STOCKHOLM IN ORDER TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM ITS HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE AND DRIVE WEDGES IN THE ALLIANCE. THE APPEAL'S FOCUS ON CDE PHASE II MAY PROVIDE US WITH ADDITIONAL NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE IN STOCKHOLM, BUT USDEL BELIEVES THAT WESTERN LEVERAGE CAN ONLY BE MAXIMIZED IF OUR WESTERN ALLIES JOIN US IN SENDING A CLEAR SIGNAL TO THE EAST THAT THERE WILL BE NO CHANCE FOR PHASE II IN THE ABSENCE OF A SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOME HERE. END SUMMARY.
 -
 4. USDEL HAS READ VARIOUS COMMENTS ON THE JUNE 11 BUDAPEST "APPEAL" ON CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE AS AN ELABORATION ON THE APRIL 18 GORBACHEV BERLIN INITIATIVE INCLUDING, ESPECIALLY, MBFR'S (REF E). AS CONCERNS THE SUBSTANTIVE EFFECT ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL REDUCTIONS, WE AGREE WITH USDEL MBFR'S COMMENTS. WHAT WE HAVE TO OFFER CONCERNS THE QUESTION OF THE FORUM,

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

ITS UTILITY, THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MBFR AND CDE, AND THE APPEAL'S POTENTIAL EFFECT ON STOCKHOLM.

5. THE JUNE 11 APPEAL, ALTHOUGH SUBSTANTIVELY MORE RELEVANT TO MBFR THAN TO THE CURRENT PHASE OF CDE, IS CLEARLY TARGETED AT THE CSCE. REFERENCE IS MADE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF CONVENING A "SPECIAL FORUM" OF ALL EUROPEAN STATES PLUS THE U.S., AND CANADA OR, ALTERNATIVELY, TO WIDENING THE FRAMEWORK OF MBFR TO INCLUDE "OTHER" EUROPEAN STATES, BUT IN OUR VIEW THESE POSSIBILITIES ARE WINDOW DRESSING DESIGNED TO DEMONSTRATE EASTERN FORTHCOMINGNESS TO WESTERN EUROPEAN PUBLICS. THE SOVIETS ARE WELL AWARE THAT THE WEST WILL NOT AGREE TO AN INDEPENDENT EUROPEAN FORUM WHICH WOULD DETACH SECURITY ISSUES FROM THE OTHER BASKETS OF CSCE, AND THEY ARE EQUALLY AWARE OF FRENCH REJECTION OF BLOC-TO-BLOC NEGOTIATIONS IN THE MBFR FORUM OR CDE. IN FACT THE FRENCH, PERHAPS AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE SOVIETS, HAVE MADE THEIR DESIRE TO TORPEDO MBFR EXPLICIT HERE (SEE SEPTEL). ADDITIONALLY THE RUMOR IS THAT THE CHIEF "TORPEDO" IN THIS EXERCISE, BENOIT D'ABOVILLE, WILL SUCCEED ISABELLE RENOARD AND THUS BECOME THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE ON THE NATO HIGH-LEVEL GROUP.

6. INDICATIONS IN STOCKHOLM, PARTICULARLY IN A RECENT PRESS CONFERENCE BY SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY (REF D), ARE THAT THE EAST SEES THE BUDAPEST APPEAL AS "PROVIDING OBJECTIVES" FOR CDE PHASE II. ONE EASTERN DELEGATE HAS TOLD US THAT THIS COULD INVOLVE A DOUBLE-BARRELED PHASE II, WITH NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT NEGOTIATING INITIAL REDUCTIONS ON A BLOC-TO-BLOC BASIS, WHILE ALL 35 CSCE STATES CONTINUE TO DISCUSS CSBM'S AT A SEPARATE VENUE. EVENTUALLY THE TWO TALKS WOULD BE MERGED TO NEGOTIATE ALL-EUROPEAN DISARMAMENT. THIS TYPE OF EVOLUTION WOULD PROBABLY HAVE PARTICULAR APPEAL FOR MOST NNA, WHO SEE THEMSELVES AS LEGITIMATE PARTICIPANTS IN THE EUROPEAN SECURITY PROCESS, BUT THE FRENCH WOULD BALK AT THE BLOC-TO-BLOC ASPECT.

7. WE CONTINUE TO VIEW THE BUDAPEST APPEAL PROPOSAL PRIMARILY AS A HIGHLY SKILLFUL PUBLIC RELATIONS GAMBIT DESIGNED TO DRIVE WEDGES IN THE ALLIANCE AND TO PERMIT THE SOVIETS TO "ESCAPE FORWARD" OUT OF BOTH MBFR AND CDE PHASE I. IN VIENNA THE SOVIETS HAVE CLEARLY BEEN BOXED IN BY THE WESTERN PROPOSAL OF DECEMBER 5, WHILE IN STOCKHOLM THEY HAVE SEEN THE SHAPE OF A POTENTIAL CDE AGREEMENT TAKE ON AN INCREASINGLY WESTERN FORM AS EASTERN NON-STARTERS HAVE FALLEN BY THE WAYSIDE.

8. FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, ONE OF THE MOST STRIKING FEATURES OF BOTH THE APPEAL AND THE WARSAW PACT COMMUNIQUE IS THAT THEY CONTAIN A VIRTUAL "GRAB BAG" OF SOVIET NON-STARTERS FROM STOCKHOLM AND OTHER NEGOTIATING FORA (E.G., SO-CALLED FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS, LIMITATIONS

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES, REDUCTIONS IN MILITARY BUDGETS, NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS-FREE ZONES, A NATO-WARSAW PACT NON-USE OF FORCE TREATY, ETC.). IN FACT, WHILE UNDENIABLY WELL PRESENTED FROM A PUBLIC RELATIONS VIEWPOINT, THESE PROPOSALS SEEM SOMEWHAT ANALAGOUS TO PACKAGING THE SAME DETERGENT IN A MORE ATTRACTIVE BOX MARKED "NEW AND IMPROVED " IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT THE SOVIETS MAY EVEN BE USING THIS BROAD PROGRAM AS A MEANS OF WITHDRAWING CERTAIN OF THEIR PROPOSALS FROM OTHER FORA WITHOUT LOSING FACE. FOR EXAMPLE, WE NOTE THAT SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH APPARENT SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO DROP THEIR INSISTENCE ON INCLUDING FBS AIRCRAFT IN AN NST AGREEMENT, THE IDEA OF CAPTURING SO-CALLED "TACTICAL STRIKE AIRCRAFT" SURFACES IN THE BUDAPEST APPEAL. AS IN OUR VIEW THE SOVIETS HARBOR NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THIS PROPOSAL'S CHANCES FOR SUCCESS, THIS COULD MERELY BE A WAY OF CASTING OFF AN UNTENABLE POSITION WITHOUT EXPLICITLY ABANDONING IT.

9. FROM THE CDE CONTEXT, THE BUDAPEST APPEAL IS BROADLY CONSISTENT WITH EASTERN PROPOSALS AND STATEMENTS IN STOCKHOLM. ITS PRIMARY EMPHASIS ON REDUCTIONS IS MORE IMMEDIATELY PERTINENT TO THE MBFR TALKS THAN TO THE CURRENT STAGE OF THE CDE, BUT WE CAN OFFER THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON SPECIFIC AREAS OF CONCERN TO US:

A) ZONE OF REDUCTIONS: WHILE THE APPEAL SEEMS TO ADOPT THE CDE ZONE FOR REDUCTIONS, IT STATES A SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT FORMULATION FROM THAT IN THE MADRID MANDATE. WHEREAS THE MANDATE REFERS TO "THE WHOLE OF EUROPE," THE APPEAL SPEAKS OF THE "TERRITORY OF THE WHOLE OF EUROPE FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS." THE USE OF THE WORD "TERRITORY" COULD BE SIGNIFICANT. THE SOVIETS HAVE RECENTLY PRESSED IN STOCKHOLM FOR USE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL DEFINITION OF "TERRITORY" WHICH WOULD INCLUDE TERRITORIAL WATERS AS WELL AS THE AIRSPACE ABOVE THE EUROPEAN LAND-MASS. IT IS NOT CLEAR IF THE SOVIETS INTEND TO USE THIS TERM "TERRITORY" AS A BENIGN MEANS OF DELIMITING THE ZONE OR TO ESTABLISH A BASIS FOR PRESSING US TO INCLUDE INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE IN THE "TERRITORY" OF EUROPE (I.E., IN THE AIRSPACE ABOVE EUROPE OR IN THE TERRITORIAL WATERS) IN CDE II. WE WILL HAVE TO WATCH CAREFULLY FOR SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO USE THE APPEAL TO BREAK OUT OF THE ZONE OF APPLICATION NEGOTIATED AT MADRID, PARTICULARLY AS IT RELATES TO NAVAL ACTIVITIES. AND, AS PREVIOUSLY NOTED, BY EXTENDING THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FROM THE MBFR GUIDELINES AREA -- WHERE THEY MAINTAIN A SIGNIFICANT CONVENTIONAL ARMS ADVANTAGE -- TO THE CDE ZONE -- WHERE THE DISPARITY IS NEGLIGIBLE, THE SOVIETS ARE ABLE TO PUT FORWARD THEIR REDUCTIONS PROPOSAL AS BEING ON A STRICTLY ONE-FOR-ONE BASIS AND PRESERVE, THROUGHOUT THE REDUCTION PROCESS,

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

THEIR ADVANTAGE IN THE CENTRAL AREA.

B) MEASURES AGAINST SURPRISE ATTACK: IN SECTION II THE BUDAPEST APPEAL PROPOSES A NUMBER OF MEASURES WHICH THE EAST HAS PREVIOUSLY TABLED IN STOCKHOLM; THE MOST SIGNIFICANT COVER LIMITATIONS ON THE SIZE OF MILITARY EXERCISES AND AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ABOUT FORCES BEING "REGROUPED" TO EUROPE FOR SUCH EXERCISES. THE LATTER CLEARLY BUILDS ON THE EAST'S PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE IN CSBM'S TO BE AGREED THE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF FORCES BEING TRANSFERRED INTO THE CDE ZONE, AND IS AIMED AT CAPTURING U.S. REINFORCEMENT EXERCISES (E.G., REFORGER). A NEW ELEMENT IN THE BUDAPEST APPEAL IS THAT

THE EAST IS NOW PROPOSING AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON EQUIPMENT AS WELL AS MANPOWER FOR SUCH TRANSFERS. THE EAST'S SUGGESTION FOR NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS-FREE ZONES HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN TABLED AND LARGELY IGNORED IN STOCKHOLM, WHILE THEIR PROPOSAL FOR LOWERING THE LEVEL OF CONCENTRATION OF TROOPS ALONG THE CENTRAL FRONT HAS BEEN BORROWED FROM EARLIER SUGGESTIONS BY SOME NNA COUNTRIES. BUT HERE, AS IN OTHER AREAS, THE SOVIETS MAY BE USING THIS APPEAL TO CONSIGN A VARIETY OF PROPOSALS WHICH ARE EITHER HEADED NOWHERE OR WHICH THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES DON'T REALLY LIKE (E.G., NWFZ, REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS, ETC.) TO THE SCRAP HEAP WITHOUT EXPLICITLY HAVING TO SWALLOW THEM.

C) VERIFICATION: THE BUDAPEST APPEAL IS CONSISTENT WITH OTHER RECENT SOVIET ARMS CONTROL OFFERS IN OFFERING INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE INSPECTION FOR THE REDUCTION PROCESS. IN THIS INSTANCE, INSPECTION COULD BE USED "IF NECESSARY" ALONG WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS (NTM'S) AND OTHER "INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURES." INSPECTIONS COULD BE PERFORMED BY AN INTERNATIONAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE TO INCLUDE PARTICIPATION OF NATO, WARSAW PACT AND NNA REPRESENTATIVES. THIS POSITION IS CONSISTENT WITH THE SOVIET POSITION IN STOCKHOLM THAT INSPECTION IS APPROPRIATE FOR DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS BUT NOT FOR VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH CSBM'S. THE REMAINDER OF THE SOVIET OFFER OF VERIFICATION SEEMS TO FLOW LOGICALLY FROM THIS:

- WHILE MEASURES UP TO ON-SITE INSPECTION COULD BE USED "IF NECESSARY" TO VERIFY REDUCTIONS, IT WOULD NOT EXTEND TO THE VERIFICATION OF RESIDUAL FORCES.
- FOR THAT PURPOSE THEY OFFER ONLY "THE OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF TROOPS REMAINING AFTER THE REDUCTIONS" AND VAGUE "APPROPRIATE" FORMS OF VERIFICATION FOR AGREED CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES.
- AS IN STOCKHOLM, THE SOVIET APPROACH IS TO HAVE A VERIFICATION LADDER, WITH THE EMPHASIS ON NTM'S FOLLOWED

BY CONSULTATIONS. THE APPEAL CLEARLY IMPLIES THAT THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE WOULD DO JUST THAT -- CONSULT --

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

IF VERIFICATION QUESTIONS AROSE, AND ONLY LATER, "IF NECESSARY," CARRY OUT AN INSPECTION, AS A LAST RESORT (I.E., THE COMMITTEE WOULD BE A DELAYING RATHER THAN A PROBLEM-SOLVING MECHANISM).

-- THE EAST PROVIDES NO DETAIL OF WHO CAN REQUEST INSPECTION (INDIVIDUAL STATES PARTY TO THE AGREEMENT OR THE CONSULATIVE COMMITTEE?) AND IF SUCH A REQUEST CAN BE REFUSED. JUDGING FROM OUR EXPERIENCE IN STOCKHOLM, WE CAN ANTICIPATE THAT THE EAST WILL REQUIRE "GROUNDS" FOR AN INSPECTION REQUEST (THE VALIDITY OF WHICH THEY CAN DETERMINE) AND WILL RETAIN SOME FORM OF THE RIGHT OF REFUSAL (PROBABLY WHEN THEY REGARD THE "GROUNDS" FOR A REQUEST AS INSUFFICIENT).

-- THIS BUDAPEST APPEAL COULD, IN FACT, REPRESENT A HARDENING OF THE SOVIET POSITION AGAINST ANY INSPECTION MEASURE FOR CSBM'S. AS MUCH AS WE SEE IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS (IN TERMS OF A PRECEDENT FOR OTHER ARMS CONTROL FORA) FOR AGREEMENT TO INSPECTION IN STOCKHOLM, THE SOVIETS ARE UNDOUBTEDLY WORRIED ABOUT ESTABLISHING THAT PRECEDENT, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF THEIR APPARENT PROPOSAL FOR A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT FOR GROUND FORCES AND TACTICAL STRIKE AIR FORCES OUTSIDE THE ZONE OF REDUCTIONS. IF THEY WERE TO PERMIT INSPECTION FOR CSBM'S OR FOR RESIDUAL FORCES WITHIN THE ZONE, THEY COULD COME UNDER PRESSURE TO EXTEND THE SAME PROCEDURES TO THE NO INCREASE COMMITMENT COVERING THE NON-EUROPEAN PORTIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION.

D) INFORMATION: THE BUDAPEST APPEAL PROPOSES AN INFORMATION EXCHANGE IN CONNECTION WITH THE FORCES TO BE REDUCED. ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE EAST IS OFFERING ANYTHING BEYOND THEIR CURRENT POSITION IN VIENNA, WE DEFER TO MBFR DEL FOR SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT. WE ARE INTERESTED IN THE OFFER TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON THE TOTAL TROOP STRENGTH OF LAND AND TACTICAL STRIKE AIR FORCES WHICH ARE TO REMAIN IN THE ZONE, AS SUCH AN EXCHANGE OF STATIC INFORMATION IS A MAJOR PORTION OF THE NATO PACKAGE IN STOCKHOLM. THE REFERENCE TO SUCH AN EXCHANGE, HOWEVER, IS SO VAGUE THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS ITS PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE AND THEY WOULD ONLY PROVIDE THE KIND OF DETAILED INFORMATION WE ARE SEEKING ON THOSE FORCES TO BE REDUCED OR DISBANDED.

10. WHAT DOES THE BUDAPEST APPEAL MEAN FOR STOCKHOLM? WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT, IF PROPERLY PLAYED BY THE ALLIANCE, THESE PROPOSALS MAY OFFER US SOME NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE HERE. THE SOVIETS REALIZE THAT THE CHANCES FOR MOVING TO A PHASE II CDE NEGOTIATION WILL BE ENHANCED BY A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME IN STOCKHOLM, AND USDEL IS MAKING IT CLEAR TO THEM THROUGH VARIOUS CHANNELS WHAT THE PRICE OF FAILURE WILL BE -- NO CONSIDERATION OF MOVING BEYOND CDE PHASE I. WE CANNOT, HOWEVER, EXAGGERATE THE POTENTIAL LEVERAGE OFFERED TO THE WEST. BOTH THE

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

EASTERN APPEAL AND THE COMMUNIQUE MAKE ONLY PASSING REFERENCE TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION IN STOCKHOLM AS CREATING MORE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR PHASE II. NEITHER MAKES SUCCESS HERE A PREREQUISITE FOR THE PURSUIT OF A DISARMAMENT PHASE IN VIENNA. AND WHILE ONE EASTERN HEAD OF DELEGATION HAS TOLD US THAT THE EAST UNDERSTANDS THAT THERE WILL BE NO PHASE II WITHOUT A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME HERE, WE BELIEVE THE EAST WILL ADVANCE A PHASE II PROPOSAL AT THE VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING IN ANY EVENT FOR SEVERAL REASONS: 1) THE PROPOSAL IS PRIMARILY A PROPAGANDA PLOY AND AS SUCH THE SOVIETS ARE NOT PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT ITS SUCCESS OR FAILURE AS LONG AS IT SERVES TO HIGHLIGHT THEIR "PEACE-LOVING" POLICIES WITH EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION; 2) THE PROPOSAL AND A CAMPAIGN FOR CDE PHASE II WILL SERVE TO DEFLECT ATTENTION IN VIENNA FROM THE POOR EASTERN RECORD ON HUMAN RIGHTS; 3) SUCH AN CAMPAIGN WOULD, AT THE MINIMUM, FORCE THE WEST TO REJECT "A COMPREHENSIVE" PROGRAM OF DISARMAMENT WITH THE RESULTANT PROPAGANDA OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE EAST; AND 4) IT COULD ONCE AGAIN SERVE TO DRIVE WEDGES IN THE ALLIANCE, AS WE COULD

-
ANTICIPATE THAT A NUMBER OF NATO ALLIES WILL FEEL CONSIDERABLE DOMESTIC PRESSURE TO MOVE TO PHASE II REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME IN STOCKHOLM. IN LIGHT OF THIS, USDEL BELIEVES WE CAN BEST EXPLOIT OUR LEVERAGE BY ENCOURAGING OUR ALLIES TO IMPRESS UPON THE EAST THAT THERE WILL BE NO CONSIDERATION OF PHASE II CDE WITHOUT A SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOME HERE. THE SOVIETS ARE WELL AWARE OF OUR POSITION ON THIS QUESTION BUT AS IT IS A EUROPEAN AUDIENCE THAT IS THE TARGET OF THE BUDAPEST APPEAL, OUR VIEWS WILL HAVE LITTLE IMPACT IN THE ABSENCE OF A UNIFIED ALLIANCE RESPONSE.

11. CONCLUSION:

- 1) AS TO FORUM, THE FRENCH HAVE ALREADY MOVED TO KILL OFF AN "EXPANDED MBFR; THE SOVIETS KNOW THAT THE "NEW FORUM" IDEA IS A NON-STARTER BECAUSE IT WOULD LEAVE BASKET III TO WITHER ON THE UNTENDED VINE; THUS, LEAVING ONLY CDE PHASE II.

- 2) WHAT THE SOVIETS SEEM TO BE OFFERING (IF ANYTHING) IS A FACE-SAVING DUMPING GROUND FOR BOTH SIDES' PROPOSALS.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 04916
SUBJECT: POLADS PAPER ON VIENNA MEETING
REF: USNATO 3342

1. CDE XI - 014.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. USDEL CDE IS NOT CLEAR AS TO WHY, IN THE IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW PORTION OF THE VIENNA CSCE MEETING, THE WESTERN APPROACH TO SECURITY PART OF BASKET I SHOULD BE DEPENDENT UPON THE OUTCOME OF THE CDE. IN OUR VIEW, THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE SHOULD REVIEW THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMITMENTS CONTAINED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THUS, AT VIENNA, WE SHOULD CAREFULLY REVIEW EASTERN IMPLEMENTATION OF HELSINKI CBMS, INCLUDING THE FREQUENCY, NUMBER, AND TREATMENT OF OBSERVERS AT NOTIFIED MILITARY EXERCISES AS WELL AS THE EAST'S MINIMALIST APPROACH TO THE PROVISION OF INFORMATION IN PAST NOTIFICATIONS, AND OF COURSE, IN THE CASE OF ZAPAD-81, SOVIET NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE FINAL ACT.
4. THE MADRID MANDATE DOES NOT SPEAK OF IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW VIS A VIS THE CDE, BUT OF REVIEWING THE RESULTS ACHIEVED BY THE FIRST STAGE IN THE CONTEXT OF A FUTURE (NOT NECESSARILY VIENNA) FOLLOW-UP MEETING WHICH WOULD CONSIDER THE WAYS AND APPROPRIATE MEANS FOR THE PARTICIPATING STATES TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TOWARDS SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT, INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF SUPPLEMENTING THE PRESENT MANDATE. THIS PLACES THE REVIEW OF RESULTS AT STOCKHOLM CLEARLY IN THE CONTEXT OF NEW PROPOSALS; COMPLIANCE WITH PAST OR CURRENT COMMITMENTS IS A SEPARATE ITEM.
5. USDEL URGES WASHINGTON CONSIDERATION OF THESE FACTS AS PREPARATION FOR VIENNA BEGIN.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 04899

SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS DISCUSSION OF THE SOVIET
- POSITION ON AIR ACTIVITIES

1. CDE XI - 015
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

-

3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE CDE NATO CAUCUS JUNE 18 DISCUSSED ALLIANCE REACTION TO U.S. AND FRENCH REPORTS THAT THE SOVIET POSITION CALLING FOR AN INDEPENDENT NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD FOR AIR ACTIVITIES AND REJECTING THE COMBINED ARMS APPROACH HAS APPARENTLY HARDENED. WHILE ALL CAUCUS MEMBERS VOICED CONCERN, MOST AGREED THAT THE ISSUE WAS SERIOUS BUT NOT CRITICAL AT THIS TIME. THERE WAS GENERAL SUPPORT FOR THE SUGGESTION THAT ALLIED GOVERNMENTS USE ANY OPPORTUNITIES FOR BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH SENIOR SOVIET OFFICIALS TO VOICE OUR CONCERNS ON THIS AND OTHER CDE ISSUES. IN THIS REGARD, FRANCE INDICATED THAT CDE MAY BE RAISED DURING PRESIDENT MITTERAND'S JULY VISIT TO MOSCOW. END SUMMARY.

4. AMBASSADORS GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) AND BARRY (U.S.) REPORTED TO THE CAUCUS ON RECENT CONTACTS WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY CONCERNING THE NOTIFICATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES. GASCHIGNARD REPORTED THAT GRINEVSKY CONTINUES TO REJECT THE CONCEPT OF COMBINED ARMS ACTIVITIES AND INSISTS ON AN INDEPENDENT THRESHOLD FOR THE NOTIFICATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES. BARRY AGREED WITH GASCHIGNARD'S ASSESSMENT BASED ON HIS ATTEMPT TO WORK OUT WITH GRINEVSKY A POSSIBLE STARTING TEXT FOR DRAFTING A SOLUTION TO THE AIR ISSUE. BARRY REPORTED THAT THE SOVIETS REFUSE TO WORK FROM ANY FORMULATION WHICH MAINTAINS THE SUBORDINATE POSITION OF AN AIR THRESHOLD TO GROUND ACTIVITIES AND WILL ONLY CONSIDER LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD, DE FACTO, CREATE AN INDEPENDENT AIR TRIGGER FOR NOTIFICATION. THE SOVIET POSITION, BARRY NOTED, SEEMS TO HAVE HARDENED SINCE THE END OF ROUND X, ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THIS IS FOR TACTICAL OR SUBSTANTIVE REASONS. HE THEORIZED THAT THE SOVIETS, PARTICULARLY THE GENERAL STAFF, MAY NOT WANT TO SETTLE THE AIR ISSUE, BUT RATHER USE IT AS A MEANS OF SETTING UP A MINI-PACKAGE. UNDER THIS THEORY, THE SOVIETS, WISHING TO AVOID A SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT, MAY WANT TO USE WESTERN REFUSAL TO INCLUDE INDEPENDENT AIR TO SET UP AN ULTIMATE TRADE-OFF OF AIR FOR INSPECTION, LEAVING COSMETIC IMPROVEMENTS OVER THE FINAL ACT'S CBM'S AS THE ONLY ATTAINABLE RESULT.

-

4. CAUCUS MEMBERS EXPRESSED GENERAL CONCERN ABOUT THIS SOVIET POSITION AND ITS POTENTIAL EFFECT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCE. THE FOLLOWING MAIN POINTS EMERGED IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION:

-- IN GENERAL, THE CAUCUS VIEWED THE AIR ISSUE AS

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

SERIOUS BUT NOT NECESSARILY CRITICAL AT THIS TIME, ALTHOUGH SOME (NOTABLY ITALY) BELIEVED THAT IT COULD RISK THE FAILURE OF THE CONFERENCE. MOST FELT THE SOVIET POSITION WAS MORE TACTICAL THAN SUBSTANTIVE AND THAT WE COULD EXPECT TO HEAR MORE FROM THE EAST ON THIS ISSUE.

-- THERE WAS FUNDAMENTAL AGREEMENT THAT WE SHOULD SIGNAL OUR CONCERN TO THE EAST, INDICATING THAT WE ARE EAGER TO SOLVE THE AIR PROBLEM, BUT NOT IN ANY WAY WHICH WOULD CREATE A DE FACTO INDEPENDENT AIR NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD.

-- FRANCE NOTED THAT PRESIDENT MITTERAND WOULD BE IN MOSCOW IN JULY AND THAT CDE ISSUES COULD BE RAISED WITH THE SOVIETS AT THAT TIME. IN LIGHT OF THIS, THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT OPPORTUNITIES FOR BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH SENIOR SOVIET OFFICIALS SHOULD BE USED TO UNDERLINE OUR POSITION ON THIS AND OTHER ISSUES AND VOICE OUR CONCERNS.

-- MEVIK (NORWAY), AFTER SUGGESTING THAT IN STOCKHOLM THE WEST SHOULD SIT TIGHT AND LET THE EAST MAKE OVERTURES TO US, RAISED THE IDEA OF A COORDINATED ALLIANCE DEMARCHE IN MOSCOW ON THE AIR ISSUE, BUT THERE WAS NO WIDESPREAD SUPPORT FOR SUCH A DEMARCHE AT THIS TIME. THERE WAS SOME SENTIMENT FOR REVISITING THE QUESTION OF DEMARCHES ON THIS BUT ALSO OTHER ISSUES IN LIGHT OF THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION AT THE END OF THE CURRENT ROUND.

-- THERE WAS GENERAL SUPPORT FOR CONTINUED U.S.-USSR BILATERAL DISCUSSION ON THE AIR ISSUE.

-- OF SOME CONCERN TO US WAS BUWALDA'S (NETHERLANDS) CAUTION THAT NATO MUST NOT BE SEEN AS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FAILURE OF THE CONFERENCE OVER THIS ISSUE. CLAIMING TO BE PLAYING THE ROLE OF "DEVIL'S ADVOCATE," HE ARGUED

-
THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO PAINT THE EAST AS AT FAULT FOR THE FAILURE OF THE CONFERENCE OVER AIR BECAUSE NATO HAD NOT CONSISTENTLY VIEWED INDEPENDENT AIR AS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE MANDATE AND BECAUSE THE EAST CAN MAKE A STRONG CASE WITH OUR PUBLICS THAT AIR ACTIVITIES "AFFECT SECURITY IN EUROPE." WE SUSPECT, HOWEVER, THAT BUWALDA'S SO-CALLED "DEVIL'S ADVOCATE" ROLE MAY BE INDICATIVE OF GENUINE WEAKNESS IN THE NETHERLANDS' POSITION ON THE EXCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 04893
SUBJECT: CDE AND THE MITTERAND VISIT TO MOSCOW
1. CDE XI - 016
2. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. ACCORDING TO SOVIET DELEGATION MEMBER AND KGB REPRESENTATIVE ROZANOV, SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY FLEW TO MOSCOW TODAY (JUNE 20) TO "PREPARE FOR THE MITTERAND VISIT." SINCE BENOIT D'ABOVILLE OF THE QUAI WILL BE IN MOSCOW ON TUESDAY, JUNE 24, IN PREPARATION FOR THE VISIT, WE SUSPECT THAT CDE ISSUES WILL BE DISCUSSED BILATERALLY. WE ALSO SUSPECT THAT GRINEVSKY WILL REPORT TO SENIOR SOVIET OFFICIALS ON THE RATHER BLEAK SITUATION HERE IN STOCKHOLM AT PRESENT AND THAT SOME NEW DECISIONS MIGHT BE MADE.
4. WE THINK THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO TRY TO GET A FRESH IDEA OF QUAI THINKING ON THE CDE ASAP.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 04911
 SUBJECT: CDE: EASTERN NOTIFICATION PARAMETERS
 REFS: (A) STOCKHOLM 1519 (B) STOCKHOLM 3962
 - (C) STOCKHOLM 4133 (D) STOCKHOLM 4714

1. CDE XI -17.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY. IN THE NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP ON JUNE 18, THE EAST (GDR) TABLED A NEW TEXT CONTAINING ACTIVITIES AND RELATED THRESHOLDS FOR NOTIFICATION. WHILE BUILDING ON PREVIOUS EASTERN PROPOSALS, THERE ARE SOME NEW ELEMENTS. IT IS CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE. END SUMMARY.
4. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF EASTERN NOTIFICATION TEXT TABLED BY GDR CAPT. GRACZYNSKI IN B-1 WORKING GROUP ON NOTIFICATION, JUNE 18. WE REPORT IT BECAUSE IT REPRESENTS WHAT APPEARS TO BE THE COMPLETE EASTERN POSITION ON THE ISSUES. COMMENT FOLLOWS.

BEGIN TEXT:

NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN OF:

- MANOEUVRES OF LAND FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES CONDUCTED UNDER A SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH ANY POSSIBLE AIR, AMPHIBIOUS OR AIRBORNE COMPONENTS, IF THEY INVOLVE 18,000 TROOPS OR MORE. AT THE SAME TIME THE NUMBER OF DIVISIONS WILL BE REPORTED.
- MANOEUVRES OF AIR FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES, IF IT IS FORESEEN THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE MANOEUVRES 700 SORTIES AND MORE WILL BE FLOWN.
- MOVEMENTS (TRANSFERS) OF LAND OR AIR FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES, EFFECTED IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS AS WELL AS INTO THE ZONE OR OUT OF IT, IF THEY INVOLVE 18,000 TROOPS OR 100 AIRCRAFTS (SIC) AND MORE.
- MANOEUVRES OF AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE TROOPS CONDUCTED INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH LAND FORCES, IF THE NUMBER OF AMPHIBIOUS AND/OR AIRBORNE TROOPS WILL TOTAL 5,000 MEN AND MORE.

END TEXT.

5. ASSESSMENT. THIS JUNE 18 GDR TEXT REPRESENTS A MINOR EVOLUTION IN THE EASTERN POSITION ON THRESHOLDS FOR ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED. EARLIER 1986 PROPOSALS INCLUDED A FEBRUARY 25 GDR PROPOSAL (REF A), A MAY 13 GDR PROPOSAL (REF B), AND A MAY 23 USSR PLENARY PROPOSAL (REF C). THE SIGNIFICANT NEW ELEMENT IN THE JUNE 18 TEXT IS A PROVISION FOR NOTIFICATION OF AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE TROOPS, WHETHER INDEPENDENT OR IN COMBINATION WITH LAND FORCES, AT A NUMERICAL TROOP THRESHOLD OF 5,000 OR MORE. OTHER ITEMS OF NOTE IN THE NEW PROPOSAL INCLUDE:
 - ON LAND FORCE MANEUVERS THE PHRASE "UNDER A COMMON PLAN" HAS BEEN SUBSTITUTED WITH "UNDER A SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND." THE THRESHOLD REMAINS PURELY A MANPOWER THRESHOLD AND INCORPORATES THE 18,000 TROOP FIGURE PROPOSED BY THE USSR MAY 23 (AND IF MEMORY SERVES

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

US CORRECTLY THE SOVIETS PROPOSED THIS THRESHOLD IN BELGRADE AS WELL). IT ALSO INCLUDES THE MAY 23 USSR REFERENCE TO STRUCTURE -- THE NUMBER OF DIVISIONS WILL BE REPORTED, I.E., INCLUDED IN THE CONTENTS OF NOTIFICATION; STRUCTURE IS NOT, HOWEVER, AN ELEMENT IN THE NOTIFICATION TRIGGER. (IN OUR PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS THE SOVIETS HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO COMBINE STRUCTURE AND NUMBER INTO A TRIGGER - I.E. "18,000 TROOPS AND THE CORRESPONDING NUMBER OF DIVISION/UNITS/SUBUNITS." BUT IN PUBLIC WE HAVE SEEN NO SUCH INDICATIONS.) IN ALL OTHER VARIANTS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS, MANEUVERS OF LAND FORCES WERE TO BE NOTIFIED IF INDEPENDENT, OR IF IN COMBINATION WITH ANY POSSIBLE "AIR, NAVAL, AMPHIBIOUS, OR AIRBORNE COMPONENTS." THE NEW TEXT DROPS ANY REFERENCE TO "NAVAL."

-- THE PROPOSAL FOR NOTIFICATION OF AIR FORCE MANEUVERS INCORPORATES THE USSR MAY 23 THRESHOLD OF 700 SORTIES. IT DROPS, HOWEVER, THE OTHER ELEMENT INCLUDED IN THE USSR MAY 23 AIR FORCE MANEUVER NOTIFICATION PROPOSAL -- "OR MORE THAN 350 COMBAT AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN THE MANEUVER." UNLIKE EARLIER PROPOSALS, BOTH THE MAY 23 AND JUNE 18 PROPOSALS EXCLUDE ANY REFERENCE TO AN AIR FORCE MANEUVER BEING CONDUCTED UNDER A "COMMON PLAN" OR EVEN A "SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND." BOTH THE MAY 23 PROPOSAL AND THIS PROPOSAL SEEM TO CHANGE THE INDEPENDENT AIR DISGUISE AS NEITHER MENTIONS NOTIFICATION OF AIR FORCE MANEUVERS WHETHER "COMBINED WITH LAND FORCES OR INDEPENDENTLY;" BUT RATHER SIMPLY REFER TO AIR FORCE MANEUVERS.

-- ON MOVEMENT (TRANSFERS) OF LAND OR AIR FORCES, SPECIFIC NUMERICAL PARAMETERS HAVE NOW BEEN PROVIDED: "18,000 TROOPS OR 100 AIRCRAFT AND MORE." IN ADDITION, IN EARLIER PROPOSALS REFERENCE TO AIR WAS MADE SIMPLY IN THE CONTEXT OF "TRANSFERS;" NOW REFERENCE TO AIR IS MADE IN THE CONTEXT OF "MOVEMENTS (TRANSFERS)." BOTH THIS PROPOSAL AND THE MAY 13 GDR PROPOSAL HAVE DROPPED THE 250-300 KM STRAIGHT LINE DISTANCE QUALIFICATION FOR NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS (TRANSFERS) INCLUDED IN THE GDR FEBRUARY 25 PROPOSAL.

6. COMMENT. ALTHOUGH THE FACT OF A SEPARATE AMPHIBIOUS THRESHOLD IS WELCOME, THE THRESHOLD IS SO HIGH THAT FEW, IF ANY, NOTIFICATIONS WILL EVER BE REQUIRED BY THE EAST, WHEREAS IT WOULD CAPTURE A NUMBER OF NATO'S AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES (NORWAY, DENMARK). OTHER CHANGES DO NOT MAKE THIS PROPOSAL ANY MORE ACCEPTABLE THAN EARLIER VARIANTS. THE USSR CONTINUES TO PRESS FOR NOTIFICATION OF WESTERN INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES WHILE ATTEMPTING TO MINIMIZE ITS OWN NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. IN ADDITION, THEY SEEK TO AVOID PROVISION OF ANY INFORMATION ON NAVAL SUPPORT OF NOTIFIABLE GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES, EXCEPT AMPHIBIOUS. IN INTRODUCING THE PROPOSAL, THE EAST SIDESTEPED ANY COMMENT ON THE NNA PARAMETERS PROPOSAL OF JULY 13 (REF D), CAUSING

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

ONE NNA DELEGATE TO OBSERVE THAT THE EAST WAS EMPLOYING A WELL-KNOWN TACTIC -- INTRODUCING A NEW PROPOSAL TO AVOID COMMENTING ON ANOTHER PROPOSAL. (PRIVATELY THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN QUITE NEGATIVE ABOUT THE PROPOSAL, DESCRIBING IT AS "OVERLY COMPLICATED" AND, WITH REMARKABLE CHUTZPAH, "DIFFICULT TO VERIFY.") THE USSR, IN ADDITION, REFERRED TO THE SC.1 PARAMETERS AS A "JOKE," AND CALLED FOR REALISTIC, NEW" PARAMETERS FROM THE WEST AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. "FOR THE TIME BEING WE CONSIDER THIS A GAME," USSR MILREP TATARNIKOV SAID, "AND NOTHING MORE THAN THAT." END COMMENT.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 04931
 SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS
 REF: A) STOCKHOLM 4714, B) STOCKHOLM 4911
 1. CDE XI - 018
 2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

-
 3. BEGIN SUMMARY AND GENERAL ASSESSMENT: THE FRG DEFENSE STATE SECRETARY OPENED THE JUNE 20 PLENARY BY DECLARING THAT HE WAS "DEEPLY WORRIED" ABOUT THE COURSE OF THE CDE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS GLOOMY ASSESSMENT IS WIDELY SHARED IN STOCKHOLM. AS WAS AMPLY DEMONSTRATED ALMOST ON A DAILY BASIS THIS WEEK, THE SOVIETS ARE IN NO HURRY TO RESOLVE A SERIES OF ISSUES, MOST PARTICULARLY THE QUESTION OF HOW TO HANDLE AIR ACTIVITIES. U.S.-SOVIET CONTACTS SEEM TO SUGGEST THAT MOSCOW (OR AT LEAST THE GENERAL STAFF) HAS MADE A CONSCIOUS DECISION TO EXPLOIT THE AIR NOTIFICATION ISSUE AS AN EXCUSE TO STALL PROGRESS ON OTHER ISSUES. THIS MAY CHANGE WITH GRINEVSKY NOW IN MOSCOW "TO PREPARE FOR THE MITTERAND VISIT." PRESENT SOVIET OB DURACY MAY WELL BE INSPIRED BY TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. THE SOVIETS EVENTUALLY MAY AGREE TO A FORMULA ON AIR FUNCTIONALLY LINKED TO A NOTIFIABLE GROUND ACTIVITY BUT ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF A MINI-PACKAGE WHICH AVOIDS EVERYTHING WE CONSIDER NECESSARY FOR A MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT AGREEMENT. AT THIS POINT, THE ALLIANCE IS HOLDING TOGETHER -- AT LEAST PUBLICLY -- ON A RANGE OF ISSUES FROM INDEPENDENT AIR TO ON-SITE INSPECTION TO CONSTRAINTS. IN FACT, SOME ALLIANCE MEMBERS SEEM TO WANT A BREATHING SPACE TO CONSIDER WESTERN OPTIONS (WE ARE, FOR EXAMPLE, SLOWING DOWN DRAFTING ON NUF CONSISTENT WITH OUR APPROACH OF "FLEXIBLE PARALLELISM"). HOWEVER, AS THE SEPTEMBER DEADLINE APPROACHES WITH NO SIGNIFICANT AGREEMENT IN SIGHT, THE EASY BREATHING OF SUMMER MAY TURN TO HEAVY PANTING FOR ANY AGREEMENT, INCLUDING A MINI-PACKAGE, THIS AUTUMN. IF THIS ASSESSMENT IS ACCURATE, THE FRG STATE SECRETARY HAS GROUNDS FOR CONCERN. END SUMMARY AND GENERAL ASSESSMENT.

-
 4. NOTIFICATION: U.S.-SOVIET PRIVATE EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE THE IMPASSE ON THE AIR ISSUE HAVE GROUND TO A HALT. AT THE SAME TIME EASTERN ACTIONS IN THE WORKING GROUPS -- THROWING IN LANGUAGE ON AIR TO SET UP A ROADBLOCK TO THE NOTATION OF MORE LANGUAGE -- HAVE REFLECTED A GENERAL UNWILLINGNESS TO MOVE AHEAD UNTIL THE AIR ISSUE IS RESOLVED TO THEIR SATISFACTION. MOREOVER, AS IT BECAME CLEAR THAT ANY BILATERAL SOLUTION TO AIR WAS NOT GOING TO FLY, THE EAST INTENSIFIED THEIR PUBLIC SELLING CAMPAIGN FOR A SEPARATE AIR PARAMETER: THE GDR ON JUNE 18 INTRODUCED AN EASTERN PARAMETERS PROPOSAL WHICH PROVIDES SEPARATE PARAMETERS FOR LAND FORCES, AIR FORCES, AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE FORCES, AND

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS (SEE REF B). IN THE JUNE 20 PLENARY (THE DAY AFTER THE FINAL U.S.-SOVIET BILATERAL ON AIR), WITH SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY ON HIS WAY TO MOSCOW "TO PREPARE FOR THE MITTERAND VISIT", SOVIET GENERAL TATARNIKOV MADE THE SOVIET CASE PUBLICLY FOR A SEPARATE 700-SORTIE AIR PARAMETER. REVEALING TO THE CONFERENCE ARGUMENTS WHICH THE SOVIETS HAD USED WITH US PRIVATELY, TATARNIKOV CALLED FOR A "FLEXIBLE AND ELASTIC" APPROACH TO AIR BASED ON A SPECIFIC PARAMETER. HE CLAIMED THAT THE 700-SORTIE PARAMETER WOULD HAVE CAPTURED 20 1985 NATO AIR EXERCISES AS WELL AS SUCH SOVIET EXERCISES IN 1985 AS "KAVKAZ", "ZAPAD", "GRANIT" AND AIR DEFENSE EXERCISES. HE TRIED TO MAKE THE CASE THAT VERIFICATION OF AIR EXERCISES IS SIMPLER THAN THAT OF GROUND FORCE EXERCISES -- THROUGH THE USE OF NTM'S, E.G., RADAR, RADIO INTERCEPTS AND SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEMS.

IN THE WORKING GROUP THE WEST SIGNALLED ITS WILLINGNESS TO WORK ON THE BASIS OF THE NNA PARAMETER PROPOSAL (REF A). THE EAST PUBLICLY WAS SILENT, FOCUSING INSTEAD ON ITS OWN PROPOSAL. IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS, HOWEVER, GRINEVSKY HAS CRITICIZED THE NNA PROPOSAL AS UNVERIFIABLE AND UNEQUAL IN ITS TREATMENT OF DIFFERENT STATES (REF B). FOR THEIR PART THE NNA HAVE BEEN STRANGELY RELUCTANT TO DEFEND OR EXPLAIN THEIR PROPOSAL.

5. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION: IN WORKING GROUP DISCUSSION THIS WEEK THE NETHERLANDS AND FRANCE GAVE THE MOST EXPLICIT SIGNAL TO DATE OF WESTERN WILLINGNESS TO MOVE AWAY FROM MEASURE 1 IF IT IS AGREED TO PROVIDE STATIC/STRUCTURAL INFORMATION IN THE CONTEXT OF OTHER MEASURES (I.E., FORECASTS, NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION). THE SOVIETS REITERATED THAT THEY WOULD CONSIDER PROVIDING SOME STATIC INFORMATION IN THE CONTEXT OF NOTIFICATION, BUT NOT MEASURE 1 TYPE INFORMATION SUCH AS NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATIONS OF FORCES. THE SOVIETS NOTED THAT INCLUSION OF SUCH INFORMATION IN CSBM'S WAS "PREMATURE" ALTHOUGH IT COULD, PERHAPS, BE CONSIDERED IN A DISARMAMENT PHASE OF CDE.

ON VERIFICATION, THE EAST BID TO SLOW OR STOP DRAFTING BY SHIFTING THE DISCUSSION AWAY FROM VERIFICATION MODALITIES, WHERE SOME PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE, ONTO THE MOST CONTENTIOUS ISSUE BEFORE THE GROUP -- FORMS OF VERIFICATION. THE SOVIETS HAVE CLEARLY DECIDED TO BLOCK FURTHER DRAFTING ON VERIFICATION MODALITIES, APPARENTLY PERCEIVING THAT THE DEVELOPING VERIFICATION FRAMEWORK WAS BIASED TOWARD SOME FORM OF ON-SITE VERIFICATION (I.E., INSPECTION OR OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST), LEAVING BEHIND THEIR PREFERENCE FOR CONSULTATIONS. THE EAST SUGGESTED THAT THE COORDINATOR'S LATEST "FOOD FOR THOUGHT" ON DEFINING THE AREA (WHERE THE INSPECTIONS

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

WOULD TAKE PLACE) BE PUT ASIDE AND TABLED A TEXT PROVIDING THE REQUESTING STATE THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE FROM "AGREED FORMS" OF VERIFICATION FOR A SPECIFIC ACTIVITY (I.E. LAND, AIR, OR MOVEMENTS (TRANSFERS) OF TROOPS AND AVIATION). TO ILLUSTRATE THESE CHOICES, THE SOVIETS CITED DIFFERENT METHODS OF VERIFYING AIR ACTIVITIES (E.G., RADAR AND RADIO INTERCEPTS). SOME OF THE NNA (SWEDEN, YUGOSLAVIA, MALTA) FOUND PARTICULAR APPEAL IN ESTABLISHING A STATE'S RIGHT TO CHOOSE FROM A "MENU" OF AGREED VERIFICATION METHODS, BUT NATO FOCUSED ON WHETHER THE REQUESTING STATE'S RIGHT TO "CHOOSE" ALSO MEANT THE RIGHT TO "USE" THE METHOD SELECTED. THE CLEAR ANSWER THE SOVIET DELEGATE AT THE TABLE (COL. BOGDANOV) PROVIDED

-
 WAS THAT THE STATE RECEIVING THE REQUEST RETAINED THE RIGHT OF REFUSAL (HOWEVER, EARLIER THE MORE SENIOR SOVIET REP ON THIS GROUP, ROZANOV, HAD TOLD US PRIVATELY THAT THE RIGHT TO "USE" YOUR CHOICE WAS INHERENT IN THIS IDEA). SINCE THERE ARE ONLY TWO FORMS OF ADEQUATE VERIFICATION -- NTM'S AND INSPECTION -- AND SINCE NO AGREEMENT IS REQUIRED FOR A STATE TO USE ITS NTM'S, THE "CHOICE" OFFERS NO CHOICE AT ALL. FOR THE WEST, THE CHALLENGE NOW IS TO GET BACK TO DRAFTING ON MODALITIES.
 6. OBSERVATION: DRAFTING PROGRESS WAS BLOCKED AS THE EAST TORPEDOED A TEXT IDENTIFYING WHICH STATE WILL BE THE "HOST STATE" FOR AN OBSERVATION, OVER THE DEFINITION OF THE WORD "TERRITORY." THIS ISSUE, WHICH GOES WELL BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE ISSUE OF OBSERVATION, HAD BEEN RAISED BEFORE BY THE SOVIETS IN CONNECTION WITH LANGUAGE ON VERIFICATION. IT HAS NOW RESURFACED WITH A VENGEANCE IN B-2, AS THE SOVIET MILREP SOUGHT A CONFERENCE-WIDE UNDERSTANDING THAT "TERRITORY" IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD IN ITS INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SENSE (I.E., THE LAND, AIR SPACE, AND TERRITORIAL WATERS OF A STATE) AND MADE SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING A PRECONDITION FOR THE NOTATION OF THE TEXT BEING CONSIDERED. IN THE SOVIET VIEW, THIS WOULD "SETTLE" THE QUESTION OF THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S. THE EAST'S OBJECTIVE HERE SEEMS TO BE TO DRAW TERRITORIAL WATERS (AND AIR SPACE) INTO THE MADRID MANDATE'S CONCEPT OF "THE WHOLE OF EUROPE," PERHAPS IN ORDER EVENTUALLY TO CAPTURE AIR AND SOME NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNDER CSBM'S WITHOUT THE REQUIREMENT FOR A FUNCTIONAL LINK TO GROUND ACTIVITIES. NATO (JOINED BY SWITZERLAND) REFUSED TO NOTE ANY TEXT BASED ON THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF TERRITORY AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO FOR SEVERAL REASONS: 1) "THE WHOLE OF EUROPE" IN THE MADRID MANDATE REFERS ONLY TO THE LAND MASS OF EUROPE, NOT TERRITORIAL WATERS; 2) ANY DISCUSSION OF "TERRITORY" BASED ON THE LEGAL DEFINITION RISKS UNDERMINING THE ZONE AS AGREED AT MADRID; AND 3) WE ARE NEGOTIATING A POLITICALLY BINDING, NOT LEGALLY BINDING DOCUMENT AT CDE. ON OTHER ISSUES,

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

THE COORDINATOR IS CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS ON FOUR TEXTS DEALING WITH THE PROVISION OF INFORMATION TO OBSERVERS AND THERE IS SOME CHANCE THAT THESE CAN BE NOTED IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

-

7. ANNUAL FORECAST: WHILE THE SOVIETS HAVE TOLD US BILATERALLY THAT THEY WOULD NOT LET THE CONTINUED IMPASSE ON THE AIR ISSUE INTERFERE WITH WORK ON OTHER ISSUES, THEY STALLED AGREEMENT ON THE FIRST THREE TIRETS OF THE CONTENT OF THE FORECAST: 1) DESIGNATION OF THE ACTIVITY; 2) CHARACTERISTICS AND GENERAL PURPOSE; 3) NAMES OF THE STATES INVOLVED. THE U.S., NOT CONTENT WITH NOTED LANGUAGE IN B-1 (NOTIFICATION) ON INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED IN THE NOTIFICATION ON THE LEVEL OF COMMAND "ORGANIZING AND COMMANDING" THE MILITARY ACTIVITY, TRIED WITHOUT SUCCESS TO WIN ACCEPTANCE FOR A LOWER LEVEL BY INTRODUCING THE WORDS "NAME OR NAMES OF HEADQUARTERS AND LEVEL OR LEVELS OF COMMAND CONDUCTING THE ACTIVITY."

8. CONSTRAINTS: THE EAST, AFTER BLOCKING PROGRESS ON FORECASTS, CONTINUED TO WOO THE NNA AND ISOLATE THE WEST BY INTRODUCING A NEW CONSTRAINTS PROPOSAL, DESIGNED TO COUNTER TO WESTERN ARGUMENTS THAT THE ALLIANCE NEEDS TO BE ABLE TO CONDUCT CYCLICAL LARGE-SCALE EXERCISES. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL, WHICH WOULD PERMIT STATES TO CONDUCT LARGER EXERCISES ONCE EVERY THREE YEARS, WAS GREETED WARMLY BY SOME NNA.

9. NON-USE OF FORCE: AFTER DISMISSING LAST-MINUTE EASTERN AND CYPRIOT AMENDMENTS, THE WORKING GROUP REGISTERED ON JUNE 17 A TEXT ON THE ACTUAL REAFFIRMATION OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE, THE HEART OF THE NUF SECTION: ". . . THE PARTICIPATING STATES, RECALLING THEIR OBLIGATION TO REFRAIN, IN THEIR MUTUAL AS WELL AS THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL, FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, ACCORDINGLY REAFFIRM.. (TENSE TO BE DECIDED LATER) THEIR COMMITMENT TO RESPECT AND PUT INTO PRACTICE THE PRINCIPLE OF REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, AS LAID DOWN IN THE FINAL ACT." THE SECTION QUOTES VIRTUALLY VERBATIM FROM ARTICLE 2/4 OF THE UN CHARTER AND HENCE, THE ORIGINAL U.S. LANGUAGE ON THE

-

SUBJECT. THEREFORE, IT WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIETS AND SOME OF THE NNA TO INSIST THAT THE PRINCIPLE SHOULD BE DEVELOPED, E.G., BY DEFINING MANIFESTATIONS OF FORCE SUCH AS "ARMED" OR "MILITARY" FORCE. THE NEXT LOGICAL CANDIDATE FOR "NOTATION" IS THE SELF-DEFENSE EXCEPTION TO THE NUF PRINCIPLE. WHILE EVERYONE AGREED TO STICKING WITH LANGUAGE BORROWED FROM ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER, THE SWISS, SUPPORTED BY THE NNA, OBJECTED

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

TO ANY SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE CHARTER. THE U.S. AND USSR, STRANGE BEDFELLOWS ON THIS ISSUE, HAVE A COMMON INTEREST IN PUTTING SELF-DEFENSE IN THE UN CONTEXT, PARTICULARLY THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IN ANY CASE, GIVEN THE LACK OF PROGRESS IN OTHER WORKING GROUPS, WE ARE IN NO RUSH TO NOTE THIS TEXT. WE HAVE NOW TAKEN UP PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION OF THE "ERGA OMNES" (ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE) PRINCIPLE AND THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN THE COFFEE GROUP. THE SOVIETS WILL BE HARD-PRESSED TO REFUSE TO NOTE LANGUAGE ON THIS SUBJECT, GIVEN THE INCLUSION OF THE ERGA OMNES PRINCIPLE IN THE NUF REAFFIRMATION AND NNA INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT (NOT TO MENTION THE UNDERSTANDABLE LACK OF HEARTFELT SUPPORT FOR MOSCOW'S POSITION AMONG ITS ALLIES).

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 04909
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON STATUS OF US-SOVIET BILATERALS ON
THE AIR ISSUE

1. CDE - 019.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY. THE U.S. AND SOVIET HEADS OF DELEGATION HAVE MET SEVERAL TIMES THIS ROUND FOR INTENSE DISCUSSIONS OF THE AIR ISSUE. SO FAR, THEY HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO RESOLVE IT. THE U.S. HAS STUCK WITH THE SUB-THRESHOLD CONCEPT WHILE THE SOVIETS ARE PRESSING A SEPARATE AIR PARAMETER WITH EXTENSIVE EXCEPTIONS. APPARENTLY CONVINCED THAT THE BILATERAL VENUE COULD MOVE NO FURTHER, ON JUNE 19 THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED THAT THE COORDINATOR BE INFORMED OF THE IMPASSE SO THAT HE COULD DEVISE ANOTHER WAY TO DEAL WITH THE ISSUE. THE NEXT DAY, THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR LEFT FOR MOSCOW "TO PREPARE FOR THE MITTERAND VISIT." END SUMMARY.
4. DURING THIS SESSION, USDEL (AMBASSADORS BARRY AND HANSEN) HAS ENGAGED SOVIET COUNTERPARTS (AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY AND GENERAL TATARNIKOV) IN SIX HOURS OF INTENSIVE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON THREE SEPARATE DAYS ABOUT THE AIR PROBLEM.
5. THE SOVIETS CLEARLY PREFER A SEPARATE AIR PARAMETER WITH EXCEPTIONS PERMITTING THE EXCLUSION OF STRATEGIC AIR FORCES, AIR DEFENSE FORCES, FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS AND/OR INDIVIDUAL TYPES OF AIRCRAFT. WE HAVE SHOWN NO INTEREST IN SUCH A FORMULA, STRESSING THAT A SEPARATE AIR NOTIFICATION, IN ADDITION TO VIOLATING THE MANDATE'S FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO AIR, WOULD POSE SERIOUS VERIFICATION PROBLEMS FOR US.
6. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, GRINEVSKY'S VIEW IS THAT THE ONLY POSSIBLE AVENUE FOR RESOLVING THE ISSUE LIES IN "CONSTRUCTIVELY AMBIGUOUS" LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD ENABLE BOTH SIDES TO PRESERVE THEIR POSITIONS, I.E., FOR THE SOVIETS, NOTIFICATION OF ALL AIR EXERCISES AND, FOR THE U.S., PROVISION OF INFORMATION ON AIR COMPONENTS OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES. CONSEQUENTLY, WE HAVE BASED OUR BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON AN NNA PAPER TABLED LATE LAST SESSION WHICH, BY PERMITTING SUCH "CONSTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY", WAS DESIGNED TO SERVE AS A BASIS FOR RESOLVING THE U.S.-SOVIET PRINCIPLED DIFFERENCE ON AIR. THE SOVIETS REJECTED IT LATE LAST ROUND; THEY SUGGESTED RETURNING TO IT THIS ROUND BUT THEN INSISTED ON CRITICAL DRAFTING CHANGES WHICH "TILT" IT IN THE DIRECTION OF "INDEPENDENT" AIR. THIS IS OBVIOUSLY AT THE INSISTENCE OF TATARNIKOV, WHO DOES NOT BELIEVE IN AMBIGUOUS SOLUTIONS.
7. AT THE END OF A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE WITH AMBASSADOR BARRY ON JUNE 19, GRINEVSKY SAID THAT IT APPEARED THAT THE BILATERALS COULD MOVE NO FURTHER ON

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

THE ISSUE AND THAT IT WAS TIME TO INFORM THE SWEDISH COORDINATOR (LIDGARD) OF THE CONTINUING IMPASSE. HE WILL RESUME PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE IN "EXTRA MEETINGS" OF THE NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP. FOR THE MOMENT THE SOVIETS WANT TO SET ASIDE THE AIR ISSUE IN THIS FASHION, POSSIBLY USING INABILITY TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM AS AN EXCUSE FOR GIVING AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE ELSEWHERE. THEY MAY STILL COME BACK TO THE SUBTHRESHOLD IDEA, BUT PROBABLY ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF A MINI-PACKAGE WHICH WILL BE UNACCEPTABLE TO US.

-
8. IN THE JUNE 20 PLENARY TATARNIKOV MADE THE SOVIET CASE PUBLICLY FOR A SEPARATE 700-SORTIE AIR PARAMETER, CALLING FOR A "FLEXIBLE AND ELASTIC" APPROACH TO AIR BASED ON A SPECIFIC PARAMETER. HE CLAIMED THAT THE USSR'S 700-SORTIE PARAMETER WOULD CAPTURE 20 NATO AIR EXERCISES A YEAR AS WELL AS SUCH SOVIET EXERCISES IN 1985 AS "KAVKAZ", "ZAPAD", "GRANIT" AND AIR DEFENSE EXERCISES BUT THAT ROUTINE DAILY TRAINING EXERCISES WOULD NOT BE CAPTURED. THE SOVIET GENERAL ALSO TRIED TO MAKE THE CASE THAT VERIFICATION OF AIR EXERCISES IS SIMPLER THAN THAT OF GROUND FORCE EXERCISES -- THROUGH THE USE OF NTM'S, E.G., RADIO INTERCEPTS AND SATELLITE TRACKING SYSTEMS. IN CONCLUSION, TATARNIKOV PROPOSED THAT THE CONFERENCE RETURN TO THE NNA-SPONSORED FORMULA AND FILL IN THE ELLIPSES -- PRECISELY WHAT THE THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION HAD FAILED TO DO PRIVATELY THE DAY BEFORE. BARRY

END OF MESSAGE
NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 04910
 SUBJECT: NEW GRINEVSKY FORMULA FOR DEFERRAL OF NAVAL
 - ACTIVITIES
 REF: A) STOCKHOLM 3838, B) STATE 146054,
 - C) STOCKHOLM 3458
 1. CDE XI - 020.
 2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
 3. BEGIN SUMMARY: ON JUNE 19, 1986 SOVIET CDE
 AMBASSADOR PRESENTED US WITH A NEW SOVIET FORMULATION OF
 A CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT DEFERRING NAVAL ACTIVITIES (SEE
 PARA 4 FOR TEXT). U.S. CDE AMBASSADOR INDICATED THAT HE
 WOULD SEND THE LANGUAGE TO WASHINGTON (ACTION REQUEST IN
 PARA 6). END SUMMARY.
 -
 4. IN A PRIVATE BILATERAL MEETING ON JUNE 19, SOVIET
 CDE AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY RETURNED TO THE ISSUE OF
 LANGUAGE FOR A CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT DEFERRING NAVAL
 ACTIVITIES. HE SAID THAT DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW DURING
 THE RECESS HAD CONVINCED HIM THAT SUCH A CHAIRMAN'S
 STATEMENT WAS AN ACCEPTABLE WAY TO DEAL WITH THE NAVAL
 ISSUE. HE MADE NO MENTION OF TWO OTHER PROPOSALS
 FLOATED IN THE PAST AS WAYS TO RESOLVE THE NAVAL PROBLEM
 (REF A): 1) A "FRENCH SOLUTION" LISTING UNRESOLVED
 ISSUES; AND 2) A "SWISS SOLUTION" INVOLVING A
 PRENEGOTIATED UNILATERAL STATEMENT. INSTEAD HE PROPOSED
 THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD BE PART OF A
 CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT:
 BEGIN TEXT:
 . . . POSTPONEMENT TO THE NEXT STAGE OF THE ISSUE OF
 NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXISTING MANDATE

 END TEXT.
 5. BARRY SAID THAT HE COULD NOT COMMENT ON THIS NEW
 SOVIET FORMULATION, BUT THAT HE WOULD REPORT IT BACK TO
 WASHINGTON. GRINEVSKY DID NOT CONVEY ANY SENSE OF
 URGENCY FOR AGREEING ON A FORMULATION. NONETHELESS, WE
 THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR WASHINGTON TO GIVE SOME
 THOUGHT TO WHAT ACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE MIGHT LOOK LIKE
 TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE NEGOTIATING HISTORY ON
 THIS ISSUE (SEE REFS). IN OUR VIEW IT WOULD BE USEFUL
 TO HAVE SUCH AGREED LANGUAGE IN OUR POCKET TO BE USED IF
 NECESSARY AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME DURING THE END GAME
 NEGOTIATIONS.
 -
 6. ACTION REQUEST: DELEGATION REQUESTS WASHINGTON
 GUIDANCE ON THIS LATEST GRINEVSKY FORMULA AND, IF
 APPROPRIATE, CHANGES OR AN ALTERNATIVE FORMULA. ONE
 POSSIBLE APPROACH MIGHT BE TO COMBINE THE EARLIER SOVIET
 AND U.S. FORMULAS IN THIS FASHION: "PARTICIPATING
 STATES CAN RAISE IN ANY POSSIBLE POST-VIENNA
 CONTINUATION OR NEXT STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE SUBJECTS

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

**CONSISTENT WITH THE AGREED MANDATE, INCLUDING THE
SUBJECT OF NAVAL ACIVITIES." CLEARLY ANY U.S.-AGREED
FORMULA WOULD HAVE TO BE AGREED BY THE ALLIES AS WELL.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE
NNNN**

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 04988

SUBJECT: CDE: DISCUSSIONS OF INSPECTION

1. SUMMARY: IN PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITH CLOSE ALLIES, SELECTED NEUTRALS AND THE USSR WE HAVE BEEN PROMOTING THE IDEA OF EFFECTIVE INSPECTION AS THE ONLY REAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION. WE HAVE HAD SOME SUCCESS, BUT THE NEUTRALS HAVE BEEN UNWILLING SO FAR TO BECOME INVOLVED WITH THE AIR INSPECTION ISSUE. END SUMMARY.

2. BASED ON WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS WE HAVE BEEN PRESSING THE FOLLOWING POINTS ON INSPECTION IN OUR PRIVATE CONTACTS HERE:

-- INSPECTION IS THE ONLY EFFECTIVE MEANS OF VERIFICATION AVAILABLE TO ALL CDE PARTICIPANTS AND MUST BE PROVIDED FOR IN ANY CONCLUDING DOCUMENT THE US WILL AGREE TO IN STOCKHOLM.

-

-- THERE CAN BE NO ESCAPE CLAUSE ENABLING A PARTICIPANT TO TURN ASIDE AN INSPECTION REQUEST, BUT WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO ACCEPT A FORMULA WHICH SAYS THAT IF A COUNTRY DENIES AN INSPECTION REQUEST IN EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGNTY, ALL OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT LAPSE UNTIL THERE IS CONSENSUS ON RESUMING THEM.

-- INSPECTION MODALITIES MUST BE EFFECTIVE; ONLY AIR INSPECTION GIVES A REAL CHANCE TO SEE WHAT IS HAPPENING ON THE GROUND. WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO ACCEPT THE IDEA THAT NEUTRALS WILL PROVIDE THE AIRCRAFT AND/OR THE PILOT, BUT THE INSPECTORS WOULD BE FROM THE CHALLENGING STATE ONLY.

3. WE HAVE DISCUSSED THESE ISSUES WITH THE BRITISH, FRENCH AND FRG HERE ON A CLOSE-HOLD BASIS. ALL ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF SUSPENDING THE AGREEMENT IF A REQUEST FOR INSPECTION WAS DENIED, BUT THE UK AND FRG STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF GETTING A NEUTRAL TO PROPOSE THE IDEA. ON AIR INSPECTION THE COMMENTS WERE AS FOLLOWS:

-- FRG: BONN'S REACTION IS POSITIVE, ESPECIALLY IF THE NEUTRALS WILL PLAY A ROLE. THEY DOUBT THAT THE PROPOSAL WILL BE NEGOTIABLE BUT BELIEVE IT SHOULD SURFACE ASAP "FOR THE RECORD". SPECIFICALLY, BONN'S FAVORABLE REACTION IS TAKEN BY THIS DELEGATION HERE TO MEAN WAIVING THEIR INSISTENCE ON A 4000' MINIMUM ALTITUDE FOR AIR INSPECTION. BONN WANTS TO CALL FOR A PASSIVE QUOTA ON INSPECTIONS AND SUGGESTS THE FOLLOWING TEXT:

BEGIN TEXT

A PARTICIPATING STATE SHALL NOT BE REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH MORE THAN ... REQUESTS FOR ... FROM OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES BELONGING TO A MILITARY GROUP OF WHICH IT IS NOT A MEMBER, AND, IN ADDITION, WITH NO MORE THAN ... FROM OTHER STATES.

END TEXT.

-

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

(COMMENT: FRENCH REP SUGGESTED THAT FORMULA AVOID REFERENCE TO MILITARY ALLIANCES OR GROUPS; IT COULD BE SOMETHING LIKE "STATES WHICH PARTICIPATE IN MULTI-LATERAL MILITARY EXERCISES" THOUGH ROMANIA COULD ESCAPE THROUGH THE LOOPHOLE.)

-- UK: ON A PRELIMINARY BASIS THE UK DOES NOT SHARE OUR VIEW ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR INSPECTION; WITHOUT SENSORS AND PRE-POSITIONED VEHICLES ON THE GROUND FOR USE IN CONJUNCTION WITH AIR INSPECTION THEY DOUBT THAT MUCH CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED. THEY WOULD NOT LIKE TO SEE AIR INSPECTION RANKED HIGHER THAN GROUND.

-- FRANCE: THE QUAI DOES NOT OBJECT TO OUR IDEA IF THERE ARE NO MAJOR TECHNICAL PROBLEMS; THE MOD HAS NOT YET BEEN HEARD FROM. (COMMENT: BUT THEY MAY WELL NOT BE READY TO OFFER RECIPROCITY. END COMMENT)

4. ON JUNE 19 BARRY DISCUSSED THESE ISSUES WITH FRG MOD STATE SECRETARY RUEHL WHO SPENT THREE DAYS IN STOCKHOLM. HE WAS GENERALLY SYMPATHETIC TO OUR EMPHASIS ON VERIFICATION BUT URGED THAT WE HAVE NO ILLUSIONS AS TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AN AIR MODALITY. AS SOMEONE WHO SPENT A LOT OF TIME "INSPECTING" MILITARY EXERCISES FROM THE AIR, OFTEN IN THE COMPANY OF TOP US AND FRG COMMANDERS, HE COULD TELL US THAT:

-- ANY GERMAN COMMANDER COULD HIDE A DIVISION MANY TIMES OVER IN THE 24-36 HOURS BEFORE INSPECTORS COULD ARRIVE ON THE SCENE UNDER THE NATO PROPOSAL;

-- EVEN WITH COMPLETE CONTROL OVER THE FLIGHT OF FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT OR HELICOPTERS, HE HAD FREQUENTLY BEEN UNABLE TO FIND A DIVISION OR CORPS HE KNEW WAS OPERATING IN THE FIELD;

-- THE ONLY EFFECTIVE MEANS OF VERIFICATION WOULD BE TO PERMIT SIMULTANEOUS COORDINATED INSPECTION BY F-4 RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT, HELICOPTERS AND ALL-TERRAIN VEHICLES. THE FRG WOULD NOT PERMIT THIS ON

ITS OWN TERRITORY. RUEHL AGREED WITH OUR STRESS ON THE NEED TO PREVENT AN ESCAPE CLAUSE BECAUSE OF THE EFFECT ON MBFR, AND HE SAID THE FRG MOD WOULD ACCEPT OUR POSITION ON AIR MODALITIES. BARRY STRESSED THE DETERRENT VALUE OF AIR INSPECTION AND SAID WE WERE NOT THINKING OF USING IT TO PIN DOWN MINOR VIOLATIONS.

5. IN A COUPLE OF DISCUSSIONS WITH GRINEVSKY, BARRY HAS HIGHLIGHTED THE AIR MODALITY IN SC.1. GRINEVSKY HAS NOT REJECTED THE IDEA OUTRIGHT, BUT CLAIMS THAT THIS IS SOMETHING NEW IN THE US POSITION. HIS FIRST REACTION WAS THAT THE USSR WOULD NEVER AGREE TO ALLOWING OVERFLIGHT ON SENSITIVE INSTALLATIONS OR AREAS. WHEN WE STRESSED THAT INSPECTING AIRCRAFT WOULD KEEP TO APPROVED CIVIL AIRWAYS ENROUTE TO AND FROM THE

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

INSPECTED AREAS, HE RETORTED THAT "THERE ARE NO CIVIL AIRWAYS IN THE DISTRICTS NEAR THE URALS" - I.E. THE SOVIETS WOULD NEVER LET FOREIGN AIRCRAFT THERE. HE SEEMED LESS ADAMANT ABOUT AIR INSPECTION IN THE NSWP PART OF THE ZONE.

6. THE NEUTRALS WE HAVE CONTACTED SO FAR HAVE REACTED NEGATIVELY TO THE AIR MODALITY. A COUPLE OF KEY INDIVIDUALS WHO WE THOUGHT MIGHT BE HELPFUL ON THE ISSUE CLAIM IT IS NON-NEGOTIABLE. EVEN RAISING THE ISSUE WOULD TOLL THE DEATH KNEEL OF THE CONFERENCE, ONE NNA HEAD OF DELEGATION SAID. THIS IS TYPICAL OF THE NNA AT THE CURRENT STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE; THEY ARE SO AFRAID THAT THE CONFERENCE WILL FAIL THAT THEY ARE UNWILLING EVEN TO STAND UP FOR IDEAS OF THEIR OWN.

7. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PROMOTE BOTH THE NO-ESCAPE CLAUSE AND AIR MODALITY ASPECTS OF VERIFICATION.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05010
 SUBJECT: UK PROPOSAL ON AIR ACTIVITIES
 REF: STOCKHOLM 4713

1. CDE XI - 022
2. C-ENTIRE TEXT.

-
 3. SUMMARY: IN PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS, FRANCE, THE FRG, AND THE US COMMENTED ON THE UK IDEA FOR A SOLUTION TO THE AIR IMPASSE (REFTEL). THE RESPONSE WAS MIXED WITH THE FRENCH ENDORSING THE CONCEPT AND THE US AND FRG VOICING SEVERAL CONCERNS. THE DISCUSSION REAFFIRMED THAT THIS APPROACH COULD CAUSE SERIOUS VERIFICATION PROBLEMS. END SUMMARY.

4. SPEAKING ON INSTRUCTIONS, THE FRENCH CDE DEPUTY (PAGANON) INFORMED US THAT FRANCE COULD ACCEPT THE UK CONCEPT. PARIS BELIEVES THAT THE SUBTHRESHOLD APPROACH IS PREFERABLE AND SHOULD BE KEPT ON THE TABLE FOR TACTICAL REASONS, SO THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE TO PAY A PRICE FOR AN APPROACH THEY WOULD PREFER. THEY ARE CONCERNED THAT THE UK APPROACH COULD MAKE AIR THE TRIGGER ELEMENT FOR NOTIFICATION IN SOME CASES (I.E., THE FRENCH AIREX EXERCISE WHICH HAS OVER 700 SORTIES AND TWO REGIMENTS INVOLVED, BUT WHICH WOULD NOT REQUIRE NOTIFICATION UNDER OUR CURRENT THRESHOLD, OR A COMBINED STRUCTURE-TROOPS OR STRUCTURE-TANKS THRESHOLD). PAGANON INDICATED THAT FRENCH POSITION IN MOSCOW WILL BE THAT THE BEST SOLUTION TO THE AIR ISSUE IS A SUBTHRESHOLD, BUT THAT FRENCH WILL FIELD THE BRITISH IDEA IN THE CONTEXT OF A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION WHICH INCLUDES A LOWER STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD AND NO REFERENCE TO NAVAL ACTIVITIES.

5. FRANCE ALSO SEES TWO PROBLEMS IN NEGOTIATING SUCH AN APPROACH: IT COULD RESULT IN THE WEAKENING OF THE STRUCTURAL PART OF THE THRESHOLD WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY INCREASING THE CURRENCY OF THE NUMERICAL; AND, IT COULD UNDERMINE OUR DEFINITION OF DIVISION EQUIVALENT (A DIVISION CAN BE DEFINED IN TERMS OF MANPOWER AND TANKS BUT NOT IN TERMS OF AIR SORTIES).

6. THE FRENCH SAW LESS PROBLEM WITH AN "OPTICAL" TRIGGER IF IT DID NOT IN FACT CAUSE NOTIFICATION OF AN ACTIVITY BASED ON THE AIR COMPONENT. THE US (BARRY)

-
 INDICATED THAT EVEN AN OPTICAL TRIGGER IS IN CONFLICT WITH THE US VIEW OF THE MANDATE AND COULD ACT TO UNDERMINE OUR POSITION ON THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. HE ALSO SAID THAT ANY AIR TRIGGER RAISED THE PROBLEM OF VERIFICATION; THERE WAS NO WAY TO "INSPECT" A NUMBER OF SORTIES. THE SUBTHRESHOLD APPROACH TRIGGERED INFORMATION, NOT NOTIFICATION, AND THUS DID NOT RAISE THE SAME PROBLEM. THE UK, FRANCE AND THE FRG DISAGREE WITH THE MORE NARROW US INTERPRETATION OF THE

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, BUT AGREE THAT THE VERIFICATION PROBLEM RAISED BY THE US WAS A THORNY ISSUE. THE US FURTHER ARGUED AGAINST AIR AS AN INDEPENDENT TRIGGER FOR NOTIFICATION BY POINTING TO THE MUTUAL INTEREST IN US REINFORCEMENT FLEXIBILITY.

7. THE FRG (CITRON) ALSO TELLS US THEY ARE AGAINST AN INDEPENDENT TRIGGER AND URGED THAT ALLIES STAY CLOSE TOGETHER ON THIS ISSUE. COMMENT: WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED PRIVATELY THAT MOD BONN WILL SUPPORT THE US POSITION ON AIR STAUNCHLY, ALTHOUGH THE GERMANS THEMSELVES ARE NOT OPPOSED TO A MORE FLEXIBLE SOLUTION. THE FRG CDE DELEGATION IS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO SUPPORT US IN AN EFFORT TO AVOID THE ISOLATION OF THE US AND DIVISION OF THE ALLIANCE ON THIS, OR ANY OTHER, ISSUE. END COMMENT.

8. THE UK IS NOW ARGUING RATHER STRONGLY FOR ITS PROPOSAL, WHICH WE HAVE SAID REMAINS UNDER REVIEW IN WASHINGTON. WE DO NOT EXPECT ANY OF THE CLOSE ALLIES TO BEGIN ARGUING FOR THE PROPOSAL IN THE CORRIDORS, BUT WE GATHER IT HAS BEEN THOUGHT OF INDEPENDENTLY BY AMB LIDGARD (SWEDEN, B-1 COORDINATOR) AND THUS MAY EMERGE IN ANY CASE.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05049

SUBJECT: SIGNS OF GROWING EASTERN DISSATISFACTION WITH
- SOVIET TACTICS AT THE CDE

1. CDE XI - 023
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. BEGIN SUMMARY: RECENT INDICATIONS ARE THAT SOME OF THE USSR'S EAST EUROPEAN ALLIES (MOST NOTABLY POLAND) ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY DISSATISFIED WITH THE PACE OF WORK IN STOCKHOLM AND DO NOT EXEMPT THEIR BIG BROTHER FROM BLAME. INFORMAL CONTACTS HAVE REVEALED THAT SOME EASTERNERS, WHO ARE CLEARLY MORE INTERESTED THAN MOSCOW IN A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME IN STOCKHOLM, FEEL THEY ARE BEING IGNORED ON SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS AND SLIGHTED IN OTHER AREAS. WHILE WE CANNOT EXPECT TO REAP ANY MAJOR GAINS FROM EAST EUROPEAN DISSATISFACTION, IT MAY PRESENT US WITH SOME TACTICAL OPPORTUNITIES TO ISOLATE THE EAST ON SPECIFIC ISSUES. END SUMMARY.

4. RECENTLY USDEL HAS NOTED INCREASING SIGNS OF FRUSTRATION WITH THE PACE OF THE CDE AMONG THE NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT DELEGATIONS. WHILE IN PUBLIC THEY CONTINUE TO PARROT THE SOVIET LINE THAT THE WEST IS RESPONSIBLE FOR FOOTDRAGGING IN STOCKHOLM, IN PRIVATE THEY ARE GROWING INCREASINGLY PERTURBED OVER SOVIET TACTICS AS WELL. FOR EXAMPLE:

-- WE HAVE HEARD COMPLAINTS FROM SEVERAL EASTERNERS OVER THE RECENT ACTION OF THE SOVIET MILREP (TATARNIKOV) WHO TORPEDOED NOTATION OF AN INNOCUOUS TEXT ON OBSERVATION BY INSISTING THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS ACCEPT THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL DEFINITION OF THE WORD "TERRITORY" AS A PRECONDITION FOR EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE TEXT. THAT DEFINITION, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE LAND, AIRSPACE AND TERRITORIAL WATERS OF A STATE, IS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST AS IT WOULD UNDERMINE THE ZONE OF APPLICATION AS AGREED IN THE MADRID MANDATE. WE HAVE LEARNED THAT THE OTHER EASTERNERS HAD RECOMMENDED AGAINST THIS COURSE OF ACTION IN THE WARSAW PACT CAUCUS AND WERE NOT AT ALL PLEASED THAT THE SOVIETS BLOCKED DRAFTING OVER AN ISSUE THEY VIEWED AS A NON-STARTER. POLISH AMBASSADOR KONARSKI TOLD AMBASSADOR BARRY (U.S.) THAT HE HAD PERSONALLY RECOMMENDED AGAINST RAISING THIS ISSUE BUT WAS IGNORED BY THE SOVIET MILREP.

-- EASTERN AMBASSADORS WERE SLIGHTED BY THE SOVIETS WHEN AMBASSADOR GRINVESKY (USSR) DEPARTED SUDDENLY FOR MOSCOW TO ASSIST IN PREPARATIONS FOR THE MITTERAND VISIT IN JULY. WE HAVE LEARNED FROM THE BULGARIAN AMBASSADOR (TODOROV) THAT NOT ONLY HAD THE SOVIETS NOT INFORMED THEIR ALLIES OF GRINVESKY'S DEPARTURE, BUT THAT HE, TODOROV, HAD LEARNED ABOUT IT FROM THE FRG AMBASSADOR. TODOROV WAS CLEARLY PIQUED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD KEPT THE

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

FRG BETTER INFORMED THAN THEIR WARSAW PACT PARTNERS.
 -- IN PRELIMINARY COFFEE GROUP DISCUSSION OF THE WEST'S (AND NNA'S) ERGA OMNES LANGUAGE FOR USE IN A NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF) TEXT, THE EASTERNERS HAVE PROVIDED THE SOVIETS LITTLE OR NO SUPPORT IN REJECTING SUCH A TEXT. (NOTE: THE ERGA OMNES LANGUAGE IS, IN EFFECT, ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE LANGUAGE, COMMITTING STATES NOT TO THREATEN OR USE FORCE AGAINST THEIR ALLIANCE PARTNERS AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.) THE LACK OF EASTERN SUPPORT, COMBINED WITH THE FACT THAT THE EAST HAS ALREADY ACCEPTED THE ERGA OMNES PRINCIPLE IN THE NOTED NUF REAFFIRMATION PARAGRAPH, IS MAKING IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIETS TO OPPOSE THE NOTATION OF AN ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE SENTENCE.

-- GDR AMBASSADOR BUHRING TOLD AMBASSADOR BARRY THAT THE CHERNOBYL REACTOR ACCIDENT HAD SENSITIZED HIM TO THE IMPORTANCE OF INCREASED OPENNESS, THAT IS, IN CDE CONTEXT, TO THE NEED FOR INCREASED EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION.

5. ON JUNE 24, KONARSKI (POLAND) PROVIDED THE MOST EXPLICIT STATEMENT TO DATE OF EASTERN DISSATISFACTION WHEN HE INFORMALLY TOLD BARRY THAT WARSAW WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT POTENTIAL FAILURE OF THE CDE AND HAD INSTRUCTED HIM TO DO WHAT HE COULD TO SAVE THE CONFERENCE. KONARSKI MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-
- HE DIDN'T DISPUTE THAT THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF WAS DRAGGING ITS FEET.
- HE IMPLIED THAT THE EAST EUROPEANS HAD BEEN PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE NNA'S RECENT GROUND FORCE THRESHOLD PROPOSAL AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN THE NOTIFICATION GROUP BUT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD VETOED IT.
- HE DID NOT ANTICIPATE THAT GRINEVSKY (USSR) WOULD COME BACK FROM MOSCOW WITH ANYTHING NEW TO OFFER.
- HE (KONARSKI) IS TRYING TO PROMOTE ANOTHER NNA INITIATIVE ON NOTIFICATION TO BREAK THE LOGJAM OVER AIR/COMBINED ARMS PARAMETERS. INTERESTINGLY, HE CLAIMS NOT TO KNOW HOW GRINEVSKY WILL REACT.

6. IT SEEMS THAT, WITH THE END OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE NOW IN SIGHT, THE SOVIETS ARE GATHERING IN ALL THE REINS FOR THE STRETCH RUN AND THAT EASTERN VIEWS AND SENSIBILITIES WILL BE INCREASINGLY IGNORED IN THE RUSH TO THE FINISH. AS THE EASTERN EUROPEANS ARE CLEARLY MORE INTERESTED IN AN AGREEMENT THAN THEIR SOVIET MASTERS, THEIR FRUSTRATION IS ONLY LIKELY TO INCREASE. AND WHILE WE CANNOT ANTICIPATE ANY SIGNIFICANT GAINS FROM EASTERN DISSATISFACTION, IT MAY PRESENT US WITH SOME ADDITIONAL TACTICAL OPPORTUNITIES TO ISOLATE THE EAST ON SPECIFIC ISSUES.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05028
SUBJECT: CDE: LANGUAGE NOTED IN NOTIFICATION WORKING
GROUP

1. CDE XI - 024.

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE, FOR INCLUSION IN THE
"CONTENTS OF NOTIFICATION" WAS PROVISIONALLY NOTED
IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK AT THE JUNE 24
MEETING OF THE NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP:
BEGIN TEXT.

"...

- CHANGES, IF ANY, IN RELATION TO INFORMATION PROVIDED IN
THE ANNUAL CALENDAR REGARDING THE ACTIVITY

- RELATIONSHIP OF THE ACTIVITY TO OTHER NOTIFIABLE
ACTIVITIES." END TEXT. BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05068
 C O R R E C T E D C O P Y T E X T
 O R I G I N A L L Y P R O C E S S E D A S 1333108.

SUBJECT: CDE: SOVIET "IDEA" ON AIR

1. THE FRG HAS BRIEFED US ON AN "IDEA" FLOATED BY SOVIET MILREP GENERAL TATARNIKOV AT LUNCH WITH CDE REP CITRON ON JUNE 24.

2. TATARNIKOV SUGGESTED THAT ONE WAY OUT OF THE CURRENT IMPASSE OVER AIR ACTIVITIES MIGHT BE PARALLEL SIMULTANEOUS NOTIFICATION OF THE GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY AND A RELATED AIR ACTIVITY. HE DID NOT PROVIDE MUCH DETAIL ON THE IDEA BUT SEEMED TO SUGGEST THAT RELATED ACTIVITIES (E.G., COLD FIRE-DEFIANT SAXON) COULD BE SEPARATELY FORECAST AND NOTIFIED AND THAT OBSERVERS COULD BE INVITED SEPARATELY TO BOTH GROUND AND AIR ASPECTS OF THE ACTIVITY.

3. FRG AMBASSADOR CITRON TOLD US THAT HIS REACTION WAS NONCOMMITTAL AND FOCUSED ON THE PROBLEM OF INVITING TWO TEAMS OF OBSERVERS TO TWO PHASES OF THE SAME ACTIVITY. CITRON REPEATED THAT THE FRG WOULD FOLLOW THE US LEAD ON THE AIR ISSUE AT CDE.

4. BARRY COMMENTED THAT A SEPARATE AIR NOTIFICATION RAISED THE ISSUE OF VERIFICATION, AND THUS THE SUB-THRESHOLD APPROACH WAS PREFERABLE.

5. EVIDENTLY THE SOVIETS ARE STILL SHOPPING AROUND. IN A MEETING WITH THE FRENCH THE NEXT DAY THEY EXPLAINED A VARIATION ON THE SUB-THRESHOLD THEME WHICH INCORPORATED A REFERENCE TO NOTIFYING AIR ACTIVITIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MADRID MANDATE. THE FRENCH EMPHATICALLY REJECTED THAT APPROACH BECAUSE OF THE CLEAR SOVIET INTENTION THAT THIS WOULD CAPTURE INDEPENDENT AIR. WE WILL NOT KNOW WHAT THE SOVIETS ARE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING UNTIL GRINEVSKY RETURNS FROM MOSCOW, NOW PROJECTED FOR JUNE 28.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05069
SUBJECT: AGREED COORDINATOR'S TEXT ON OBSERVATION

- 1. CDE XI - 025
- 2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT IN WORKING GROUP B-2
(OBSERVATION) WHICH WAS AGREED FOR NOTATION IN THE
COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK ON JUNE 26.

BEGIN TEXT:

TOGETHER WITH THE INVITATION THE HOST STATE WILL PROVIDE
A GENERAL OBSERVATION PROGRAM, INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING
INFORMATION:

-
- THE DATE, TIME AND PLACE OF ASSEMBLY OF OBSERVERS;
- PLANNED DURATION OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAM;
- LANGUAGES TO BE USED IN INTERPRETATION AND/OR
TRANSLATION;
- ARRANGEMENTS FOR BOARD, LODGING AND TRANSPORTATION OF
THE OBSERVERS;

--
--

END TEXT.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05076

SUBJECT: CDE: AIR INSPECTION MODALITY

1. THE FRG HAS OFFERED TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF A POSSIBLE NEUTRAL ROLE IN A CDE AIR MODALITY AT A HIGH LEVEL WITH THE AUSTRIANS IN VIENNA, AND WE HAVE ENCOURAGED THEM TO DO SO.

2. MEANWHILE THEY HAVE INQUIRED AS TO US VIEWS ON BURDEN-SHARING THE COST OF MAINTAINING NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT FOR CDE INSPECTION PURPOSES. ANY GUIDANCE WHICH WASHINGTON COULD OFFER WOULD BE APPRECIATED (E.G. WOULD THE US BE WILLING TO SHARE THE COST ON THE SAME BASIS AS THE FORMULA FOR COST-SHARING IN CSCE ACTIVITIES?)

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

- C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05077
 SUBJECT: FRENCH CONSULTATIONS IN MOSCOW
1. CDE XI -26.
 2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
 3. SUMMARY: FRENCH CDE DEPUTY PROVIDED USDEL WITH OUTLINE OF SUBJECTS DISCUSSED BETWEEN QUAI'S D'ABOVILLE AND SOVIET OFFICIAL MENDELEVICH DURING FORMER'S RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW FOR FRENCH-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS TO PREPARE FOR THE JULY MITTERAND-GORBACHEV SUMMIT. FRENCH WILL PROPOSE THAT WORK IN STOCKHOLM CONTINUE PAST THE AGREED END OF THIS SESSION, JULY 18, AND INTEND THAT A SUMMIT DECLARATION WILL INDICATE INSTRUCTIONS TO SOVIET AND FRENCH DELEGATIONS TO INTENSIFY THEIR WORK (POSSIBLY BY CONTINUING INTO THE FORESEEN SUMMER BREAK PERIOD). THE FRENCH WANT NATO TO GIVE "PUBLIC SIGNALS" OF FLEXIBILITY IN AN AGREED STATEMENT NEXT WEEK. END SUMMARY
 4. FRENCH CDE DEPUTY FELIX-PAGANON INFORMED U.S. AMB HANSEN THAT D'ABOVILLE HAD BEEN TOLD IN MOSCOW THAT VLADIMIR LOMEYKO HAD STATED THAT HE HAD BEEN NAMED TO HEAD THE SOVIET CDE DELEGATION. HIS REPLACEMENT AS MFA SPOKESMAN IS GERASIMOV OF APN. (COMMENT: GRINEVSKY DEPARTED STOCKHOLM FOR MOSCOW ON 20 JUNE WITH NO PRIOR NOTIFICATION. MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION STATED THAT HIS DEPARTURE WAS CONNECTED WITH PREPARATIONS FOR THE FRENCH-SOVIET SUMMIT; THEY HAVE BEEN ADAMANT, HOWEVER, IN DENYING THAT HE IS TO BE REPLACED; HE IS SUPPOSED TO RETURN 28 JUNE. END COMMENT.)
 5. IN CONNECTION WITH CDE, D'ABOVILLE WAS REPORTED TO HAVE SEEN MENDELEVICH AND AN UNNAMED DEPUTY. MENDELEVICH EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE CURRENT STALEMATE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND INTERPRETED THIS A POSSIBLE U.S. TACTIC TO REPEAT THE BERN EXPERIENCE, DENYING AN AGREEMENT AT STOCKHOLM. THE FRENCH LAID THE BLAME ON THE SOVIET DELEGATION, EXPRESSING THE VIEW THAT THE SOVIETS WANTED TO LEAVE EVERYTHING TO THE ENDGAME IN STOCKHOLM. MENDELEVICH REPORTEDLY AGREED WITH FRENCH THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE IN ANYONE'S INTEREST AND THEREFORE THE DRAFTING PROCESS MUST BE INTENSIFIED IN STOCKHOLM WITH THE AIM OF RESOLVING MAJOR ISSUES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. FRENCH SUGGESTED THAT WORK MIGHT CONTINUE AFTER THE END OF THE CURRENT SESSION, JULY 18. MENDELEVICH REPORTEDLY SHOWED INTEREST IN THIS IDEA. (COMMENT: FRENCH IDEAS REGARDING THE SUMMIT ARE TO FOCUS ON PROCEDURAL RATHER THAN SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO CDE. THUS, THEY HOPE THAT THE SUMMIT DECLARATION WILL INCLUDE A JOINT EXHORTATION TO INTENSIFY THE WORK IN STOCKHOLM, I.E., TO WORK DURING THE SCHEDULED SUMMER BREAK. HOWEVER, THE FRENCH HAVE ENCOUNTERED STRONG RESISTANCE TO THIS IDEA IN STOCKHOLM AND MAY BACK OFF.) END COMMENT)
 6. D'ABOVILLE EMPHASIZED TO MENDELEVICH THE NECESSITY OF AN OUTCOME AT STOCKHOLM WHICH INCLUDED THE RIGHT TO

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

ON-SITE VERIFICATION. THE SOVIETS EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THIS WOULD BE LIKE PULLING TEETH. TO THIS, THE FRENCH REPLIED THAT IT WAS TIME TO PULL TEETH BUT THAT THE ANESTHESIA MIGHT BE FOUND IN REASONABLE MODALITIES FOR ON-SITE VERIFICATION. FRENCH MADE CLEAR THAT THE RIGHT TO VERIFY MUST BE AVAILABLE TO EACH CDE PARTICIPANT, BUT THAT A PASSIVE QUOTA (I.E., A LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS ANY STATE WILL BE REQUIRED TO ACCEPT) MIGHT BE POSSIBLE. D'ABOVILLE ALSO ALLUDED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A PENALTY IN THE EVENT THAT A REQUEST FOR ON-SITE VERIFICATION WERE DENIED, IMPLYING A TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF OBLIGATION, PENDING AD HOC CONSULTATIONS AFTER A REQUEST HAD BEEN TURNED DOWN. FRENCH ALSO CHALLENGED SOVIETS TO THINK ABOUT WHAT KIND OF ON-SITE VERIFICATION WOULD BE MOST ACCEPTABLE, FROM THE AIR OR FROM THE GROUND.

7. THE QUAI, I.E., D'ABOVILLE, BELIEVES IT IS TIME TO GIVE SOME PUBLIC SIGNALS REGARDING WESTERN FLEXIBILITY IN STOCKHOLM. SUCH SIGNALS, IN THE FRENCH VIEW, SHOULD BE CONVEYED IN A PUBLIC STATEMENT NEXT WEEK AND COULD INCLUDE: ACCEPTANCE OF THE NNA THRESHOLD FORMULA AS A BASIS FOR DRAFTING; MOVE FROM THE 6000 THRESHOLD WITHOUT NAMING ANY NEW NUMERICAL FIGURE; ABANDONMENT OF THE PROPOSAL TO NOTIFY MOBILIZATIONS; AGREEMENT TO LIMIT THE DURATION OF OBSERVATION (I.E., EITHER TO THE MAIN EXERCISE PHASE OF THE ACTIVITY OR DURING THE PERIOD THAT THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD IS EXCEEDED.); AND A REDUCTION IN THE ACTIVE QUOTA FOR INSPECTIONS FROM TWO TO ONE PER STATE AS WELL AS THE ACCEPTANCE OF A PASSIVE QUOTA. (COMMENT: USDEL IS OF THE VIEW THAT WE HAVE REACHED THE TIME IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHEN A PUBLIC SIGNAL OF THIS NATURE COULD BE POLITICALLY USEFUL, BUT WE SENSE THAT THE LIST MIGHT BE PARED DOWN DURING CAUCUS DISCUSSIONS. WE HAVE SAID THAT WE BELIEVE THE PASSIVE QUOTA OF INSPECTIONS, IN PARTICULAR, SHOULD BE WITHHELD FOR LATER BARGAINING. END COMMENT)

BARRY
 END OF MESSAGE
 NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

S E C R E T STATE 209382

SUBJECT: CONSULTING WITH THE FRENCH ON CDE

REF: A. STOCKHOLM 5077, B. PARIS 29815

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: AS PART OF OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE FRENCH ON EAST-WEST AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES IN ADVANCE OF PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S JULY 7-10 VISIT TO MOSCOW, EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO EXCHANGE ASSESSMENTS AGAIN ON CDE. SOVIET CDE NEGOTIATOR GRINEVSKY'S RECENT CONSULTATIONS IN MOSCOW, REPORTEDLY TO PREPARE FOR THE MITTERRAND VISIT, INDICATE THAT THE CDE IS LIKELY TO FIGURE IN THE MOSCOW TALKS. DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS IN PARA 3, EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO UPDATE GOF ON US VIEWS AND SEEK A READING OF FRENCH OBJECTIVES FOR THE MITTERRAND VISIT. END SUMMARY.

3. TALKING POINTS

 -- THREE WEEKS INTO THE CURRENT CDE ROUND, WE BELIEVE THE PROSPECTS FOR AGREEMENT ARE NOT GOOD.

-- WE HAVE SEEN NO EVIDENCE THAT DECLARED SOVIET INTEREST IN A CDE PHASE II ON DISARMAMENT HAS BEEN TRANSLATED INTO MORE CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORTS IN STOCKHOLM. IN FACT, THE SOVIETS APPEAR TO BE IN NO HURRY TO RESOLVE THE MAIN ISSUES BLOCKING PROGRESS.

-- THIS MAY REPRESENT A TACTICAL DECISION TO WITHHOLD KEY CONCESSIONS UNTIL THE ELEVENTH HOUR ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT PUBLIC PRESSURES WILL GROW ON THE WEST TO ACCEPT A MINIMAL AGREEMENT. THOSE TACTICS WILL PUT A PREMIUM ON ALLIED UNITY.

-- IN VIEW OF SOVIET FOOTDRAGGING IN STOCKHOLM -- ESPECIALLY BY THE SOVIET MILITARY -- PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S VISIT MAY BE THE BEST OPPORTUNITY TO UNDERSCORE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL THAT THE CDE WILL BE A TEST OF SOVIET SERIOUSNESS ON ARMS CONTROL.

-- THE SOVIETS MAY HOPE THAT FRANCE'S WELL-KNOWN VIEWS ON MBFR WILL MAKE YOU EAGER TO CONCLUDE PHASE I OF CDE IN ORDER TO MOVE ON TO A REDUCTIONS PHASE. WE KNOW HOW STRONGLY YOU FEEL THAT A SOLID, MILITARILY-SIGNIFICANT PHASE I ON CSBMS IS AN ABSOLUTE PRECONDITION FOR ANY CONSIDERATION OF EXPANDING THE PRESENT MANDATE. PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S PERSONAL DELIVERY OF THIS MESSAGE COULD BE VERY IMPORTANT IN DISPELLING SOVIET HOPES THAT SOME ALLIES MIGHT SETTLE IN THE END FOR A MINI-PACKAGE.

-- WE ARE PREPARED TO MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM THAT IS VERIFIABLE AND MARKS A SIGNIFICANT ADVANCE OVER THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

-- WE ARE PREPARED TO INTENSIFY THE DRAFTING PROCESS, AS YOU HAVE SUGGESTED (REF A, PARA 5), IN ORDER TO RESOLVE MAJOR ISSUES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

-- BUT WE MUST ALSO MAKE CLEAR TO THE EAST AND THE NNA THAT WE ARE UNWILLING TO ACCEPT AN OUTCOME WHICH DOES NOT MEET

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

OUR REQUIREMENTS. WE MUST BE PREPARED, IF NECESSARY, TO GO TO VIENNA WITHOUT A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT.

-- OUR DELEGATIONS IN STOCKHOLM ARE STAYING IN CLOSE TOUCH AS THE NEGOTIATIONS PROCEED.

-- WISH TO UNDERSCORE SOME OF THE POINTS WE HAVE BEEN MAKING IN STOCKHOLM:

. O IMPORTANT THAT THE SOVIETS UNDERSTAND THAT ALLIES VIEW PROGRESS AT THE CDE AS A TEST OF THEIR SERIOUSNESS IN PURSUING BROADER CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL. FAILURE TO ACHIEVE A VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT ON CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES IN STOCKHOLM WILL PRECLUDE MOVING ON TO MORE AMBITIOUS PROPOSALS FOR REDUCTIONS.

. O THE KEY TO FURTHER PROGRESS IS DECIDING ON THE GROUND FORCE THRESHOLDS. A NUMERICAL THRESHOLD ALONE IS NOT ACCEPTABLE BECAUSE IT IS UNVERIFIABLE. WE URGE CONSIDERATION OF A COMBINATION OF STRUCTURE, MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT WHICH WOULD RESULT IN EQUITABLE TREATMENT FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS.

. O IN RESOLVING THE AIR ISSUE, WE STILL BELIEVE THE BEST APPROACH IS TO PRESS THE SOVIETS TO NOTIFY ALL FUNCTIONALLY-RELATED AIR ACTIVITIES. BUT WE ARE CONSIDERING A SUB-THRESHOLD BELOW WHICH FUNCTIONALLY-RELATED AIR ACTIVITIES WOULD NOT NEED TO BE REPORTED. WE CANNOT ACCEPT AN INDEPENDENT TRIGGER FOR NOTIFICATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES.

. O WE SHOULD SET ASIDE ISSUES, SUCH AS CONSTRAINTS AND INSTITUTIONALIZED CONSULTATIONS, WHICH CANNOT BE AGREED UPON IN THIS PHASE OF CDE .

. O WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY ABOUT THE NEED FOR VERIFICATION. INSPECTION IS THE ONLY FORM OF VERIFICATION AVAILABLE TO ALL CDE PARTICIPANTS AND MUST BE PROVIDED FOR IN ANY CONCLUDING DOCUMENT THE U.S. WILL AGREE TO IN STOCKHOLM.

-- WOULD WELCOME YOUR READING OF SOVIET APPROACH TO CDE ENDGAME AND LIKELY TACK GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV WILL TAKE WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND DURING HIS MOSCOW DISCUSSIONS.

-- HOW DO YOU INTEND TO APPROACH CDE IN THOSE DISCUSSIONS?

SHULTZ

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05088
SUBJECT: EASTERN COMMENTS ON LENGTH OF VIENNA CSCE
1. CDE XI - 027
2. FOLLOWING THE VISIT TO STOCKHOLM OF US CSCE
DELEGATION HEAD WARREN ZIMMERMAN, SEVERAL EASTERN CDE
REPRESENTATIVES HAVE TOLD US THAT THE U.S. POSITION
THAT THE VIENNA CSCE REVIEW MEETING SHOULD END AFTER
NINE MONTHS OR A YEAR SEEMS TO BE DESIGNED TO RESTRICT
DISCUSSION IN VIENNA OF THE BUDAPEST APPEAL ON
CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTION. WE HAVE REFUTED THIS
CHARGE, NOTING THAT OUR POSITION ON THE LENGTH OF THE
REVIEW MEETING WAS ESTABLISHED LONG BEFORE THE BUDAPEST
APPEAL WAS ISSUED ON JUNE 11.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE
NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 05104

SUBJECT: PROSPECTS FOR CDE

1. IN THE THIRD WEEK OF THE PENULTIMATE CDE ROUND, EVERYONE HERE IS WAITING FOR GRINEVSKY TO RETURN FROM MOSCOW WITH A SIGNAL OF SOVIET INTENTIONS FOLLOWING POLITBURO CONSIDERATION OF CDE ISSUES JUNE 27. IN MY VIEW THE REAL QUESTION IS WHETHER THEY ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT A LIMITED BUT EFFECTIVE INSPECTION REGIME; THIS WAS PROBABLY THE CENTRAL QUESTION FOR TOP LEVEL DECISION IN MOSCOW. IF THE SOVIETS CANNOT ACCEPT INSPECTION, THEIR DELEGATION HERE WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO STALL, USING AIR, TRANSFERS/TRANSITS, CONSTRAINTS, ETC. AS BLOCKING DEVICES. IF THEY ARE PREPARED TO FACE THE VERIFICATION

-
MUSIC, THEY WILL PROBABLY EASE THE LOG JAM. THE REASON THEY HAVE BEEN DRAGGING THEIR FEET SO FAR IS BECAUSE THEY DON'T WANT TO SEE THE CONFERENCE FAIL ON THE VERIFICATION ISSUE, THUS DEMONSTRATING THAT GORBACHEV'S PROMISES OF A "NEW LOOK" IN ARMS CONTROL ARE EMPTY. THEIR POSITIONS ON AIR, CONSTRAINTS, ETC. ARE EASIER TO DEFEND PUBLICLY THAN A REFUSAL TO AGREE TO INSPECTION.

2. I THINK THE SOVIETS UNDERSTAND THE FOLLOWING KEY ELEMENTS IN THE CURRENT WESTERN POSITION:

-- THERE WILL BE NO BERN IN STOCKHOLM; THE ALLIES WILL NOT ALLOW THE US TO BE ISOLATED ON SECURITY ISSUES;

-- THERE CAN BE NO "ESCAPE FORWARD" INTO A CDE PHASE II WITH AN ARMS REDUCTION MANDATE UNLESS THERE IS A PHASE I AGREEMENT;

-- THE WEST WON'T ACCEPT A PACKAGE OF CSBMS WITHOUT INSPECTION.

3. THE MAIN QUESTION IS WHETHER THE SOVIET MILITARY CAN BE BROUGHT TO SWALLOW THIS BITTER PILL. IN THAT SENSE STOCKHOLM REALLY IS A TEST OF SOVIET INTENTIONS ON ARMS CONTROL.

- ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE SOVIETS MAY ABANDON THEIR DEFENSIVE POSITIONS AND TAKE THE TEST, HERE IS WHAT I THINK MAY BE ATTAINABLE IN THE END:

- A PRETTY SOLID FORECASTING MEASURE, WHICH MAY INCLUDE SOME CONSTRAINING ELEMENTS, E.G., A COMMITMENT TO FORECAST LARGE ACTIVITIES TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE.

- NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES BASED ON A COMBINED STRUCTURAL/NUMERICAL PARAMETER. I DOUBT THAT WE CAN GET THE NUMERICAL PARAMETER DOWN TO THE 10,000-12,000 RANGE WE NEED, BUT AS AN ALTERNATIVE WE COULD PROBABLY GET AGREEMENT TO A MINIMUM QUOTA OF NOTIFICATIONS BY THE WTO WITH SOME IN THE NEW CDE ZONE.

-
- OBSERVATION OF AT LEAST 50 PERCENT OF NOTIFIED GROUND ACTIVITIES (AT LEAST ONE IN THE NEW ZONE) WITH AGREED PROVISIONS ON WHAT OBSERVERS ARE TO SEE AND DO;

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

A SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT IN THE OBSERVATION REGIME.

- RESOLUTION OF THE AIR PROBLEM IN AN OUTWARDLY AMBIGUOUS FASHION WHICH WILL NOT RESULT IN THE DE FACTO NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES.
- AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION RELEVANT TO A NOTIFICATION BUT NO SIGNIFICANT STATIC INFORMATION.
- PROTECTION OF THE US POSITION ON TRANSITS, BUT A WRITTEN FORMULATION COMMITTING US TO NOTIFY REFORGER ON THE BASIS OF THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT CONTAINED IN THE WESTERN PROPOSAL.
- A VAGUE PARAGRAPH POSTPONING THE CONSTRAINTS ISSUE AND POSSIBLY OTHERS UNTIL THE FUTURE.
- A VERIFICATION REGIME WITH THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:
 - A) RIGHT TO INSPECTION WITH NO ESCAPE CLAUSE; REFUSAL OF AN INSPECTION WOULD INCUR SUBSTANTIAL POLITICAL PENALTY, POSSIBLY INCLUDING THE SUSPENSION OF SOME PROVISIONS TO THE AGREEMENT;
 - B) A PASSIVE QUOTA: A REQUIREMENT THAT EACH PARTICIPATING STATE ACCEPT A LIMITED NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS FROM THOSE NOT MEMBERS OF THE SAME ALLIANCE;
 - C) LESS THAN IDEAL INSPECTION MODALITIES INCLUDING RESTRICTED AREAS BROAD ENOUGH TO MAKE INSPECTION PROBLEMATIC;
 - D) SPECIFICATION OF MEANS TO ENHANCE COMPLIANCE IN ADDITION TO INSPECTION WITH THE QUALIFICATION THAT THE CHOICE OF MEANS IS UP TO THE INSPECTING STATE; PERHAPS INCLUDING A PROVISION FOR EX POST FACTO CONSULTATION.
-
- E) A NON-USE OF FORCE SECTION LARGELY REFLECTING A WESTERN APPROACH TO SECURITY, INCLUDING LANGUAGE ON COMPLIANCE, TERRORISM AND THE ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE PRINCIPLE; HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE CAN BE OBTAINED IF WE ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT LANGUAGE ON MILITARY FORCE.

5. I WANTED TO FLAG THIS OUTLINE OF AN AGREEMENT IN CASE THE POLICY LEVEL IN WASHINGTON THINKS ELEMENTS ARE CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE. WE ARE NOT INVITING ADVICE TO TRY HARDER ON THIS OR THAT ISSUE, THAT IS WHAT WE ARE DOING ALREADY. NOR AM I CLAIMING THAT MY CRYSTAL BALL IS UNCLOSED; THERE MAY BE ELEMENTS IN THE ABOVE OUTLINE WHERE WE CAN DO BETTER OR MAY DO WORSE. FINALLY, IT MAY TURN OUT WHEN GRINEVSKY RETURNS NEXT WEEK THAT "OLD THINKING" AND BUREAUCRATIC CONFUSION IN MOSCOW STILL PREDOMINATES AND WE ARE DOOMED (OR SPARED).

BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05112
 SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, JUNE 23-27, 1986
 REF: A) STOCKHOLM 5028, B) STOCKHOLM 5069

1. CDE XI - 028

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

-

3. BEGIN SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT: WHILE SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY WAS IN MOSCOW, ALLEGEDLY "TO PREPARE FOR THE MITTERAND VISIT" (PROBABLY TO PREPARE FOR A JUNE 26 POLITBURO MEETING WHICH ADDRESSED THE CDE), THE CONFERENCE MADE LITTLE SUBSTANTIVE HEADWAY. THE THORNY -- AND CRUCIAL -- ISSUES OF HOW TO HANDLE AIR ACTIVITIES AND VERIFICATION REMAINED UNRESOLVED. HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS ARE CLEARLY SENSITIVE TO THE CHARGE THAT, IN CONTRAST TO THE NEW SOVIET IMAGE A LA GORBACHEV, THE SOVIET TEAM IN STOCKHOLM FITS INTO THE STOLID "NYET" STEREOTYPE OF THE 1950S. THUS, IN PRIVATE CONTACTS AND ON SOME MARGINAL ISSUES, THE SOVIETS SEEM TO BE LOOKING FOR SOLUTIONS TO SOME PROBLEMS. FOR EXAMPLE, DRAFTING PROGRESS WAS NOTED IN THE OBSERVATION AND NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUPS AND THE EAST MOVED TOWARDS SOME WESTERN POSITIONS ON NON-USE OF FORCE. THE EAST, MOREOVER, QUICKLY RETREATED FROM GDR AMBASSADOR BUHRING'S FRANK PREDICTION TO THE PRESS THAT THE CONFERENCE WOULD FAIL TO PRODUCE A FINAL DOCUMENT BEFORE THE SEPTEMBER DEADLINE AFTER THE NNA AND WEST MADE IT CLEAR THAT THERE COULD NOT EVEN BE CONSIDERATION OF A PHASE II WITHOUT A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF PHASE I. NEVERTHELESS, WITH ONLY EIGHT WORKING WEEKS REMAINING IN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, IF GRINEVSKY RETURNS FROM MOSCOW EMPTY-HANDED, BUHRING'S PROPHECY WILL BE SELF-FULFILLING. END SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT.

4. NOTIFICATION: THERE WAS NO MOVEMENT IN THE CONFERENCE ON THE CRITICAL ISSUES OF PARAMETERS. IN PUBLIC SOVIET MILREP TATARNIKOV HELD FIRM ON SOVIET POSITIONS, NOTABLY IN FAVOR OF A SEPARATE AIR PARAMETER WHICH WOULD TRIGGER NOTIFICATION. IN THE CORRIDORS MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION FLOATED SEVERAL ALTERNATIVES:

-
 - 1) TWO SIMULTANEOUS, PARALLEL NOTIFICATIONS, ONE FOR GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES, THE OTHER FOR THE AIR COMPONENT OF COMBINED ARMS ACTIVITIES;

- 2) THE ADDITION OF A THIRD (AIR) PARAMETER -- WHICH WOULD BE A NOTIFICATION TRIGGER -- TO THE NNA PARAMETER PROPOSAL WHICH ALREADY INCLUDES PARAMETERS FOR THE NUMBERS OF TROOPS AND TANKS (THIS CONCEPT SEEMS TO CLOSELY RESEMBLE THE UK IDEA RECENTLY FLOATED WITH CLOSE ALLIES);

- 3) TWO PARAMETERS: A GROUND FORCE PARAMETER WHICH ALONE WOULD TRIGGER NOTIFICATION AND A SEPARATE

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

COMBINATION GROUND AND AIR FORCE PARAMETERS WITH THE GROUND FORCE PARAMETER SET AT A LOWER LEVEL SO THAT SOME LARGE-SCALE AIR EXERCISES WITH A RELATIVELY SMALL GROUND FORCE COMPONENT COULD BE COVERED.

- 4) AN AIR PARAMETER ACCOMPANIED BY A LIST OF EXCLUSIONS (E.G., STRATEGIC AIR DEFENSE, ETC.) THIS WEEK THE NNA DEFENDED THEIR GROUND FORCE PARAMETER PROPOSAL IN THE WORKING GROUP. (BEHIND THE SCENES THE NNA HAVE BEEN WRANGLING OVER AN AMPHIBIOUS PARAMETER TO BE PROPOSED IN THE NEAR FUTURE). THIS PROPOSAL, WHICH IS AN IMPROVEMENT OVER THEIR EARLIER SC.7 FORMULATION, IS STILL A CREDIBLE CONTENDER TO SERVE AS A BASIS FOR DRAFTING. THE EAST WAS ISOLATED TO THE POINT WHERE EASTERN DELEGATES FOR THE FIRST TIME ADDRESSED THE NNA PROPOSAL -- ALBEIT WITH THE AIM OF DISCREDITING IT -- IN ORDER NOT TO BE CUT OUT OF THE ACTION ENTIRELY. LANGUAGE WAS NOTED FOR INCLUSION IN THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION (SEE REF A).

-
5. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION: ALTHOUGH NO DRAFTING PROGRESS WAS MADE THIS WEEK, THERE WAS MOVEMENT ON THE PROCEDURAL FRONT AS IT WAS AGREED TO HOLD SEPARATE COFFEE GROUP MEETINGS DEALING RESPECTIVELY WITH THE VARIOUS SUB-ITEMS UNDER A-2'S MANDATE, I.E., EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION, COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION AND MEANS OF COMMUNICATIONS (WHICH ALSO INCLUDES RAPID EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND CONSULTATIONS). WE SEE POTENTIAL ADVANTAGE IN THIS NEW ARRANGEMENT: 1) IT ISOLATES CONSULTATIONS FROM VERIFICATION, THUS MAKING IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE EAST TO ARGUE THAT IT IS A FORM OF VERIFICATION; 2) IT WILL ALLOW DISCUSSION OF THE COORDINATOR'S PROPOSED DRAFTING LANGUAGE ON MODALITIES TO RESUME IN THE COFFEE GROUP (WHILE ISSUES THE SOVIETS HAVE THROWN UP TO BLOCK PROGRESS SUCH AS FORMS OF VERIFICATION ARE EXPLORED IN THE WORKING GROUP); AND 3) IT WILL PROVIDE THE ALLIANCE WITH A DEDICATED FORUM IN WHICH TO EXPLORE THE BEST WAY TO OBTAIN MEASURE 1 TYPE INFORMATION (OF LATE THE EAST HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN AVOIDING OR LIMITING DISCUSSION OF INFORMATION IN THE WORKING GROUP).

SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION ONCE AGAIN FOCUSED ON THE EASTERN TEXT PROVIDING THE RIGHT OF A STATE TO CHOOSE FROM AGREED FORMS OF VERIFICATION. THE WEST PRESSED THE EAST TO IDENTIFY WHAT SUCH "AGREED FORMS" WOULD BE, BUT THE EAST REMAINED EVASIVE, CLAIMING THAT DISCUSSION OF SPECIFIC FORMS OF VERIFICATION MUST AWAIT FURTHER PROGRESS ON THE CSBM'S TO BE VERIFIED. PERHAPS MOST SIGNIFICANTLY, NATO WAS ABLE TO SMOKE OUT THE SOVIETS ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE A FORM OF VERIFICATION WOULD ALSO IMPLY THE RIGHT TO USE IT. ACCORDING TO THE SOVIETS, A REQUESTING STATE WOULD BE ENTITLED TO CHOOSE ANY AGREED FORM OF VERIFICATION WITHOUT ANY LIMITATION,

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

BUT THE RIGHT TO IMPLEMENT ITS CHOICE WOULD DEPEND ON A VARIETY OF FACTORS INCLUDING: THE CSBM'S AGREED; THE FORMS OF VERIFICATION AGREED; AND THE LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO BE AGREED FOR EACH FORM. THE SOVIETS FURTHER QUALIFIED THEIR POSITION BY ARGUING THAT THE VERIFICATION METHOD CHOSEN MUST BE "RELEVANT," AND IMPLYING THAT INSPECTION MAY NOT BE "RELEVANT" FOR CSBM'S.

IN THE FIRST COFFEE GROUP MEETING ON INFORMATION THE WEST PRESSED THE EAST TO EXPLAIN JUST WHAT KIND OF STATIC INFORMATION IT IS PREPARED TO PROVIDE. IN RESPONSE THE EAST MADE IT CLEAR THAT WHAT LITTLE STATIC INFORMATION, IF ANY, THEY MIGHT BE INCLINED TO PROVIDE WOULD BE IN THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION.

6. OBSERVATION: AFTER A SIX-WEEK HIATUS, THE OBSERVATION GROUP GOT BACK ON THE DRAFTING TRACK BY AGREEING TO NOTE A TEXT ON INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED TO OBSERVERS ALONG WITH THE INVITATION (REF B). ELLIPSES APPEAR IN THE TEXT IN PLACE OF THREE ITEMS STILL UNDER DISCUSSION INCLUDING INFORMATION ON OPTICAL EQUIPMENT (I.E., BINOCULARS) OR OTHER SPECIAL EQUIPMENT OBSERVERS WILL BE AUTHORIZED TO BRING WITH THEM (THE EAST CONTINUES TO REJECT THE USE OF PERSONAL BINOCULARS). THE B-2 COFFEE GROUP HAS ALSO TENTATIVELY AGREED ON A FOLLOW-ON TEXT FOR NOTATION NEXT WEEK DEALING WITH INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED AT THE START OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAM. SIGNIFICANTLY, IN THIS TEXT THE EAST HAS ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE THAT OBSERVERS WILL BE PROVIDED WITH A MAP OF THE AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY. THE QUESTION OF THE SCALE OF SUCH MAPS, HOWEVER, REMAINS TO BE RESOLVED AS THE SOVIETS HAVE TIED FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE MATTER TO A DETERMINATION OF THE TYPES OF ACTIVITIES WHICH WILL BE NOTIFIED.

7. CONSTRAINTS/ANNUAL FORECASTS: THE WORKING GROUP AGREED TO ESTABLISH TWO SEPARATE COFFEE GROUPS FOR CONSTRAINING MEASURES AND FORECASTS WITH A REFERENCE TO THE OCTOBER 14 GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT WHICH MAKES IT CLEAR THERE IS AN OBLIGATION TO DISCUSS BUT NOT TO DRAFT ON CONSTRAINING MEASURES. THE ALLIANCE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE MOVE TO COFFEE GROUPS REFLECTS NO CHANGE IN OUR POSITION VIS-A-VIS CONSTRAINTS. NATO PLANS TO USE THE LESS FORMAL COFFEE GROUP TO REEXPLAIN OUR PRINCIPAL MILITARY OBJECTIONS TO CONSTRAINING MEASURES. ALTHOUGH IT APPEARS THAT THE COORDINATOR (SWITZERLAND - JUNOD) WILL TRY TO FOCUS DISCUSSION IN THE CONSTRAINING MEASURES

COFFEE GROUP ON THE SOLE AREA WITH ANY POTENTIAL FOR CONSENSUS, THE CONSTRAINING EFFECT OF THE CALENDAR, OTHERS, BOTH EASTERNERS AND SOME AMONG THE NNA'S (YUGOSLAVIA), PROBABLY WILL PUSH HARD TO DRAFT LANGUAGE

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

ON A COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSTRAINTS. THESE DIVERGENT APPROACHES SUGGEST A ROUGH RIDE FOR THE ALLIANCE, PARTICULARLY IN THE COFFEE GROUP ON CONSTRAINING MEASURES.

8. NON-USE OF FORCE: NO DRAFTING PROGRESS WAS REGISTERED THIS WEEK. HOWEVER, THE COFFEE GROUP AGREED ON A PROVISIONAL TEXT ON THE ERGA OMNES PRINCIPLE, WHICH IS CLEARLY DIRECTED AGAINST THE "BREZHNEV DOCTRINE:" THEY WILL ABIDE BY THEIR COMMITMENT TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH ANY STATE, REGARDLESS OF THIS STATE'S POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC OR CULTURAL SYSTEM AND IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER OR NOT THEY MAINTAIN WITH THIS STATE RELATIONS OF ALLIANCE." WITH APPROPRIATE PROGRESS IN OTHER WORKING GROUPS, THIS TEXT WILL BE REGISTERED NEXT WEEK. ON SELF-DEFENSE, TWO OF OUR CLOSEST NON-NATO FRIENDS WERE AT LOGGERHEADS: THE SWISS INSISTED ON NO REFERENCE TO THE UN CHARTER WHILE THE IRISH CALLED FOR A FULL QUOTATION OF ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER. MEANWHILE, THE EAST, PERHAPS HAVING LOST ITS APPETITE NOW THAT THE WEST AND NNA ARE LARGELY THE CHEFS OF THE NUF MENU, IS CONSPICUOUS BY ITS SILENCE. THE SOVIETS ARE PUTTING OUT THE WORD THAT THE ONLY LANGUAGE THEY WILL INSIST ON IS SOME REFERENCE TO "MILITARY FORCE" AND THAT THEY WILL HOLD HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM DRAFTING HOSTAGE TO AGREEMENT ON "MILITARY" FORCE.

BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 05146

SUBJECT: NATO INITIATIVE IN CDE

1. CDE XI - 30

2. SUMMARY: THE 16 NATO COUNTRIES TODAY 30/06/86) ANNOUNCED A MAJOR INITIATIVE IN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE (CDE) IN AN EFFORT TO BREAK THE CURRENT IMPASSE IN THE CONFERENCE AND TRY TO REACH A SUCCESSFUL RESULT BEFORE ITS SEPTEMBER 19 DEADLINE. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE AMBASSADOR W. T. DELWORTH, WHO SPOKE ON BEHALF OF THE 16. END SUMMARY.

3. BEGIN TEXT: MR. CHAIRMAN: THIS NEGOTIATION IS STILL SPINNING ITS WHEELS ON THE SANDS OF POLITICAL INDECISION, AND TIME IS PASSING QUICKLY. WE ARE HALFWAY THROUGH THIS SESSION WHICH WE HAVE ALL CALLED CRITICAL IN THE SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS BASED ON THE COMMON GROUND IDENTIFIED SO FAR. WE CAN NO LONGER AFFORD TO REPEAT OLD ARGUMENTS, VALID THOUGH SOME OF THEM MAY BE. WE NEED TO REASSESS OUR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE INTERESTS AND PERCEPTIONS EXPRESSED BY OTHERS HERE.

INITIATIVES NOW SEEM CALLED FOR, TO UNBLOCK THE ROAD AHEAD TOWARDS AN AGREEMENT WHICH, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE, WILL BEGIN A PROCESS MEANINGFUL FOR BUILDING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AS WELL AS FOR THE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES.

IN SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE SPONSORS OF SC.1, THE SIXTEEN DELEGATIONS WHICH TOGETHER MADE THE FIRST INITIATIVE AT THIS CONFERENCE, I CAN SAY THAT WE HAVE THEREFORE DECIDED THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE MOVES IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS OF THE NEGOTIATION: NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES HAS OFTEN BEEN DESCRIBED AS THE CORE OF THE AGREEMENT WE HAVE TO ADOPT; THE DEFINITION OF THE THRESHOLDS FOR GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES IS A KEY ELEMENT OF THIS MEASURE. THREE APPROACHES TO THIS PROBLEM HAVE BEEN PRESENTED: ONE PUTS THE EMPHASIS ON STRUCTURES; ANOTHER ON MANPOWER; A THIRD ONE ON "MOBILITY AND FIREPOWER", WHICH IN PRACTICAL TERMS MEANS EQUIPMENT. AN ATTEMPT TO COMBINE THESE THREE APPROACHES WAS RECENTLY MADE BY THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES. WE THINK THAT THIS IS THE RIGHT WAY TO PROCEED, AND WE WOULD LIKE TO DECLARE OUR READINESS TO DRAFT ON THE BASIS OF THE PROPOSAL TABLED BY THE AUSTRIAN DELEGATION ON JUNE 13. WE HOPE OTHERS WILL TAKE A SIMILARLY POSITIVE VIEW. WE MUST, HOWEVER, MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THIS FORMULA AS IT STANDS IS FAR FROM IDEAL FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW. THE ATTEMPT TO EQUAL OUT EXISTING DISPARITIES IN FORCE STRUCTURES BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES -- THAT IS, TO ACHIEVE AN UNDERSTANDING FOR CDE PURPOSES OF WHAT A

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

DIVISION IS -- IS USEFUL. OUR CONCERN, HOWEVER, IS TO FIND A SOLUTION THAT WOULD INCLUDE ALL FORMATIONS OF GROUND FORCES THAT HAVE A MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITY, REGARDLESS OF WHAT PARTICIPATING UNITS MAY BE CALLED. WE BELIEVE AMENDMENTS WILL BE REQUIRED TO THIS END.

THE LEVEL OF THE THRESHOLD IS AN ESSENTIAL ISSUE. OUR APPROACH IS TO EMPHASIZE STRUCTURES, AND THE NUMBER OF TROOPS IS ONLY ONE ELEMENT IN THIS APPROACH. IT HAS BEEN CONTENDED THAT OUR PROPOSAL WOULD RESULT IN AN EXCESSIVE NUMBER OF NOTIFICATIONS PER YEAR. WE DO NOT THINK THAT THE FIGURES WHICH WERE MENTIONED IN SUPPORT OF THIS OBJECTION ARE ACCURATE. BUT WE ARE READY TO CONSIDER RAISING THE NUMERICAL ELEMENT OF THE THRESHOLD BEYOND THE FIGURE OF 6,000 TROOPS. WE SEEK INCREASED CONFIDENCE THROUGH MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT AND VERIFIABLE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH COVER THE WHOLE OF EUROPE. WE ENVISAGE A REASONABLE NUMBER OF NOTIFICATIONS WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE A STEP BEYOND THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. WHAT WE FORESEE IS NOT 300 NOTIFICATIONS PER ANNUM, NOT EVEN 100. WE BELIEVE IT IS A COMMON OBJECTIVE THAT THE NUMBER OF NOTIFICATIONS NOT BE UNNECESSARILY BURDENSOME. WE HAVE TO BUILD CONSTRUCTIVELY UPON THIS COMMON GROUND AND AGREE TO A COMPREHENSIVE THRESHOLD WHICH WOULD CORRESPOND TO THIS SHARED GOAL WITHOUT ENTERING INTO A NUMBERS GAME.

MOREOVER, WE ARE PREPARED TO MAKE ANOTHER MOVE. UNDERSTANDING OF MOBILIZATION PRACTICES THROUGH NOTIFICATION WOULD CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO GREATER STABILITY AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING. HOWEVER, WE HAVE HEARD CONCERN EXPRESSED ON OUR PROPOSAL RELATING TO NOTIFICATION OF MOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES. SOME COUNTRIES WHOSE DEFENCE CAPABILITIES ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY RELY ON THE RECALL OF RESERVISTS HAVE ARGUED THAT SUCH A MEASURE WOULD AFFECT THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS. WE ARE WILLING TO CONSIDER WHETHER WE COULD MEET THIS PREOCCUPATION, BUT WE WOULD EXPECT SIMILAR CONSIDERATION OF OUR CONCERN IN OTHER AREAS SUCH AS CONSTRAINTS WHERE PROVISIONS HAVE BEEN ADVOCATED WHICH, IN TURN, WOULD UNACCEPTABLY AFFECT OUR SECURITY INTERESTS.

I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT ALL THIS WOULD CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT DEPARTURE FROM THE POSITION ESTABLISHED IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED. THE MOVES WE ARE PREPARED TO MAKE ARE PRESENTED IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE OUR NEGOTIATING PARTNERS TO MATCH THEM, INTER ALIA, BY CONTRIBUTING TO SOLVING THE ISSUE OF AIR ACTIVITIES ON THE BASIS OF EXISTING COMMON GROUND.

ON OBSERVATION, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT AGREEMENT

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

TO OBSERVE ALL NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES FROM THEIR BEGINNING TO THEIR END WOULD BE A SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT OVER THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT. BUT, THIS AMBITIOUS AIM HAS RAISED MANY LOGISTICAL AND FINANCIAL OBJECTIONS. IT IS OUR VIEW THAT OBSERVATION SHOULD ASSIST PARTICIPATING STATES IN MEETING THE OVERALL OBJECTIVES OF THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING PROCESS: IT MUST ENABLE THE OBSERVERS TO ASSESS THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF MILITARY ACTIVITY, WHICH OF COURSE DOES NOT IMPLY THAT THE FIRST MAN TO LEAVE AND THE LAST TO RETURN TO NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATIONS SHOULD BE OBSERVED.

HERE AGAIN WE ARE PREPARED TO LOOK SYMPATHETICALLY AT THE ABOVE-MENTIONED OBJECTIONS AND CONSIDER A LIMITATION ON THE DURATION OF OBSERVATION BOTH AS FAR AS ITS STARTING AND ITS ENDING ARE CONCERNED. WE EXPECT THIS MOVE TO ENABLE EVERYBODY BOTH TO AGREE TO A LOW THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION AND TO FACILITATE AGREEMENT ON DETAILED AND SPECIFIC MODALITIES FOR THE OBSERVATION REGIME.

ON VERIFICATION, OUR INSPECTION PROPOSAL MEETS THE MANDATE CRITERIA AND ENSURES EACH STATE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREED CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES. OBJECTIONS HAVE BEEN RAISED, HOWEVER, EMPHASIZING THE BURDEN REPRESENTED BY OUR PROPOSAL. WHILE WE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO LEAVE OPEN THE OPTION FOR EACH PARTICIPATING STATE TO CONDUCT TWO INSPECTIONS A YEAR, WE BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT EACH PARTICIPATING STATE SHOULD HAVE THE OPTION TO CONDUCT AT LEAST ONE INSPECTION A YEAR. CENTRAL TO OUR APPROACH TO VERIFICATION IS THE POSITION THAT INSPECTIONS MUST BE AN ESSENTIAL AND INTEGRAL PART OF THE RESULT OF THE CONFERENCE. HOWEVER, WE ARE PREPARED TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS EACH STATE IS ENTITLED TO CARRY OUT EVERY YEAR FROM TWO TO ONE AS EVIDENCE OF OUR WILLINGNESS TO ENSURE AGAINST THE ABUSE OF THE RIGHT TO INSPECT MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES. INSPECTIONS WILL BE USED ONLY ON THOSE OCCASIONS WHEN DOUBTS ABOUT COMPLIANCE ARISE. INSPECTIONS ARE NOT MEANT TO BE ONEROUS OR UNDULY INTRUSIVE.

BUT IT MUST BE CLEAR THAT THE INSPECTION PROVISIONS CANNOT BE IMPAIRED BY ANY ESCAPE CLAUSE, DEFECTIVE MODALITIES OR OTHER FLAWS THAT WOULD RENDER THEM INEFFECTIVE.

CONCLUSION: THE MANDATE OF THE CONFERENCE REQUIRES US TO ENACT "NEW, EFFECTIVE AND CONCRETE ACTIONS" TO INCREASE CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THEREBY REDUCE THE RISK OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION. TO FULFILL THIS OBLIGATION, WE MUST AGREE ON VERIFIABLE MEASURES

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

OF TRUE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE. THE SIXTEEN SPONSORS OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED WILL NOT ACCEPT MERELY INSIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS OF THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES OF THE FINAL ACT. NONE OF US CAN AFFORD TO COMPROMISE ON THIS POINT.

THE TIME HAS NOW COME FOR NEW EFFORTS TO FURTHER THE DRAFTING PROCESS. THE POINTS I HAVE JUST MADE ARE INTENDED TO SERVE THAT PURPOSE. THIS IS NOT, OF COURSE, THE FIRST EXAMPLE OF OUR DETERMINATION TO REACH AN AGREEMENT. MAY I RECALL THAT ON THE ISSUE OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE WE HAVE ALSO MADE SIGNIFICANT STEPS, FIRST IN AGREEING TO INCLUDE THIS ISSUE ON THE AGENDA OF THE CONFERENCE, THEN IN TABLING THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE CONTRIBUTION TO DATE, AND MORE RECENTLY IN DRAFTING ACTIVELY ON THIS SUBJECT. WE HAVE DONE THIS EVEN THOUGH WORK IN THE FIELD OF CONCRETE MEASURES WAS STAGNATING.

THE INITIATIVE WE ARE TAKING REPRESENTS CAREFUL STUDY AND SOMETIMES DIFFICULT DECISIONS ON OUR PART. IN MAKING THESE OFFERS; THAT IS, IN SHOWING YET AGAIN THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO BE FLEXIBLE, WE MUST OF COURSE MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE DO SO IN THE EXPECTATION THAT OUR OTHER NEGOTIATING PARTNERS WILL SHOW MATCHING MOVEMENTS NOT ONLY ON THE ISSUES I HAVE MENTIONED BUT ALSO ON OTHERS, SUCH AS INFORMATION, WHICH I HAVE NOT RAISED TODAY. NOR WOULD WE EXPECT NEGOTIATING PARTNERS TO INTRODUCE OBSTACLES TO REAL PROGRESS.

THE ONLY WAY TO REACH A SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT IS TO FOLLOW A GIVE-AND-TAKE PROCESS. WE HOPE THAT THE INITIATIVE WE HAVE TAKEN TODAY WILL CREATE A DYNAMISM LEADING TO SUCH AN AGREEMENT IN THE EIGHT WEEKS LEFT TO US BEFORE THE CONFERENCE ADJOURNS ON THE 19TH OF SEPTEMBER.

WE SHALL BE PREPARED TO DO OUR PART.

THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.

END TEXT.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05200

SUBJECT: NATO STATEMENT ON CDE

REF: STOCKHOLM 5146

1. CDE XI - 031

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

-

3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE JUNE 30 WORKING GROUP AB MEETING CANADA OUTLINED, ON BEHALF OF NATO, AREAS OF FLEXIBILITY IN THE FIELD OF NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION. AT A PRESS CONFERENCE NATO REPRESENTATIVES CHARACTERIZED THE STATEMENT AS A MAJOR NEW POLITICAL SIGNAL TO FURTHER THE DRAFTING PROCESS IN STOCKHOLM. ITALY, THE FRG, AND FRANCE OFFERED SUPPORTING STATEMENTS. THE FRENCH ALSO PROPOSED TO WORK "INFORMALLY" THROUGH THE SUMMER RECESS. THE USSR GAVE A QUALIFIED, THOUGH VAGUE, WELCOME TO NATO'S INITIATIVE; GRINEVSKY ALSO CITED HIS POLITBURO INSTRUCTIONS TO ACHIEVE "A TANGIBLE CONCLUSION" TO CDE "ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY." MALTA AND YUGOSLAVIA COMMENTED ON THE NATO INITIATIVE IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR SPECIFIC SECURITY CONCERNS. END SUMMARY.

4. ACTING ON A FRENCH PROPOSAL, THE NATO CAUCUS AGREED TO DRAFT A STATEMENT WHICH WOULD SEND A "SERIES OF SIGNALS" OF FLEXIBILITY IN AN EFFORT TO PROVIDE MOMENTUM TO THE DRAFTING PROCESS AND DEFEND AGAINST CHARGES OF IMMOBILITY. AFTER TWO DAYS OF DRAFTING WHICH THE UK JOINED IN RELUCTANTLY, NATO CONSENSUS WAS REACHED ON A TEXT FOR A PAPER WHICH OUTLINED AREAS OF FLEXIBILITY IN NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION (FULL TEXT SENT REFTEL).

5. IN MAKING THESE OFFERS, CANADA MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE ALLIANCE EXPECTED "THE OTHER NEGOTIATING PARTNERS," I.E., THE SOVIETS, TO SHOW SIMILAR FLEXIBILITY. THE FRENCH PREPARED THE FIRST DRAFT OF THE STATEMENT, LARGELY DRAWING ON U.S. IDEAS. HOWEVER, MANY DELEGATIONS MADE SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS DURING THE DRAFTING PROCESS. THE UK HAD THE MOST DIFFICULTY TAKING THIS INITIATIVE AT THIS TIME, ARGUING THAT IT WAS PREMATURE AND THAT IT DID NOT DEMAND ANY DIRECT QUID PRO QUOS, ALTHOUGH IT CLEARLY LINKED NATO FLEXIBILITY ON MOBILIZATION TO RECIPROCAL NNA AND EASTERN FLEXIBILITY ON CONSTRAINTS. NATO REPRESENTATIVES WORKED OVER THE JUNE 28-29 WEEKEND TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES. ON JUNE 30, AFTER LAYING DOWN THEIR MARKERS, THE BRITISH WENT ALONG WITH THE STATEMENT.

-

6. AT THE JUNE 30 MEETING OF WORKING GROUP AB, AFTER CANADA'S STATEMENT, THE FRG OFFERED BRIEF SUPPORTING COMMENTS; ITALY AND FRANCE ADDED THEIR OWN NATIONAL TWISTS. ITALY EMPHASIZED THAT THIS STATEMENT SHOULD BEGIN A DRAFTING PROCESS "NOT ONLY ON THE POINTS

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

MENTIONED." FRANCE (GASCHIGNARD) STRESSED THE NEED TO RESOLVE THE NEGOTIATING DEADLOCK WITHIN THE "NEXT FEW DAYS" ON THE ISSUES OF AIR ACTIVITIES AND VERIFICATION. REGARDING NOTIFICATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES, HE SUGGESTED A SOLUTION BE FOUND ON BASIS OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH AND IN CONTEXT OF NUMBER OF NOTIFICATIONS TO BE REQUIRED. UNDERSCORING THIS POINT, HE SAID THAT "IT IS CLEAR THAT THE SOLUTION FOR AIR ACTIVITIES CAN ONLY BE FOUND IN THE CONTEXT OF AN OVERALL AGREEMENT ON NOTIFICATION." ALTHOUGH HE WAS FLEXIBLE ON NUMBERS AND MODALITIES FOR INSPECTION, THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR WAS FIRM ON THE PRINCIPLE: ". . . ADEQUATE VERIFICATION INVOLVES A CERTAIN DEGREE OF INTRUSIVENESS, IE., INSPECTION." AS ANTICIPATED, THE FRENCH ALSO DELCARED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO "INTENSIFY" THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE IN THE SUMMER BY CONVENING EARLY NEXT SESSION ON AN INFORMAL BASIS.

7. THE SOVIETS (GRINEVSKY) QUALIFIED THEIR WELCOME OF THE PAPER BY PROMISING TO STUDY IT TO SEE IF IT IS "REALLY DIRECTED TOWARDS PROGRESS." GRINEVSKY ENUMERATED WARSAW PACT "INITIATIVES," QUESTIONING WHETHER NATO'S PAPER IS AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE TO EASTERN "FLEXIBILITY." THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR ALSO SAID HE WAS GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS BY THE POLITBURO "TO ACHIEVE A TANGIBLE CONCLUSION OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY." ROMANIA WELCOMED THE WESTERN INITIATIVE; THERE WERE NO OTHER EASTERN REACTIONS IN THE WORKING GROUP. (BEGIN COMMENT: ALTHOUGH PRIVATE EASTERN REACTION HAS BEEN GENERALLY UPBEAT, THE SOVIET REACTION REMAINS VAGUE. EASTERN DELEGATES TELL US THE SOVIETS HAVE YET TO GIVE THEM A READOUT OF THE THURSDAY POLITBURO MEETING. END COMMENT.)

8. MALTA AND YUGOSLAVIA COMMENTED ON NATO'S PAPER TO LAY DOWN MARKERS ON THEIR SECURITY CONCERNS. MALTA IMPLIED THAT FLEXIBILITY MUST ALSO APPLY TO THE MEDITERRANEAN DIMENSION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. PICKING UP ON ITALY'S SECONDING OF THE NATO INITIATIVE, YUGOSLAVIA WELCOMED NATO'S PAPER AS THE "BEGINNING OF GIVE AND TAKE," IMPLYING THAT SUCH FLEXIBILITY SHOULD EXTEND TO AREAS NOT ADDRESSED IN THE PAPER (I.E., CONSTRAINTS).

9. AFTER THE WORKING GROUP, THE U.S., FRENCH, AND CANADIAN AMBASSADORS HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE STRESSING THAT THE WESTERN INITIATIVE WAS A MAJOR STEP AND A SIGNAL TO OTHERS TO SHOW RECIPROCAL FLEXIBILITY. THE INITIATIVE WOULD HELP BREAK THE CURRENT IMPASSE IN STOCKHOLM. FOR EXAMPLE, WHILE STRESSING THE NECESSITY OF MAINTAINING THE RIGHT OF INSPECTION WITHOUT ANY RIGHT OF REFUSAL OR INEFFECTIVE MODALITIES, WE UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF MOVING FROM TWO TO ONE INSPECTION PER

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

STATE. WE EMPHASIZED THAT A KEY ELEMENT OF THE INITIATIVE WAS WESTERN ACCEPTANCE OF ITS NNA FORMULA AS A BASIS FOR DRAFTING ON NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES, THE CENTERPIECE OF THE CONFERENCE. EARLIER PREDICTIONS BY THE GDR AMBASSADOR THAT THE CONFERENCE WAS DOOMED TO FAILURE WERE DISMISSED BY THE NATO SPOKESMEN AS PREMATURE. BUT THE ACTUAL MESSAGE WAS THAT THE CONFERENCE HAD BEEN AT AN EASTERN-IMPOSED IMPASSE FOR THE FIRST HALF OF THE ROUND AND THAT THE ONLY EFFECTIVE EASTERN RESPONSE WOULD BE TO ACCELERATE THE DRAFTING PROCESS. THE NATO STATEMENT AND PRESS CONFERENCE GOT POSITIVE TREATMENT IN THE MEDIA AND, IN GENERAL, AMONG THE NNA.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 05259

SUBJECT: FIRST US-SOVIET BILATERAL SINCE POLITBURO
- MEETING WHICH CONSIDERED CDE

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: DISAPPOINTED WITH THEIR FAILURE TO DIVIDE THE FRENCH FROM THE US THE SOVIETS ARE NOW STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF THEIR BILATERALS WITH THE US. THEY WON'T ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF INSPECTION, BUT OUR GUESS IS THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO DO SO IN THE END. ON AIR, THEY WANT TO MOUNT A NEW EFFORT AT FINDING AN ACCEPTABLE FORMULA. THEY ARE CONSIDERING ADOPTING THE NNA FORMULA ON GROUND FORCE THRESHOLDS.
END SUMMARY

2. UPON HIS RETURN FROM HIS CONSULTATIONS IN MOSCOW AND HIS PUBLICIZED REPORT TO THE POLITBURO ON CDE MATTERS, THE FIRST THING WHICH SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY DID WAS TO SUMMON FRENCH AMBASSADOR GASCHIGNARD ON JUNE 30. THE FRENCH FOUND HIS MESSAGE ENTIRELY NEGATIVE. -- GRINEVSKY EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE FRENCH APPROACH TO AIR, I.E., FRENCH REJECTION OF THE SOVIET EXCLUSIONARY APPROACH (WHICH WOULD EXCLUDE CERTAIN TYPES OF ACTIVITIES OR AIRCRAFT FROM AN INDEPENDENT AIR NOTIFICATION REGIME);

-- HE DID NOT CARE FOR THE FRENCH IDEA OF ADDING AN AIR PARAMETER TO THE LIKO FORMULA (I.E. THE "UK" APPROACH WHICH THE FRENCH FLOATED IN MOSCOW);

-- HE THOUGHT THAT THE "UK APPROACH" AND THE SUB-THRESHOLD APPROACH BOTH WERE ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVES FOR COVERING AIR IN COMBINED ARMS ACTIVITIES, BUT NOT FOR THE INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES WHICH THE SOVIETS WERE TRYING TO CAPTURE;

-- WHEN THE FRENCH RAISED THE ISSUE OF VERIFICATION GRINEVSKY GAVE THE SOVIET POSITION ON INSPECTION: INSPECTION IS RELEVANT TO ARMS REDUCTIONS NOT TO CSBMS; WHEN PRESSED, HE ALLUDED TO ITS POSSIBLE RELEVANCE FOR CSBM'S BUT ONLY IN PHASE TWO OF THE CDE.

3. IN OUR INITIAL CONTACT WITH GRINEVSKY (JULY 2), OUR MAIN PURPOSE WAS TO PIN HIM DOWN ON WHETHER THE SOVIET APPROACH TO INSPECTION WAS AS NEGATIVE AS HIS MESSAGE TO THE FRENCH. BARRY STRESSED THE CENTRAL IMPORTANCE OF INSPECTION TO THE US AND WARNED THAT IF HE WERE TO REPORT TO WASHINGTON SOVIET REJECTION OF INSPECTION IN THIS PHASE OF THE CDE, IT WAS LIKELY THAT FURTHER WORK ON RESOLVING OTHER ISSUES WOULD BE FROZEN AND THIS WOULD HAVE A SIMILAR NEGATIVE IMPACT ON WORK AT THE CONFERENCE. BARRY WARNED GRINEVSKY AGAINST APPEALING TO THE NNA TO SAVE US, NOTING THAT THE CDE IS DIFFERENT THAN OTHER CSCE MEETINGS AND THAT SUCH A RESUCE MISSION PROBABLY WOULD FAIL: THE NNA ARE SLOWMOVING AND DIVIDED THEMSELVES ON THE ISSUES. AN NNA COMPROMISE PACKAGE WOULD INCLUDE ELEMENTS UNACCEPTABLE TO EAST AND WEST. SUCH

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

A MOVE PROBABLY WOULD NOT SURFACE UNTIL NEXT ROUND WHEN IT WOULD BE TOO LATE FOR THE US BUREAUCRACY TO REACT. JUDGING FROM WHAT WE HAVE HEARD, GRINEVSKY IS NOT REPEAT NOT NOW PLANNING SUCH A DISTRESS CALL TO THE NNA.

4. GRINEVSKY SOMEWHAT RELUCTANTLY REPLIED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT FELT "THAT THE SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CSBM'S -- AS OPPOSED TO DISARMAMENT -- DO NOT REQUIRE ON THEIR OWN A MEASURE LIKE INSPECTION ... IT'S ANOTHER MATTER IF WE TAKE DISARMAMENT. HERE THERE CAN BE A REGIME OF VERIFICATION. FOR THE ARMAMENTS REMAINING AFTER REDUCTIONS, WE CAN HAVE ON-SITE INSPECTION... WE COULD THINK OF AGREEING SOMEHOW THAT IN THE PROCESS OF DISARMAMENT OF ARMED FORCES AND CONVENTIONAL ARMA-MENTS ON-SITE INSPECTION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CSBM'S

-
WOULD BE CONDUCTED AS WELL. IF THAT COULD HELP YOU, YOU NEED TO THINK IT OVER. HOWEVER, HE SOFTENED THE MESSAGE BY ASKING "HYPOTHETICALLY" IF OUR POSITION INCLUDED A PASSIVE QUOTA ON INSPECTIONS. (WE COUNTERED BY ASKING IF THEY WOULD ACCEPT THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO ESCAPE CLAUSE IN AN INSPECTION FORMULA.) IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, HE SAID HE DID NOW NOT PLAN TO STATE THE SOVIET POSITION ON INSPECTION PUBLICLY, BUT EVERYTHING DEPENDED ON BILATERAL TALKS WITH THE US - "AND NOW ONLY THE US."

5. ON AIR, BARRY STRESSED THAT THE INDEPENDENT TRIGGER QUALIFIED BY EXCLUSIONS WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE US. HE SAID THAT ONE OF THE IDEAS CIRCULATED IN THE CORRIDORS WAS THE IDEA OF ADDING AN AIR PARAMETER TO THE NNA GROUND FORCE NOTIFICATION FORMULA; HE UNDERSTOOD THIS DID NOT APPEAL TO THE USSR; IT ALSO DID NOT APPEAL TO THE US. DID THE USSR ACCEPT THE SUB-THRESHOLD APPROACH? IF NOT, DID IT HAVE ANY OTHER IDEAS WHICH WOULD PROTECT THE US POSITION? THE CLEAR SOVIET PREFERENCE WAS FOR EXPLORING THE FORMULA DISCUSSED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE ROUND; HANSEN AND TATARNIKOV WILL DO SO ON JULY 3.

6. ON GROUND FORCE THRESHOLDS, GRINEVSKY SEEMED TO BE QUESTIONING US TO CONVINCING TATARNIKOV THAT THE NNA PARAMETER MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE. THE SOVIETS ARE NOW SAYING THAT GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS SHOULD BE THE PRIORITY OF THE CONFERENCE. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT THE SOVIETS WILL RESIST THE EQUIPMENT (TANK) ELEMENT OF THE TRIGGER BUT MAY COME AROUND ON THE STRUCTURAL/NUMERICAL ASPECTS.

7. IN SUM, OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE IMPRESSED BY THE UNITY OF THE WEST AND IN PARTICULAR FRENCH UNWILLINGNESS TO DEPART FROM ALLIANCE POSITION ON KEY ISSUES SUCH AS AIR AND VERIFICATION. THEY ARE KEEPING THEIR HANDS CLOSE TO THEIR CHESTS (AS ALWAYS) BUT THEY SEEM TO HAVE A NEW SENSE OF URGENCY. ONLY THE DRAFTING SESSIONS WILL DEMONSTRATE HOW MUCH REAL FLEXIBILITY THERE IS, HOWEVER, AND WE WILL PROBABLY NOT SEE THEIR HOLE CARD ON INSPECTION UNTIL SEPTEMBER.

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

8. WE HAVE SHARED THESE IMPRESSIONS WITH NATO HEADS OF DELEGATION.

-

9. GRINEVSKY SAYS HE HIMSELF REPORTED TO THE POLITBURO; A UNIQUE EVENT. HE IMPLIED THAT THE MFA, NOT THE SECRETARIAT, PREPARED THE DOCUMENTATION FOR THE MEETING. HE DESCRIBED THE POLITBURO ATMOSPHERE AS "MORE BUSINESS-LIKE" THAN IN THE PAST.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05325

SUBJECT: AMB. ZIMMERMANN'S CONVERSATIONS WITH SWEDISH OFFICIALS

REF: STATE 167999

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AMB. WARREN ZIMMERMANN, ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT FROWICK, SAM WISE, DAVID JOHNSON AND EMB POLCOUNS INTS SILINS, HELD BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON THE UPCOMING VIENNA CSCE CONFERENCE WITH SWEDISH OFFICIALS ON JUNE 26. THE TALKS WERE HELD IN TWO BRIEF SESSIONS OF ABOUT 20 MINUTES EACH. MEETING WITH SCHORI

3. IN A MEETING WITH UNDERSECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS PIERRE SCHORI, ALSO ATTENDED BY SWEDEN'S CDE AMBASSADOR CURT LIDGARD AND EUROPE/AMERICAS DIRECTOR MATS BERGQUIST, ZIMMERMANN OUTLINED THE PROSPECTS FOR THE VIENNA CONFERENCE SEEN IN THE LIGHT OF THE NEED FOR BALANCE IN THE CSCE PROCESS AND THE EXPECTED SOVIET INTEREST IN A SECOND -- DISARMAMENT -- PHASE OF THE STOCKHOLM CDE. SCHORI SAID THE SWEDES ARE RELATIVELY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE CSCE PROCESS JUST NOW, REALIZING THAT THERE MUST BE A SIGNIFICANT RESULT AT STOCKHOLM, NOT JUST A MINI-PACKAGE, IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH ANYTHING AT VIENNA. TO ZIMMERMANN'S OBSERVATION THAT VERIFICATION IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF A STOCKHOLM AGREEMENT, AMB. LIDGARD INTERJECTED THAT SWEDEN IS "JUST AS FIRM ON VERIFICATION AS YOU ARE," SINCE SMALL COUNTRIES LIKE SWEDEN LACK SOME OF THE NATIONAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION AVAILABLE TO THE U.S.

4. SCHORI REMARKED THAT "ONE COULD WONDER AT THE U.S. POSITION (ON CSCE) AFTER BERN," WHERE THE AGREEMENT WITHIN REACH "COULD HAVE HELPED SOME HUMAN BEINGS." ZIMMERMANN EXPLAINED THAT THE KEY ISSUE AT BERN WAS "THE PROBLEM OF DOCUMENTS": THE STRONG FEELING IN THE U.S. THAT WHAT IS NEEDED IS NOT MORE DOCUMENTS BUT TO OBSERVE THE ONES WE ALREADY HAVE. THE OUTCOME AT BERN SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN TO SET THE PATTERN FOR VIENNA, ZIMMERMANN NOTED. MEETING WITH LIDGARD

5. LIDGARD DESCRIBED HIS CONSULTATIONS IN MOSCOW WITH LEV ISAAKEVICH MENDELEVICH, WHO LIDGARD EXPECTS WILL HEAD THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO VIENNA. MENDELEVICH "EXPRESSED A PREFERENCE FOR A SECOND PHASE OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE," LIDGARD SAID, AND INDICATED THAT WHILE ITS POSSIBILITY WOULD DEPEND ON A "POSITIVE OUTCOME" IN PHASE I, A SECOND PHASE MIGHT NOT BE IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT SUCH AN OUTCOME. IT WAS LATER POINTED OUT THAT THE EAST GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE TO THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE HAD JUST SAID THAT THE CONFERENCE MIGHT FAIL BUT A SECOND PHASE COULD STILL BE POSSIBLE. LIDGARD ADDED THAT FOR ITS PART, SWEDEN FAVORS A DISARMAMENT PHASE OF CDE.

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

6. MENDELEVICH PROFESSED TO HAVE AN OPEN MIND ON BASKET ONE AND SUGGESTED THAT ONE MIGHT TAKE A FRESH LOOK, FOR EXAMPLE, AT THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION, LIDGARD SAID. ON BASKET TWO, MENDELEVICH REMARKED THAT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY HAVE DEVELOPED GREATLY SINCE 1975 AND THE COOPERATION ENVISAGED THEN WOULD NOT SUFFICE FOR TODAY. IN THE CONTEXT OF A DISCUSSION ON THE CHERNOBYL DISASTER, LIDGARD SAID THAT SWEDEN AND FINLAND WOULD HAVE SOME NEW IDEAS ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES.
7. ON BASKET THREE, LIDGARD MENTIONED SWEDISH INTEREST IN THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE ON FAMILY REUNIFICATION, AND HE REITERATED CONTINUING SWEDISH INTEREST IN THE PROPOSALS MADE AT OTTAWA AND BERN. THERE IS ALSO TALK, HE SAID, OF A SECOND CULTURAL FORUM AND OF A FORUM ON WORKING CONDITIONS FOR JOURNALISTS. SWEDEN WOULD LIKE TO SEE SUCH EXPERTS' MEETINGS STREAM-LINED, PERHAPS THEIR PREPARATORY MEETINGS ELIMINATED.
8. LIDGARD CONFIRMED, UNOFFICIALLY, THAT HE WILL HEAD THE SWEDISH DELEGATION TO VIENNA.
9. THIS CABLE WAS CLEARED BY AMB. ZIMMERMANN. NEWELL
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05283
SUBJECT: CDE: LANGUAGE NOTED IN WORKING GROUP ON
VERIFICATION
1. CDE XI - 034.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THE FOLLOWING VERIFICATION LANGUAGE WAS
PROVISIONALLY NOTED IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK IN
THE RELEVANT WORKING GROUP ON JULY 2:
BEGIN TEXT.
"THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH REQUESTS . . . WILL
SPECIFY THE AREA WHERE . . ."
END TEXT.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05331
 SUBJECT: AGREED TEXT IN WORKING GROUP B-2 (OBSERVATION)
 1. CDE XI - 035
 2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
 3. WORKING GROUP B-2 (OBSERVATION) AGREED TO NOTE IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK THE FOLLOWING THREE TEXTS.

-
 A. BEGIN TEXT 1:
 AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAM GIVE A BRIEFING ON THE PURPOSE, THE BASIC SITUATION, THE PHASES OF THE ACTIVITY AND POSSIBLE CHANGES AS COMPARED WITH THE NOTIFICATION AND PROVIDE THE OBSERVERS WITH A MAP OF THE AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY . . . AND AN OBSERVATION PROGRAM WITH A DAILY SCHEDULE AS WELL AS A SKETCH INDICATING THE BASIC SITUATION.

END TEXT 1.
 B. BEGIN TEXT 2:
 IN THE COURSE OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAM GIVE THE OBSERVERS DAILY BRIEFINGS WITH THE HELP OF MAPS ON THE VARIOUS PHASES OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND INFORM THE OBSERVERS ABOUT THEIR POSITIONS GEOGRAPHICALLY

END TEXT 2.
 C. BEGIN TEXT 3:
 THE OBSERVERS WILL BE GRANTED, DURING THEIR MISSION, THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES ACCORDED TO DIPLOMATIC AGENTS IN THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

END TEXT 3.
 4. FOLLOWING AGREEMENT TO NOTE THE TEXT ON PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES THE AUSTRIAN REP MADE A UNILATERAL STATEMENT INDICATING THAT OBSERVERS INVITED TO AUSTRIA WHO ARE NOT ATTACHED TO A DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN AUSTRIA OR ARE TEMPORARILY ATTACHED FOR THE OBSERVATION PERIOD WILL BE GRANTED PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES UNDER THE SPECIAL MISSION AGREEMENT OF DECEMBER 16, 1969, RATHER THAN THE VIENNA CONVENTION. THE AUSTRIAN DELEGATION HAS INDICATED THAT THIS IS DESIGNED TO PREVENT TEMPORARY OBSERVERS FROM PURCHASING PROPERTY IN AUSTRIA UNDER THE TERMS OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION.

BARRY
 END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL
 NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 05363

SUBJECT: CDE: PROPOSED DEMARCHE TO THE SOVIETS

1. SUMMARY: THE BRITISH AND GERMANS HAVE PROPOSED AN END-OF-ROUND DEMARCHE TO THE SOVIETS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FOR RESOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES. WE HAVE EXPRESSED GENERAL WILLINGNESS TO GO ALONG, DEPENDING ON THE SUBSTANCE AND ON CONCRETE SIGNS OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY OVER THE NEXT WEEK. IN OUR VIEW THIS IS AS MUCH AN EXERCISE IN KEEPING KEY ALLIES ON BOARD AS IT IS A NEGOTIATING MOVE.

END SUMMARY

2. FRG CDE AMBASSADOR CITRON HAS SUGGESTED TO US AN IDEA WHICH CAME OUT OF GERMAN-BRITISH ARMS CONTROL CONSULTATIONS IN BONN LAST WEEK. IT IS CLEARLY RELATED TO THE SHEVARDNADZE VISIT TO LONDON JULY 14-15 AND THE GENSCHER VISIT TO MOSCOW JULY 21-23. CDE WILL BE A TOPIC IN BOTH DISCUSSIONS AND THE BRITISH-GERMAN IDEA IS A WAY OF SOUNDING POSITIVE ON CDE WHILE KEEPING CONTROL OF THE SUBSTANCE HERE IN STOCKHOLM.

-

3. THE IDEA IS THAT SOME OR ALL NATO DELEGATIONS HERE WOULD AGREE ON A FRAMEWORK FOR THE RESOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS, INCLUDING A DESCRIPTION OF BOTH THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS IN THE WESTERN POSITION AND SOME AREAS OF FLEXIBILITY. GRINEVSKY WOULD BE BRIEFED ON THIS FRAMEWORK AT THE END OF THIS ROUND, IN AN EFFORT TO INDUCE MORE FLEXIBILITY IN THE EASTERN POSITION AND TO DISCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEUTRAL "RESCUE PACKAGE" AT THE BEGINNING OF THE LAST ROUND. THE CONTENT OF THE PAPER AS DESCRIBED BY THE FRG WOULD BE A UNIFIED PACKAGE WITH NO IMPLICIT TRADES OR BARGAINS (I.E., THE SOVIETS COULD NOT CHOOSE THE ITEMS THEY FOUND APPEALING AND LEAVE THE REST). IT WOULD INCLUDE:

-- LIST OF SUBJECTS ON WHICH THERE WAS NO WESTERN FLEXIBILITY, E.G. CONSTRAINTS, NUMERICAL PARAMETERS, TRANSITS, INDEPENDENT AIR, ETC.;

-- CLARIFICATION OF QUESTIONS THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN ASKING; E.G. WE WOULD CITE THAT OUR NUMERICAL PARAMETER IN OUR THRESHOLD FORMULA WOULD BE 10,000;

-- ANOTHER LIST OF AREAS WHERE THERE WAS SOME NATO FLEXIBILITY, E.G. PASSIVE QUOTA ON INSPECTIONS AND NEUTRAL INVOLVEMENT IN AIR INSPECTION MODALITIES AS DISCUSSED AMONG SOME ALLIES HERE.

4. THE FRENCH HAVE EXPRESSED GENERAL SUPPORT FOR THE IDEA DEPENDING ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PAPER ITSELF. WE HAVE EXPRESSED SOME RESERVATIONS BUT HAVE SAID WE ARE SYMPATHETIC WITH THE PROJECT IN GENERAL AND HAVE ENCOURAGED THE GERMANS TO PROVIDE A TEXT FOR DISCUSSION LATER THIS WEEK.

5. WE ARE SKEPTICAL THAT MUCH OF THE SUBSTANCE WILL EMERGE FROM THIS EFFORT. THE BRITISH ARE ALREADY SAYING

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

THEY DON'T WANT TO SHOW ANY FLEXIBILITY ON STATIC INFORMATION AS A SEPARATE INFORMATION MEASURE OR SPECIFY THE 10,000 GROUND FORCE PARAMETER. WE HAVE EXPRESSED RELUCTANCE TO SHOW ANY OF OUR CARDS ON INSPECTIONS UNLESS THE UK IS READY TO MOVE ON INFORMATION; WE AND MOST OTHER ALLIED DELEGATIONS THINK THE UK STRATEGY ON THIS IS WRONG-HEADED; STICKING WITH MEASURE 1 PREVENTS

US FROM ASKING FOR THE SUBSTANCE OF WHAT WE REALLY WANT AND MAY BE ABLE TO GET - LOCATIONS ON DIVISIONAL HEAD-QUARTERS IN THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION.

6. NEVERTHELESS WE REGARD THIS AS AN EXERCISE IN ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT. THE BRITISH AND GERMANS WANT TO BE ABLE TO HAVE THEIR FOREIGN MINISTERS REFER TO THIS DEMARCHE DURING THEIR MEETINGS WITH SHEVARDNADZE SO THAT THEY CAN BE SEEN AS BEING AS ACTIVE AS THE FRENCH, WHO STIRRED UP THE LAST PUBLIC DEMARCHE. WE SEE MERIT IN PROCEEDING BECAUSE IT WILL HELP TO KEEP THEM WITH US ON THE DIFFICULT ISSUES AND BECAUSE THIS WILL KEEP CONTROL OF THE SUBSTANCE HERE IN STOCKHOLM RATHER THAN LEAVING THE ISSUE TO THE IMAGINATION OF MINISTERS AND THEIR AIDES.

7. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE MAY WISH TO AVOID THE PRESENTATION OF A NATO "BOTTOM-LINE" LONG BEFORE THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS IS OVER. A LOT COULD HAPPEN IN THE LAST FIVE-WEEK ROUND, AND WE WOULD WANT TO ENSURE MAINTENANCE OF OUR OWN NEGOTIATING AND TACTICAL FLEXIBILITY AND LEVERAGE BY NOT PLACING ALL OUR CARDS ON THE TABLE TOO SOON. WE WILL REVIEW THE TEXT WITH THESE CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND. WE DO NOT THINK THAT THE PAPER WILL IN FACT REPRESENT A REAL "BOTTOM LINE", ESPECIALLY WITH THE QUALIFICATIONS DISCUSSED IN PARAGRAPH 5 ABOVE. IN FACT, NATO'S "BOTTOM" LINE AT THE PRESENT EQUALS THE SUM OF THE SPECIAL INTERESTS OF ALL OF THE 16.

8. THE FRG WILL BE PROVIDING A TEXT LATER THIS WEEK WHICH WE HAVE PROMISED TO EXAMINE AND COMMENT ON. IF THE EXERCISE SEEMS TO BE GOING ANYWHERE WE WILL INFORM WASHINGTON OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS PAPER AS IT EMERGES FROM DISCUSSIONS HERE.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05393

SUBJ: CDE: WHAT'S IN A NAME?

REFS: A. STOCKHOLM 5325; B. LONDON 14033

1. CDE XI - 37
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT
3. SUMMARY: COMMON PARLANCE SEEMS TO BE ACCEPTING "CDE STAGE II" AS THE TAG FOR ANY POSSIBLE POST-VIENNA CONTINUATION OF CDE. ALTHOUGH THE MADRID MANDATE DOES NOT EXPLICITLY EQUATE CONTINUATION WITH A STAGE II, THE EQUATION, IN PART BECAUSE OF EASTERN CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTION PROPOSALS, IS GAINING SOME CURRENCY. WE NEED TO TAKE CARE NOT TO PREJUDICE THE US POSITION REGARDING CONTINUATION OF CDE AND, IN PARTICULAR, AVOID REFERRING TO CONTINUATION AS "CDE STAGE II." END SUMMARY.
4. WITH THE STOCKHOLM CDE APPROACHING ITS DEADLINE (SEPTEMBER 19) AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE VIENNA CSCE REVIEW UNDERWAY, TERMINOLOGY ABOUT ANY POSSIBLE POST-VIENNA CDE CONTINUATION BECOMES INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT. IN PARTICULAR, WE NOTE A TENDENCY AMONG NATO ALLIES AS WELL AS THE NNA (REFS) TO REFER AUTOMATICALLY TO A CONTINUATION AS "CDE STAGE II." US SPOKESMEN NEED TO MAINTAIN THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CDE STAGE I, WHICH IS NOW GOING ON IN STOCKHOLM AND MAY (OR MAY NOT) CONTINUE AFTER VIENNA, AND ANY SUBSTANTIVELY DIFFERENT CDE STAGE II, THE POSSIBILITY OF WHICH IS IMPLIED IN THE MADRID MANDATE.
5. JUDGING FROM THE JUNE 11 BUDAPEST APPEAL, THE SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES APPARENTLY WANT A CDE STAGE II, DEALING WITH DISARMAMENT, TO COME OUT OF THE VIENNA CSCE. SUCH A MOVE WOULD REQUIRE CONSENSUS OF THE THIRTY-FIVE IN VIENNA TO REVISE THE MADRID MANDATE. WHETHER CONSENSUS IS REQUIRED TO CONTINUE CDE UNDER ITS CURRENT MANDATE FOCUSED ON CSBM'S IS MORE OPEN TO INTERPRETATION: THE RELEVANT DECISION OF THE 1983 HELSINKI PREPARATORY MEETING, WHICH SET "THE AGENDA, TIME-TABLE AND OTHER MODALITIES FOR THE FIRST STAGE" OF CDE READS, "THE FIRST STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE WILL CONTINUE PENDING CONSIDERATION BY THE VIENNA OR A FUTURE CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING OF WAYS AND APPROPRIATE MEANS FOR THE PARTICIPATING STATES TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS FOR SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE, INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF SUPPLEMENTING THE MADRID MANDATE FOR THE NEXT STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE . . . "
6. COMMENT: CONTINUATION WITH THE SAME MANDATE MIGHT MEET THE POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS OF MANY, INCLUDING ALLIES, WITHOUT THE SUBSTANTIVE DIFFICULTIES OF MOVING TO A DISARMAMENT STAGE. END COMMENT
8. IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS, WE NEED TO GUARD AGAINST PREJUDICING THE US POSITION REGARDING ANY POST-VIENNA CDE. EVEN TERMS LIKE "CDE STAGE I(B)" OR SIMPLY "CONTINUATION OF CDE," WHICH

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

MIGHT HELP COUNTER HAVING STAGE II TERMINOLOGY ASSUME A
POLITICAL OR PUBLIC AFFAIRS CURRENCY ACTING AGAINST OUR
INTERESTS, COULD IMPLY US ACCEPTANCE OF CONTINUATION
AND SHOULD BE HANDLED WITH CARE.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05343
SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION FORMULAE, BILATERAL WITH SOVIETS
REFS: (A) STOCKHOLM 3962 (B) STOCKHOLM 4L27

1. XI - 38.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: U.S. - SOVIET CONSULTATIONS HAVE RESULTED IN TWO VARIANTS OF THE SAME FORMULA FOR RESOLVING THE IMPASSE ABOUT HOW AIR ACTIVITIES MIGHT BE INCLUDED IN A CDE CSBMS REGIME (INCLUDED PARA 10 BELOW). BOTH TEXTS INDICATE THAT AIR ACTIVITIES WOULD BE PART OF A NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES BUT ALSO INCLUDE A SEPARATE AIR PARAMETER BASED ON NUMBER OF SORTIES OF FIXED WING AIRCRAFT. SOVIETS APPEARED RECEPTIVE TO U.S. PROPOSED CHANGES TO LANGUAGE DEFINING GROUND FORCES AND GAVE EXPLANATIONS REGARDING NUMERICAL THRESHOLD OF 18,000 TROOPS. FORMULATION FOR THE NOTIFICATION OF AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT LANDINGS IS ALSO INCLUDED. DELEGATION BELIEVES THE APPROACH TO RESOLVING THE AIR ISSUE SHOULD BE PURSUED TO SEE WHERE IT LEADS; UNLESS WASHINGTON OBJECTS WE WILL DO SO. SPECIFIC GUIDANCE REQUESTED IN PARA. 13. END SUMMARY.
4. IN A FOLLOW-UP MEETING WHICH FLOWED FROM THE LAST U.S. - SOVIET BILATERAL, AMB HANSEN AND USDEL MEMBER GALASSI MET WITH GENERAL TATARNIKOV AND INTERPRETER VOLOSSATOV FOR DISCUSSIONS DEALING WITH THE NOTIFICATION SECTION OF A POSSIBLE FINAL DOCUMENT. SOVIETS HAD PREVIOUSLY INDICATED THEY BELIEVED THE APPROACH WHICH OFFERED THE MOST PROMISE FOR RESOLVING THE IMPASSE ON AIR ACTIVITIES WAS THAT DISCUSSED IN THE WORKING GROUP AT THE END OF THE LAST SESSION, 20 AND 21 MAY (REFS). TATARNIKOV SOUGHT AFFIRMATION THAT U.S. DEL WAS PREPARED TO PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF THAT FORMULA AND THEN ASKED WHAT CHANGES THE U.S. WANTED IN IT. HANSEN RESPONDED THAT WE NEEDED TO PLACE AMPHIBIOUS, AIRBORNE AND AIRMOBILE FORCES WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF GROUND FORCES IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH WHICH DEALT WITH THE ENGAGEMENT OF LAND FORCES IN A MILITARY ACTIVITY. THIS COULD BE DONE WITH AN ASTERISK AFTER LAND FORCES FOLLOWED BY A FOOTNOTE WHICH STATED: "IN THIS CONTEXT, LAND FORCES INCLUDES AMPHIBIOUS, AIRBORNE AND AIRMOBILE FORCES." TATARNIKOV AMENDED HIS TEXT ACCORDINGLY WITHOUT COMMENT. THE NEXT CHANGE HANSEN PROPOSED WAS IN THE SECOND PARAGRAPH, THAT DEALING WITH AIR FORCES. THERE, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO INDICATE THAT ANY SORTIE NUMBER WAS APPLICABLE ONLY TO FIXED WING AIRCRAFT. BEING UNABLE TO FIND AN ACCEPTABLE RUSSIAN EXPRESSION FOR FIXED WING, BOTH PARTIES AGREED THE IDEA COULD BE EXPRESSED: ". . . SORTIES OF AIRCRAFT, EXCLUDING HELICOPTERS, PLANNED TO BE FLOWN."
5. TATARNIKOV THEN INQUIRED ABOUT THE U.S. POSITION ON AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE ACTIVITIES. HANSEN RESPONDED

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

THAT WE HAD PROPOSED AND SUPPORTED THE CONCEPT OF NOTIFYING AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES; WE HAD NOT PROPOSED NOTIFICATION OF AIRBORNE ACTIVITIES APART FROM INCLUDING THEM IN THE NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES. THUS THE ALLIANCE NEEDED TIME TO STUDY THIS ISSUE AND TO CONSULT WITH CAPITALS. IN PRINCIPLE, HOWEVER, THE U.S. DELEGATION DID NOT OPPOSE THE IDEA OF NOTIFYING AIRBORNE LANDINGS IN A MANNER SIMILAR TO AMPHIBIOUS (I.E., ASSAULT) LANDINGS. NEVERTHELESS, NEITHER WE NOR OUR ALLIES HAD INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WOULD ALLOW US TO AGREE TO TEXT DEALING WITH AIRBORNE LANDINGS AND IT COULD TAKE SOME TIME BEFORE ALL DELEGATIONS WOULD RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS ISSUE. BOTH TATARNIKOV AND HANSEN INDICATED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER WHETHER AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE LANDINGS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE SAME OR SEPARATE PARAGRAPHS. TATARNIKOV SEEMED EAGER TO ENSURE THAT THE THRESHOLD FOR BOTH KINDS OF ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE THE SAME.

6. CURRENTLY NO LANGUAGE EXISTS ON MOVEMENTS OR TRANSFERS WHICH CAN BE USED AS A BASIS FOR DRAFTING. TATARNIKOV INSISTED THAT ELLIPSES BE PLACED AT THE END TO INDICATE THE POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE LANGUAGE ON MOVEMENTS, TRANSFERS AND ROTATIONS. SUCH ELLIPSES, IN OUR VIEW, SIMPLY INDICATE THAT SOME TEXT MAY FOLLOW. THEY DO NOT PREJUDGE THE SUBSTANCE OF ANY POSSIBLE TEXT, I.E., THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THERE WILL BE TEXT ON MOVEMENTS. AMB HANSEN INFORMED TATARNIKOV IN THE PLAINEST LANGUAGE THAT THERE CAN BE NO LANGUAGE OF ANY KIND DEALING WITH TRANSITS IN AN AGREED DOCUMENT. TATARNIKOV REPLIED HE UNDERSTOOD U.S. DIFFICULTIES BUT INSISTED HE MUST FOLLOW HIS INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS ISSUE.

7. HAVING FOUND REASSURANCE THAT THE U.S. POSITION PERMITS THE NOTIFICATION OF SOMETHING MORE THAN JUST GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES, I.E. AMPHIBIOUS AND POSSIBLY AIRBORNE LANDINGS, TATARNIKOV TURNED TO THE 20/21 MAY FORMULATION ON DEFINING THE TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED. HE WANTED TO KNOW THE U.S. VIEW OF THE ORDER IN WHICH VARIOUS PARAGRAPHS IN THE NOTIFICATION SECTION WOULD BE ARRANGED. HANSEN RESPONDED THAT AS CURRENTLY CONSTITUTED THE FIRST PARAGRAPH WOULD DEAL WITH THE NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCES ACTIVITIES, THE SECOND WOULD ADDRESS AIR ACTIVITIES, THE THIRD PARAMETERS AS SET FORTH IN THE NNA (LIKO) 13 JUNE TEXT ON THRESHOLDS AND THE FOURTH WOULD DEAL WITH AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS, IF WE AGREED ON OTHER NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES THEY WOULD FOLLOW IN SUBSEQUENT PARAGRAPHS. TATARNIKOV NODDED HIS UNDERSTANDING AND THEN ASKED IF IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO PLACE THE THRESHOLD TEXT IN SECOND POSITION, AFTER THE PARAGRAPH ON GROUND FORCES. HANSEN NOTED THIS WAS ANOTHER APPROACH BUT THAT IN THAT APPROACH, THE PHRASE AT THE END OF THE FIRST PARAGRAPH "WHICH WILL BE

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

INCLUDED IN THE NOTIFICATION" WOULD HAVE TO FIND ITS PLACE IN THE AIR PARAGRAPH WHICH WOULD NOW BE IN THIRD POSITION. TATARNIKOV INDICATED HIS WILLINGNESS TO MAKE THIS CHANGE IN ORDER TO HAVE TWO APPROACHES WHICH EACH SIDE COULD CONSIDER FURTHER. HE NOTED HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE AGAIN IN THE SAME FORMAT AS SOON AS THE U.S. DELEGATION HAD A POSITION.

8. AMB HANSEN NOTED THAT THE AIR ACTIVITIES QUESTION WOULD NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH IN THE SAME GENERAL FASHION IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR. TO THIS, TATARNIKOV STATED THAT HE FORESAW ONLY THE MOST GENERAL INFORMATION ON AIR ACTIVITIES IN AN ANNUAL CALENDAR. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION DOES NOT FAVOR PROVIDING THE NAME OF AIR ACTIVITIES SUCH AS "COLD FIRE" SINCE THEY OFTEN DID NOT GIVE NAMES TO SUCH ACTIVITIES AND DID NOT THINK THE PROVISION OF NAMES WAS IN ANY CASE NECESSARY. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THE EASTERN POSITION WAS TO MAKE PROVISION FOR BOTH THE OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES. HANSEN REPLIED THAT OUR OWN POSITION ALLOWED THE OBSERVATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES AND THAT TOPIC COULD BE DEALT WITH IN THE APPROPRIATE WORKING GROUP. HOWEVER, WE HAVE A FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENT CONCERNING THE VERIFICATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES WHICH WE HAVE EXPLAINED IN GREAT DETAIL. TATARNIKOV REPLIED THAT AIR ACTIVITIES ARE VERIFIABLE FULL STOP. AND, HE SAID, THE SOVIET SIDE IS NOT THINKING ABOUT OBSERVERS ON AIRFIELDS OR INSPECTORS IN CONTROL CENTERS. OBSERVERS AT RADAR SITES DID NOT RATE HIGH ON HIS LIST OF OBJECTIVES EITHER, ALTHOUGH THIS HAS BEEN ONE EASTERN IDEA OFTEN EXPRESSED IN THE CONTEXT OF OBSERVATION. (COMMENT: THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS TAKEN PAINS TO ENSURE THAT NTMS GAIN RECOGNITION AS ONE OF THE FORMS OF VERIFICATION TO BE AGREED UPON IN THIS CONFERENCE. THIS APPROACH IN THE CONTEXT OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES HAS FAILED MISERABLY WITH THE NNA, AND THE SOVIETS PROBABLY SEE AIR ACTIVITIES AS THE VEHICLE BY WHICH THEY MIGHT GAIN THIS RECOGNITION. END COMMENT)

9. IN A DISCUSSION OF GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS, TATARNIKOV INSISTED THAT A NUMERICAL THRESHOLD OF 18,000 TROOPS WOULD CARRY AN OBLIGATION TO MAKE AT LEAST 20 NOTIFICATIONS EACH YEAR FOR THE WTO STATES. HE AGREED THAT SOVIET DIVISIONS DO NOT ROUTINELY EXERCISE WITH ALL THEIR REGIMENTS PARTICIPATING. THE PRACTICE VARIES ACCORDING TO THE TYPE OF DIVISION. NEVERTHELESS, AN EXERCISE INVOLVING A "FRONT-LINE" DIVISION WOULD BREAK THE 18,000 THRESHOLD AND SUCH EXERCISES OCCUR, IF NOT EVERY YEAR THEN EVERY OTHER YEAR. CORPS LEVEL EXERCISES WOULD OCCUR AT SIMILAR INTERVALS AS WOULD ARMY LEVEL EXERCISES. (COMMENT: TATARNIKOV HAS FREQUENTLY CHARACTERIZED KAVKAZ-85 AS A

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

DIVISIONAL EXERCISE EVEN THOUGH IT WAS NOTIFIED UNDER THE HELSINKI REQUIREMENT OF 25,000 TROOPS. HE DID NOT FURTHER DEFINE WHAT HE MEANT BY CORPS LEVEL EXERCISES, BUT WE SUSPECT HE MAY HAVE BEEN SPEAKING OF EXERCISES AT THE TWO DIVISION LEVEL. ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT MENTION THEM ON THIS OCCASION, HE HAS PREVIOUSLY ADDED WTO EXERCISES TO THE CATEGORY OF THOSE WHICH WOULD EXCEED THE 18,000 FIGURE. END COMMENT) THE MAJOR CONCERN FOR THE SOVIETS, HE SAID, WAS THE DANGER THAT THE WEST, WHICH KNOWS OF SOVIET DIVISIONAL TRAINING REQUIREMENTS, WOULD RAISE COMPLIANCE ISSUES RELATED TO SMALL EXERCISES CONDUCTED IN THE INTERIOR MILITARY DISTRICTS BY DIVISIONS AT A LOW LEVEL OF MANNING. HE TOOK PAINS TO EMPHASIZE, HOWEVER, THAT THE FIGURE OF 20 NOTIFICATIONS PER YEAR AT THE LEVEL OF 18,000 WOULD INCLUDE SOME EXERCISES IN THE NEW ZONE.

10. FORWARDED FOR WASHINGTON CONSIDERATION ARE BOTH VARIANTS OF THE ENTIRE NOTIFICATION TEXT AS SUCH TEXTS, STILL UNNOTED, CURRENTLY EXIST. THEY MUST STILL BE HANDLED WITHIN NATO AS WELL AS IN THE NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES AS WELL AS AMPHIBIOUS (AIRBORNE?) LANDINGS ARE "SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION" WHEREAS AIR ACTIVITIES "WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE NOTIFICATION." TATARNIKOV'S WILLINGNESS TO WORK ON THE BASIS OF THE TEXTS TO DEAL WITH THE AIR ACTIVITIES ISSUE DOES NOT IMPLY SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THE NNA (LIKO) FORMULA OF 13 JUNE; IT IS CLEAR THAT SOME MODIFICATIONS WILL BE SOUGHT DURING NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS FORMULA. (WORDS AND PHRASES WITHIN BRACKETS REFLECT ELLIPSES IN THE TEXT AND OUR PROPOSALS FOR TEXT TO FILL THEM.) BEGIN TEXT.

FIRST VARIANT

THE (ENGAGEMENT) OF (FORMATIONS) OF LAND FORCES (ASTERISK) OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES (IN A MILITARY ACTIVITY OUTSIDE THEIR NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATIONS) UNDER A SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH ANY POSSIBLE AIR OR NAVAL COMPONENTS, WHOSE PARTICIPATION WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE NOTIFICATION.

THE (ENGAGEMENT) OF AIR FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES (IN THE ABOVE MENTIONED ACTIVITY) IF IT IS FORESEEN THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE ACTIVITY 700 SORTIES BY AIRCRAFT, EXCLUDING HELICOPTERS, WILL BE FLOWN.

THE MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO (NOTIFICATION) WHENEVER IT INVOLVES AT LEAST ONE DIVISION, OR AN EQUIVALENT FORCE, DEFINED FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS AGREEMENT AS

- 2 - 5 MOBILE COMBAT UNITS (THAT IS, TANK,
- MECHANISED INFANTRY, MOTORISED RIFLE,
- AIRMOBILE OR AIRBORNE) ON BRIGADE/REGIMENT

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

- LEVEL OR A FORMATION OF EQUIVALENT CAPABILITY WITH A TOTAL NUMBER OF AT LEAST
- . . . TROOPS, INCLUDING SUPPORT TROOPS, OR
- . . . BATTLE TANKS

THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES IN AN AMPHIBIOUS (OR AIRBORNE) ASSAULT IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.

THE MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO (NOTIFICATION/PRIOR NOTIFICATION) WHENEVER THE LANDING INVOLVES AT LEAST (THREE) BATTALIONS OR (3000) TROOPS.

. . .
(ASTERISK) IN THIS CONTEXT, LAND FORCES INCLUDES AMPHIBIOUS, AIRBORNE AND AIRMOBILE FORCES.

SECOND VARIANT

THE (ENGAGEMENT) OF (FORMATIONS) OF LAND FORCES (ASTERISK) OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES (IN A MILITARY ACTIVITY OUTSIDE THEIR NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATIONS) UNDER A SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH ANY POSSIBLE AIR OR NAVAL COMPONENTS.

THE MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO (NOTIFICATION/PRIOR NOTIFICATION) WHENEVER IT INVOLVES AT LEAST ONE DIVISION, OR AN EQUIVALENT FORCE, DEFINED FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS AGREEMENT AS

- 2 - 5 MOBILE COMBAT UNITS (THAT IS, TANK,
- MECHANISED INFANTRY, MOTORISED RIFLE,
- AIRMOBILE OR AIRBORNE) ON BRIGADE/REGIMENT
- LEVEL OR A FORMATION OF EQUIVALENT CAPABILITY WITH A TOTAL NUMBER OF AT LEAST
- . . . TROOPS, INCLUDING SUPPORT TROOPS, OR
- . . . BATTLE TANKS

THE ENGAGEMENT OF AIR FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE NOTIFICATION IF IT IS FORESEEN THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE ACTIVITY 700 SORTIES BY AIRCRAFT, EXCLUDING HELICOPTERS, WILL BE FLOWN.

THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES IN AN AMPHIBIOUS (OR AIRBORNE) ASSAULT IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.

THE MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION WHENEVER THE LANDING INVOLVES AT LEAST (THREE) BATTALIONS OR (3000) TROOPS.

. . .
(ASTERISK) IN THIS CONTEXT, LAND FORCES INCLUDES AMPHIBIOUS, AIRMOBILE AND AIRBORNE FORCES. END TEXT
11. AT THE CURRENT STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THERE IS NO TITLE FOR THE NOTIFICATION SECTION UNDER DISCUSSION. THE FIRST FORMULATION IS UNDERSTOOD BY TATARNIKOV TO BE THE U.S. PREFERRED VARIANT. THE SECOND IS CLEARLY TATARNIKOV'S. IN REALITY, USDEL BELIEVES THE SECOND

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

VARIANT IS THE BEST APPROACH TO DATE OF THOSE WHICH HAVE EITHER BEEN UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION OR WHICH HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED IN THE CORRIDORS AS POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE AIR ACTIVITIES IMPASSE. IT CONTAINS FAR LESS AMBIGUITY REGARDING THE FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP OF AIR TO GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY THAN ANY OTHER NEGOTIABLE FORMULATION TO DATE. USDEL VIEWS IT AS MORE ACCEPTABLE THAN THE U.K. IDEA OR THAT OF CONCURRENT NOTIFICATIONS BOTH OF WHICH HAVE SURFACED IN THE CORRIDORS HERE.

12. THE LANGUAGE ON AMPHIBIOUS AND/OR AIRBORNE ASSAULTS IS CRITICAL TO THE OVERALL APPROACH AND TO PROTECTING OUR SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS. THE ENGAGEMENT OF "MILITARY FORCES" IS REQUIRED TO PROTECT THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH AS IT APPLIES TO NAVAL FORCES PRECISELY BECAUSE IT DOES GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF INCLUDING THEM. IF THIS WORDING IS REDUCED TO FORCES WHICH OPERATE ON LAND, WE WILL IN THE FUTURE HAVE NO BASIS FOR ARGUING THAT THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO NAVAL ACTIVITIES HAS BEEN PRESERVED IN STOCKHOLM. THE ACTUAL THRESHOLD MAKES IT CLEAR THAT ONE IS ONLY SPEAKING OF THE LANDING. THE INCLUSION OF NAVAL FORCES IS LIMITED TO THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION SECTION WHERE ALL THAT CAN BE AGREED IS TO STATE NUMBERS OF SORTIES FLOWN (WITH NO REFERENCE TO BRANCH OF SERVICE) AND SHIP TO SHORE GUNNERY. THIS IS AN AGREED POSITION WITHIN THE NATO GROUP HERE. IN SUM, THIS FORMULATION DOES THREE THINGS FOR US 1) FOCUSES ON THE ASSAULT LANDING, 2) PROTECTS THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH AND 3) IS CONSISTENT WITH THE ESTABLISHED PATTERN FOR RESOLVING THE AIR ISSUE. (NOTE: JCS REPS HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE USE OF THE TERM "MILITARY FORCES" IN AN AMPHIBIOUS OR AIRBORNE ASSAULT. THEIR CONCERN CENTERS AROUND THE POSSIBILITY THAT SUCH AN AMBIGIOUS TERM COULD BE INTERPRETED AS INCLUDING NAVAL OR AIR FORCES NOT DIRECTLY ENGAGED IN THE LANDING BUT EMPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF THE ENTIRE AMPHIBIOUS OR AIRBORNE ACTIVITY. JCS REPS PREFER THE TERM "GROUND FORCES". AN ALTERNATE WHICH COULD ALSO ADDRESS THE CONCERNS RAISED BY JCS WOULD BE THE ADDITION OF THE WORD "LANDING" TO "ASSAULT". END NOTE) (COMMENT: REGARDLESS OF THE MERITS OR DEMERITS OF THE "GROUND FORCES" APPROACH IT IS CLEARLY UNATTAINABLE. THE NNA, PARTICULARLY THE YUGOSLAVS AND MALTESE, WOULD NEVER AGREE TO IT. END COMMENT)

13. REQUEST WASHINGTON GIVE CONSIDERATION TO THE FORMULATIONS FOR THE NOTIFICATION ISSUE AS REPORTED ABOVE. UNLESS INSTRUCTED OTHERWISE, WE WILL PURSUE APPROACH OUTLINED ABOVE FOR RESOLVING THE AIR ACTIVITIES ISSUE. SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING A SEPARATE THRESHOLD FOR AIRBORNE ASSAULT LANDINGS AS

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

WELL AS WASHINGTON REACTION TO THE TWO FORMULAE IN
PARA. 10 ARE REQUESTED BY FRIDAY, 11 JULY, IN ORDER
THAT THE ISSUE CAN BE WORKED HERE BEFORE THE CLOSING OF
THIS SESSION ON 18 JULY.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05349

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR ZIMMERMANN'S BILATERAL WITH SOVIET
- ACTING CDE CHIEF, JUNE 26, 1986

1. CDE XI - 039

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

-

3. BEGIN SUMMARY. AMBASSADOR ZIMMERMANN, ACCOMPANIED BY U.S. CDE HEAD AMBASSADOR BARRY, MET WITH ACTING HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION, AMBASSADOR RAKHMANINOV, FOR OVER AN HOUR ON JUNE 26 TO DISCUSS CDE ISSUES -- IN PARTICULAR, NOTIFICATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES, VERIFICATION, MANDATORY OBSERVATION AND NON-USE OF FORCE -- AS WELL AS U.S. AND SOVIET APPROACHES TO THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING. END SUMMARY.

4. AMBASSADOR ZIMMERMANN, ACCOMPANIED BY U.S. CDE HEAD AMBASSADOR BARRY, MET WITH ACTING HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION, AMBASSADOR RAKHMANINOV, FOR OVER AN HOUR ON JUNE 26 TO DISCUSS CDE ISSUES AS WELL AS U.S. AND SOVIET APPROACHES TO THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING. RAKHMANINOV OPENED THE MEETING BY OUTLINING FOUR "DIFFICULT ISSUES" WHICH, IN THE VIEW OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION, REMAIN OUTSTANDING: 1) NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE AND AIR ACTIVITIES; 2) VERIFICATION, IN PARTICULAR, INSPECTION; 3) MANDATORY INVITATION OF OBSERVERS; AND 4) NON-USE OF FORCE.

5. NOTIFICATION: RAKHMANINOV'S CHARACTERIZATION OF WHAT SORT OF AIR ACTIVITY WOULD BE NOTIFIED DIFFERED SOMEWHAT FROM THAT OF USSR CDE CHIEF GRINEVSKY IN RECENT U.S.-SOVIET BILATERALS AND MAY REFLECT THE APPROACH THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN TAKING WITH OUR ALLIES SINCE THE U.S.-SOVIET BILATERALS ON AIR BROKE DOWN LAST WEEK. WHILE GRINEVSKY INSISTED ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT ALL AIR, INCLUDING INDEPENDENT AIR, MUST BE CAPTURED BY A SEPARATE AIR TRIGGER (WITH CERTAIN UNSPECIFIED "EXCEPTIONS"), RAKHMANINOV DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF A "CONSTRUCTIVELY AMBIGUOUS" FORMULATION WHICH, "IN FACT," WOULD APPLY ONLY TO GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES AND TO THOSE AIR ACTIVITIES LINKED WITH GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES. HE OFFERED ONE POSSIBLE FORM SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING COULD TAKE: TWO BLOCKS -- ONE FOR GROUND FORCES, ONE FOR AIR FORCES -- WITH A "FLEXIBLE LINK" BETWEEN THE TWO. REFERRING TO PAST ASSERTIONS THAT FUNCTIONALLY LINKED AIR AMOUNTS TO 90 PER CENT OF ALL AIR ACTIVITY IN EUROPE, HE SAID THAT THE MOST DIFFICULT TASK WOULD BE TO SINGLE OUT THE TEN PER CENT OF NON-NOTIFIABLE (AIR) ACTIVITY. HOWEVER, HE CHARACTERIZED THIS TASK AS A TECHNICAL PROBLEM WHICH MILITARY EXPERTS COULD WORK OUT.

6. VERIFICATION/INSPECTION: RAKHMANINOV ARGUED THAT INSPECTION IS BUT ONE FORM OF VERIFICATION AND THAT IT IS MORE APPROPRIATE FOR DISARMAMENT MEASURES; THEREFORE,

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

THE USSR WOULD BE READY TO CONSIDER INSPECTION DURING THE SECOND (DISARMAMENT) PHASE OF THE CDE. HE TOOK ISSUE WITH "WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES" WHO ACCUSE THE SOVIET DELEGATION OF NOT IMPLEMENTING GORBACHEV'S INITIATIVE WITH REGARD TO INSPECTION, INSISTING THAT GORBACHEV LINKED INSPECTION WITH DISARMAMENT. RAKHMANINOV STRESSED THAT INSPECTION WAS THE MOST DIFFICULT ISSUE ON HIS LIST.

7. ZIMMERMANN POINTED OUT THAT AT THE GENEVA NST NEGOTIATIONS, BOTH THE U.S. AND THE USSR HAVE STATED THAT AGREEMENTS ARE IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT ADEQUATE VERIFICATION. HE ALSO ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIETS SHARED THE VIEW EXPRESSED RECENTLY BY GDR CDE AMBASSADOR THAT STOCKHOLM IS NOT THE CORRECT FORUM AT WHICH TO BREAK NEW GROUND ON VERIFICATION. RAKHMANINOV RESPONDED NONCOMMITTALLY THAT VERIFICATION IS A SERIOUS ISSUE AND SHOULD BE RESOLVED ON THE BASIS OF THE MADRID MANDATE.

8. BARRY STRESSED THAT THE USDEL WAS IN NO POSITION TO ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT WHICH IT COULD NOT DEFEND AS VERIFIABLE. HE NOTED THAT THIS WAS NOT JUST A U.S. POSITION BUT ALSO A NATO POSITION. CALLING RAKHMANINOV'S CONVERSATION "SOBERING," BARRY SAID THAT HE HAD NOT HEARD THE SOVIETS SAY SO CLEARLY IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS THAT THEY WOULD NOT AGREE TO INSPECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS CONFERENCE. IF THAT WAS THE CASE, BARRY CONCLUDED, THERE WOULD BE NO AGREEMENT AND THUS NO POINT IN DISCUSSING OTHER ISSUES. ZIMMERMANN, SAYING THAT HE WAS REFLECTING WASHINGTON'S VIEW, SUPPORTED BARRY'S ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF VERIFICATION IN STOCKHOLM AND IN ALL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.

9. OBSERVATION: RAKHMANINOV PROPOSED LIMITING OBSERVATION TO "THOSE ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE THREATENING TO SECURITY IN EUROPE". HE SUGGESTED THAT THE FRG AND THE USSR, AS THE TWO COUNTRIES MOST AFFECTED BY THIS MEASURE, SHOULD WORK TOGETHER TO FIND THE RIGHT THRESHOLD.

-

10. NON-USE OF FORCE: RAKHMANINOV SAW A PARADOX IN THE U.S. APPROACH TO NUF: ON THE ONE HAND INSISTING ON ESTABLISHING A LINK BETWEEN NUF AND "MILITARY" CSBM'S AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, INTRODUCING ISSUES, E.G., HUMAN RIGHTS, WHICH HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH CSBM'S.

11. VIENNA REVIEW MEETING: ZIMMERMANN PREDICTED THAT THE U.S. IN VIENNA WOULD PLACE GREAT EMPHASIS ON BALANCE BETWEEN THE SECURITY ELEMENT OF THE FINAL ACT AND OTHERS, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN CONTACTS. HE EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL VIEW THAT THERE IS A "NATURAL RELATIONSHIP" BETWEEN SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A GOVERNMENT WHICH CAN THREATEN ITS OWN CITIZENS ALSO COULD THREATEN ITS NEIGHBORS AND OTHER COUNTRIES. HE URGED ALL 35 PARTICIPATING STATES TO TRY TO REDUCE BOTH KINDS OF THREATS.

12. RAKHMANINOV'S RESPONSE WAS TO QUOTE EXTENSIVELY FROM GORBACHEV STATEMENTS (TO FRENCH PARLIAMENTARIANS

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

LAST OCTOBER AND TO THE CPSU CONGRESS) WHICH EXPRESS THE "SAME IDEAS ABOUT THE CSCE PROCESS." REPEATING SEVERAL TIMES THAT THERE ARE NO PROBLEMS OF PRINCIPLE ON HUMAN RIGHTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE USSR, RAKHMANINOV SAID THAT, AS PART OF GORBACHEV'S "NEW WAY OF THINKING" ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE USSR WOULD PLACE THE MOST SERIOUS IMPORTANCE ON PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS. IN THIS CONTEXT RAKHMANINOV EXPLICITLY ADVOCATED DEALING WITH BINATIONAL MARRIAGES IN A "POSITIVE AND HUMANE SPIRIT." HE ASKED WHETHER THE U.S. PLANNED TO RATIFY THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION. ZIMMERMANN RESPONDED THAT THERE WAS OPPOSITION IN THE U.S. TO THE CONVENTION AS PEOPLE WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE EFFECT ON STATES' RIGHTS.

13. RAKHMANINOV COMPLAINED THAT THE WESTERN PRESS HAD NOT REPORTED ON CHERNOBYL THE WAY THE SOVIETS EXPECTED. ZIMMERMANN NOTED THAT WESTERN SOCIETIES EXPECT TRANSPARENCY ESPECIALLY WHEN IT COMES TO A NUCLEAR DISASTER WHICH AFFECTS OTHER COUNTRIES. HE POINTED OUT THAT IF THE U.S. HAD FAILED TO INFORM THE PUBLIC ABOUT A SIMILAR EVENT, WESTERN PRESS CRITICISM WOULD HAVE BEEN EVEN STRONGER. RAKHMANINOV THEN ARGUED THAT OPPENNESS MUST BE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL AND COMPLAINED ABOUT THE CUT-OFF OF BILATERAL EXCHANGES AND CIVILIAN FLIGHTS. ZIMMERMANN RESPONDED THAT THE GENEVA SUMMIT HAD SERVED TO SPUR THE RECREATION OF SUCH CONTACTS.

14. BEGIN COMMENT: RAKHMANINOV'S TONE THROUGHOUT THE MEETING WAS POSITIVE -- HE REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT HE WAS AN OPTIMIST ABOUT CDE -- AND NONPOLEMICAL. WE ALSO WERE STRUCK RECENTLY BY SOVIET CDE HEAD GRINEVSKY'S FORTHCOMING APPROACH WHEN HE MET WITH CSCE COMMISSION CO-CHAIRMAN CONGRESSMAN HOYER'S PARTY FOR A DISCUSSION BEFORE THE BERN EXPERTS MEETING ON HUMAN CONTACTS. ALTHOUGH GRINEVSKY WAS CAREFUL TO NOTE THAT HUMAN CONTACTS WERE NOT HIS RESPONSIBILITY, HE DISCUSSED THE ISSUE IN GENERAL TERMS, ACCEPTED A REPRESENTATION LIST AND HINTED THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATE IN BERN WOULD SERIOUSLY CONSIDER U.S. PROPOSALS. HOWEVER, WE NOTE THAT IT DOESN'T COST THE SOVIET CDE DELEGATES ANYTHING TO BE POSITIVE ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS IN STOCKHOLM.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05368

SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS -

- JUNE 30-JULY 1, 1986

REF: A) STOCKHOLM 5200, B) STOCKHOLM 5343

1. CDE XI - 040

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. BEGIN SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT: THE STOCKHOLM LOGJAM MAY BE BREAKING. AT THE JUNE 30 WORKING GROUP AB MEETING CANADA OUTLINED, ON BEHALF OF NATO, AREAS OF WESTERN FLEXIBILITY IN THE FIELDS OF NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION (REF A). THE INITIATIVE WAS GENERALLY GREETED WARMLY BY THE NNA AND GIVEN A QUALIFIED, THOUGH VAGUE, WELCOME BY THE SOVIETS. TOWARD THE END OF THE WEEK SOME OF THE PROGRESS MENTIONED AT THE JUNE 27 POLITBURO MEETING WHICH DISCUSSED CDE BEGAN TO APPEAR. FOR EXAMPLE, BASED ON OUR PRELIMINARY BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS, THE SOVIETS SEEM PREPARED TO RESOLVE THE VEXING ISSUE OF AIR ACTIVITIES (SEE REF B). THIS COULD BE A SIGNAL BECAUSE, IF MOSCOW HAD DECIDED THAT IT COULD NOT ACCEPT INSPECTIONS, OUR "SINE QUA NON," IN ANY FORM, IT COULD HAVE CONTINUED TO STALL ON THE "AIR" ISSUE, WHICH IS EASIER TO DEFEND PUBLICLY THAN A REFUSAL TO AGREE TO INSPECTION. WE FORESEE CONTINUED DIFFICULTY IN GETTING THE SOVIETS TO ACCEPT A REASONABLE PARAMETER FOR NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE AND COMBINED ACTIVITIES. WE ARE NOW TAKING THE LINE THAT WE ARE GUARDEDLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE COURSE OF THE STOCKHOLM NEGOTIATIONS; FIRST, BECAUSE THAT OPTIMISM WILL BE JUSTIFIED ONLY IF INITIAL SIGNS OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY ACTUALLY MATERIALIZE AND SECOND, BECAUSE WE WANT TO HEAD OFF ANY PREMATURE NNA INITIATIVES TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. IN THE WORKING GROUPS, LANGUAGE WAS REGISTERED ON OBSERVATION, VERIFICATION, AND ANNUAL CALENDARS AND SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS WAS MADE IN RESOLVING KEY NOTIFICATION ISSUES, E.G., THE DEFINITION OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES. END SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT.

4. NOTIFICATION: WORK PICKED UP IN BOTH THE WORKING GROUPS AND IN A NEW, MORE INTENSIVE ROUND OF U.S.-SOVIET BILATERALS. UPON HIS RETURN FROM MOSCOW FOLLOWING A POLITBURO MEETING AT WHICH CDE ISSUES WERE DISCUSSED, SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY IMMEDIATELY MET WITH THE FRENCH WHERE HE TRIED, UNSUCCESSFULLY, TO PUNISH THEM FOR SEEKING TO GUARD ALLIANCE POSITIONS BY EXPRESSING DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE MEAGER RESULTS OF THE "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP." THE SOVIETS THEN RESUMED PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITH US, AND HAVE GENERALLY SEEMED EAGER TO SETTLE SOME OUTSTANDING ISSUES. WHILE THE SOVIETS HAVE INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO SETTLE AIR ON TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO US, THEY HAVE HINTED THAT TRANSFERS (TRANSITS) MIGHT

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

BECOME THE NEXT EXCUSE FOR STALLING. ON THE WHOLE, HOWEVER, IT IS OUR TENTATIVE VIEW THAT THE SOVIETS ARE READY TO DO BUSINESS -- AT LAST.

IN THREE WORKING GROUP MEETINGS THIS WEEK, DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON NOTIFICATION OF AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES, MOVEMENTS/TRANSFERS AND ALERT ACTIVITIES. THERE WAS NOT MUCH PROGRESS ON ANY SUBJECTS, AS DIFFERENCES -- WITHIN GROUPS AS WELL AS AMONG THEM -- EMERGED FOR ALL TO SEE. THE NNA NOT ONLY WERE UNABLE TO INTRODUCE THEIR MUCH HERALDED AMPHIBIOUS PROPOSAL; THEY DISAGREED PUBLICLY ON WHETHER A NOTIFIABLE AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITY SHOULD INCLUDE JUST THE LANDING (SWEDEN) OR THE WHOLE ACTIVITY (MALTA AND TO SOME EXTENT YUGOSLAVIA). THE EAST AND SWEDEN WANTED TO NOTIFY BOTH AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE ACTIVITIES WHILE THE WEST HAD TO RESERVE ITS POSITION ON THE INCLUSION OF AIRBORNE ACTIVITIES. ON MOVEMENTS/TRANSFERS, THE WEST STRESSED THE SC.1 APPROACH ACCORDING TO WHICH MOVEMENTS WOULD BE PART OF A MILITARY ACTIVITY AND ARGUED THAT SOVIET TROOP ROTATIONS SHOULD BE NOTIFIED WHILE THE USSR TRIED TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN MOVEMENTS, WHICH IT CHARACTERIZED AS THREATENING, AND ITS SEMI-ANNUAL TROOP ROTATIONS, WHICH IT INSISTED WERE NOT. THE EAST (GDR) FOR THE FIRST TIME ASKED THE WEST POINT BLANK WHETHER U.S. TRANSITS WOULD BE NOTIFIED. THE U.S. RESPONSE: TRANSITS ARE EXCLUDED; THERE IS NOT, AND NEVER WILL BE, ANY POSSIBILITY OF INCLUDING THE NOTIFICATION OF TRANSITS IN A FINAL DOCUMENT IN STOCKHOLM. THE SWEDISH COORDINATOR (LIDGARD) MADE A CLUMSY ATTEMPT TO INTRODUCE A NEW CONCEPT FOR ALERT ACTIVITIES BASED ON A NATIONAL (SWEDISH) POSITION, WHICH ALSO WOULD HAVE SET THE STAGE FOR A NEW SWEDISH PROPOSAL FOR CONSTRAINTS IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR. HIS INITIATIVE NEVER GOT OFF THE GROUND AS THE WEST DISSECTED AND DISCREDITED IT. WHEN PRESSED, EVEN THE NNA REAFFIRMED THEIR ORIGINAL SC.7 POSITION ON SHORT-NOTICE NOTIFICATIONS.

5. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION/COMMUNICATIONS: DRAFTING ON A VERIFICATION FRAMEWORK RESUMED THIS WEEK WITH A TEXT BEING NOTED STATING THAT "THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH REQUESTS . . . WILL SPECIFY THE AREA WHERE" THIS TEXT REPRESENTS TWO DIFFERENT CONCEPTS IN THE MINDS OF EAST AND WEST: THE WEST HAS FOCUSED ON "THE AREA WHERE

-
THE INSPECTION WOULD TAKE PLACE," WHILE THE EAST HAS FOCUSED ON "THE AREA WHERE THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OCCURRED."

THE SOVIETS TABLED A PROPOSAL FLESHING OUT THEIR VERIFICATION "MENU" CONCEPT WITH A LIST OF VERIFICATION FORMS A STATE COULD "USE:" IN A FIRST PARA, THEY IDENTIFY NTM'S TO DETECT A POSSIBLE VIOLATION AND THEN, AS FORMS TO USE, CLARIFICATIONS, BILATERAL OR

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

MULTILATERAL CONSULTATIONS, OR A TEMPORARY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE AS VERIFICATION METHODS -- IN OTHER WORDS, CONSULTATIONS, CONSULTATIONS AND MORE CONSULTATIONS. ELLIPSES AT THE END OF THE TEXT LEAVE OPEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT ADDITIONAL FORMS COULD BE ADDED. SEVERAL OF THE NNA WELCOMED THE EAST'S PROPOSAL AS A CONTRIBUTION TO THE DRAFTING PROCESS. NATO REJECTED THE SOVIET APPROACH BECAUSE IT FAILED, IN OUR VIEW, TO INCLUDE ANY LEGITIMATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION. UNFORTUNATELY, THE ALLIANCE'S POSITION THAT CONSULTATION IS NOT VERIFICATION WAS SEVERELY UNDERMINED BY A FRENCH INTERVENTION WHICH SEEMED TO CONCEDE TO THE EAST THAT FOR LESS SERIOUS VIOLATIONS CLARIFICATIONS AND CONSULTATIONS COULD BE USED, ALTHOUGH "ON-SITE VERIFICATION" REMAINED NECESSARY FOR "SERIOUS VIOLATIONS." WE SUSPECT THIS LATEST FRENCH DEPARTURE FROM THE NATO LINE REFLECTS BOTH A DIFFERENT TACTICAL APPROACH TO THE THE PROBLEM AS WELL AS POSSIBLY PARIS'S DESIRE, IN PREPARATION FOR THE MITTERAND VISIT TO MOSCOW, TO DEMONSTRATE FLEXIBILITY ON VERIFICATION WHILE CONTINUING TO INSIST ON A ROLE FOR INSPECTION IN THE OVERALL PROCESS. IN STOCKHOLM, HOWEVER, THE FRENCH INTERVENTION HAS MERELY SERVED TO GIVE THE EAST FRESH HOPE THAT THEY CAN EXPLOIT ALLIED DIFFERENCES OVER THE VERIFICATION ISSUE. WHAT MAKES THIS ACTION ALL THE MORE UNFORTUNATE IS THAT NATO SEEMED TO BE HAVING SOME SUCCESS IN SELLING OUR VIEWS OUTSIDE OF THE ALLIANCE. AT A COFFEE GROUP EARLIER IN THE WEEK MANY OF THE NNA'S, AS WELL AS YUGOSLAVIA AND ROMANIA, OBSERVED THAT CONSULTATIONS ARE NOT IN AND OF THEMSELVES A FORM OF VERIFICATION, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE IMPORTANT TO THE COMPLIANCE PROCESS AS A WHOLE.

6. OBSERVATION: DRAFTING REGAINED ITS MOMENTUM IN B-2 AS THREE TEXTS WERE AGREED FOR NOTATION: 1) INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED TO OBSERVERS AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAM; 2) UPDATED BRIEFINGS TO BE PROVIDED DURING THE PROGRAM; AND 3) PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES FOR OBSERVERS (I.E., VIENNA CONVENTION). IN THESE TEXTS THE EAST HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE THE TYPE OF BRIEFINGS AND UPDATES THE WEST HAS BEEN SEEKING AND HAS CONCEDED THE PRINCIPLE OF PROVIDING MAPS TO OBSERVERS, ALTHOUGH THE SCALE AND ACCURACY OF SUCH MAPS REMAINS TO BE DETERMINED. THE EAST IS STILL UNPREPARED TO DRAFT SERIOUSLY ON THE CENTRAL QUESTION OF WHAT OBSERVERS WILL BE ENTITLED TO SEE AND DO, APPARENTLY FINDING THE PROPOSALS OF THE WEST, IRELAND AND THE NNA TOO INTRUSIVE FOR ITS TASTE, AND CONTINUES TO USE THE ISSUE OF OBSERVATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES AND TRANSFERS AS A STALLING TACTIC. NEVERTHELESS, THE COORDINATOR (KAHILUOTO - FINLAND) IS CONTINUING TO MAKE STEADY IF UNSPECTACULAR PROGRESS AND CLEARLY HAS

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

THE MOST DEVELOPED MEASURE IN THE CONFERENCE TO DATE.
 7. ANNUAL FORECASTS: DESPITE EASTERN WARINESS ABOUT NOTING ANYTHING IN THE CONTENT OF THE CALENDAR WHICH MIGHT PREJUDICE ITS POSITION ON NOTIFICATION, THREE TIRETS WERE NOTED THIS WEEK: 1) TYPE OF MILITARY ACTIVITY AND ITS DESIGNATION; 2) GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PURPOSE OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY; AND 3) NAMES OF THE STATES INVOLVED IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY. DURING DISCUSSION OF A FOURTH TIRET -- THE AREA OF A MILITARY ACTIVITY -- THE EAST APPEARED NOT TO RULE OUT PROVISION OF GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES AND SWEDEN SUGGESTED A POSSIBLE FORMULATION: "GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES SUPPLEMENTED BY GEOGRAPHICAL FEATURES."

WITHIN NATO, THE UK CONTINUES TO INSIST ON NOT COMPROMISING THE USE OF MEASURE 1 AS AN END GAME BARGAINING CHIP IF THE EAST SHOWS NO WILLINGNESS TO INCLUDE STATIC INFORMATION IN THE CONTENT OF THE CALENDAR OR NOTIFICATION. CONSEQUENTLY, THE UK HAS RELUCTANTLY AGREED TO GIVE NATO NEGOTIATORS THE FLEXIBILITY TO ASK LEADING QUESTIONS ABOUT STATIC INFORMATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CALENDAR (AND NOTIFICATION) TO THE EXTENT THEY CAN DO THIS WITHOUT SPECIFICALLY MENTIONING MEASURE 1 PROVISIONS, SUCH AS THE REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATIONS.

-
 8. CONSTRAINTS: THE USSR SOUGHT TO DISCREDIT NATO'S RECENT INITIATIVE, WHICH IMPLICITLY LINKS WESTERN WILLINGNESS TO DROP NOTIFICATION OF MOBILIZATIONS TO OTHERS' (EAST AND NNA) WILLINGNESS TO STOP PUSHING CONSTRAINTS. INSTEAD THE SOVIETS INTRODUCED A DIFFERENT LINKAGE: CONSTRAINTS AND INSPECTION AS TWO SUBJECTS WHICH BELONG TO A DIFFERENT CDE STAGE. THE WEST REFUSED TO CONSIDER THIS EFFORT TO DEFER INSPECTION. THE EAST CONTINUED TO PUSH ITS JUNE 18 CONSTRAINTS MEASURE.

9. NON-USE OF FORCE: AT THE TIME OF THE NUF MEETING (TUESDAY, JULY 1) IT WAS STILL UNCLEAR WHETHER GRINEVSKY HAD RETURNED WITH NEW MARCHING ORDERS FROM MOSCOW AND WHETHER THE SOVIETS WOULD SHOW FLEXIBILITY ON KEY ISSUES. THE WEST, THEREFORE AVOIDED REGISTERING NEW LANGUAGE IN THE NUF WORKING GROUP FOR THE SECOND STRAIGHT WEEK. HOWEVER, BASED ON APPROPRIATE PROGRESS IN THE CSBM'S WORKING GROUPS, THE WEST IS NOW PREPARED TO NOTE LANGUAGE ON THE ERGA OMNES PRINCIPLE, "NO CONSIDERATION" LANGUAGE TAKEN VERBATIM FROM THE WESTERN TEXT AND SELF-DEFENSE LANGUAGE APPROVED BY WASHINGTON, I.E., "AS RECOGNIZED IN THE UN CHARTER." (ONLY IRELAND IS HOLDING UP CONSENSUS.) AT THE SAME TIME SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS REFLECTING THE WESTERN APPROACH WAS MADE REFINING TEXTS ON THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES, THE COMMITMENT TO THE FINAL ACT, AND THE EQUALITY OF THE TEN PRINCIPLES. THE WEST PRESSED FOR DRAFTING ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES AND PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT MUCH TO THE DISMAY OF THE EAST AND, UNFORTUNATELY, EVEN SOME OF THE NNA. AS THE CONTOURS OF THE NUF SECTION BECOME MORE EVIDENT, THE EAST IS BECOMING MORE DIFFIDENT. THE SOVIET NUF REPRESENTATIVE ADMITTED TO US (AFTER A FEW DRINKS) THAT MOSCOW HAD LOST ITS ENTHUSIASM FOR THE EXERCISE AND WOULD BE HAPPY WITH A "CUT-AND-PASTE" JOB USING FINAL ACT LANGUAGE PLUS SOME MENTION OF "MILITARY FORCE." DURING THE WORKING GROUP, THE EAST INTRODUCED ITS LANGUAGE ON "MILITARY FORCE:" "THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY USE OF MILITARY FORCE INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND THE FINAL ACT, IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE DANGERS OF ARMED CONFLICT, TO PRESERVE PEACE AND TO PREVENT ANY KIND OF WAR, CONVENTIONAL OR NUCLEAR." THIS LANGUAGE, IN EFFECT, IS WHAT THE SOVIETS BELIEVE THEY CAN SALVAGE FROM SC.6 -- THEIR NUF TREATY. IT IS STILL UNACCEPTABLE TO US.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05391
 SUBJECT: EMERGING SOVIET POSITION ON INSPECTION
 REF: MBFR VIENNA 558

1. CDE XI - 041
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

-
 3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE SOVIET POSITION ON VERIFICATION WHICH SEEMS TO BE EMERGING IN STOCKHOLM MIGHT INCLUDE A PROVISION FOR AN EXTREMELY LIMITED FORM OF INSPECTION. IN ADDITION TO PRESERVING THE RIGHT TO DENY A REQUEST FOR AN INSPECTION, THE SOVIETS ALSO SEEK TO LIMIT ITS USE TO DEMONSTRABLY GROSS INSTANCES OF NONCOMPLIANCE. END SUMMARY.

4. THE SOVIETS, TOGETHER WITH THEIR VARIOUS WTO FRONTMEN, HAVE BEGUN TO HINT, PRIMARILY BEHIND THE SCENES, AT THE KIND OF INSPECTION MEASURE THEY MIGHT FIND ACCEPTABLE FOR A STOCKHOLM AGREEMENT. ALTHOUGH THEY CONTINUE TO ASSERT THAT INSPECTION IS APPROPRIATE ONLY FOR DISARMAMENT OR FOR A SUBSEQUENT PHASE OF SECURITY NEGOTIATIONS THEY UNDOUBTEDLY UNDERSTAND THE WESTERN POSITION THAT STOCKHOLM WILL FAIL IF THERE IS NO PROVISION FOR INSPECTION IN THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. ACCORDINGLY, THE SOVIETS AND THEIR EAST EUROPEAN PARTNERS AVOID RULING OUT INSPECTION PER SE AND HAVE BEGUN PROPOSING A SPECTRUM OF SO-CALLED FORMS OF VERIFICATION. THE FORMS THUS FAR ADVANCED IN THE DRAFTING PROCESS INCLUDE THE RIGHTS TO 1) USE NTM'S; 2) REQUEST CLARIFICATIONS; 3) CONSULT BILATERALLY AND MULTILATERALLY; AND 4) SET UP TEMPORARY OR AD HOC CONSULTATIVE COMMISSIONS. ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE YET TO PROPOSE IT EXPLICITLY, THE EAST HAS MADE CLEAR THAT ITS LIST IS INCOMPLETE AND THAT SOMETHING ALONG THE LINES OF THE NNA PROPOSAL FOR OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST (WHICH THE EAST WOULD TRY TO SELL AS INSPECTION) WOULD BE AN ACCEPTABLE ADDITION.

5. BY AVOIDING OUTRIGHT REJECTION OF THE WESTERN POSITION ON INSPECTION AT THE MOMENT, THE SOVIETS ARE PROBABLY SETTING THEMSELVES UP TO EMPLOY ONE OF TWO POSSIBLE TACTICS. FIRST, THEY PROBABLY INTEND TO EXHIBIT SUFFICIENT INTEREST IN VERIFICATION TO STRING NATO ALONG UNTIL LATE IN THE GAME WHEN THEY HOPE INTERNAL ALLIANCE PRESSURES FOR A CDE OUTCOME WILL PROVE MORE PERSUASIVE TO NATO THAN THE -- BY THAT TIME -- RELATIVELY ISOLATED U.S. POSITION ON INSPECTION. SECOND, THEY SEE PROBABLE ADVANTAGE IN CONTINUING TO PLAY FOR TIME BY ARGUING AGAINST THE NEED FOR INSPECTION ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WOULD ONLY BE APPROPRIATE TO DISARMAMENT AND BY ESTABLISHING VARIOUS ROADBLOCKS TO PROGRESS (E.G., FIRST AIR, NOW TRANSITS). THESE ARTIFICIAL OBSTACLES COULD THEN SERVE AS MAJOR "CONCESSIONS" LATE IN THE END GAME WHEN THE WEST COULD NOT PLAUSIBLY EXPECT MORE THAN A WATERED-DOWN VERSION OF INSPECTION IN RETURN.

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

6. ACCORDING TO THE SOVIET APPROACH, INSPECTION WOULD BE THE LAST RECOURSE IN A GRADUATED PROCESS IN WHICH THE OTHER LESS INTRUSIVE FORMS OF VERIFICATION SHOULD FIRST BE EMPLOYED. MOREOVER, INSPECTION WOULD BE RESERVED ONLY FOR SERIOUS TRANSGRESSIONS. MARGINAL OR NONTHREATENING INSTANCES OF SUSPECTED NONCOMPLIANCE WOULD NOT WARRANT INSPECTION; THESE COULD BE DEALT WITH MORE APPROPRIATELY THROUGH CLARIFICATIONS TENDERED UPON REQUEST OR CONSULTATIONS.

7. QUESTION OF RIGHT OF REFUSAL: OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST MAY PROVIDE THE SOVIETS A WAY OUT OF THEIR DILEMMA. OF OBVIOUS APPEAL, BUT WITH SOME MODIFICATION, IS THE EXPLICIT PROVISION IN THE NNA PROPOSAL FOR THE RIGHT TO DENY A REQUEST FOR OBSERVATION; DOUBTLESSLY PREFERABLE WOULD BE A RANGE OF LESSER GROUNDS FOR DENYING A REQUEST THAN THE NNA PROPOSAL STIPULATES, I.E., SUPREME NATIONAL INTERESTS. THE NNA PROPOSAL ALSO ENTAILS TWO REQUIREMENTS WHICH COULD NOT ONLY FACILITATE EVADING A REQUEST BUT ALSO REDUCE THE LIKELIHOOD OF INSPECTION IN THE NEW CDE ZONE. THE NNA PROPOSAL, FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD REQUIRE THAT A REQUEST FOR OBSERVATION BE OCCASIONED BY A PERCEIVED THREAT TO ONE'S NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS. THIS PROVISIO WOULD REST ON SUBJECTIVE JUDGMENT WHICH READILY COULD BE DISPUTED; DISPUTES, IN TURN, COULD LEAD TO REQUESTS FOR PROOF, A REQUIREMENT THE SOVIETS DESIRE BUT HAVE YET TO ENUNCIATE AS THEY HAVE IN THE MBFR TALKS (SEE REFTTEL). THE NEUTRAL APPROACH ALSO STIPULATES THAT REQUESTS FOR OBSERVATION BE LIMITED TO INSTANCES WHEN THE CONTINUED EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AGREED CSBM REGIME IS IN SERIOUS JEOPARDY. MARGINAL OR NONTHREATENING ACTS OF NONCOMPLIANCE, IN THE SOVIET VIEW, WOULD MEET NEITHER THE PERCEIVED THREAT NOR THE JEOPARDY CRITERION. MOREOVER, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT EITHER OF THESE CRITERIA WOULD EVER APPLY TO SOVIET MILITARY TRAINING ACTIVITIES IN THE INTERIOR OF THE USSR, ESPECIALLY THE URAL AND VOLGA MILITARY DISTRICTS, WHERE SUCH ACTIVITIES ARE OF RELATIVELY SMALL SCALE.

-

8. THE SOVIETS' ATTEMPT TO PRESERVE THE RIGHT OF REFUSAL AND LIMIT THE CIRCUMSTANCES FOR INSPECTION IS TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT ABETTED BY NATO'S OWN POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF RESTRICTED AREAS. THE ALLIANCE'S LACK OF AN AGREED POSITION ON RESTRICTED AREAS HAS HAMPERED DEVELOPMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE TACTIC FOR CONFRONTING THE SOVIETS ON THE ISSUE OF RIGHT OF REFUSAL. THE SOVIETS HAVE THUS BEEN ABLE TO RESPOND EVASIVELY TO REQUESTS TO ELABORATE THE GROUNDS ON WHICH THEY WOULD TURN DOWN A REQUEST FOR INSPECTION. TO BUILD A CASE FOR THE RIGHT OF REFUSAL THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO EMPLOYED OTHER TACTICS. THESE INCLUDE:

-- ELABORATION OF FORMS OF VERIFICATION. THE SOVIETS

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

HAVE ENCOURAGED DEVELOPMENT IN WORKING GROUPS OF A LIST OF AGREED FORMS OF VERIFICATION. THEIR AIM IS TO FORMALIZE SPECIFIC APPROACHES WHICH WOULD BE TAILORED TO THE CSBM IN QUESTION OR THE GRAVITY OF SUSPECTED INSTANCES OF NONCOMPLIANCE; INSPECTION OF COURSE WOULD BE RESERVED FOR ONLY THE GRAVEST.

-- WAFLING ON THE PRINCIPLE OF CHOICE. THE SOVIETS HAVE FORMALLY ACKNOWLEDGED THE RIGHT OF A STATE TO CHOOSE THE FORM OF VERIFICATION IT WISHES TO EMPLOY. IT HAS BECOME APPARENT, HOWEVER, THAT THEY DRAW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE AND THE OBLIGATION OF THE STATE WHOSE ACTIVITIES ARE IN QUESTION TO GRANT THE CHOICE.

-- REFERENCES TO VIOLATIONS, OR ALLEGATIONS OF VIOLATIONS. ATTEMPTS TO HAVE SUCH REFERENCES INCORPORATED INTO DRAFTING TEXT ARE INTENDED TO ESTABLISH THE RATIONALE FOR A REQUIREMENT FOR PROOF. THE ADEQUACY OF THE PROOF, OF COURSE, WOULD BE SUBJECT TO QUESTION.

9. USDEL, WITH GENERAL SUPPORT FROM NATO, HAS MADE THE FOLLOWING RESPONSES IN REPLY:

-- NO INSPECTION, NO AGREEMENT.

-- WE CAN ACCEPT NO RIGHT OF REFUSAL AND NO FLAWED MODALITIES; OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST IS UNACCEPTABLE.

-- FOR US THERE IS ONLY ONE "CHOICE" OF VERIFICATION: INSPECTION.

-- BUT WE ARE PREPARED TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS SO THAT IT WOULD NOT BE ABUSED.

10. LOCALLY, THE ALLIES ARE SOLIDLY ON BOARD BUT SOME UNHELPFUL IDEAS ARE BEGINNING TO SURFACE.

-- FRG IS BEGINNING TO BACK OFF THE IDEA OF SUSPENSION AS THE PENALTY FOR REFUSAL; THEY ARE SUGGESTING INSTEAD THAT OBLIGATIONS WOULD ONLY BE SUSPENDED FOR THE REFUSING STATE. THEY ARE ALSO BEGINNING TO SURFACE THE IDEA THAT INSPECTION OUGHT ONLY APPLY TO NONFORECAST EVENTS.

-- UK IS ACTUALLY EXPRESSING A PREFERENCE FOR GROUND INSPECTION AS OPPOSED TO AIR.

-- ITALY IS OPENLY TALKING ABOUT A QUOTA OF INSPECTION REFUSALS (ONE EVERY TWO YEARS, FOR EXAMPLE).

-- NETHERLANDS IS PUSHING FOR CONSULTATIONS/CLARIFICATIONS AS A MEANS OF VERIFICATION.

11. WE ARE CAUTIONING THAT THESE IDEAS ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE TO US AND WARNING AGAINST CREATING MISPERCEPTIONS REGARDING THE ALLIANCE POSITION.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05471

SUBJECT: CDE: UK PROPOSAL ON "COMPLIANCE VISITS"

1. CDE XI-044. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. ON JULY 10, UK AMBASSADOR EDES SHARED WITH US A PROPOSAL ON "COMPLIANCE VISITS" WHICH HAS BEEN DEVELOPED IN LONDON. THE IDEA IS TO MAKE INSPECTION MORE PALATABLE BY CHANGING ITS NAME AND ESTABLISHING A "CDE COMMISSION" MADE UP OF REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL 35 PARTICIPATING STATES WHICH WOULD BE CHARGED WITH MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR "COMPLIANCE VISITS" AND ACTING AS A CLEARING HOUSE FOR INFORMATION ON COMPLIANCE. WE SUSPECT THE FRENCH WILL TORPEDO THE IDEA IN ANY CASE BECAUSE OF THEIR FEARS OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND CONSULTATION. SINCE THE SOVIETS HAVE NOW ACCEPTED THE CONCEPT OF INSPECTION, THE USE OF THE TERM "COMPLIANCE VISIT" WILL DIE A NATURAL DEATH. WE WILL DISCOURAGE PUTTING THE IDEA TO THE 16, WHERE IT WOULD PROBABLY EVOLVE INTO A NEUTRAL INSPECTION TEAM. AT THE SAME TIME WE WOULD LIKE TO DEMONSTRATE TO LONDON THAT WE HAVE TAKEN IDEA SERIOUSLY; TO THAT END WOULD APPRECIATE ANY GUIDANCE WASHINGTON MIGHT WISH TO PROVIDE.
3. TEXT FOLLOWS:

-
BEGIN TEXT
COMPLIANCE

1. COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE MONITORED BOTH BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION AND THROUGH COMPLIANCE VISITS ORGANISED BY A CDE COMMISSION.
- "2. NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL USE AVAILABLE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH GENERALLY RECOGNISED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
- "3. NO PARTICIPATING STATE MAY INTERFERE WITH THE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION OF THE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES OPERATING IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 2 ABOVE.
- "4. COMPLIANCE VISITS. A CDE COMMISSION SHALL BE ESTABLISHED. ITS TERMS OF REFERENCE, MEMBERSHIP AND OPERATING PROCEDURES ARE SET OUT BELOW. IT WILL BE RESPONSIBLE, INTER ALIA, FOR ORGANISING, AT THE REQUEST OF A PARTICIPATING STATE, VISITS TO THE TERRITORIES OF OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES FOR THE PURPOSE OF VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT.
- "5. LIMITATIONS. THE RECEIVING STATE WILL NOT BE REQUIRED TO PERMIT COMPLIANCE VISITS IN THE FOLLOWING:
A) DEFENCE INSTALLATIONS (AS IN SC1 (AMPLIFIED)) B) RESTRICTED AREAS, WHICH WILL BE NOTIFIED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR. THESE AREAS SHALL NOT BE EITHER SO NUMEROUS OR SO EXTENSIVE AS TO FRUSTRATE THE PURPOSES OF THIS AGREEMENT. ANY CHANGES IN THE NUMBERS OF GEOGRAPHICAL CO-ORDINATES OF THESE RESTRICTED AREAS SHACL BE NOTIFIED

100

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

AT LEAST TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE.

"6. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPLIANCE VISITS. ANY PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH WISHES A COMPLIANCE VISIT TO BE ORGANISED UPON THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER SHALL INFORM SIMULTANEOUSLY THE CDE COMMISSION AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATE CONCERNED. THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH REQUESTS SUCH A VISIT SHALL INDICATE REASONS WHY IT WISHES THE VISIT IN QUESTION TO BE CARRIED OUT. THE CDE COMMISSION SHALL, IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT OF THE REQUEST, CONTACT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE UPON WHOSE TERRITORY THE VISIT IS TO BE CARRIED OUT. ARRANGEMENTS SHALL BE MADE BETWEEN THE COMMISSION AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE WHOSE TERRITORY IS INVOLVED SO AS TO ENABLE THE VISIT TO COMMENCE WITHIN 36 HOURS OF THE INITIAL ISSUANCE OF THE REQUEST.

"7. THE DESIGNATED AREA. IN SUBMITTING ITS REQUEST FOR THE ORGANISATION OF A COMPLIANCE VISIT, THE REQUESTING STATE SHALL SPECIFY THE GEOGRAPHICAL CO-ORDINATES OF THE AREA WHICH THE VISIT SHOULD COVER.

"8. IF ANY PART OF THE DESIGNATED AREA COINCIDES WITH A RESTRICTED AREA (SEE PARAGRAPH 5 ABOVE) THE CDE COMMISSION SHALL EXCLUDE THAT PART OF THE AREA FROM THE ORGANISATION OF THE VISIT.

"9. ACCESS AND ENTRY TO THE DESIGNATED AREA AND THE UNOBSTRUCTED SURVEY OF IT FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE COMPLIANCE VISIT SHALL BE ENSURED BY THE STATE ON WHOSE TERRITORY THE VISIT TAKES PLACE.

"10. PARTICIPATION. THE COMPLIANCE VISIT SHALL BE UNDERTAKEN BY TWO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REQUESTING STATE ACCOMPANIED BY THREE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CDE COMMISSION. IN THE CASE OF THE THREE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION, NO TWO MEMBERS SHALL BE FROM STATES BELONGING TO THE SAME MILITARY ALLIANCE.

"11. TIMING. A COMPLIANCE VISIT WILL PROCEED IN THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE:

A. WITHIN 12 HOURS OF THE ISSUANCE OF A REQUEST, THE RECEIVING STATE WILL REPLY TO THE REQUESTING STATE THROUGH THE CDE COMMISSION, MAKING NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE VISIT, AND TRANSMITTING CO-ORDINATING INFORMATION, INCLUDING THE POINT OF ENTRY TO ITS TERRITORY. THE RECEIVING STATE WILL ENSURE THAT THE VISITING TEAM IS ABLE TO REACH THE DESIGNATED AREA WITHOUT DELAY FROM THE POINT OF ENTRY:

-
B. WITHIN 36 HOURS AFTER THE ISSUANCE OF A REQUEST, UNLESS OTHERWISE MUTUALLY AGREED, THE TEAM WILL BE PERMITTED TO ENTER THE TERRITORY OF THE RECEIVING STATE:

C. THE TEAM WILL INFORM THE RECEIVING STATE OF ANY DELAY IN ITS ARRIVAL BEYOND 36 HOURS AT THE POINT OF ENTRY TO THE TERRITORY OF THE RECEIVING STATE AND INDICATE THE EXTRA TIME NEEDED TO ARRIVE AT THE POINT OF ENTRY:

101

SECRET

- D. WITHIN 36 HOURS AFTER THE ARRIVAL OF THE TEAM AT THE DESIGNATED AREA, UNLESS OTHERWISE MUTUALLY AGREED, THE VISITORS WILL BE REQUIRED TO LEAVE THE DESIGNATED AREA.
- "12. CONDUCT OF COMPLIANCE VISITS. THE TEAM SHALL BE PERMITTED TO CONDUCT THE VISIT ON LAND AND FROM THE AIR. THE STATE REQUESTING THE VISIT SHALL PROVIDE THE AIRCRAFT (WITH THE CREW) AND THE LAND VEHICLES (WITH TWO DRIVERS) UNLESS, UPON REQUEST, THE RECEIVING STATE DOES SO. THE TEAM SHALL BE PERMITTED THE USE OF THAT ONE AIRCRAFT AND THE TWO LAND VEHICLES THROUGHOUT.
- "13. LOGISTIC SUPPORT. UPON REQUEST THE RECEIVING STATE WILL FURNISH ADEQUATE FOOD AND LODGING FOR THE VISITORS. THE VISITORS MAY PROVIDE THEIR OWN TENTS AND RATIONS AND MAY MAKE USE OF CIVILIAN FACILITIES.
- "14. OPTICAL EQUIPMENT. THE VISITORS WILL HAVE THE UNRESTRICTED USE OF MAPS, BINOCULARS, CAMERAS AND TAPE RECORDERS. BINOCULARS, CAMERAS AND TAPE RECORDERS WILL BE DRAWN FROM THE STOCK HELD BY THE CDE COMMISSION.
- "15. COMMUNICATIONS. THE VISITING TEAM WILL HAVE ACCESS TO, AND MAY USE, STANDARDISED TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, THE TYPE OF WHICH WILL BE NOTIFIED IN THE ANNUAL FORECAST OF THE PRECEDING YEAR. NO ENCRYPTION OF MESSAGES WILL BE ALLOWED.
- "16. REPORT. THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REQUESTING STATE SHALL PROVIDE A REPORT ON THE VISIT. THIS REPORT, TOGETHER WITH ANY COMMENTS ON IT WHICH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMISSION MAY WISH TO MAKE, SHALL BE CIRCULATED BY THE COMMISSION TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES.
-
- THE REPORT AND THE ACCOMPANYING COMMENTS WILL FORM THE BASIS OF ANY SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS.
- "17. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES. WHEN IN THE TERRITORY WITHIN THE ZONE OF ANY PARTICIPATING STATE, THE VISITORS WILL BE GRANTED THESE DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES ACCORDED TO ACCREDITED DIPLOMATS UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.
- THE CDE COMMISSION
- "18. THE CDE COMMISSION WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF ALL INFORMATION REGARDING ALL MEASURES AGREED AT THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE (CDE). PARTICIPATING STATES WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING THAT INFORMATION IN STRICT ACCORDANCE WITH THE FORMAT AND TIMESCALES LAID DOWN BY THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT.
- "19. THE CDE COMMISSION WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING REPRESENTATIVES FOR COMPLIANCE VISITS CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS VERIFICATION MEASURE. PERSONAL OPTICAL AND AUDIO EQUIPMENT (BINOCULARS, CAMERAS, TAPE RECORDERS) WILL BE PROVIDED FROM A STOCK MAINTAINED BY THE COMMISSION. THE COMMISSION WILL ALSO BE THE FORUM FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF COMMENTS BY NATIONS ON THE COMPLIANCE VISIT REPORT CIRCULATED BY THE CHALLENGING STATE.

SECRET

25X1

"20. THE CDE COMMISSION WILL BE LOCATED IN (VIENNA). IT WILL BE COMPOSED OF A SINGLE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE FROM EACH OF ALL THIRTY FIVE PARTICIPATING STATES, WHO WILL AT THE DISCRETION OF THE SENDING STATE, BE SECONDED FROM THEIR COUNTRY'S BILATERAL MISSIONS TO (AUSTRIA). THOSE STATES WITHOUT PERMANENT REPRESENTATION IN (AUSTRIA) MAY DESIGNATE ANOTHER TO REPRESENT THEIR INTERESTS. IN ADDITION, UP TO TWO FURTHER DELEGATES FROM CAPITALS MAY BE SECONDED TEMPORARILY. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT FOR THE CDE COMMISSION WILL BE PROVIDED BY THE HOST NATION, WHICH WILL BE REIMBURSED BY PARTICIPATING STATES ACCORDING TO THE USUAL CSCE FORMULA."
END TEXT
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 05469

SUBJECT: CDE: FRANCO-SOVIET "BREAKTHROUGH"

1. CDE XI-046. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE SOVIETS EVIDENTLY USED THE OCCASION OF THE MITTERAND VISIT TO ANNOUNCE SOME IMPORTANT NEW POSITIONS ON CDE. ALTHOUGH THERE MAY BE SLIPPAGE WHEN GRINEVSKY RETURNS TO STOCKHOLM AND ANNOUNCES WHAT HAS BEEN DECIDED, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE USSR IS NOW READY:

- TO LOWER THE GROUND FORCE THRESHOLD FROM 18,000 TO 15-14,000 AND ACCEPT SOME KIND OF A STRUCTURAL PARAMETER;
- TO ACCEPT THE SUB-THRESHOLD APPROACH TO AIR ACTIVITIES, WHICH INVOLVES PROVIDING INFORMATION ON AIR ACTIVITIES INVOLVING OVER 700 SORTIES IN A NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES;
- TO PUT ASIDE THE QUESTION OF TRANSITS BUT PRESS FOR NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFERS INTO THE ZONE SO THAT "STOCK-PILING OF MEN AND THEIR EQUIPMENT" AT ARRIVAL BASES IN THE ZONE WOULD BE CAPTURED;
- TO ACCEPT BOTH THE PRINCIPLES OF INSPECTION AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT PRINCIPLE ON AN EXPERIMENTAL BASIS IN THIS PHASE OF THE CDE, I.E. WE COULD HAVE SOME INSPECTION BUT NOT MUCH.

3. WE UNDERSTAND GRINEVSKY WILL LAY OUT THE NEW SOVIET POSITIONS TO THE CONFERENCE WHEN HE RETURNS FROM MOSCOW ON JULY 14. HE WILL PROBABLY ALSO SAY THAT THE USSR IS READY TO DRAFT MORE INTENSIVELY IN ORDER TO MEET THE APPROACHING DEADLINE. HE WILL SUGGEST STAYING ON FOR AN EXTRA WEEK IN JULY (JULY 18-25) TO TRY TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE WHOLE COMPLEX OF NOTIFICATION ISSUES AND VERIFICATION IF POSSIBLE AND THEN COMING BACK 10 DAYS EARLY (AUGUST 9). (COMMENT: THE FRENCH BELIEVE THIS SCHEDULE WOULD ALLOW THE CONFERENCE TO RESOLVE THE REMAINING ISSUES BY SEPTEMBER 1, LEAVING THE REST OF SEPTEMBER FOR EDITORIAL WORK. END COMMENT.)

4. THESE SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES SHOULD MAKE SERIOUS DRAFTING POSSIBLE. IF THE SOVIETS SHOW REAL FLEXIBILITY ON KEY ISSUES, WE DOUBT THAT DELEGATIONS WILL INSIST ON THEIR SUMMER VACATIONS, THOUGH MANY WILL RESENT THE FRANCO-SOVIET MOVE INTENSELY. WE ARE ALREADY LETTING IT BE KNOWN THAT WE ARE WILLING TO GO ALONG WITH ANY INTENSIFICATION OF THE WORK PROGRAM WHICH DOESN'T GO BEYOND SEPTEMBER 19.

5. AS FOR THE ACTUAL DRAFTING, WE SEE MAJOR PROBLEMS IN PINNING DOWN AGREEMENT ON THE AREAS LISTED ABOVE.

- ON THRESHOLDS, THE SOVIETS WILL CERTAINLY HOLD OUT FOR HIGHER LEVELS THAN NATO IS NOW READY TO ACCEPT; A NUMBER OF OUR ALLIES INSIST THAT 10,000 IS AS HIGH AS THEY CAN GO; THE SOVIETS WILL ALSO RESIST INCLUSION OF ANY MEANINGFUL EQUIPMENT ELEMENT;

SECRET

25X1

- ON AIR, THE SOVIETS WILL MAKE TROUBLESOME DEMANDS REGARDING OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION;
- ON TRANSFERS, THE SOVIETS WILL CERTAINLY TRY TO INCLUDE TRANSITS DE FACTO;
- ON INSPECTIONS, WE WILL HAVE GREAT PROBLEMS NEGOTIATING MODALITIES REQUIRED FOR EFFECTIVE REGIME.

-
6. ALL THAT BEING SAID, THE PROSPECTS FOR AGREEMENT ARE NOW REASONABLY BRIGHT.

BARRY##

7. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS: JCS WASHDC AND SECDEF WASHDC
BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05502

SUBJECT: CDE - NNA CONSTRAINT PROPOSAL PRESENTED

1. CDE XI - 047.

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. THE NNA (ELMER-SWEDEN) PRESENTED A NEW CONSTRAINT PROPOSAL DURING THE 10 JULY WORKING GROUP MEETING OF A-3 (ANNUAL FORECASTS/CONSTRAINING MEASURES). THIS CONCEPT, WHICH RESEMBLES THE IRISH PROPOSAL OF 1 MAY, IS PART OF AN APPARENT TREND IN THE NNA POSITION AWAY FROM CEILINGS AND TOWARDS CONSTRAINING ELEMENTS OF THE CALENDAR.

-

4. BEGIN TEXT:

"THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL ABIDE BY THE FOLLOWING PROVISIONS CONSTRAINING NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES.

...

THE FOLLOWING CONSTRAINING PROVISIONS APPLY TO NOTIFIABLE MILITARY MANOEUVRES, WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN LISTED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR, PROVIDED THEIR DURATION EXCEEDS 24 HOURS:

NO SUCH MILITARY MANOEUVRE WILL COMPRISE MORE THAN

... DIVISIONS OR EQUIVALENT FORCES ...

THE STATES WILL NEITHER PERMIT ON THEIR OWN TERRITORY NOR CARRY OUT OR PARTICIPATE IN MORE THAN A TOTAL OF ... SUCH MILITARY MANOEUVRES PER CALENDAR YEAR.

MOREOVER, THE STATES WILL NEITHER PERMIT ON THEIR OWN TERRITORY NOR CARRY OUT OR PARTICIPATE IN A TOTAL OF MORE THAN ... SUCH MILITARY MANOEUVRE(S) AT THE SAME TIME.

. TO BE DEFINED

.. AS DEFINED IN SC 7

... PARAMETERS WILL RELATE TO THE COMBINATION OF STRUCTURAL AND NUMERICAL ELEMENTS TO BE AGREED IN THE CONTEXT OF NOTIFICATION"

END TEXT.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 05510

SUBJECT: CDC: PROPOSED DEMARCHE TO THE SOVIETS

RCF: STOCKHOLM 5363

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. REFTTEL DESCRIBED UK/FRG IDEA FOR AN END-OF-ROUND INFORMAL DEMARCHE TO THE SOVIETS REGARDING ALLIANCE VIEWS ON THE CHARACTER OF A CDE AGREEMENT. FRG DRAFT TALKING PAPER, AT PARA 2 BELOW, HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO CLOSE ALLIES. THE CONCEPT WILL BE DISCUSSED BY THE FULL CAUCUS ON JULY 14. IT REMAINS OUR VIEW THAT ANY DECISION TO PROCEED DEPENDS ON CONCRETE SIGNS OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY UPON GRINEVSKY'S RETURN FROM MOSCOW.

-
3. BEGIN TEXT:

INFORMAL WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR A CDE PACKAGE

- "IT IS IN THE WESTERN INTEREST TO DEFINE IN TIME THE OUTLINES OF A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM AND TO OBLIGE THE SOVIETS TO RESPOND TO IT AT THE LATEST EARLY IN THE 12TH ROUND. MANY ELEMENTS OF THIS PACKAGE ARE NOT NEW BUT REPRESENT KNOWN WESTERN POSITIONS. THEY ARE REITERATED HERE IN ORDER TO PREVENT ANY MISUNDERSTANDING.

- THIS PACKAGE WOULD CONTAIN THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:

- 1. --NOTIFICATION--:

- WILLINGNESS TO ADJUST THE STRUCTURAL AND NUMERICAL THRESHOLDS SO THAT ONLY ACTIVITIES INVOLVING ELEMENTS OF MORE THAN ONE DIVISION WOULD HAVE TO BE NOTIFIED.

- WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER A NUMERICAL THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION OF LAND ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE RANGE FROM 6.000 TO 10.000 MEN.

- INCLUSION OF INFORMATION ON THE NUMBER OF SORTIES OF FIXED WING AIRCRAFT ABOVE A CERTAIN LEVEL IN THE NOTIFICATION OF COMBINED ACTIVITIES.

- WILLINGNESS TO ACCOMMODATE CONCERN ON NOTIFICATION OF MOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES AS INDICATED ON JUNE 30TH.

- CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION TO INCLUDE STATIC INFORMATION (SEE PARA 3 AND 4).

- NO NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES INCLUDING TRANSFERS.

- NO NOTIFICATION OF TRANSITS.

- 2. --OBSERVATION--:

- MANDATORY INVITATION OF ALL CSCE-STATES TO OBSERVE ALL NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES AS LONG AS THE CRITERIA FOR A NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY ARE MET.

- 3. --CALENDAR--: (TO INCLUDE STATIC INFORMATION ELEMENTS).

- 4. --INFORMATION--:

- WILLINGNESS NOT TO INSIST IN THIS PHASE ON AN INDEPENDENT INFORMATION MEASURE PROVIDED THAT ADEQUATE INFORMATION IS PROVIDED IN THE NOTIFICATION MEASURE

107

SECRET

SECRET

AND IN THE CALENDAR (SEE PARAS 1 AND 3), INCLUDING PEACE-TIME LOCATION, DESIGNATION OF ALL UNITS AT DIVISION LEVEL AND ABOVE PARTICIPATING IN NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES.

5. --VERIFICATION--:

- ESTABLISHMENT OF A VERIFICATION REGIME WHICH WOULD BE EFFECTIVE BUT NOT UNDULY INTRUSIVE. THE WEST HAS ALREADY SHOWN FLEXIBILITY AT STOCKHOLM EXPRESSING ITS WILLINGNESS TO AGREE TO ONLY ONE ACTIVE INSPECTION PER YEAR PER PARTICIPATING STATE. IT IS SUGGESTED TO FACILITATE AGREEMENT THROUGH SPECIFIC MODALITIES ASSOCIATED WITH AN INSPECTION REGIME:

(A) --LIMITATION OF INSPECTIONS--:

- IN THE CONTEXT OF AN INSPECTION REGIME WITH NO ESCAPE CLAUSE WE ARE WILLING TO CONSIDER A LIMITATION OF THE NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS A STATE HAS TO ACCEPT ON ITS TERRITORY.

- (FOR EXAMPLE: A PARTICIPATING STATE SHALL NOT BE REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH MORE THAN (...) REQUESTS FOR INSPECTIONS FROM OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES WITH WHICH IT HAS NOT CARRIED OUT COMMON MILITARY ACTIVITIES DURING THE LAST 5 YEARS.)

(B) --LAND OR AIR INSPECTIONS--:

- WILLINGNESS TO PROPOSE BOTH LAND AND AIR, INDICATING THAT AIR INSPECTIONS COULD BE MADE MORE ACCEPTABLE BY SUGGESTING THAT THEY MIGHT BE CARRIED OUT WITH NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT AND CREW, WHICH WOULD TAKE INSPECTORS OF THE INSPECTING STATE AND THEIR ESCORT FROM THE INSPECTED STATE TO THE INSPECTION AREA.

6. --COMMUNICATION MEASURE--:

7. --CONSTRAINTS--:

- UNDERSTANDING THAT CONSTRAINTS ARE NOT TO BE INCLUDED IN A RESULT OF THIS PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE." END TEXT.'

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05555

SUBJECT: WHAT TO DO WITH A STOCKHOLM CONCLUDING
- DOCUMENT?

REF: STOCKHOLM 1444

1. CDE XI - 048
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

-

3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS CABLE OUTLINES A NUMBER OF UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE ADOPTION, INITIALING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT IF CONSENSUS CAN BE ATTAINED ON SUCH A DOCUMENT HERE IN STOCKHOLM. SEE PARA 8 FOR ACTION REQUESTED. END SUMMARY.

4. AS WE ENTER END GAME NEGOTIATIONS HERE IN STOCKHOLM WE MUST ADDRESS A NUMBER OF PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS, SOME WITH SUBSTANTIVE IMPLICATIONS. WITHOUT PREDICTING THAT THERE WILL BE A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT, IT IS NEVERTHELESS ESSENTIAL FOR WASHINGTON TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF WHAT TO DO WITH SUCH A DOCUMENT WHEN AND IF CONSENSUS IS REACHED. WOULD SUCH A DOCUMENT, FOR EXAMPLE, BE INITIALED OR SIGNED? WOULD IT BE ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS IN STOCKHOLM OR IN VIENNA? WHEN WOULD THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE BEGIN? CONCURRENTLY WITH THE DOCUMENT'S ADOPTION BY CONSENSUS IN STOCKHOLM OR AT THE BEGINNING OF THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE?

5. BACKGROUND: AS EARLY AS THE VISIT OF NST CHIEF NEGOTIATOR AND FORMER CSCE AMBASSADOR MAX KAMPelman ON FEBRUARY 21, USDEL OUTLINED SOME OF OUR CONCERNS AS TO HOW AND WHEN A STOCKHOLM CONCLUDING DOCUMENT MIGHT BE ADOPTED AND IMPLEMENTED (REFTEL). IF WE ARE ABLE TO REACH A GOOD MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT RESULT IT WOULD BE LOGICAL TO IMPLEMENT SUCH AN AGREEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE CDE CHILD DOES NOT TAKE ON A LIFE OF ITS OWN AND THAT IT MAINTAINS ITS SUBORDINATION TO ITS CSCE PARENT ORGANIZATION -- THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE, WHICH BEGINS ON NOVEMBER 4, 1986. OUR ALLIES SHARE THESE CONCERNS. HOWEVER, THEIR OVERRIDING PREOCCUPATION SEEMS TO BE THAT ANY DOCUMENT JUDGED TO BE IN NATO'S SECURITY INTERESTS (AND, IMPLICITLY, IN THEIR DOMESTIC POLITICAL INTERESTS) SHOULD BE ADOPTED AND IMPLEMENTED WITHOUT DELAY. ANOTHER CONSIDERATION FOR THE USG IS WHETHER A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT AGREED TO IN STOCKHOLM, EVEN THOUGH IT WILL BE POLITICALLY AND NOT LEGALLY BINDING, WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED UNDER THE CASE ACT GOVERNING LEGISLATIVE REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS.

-

6. ONE APPROACH, SUGGESTED BY THE UK AMBASSADOR (EDES), IS TO HAVE THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ADOPT A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT BY CONSENSUS AT THE END OF ITS LAST SESSION (SEPTEMBER 19) AND TO HAVE THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE "BLESS" THE DOCUMENT DURING ITS OPENING WEEK IN NOVEMBER,

SECRET

THIS SIGNALING THE BEGINNING OF ITS IMPLEMENTATION. THIS APPROACH WOULD BE LOGICAL IF MINISTERS WERE TO BE PRESENT AT THE VIENNA OPENING; THEY WOULD WANT TO SHARE IN THE CREDIT FOR A SUCCESS. LIKewise IT WOULD GIVE GOVERNMENTS A CHANCE TO REVIEW A LAST-MINUTE AGREEMENT, AND WOULD COINCIDE WITH THE NEED TO BEGIN FORECASTING FOR 1987 IN NOVEMBER 1986 AND TO BEGIN NOTIFICATION FOR 1987 EFFECTIVE FOR EXERCISES THAT BEGIN JANUARY 1, 1987. IN VIENNA FOREIGN MINISTERS COULD THEN CALL FOR THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STOCKHOLM CONCLUDING DOCUMENT WHICH WOULD FORMALLY INITIATE THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE OF THE ACCORD. FINALLY, A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT MUST BE TRANSLATED INTO ALL SIX OFFICIAL CSCE LANGUAGES; BASED ON THE DIFFICULTY OF TRANSLATION OF PREVIOUS CSCE DOCUMENTS, PARTICULARLY INTO RUSSIAN, THIS MAY BE A TIME-CONSUMING AND CONTENTIOUS TASK WHICH MIGHT NOT BE COMPLETED BY THE SEPTEMBER 19 CLOSE OF THE CONFERENCE.

7. WHILE THIS APPROACH HAS CERTAIN ATTRACTIONS TO USDEL, IT IS NOT WITHOUT PITFALLS. AS NOTED ABOVE, MANY, IF NOT MOST OF OUR ALLIES -- NOT TO MENTION THE EAST AND NNA -- PREFER TO HAVE ANY DOCUMENT ADOPTED AND IMPLEMENTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, PROBABLY IN STOCKHOLM. FURTHERMORE, THE SWEDISH HOSTS WILL PRESS TO HIGHLIGHT ANY DOCUMENT EMERGING FROM STOCKHOLM.

8. ACTION REQUESTED: IN OUR VIEW, A STOCKHOLM CONCLUDING DOCUMENT MUST BE ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS BEFORE THE SEPTEMBER 19 CLOSING DATE. AT THE SAME TIME, THE DOCUMENT CANNOT BE SIGNED IN STOCKHOLM, ACCORDING TO THE CONFERENCE'S EXECUTIVE SECRETARY. THUS IT IS NECESSARY TO DEVELOP AN APPROACH TO CERTAIN QUESTIONS POSED BY THIS CONUNDRUM BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THE NEXT ROUND IN AUGUST. IN PARTICULAR, WHAT ROLE WILL THE CDE AMBASADORS PLAY? SHOULD THEY INITIAL ANY DOCUMENT? WHAT

ROLE SHOULD THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE PLAY, IF ANY? WHEN SHOULD THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE BEGIN? COULD THE DOCUMENT FALL UNDER THE PURVIEW OF THE CASE ACT? BASED ON OUR DISCUSSIONS HERE, USDEL IS FURTHER DEVELOPING ITS VIEWS AND LOOKS FORWARD TO CONSULTATION ON THESE AND RELATED SUBJECTS WHEN WE RETURN TO WASHINGTON IN LATE JULY.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05529

SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS - JULY 7-11, 1986

1. CDE XI - 049

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

-

3. BEGIN SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT: THIS WEEK THE REAL "BREAKTHROUGH" IN STOCKHOLM OCCURRED AT THE MITTERAND AND GORBACHEV SUMMIT IN MOSCOW. SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY FLEW TO MOSCOW AGAIN AT MID-WEEK, PRESUMABLY TO GET NEW INSTRUCTIONS. WHILE WE ARE EXPECTING GRINEVSKY TO MAKE A MAJOR STATEMENT ON JULY 14, WE ALREADY HAVE A GOOD IDEA FROM THE FRENCH OF WHAT THE USSR IS NOW READY TO ACCEPT: 1) LOWERING THE GROUND FORCE THRESHOLD FROM 18,000 TO 15-14,000; 2) ACCEPTING SOME KIND OF A STRUCTURAL PARAMETER; 3) ACCEPTING THE SUB-THRESHOLD APPROACH TO AIR ACTIVITIES; 4) PUTTING ASIDE THE QUESTION OF TRANSITS BUT PRESSING FOR NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFERS INTO THE ZONE; AND 5) ACCEPTING BOTH THE PRINCIPLE OF INSPECTION AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION ON AN EXPERIMENTAL BASIS IN THIS PHASE OF THE CDE. WHILE WE SEE MAJOR PROBLEMS IN PINNING DOWN AGREEMENT ON THESE AREAS, DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EAST AND WEST ARE CLEARLY NARROWING. END SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT.

4. NOTIFICATION: THE REAL ACTION ON NOTIFICATION THIS WEEK TOOK PLACE IN MOSCOW. SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY FLEW HOME AGAIN AT MID-WEEK, PRESUMABLY TO GET NEW INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOWING THE FRANCO-SOVIET SUMMIT. WHILE WE ARE EXPECTING HIM TO MAKE A MAJOR STATEMENT ON JULY 14, WE ALREADY HAVE A GOOD IDEA FROM THE FRENCH OF CHANGES IN THE SOVIET POSITION ON NOTIFICATION: 1) REDUCTION OF THE GROUND FORCE THRESHOLD FROM 18,000 TO 15-14,000; 2) ACCEPTANCE OF SOME KIND OF A STRUCTURAL PARAMETER; 3) ACCEPTANCE OF THE SUB-THRESHOLD APPROACH TO AIR ACTIVITIES, WHICH INVOLVES PROVIDING INFORMATION ON AIR ACTIVITIES INVOLVING OVER 700 SORTIES IN A NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES; AND 4) PUTTING ASIDE THE QUESTION OF TRANSITS BUT PRESSING FOR NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFERS INTO THE ZONE. WHEN IT COMES TO ACTUAL DRAFTING, WE PREDICT THAT 1) ON THRESHOLDS, THE SOVIETS WILL BOTH HOLD OUT FOR HIGHER LEVELS THAN NATO IS NOW READY TO ACCEPT AND RESIST INCLUSION OF ANY MEANINGFUL EQUIPMENT ELEMENT; 2) ON AIR, THE SOVIETS WILL MAKE TROUBLESOME DEMANDS REGARDING OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION; 3) ON TRANSFERS, THE SOVIETS WILL TRY TO INCLUDE TRANSITS DE FACTO.

-
MOST OF THE ACTION IN STOCKHOLM ALSO OCCURRED BEHIND THE SCENES THIS WEEK IN U.S.-SOVIET BILATERALS. IN A REAL REVERSAL OF ROLES WHICH DOUBTLESS REFLECTED THE SEA CHANGE IN MOSCOW, SOVIET MILREP TATARNIKOV, WHO HAS BEEN ANYTHING BUT FLEXIBLE IN THE PAST, PROPOSED TO US

111

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

PRIVATELY THAT THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION SHOW THE CONFERENCE THAT THE LOGJAM OVER AIR ACTIVITIES HAD BEEN BROKEN BY NOTING ALL TYPES OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES TOGETHER AS A SERIES OF BLOCKS BEFORE THE END OF THE SESSION. MOREOVER, FOR THE FIRST TIME, HE SAID PRIVATELY THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT A MODIFIED VERSION OF THE NNA (LIKO) FORMULA ON GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS. HE INSISTED, HOWEVER, ON INCLUSION OF A BLOCK FOR MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS, SAYING THAT THIS WAS A SOVIET "PRINCIPLED POSITION".

IN THE WORKING GROUP, DISCUSSION PRIMARILY FOCUSED ON THE NNA THRESHOLD PROPOSAL WITH THE SOVIETS ARGUING AGAINST DEFINING A DIVISION EQUIVALENT IN TERMS OF BRIGADES OR REGIMENTS. WHILE THERE WAS SOME MOVEMENT BEHIND THE SCENES, BOTH SIDES STALLED IN THE COFFEE GROUPS THIS WEEK: FIRST, EARLY IN THE WEEK THE SOVIETS ADAMANTLY REFUSED TO ADDRESS THE LIKO FORMULA, APPARENTLY WAITING TO SEE THE RESULTS OF BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH US ON A GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR DEFINING NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES (SEE ABOVE); THEN THE WEST, IN ORDER TO PROTECT NATO'S POSITION THAT THE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING, NOT THE WHOLE AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITY, IS NOTIFIABLE, STALLED ON LANGUAGE ON AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES -- AN ITEM BOTH THE EAST AND THE NNA WERE EAGER TO DRAFT ON. BY THE END OF THE COFFEE GROUP MEETING, HOWEVER, SOME COMMON GROUND APPEARED TO EMERGE.

5. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION: THE SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT ON VERIFICATION THIS WEEK ALSO TOOK PLACE IN MOSCOW, WHERE THE SOVIETS INDICATED TO THE FRENCH A WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT BOTH THE PRINCIPLE OF INSPECTION AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT PRINCIPLE ON AN EXPERIMENTAL BASIS IN THIS PHASE OF CDE. WHILE WE

-
WILL HAVE TO WAIT FOR GRINEVSKY'S RETURN TO CONFIRM THIS, WE BELIEVE THE SOVIETS NOW ARE WILLING TO ACCEPT SOME KIND OF INSPECTION -- WHAT WILL BE DIFFICULT IS PINNING DOWN INSPECTION MODALITIES WHICH MEET OUR REQUIREMENTS. IN STOCKHOLM THE SOVIETS PROVIDED A PALE REFLECTION OF THEIR MOSCOW DISCUSSIONS BY INDICATING THAT THEY COULD ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF "ON-SITE INSPECTION" FOR CSBM'S IN A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT; HOWEVER, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRINCIPLE WOULD HAVE TO OCCUR LATER IN "THE PROCESS OF MONITORING REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS." STOCKHOLM COULD NOT PUT INSPECTION INTO PRACTICE, THE SOVIETS ARGUED, DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE, BUT THEY NOTED THAT SUCH EXPERIENCE MIGHT BE GAINED ON THE BASIS OF EXPERIMENTS AND TRIAL RUNS, PERHAPS TO BE CONDUCTED DURING THE VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING. INSPECTION POSSIBLY COULD GO INTO EFFECT, IN THE SOVIET VIEW, AFTER THE VIENNA MEETING IF THAT MEETING MANDATES A CDE PHASE II DISARMAMENT STAGE

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

(BASED ON THE BUDAPEST APPEAL). BOTH NATO AND THE NNA GAVE A COOL RECEPTION TO THIS NEW EASTERN IDEA. NATO INDICATED THAT THE EAST'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF INSPECTION WAS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT, BUT THAT IT WAS NOT ENOUGH. IN BILATERAL CONTACTS IN STOCKHOLM, THE SOVIET MILREP ALSO HAS SHOWN SUDDEN INTEREST IN INSPECTION MODALITIES FOR GROUND AND AIR INSPECTION OF ALL NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES BUT HAS INSISTED THAT SENSITIVE POINTS BE OFF LIMITS.

THE WEST TRIED TO CONTINUE THE DRAFTING PROCESS ON VERIFICATION MODALITIES THIS WEEK BY PROPOSING TWO SENTENCES DEALING WITH THE NEED FOR RAPID RESPONSE TO VERIFICATION REQUESTS AND THE FACT THAT NOTHING SHOULD DELAY CARRYING OUT VERIFICATION. WHILE THESE SENTENCES WERE WELL RECEIVED BY THE NNA, THEY WERE SIMPLY IGNORED BY THE EAST. WE WILL TAKE THEM UP AGAIN NEXT WEEK. ON INFORMATION THIS WEEK, BOTH IN THE COFFEE GROUP AND THE WORKING GROUP, A HOST OF ALLIANCE SPEAKERS BEAT THE DRUM FOR AN EXCHANGE OF MEASURE I-TYPE INFORMATION, BUT

MADE NO DISCERNIBLE HEADWAY. THE EAST REITERATED ITS STANDARD ARGUMENTS THAT MEASURE I WAS NOT COMPREHENSIVE BECAUSE IT DOES NOT INCLUDE NAVAL INFORMATION, AND THAT INFORMATION SHOULD BE DISCUSSED ONLY IN CONNECTION WITH NOTIFICATION (IN THE B-1 GROUP). THIS PRESENTS A REAL TACTICAL PROBLEM FOR THE ALLIANCE IN THAT, WHILE THE EAST INSISTS THAT THEY WILL DISCUSS STATIC INFORMATION ONLY IN B-1, THE UK STUBBORNLY REFUSES TO LET THE ALLIANCE TAKE THE EAST UP ON THE OFFER FOR FEAR OF "GIVING AWAY" MEASURE I. THE UK, HOWEVER, DOES NOT OPPOSE OUR PROBING IN A-2 EASTERN READINESS TO PROVIDE STATIC INFORMATION IN THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION.

6. OBSERVATION: THERE WAS NO DRAFTING PROGRESS IN THE WORKING GROUP THIS WEEK. FOR THE FINAL MEETING OF THE ROUND IT IS HOPED THAT TWO TEXTS WILL BE NOTED (I.E., BOARD AND LODGING FOR OBSERVERS AND COMMUNICATIONS FOR OBSERVERS). THESE TEXTS WILL VIRTUALLY COMPLETE THE DRAFTING ON ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS. ONCE AGAIN THIS WEEK IN THE B-2 COFFEE GROUP, THE EAST TRIED TO PREEMPT WORKING GROUP B-1'S DISCUSSION OF TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED (AND SUBSEQUENTLY OBSERVED) BY TABLING AN ADDITIONAL PROPOSAL ON THE OBSERVATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES AND MOVEMENTS (TRANSFERS). INTERNALLY, THE NATO TEAM AND CLUSTER CONTINUE TO CONSIDER OPTIONS FOR FLESHING OUT THE ALLIANCE'S JUNE 30 OFFER OF FLEXIBILITY ON DURATION OF OBSERVATION. FOUR OPTIONS ARE UNDER CONSIDERATION: OBSERVATION 1) WHEN THE ACTIVITY IS AT OR ABOVE THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD; 2) OF THE ACTIVE PHASE OF THE EXERCISE; 3) FROM THE TIME THE TROOPS ENTER THE EXERCISE AREA UNTIL THEY RETURN TO BARRACKS; 4) A COMBINATION OF OPTIONS 1 AND 3 (PROPOSED BY U.S.). AT

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

WEEK'S END OPTION 4 HAD ATTRACTED THE MOST INTEREST, BUT DISCUSSION CONTINUES.

7. CONSTRAINTS: THE NNA INTRODUCED A NEW PROPOSAL FOR "CONSTRAINING NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES" (SEE SEPTTEL), WHICH IT DEFENDED AS INCREASING PREDICTABILITY AND REINFORCING THE ANNUAL CALENDAR -- TWO OBJECTIVES

- WHICH NATO SUPPORTS. ALTHOUGH IT WAS PRESENTED ON A SINGLE SHEET OF PAPER, THE PROPOSAL CONSISTS OF TWO DISTINCT PARTS. THE NEW PROPOSAL POSES A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS FOR NATO: 1) THE FIRST PARAGRAPH WOULD REGISTER PARTICIPATING STATES' ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSTRAINING MILITARY ACTIVITIES -- A PRINCIPLE WHICH THE WEST HAS DOGGEDLY REFUSED TO ACCEPT; 2) THE SECOND PART LIMITS THE SIZE, FREQUENCY AND SIMULTANEOUS CONDUCT OF UNFORECAST NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH LAST MORE THAN 24 HOURS. IT IS NOT CLEAR AT THIS POINT HOW THIS NEW NNA CONSTRAINT WILL APPLY TO NATO; HOWEVER, DISCUSSION IN THE COFFEE GROUP CONFIRMED OUR INITIAL IMPRESSION REGARDING ITS POTENTIALLY DETRIMENTAL IMPACT ON ALERTS. IT IS, HOWEVER, TARGETED ONLY AT ALERTS FOR TRAINING PURPOSES, NOT THOSE WHICH WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN IN RESPONSE TO A CRISIS SITUATION (I.E, U.S. REINFORCEMENTS, FRG MOVES TO GDP'S). BASED ON WHAT WE HAVE HEARD IN THE CORRIDORS, IT APPEARS THAT THIS PROPOSAL WAS A SWEDISH INITIATIVE WITHIN THE NNA AND THAT IT DOES NOT ENJOY THE SUPPORT OF ALL OF THE OTHER NNA'S. NATO GAVE THE NEW NNA PROPOSAL A COOL RECEPTION IN THE WORKING GROUP, BUT ENGAGED THE NNA IN A DETAILED EXCHANGE REGARDING ALERTS IN THE COFFEE GROUP. THE EAST BARELY MENTIONED IT IN THE WORKING GROUP WHERE THEY FOCUSED ON THEIR OWN CONSTRAINTS PROPOSALS. IN THE COFFEE GROUP, HOWEVER, THE EAST DID ACCEPT OUTRIGHT THE FOURTH PARAGRAPH OF THE PROPOSAL (SEE SEPTTEL).

8. ANNUAL CALENDAR: THE ANNUAL CALENDAR TOOK A BACK SEAT TO THE NEW NNA CONSTRAINTS PROPOSAL THIS WEEK. TWO POSSIBLE TICKS OF THE CONTENT OF THE CALENDAR WERE DISCUSSED: THE AREA AND TIMEFRAME OF A NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY. ON THE FIRST ISSUE, THE EAST INSISTED ON THE OPTION TO DESIGNATE THE AREA WITH EITHER "COORDINATES" OR "FEATURES." THE WEST CONTINUED TO PUSH FOR GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES AS BEING THE ONLY REASONABLE STANDARD. ON TIME FRAME, BOTH THE NNA AND THE WEST WANTED A PRECISE FORMULATION -- DURATION AND STARTING AND ENDING DATES -- WHILE THE EAST THIS WEEK

- BECAME THE CHAMPION OF THE SC.1 APPROACH -- THE 30-DAY PERIOD DURING WHICH THE ACTIVITY IS PLANNED TO BEGIN -- ALTHOUGH FOR MONTHS THEY HAVE CRITICIZED IT AS TOO COMPLICATED. WE DO NOT EXPECT RAPID MOVEMENT ON EITHER OF THESE ITEMS, IN PART BECAUSE THE EAST REMAINS

114

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

CAUTIOUS ABOUT PREJUDICING ITS POSITION ON THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION.

9. NON-USE OF FORCE: THE TEXT ON THE ERGA OMNES (ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE) CONCEPT WAS NOTED. THE WORKING GROUP WAS PREPARED TO NOTE TWO SENTENCES ON SELF-DEFENSE, BUT THE IRISH STILL CONTEND THAT THE FORMULATION "AS RECOGNIZED IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS" DOES NOT SUFFICIENTLY PROTECT THE PRIMACY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN DETERMINING THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE. THE COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES AND PROVISIONS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, MANIFESTATION OF FORCE AND TERRORISM FORMED THE FOCUS OF DRAFTING IN THE COFFEE GROUP. UNDER THE RUBRIC OF COMMITMENT TO THE FINAL ACT, THE EAST INTRODUCED AN AMENDMENT ENUMERATING ALL TEN PRINCIPLES OF THE ACT, PRESUMABLY TO SUBSUME A SEPARATE PASSAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS. THE NNA JOINED THE WEST IN REJECTING THIS APPROACH. THE EAST ALSO INTRODUCED A TEXT ON TERRORISM WHICH ADDS THE CONCEPT OF "STATE TERRORISM" TO THE DISCUSSION. AGAIN THE NNA JOINED THE WEST IN OPPOSING A REFERENCE TO THIS CONTENTIOUS CONCEPT. UNTIL THE RECENT DECLARATIONS OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY EMERGING OUT OF THE GORBACHEV-MITTERAND SUMMIT ARE TRANSLATED INTO CONCRETE DRAFTING PROGRESS ON CSBM'S, THE NATO NUF CLUSTER HAS DECIDED TO SLOW DOWN THE ACTUAL REGISTRATION OF TEXTS IN THE NUF WORKING GROUP.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05526
 SUBJECT: CDE: NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD -- SINGLE
 - OPERATIONAL COMMAND

1. CDE XI - 050.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
-
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: USDEL UNDERSTANDS THAT WASHINGTON IS CONCERNED THAT INCLUSION OF THE PHRASE "UNDER A SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND" MIGHT PUT INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS AT RISK WERE THE U.S. REQUIRED TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A COMPLIANCE CHALLENGE. USDEL RAISED THESE CONCERNS WITH CLOSE ALLIES ON JULY 11. BASED ON THAT DISCUSSION, USDEL STRONGLY RECOMMENDS THAT WE NOT PURSUE REMOVAL OF THE PHRASE "UNDER A SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND" FROM THE NOTIFICATION TEXT CURRENTLY UNDER NEGOTIATION. TO DO SO WOULD ENDANGER THE ENTIRE STRUCTURAL APPROACH. END SUMMARY.
4. THE NECESSITY OF EVIDENCE. WHILE ALLIES SUPPORT FULL PROTECTION OF INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS, THEY ARE HIGHLY SKEPTICAL THAT A COMPLIANCE CHALLENGE WOULD REQUIRE THE U.S. TO PRESENT SUCH EVIDENCE OR THAT "SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND" PROVIDES THE SOVIETS A KEY LOOPHOLE FOR REFUTING AN ALLEGATION. THE SOVIETS NEED NOT GO SO FAR AS TO USE "SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND" AS A LOOPHOLE: IF THEY ARE INTENT ON REFUTING AN ALLEGATION THEY COULD CLAIM, DEPENDING ON THE SIZE OF AN ACTIVITY, THAT IT HAD NOT MET THE STRUCTURAL/NUMERICAL THRESHOLD. THE PROBLEM OF THE SOVIETS REJECTING WESTERN NONCOMPLIANCE ALLEGATIONS WILL EXIST REGARDLESS OF THE AVAILABILITY OF EVIDENCE. NO VERIFICATION REGIME WE DEVELOP HERE WILL BE AIRTIGHT ENOUGH TO OVERCOME THE PROBLEM OF SOVIET DENIAL, BUT IN ANY CASE, OUR APPROACH TO VERIFICATION GUARDS AGAINST ANY REQUIREMENT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OF NONCOMPLIANCE IN ADVANCE OF A REQUEST FOR INSPECTION.
5. NEGOTIATING CONCERNS. THE UK, FRG, AND FRANCE STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT IF NATO DEMANDS A CHANGE IN THE APPROACH TO NOTIFICATION THE DOOR WILL BE OPENED TO A VARIETY OF SUCH DEMANDS. USDEL SUPPORTS ALLIED CONCERNS THAT SUCH A MOVE ON OUR PART WOULD SERIOUSLY RISK UNDERMINING GRUDGING SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THE BASIC APPROACH TO THE NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES -- AN APPROACH WHICH IS FAVORABLE TO WESTERN INTERESTS. ALLIES ARGUE THAT SUCH A MOVE COULD DESTROY THE PRECARIOUS CONSENSUS TO DRAFT ON THE BASIS OF THE NNA (LIKO) FORMULA FOR DEFINING NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY.
-
6. STRUCTURAL APPROACH. IT IS THE VIEW OF BOTH ALLIES AND USDEL THAT THE PHRASE "UNDER A SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND" IS REQUIRED TO PRESERVE OUR STRUCTURAL APPROACH TO NOTIFICATION. WITHOUT SUCH A REFERENCE THE THRESHOLD

116

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

WOULD LOSE ITS CURRENT REQUIREMENT FOR A RELATIONSHIP AMONG THE UNITS PARTICIPATING IN A NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY. NATO ARGUMENTATION IN SUPPORT OF A STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD WOULD BE DAMAGED BY THE ELIMINATION OF THIS INTERRELATIONSHIP -- AS EXPRESSED BY THIS PHRASE.

MOREOVER, AS WASHINGTON IS AWARE, CERTAIN ALLIES (E.G., FRG) STRONGLY PREFER THE NUMERICAL TO THE STRUCTURAL ASPECT OF THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD AND WOULD USE U.S. INSISTENCE ON REMOVAL OF THIS PHRASE AS ANOTHER REASON TO PRESS FOR A "NUMBERS ONLY" SOLUTION.

7. "COMMON ACTIVITY" VS "SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND." IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN ALLIED SUPPORT FOR THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH, AS EXPRESSED ABOVE, USDEL IS CONVINCED THAT ONE OF THESE PHRASES IS NECESSARY. IN ARGUING THE RELATIVE MERITS OF "IN A COMMON ACTIVITY" OR "UNDER A SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND," ALLIED DELS POINT OUT THAT THE PROOF PROBLEM REGARDING SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE EXISTS IN EITHER CASE. FURTHERMORE, UK DEL ARGUES THAT THE PHRASE "COMMON ACTIVITY" COULD REQUIRE NOTIFICATION OF CPX'S LIKE WINTEX, WHEREAS "UNDER A SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND" WOULD NOT. ALLIES STRONGLY BELIEVE WINTEX SHOULD NOT BE CAPTURED BY A NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD AND WE AGREE. LASTLY, THE FRENCH HAVE RELUCTANTLY SUPPORTED THE FOCUS ON BRIGADES AND REGIMENTS IN THE CURRENT NATO APPROACH TO NOTIFICATION. IT IS THEIR VIEW THAT USE OF THE PHRASE "COMMON ACTIVITY" STRENGTHENS THAT EQUATION; THEREFORE, THEY STRONGLY PREFER TO USE THE PHRASE "UNDER A SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND." IN FACT, AS WILL BE RECALLED, THEY WERE THE ONES TO INSIST THAT THE PRESENCE OF DIVISION HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD BE INSERTED INTO OUR FORMULA IN DISCUSSIONS IN THE LAST ROUND; "UNDER A SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND" WAS A FALLBACK FOR THEM. THEY HAVE REMINDED US OF THAT -- FORCEFULLY -- IN THE CURRENT DISCUSSION.

8. USDEL WOULD APPRECIATE WASHINGTON REVIEW OF THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED ABOVE AND STRONGLY SUGGESTS MAINTAINING THE PHRASE "UNDER A SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND" IN THE CURRENT NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD FORMULA.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

11/

SECRET

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05549

SUBJECT: FRANCO-SOVIET BILATERAL

REF: STOCKHOLM 5343

1. XI - 051.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY, HEAD OF THE SOVIET CDE DELEGATION, UPON HIS RETURN FROM CONSULTATIONS IN MOSCOW, MET WITH THE FRENCH DELEGATION TO OUTLINE NEW SOVIET POSITIONS ON CDE OUTCOME. GRINEVSKY TOLD THE FRENCH HE WANTS RAPID PROGRESS IN THE AREA OF NOTIFICATION BEFORE THE SUMMER BREAK, WHICH HE SAID SHOULD BE POSTPONED AT LEAST ONE WEEK. HE SAID, FURTHER, THAT THE SOVIETS ARE READY TO ACCEPT OUTLINES OF FINAL AGREEMENT AS REPORTED REFTEL BUT HAVE DIFFERENT FORMULATION FOR GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS. GRINEVSKY ALSO PROVIDED FRENCH WITH FORMULA FOR POSTPONEMENT OF ISSUES TO FURTHER STAGE OF CDE. END SUMMARY.
4. UPON HIS RETURN FROM MOSCOW, SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY MET FOR TWO HOURS WITH HEAD AND DEPUTY HEAD OF THE FRENCH DELEGATION TO OUTLINE SOVIET POSITIONS ON FINAL DOCUMENT AT STOCKHOLM. AT THE SAME TIME, SOVIET DEL MEMBER GENERAL TATARNIKOV WAS MEETING WITH SENIOR FRG MOD DEL MEMBER, GENERAL SCHMIDBAUER. SOVIET AND FRENCH DELEGATIONS HAVE AGREED THAT THEY ARE NOT ONLY WILLING TO WORK BEYOND JULY 18, BUT THAT SUCH AN INTENSIFICATION OF THE WORK IS REQUIRED. GRINEVSKY STATED HE NOT ONLY WANTS TO MAKE QUICK PROGRESS ON THE OUTLINE OF A FINAL NOTIFICATION SECTION DURING THIS PERIOD BUT ALSO WANTS TO AGREE ON THE FRAMEWORK FOR GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS. (NOTE: IN THE WORKING GROUP AB THIS AFTERNOON, THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR MERELY SUPPORTED THE IDEA OF EXTENDING THE CONFERENCE WORKING SCHEDULE, BUT HE GAVE NO INDICATION OF AREAS OF SUBSTANTIVE FLEXIBILITY, LET ALONE CHANGES IN THE SUBSTANTIVE SOVIET POSITIONS. END NOTE)

AIR: SOVIETS WILL AGREE TO REPLACING THE FIRST SET OF ELLIPSES IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH DEALING WITH LAND FORCES SO IT WOULD READ "THE ENGAGEMENT OF . . . OF LAND FORCES" AND THE AIR PARAGRAPH WOULD BE AGREED TO READ "THE PARTICIPATION OF AIR FORCES IN AN EXERCISE/MANEUVER WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE NOTIFICATION" THUS CLEARLY MAKING AIR ACTIVITIES A SUB-SET OF NOTIFIABLE LAND FORCE ACTIVITIES. FRENCH INFORMED GRINEVSKY THAT NO REFERENCE COULD BE MADE TO EITHER EXERCISE OR MANEUVER IN THIS PARAGRAPH. SOVIETS ALSO INDICATED THAT THEIR AIR SORTIE THRESHOLD COULD BE 700 SORTIES, OR JUST AS EASILY, 200 SORTIES.

GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS: GRINEVSKY INDICATED THAT THERE SEEMED TO BE AGREEMENT THAT WE ARE SPEAKING OF MULTI-DIVISIONAL EXERCISES IN THE CDE; TO THIS THE

SECRET

25X1

FRENCH REPLIED THAT IT COULD NOT BE MULTI-DIVISIONAL FOR THE WEST SINCE MANY WESTERN STATES, INCLUDING FRANCE, DID EXERCISE WITH AN ENTIRE SINGLE DIVISION ALONE. GRINEVSKY OFFERED TWO NEW FORMULAE FOR GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS. EACH STARTS WITH THE APPROACH IN THE NNA 13 JUNE FORMULA "THIS MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO . . . WHENEVER IT INVOLVES:" AND THEN CONTINUE AS FOLLOWS:

- A) -- TWO MOBILE COMBAT FORMATIONS OR UNITS (THAT IS, TANK, MECHANISED INFANTRY, MOTORISED RIFLE, AIRMOBILE OR AIRBORNE) AT THE DIVISIONAL/BRIGADE/REGIMENTAL LEVEL WITH A TOTAL OF . . . TROOPS
OR

- B) -- . . . TROOPS AND MORE CORRESPONDING TO TWO DIVISIONS WHOSE TYPE WOULD BE INCLUDED. FOR STATES WITH STRUCTURES NOT INCLUDING DIVISIONS, THESE WOULD BE THE CORRESPONDING NUMBER OF BRIGADES AND REGIMENTS;
(COMMENT: GRINEVSKY ALSO NOTED THE POSSIBILITY OF INCLUDING IN BOTH FORMULAE A PROVISION FOR MAIN BATTLE TANKS, DEPENDING UPON THE ACTUAL FIGURES FOR BOTH TROOPS AND TANKS. IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT THE ABOVE LANGUAGE IS VERY PROVISIONAL, BEING TRANSLATED FIRST FROM RUSSIAN TO FRENCH AND THEN TO ENGLISH. END COMMENT)

MOVEMENTS/TRANSFERS: GRINEVSKY CALLED THIS A VERY IMPORTANT ISSUE AND SAID, IN RESPONSE TO FIRM FRENCH STATEMENT, THAT THEY ARE NOT INTERESTED IN ARMAMENTS, ONLY IN THE TRANSFER OF PERSONNEL.

5. GRINEVSKY SAID THAT THERE SHOULD BE A CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT AT THE END OF THE CONFERENCE TO THE EFFECT THAT EACH CDE DELEGATION HAS THE RIGHT TO RAISE (AT SOME SUBSEQUENT CSCE MEETING) ANY AND ALL QUESTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXISTING MANDATE. AFTER A CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT, DELEGATIONS WOULD PRESENT THEIR OWN LIST OF ISSUES FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION.
(COMMENT: THE SOVIET LIST WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY CONTAIN BOTH INDEPENDENT AIR AND INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES. IF THIS WERE THE CASE, THE U.S. WOULD REPLY BY SAYING THAT WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED AND THAT STOCKHOLM COULD NOT PRESUME THAT FURTHER CDE/CSCE MEETINGS WOULD, IN FACT, TAKE PLACE. END COMMENT)

6. SOVIETS EXPRESSED INTEREST IN THE IDEA OF A PASSIVE QUOTA FOR INSPECTIONS WITH GRINEVSKY NOTING THAT THEY COULD ACCEPT ONE OR TWO "INSPECTIONS" PER YEAR. HE TOOK CARE TO STATE THAT HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS TO ENGAGE IN PRACTICAL NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS MATTER, BUT THAT IT WAS NONETHELESS NECESSARY TO BEGIN TO DRAFT PRACTICAL ARRANGMENTS. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, THREE PRECONDITIONS TO SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF INSPECTIONS:

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

1) THE WEST MUST GIVE UP THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT;
2) INSPECTIONS CANNOT BE ROUTINE IN NATURE, THEY MUST
REFLECT EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND 3) THEY CANNOT
APPLY IN CLOSED AREAS. GRINEVSKY THEN NOTED EXAMPLES
OF "CLOSED AREAS", E.G., MILITARY BASES, INSTALLATIONS.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE
NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05600

SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS UPDATE IN NON-USE OF FORCE
- WORKING GROUP

1. CDE XI - 052
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE U.S., WITH THE SUPPORT OF ITS ALLIES, HAS TAKEN THE LEAD IN BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS TO THE FOREFRONT OF DISCUSSION AND DRAFTING IN THE NON-USE OF FORCE COFFEE GROUP. WE ARE INTRODUCING OUR HUMAN RIGHTS TEXT AS A LOGICAL, INDEPENDENT, AND NONCONTROVERSIAL COMPONENT OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE. THE EAST, HOWEVER, WANTS TO POSTPONE THE DISCUSSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, WHICH IT APPARENTLY PERCEIVES AS A SUBJECT FOR AN END GAME TRADE OFF BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS AND "MILITARY FORCE." THE NNA, WHOSE HUMAN RIGHTS TEXT IS NOT DISSIMILAR TO OUR OWN, HAS MAINTAINED A SPECTATOR'S ROLE THUS FAR, BUT WE EXPECT THEM TO BE MORE SUPPORTIVE AS THE DISCUSSION PROGRESSES. END SUMMARY.

4. THE SITUATION: DURING THE PAST TWO WEEKS THE WEST HAS INITIATED DISCUSSION AND ATTEMPTED TO DRAFT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE NUF COFFEE GROUP. THE WEST HAS RELATED THE DISCUSSION, WHICH IS BASED ON OUR HUMAN RIGHTS TEXT, TO THE COMMITMENT TO THE TEN PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT. THE WEST HAS ARGUED THAT HUMAN RIGHTS IS A VITAL COMPONENT OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND THE NUF PRINCIPLE. THE EAST, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAS OPPOSED THE WESTERN LANGUAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS WHILE PRIVATELY SAYING IT MIGHT ACCEPT A REFERENCE TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN EXCHANGE FOR A PASSAGE ON "MILITARY FORCE." AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR LOIBL, THE COORDINATOR OF THE GROUP, HAS TENDED TO EQUATE THESE TWO SUBJECTS. WE HAVE CATEGORICALLY REJECTED THIS LINKAGE AND HAVE EMPHASIZED THAT HUMAN RIGHTS IS AN IMPORTANT AND ESSENTIAL NUF COMPONENT SEPARATE FROM "MILITARY FORCE."

5. EASTERN TACTICS: WHILE THE EAST HAS YET TO RAISE SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIONS TO OUR HUMAN RIGHTS TEXT, IT WANTS TO DELAY DRAFTING ON HUMAN RIGHTS UNTIL THE COFFEE GROUP HAS RUN THROUGH ALL THE OTHER NUF TEXTS. THE EAST PRESUMABLY WANTS TO DELAY HUMAN RIGHTS DRAFTING IN ORDER TO SET IT UP AGAINST "MILITARY FORCE" IN AN END GAME TRADE OFF. LAST WEEK THE EAST TABLED A PROPOSAL TO SIMPLY LIST ALL OF THE TEN PRINCIPLES. IN OUR VIEW, THIS ENUMERATION, WHICH OF COURSE WOULD INCLUDE THE HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLE, WAS INTENDED, INTER ALIA, TO SUBSUME A FUTURE AND INDEPENDENT PASSAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

6. THE EAST HAS ALSO INTRODUCED A TEXT WHICH IT LABELS AS ITS HUMAN RIGHTS CONTRIBUTION:
"THE PARTICIPATING STATES REAFFIRM THAT ACTS OF AGGRESSION ESPECIALLY INVOLVING THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE UN CHARTER AND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT CONSTITUTE GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN PARTICULAR THE RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY." BEGIN COMMENT: WE VIEW THIS AS A TACTICAL MOVE TO LINK HUMAN RIGHTS AND "MILITARY FORCE." IT HAS NO CHANCE OF BEING ACCEPTED. END COMMENT.

7. WESTERN APPROACH: THE U.S., SUPPORTED BY ALLIES, HAS TAKEN THE LEAD IN THE DISCUSSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS. WE ARE PRESENTING OUR HUMAN RIGHTS TEXT AS A LOGICAL AND NONCONTROVERSIAL INGREDIENT OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE. IN OUR VIEW, IF A COUNTRY RESPECTS AND OBSERVES HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, IT WILL BE LESS INCLINED TO USE OR THREATEN TO USE FORCE. SEVERAL OF THE NNA MEMBERS HAVE SUPPORTED THIS PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH. IN ADDITION, WE HAVE ARGUED THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IS HIGHLIGHTED IN THE FINAL ACT AND IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF BOTH THE WESTERN AND NNA APPROACH. OUR HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE, MOREOVER, HAS MERIT ON ITS OWN AND SHOULD NOT BE TIED TO OTHER ISSUES, PARTICULARLY "MILITARY FORCE." THE WEST HAS FIRMLY REJECTED THE EAST'S ATTEMPTS TO EQUATE HUMAN RIGHTS WITH "MILITARY FORCE;" WE REFUSE TO DISCUSS HUMAN RIGHTS IN TERMS OF AN "ULTIMATE" TRADE OFF WITH "MILITARY FORCE."

8. NNA APPROACH: A LOW PROFILE HAS CHARACTERIZED THE NNA'S APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS THUS FAR. IN OUR VIEW, THE NNA COUNTRIES HAVE REMAINED QUIET IN ORDER TO AVOID ENTANGLEMENT IN A POTENTIAL EAST-WEST CONTROVERSY. WE REMAIN CONFIDENT, HOWEVER, THAT THE NNA, PARTICULARLY THE SWISS, WILL PROVIDE THE WEST WITH SUPPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GIVEN THAT HUMAN RIGHTS IS A KEY ASPECT TO THEIR APPROACH. FURTHERMORE, THE HUMAN RIGHTS TEXT PUT FORWARD BY THE WEST IS NOT DISSIMILAR TO THE NNA'S OWN HUMAN RIGHTS TEXT.

9. GIVEN THAT THE EAST INTENDS TO HOLD HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE HOSTAGE TO OUR ACCEPTANCE OF MILITARY FORCE, WE HAVE SEVERAL OPTIONS TO CONSIDER. IN ITS QUEST TO LINK HUMAN RIGHTS AND "MILITARY FORCE," THE EAST SEEMS TO PREFER A POSITIVE-POSITIVE TRADE OFF. THAT IS, IT FAVORS A TRADE OFF WHICH WOULD LEAD TO THE INCLUSION OF BOTH "MILITARY FORCE" AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN A FINAL NUF DOCUMENT. THE WEST, HOWEVER, IS AWARE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEGATIVE-NEGATIVE TRADE OFF IN WHICH BOTH HUMAN RIGHTS AND "MILITARY FORCE" WOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM A FINAL DOCUMENT. WE WILL, OF COURSE, CONTINUE TO FIGHT OVER LINKAGE, BUT WASHINGTON SHOULD CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

-- IN THE END GAME, ARE WE WILLING TO ACCEPT SOME REFERENCE TO "MILITARY FORCE" IN RETURN FOR A HUMAN RIGHTS SECTION? (IF SO, WHAT SORT OF REFERENCE TO "MILITARY FORCE?")

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

-- IN OTHER WORDS, CAN WE ACCEPT EITHER A NEGATIVE-
NEGATIVE OR POSITIVE-POSITIVE TRADE OFF BETWEEN HUMAN
RIGHTS AND "MILITARY FORCE?"
-- DO OTHER OPTIONS EXIST, SUCH AS SOME ALLUSION TO
"MILITARY FORCE," E.G. THE REFERENCE TO "ARMED FORCES"
IN THE FINAL ACT, IN EXCHANGE FOR EASTERN CONCESSIONS ON
ISSUES IN OTHER WORKING GROUPS?
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE
NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 05704

SUBJECT: DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

1. CDE XI - 053

2. FOLLOWING IS A DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT FOR OPENING OF ROUND XII.

3. BEGIN STATEMENT: AFTER TWO AND A HALF YEARS, THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE (CDE) BEGINS ITS TWELFTH AND FINAL SESSION ON AUGUST 19. IT MUST COMPLETE ITS WORK BY SEPTEMBER 19.

ALTHOUGH VERY INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS ON KEY ISSUES ARE STILL REQUIRED, THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE CONFERENCE CAN REACH ITS OBJECTIVE OF ESTABLISHING PRACTICAL, CONCRETE MEASURES TO REDUCE THE RISK OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE. TO MEET THIS OBJECTIVE, THE CDE MUST ADOPT MEASURES TO CREATE A COMPREHENSIVE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME FOR THE EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION AND THE FORECASTING, NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES. AS IN OTHER ARMS CONTROL AND SECURITY AREAS, THE MEASURES MUST PROVIDE THE MEANS TO ASSURE ALL PARTICIPATING STATES THAT THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS ARE LIVING UP TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ARRANGEMENT; THAT IS, THEY MUST BE VERIFIABLE. IN THE CDE CONTEXT, ADEQUATE VERIFICATION CAN ONLY COME FROM INSPECTION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH CAST DOUBT ON COMPLIANCE. THE UNITED STATES PLACES THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE ON REACHING A MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT RESULT IN STOCKHOLM, BECAUSE THE IMPLICATIONS TRANSCEND THE FATE OF A SINGLE CONFERENCE. IN THE MILITARY FIELD, SUCCESS IN CDE WOULD CONTRIBUTE DIRECTLY TO A MORE PREDICTABLE AND STABLE MILITARY SITUATION IN EUROPE AND, THUS, HELP TO INCREASE THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN THE WORLD. FURTHERMORE, CDE COULD PROVIDE A BASIS FOR FUTURE, PERHAPS MORE AMBITIOUS, STEPS IN ARMS REDUCTIONS AS WELL AS IN CONFIDENCE-BUILDING EFFORTS. MORE BROADLY, SUCCESS IN CDE SHOULD GIVE AN IMPORTANT IMPULSE TO THE HELSINKI PROCESS OF SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, THE CSCE, OF WHICH CDE IS AN INTEGRAL PART, AND THUS CONTRIBUTE TO IMPROVEMENT IN THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP OVERALL.

AS HE RETURNS TO STOCKHOLM FOR THE FINAL DAYS OF NEGOTIATIONS, AMBASSADOR ROBERT L. BARRY, HEAD OF THE U.S. DELEGATION TO CDE, HAS THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE PRESIDENT IN SEEKING A FINAL DOCUMENT WHICH MEETS THE STRINGENT OBJECTIVES WE HAVE PURSUED DURING THE PAST YEARS, AND WHICH WE WERE CHARGED WITH ACHIEVING IN THE CONFERENCE'S MANDATE. END STATEMENT.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05599
SUBJECT: CDE: LANGUAGE NOTED IN NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP

- 1. CDE XI - 054.
- 2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
- 3. THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE WAS PROVISIONALLY NOTED IN THE NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP (B-1) ON JULY 15:
BEGIN TEXT.

THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES IN AN AMPHIBIOUS . . . (1) LANDING . . . (2) IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.

THIS MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO . . . (3) WHENEVER THIS LANDING . . . (2) INVOLVES AT LEAST . . . (4)

END TEXT.

- 4. FOOTNOTES. INTERNAL ALLIANCE UNDERSTANDING IS THAT LANGUAGE ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES WILL FILL IN THE ELLIPSES:

- (1) ASSAULT
- (2) AN APPROPRIATE REFERENCE TO AN AIRBORNE DROP, SHOULD THE ALLIANCE AGREE TO ACCEPT ANY AIRBORNE REFERENCE.
- (3) NOTIFICATION
- (4) PARAMETERS, I.E., 3 BATTALIONS OR 3,000 TROOPS.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05591
SUBJECT: WORKING GROUP AB MEETING, JULY 14, 1986
REF: STOCKHOLM 5469

1. CDE XI - 055
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

-

3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE WORKING GROUP AB MEETING, FRANCE AND THE USSR MENTIONED THE "POSITIVE" RESULTS OF MITTERAND'S VISIT TO MOSCOW, BUT NEITHER DELEGATION OFFERED SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS ON THE TRIP. THE SOVIET LACK OF SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS ON NOTIFICATION AND VERIFICATION WAS PARTICULARLY DISAPPOINTING, GIVEN THEIR PRIVATE COMMENTS TO THE FRENCH (REFTEL). NONETHELESS, FRANCE "APPEALED" TO PARTICIPANTS TO VOLUNTARILY HOLD "INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS" DURING THE BREAK WITHOUT CHANGING THE CDE WORK CALENDAR. THE SOVIETS, POLES, AND SWEDES ENDORSED THE FRENCH "APPEAL." WHILE THE U.S. WELCOMED MITTERAND'S TRIP, U.S. AMBASSADOR BARRY VOICED DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NOT ELABORATED SOLUTIONS TO THE NEGOTIATING DEADLOCK; HE SUGGESTED INTENSIFICATION OF WORK TO DEFINE AND DRAFT INSPECTION AND ITS MODALITIES DURING THIS WEEK; IF THERE IS NO PROGRESS THERE IS LITTLE REASON TO EXTEND THIS SESSION. PORTUGAL, ITALY, FRG AND THE NETHERLANDS EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT OVER LACK OF SUBSTANTIVE SUGGESTIONS FROM THE SOVIETS. MALTA AND CYPRUS OPPOSED EXTENDING WORK AS THE FRENCH SUGGESTED. IN PREPARED COMMENTS, SPAIN REITERATED THE IMPORTANCE OF INSPECTION BUT ALSO DISPLAYED FLEXIBILITY IN ITS USE AND MODALITIES, WHICH WAS WELCOMED BY SWEDEN, YUGOSLAVIA AND THE SOVIETS. END SUMMARY.

4. AMBASSADOR GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) NOTED THE PARTICULAR INTEREST PAID TO CDE AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS DURING MITTERAND'S TRIP TO MOSCOW, WHICH HAS GIVEN "CAUSE FOR OPTIMISM." STRESSING THAT WE MUST NOW REALISTICALLY ASSESS THE SCOPE OF OUR TASK, HE "APPEALED" TO PARTICIPANTS TO WORK THROUGH THE BREAK, I.E., "INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS" WITHOUT A CHANGE TO THE CDE CALENDAR. HE ARGUED THAT SUCH VOLUNTARY EXTENSION OF WORK WOULD NOT SERVE AS A PRECEDENT VIS-A-VIS THE SEPTEMBER 19 CUTOFF FOR THE CONFERENCE, SINCE ANY DECISIONS UNDERTAKEN DURING THE BREAK WOULD HAVE TO BE REGISTERED DURING THE SESSION WHICH BEGINS ON AUGUST 19.

-

5. LIKE THE FRENCH, AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY (USSR) REFERRED TO THE POSITIVE RESULTS OF MITTERAND'S TRIP WITHOUT OFFERING SPECIFICS. HE CALLED FOR "RESPONSIBLE FLEXIBILITY" ON A "RECIPROCAL BASIS" TO RESOLVE THE "FOUR OR FIVE KEY QUESTIONS" WHICH DEADLOCK THE CONFERENCE. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE URGED AN INTENSIFICATION OF WORK DURING THE LAST WEEK OF THE CURRENT SESSION. HE ALSO ANNOUNCED THAT HIS "DELEGATION WILL REMAIN IN STOCKHOLM TO WORK

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

WITH OTHER DELEGATIONS THAT CAN AND WISH TO HOLD INFORMAL CONTACTS AND NEGOTIATIONS" DURING THE BREAK. GRINEVSKY OFFERED NO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ON NOTIFICATION AND VERIFICATION AS HAD BEEN SUGGESTED TO THE FRENCH.

6. AMBASSADOR BARRY WELCOMED THE POSITIVE RESULTS OF MITTERAND'S TRIP. ALTHOUGH HE INDICATED READINESS TO INTENSIFY WORK, HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF KNOWING -- IN SUBSTANTIVE TERMS -- WHAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED BY SUCH WORK. ALLUDING TO THE FACT THAT GRINEVSKY OFFERED NO NEW PROPOSALS, HE AGAIN ASKED THE SOVIETS: "WHERE'S THE BEEF?" CITING RECENT STATEMENTS BY MFA PRESS SPOKESMAN GERASIMOV ON INSPECTION IN CONTEXT OF CSBM'S, BARRY SUGGESTED THAT IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT ALL PARTICIPATING STATES HAD NOW ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF INCLUDING INSPECTIONS IN A CSBM REGIME HERE IN STOCKHOLM. IT WAS TIME TO DEFINE AND DRAFT AN INSPECTION REGIME TO MAKE IT "A TRULY EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT OF VERIFICATION." THIS SHOULD INCLUDE, FOR EXAMPLE: 1) NUMBER, DURATION, AND TIMING OF INSPECTION; 2) SIZE OF INSPECTION TEAMS; 3) AREAS FOR INSPECTION AND "OFF LIMITS AREAS," AND 4) IMPORTANT MODALITIES, E.G., GROUND, AIR, LOGISTICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE.

7. NATO ALLIES (ITALY, FRG, PORTUGAL) ALSO EXPRESSED THEIR DISAPPOINTMENT OVER THE LACK OF SUBSTANCE IN THE SOVIET STATEMENT. THEY QUESTIONED WHETHER EXTENSION OF WORK WOULD BE USEFUL WITHOUT AN INDICATION THE TIME WOULD BE SPENT PRODUCTIVELY. AMBASSADOR CIARRAPICO (ITALY) ASKED POINT BLANK WHETHER GRINEVSKY WOULD "TELL US WHICH CONCESSIONS WOULD BE MADE," OR PROVIDE "A RESPONSE TO NATO'S JUNE 30 STATEMENT." GRINEVSKY REPLIED THAT THE USSR IS PREPARED TO MAKE "MUTUAL CONCESSIONS." THE NETHERLANDS RAISED PROCEDURAL DOUBTS ABOUT THE FRENCH IDEA.

8. BOTH MALTA AND CYPRUS OPPOSED THE WORK EXTENSION ON PROCEDURAL, PRECEDENTIAL, AND LEGAL GROUNDS. AMBASSADOR GAUCI (MALTA) ARGUED SOMEWHAT BITTERLY THAT CDE MUST "STICK TO DECISIONS AND PROJECTIONS MADE." AMBASSADOR PAPADOPOULOS (CYPRUS) QUESTIONED THE FRENCH "APPEAL" WITH SEVERAL QUESTIONS: 1) WHO PAYS THE COSTS? 2) SHOULD THERE NOT BE A PROCEDURAL DECISION TO MAKE SUCH A CHANGE TO THE WORK CALENDAR? 3) WHAT IS THE STATUS AND LEGALITY OF SUCH AN EXTENSION? 4) WOULD IT SERVE AS A PRECEDENT, PARTICULARLY IN TERMS OF THE SEPTEMBER 19 ENDING OF THE CONFERENCE?

9. AMBASSADOR ALLENDESALAZAR EXPOUNDED SPANISH IDEAS ON THE ROLE OF "ON-SITE VERIFICATION" (OSV) IN A CDE AGREEMENT. WELCOMING SOVIET STATEMENTS WHICH APPEAR TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF INSPECTION IN CDE, HE STRESSED THAT CSBM'S WOULD BE INCOMPLETE WITHOUT OSV. HOWEVER, HE DISPLAYED FLEXIBILITY ON IMPLEMENTATION OF INSPECTION,

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

25X1

MAKING THREE MAIN POINTS IN THIS REGARD: 1) USE OF OSV SHOULD NOT BE FREQUENT. EXPERIENCE MUST BE GAINED IN ITS USE TO PROMOTE CONFIDENCE BUILDING. THUS ESTABLISHMENT OF A "NUMERICAL LIMITATION" (PASSIVE QUOTA) ON OSV SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. 2) TOO-FREQUENT USE OF OSV WOULD "MAKE IT UNACCEPTABLE." THUS OSV SHOULD ONLY BE USED IN "SERIOUS SITUATIONS" SO AS NOT TO RENDER THE MEASURE "TRIVIAL." WE MUST DEFINE A SERIES OF ELEMENTS WHICH GIVE RISE TO SUSPICION OF A GRAVE FAILURE TO FULFILL CSBM'S. 3) OSV SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD "MULTILATERALLY," THUS HINTING AT A NEUTRAL ROLE IN OSV. (BEGIN COMMENT: THE SPANISH STATEMENT, THE SUBSTANCE OF WHICH WAS NOT CLEARED IN THE CAUCUS, REFLECTS THE READINESS OF CERTAIN ALLIES TO MOVE OFF ESTABLISHED POSITIONS AND THE SPANISH TENDENCY TO ACT AS A LAST-MINUTE MEDIATOR A LA MADRID 1983. END COMMENT.) SWEDEN, YUGOSLAVIA, AND THE USSR WELCOMED THE SPANISH STATEMENT.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05710

SUBJECT: CDE: RESTRICTED AREAS

1. CDE XI - 056.

2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. SUMMARY. U.S. DEL HAS CONSULTED WITH KEY ALLIES WITH THE VIEW TO RESOLVING THE RESTRICTED AREAS ISSUE IN THE CONTEXT OF AN INSPECTION MEASURE. U.S. DEL SEEKS WASHINGTON APPROVAL (SEE PARA 5) TO USE PROPOSED SOLUTION (SEE PARAS 7 AND 8) IN EXPANDED CONSULTATIONS WITH OTHER ALLIES. END SUMMARY.

4. AS NOTED REFTTEL, ONE OF THE KEYS TO GAINING SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF INSPECTION LIES IN RESOLVING THE QUESTION OF AREAS TO BE EXCLUDED FROM SUCH INSPECTIONS, I.E. EXCLUSIONS, EXCEPTIONS, RESTRICTED AREAS. U.S. DEL HAS CONSULTED WITH KEY ALLIES IN STOCKHOLM, INCLUDING TURKEY, WITH A VIEW TO FINDING A SOLUTION THAT WOULD SERVE TWO PURPOSES: (1) MEET ALLIANCE SECURITY CONCERNS AND, (2) AT THE SAME TIME, NOT PROVIDE THE EAST WITH THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXEMPT VAST PORTIONS OF ITS TERRITORY THUS RENDERING INSPECTION ESSENTIALLY USELESS. A RELATED OBJECTIVE IS OUR DESIRE TO ENSURE THAT WHATEVER FORMULATION WE ARRIVE AT IS NOT PRESENTED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO PROVIDE "GROUNDS" FOR REFUSAL OF AN INSPECTION REQUEST. IN PRACTICE, OF COURSE, IT WILL BE HARD TO GET AROUND THE FACT THAT IF AN AREA IS EXCLUDED FROM AN INSPECTION, INSPECTION OF THAT AREA CAN BE REFUSED. WE TOOK AS A GIVEN IN OUR CONSULTATIONS THAT EXCEPTIONS AS AGREED IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED/ MEASURE 5 WOULD APPLY IN ANY EVENT, AND FOCUSED ON THE ISSUE OF ADDITIONAL RESTRICTED AREAS. IN OUR CONSULTATIONS, THE FOLLOWING KEY POSITIONS WERE IDENTIFIED:

-- FRG. FOR THE PURPOSES OF CSBMS, THE FRG HAS MOVED BACK TO A "PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED AREA" CONCEPT. THESE AREAS, HOWEVER, WOULD NOT BE RESTRICTED IN NORMAL PEACETIME SITUATIONS. RESTRICTIONS WOULD ONLY BE INVOKED AND APPLIED DURING A CRISIS. THE FRG WANTS TO EXCHANGE A LIST WITH OTHER CSCE PARTICIPATING STATES OF SUCH AREAS, WITH THE INDICATION THAT UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES SUCH AREAS WOULD NOT BE RESTRICTED. AREAS TO BE TREATED IN THIS WAY ARE NOT NECESSARILY BORDER AREAS, BUT COULD INCLUDE SUCH POINTS AS TOWNS OR TRAINING AREAS, WHICH WOULD NOT FALL INTO THE CATEGORY OF MEASURE 5 EXCEPTIONS. FRG DELEGATION DOES NOT YET HAVE AN INDICATION FROM BONN CONCERNING THE PERCENTAGE OF FRG TERRITORY THAT WOULD FALL INTO THIS CATEGORY, BUT BELIEVES THAT IT WOULD NOT BE GREATER THAN TEN PERCENT.

FRANCE. FRANCE DOES NOT WANT PERMANENT RESTRICTED AREAS, AND PARIS REJECTS THE IDEA OF EXCHANGING ANY LISTS OF RESTRICTED AREAS. FRANCE DOES, HOWEVER, DEMAND THAT A "SENSITIVE POINTS" CONCEPT -- SMALL

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

AREAS, WHICH COULD BE INVOKED AS OFF-LIMITS UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, BE ADDED TO THE AGREED MEASURE 5 EXCEPTIONS.

-- TURKEY. TURKEY HAS, IN PRACTICE, BOTH PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED AREAS AND A REQUIREMENT FOR TEMPORARILY RESTRICTED AREAS. PERMANENT AREAS INCLUDE THE BORDER REGIONS, APPROXIMATELY 5-10 KMS WIDE, AS WELL AS SOME AREAS THAT WOULD FALL UNDER THE MEASURE 5 EXCEPTIONS, SUCH AS DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS (APPROXIMATELY 10 PERCENT OF TOTAL TURKISH TERRITORY). THEY ARTICULATE A REQUIREMENT FOR UP TO 5 PERCENT TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS, WHICH COULD BE INVOKED UNDER VARIABLE CIRCUMSTANCES AND COULD INCLUDE POINTS SUCH AS TOWNS, AS WELL AS AREAS INCLUDED UNDER THE MEASURE 5 EXCEPTIONS.

-- NORWAY. NORWAY HAS TWO LARGE RESTRICTED AREAS, WHICH SURROUND DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS AND THEREFORE WHICH MIGHT WELL FALL UNDER THE MEASURE 5 EXCEPTIONS. NORWEGIAN COMMANDERS, HOWEVER, HAVE THE RIGHT TO INVOKE A TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA AT ANY TIME THEY DEEM ADVISABLE AND, ACCORDING TO OUR NORWEGIAN CONTACT, SUCH AREAS COULD INCLUDE TRAINING AREAS AND PUBLIC TERRAIN. WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE THAT THIS WILL PRESENT AN OBSTACLE TO SOLVING THE PROBLEM, IF WE CAN FIND A WAY TO MEET FRG, TURKISH, AND FRENCH CONCERNS.

--UK. THE UK POSITION IS VERY MUCH LIKE OUR OWN. THEY DO NOT LIKE THE RESTRICTED AREA CONCEPT, NOR DO THEY FAVOR AN EXCHANGE OF LISTS OF SUCH AREAS.

5. BASED ON THESE CONSULTATIONS WE, IN CONCERT WITH KEY ALLIES (NOT NORWAY, HOWEVER), HAVE DEVELOPED THE FOLLOWING FORMULA AS ONE THAT MIGHT MEET RESPECTIVE CONCERNS, AND HAVE AGREED TO CONSULT WITH AUTHORITIES ABOUT IT. WHILE NO COMMITMENTS TO THIS POSSIBLE SOLUTION HAVE BEEN MADE, U.S. DEL BELIEVES IT SERVES OUR PURPOSES AND WILL USE IT, ALONG WITH THE ATTACHED COMMENTS, AS A BASIS FOR EXPANDED CONSULTATIONS WITH OTHER ALLIES.

6. PLEASE NOTE: TURKISH DEPREP HAS MADE NO COMMITMENT TO AND, INDEED NO COMMENTS ON, THE FORMULA ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. HE INTENDS TO PURSUE CONSULTATIONS WITH HIS AUTHORITIES IN PERSON IN ANKARA OVER THE BREAK BETWEEN ROUNDS; WE WOULD THUS PREFER TO HANDLE THIS WITH TURKISH DEPREP HERE IN STOCKHOLM AND WOULD THEREFORE REQUEST THAT THIS ISSUE NOT BE RAISED AT THIS POINT BY US WITH TURKISH AUTHORITIES IN ANKARA, NATO, OR ELSEWHERE.

7. PROPOSED TEXT AND EXPLANATORY COMMENTS FOLLOW. THIS TEXT IS DESIGNED AS A REPLACEMENT FOR EXISTING PARAS 6 AND 7 IN MEASURE 5 OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED AND IS, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, BASED ON TEXTS ALREADY PROVISIONALLY NOTED IN THE WORKING GROUP.

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

BEGIN TEXT.

AREA FOR INSPECTION. FOR THE PURPOSE OF VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH AGREED CSBMS, AN INSPECTING STATE IS PERMITTED TO DESIGNATE THE AREA IN WHICH AN INSPECTION IS TO BE CARRIED OUT ON THE TERRITORY OF A PARTICIPATING STATE WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS. SUCH AN AREA WILL BE REFERRED TO AS A "DESIGNATED AREA." THE DESIGNATED AREA WILL INCLUDE, INTER ALIA, TRAINING AREAS AND PUBLIC TERRAIN WHERE ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION CAN BE CONDUCTED. EXCEPT FOR SENSITIVE POINTS IN THE DESIGNATED AREA, TO WHICH ACCESS BY THE GENERAL PUBLIC IS NORMALLY RESTRICTED OR DENIED, THE INSPECTING STATE WILL BE PERMITTED ACCESS, ENTRY AND UNOBSTRUCTED SURVEY.

END TEXT.

8. COMMENTS:

U.S. DEL BASED ITS THINKING IN FORMULATING THE ABOVE TEXT ON CERTAIN BASIC ASSUMPTIONS, WHICH FOLLOW:

-- A NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY CANNOT TAKE PLACE IN NAVAL VESSELS, MILITARY VEHICLES, AIRCRAFT, ETC.; IT IS NOT CONCEIVABLE TO THINK THAT SUCH AN EXERCISE COULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS EXCEPT TRAINING AREAS), NAVAL BASES, DOCKYARDS, GARRISONS, MILITARY AIRFIELDS, FIRING RANGES, ETC.; AND EVEN MORE ABSURD TO THINK THAT AN ACTIVITY (OF AT LEAST 10,000 MEN) COULD OCCUR IN DEFENSE RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT OR PRODUCTION ESTABLISHMENTS.

-- ALL OF THE ABOVE CAN BE COVERED BY THE CONCEPT OF SENSITIVE POINTS.

-- IMPLICIT IS THE IDEA THAT THE HOST STATE WILL IDENTIFY ANY SENSITIVE POINTS WITHIN THE DESIGNATED AREA AT THE TIME IT ACCEDES TO THE REQUEST OR DURING ACTUAL INSPECTION.

-- THIS FORMULA ASSUMES THAT A DIVISION LEVEL EXERCISE WILL NOT BE CONDUCTED IN A RESTRICTED AREA AT OR NEAR THE BORDER, I.E., WITHIN 5-10 KILOMETERS. ALTHOUGH WE ACKNOWLEDGE THAT LARGE NUMBERS OF TROOPS, NOT PARTICIPATING IN AN ACTIVITY PER SE, COULD BE CONCENTRATED ON A BORDER AREA FOR PURPOSES OF POLITICAL OR MILITARY INTIMIDATION.

-- IN PERIODS OF CRISIS (WHICH IS A CONTINGENCY ONE HOPES WILL NEVER HAPPEN AND WHICH COULD, IN ANY CASE SPELL THE END OF CSBMS), TWO OPTIONS REMAIN OPEN:

(1) REFUSE INSPECTION AND INCUR A POLITICAL PENALTY, E.G. THE SUSPENSION OF CSBMS OBLIGATIONS AND THE POSSIBLE CONVENING OF AN AD HOC CSCE BODY TO DETERMINE STATUS OF CDE OBLIGATIONS;

(2) TO EXTEND THE CONCEPT OF "SENSITIVE POINTS" TO THAT OF "SENSITIVE AREAS." SENSITIVE AREAS IS A MUCH BROADER CONCEPT AND COULD BE INTERPRETED TO INCLUDE THE PERMANENT/TEMPORARILY RESTRICTED AREA CONCEPT, I.E.,

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

THE NAMING OF PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED AREAS WHICH WOULD BECOME EFFECTIVE ONLY IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES.

-- THE CONCEPT OF PROVIDING LISTS OF RESTRICTED AREAS OR OF ALLOWING A CERTAIN PERCENTAGE OF A NATIONAL TERRITORY TO BE CLASSIFIED AS RESTRICTED WOULD ALLOW THE EAST TO ESTABLISH RESTRICTED AREAS WHICH WOULD NULLIFY ANY INSPECTION.

-- IF RESTRICTED AREAS ARE REQUIRED IN A FINAL AGREEMENT, THE WEST SHOULD NOT BE THE ONES WHO DEMAND THEM, LEST WE WEAKEN OUR OWN TACTICAL POSITION ON THE NEED FOR THE RIGHT TO INSPECT.

9. SOVIET POSITION: IN INFORMAL AND INDIRECT CONTACT WITH THE SOVIETS, WE GATHER THEIR POSITION ON RESTRICTED AREAS MIGHT BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE ABOVE;

-- THEY DO NOT WANT TO DESIGNATE RESTRICTED AREAS OR AGREE TO A PERCENTAGE LIMITATION

-- NOR DO THEY WANT TO LIST "SENSITIVE POINTS"

-- THEY WOULD, HOWEVER, DENY A REQUEST FOR INSPECTION OF A "SENSITIVE POINT"

-- SC-1'S APPROACH TO THE "EXCEPTION" PROBLEM IS "NOT TOO BAD"

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05632

SUBJECT: CDE: LANGUAGE ON NOTIFYING LAND FORCE
ACTIVITIES NOTED IN NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP, JULY
16, 1986

REF: STOCKHOLM 5599

1. CDE XI - 057.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. LATE NIGHT MEETING ON JULY 15 LED TO AGREEMENT ON A TEXT DEFINING LAND FORCE ACTIVITIES AS A TYPE OF MILITARY ACTIVITY TO BE NOTIFIED. REFERENCE TO "PARTICIPATING" AIR FORCES MAKES IT UNAMBIGUOUSLY CLEAR THAT INFORMATION ON AIR FORCE PARTICIPATION WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE LAND FORCE NOTIFICATION, BUT THAT AIR FORCE ACTIVITY WILL NOT TRIGGER A NOTIFICATION, NOR REQUIRE SEPARATE NOTIFICATION. THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF THIS TEXT ("THIS MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION WHENEVER . . .") SERVES AS THE LEAD IN TO RELATED PARAMETERS TRIGGERING A LAND FORCE NOTIFICATION, WHICH HAVE YET TO BE RESOLVED. THIS TEXT WOULD PRECEDE THAT ALREADY NOTED ON AMPHIBIOUS LANDING (REFTEL) IN A FINAL DOCUMENT. THIS TEXT, NOTED IN A JULY 16 MEETING OF THE NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP (B-1), READS AS FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT.

THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORMATIONS OF LAND FORCES (ASTERISK) OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES . . . CONDUCTED UNDER A SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH ANY POSSIBLE AIR OR NAVAL COMPONENTS. THIS MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION WHENEVER . . .

THE PARTICIPATION OF AIR FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE NOTIFICATION IF IT IS FORESEEN THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE ACTIVITY . . . OR MORE SORTIES BY AIRCRAFT, EXCLUDING HELICOPTERS, WILL BE FLOWN.

(ASTERISK) IN THIS CONTEXT, THE TERM LAND FORCES INCLUDES AMPHIBIOUS, AIRMOBILE AND AIRBORNE FORCES.

END TEXT.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN

SECRET

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05629

SUBJ: FRG DEMARCHE TO SOVIETS

REFS: A. STOCKHOLM 5363; B. STOCKHOLM 55LO

1. CDE XII - 58

2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT

3. SUMMARY: IN NATO CAUCUS TODAY, US WILL SUPPORT FRG PROPOSAL FOR A DEMARCHE TO SOVIETS LATER THIS WEEK ON OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN CDE. OUR MAIN CONCERN IS TO HEAD OFF ANY FRG INCLINATION TO USE GENSCHER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW FOR MORE RADICAL INITIATIVES. SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS CONTAINED IN DEMARCHE MEET US REQUIREMENTS; IT IS TO OUR TACTICAL ADVANTAGE TO PIN DOWN UK READINESS TO GIVE UP ON INDEPENDENT INFORMATION IN RETURN FOR INFORMATION ON LOCATION OF DIVISION HEADQUARTERS IN THE CONTEXT OF NOTIFICATION. END SUMMARY.

4. IN THE NATO CAUCUS TODAY (7/16) US WILL JOIN CONSENSUS ON THE FRG PROPOSAL FOR A DEMARCHE TO THE SOVIETS THIS WEEK ON SOME OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN THE CONFERENCE (REFS). USDEL BELIEVES THAT THE UPCOMING GENSCHER VISIT TO MOSCOW (7/20 - 7/22) FAVORS OUR SUPPORTING FRG NOW ON THIS SPECIFIC INITIATIVE, WHICH WE KNOW ABOUT AND CAN INFLUENCE. WITHOUT A COORDINATED INITIATIVE IN STOCKHOLM, THE FRG WOULD BE INCLINED TO ATTEMPT A UNILATERAL AND PROBABLY LESS ACCEPTABLE PLAY IN MOSCOW.

5. IN ADDITION, USDEL BELIEVES THAT ANOTHER WESTERN INITIATIVE GIVES NATO ADDITIONAL LEVERAGE. IT WILL PUT GREATER PRESSURE ON THE EAST TO RESPOND TO OUR DEMANDS FOR FLEXIBILITY IN THE SUBSTANCE OF THEIR POSITIONS. FURTHERMORE, THE SUBSTANCE OF THE FRG DEMARCHE CONTAINS LITTLE NEWS: EVEN THE IDEAS OF PASSIVE QUOTAS AND NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT VIS-A-VIS INSPECTION HAVE BEEN STIRRING IN THE CDE RUMOR MILL.

6. SUBSTANTIVELY, THE POSITIONS IN THE DEMARCHE ARE IN KEEPING WITH USG POSITIONS.

7. THE FRG WILL MAKE THE POINTS CONTAINED IN REF A ORALLY TO THE SOVIET, PROBABLY TOMORROW (7/17).

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05676

SUBJECT: SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS ON THE JUNE 30 NATO
- CDE INITIATIVE

REF: SOFIA 2968

1. CDE XI - 059
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. WE AGREE WITH EMBASSY SOFIA'S SUGGESTION (REFTEL) FOR A SEPARATE DEMARCHE IN EASTERN EUROPEAN CAPITALS ON NATO'S JUNE 30 CDE INITIATIVE IN ADDITION TO BROADER CSCE BRIEFINGS IN PREPARATION FOR VIENNA. IN PREPARING SUCH AN APPROACH, YOU MAY WISH TO DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- ON JUNE 30, NATO INTRODUCED A MAJOR INITIATIVE AT THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE (CDE) DESIGNED TO HELP UNBLOCK THE CONFERENCE AND CONTRIBUTE TO AN AGREEMENT WHICH, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONFERENCE'S MANDATE, CAN HELP TO BUILD CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND REDUCE THE RISK OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE.

-- THE INITIATIVE IDENTIFIED AREAS OF NEW FLEXIBILITY IN NATO'S POSITION ON THE MAJOR UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS BEFORE THE CONFERENCE: NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION.

-- IN THE AREA OF NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES, WHICH HAS OFTEN BEEN DESCRIBED AS THE CORE OF A CDE AGREEMENT, THE ALLIANCE MADE A SIGNIFICANT DEPARTURE FROM THE POSITION ESTABLISHED IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED.

-- ON THE KEY QUESTION OF THE DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCE THRESHOLDS, NATO HAS ACCEPTED AS THE BASIS FOR DRAFTING THE NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED COUNTRIES' (NNA) PROPOSAL OF JUNE 13, WHICH COMBINES OUR PREFERRED EMPHASIS ON A STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD, WITH THE WARSAW PACT'S EMPHASIS ON MANPOWER AND THE NNA'S APPROACH FOCUSING ON MOBILITY AND FIREPOWER.

-- IN RESPONSE TO CONCERNS THAT OUR APPROACH WOULD RESULT IN AN EXCESSIVE NUMBER OF NOTIFICATIONS PER YEAR, THE ALLIANCE ALSO INDICATED THAT IT WAS PREPARED TO RAISE ITS PROPOSAL FOR THE NUMERICAL ELEMENT IN THIS THRESHOLD BEYOND OUR CURRENT FIGURE OF 6,000 TROOPS.

-- FURTHER, WE ALSO EXPRESSED OUR WILLINGNESS TO DROP OUR PROPOSAL FOR NOTIFICATION OF MOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES IF OTHERS, IN TURN, WILL DEMONSTRATE SIMILAR CONSIDERATION FOR OUR CONCERNS IN OTHER AREAS SUCH AS CONSTRAINTS.

-- ON THE VITAL ISSUE OF VERIFICATION, IT REMAINS OUR VIEW THAT INSPECTION MUST BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF ANY CDE AGREEMENT. IN RESPONSE, HOWEVER, TO CONCERNS WHICH HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED BY SOME PARTICIPANTS, EMPHASIZING THE BURDEN REPRESENTED BY OUR PROPOSAL TO ALLOW EACH PARTICI-

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

PATING STATE TO CONDUCT TWO INSPECTIONS PER YEAR, WE HAVE INDICATED OUR WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS EACH STATE IS ENTITLED TO CARRY OUT FROM TWO TO ONE. BUT IT MUST BE CLEAR THAT THE INSPECTION PROVISIONS CANNOT BE IMPAIRED BY ANY ESCAPE CLAUSE OR BY FAULTY MODALITIES WHICH WOULD RENDER INSPECTION MEANINGLESS.

-- IN THE AREA OF OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES, NATO HAS INDICATED NEW FLEXIBILITY ON THE QUESTION OF DURATION OF OBSERVATION. ALTHOUGH WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT AGREEMENT TO OBSERVE ALL NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES FROM THEIR BEGINNING TO END WOULD CONSTITUTE A SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT OVER THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE HELSINK FINAL ACT, WE HAVE RECOGNIZED THE LOGISTICAL AND FINANCIAL CONCERNS OF MANY REGARDING THIS APPROACH. THEREFORE, WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER A LIMITATION ON THE DURATION OF OBSERVATION BOTH AS FAR AS ITS STARTING AND ENDING DATES ARE CONCERNED. WE EXPECT SUCH A LIMITATION TO ENABLE ALL PARTICIPATING STATES TO AGREE TO A LOW THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION.

-- NATO HAS TAKEN THESE SIGNIFICANT STEPS IN ANTICIPATION THAT OUR NEGOTIATING PARTNERS, INCLUDING YOUR GOVERNMENT, WILL SHOW MATCHING MOVEMENT. IN THIS REGARD, WE WELCOME THE EASTERN DECISION TO JOIN US IN RESOLVING THE ISSUE OF AIR ACTIVITIES ON THE BASIS OF EXISTING COMMON GROUND.

-- MORE IS NEEDED. ONLY AN ACCELERATED AND SUBSTANTIVE GIVE-AND-TAKE PROCESS CAN LEAD TO A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME IN STOCKHOLM BY SEPTEMBER 19. WE HOPE THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL BE PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN SUCH A PROCESS DURING THE FINAL SESSION OF THE CDE.

-- IN THIS REGARD, WE MUST BEGIN IMMEDIATELY TO DEVELOP EFFECTIVE MODALITIES FOR INSPECTION WITHOUT A RIGHT OF REFUSAL. WHILE WE WELCOME THE RECENT SOVIET STATEMENT IN STOCKHOLM ACCEPTING THE PRINCIPLE OF INSPECTION AS APPROPRIATE FOR VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH CSBM'S -- THE PRINCIPLE IS NOT ENOUGH. WE MUST AGREE TO IMPLEMENT INSPECTION AS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE PACKAGE OF MEASURES TO BE AGREED IN STOCKHOLM.

-- RECENTLY THE STATES OF THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION APPEALED TO THE NATO STATES TO BEGIN A PROGRAM FOR THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE AND SUGGESTED THAT A SUCH A PROGRAM COULD BE CONSIDERED IN A SECOND PHASE OF THE CDE UNDER A NEW MANDATE FROM THE VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING. THE UNITED STATES AND ITS NATO ALLIES SHARE YOUR DESIRE TO REDUCE THE LEVEL OF ARMAMENTS IN EUROPE. AS YOU ARE AWARE, IN JUNE, NATO MINISTERS MEETING IN HALIFAX CREATED A HIGH-LEVEL TASK FORCE ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL TO STUDY HOW BEST TO WORK TOWARD OUR OBJECTIVE OF INCREASED OPENNESS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A VERIFIABLE, COMPRE-

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

HENSIVE AND STABLE BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES AT LOWER LEVELS.

-- NO PROGRESS TOWARD OUR MUTUAL OBJECTIVES IS POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, IN THE ABSENCE OF AN ATMOSPHERE OF GENUINE CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE. IN THIS REGARD A SUBSTANTIVE, MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES IN STOCKHOLM WOULD BE THE FIRST STEP TOWARD CREATING SUCH AN ATMOSPHERE AND OPENING THE POSSIBILITY TO CONSIDER MORE AMBITIOUS STEPS WITHIN THE CSCE PROCESS. IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT, HOWEVER, TO CONSIDER ANY DECISION AT THE VIENNA MEETING TO BROADEN THE CDE MANDATE WHILE THE FOUNDATION NECESSARY TO BUILD CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY LIES UNFINISHED.

-- DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE MUST BE BUILT BRICK BY BRICK ON THE STRONG FOUNDATION OF A SUBSTANTIAL OUTCOME IN STOCKHOLM. WE HOPE YOU WILL WORK WITH US TO ACHIEVE SUCH A RESULT IN THE WEEKS REMAINING.

4. USDEL SUGGESTS THAT THIS APPROACH BE MADE IN ALL WARSAW PACT CAPITALS ASAP.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 05677

SUBJ: CDE AMB. BARRY END-OF-ROUND PRESS BRIEFING

1. CDE XI - 60

2. TO END THE NEXT TO LAST ROUND OF CDE, AMBASSDOR ROBERT L. BARRY, HEAD OF THE US DELEGATION TO CDE, BRIEFED THE PRESS ON THE RECORD TODAY (07/17/86), SUMMING UP PROGRESS DURING THE ROUND AND GIVING HIS VIEW OF PROSPECTS FOR THE CONFERENCE AS IT APPROACHES ITS DEADLINE. FOLLOWING IS THE TRANSCRIPT OF AMB. BARRY'S OPENING STATEMENT, WITH EXCERPTS OF THE Q&A.

3. BEGIN STATEMENT: IN CONTRAST TO WHAT I SAID AT THE END OF THE LAST ROUND, AT THIS POINT I REGARD OUR PROSPECTS WITH GUARDED OPTIMISM. AT THE END OF THE LAST ROUND, I SAID THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT WE BE ABLE TO SEE THE CONTOURS OF AN AGREEMENT BY THE END OF THE NEXT ROUND, THAT IS, THIS ONE, BECAUSE OTHERWISE IT WOULD PROBABLY BE IMPOSSIBLE TO PUT TOGETHER THE FINAL ELEMENTS OF AN AGREEMENT. WELL, I THINK THAT NOW THE CONTOURS OF AN AGREEMENT ARE VISIBLE, THOUGH SOME OF THEM ARE STILL FAIRLY WELL SHROUDED WITH THE CLOUDS. I HAVE IN MIND PARTICULARLY THE ISSUE OF INSPECTION, WHICH I STILL FIND SOMEWHAT CLOUDY. BUT I DO BELIEVE THAT SUCCESS IN REACHING AN AGREEMENT HERE IS WITHIN OUR GRASP.

THE TIME REMAINING TO US IS INDEED SHORT: WE HAVE FIVE WEEKS OF OFFICIAL SESSIONS STILL BEFORE US, AND A LOT OF DRAFTING REMAINS TO BE DONE; A LOT OF BLANKS REMAIN TO BE FILLED IN. BUT I ALSO THINK THERE IS A STRONG DESIRE ON THE PART OF THE WEST, AND I WOULD SAY ALSO OF THE EAST AND THE NEUTRALS AND NON-ALIGNED HERE, TO SEE THIS CONFERENCE REACH A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION: THAT IS, BY THE 19TH OF SEPTEMBER, WE WOULD HAVE A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT THAT COULD BE ACCEPTED BY CONSENSUS BY ALL OF US HERE.

AS YOU KNOW, THE MEMBERS OF NATO MADE A PUBLIC INITIATIVE ON THE 30TH OF JUNE, WHICH IS AN EXAMPLE OF THE COMMITMENT THAT WE HAVE TO SUCCESS HERE. WE ARE EVEN NOW WORKING ON SOME OF THE CRITICAL ISSUES OF NOTIFICATION, AND I HOPE WE WILL HAVE STILL MORE PROGRESS THERE BEFORE THE END OF THE SESSION TOMORROW. ON INSPECTION, WHAT MAKES ME MORE OPTIMISTIC IS MY IMPRESSION THAT ALL OF THE STATES REPRESENTED HERE ACCEPT THE IDEA THAT INSPECTION WILL BE ADOPTED AND IMPLEMENTED HERE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT, AND THAT MAKES ME MUCH MORE POSITIVE ABOUT THE LIKELIHOOD OF A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME.

LET ME SAY A WORD ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF AN OUTCOME HERE, BECAUSE, QUITE ASIDE FROM THE VIRTUES THAT AN AGREEMENT HERE WOULD HAVE IN TERMS OF ITS ABILITY TO BUILD CONFIDENCE AND REDUCE THE POTENTIAL FOR INSTABILITY AND SURPRISE IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF

133

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

THE COUNTRIES HERE, A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME WOULD ALSO HAVE A VERY POSITIVE IMPACT IN GENERAL EAST-WEST TERMS. BECAUSE THIS IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE OVERALL HELSINKI CSCE PROCESS, WE THINK THAT SUCCESS HERE WOULD HAVE A VERY HELPFUL EFFECT ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP. AS YOU KNOW, IT HAS BEEN OUR POSITION THAT SECURITY IN EUROPE ENCOMPASSES THE BROADER CONCEPT OF SECURITY WHICH INCLUDES HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN CONTACTS AND ALL OF THE OTHER ASPECTS OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS. WE THINK THAT THE MILITARY SECURITY ASPECT FITS IN VERY WELL WITH THE REST, AND WE HOPE, THEREFORE, THAT WE WILL SEE SOMETHING COME OUT OF THIS CONFERENCE WHICH WILL GIVE A BOOST TO THE GENERAL EAST-WEST CONTEXT.

I DON'T WANT TO OVERSTRESS MY OPTIMISM, BECAUSE A GREAT DEAL OF WORK REMAINS TO BE DONE AND NOT VERY MUCH TIME REMAINS TO DO IT. BUT WE'RE CERTAINLY GOING TO TRY VERY HARD FOR OUR PART -- AND I KNOW I SPEAK IN THIS SENSE ON BEHALF OF ALL THE SIXTEEN MEMBERS OF NATO -- TO ACCOMPLISH WHAT NEEDS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED IN THE TIME REMAINING.

QUESTIONS & ANSWERS:

Q: AMBASSADOR BARRY, WOULD YOU SAY THAT THERE HAS BEEN A BREAKTHROUGH IN THE NEGOTIATIONS HERE?

A: I WOULD SAY THAT THERE HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN THIS ROUND AND IN PARTICULAR IN THE LAST FEW DAYS. WE BELIEVE THAT THE RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE OF AIR ACTIVITIES IS AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD. IT INVOLVED THE PROCESS OF GIVE AND TAKE ON BOTH THE SIDES, EAST AND WEST. WE BELIEVE THIS OPENS THE WAY TO RESOLUTION OF THE OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES. I THINK THAT THERE IS NO SINGLE BREAKTHROUGH THAT IS GOING TO MAKE THIS CONFERENCE. IT IS THE RESOLUTION OF A SERIES OF ISSUES, LIKE THE AIR ISSUE; BUT THE ISSUES OF NOTIFICATION AND THE ISSUES OF VERIFICATION ALSO PLAY A VERY IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE TOTAL AGREEMENT THAT IS GOING TO BE PRODUCED HERE.

Q: MR. AMBASSADOR, WHO GAVE MOST AND WHO TOOK MOST IN THIS PROCESS, THE EAST OR THE WEST?

A: WELL, THIS ISN'T REALLY A BAZAAR. I MEAN, YOU CAN'T PUT A PRICE ON THINGS. WHAT'S IMPORTANT IS THAT BOTH SIDES WERE READY TO FOLLOW THE PROCESS OF GIVE AND TAKE, AND WE PRODUCED AN AGREEMENT (ON AIR) WHICH WAS SATISFACTORY TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES. AND I THINK THAT IS THE BASIS ON WHICH THE REMAINING ISSUES WILL BE RESOLVED ALSO. IT'S RATHER POINTLESS TO SAY WHO GAVE MORE. THE QUESTION IS: ARE BOTH SIDES WILLING TO GIVE? AND I THINK THE ANSWER TO THAT IS "YES."

Q: WHAT REALLY HAPPENED YESTERDAY?

A: WELL, THERE WAS TEXT AGREED UPON YESTERDAY (7/16) WHICH RESOLVES THE QUESTION OF WHAT AIR ACTIVITIES ARE

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

TO BE INCLUDED IN THE NOTIFICATION REGIME HERE. THE TEXT BASICALLY TREATS AIR ACTIVITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF NOTIFIABLE GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES.

Q: HAS IT BEEN RESOLVED OR SIMPLY POSTPONED?

A: IT HAS BEEN RESOLVED FOR PURPOSES OF THIS AGREEMENT.

Q: AMBASSADOR, COULD YOU GIVE ANY INDICATION OF WHERE THE CONFERENCE IS ON THE NEGOTIATION OF THE THRESHHOLDS FOR NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES TODAY?

A: WELL, IT'S HARD TO KEEP UP WITH IT MINUTE-BY-MINUTE, BUT WE HOPE THAT MOST OF THE QUESTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE WHOLE NOTIFICATION ISSUE CAN BE RESOLVED IN BROAD TERMS BEFORE WE LEAVE (AT THE END OF THIS ROUND). SOME OF THEM NO DOUBT WILL BE LEFT FOR US TO DEAL WITH IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS DURING THE PERIOD BEFORE THE START-UP OF THE NEXT SESSION; SOME OF THEM MAY BE LEFT FOR US TO DEAL WITH WHEN WE COME BACK NEXT ROUND. BUT I THINK THAT REAL PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ACROSS THE BOARD. THE TEXT THAT WAS ADOPTED YESTERDAY, IN FACT, COVERED GROUND ACTIVITIES AS WELL AS AIR ACTIVITIES, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE STILL GROUND ACTIVITY PARAMETERS THAT NEED TO BE WORKED OUT.

Q: COULD YOU SPECULATE, OR MAYBE MORE THAN SPECULATE, ON WHAT HAPPENED IN THE EAST-WEST POLITICAL CONTEXT TO PERMIT THIS PROGRESS RIGHT NOW. DO YOU THINK THAT THE PROGRESS THAT IS TAKING PLACE IN THIS CURRENT SESSION REFLECTS A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE EAST-WEST ATMOSPHERE?

A: WELL, ACTUALLY I THINK IT REFLECTS SOMETHING ELSE, AND I THINK MAYBE IT IS SOMETHING THAT OUGHT TO BE TRUE OF MORE NEGOTIATIONS OF THIS KIND. THE PROGRESS AT THIS POINT, IN MY VIEW, COMES IN LARGE PART FROM THE FACT THAT THE NEGOTIATION IS COMING TO AN END. SOMETIMES DEADLINES HAVE A VERY USEFUL PLACE IN HELPING TO CONCENTRATE THE MIND. MAYBE THAT'S WHY PEOPLE HAVE SUDDENLY FACED UP TO SOME OF THE HARD DECISIONS THAT HAVE TO BE MADE. IT'S MY IMPRESSION THAT IF YOU HAVE A NEGOTIATION THAT RUNS ON AND ON WITHOUT ANY DEADLINE THERE IS NO CATALYST FOR HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL DECISIONS. SO MY EXPLANATION IS THAT WE ONLY HAVE FIVE WEEKS TO GO IN TERMS OF OFFICIAL WORKING TIME, AND THAT DOES SERVE TO CONCENTRATE THE MIND AND MAKE THE EFFORTS BE A LITTLE MORE INTENSIVE. IT MAY HAVE BROUGHT ABOUT SOME OF THE DECISIONS WHICH I THINK HAVE TAKEN PLACE THAT HAVE HELPED PRODUCE PROGRESS OVER THE BROAD FRONT.

Q: DON'T YOU FEEL THAT THE AGREEMENT, THE CONCRETE PROPOSALS THAT COME OUT AT THE END OF THIS CONFERENCE, ARE GOING TO BE SO DILUTED BECAUSE YOU ARE GOING FOR POLITICAL EXPEDIENCY, IN JUST GETTING ANY KIND OF AGREEMENT?

A: OH, ABSOLUTELY NOT. I WOULD SAY QUITE THE CONTRARY. I THINK THAT THE KIND OF AGREEMENT THAT I

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

CAN SEE COMING OUT OF THIS CONFERENCE IS GOING TO BE A VERY SUBSTANTIVE ONE. IT'S GOING TO HAVE IN IT, FOR EXAMPLE, A MEASURE ON FORECASTING MILITARY ACTIVITIES A YEAR IN ADVANCE, WHICH IS SOMETHING COMPLETELY NEW. IT IS GOING TO HAVE A SECTION ON NOTIFICATION WHICH IS GOING TO MEAN BY AN ORDER OF MAGNITUDE MORE KINDS OF ACTIVITIES ARE BEING NOTIFIED AND OBSERVED THAN CURRENTLY UNDER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. IT'S GOT A WHOLE NEW AREA IN WHICH THESE MEASURES APPLY; THAT IS, THE WHOLE OF EUROPE FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS, WHICH WILL BE AN IMPORTANT NEW STEP IN ARMS CONTROL TERMS. I EXPECT THERE TO BE AN INSPECTION MEASURE WHICH WILL BE AN INNOVATION IN ARMS CONTROL, WHICH WILL PROVIDE FOR INSPECTION OF SITUATIONS WHERE THERE IS DOUBT ABOUT COMPLIANCE. AND THERE WILL ALSO, I THINK, BE OTHER SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS. WE HAVE SAID FROM THE VERY OUTSET THAT WE DO NOT WANT AN AGREEMENT FOR AGREEMENT'S SAKE, THAT A BAD AGREEMENT IS WORSE THAN NO AGREEMENT AT ALL. THAT REMAINS OUR ATTITUDE. SO IT'S NOT POLITICAL EXPEDIENCY. IT'S THE FACT THAT A SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD BE A MAJOR IMPROVEMENT ON THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IS IN REACH THAT MAKES IT ACCEPTABLE TO US.

Q: COULD YOU PUT THIS INSPECTION MEASURE IN TERMS OF THE LARGER CONTEXT OF ARMS CONTROL MATTERS: WHY WOULD IT BE SIGNIFICANT, AND WOULD IT REPRESENT A BREAKTHROUGH SOMEWHAT? WHAT SORT OF EAST-WEST PRECEDENTS WOULD IT SET?

A: WELL, OBVIOUSLY, INSPECTION IS ONE OF THE BIG ISSUES IN THE AREA OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTION, AND THIS HAS BEEN A BIG STUMBLING BLOCK FOR DISCUSSIONS IN THE VIENNA MBFR TALKS. BUT, LIKEWISE, IT IS A MAJOR OBSTACLE IN NEGOTIATIONS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND NEGOTIATIONS ON STRATEGIC IMMEDIATE-RANGE WEAPONS; SO THERE ARE IMPLICATIONS ACROSS THE BOARD. NOW, MIND YOU AGAIN, WE HAVEN'T GOT INSPECTION HERE YET. THE DRAFTING IS GOING RELATIVELY SLOWLY ON THE ISSUE, BUT I AM HOPEFUL THAT THIS PROCESS WILL ACCELERATE AND THAT WE WILL END UP WITH A SOLID, WELL-DRAFTED SET OF MODALITIES TO MAKE INSPECTION EFFECTIVE.

Q: WOULD YOU GIVE ODDS NOW ON WHETHER YOU WILL GET INSPECTION?

A: WELL, YOU'RE ASKING ME WHAT SORT OF ODDS I WOULD GIVE FOR SUCCESS OF THE CONFERENCE. BECAUSE WE HAVE ALWAYS SAID THAT INSPECTION IS A REQUIREMENT FOR A SUCCESSFUL AGREEMENT -- THAT THE AGREEMENT MUST BE VERIFIABLE. IN FACT, THE MADRID MANDATE SAYS THAT.

Q: COULD YOU DESCRIBE THE MOVEMENT ON THE EASTERN SIDE DURING THE COURSE OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE ISSUE OF INSPECTION?

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

A: WELL, I THINK THAT THE MOVEMENT HAS BEEN -- AND I'M HAVING TO SAY HERE THAT I AM INFERRING FROM STATEMENTS THAT HAVE MADE HERE AT THE CONFERENCE AND STATEMENTS MADE BY, FOR EXAMPLE, THE SPOKESMAN OF THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY IN MOSCOW AT THE TIME OF THE MITTERAND VISIT -- WHAT I INFERRED FROM THIS IS THAT SUCCESS IN THE AREA OF INSPECTION IS POSSIBLE. I CANNOT TELL YOU THAT BASED UPON THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT HAVE GONE ON SO FAR. THAT IS STILL TO COME, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE DONE SOME DRAFTING ON VERIFICATION, AND DISCUSSION IN THE GROUP ON VERIFICATION HAS CERTAINLY FOCUSED ON THE IDEA OF INSPECTION AND THE MODALITIES OF INSPECTION.

Q: THERE HAS BEEN SOME AGREEMENT THAT WAY?

A: THERE HAS BEEN DRAFTING, BUT WHAT HAPPENS HERE IS THAT YOU DON'T AGREE ABOUT THINGS IN THE ABSTRACT; WHAT YOU DO IS YOU WRITE DOWN SENTENCES THAT ARE GOING TO BE PART OF THE AGREEMENT. AND WE HAVE WRITTEN DOWN QUITE A FEW SENTENCES ON VERIFICATION, THOUGH NONE OF THEM YET PINS DOWN THE IDEA THAT INSPECTION IS THE MEANS OF VERIFICATION OF CERTAIN CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. BUT I BELIEVE THAT IS OBTAINABLE.

Q: WILL SUCCESS HERE MAKE EUROPE A SAFER PLACE TO LIVE IN?

A: I BELIEVE THAT IF WE GET A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT HERE IT CERTAINLY WILL MAKE EUROPE A SAFER PLACE TO LIVE IN. IT WILL OPEN UP AN ENTIRE NEW PERSPECTIVE OF PREDICTABILITY IN THE MILITARY SITUATION ON THE CONTINENT AND MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR STATES PARTICIPATING IN THIS AGREEMENT TO APPRECIATE BETTER WHAT IS GOING ON ON THE OTHER SIDE IN MILITARY TERMS. AND THAT, I THINK, SHOULD MAKE EUROPE SAFER.

Q: AND THIS IS ABOUT THE ELEVENTH HOUR, IS IT? WHAT ARE YOUR FEELINGS? ARE YOU GOING TO GET THERE OR NOT?

A: WELL, I BELIEVE WE ARE GOING TO GET THERE, ALTHOUGH A GREAT DEAL OF WORK REMAINS TO BE DONE. BUT I BELIEVE ALL PARTICIPANTS NOW WANT TO MAKE THE CONFERENCE A SUCCESS, AND I BELIEVE WE JUST BARELY HAVE ENOUGH TIME TO DO THAT.

Q: THE EAST BLOC ARE SAYING THEY MADE ONE CONCESSION BY NOT DEMANDING THAT THE QUESTION OF INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AT THIS CONFERENCE. WHAT CONCESSIONS HAVE YOU MADE?

A: WELL, I DON'T THINK IT IS A USEFUL EXERCISE IN COMPARING ONE'S CONCESSIONS WITH SOMEONE ELSE'S CONCESSION. THE AIM IS TO TAKE PART IN THE PROCESS OF GIVE AND TAKE, AND THAT'S WHAT THE EAST IS DOING AND THAT'S WHAT THE WEST IS DOING. WE MADE A MAJOR STATEMENT ON THE 30TH OF JUNE, LISTING ALL THE AREAS IN WHICH WE WERE PREPARED TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY. WE'RE GLAD THAT THE EAST DID, FINALLY, SHOW SOME FLEXIBILITY ON THIS AIR QUESTION.

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

Q: WHY ARE THINGS MOVING SO FAST NOW? BECAUSE IT IS NEARLY THE END OF THE CONFERENCE OR BECAUSE THERE HAS BEEN A THAW IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS?

A: I THINK THAT THE APPROACHING END HAS FOCUSED THE MIND OF NEGOTIATORS AND THEIR GOVERNMENTS.

Q: YOU WANT TO GET HOME WITH SOMETHING IN YOUR PORTFOLIO.

A: WELL, WE WANT TO GET HOME WITH SOMETHING GOOD IN OUR PORTFOLIO.

END Q&A. END TRANSCRIPT.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 05702

SUBJ: US AMB. BARRY CDE PLENARY STATEMENT, 07/18/86

1. CDE XI - 61

2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF REMARKS BY AMB. ROBERT L. BARRY, HEAD OF US DELEGATION TO CDE, IN THE CLOSING PLENARY OF ROUND XI 07/18/86. AMB. BARRY SPOKE AFTER SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY AND REFERS TO COMMENTS IN GRINEVSKY'S TEXT, WHICH WAS SENT SEPTEL.

BEGIN US TEXT: MR. CHAIRMAN: AS MANY HAVE SAID, THE TIME FOR SPEECHES IS PAST AS THE ADJOURNMENT DATE OF OUR CONFERENCE APPROACHES WITH UNREMITTING SPEED. BUT AT THE END OF THIS CRUCIAL PENULTIMATE ROUND OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, I FELT IT NECESSARY TO SAY A FEW BRIEF WORDS ABOUT THE VIEW MY DELEGATION TAKES OF OUR PROSPECTS HERE.

THE LAST TIME I SPOKE BEFORE A PLENARY SESSION, ON MAY 16, I SAID THAT THE PROSPECT OF FAILURE LOOMED LARGE ABOVE THE CONFERENCE. IT WOULD BE INCAUTIOUS TO SAY THAT WE ARE NOW FACING THE PROSPECT OF SUCCESS, BUT I AM GUARDEDLY OPTIMISTIC THAT A SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENT OF THE KIND MY GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS SUPPORTED IS WITHIN OUR GRASP. THE CONTOURS OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT ARE VISIBLE, AS WE HAVE SAID THEY SHOULD BE BY THE END OF THIS SESSION; BUT MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE IN A VERY SHORT TIME IF WE ARE TO PRODUCE A DOCUMENT TO WHICH ALL CAN AGREE BY SEPTEMBER 19.

THE MAIN FACTOR THAT ENCOURAGES ME TO THINK THAT AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE IS THAT FINALLY WE SEEM TO HAVE DEVELOPED SOME MOMENTUM. THE GLACIER IS MOVING, AT LEAST ON SOME CENTRAL ISSUES. WE, THE SIXTEEN CO-SPONSORS OF SC.1, HAVE DISPLAYED FLEXIBILITY BOTH IN THE DRAFTING ITSELF AND IN PUBLICLY FORMULATING OUR POSITIONS, AS (CANADIAN) AMBASSADOR DELWORTH DID ON JUNE 30. I BELIEVE (SOVIET) AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY HAS MADE A RECIPROCAL, SUBSTANTIAL AND IMPORTANT REPLY TO THAT IN HIS STATEMENT TODAY, WHICH I CERTAINLY WELCOME, AS I WELCOME THE STEPS WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO RESOLVE KEY ISSUES, SUCH AS THE ISSUE OF AIR ACTIVITIES WHICH I REGARD AS IMPORTANT.

JUST IN COMMENTING BRIEFLY AND INFORMALLY, AS IT WERE, ON SOME OF THE COMMENTS THAT AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY MADE TODAY: MY DELEGATION, AT LEAST, WELCOMES HIS INTRODUCTION OF THE FIGURE 200 AS A FIGURE FOR THE NUMBER OF SORTIES IN THE AIR THRESHOLD. AND WE, AT LEAST, WOULD BE WILLING TO WORK TOGETHER TO REACH A STILL LOWER NUMBER. WE HAVE ALWAYS FELT THAT AIR ACTIVITIES ARE IMPORTANT, AND WE HAVE STARTED FROM A POSITION OF SAYING THAT WE WOULD PROVIDE INFORMATION ON ALL AIR ACTIVITIES CONNECTED WITH NOTIFIABLE GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES.

I ALSO WELCOME WHAT HE HAD TO SAY ON INCLUDING THE

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

ELEMENTS OF STRUCTURE, NUMBERS AND MOBILITY/FIREPOWER IN A CONCEPTUAL FORMULA FOR GROUND-FORCE NOTIFICATION; THAT IS A VIEW WHICH WE SHARE. BUT I WOULD LIKE TO CORRECT ONE MISAPPREHENSION: IT IS NOT REALLY ACCURATE TO SAY THAT WE IN THE WEST ARE SERIOUSLY THINKING OF TEN TO TWELVE THOUSAND (TROOPS) AS A STARTING POINT FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON THE NUMERICAL ASPECT OF THAT FORMULA. I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO SAY THAT WE ARE QUITE PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO WORK ON FINDING AN APPROPRIATE FORMULA TO RESOLVE THE QUESTION OF TRANSFERS. IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN OUR POSITION THAT TRANSFERS OUGHT TO BE INCLUDED IN NOTIFICATIONS OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES, AND WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT QUESTION CAN BE RESOLVED. I COULD ALSO SAY THE SAME IN TALKING ABOUT FORECASTS. THERE IS ANOTHER AREA WHERE I THINK MY DELEGATION CAN EASILY MOVE AHEAD TO ADD SUBSTANCE TO THE FORECASTING PROPOSAL. I WAS ALSO ENCOURAGED, I MUST SAY, BY AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY'S COMMENTS ON VERIFICATION AND INSPECTION. THE VARIOUS COMMENTS MADE ON THIS SUBJECT IN RECENT DAYS ENCOURAGE ME TO BELIEVE THAT INSPECTION IS WITHIN OUR REACH HERE IN STOCKHOLM. AS THE DISTINGUISHED AMBASSADOR OF SPAIN POINTED OUT ON JULY 14, UP UNTIL NOW MANY HERE HAVE PREFERRED THE OSTRICH APPROACH TO THIS CRUCIAL ISSUE. NOW THAT ALL DELEGATIONS SEEMINGLY ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF INSPECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES, IT IS TIME FOR US ALL TO LIFT OUR HEADS FROM THE SAND. THE ENTIRE CONCEPT OF INSPECTION MIGHT SEEM AT FIRST GLANCE SOMEWHAT FRIGHTENING, BUT I THINK IT IS IMPROTANT THAT WE ALL OVERCOME THIS FEAR SO THAT WE CAN DO NECESSARY DRAFTING ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE VERIFICATION SECTION OF AN AGREEMENT, INCLUDING EFFECTIVE MODALITIES AND THE UNCONDITIONAL RIGHT TO USE INSPECTION FOR VERIFICATION. EARLIER, WE HAD HEARD IT SUGGESTED THAT THIS WORK COULD BE DONE BY EXPERTS IN VIENNA. LET ME BE CLEAR IN SAYING THAT, IN MY GOVERNMENT'S VIEW, THIS IS NOT AN OPTION. THE AGREEMENT WE ADOPT HERE MUST BE COMPLETE AND, IN OUR VIEW, INSPECTION MUST BE PART OF IT IF IT IS TO BE COMPLETE.

IT IS TRUE THAT WE WILL BE BREAKING NEW GROUND IN DRAFTING INSPECTION PROVISIONS HERE IN STOCKHOLM, ALTHOUGH THE SUBJECT OF INSPECTION HAS BEEN UNDER DISCUSSION FOR DECADES. IN DOING THIS DRAFTING, WE HAVE TO BE CAUTIOUS; AS AMBASSADOR DELWORTH SAID, WE ARE WILLING TO ENSURE AGAINST THE ABUSE OF THE RIGHT AND SEE TO IT THAT INSPECTIONS ARE NOT ONEROUS OR UNDULY INTRUSIVE. BUT WE MUST ALSO BE CAREFUL NOT TO SET THE WRONG PRECEDENT BY ESTABLISHING PROVISIONS WHICH CANNOT EFFECTIVELY VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THE REGIME OF WHICH IT IS A PART. THIS WOULD SET BACK THE

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

CAUSE OF ARMS CONTROL AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING, NOT
ADVANCE IT.

TO CREATE AN EFFECTIVE REGIME, WE MUST BE READY TO
DRAFT INTENSIVELY ON ALL OUTSTANDING ISSUES, INCLUDING
INSPECTION, WHEN THE CONFERENCE RESUMES ON AUGUST 19.
THIS WILL NOT BE AN EASY PROCESS, BUT FAILURE TO TACKLE
IT HEAD-ON WILL LEAD TO AN INCOMPLETE AGREEMENT AND AN
UNSATISFACTORY CONCLUSION TO THE CONFERENCE.

LIKE MANY OTHER DELEGATIONS HERE, MY OWN WILL RESPOND
TO THE CALL FOR INTENSIFIED WORK. WE STAND READY FOR
INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON THE INSPECTION ISSUE AND
OTHER ISSUES IN HOPES OF SMOOTHING THE WAY FOR DRAFTING
WHEN THE CONFERENCE RESUMES OFFICIALLY. THERE ARE A
NUMBER OF QUESTIONS WHICH NEED URGENT ATTENTION, BUT
OBVIOUSLY THEY REQUIRE THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL THE
MEMBERS OF THIS CONFERENCE. AND MY DELEGATION IS
CLEARLY SENSITIVE TO THAT ISSUE. THANK YOU MR:
CHARIMAN. END TEXT. BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 05703

SUBJ: TEXT OF SOVIET CDE STATEMENT, 07/18/86

1. CDE XI - 62

2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT (AS DISTRIBUTED) OF THE SPEECH SOVIET AMBASSADOR OLEG GRINEVSKY GAVE IN CDE PLENARY TODAY, 07/18/86:

BEGIN TEXT: MR. CHAIRMAN, IN RECENT DAYS THE CONFERENCE HAS BEEN GIVEN NEW AND FRESH IMPULSES WHICH STEER IT DIRECTLY TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF POSITIVE RESULTS IN CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING IN EUROPE. WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS ALONG THIS DIRECTION THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE A TURN IN EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL. TODAY SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM IS THE KEY LINK GRASPING WHICH IT IS POSSIBLE TO SET IN MOTION THE ENTIRE CHAIN OF NEGOTIATIONS AND SOLUTIONS TO PRESSING INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. IF WE ARE ABLE TO WORK OUT IN STOCKHOLM SUFFICIENTLY MEANINGFUL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, THIS WOULD CREATE FAVOURABLE PREREQUISITES FOR THE VIENNA CSCE MEETING TO BE HELD THIS FALL AND HENCE FOR THE SECOND STAGE OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE WHICH COULD ADDRESS PRODUCTIVELY DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS.

WHAT IS REQUIRED TO ASSURE SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM? AS GENERAL SECRETARY MIKHAIL GORBACHEV STATED, THE TIME HAS COME FOR ALL THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE TO DEMONSTRATE RESPONSIBILITY AND FLEXIBILITY. ONLY SERIOUS MUTUAL CONCESSIONS ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY CAN PRODUCE A POSITIVE RESULT.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE MADE QUITE A FEW STEPS TO OUTLINE SOLUTIONS ON SUCH KEY ISSUES AS NOTIFICATION, EXCHANGES OF ANNUAL PLANS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES, INVITATION OF OBSERVERS, LIMITATION OF THE SCALE OF MILITARY MANOEUVRES, NON-USE OF FORCE, VERIFICATION, ETC.

DURING THE PAST YEAR THERE HAS NOT BEEN, IT WOULD SEEM, A SINGLE SESSION WHERE ONE OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES -- BULGARIA, HUNGARY, THE GDR, POLAND, ROMANIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA -- DID NOT INITIATE A PROPOSAL MOVING THE CONFERENCE FORWARD.

WE HIGHLY APPRECIATE THE EFFORTS THAT HAVE BEEN AND ARE BEING MADE BY THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS AT THE CONFERENCE.

WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO VIEW AS A POLITICAL SIGNAL OF THEIR READINESS TO MOVE AHEAD THE PROPOSALS PRESENTED BY THE WESTERN COUNTRIES IN THE STATEMENT BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA, AMBASSADOR DELWORTH, OF JUNE 30. THOSE PROPOSALS TOUCH UPON THE MANY SERIOUS PROBLEMS THAT FACE THE CONFERENCE, ALTHOUGH, FRANKLY SPEAKING, THEY GIVE LITTLE FOR THEIR PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS.

AS TO THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, THEY ARE PREPARED TO ACT

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

ALSO IN THE FUTURE IN A CONSTRUCTIVE KEY, TO SEEK BALANCED SOLUTIONS TO THE OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS BY WAY OF A COMPROMISE AND A REALISTIC VIEW ON WHAT GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS COULD CONCLUDE THE WORK IN STOCKHOLM.

I WOULD NOTE, FIRST OF ALL, THE FOLLOWING ITEMS: FIRST, AN IMPORTANT BREAKTHROUGH HAS BEEN MADE AT THE CONFERENCE IN RECENT DAYS. WE HAVE MANAGED TO UNDO ONE OF THE TIGHTEST KNOTS WHICH FOR A LONG TIME IMPEDED OUR MOVEMENT FORWARD, I.E. NOTIFICATION OF AIR FORCE MANOEUVRES.

THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE ALWAYS CONSISTENTLY ADVOCATED NOTIFICATION OF ALL MAJOR MANOEUVRES OF AIR FORCES WHICH ARE THE STRIKE TYPE OF THE ARMED FORCES. UNFORTUNATELY, HOWEVER, THE NATO COUNTRIES REFUSED ALTOGETHER TO NOTIFY AIR FORCE MANOEUVRES. IT IS BETWEEN THESE POLAR POSITIONS THAT THE SIDES HAVE CLASHED FOR A LONG TIME AT THE CONFERENCE.

A COMPROMISE BECAME POSSIBLE ON THE BASIS OF ESTABLISHING AN AIR SUB-LEVEL WITHIN NOTIFICATION OF MANOEUVRES OF LAND FORCES STARTING FROM WHICH CERTAIN IMPORTANT INFORMATION WOULD BE PROVIDED ON AIR FORCE MANOEUVRES. WE SHOULD BE STRAIGHTFORWARD IN SAYING THAT ALL THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THIS COMPROMISE BY DEMONSTRATING THE POLITICAL WILL FOR AN AGREEMENT. AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF POLAND STATED, GIVEN THIS SOLUTION THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ARE PREPARED TO POSTPONE NOTIFICATION OF SEPARATE AIR FORCE MANOEUVRES TO THE NEXT STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE, AS IS THE CASE WITH NAVAL ACTIVITIES. AT PRESENT, IT IS NECESSARY TO AGREE UPON THIS AIR SUB-LEVEL. MANY COUNTRIES, BOTH NEUTRAL AND NATO ALIKE, HAVE SPOKEN ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS IN FAVOUR OF A LOWER CEILING WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FOR MORE INFORMATION ON AIR FORCE MANOEUVRES. WE HAVE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THEIR VIEWS AND PROPOSE NOW AN AIR PARAMETER OF 200 SORTIES FLOWN DURING THE MANOEUVRES. WE TRUST THAT OUR COUNTERPARTS WILL DULY CONSIDER THIS PROPOSAL.

SECOND, AS REGARDS MANOEUVRES OF LAND FORCES, SUBSTANTIAL COMMON GROUND IS ALSO VISIBLE. IN RECENT DAYS AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED THAT NOTIFICATIONS WOULD COVER MANOEUVRES OF LAND FORCES CONDUCTED IN COMBINATION WITH AIR, NAVAL, AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE TROOPS.

WE ARE YET TO AGREE ON PARAMETERS OF SUCH NOTIFICATION. THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ARE KNOWN TO HAVE MADE A STEP TO MEET THE DESIRES OF MANY COUNTRIES, BOTH NATO AND NEUTRAL, REGARDING A LOWER NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD BY PROPOSING THAT THEY WOULD COVER MANOEUVRES TALLING 18 THOUSAND TROOPS. THE NATO COUNTRIES

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

DECLARED THEIR READINESS TO RAISE THE NUMERICAL LEVEL OF NOTIFICATION. HOWEVER, DESPITE THE FACT THAT ALMOST A MONTH HAS PASSED SINCE, THEY DID NOT NAME ANY SPECIFIC FIGURES (THOUGH SOMETIMES HINT AT THE FIGURE OF 10-12 THOUSAND). LET US BE STRAIGHT; SUCH VALUES CANNOT BE A STARTING POINT IN THE SEARCH FOR A COMPROMISE. NEVERTHELESS, IN ORDER TO STEER THE NEGOTIATIONS TOWARDS GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS ON THIS QUESTION, TOO, WE WOULD LIKE TO STATE THAT 18 THOUSAND IS NOT THE LAST WORD. WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT A LOWER LEVEL BUT, OBVIOUSLY, ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY.

CERTAINLY, IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE PARAMETER OF NOTIFICATION OF LAND FORCE MANOEUVRES BE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL AND DAMAGE NO-ONE'S SECURITY. PROVIDED A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE NUMERICAL LEVEL OF NOTIFICATION IS FOUND, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO LOOK FOR SUCH A NOTIFICATION PARAMETER CONCERNING LAND FORCES WHICH WOULD COVER ALL ITS ASPECTS. IT HAS BEEN ALREADY STATED HERE THAT THREE APPROACHES TO THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM ARE SUGGESTED AT THE CONFERENCE: IN ACCORDANCE WITH ONE OF THEM, FOCUS IS MADE ON STRUCTURE; IN ANOTHER CASE, ON NUMBERS; IN THE THIRD CASE, ON "MOBILITY AND FIREPOWER." WELL, WE ARE READY, TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER DELEGATIONS, TO WORK ON THE BEST COMBINATION OF THESE APPROACHES.

THIRD. THE WAY TO CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IS ALSO CONNECTED WITH SUCH AN IMPORTANT MEASURE AS NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFERS OF TROOPS TO THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S. SUCH AGREEMENT COULD IMPART AN IMPULSE TO MOVEMENT IN OTHER QUESTIONS AS WELL. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT IT SHOULD EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF COVERT ACCUMULATION OF FORCES AND PROVIDE AT THE SAME TIME FOR ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF THE ARRIVAL OF TROOPS TO EUROPE TO CONDUCT AN ACTIVITY WHICH WILL BE NOTIFIED. FOURTH. AGREEMENT ON THE QUESTION OF EXCHANGES OF ANNUAL PLANS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES WOULD BECOME A KIND OF SAFETY VALVE AGAINST COVERT PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE DONE A LOT TO MOVE AHEAD IN THE ELABORATION OF THIS CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE. AND THINGS ARE SLOWLY MOVING FORWARDS. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE WISHES MADE BY THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES AND BY THE WESTERN STATES, WE PROPOSE TODAY THAT SUCH PLANS FOR EACH SUBSEQUENT YEAR WOULD BE GIVEN BY ALL THE PARTICIPATING STATES TO ONE ANOTHER NOT LATER THAN NOVEMBER 15-20 OF THE PRECEDING YEAR.

FIFTH. IN ORDER TO FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS ON CONSTRAINS (SIC) CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH WOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL THE PARTICIPATING STATES, WE ARE READY TO TAKE, AS A BASIS,

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

THE PROPOSALS OF NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES. THEY PROVIDE FOR MANY OPTIONS: E.G. ON THE ONE HAND, NOT TO CONDUCT DURING ONE YEAR IN ADDITION TO PLANS MORE THAN FIVE MILITARY MANOEUVRES THE SIZE OF WHICH WOULD EXCEED THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL LESS THAN TWO TIMES AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, NOT TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF SUCH MANOEUVRES IF THEY ARE INCLUDED IN THE ANNUAL PLANS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES.

WOULD IT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT WITH THIS MULTIPLICITY OF APPROACHES? SIXTH. VERIFICATION IS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE FOR THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. WE WANT TO BE CONFIDENT THAT AGREEMENTS WE CONCLUDE ARE STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH BY ALL. THEREFORE, WE FAVOUR THAT AGREEMENTS ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES BE PROVIDED WITH EFFECTIVE AND ADEQUATE VERIFICATION, AND ARE READY TO GO AS FAR IN THIS QUESTION AS THE INTERESTS OF OUR BUSINESS REQUIRE.

IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT THE PROPOSALS OF THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES SET FORTH IN BUDAPEST CONTAIN THE IDEA OF VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AS WELL AS OF ON-SITE INSPECTION.

ACCORDINGLY, WE ARE READY TO CONSIDER THE ISSUE OF INSPECTION AND BELIEVE THAT IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE TO MOVE FORWARD IN THIS AREA. IN PARTICULAR, THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ARE READY TO RECORD AGREEMENT THAT THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL CONDUCT ON-SITE INSPECTION OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE PROCESS OF VERIFICATION OF REDUCTIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS. I WOULD STRESS THAT WE ARE ALSO READY TO CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF WHETHER WE CAN MEET THE CONCERN VOICED BY SOME COUNTRIES ON THE ISSUE. HOWEVER, WE EXPECT THE SAME TREATMENT OF OUR PROBLEM IN OTHER AREAS WHERE PROPOSALS ARE MADE WHICH AFFECT ADVERSELY OUR SECURITY INTERESTS.

SEVENTH. IN ORDER TO FINALIZE THE ELABORATION OF AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE, WE ARE MAKING A STEP FORWARD IN THIS AREA, TOO -- WE TAKE THE DOCUMENT OF THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES AS A BASIS. WE ARE ALSO READY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN NATO PROPOSALS.

SOME SAY THAT A HUMAN-RIGHTS PROVISION SHOULD BE A NECESSARY COMPONENT OF THE AGREEMENT. WHAT IS THE MATTER, THOUGH? WE DON'T HAVE ANY PROBLEMS HERE. WE ARE READY TO NOTE A PROVISION THAT RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR OF PEACE. THIS FOLLOWS FROM THE FUNDAMENTAL APPROACH OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES TO HUMAN RIGHTS AS ONE OF THE COMPONENTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. MR. CHAIRMAN, THE ONLY WAY OF HAVING A MEANINGFUL

150

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

AGREEMENT LIES THROUGH MUTUAL CONCESSIONS. WE HOPE THAT OUR INITIATIVES WILL PROVIDE AN APPROPRIATE DYNAMISM LEADING TO ACHIEVING PRECISELY THIS AGREEMENT IN THE WEEKS LEFT BEFORE THE CONFERENCE CONCLUDES ITS WORK ON SEPTEMBER 19. OBVIOUSLY, THIS REQUIRES GOODWILL ON THE PART OF ALL THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 04 STOCKHOLM 05703
SUBJ: TEXT OF SOVIET CDE STATEMENT, 07/18/86
CONFERENCE. IT IS THIS WILL THAT SOME, UNFORTUNATELY, ARE NOT YET TOO HASTY TO DEMONSTRATE. TIME FACTOR, TOO, STARTS TO PLAY AN EVER-INCREASING ROLE. IT IS LIKE DAMOCLES'S SWORD OVER THE CONFERENCE. IF WE DO NOT INTENSIFY OUR WORK, TIME MAY RUN OUT, EVEN GIVEN THE WILL. WE ARE NOT IN FAVOUR OF PROTRACTED DIPLOMATIC BARGAINING WHEN AGREEMENTS ARE REACHED AT THE LAST NIGHT. THEREFORE, THE SOVIET DELEGATION IS PREPARED TO REMAIN IN STOCKHOLM DURING THE BREAK AS WELL AS TO HOLD INFORMAL MEETINGS AND CONSULTATIONS.
END TEXT
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE
NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05712
 SUBJ: NAC/POLADS DISCUSSION OF STOCKHOLM CDE
 REFS: A. USNATO 03987; B. STOCKHOLM 5350;
 C. STOCKHOLM 5676; D. STOCKHOLM 5702

1. CDE XI - 63
2. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT
3. SUMMARY: WE BELIEVE POLADS/NAC DISCUSSION OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORTS ON CDE IS PARTICULARLY TIMELY AS THE CONFERENCE APPROACHES ITS FINAL ROUND. THIS MESSAGE SUGGESTS TALKING POINTS ON CDE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND ALSO SUPPLEMENTS EARLIER SUGGESTIONS FOR TALKING POINTS ON CDE MORE GENERALLY. END SUMMARY.
4. ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT AGREE WITH FRG POLAD'S ASSESSMENT THAT EASTERN PROPAGANDA HAS THE ADVANTAGE OVER WESTERN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ON THE CDE ISSUE, WE STRONGLY SUPPORT POLAD/NAC DISCUSSION OF HOW BEST TO EXPLOIT A POSSIBLE CDE AGREEMENT TO PUBLIC AFFAIRS ADVANTAGE. FOR JULY 22 POLADS MEETING AND JULY 24 NAC, IF THERE IS ONE, WE SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING:
 - NOW AS CDE ENDS, NATO MEMBER STATES SHOULD INCREASE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORTS TO EXPLOIT ANY SUCCESS IN CDE: CDE HAS FOLLOWED THE WESTERN APPROACH AND MET WESTERN OBJECTIVES; ANY CDE FINAL DOCUMENT WILL ADVANCE IMPORTANT WESTERN CONCEPTS OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING BASED ON INCREASED OPENNESS AND, IN VERY SPECIFIC WAYS, OF VERIFICATION BY INSPECTION; WE SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO EXPLOIT THAT POSITION WITH THE PUBLIC;
 - THE WEST WILL NEED TO COUNTER EASTERN ATTEMPTS TO CLAIM CREDIT FOR ANY SUCCESS IN CDE; THE EAST OFTEN SEEMS TO HAVE THE EDGE IN ORCHESTRATING ANNOUNCEMENTS OF "DRAMATIC" CONCESSIONS AND OTHER "NEWSWORTHY" EVENTS TO CLAIM CREDIT FOR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CONFERENCE;
 - BECAUSE THE NON-BLOC-TO-BLOC NATURE OF CDE IS AN IMPORTANT CHARACTERISTIC OF THE CONFERENCE, ESPECIALLY AMONG THE NNA, PUBLIC DIPLOMACY SHOULD DEPEND ON EFFORTS OF INDIVIDUAL MEMBER STATES RATHER THAN NATO AS A WHOLE;
 - OUR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY HAS BEEN RELATIVELY SUCCESSFUL TO THIS POINT: CDE IS VIEWED BY THE WESTERN EUROPEAN PUBLIC IN WESTERN TERMS; SOVIET/WTO EFFORTS TO TURN CDE INTO A POLITICAL/PROPAGANDA FORUM HAVE FAILED TO CATCH FIRE;
 - PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORTS HAVE REINFORCED THE CREDIBILITY OF KEY WESTERN POSITIONS, E.G., ON INSPECTION, INSIDE THE CONFERENCE;
 - AS FAR AS THE JUNE 30 INITIATIVE IS CONCERNED, ALLIES HERE DISAGREE WITH THE FRG POLAD'S ASSESSMENT; FRG, FRENCH AND OTHER CDE DELEGATES HAVE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH THE EXTENSIVE COVERAGE THE

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

INITIATIVE RECEIVED IN THEIR NATIONAL MEDIA;
-- USDEL HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN AN ACTIVE PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY EFFORT; WITH THE END OF THE CONFERENCE IN
SIGHT, MAINTAINING A HIGH PUBLIC PROFILE IS
INCREASINGLY OUR INTEREST; WE ARE INCREASING OUR OWN
EFFORTS TO THIS END;
-- HIGH LEVEL BILATERAL CONTACTS, LIKE THE
FRENCH-SOVIET, SOVIET-UK AND UPCOMING FRG-SOVIET
VISITS, WHICH DRAW ATTENTION TO THE CONFERENCE, SHOULD
BE USED TO HIGHLIGHT WESTERN POSITIONS IN CDE.
5. REFS B AND C SUGGEST TALKING POINTS ON CDE MORE
GENERALLY WHICH CAN BE ADAPTED FOR POLADS/NAC
DISCUSSION. US STATEMENT AT END OF ROUND XII SUMS UP
CURRENT VIEW (REF D): WE ARE GUARDEDLY OPTIMISTIC
ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR AN AGREEMENT; RESOLUTION OF THE
AIR ISSUE WAS A MAJOR STEP FORWARD; IMPORTANT ISSUES,
ESPECIALLY INSPECTION AND DETAILS OF THE GROUND FORCE
NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD, REMAIN TO BE SETTLED.
BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05708

SUBJECT: PLENARY, JULY 18

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT

2. CDE XII - 064

3. THE FINAL PLENARY OF THE ELEVENTH ROUND WAS CHARACTERIZED BY A MOOD OF GUARDED OPTIMISM. SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE EC-12, UK MINISTER RENTON STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF A SUBSTANTIAL RESULT IN STOCKHOLM WHICH WOULD GO WELL BEYOND THE LIMITED MEASURES CONTAINED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT; HE EMPHASIZED BRITISH VIEWS ON INSPECTION. IN AN UPBEAT STATEMENT, GRINEVSKY (USSR) SHOWED SOME FLEXIBILITY ON THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN THE CONFERENCE FULL TEXT SENT SEPTEL). BARRY (US) ASSESSED THE PROSPECTS FOR AGREEMENT AND WELCOMED POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN THE SOVIET STATEMENT. REZNIK (CSSR) AND GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) MADE OPTIMISTIC ASSESSMENTS ON THE PROSPECTS FOR AGREEMENT; REZNIK LISTED PROBLEM AREAS. ON BEHALF OF THE NNA, SCHENK (SWITZERLAND) NOTED WILLINGNESS TO DO INTENSIVE WORK BY RETURNING TO STOCKHOLM ON AUGUST 12. THE US AND USSR AGREED TO INTENSIFY WORK BY HOLDING INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WITH INTERESTED DELEGATIONS DURING THE BREAK. END SUMMARY.

4. BRITISH MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS TIM RENTON, SPEAKING FOR THE EC-12, STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF A CDE AGREEMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FUTURE OF THE CSCE PROCESS, SPECIFICALLY THE PROSPECTS OF SUCCESS AT THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING. HE WARNED THAT THERE CAN BE "NO COMPROMISE FOR COMPROMISE SAKE", I.E., THERE MUST BE A SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT. FAILURE IN STOCKHOLM, HE ADDED, WOULD ALSO MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO BEGIN WORK ON "FAR-REACHING DISARMAMENT STEPS" SUCH AS THOSE PROPOSED BY THE BUDAPEST APPEAL. IN HIS NATIONAL CAPACITY, RENTON OUTLINED BRITISH VIEWS ON INSPECTION:

-- THERE MUST BE A GUARANTEE THAT INSPECTIONS WILL TAKE PLACE.

-- ARRANGEMENTS MUST NOT BE "UNDULY BURDENSOME". VERIFICATION SHOULD BE "PROPORTIONATE" TO PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF ABUSE.

-- "THIRD PARTY" PARTICIPATION IN THE INSPECTION REGIME IS "PERHAPS WORTH EXPLORATION." SUCH PARTICIPATION "CANNOT SUBSTITUTE FOR INSPECTORS," HOWEVER.

-- CONCERN FOR THE PROBLEM OF RESTRICTED AREAS IS LEGITIMATE. NONETHELESS, SUCH AREAS SHOULD BE LIMITED IN SIZE AND NUMBER. ACCESS TO TERRITORY SHOULD BE LIMITED AS "ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY" TO MAKE INSPECTION J CTIVE.

-- THE BRITISH DO NOT HAVE "RIGID VIEWS ON MODALITIES."
5. AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY (USSR) MAINTAINED THAT SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM COULD BE A "KEY LINK TO SET IN MOTION"

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

OTHER FORA, E.G., THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING AND A POSSIBLE SECOND STAGE OF CDE. HE CALLED FOR MUTUAL CONCESSIONS, REFERRING TO THE EAST'S "INITIATIVES," NNA CONTRIBUTIONS, AND THE "POLITICAL SIGNAL" REPRESENTED BY THE WEST'S JUNE 30 INITIATIVE. IN THIS SPIRIT, HE SUGGESTED THE FOLLOWING:

- AN AIR PARAMETER OF 200 SORTIES;
- A FORMULATION FOR GROUND FORCES WHICH TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE THREE DIFFERENT APPROACHES OF A STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD, NUMERICAL THRESHOLD AND MOBILITY-AND-FIREPOWER;
- AGREEMENT ON NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFERS;
- EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL CALENDARS BETWEEN NOVEMBER 15-20 OF THE PRECEDING YEAR;
- USING THE NNA PROPOSAL ON CONSTRAINTS AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS;
- FINALIZING NUF, USING THE NNA DOCUMENT AND "ELEMENTS" OF NATO'S NUF TEXT. FOR THE FIRST TIME PUBLICLY, THE SOVIETS INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO INCLUDE SOME LANGUAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS;
- GOING AS "FAR AS NECESSARY" TO ENSURE ADEQUATE VERIFICATION; ON INSPECTION, GRINEVSKY REPEATED THE SOVIET POSITION THAT INSPECTION COULD BE IMPLEMENTED IN CONNECTION WITH CSBM'S AS PART OF AN ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENT.

6. AMBASSADOR BARRY CHARACTERIZED THE US VIEW OF PROSPECTS AT THE END OF ROUND XI AS ONE OF GUARDED OPTIMISM (FULL TEXT SEPTEL); HE WELCOMED RESOLUTION OF THE AIR ISSUE AS AN IMPORTANT STEP AND NOTED THE ROLE OF THE JUNE 30 NATO INITIATIVE IN STIMULATING PROGRESS IN THE CONFERENCE.

7. AMBASSADORS REZNIK (CSSR) AND GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) ALSO ASSESSED THE PROSPECTS FOR AGREEMENT FAVORABLY, GASCHIGNARD NOTING THAT HE VIEWED THESE PROSPECTS WITH "SATISFACTION, REALISM AND HOPE". REZNIK LISTED REMAINING DIFFICULT AREAS FROM AN EASTERN PERSPECTIVE.

8. INTENSIFICATION OF WORK: GRINEVSKY AND BARRY AGREED TO INTENSIFY THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE BY HOLDING INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS DURING THE BREAK. AMBASSADOR SCHENK (SWITZERLAND) NOTED NNA WILLINGNESS TO RETURN TO STOCKHOLM ON AUGUST 12 TO INTENSIFY THE WORK ON AN INFORMAL BASIS. NO PROCEDURAL DECISION WAS MADE REGARDING THE CDE WORK CALENDAR.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05721

SUBJECT: CDE: FRG PRESSURE FOR ABANDONING STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD

1. NOW THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ACCEPTED THE CONCEPT OF A STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD FOR GROUND FORCE NOTIFICATION, THE GERMANS ARE PRESSING US TO ABANDON IT. WE WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF EMBASSY BONN WERE INSTRUCTED TO MAKE A DEMARCHE AT A HIGH LEVEL.
2. THE FRG MOD HAS ALWAYS DISLIKED THE CONCEPT OF A STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD AND PREFERRED SETTING THE "TRIGGER" FOR NO'IFICATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES BY A NUMERICAL PARAMETER ALONE. WE HAVE OBJECTED TO THE APPROACH ON 'HE GROUNDS THAT A NUMERICAL PARAMETER CANNOT BE VERIFIED. SO FAR, THE GERMANS HAVE GONE ALONG RELUCTANTLY WITH THE ALLIANCE POSITION, BUT AT THE MOMENT THE MOD IS PRESSING HARD TO CHANGE THE GERMAN POSITION BASED ON A NEW - AND IN OUR VIEW FAULTY - ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF VARIOUS PARAMETERS ON NOTIFICATION.
3. WE UNDERSTAND THE FRENCH ARE PLANNING A HIGH LEVEL DEMARCHE IN BONN TO FORESTALL THIS; WE RECOMMEND THAT WE DO LIKEWISE, AT THE LEVEL OF FRED RUTH OR MEYER-LANDRUT. 'HE FOLLOWING ARE TALKING POINT FOR DEPARTMENT'S CONSIDERATION:
 - WE KNOW YOU SHARE OUR INTEREST IN A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME TO CDE WHICH NOW SEEMS WITHIN OUR GRASP.
 - WE SUPPORT YOUR GOAL OF OPERATIONALIZING THE MADRID ZONE BY GETTING SOME NOTIFICATIONS/OBSERVATIONS OF EXERCISES THERE, AND WE AGREE THAT THE BURDEN OF OBSERVATIONS SHOULD BE SPREAD AS WIDELY AS POSSIBLE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.
 - BUT WE DON'T AGREE WITH YOUR MOD WHICH SEEMS TO WANT TO DROP THE STRUCTURAL AND EQUIPMENT ASPECTS OF THE GROUND FORCE NOTIFICATION PARAMETER NOW THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE AGREED TO THEM.
 - FOR US, A STRUCTURAL AND EQUIPMENT ELEMENT IN THE GROUND FORCE PARAMETER IS ESSENTIAL TO VERIFICATION. NUMBERS ALONE CANNOT BE VERIFIED; NEITHER INSPECTION NOR NTMS CAN DISTINGUISH BETWEEN EXERCISES AT 10,000, 12,000 OR 15,000.
 - ALSO, WE DO NOT AGREE WITH THE APPARENT METHODOLOGY WHICH THE MOD HAS USED IN THE ANALYSIS WHICH HAS LED TO 'HEIR RENEWED ENTHUSIASM FOR THE NUMERICAL PARAMETER. IT SEEMS TO US THAT MOD HAS USED A THEORETICAL MODEL RATHER THAN EMPERICAL DATA. WE BELIEVE THAT ALMOST ALL EXERCISES AT THE LEVEL OF 10-12,000 INVOLVE UNITS OF TWO OR MORE DIVISIONS. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN THE "NEW ZONE";
 - OUR BEST ANALYST ON THIS TOPIC (KEN HUCK, CIA) WILL BE TRAVELING TO BONN JULY 24 TO MEET WITH MOD ANALYSTS;
 - WE HOPE THAT THIS EXCHANGE ON THE EXPERT LEVEL WILL HELP. BUT IN ANY CASE, WE URGE THAT YOU STICK WITH THE

156

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

ALLIANCE POSITION, WHICH HAS BEEN PRODUCED THROUGH CLOSE CONSULTATIONS IN BRUSSELS AND STOCKHOLM.
-- WE SUPPORT YOUR DESIRE TO SEE THE NUMERICAL ASPECT OF THE PARAMETER KEPT TO 10,000 - BUT FRANKLY WE DO NOT THINK THE SOVIETS WILL AGREE. THEY MAY NOT BE WILLING TO GO BELOW 14-15000, SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY DON'T WANT OBSERVATION IN THE NEW ZONE.
-- SOME DELEGATIONS IN STOCKHOLM HAVE RAISED THE IDEA OF SEPARATE THRESHOLDS FOR NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION - SAY STRUCTURE WITH 10,000 PERSONNEL OR 250 TANKS FOR NOTIFICATION AND 15,000 FOR OBSERVATION. THEY CLAIM THIS IS A NEGOTIABLE WAY OF ENSURING NOTIFICATION BUT NOT OBSERVATION IN THE NEW ZONE. WE DON'T EXCLUDE SUCH A SOLUTION.

BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05722
SUBJECT: CDE: NOTED TEXT IN WORKING GROUP,
18 JULY 1986

1. CDE XI -
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THE FOLLOWING TEXT, AGREED UPON IN THE LATE NIGHT HOURS OF 17 JULY, WAS NOTED JULY 18 IN THE NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP. IT DEALS WITH "AIRBORNE DROP" ACTIVITIES, AND STANDS AS A SEPARATE ACTIVITY TO BE NOTIFIED. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER IT WILL LATER BE MERGED WITH AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT LANDINGS LANGUAGE, AS INITIALLY SUGGESTED BY THE EAST AND SOME NNA DELS, MAY BE RETURNED TO LATER.

BEGIN TEXT.

THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES IN A PARACHUTE ASSAULT BY AIRBORNE FORCES IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSEMS.

THIS MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION WHENEVER THE PARACHUTE DROP INVOLVES AT LEAST . . .

END TEXT. BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05724
 SUBJECT: CDE: ROMANIAN OAR IN CDE WATERS; UNIDIR DIRECTOR
 LIVIU BOTA

1. CDE XI -
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: IN STOCKHOLM TO ASSESS THE POSSIBILITIES OF A CDE AGREEMENT, AMBASSADOR KONSTANTIN ENE, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SECTION IN THE ROMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY, DISCUSSED ROMANIAN PERCEPTIONS OF SOVIET POSITIONS IN CDE WITH USDEL DEPUTY AMBASSADOR HANSEN. HAVING PREVIOUSLY BEEN IN MOSCOW TO CONVEY A MESSAGE FROM CEAUSESCU TO GORBACHEV ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF A POSITIVE OUTCOME IN STOCKHOLM, ROMANIANS RECEIVED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE THE POLITICAL DECISIONS NECESSARY TO OBTAIN A CDE AGREEMENT. ENE REPORTED SOVIETS INDICATED A NUMERICAL THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATIONS OF GROUND FORCES BETWEEN L2 AND L8 THOUSAND AS WELL AS ACCEPTANCE OF INSPECTION WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF CDE AGREEMENT. CEAUSESCU IS PREOCCUPIED WITH CSCE PROCESS AND PROGRESS TOWARD REALIZATION OF A CDE PHASE II IN ANSWER TO THE BUDAPEST APPEAL. LIVIA BOTA IS ALIVE AND WELL. END SUMMARY.
4. ACCORDING TO ENE, PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU DEVOTES A PART OF EVERY WEEK TO ASSESSING THE POSSIBILITIES OF AN AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM. THIS PREOCCUPATION HAD RESULTED IN A VISIT BY ENE TO MOSCOW TO CONVEY TO THE SOVIETS THE IMPORTANCE OF A POSITIVE OUTCOME IN STOCKHOLM. THE ONLY SOVIET OFFICIAL IDENTIFIED BY NAME WITH WHOM THE ROMANIANS SPOKE WAS AMBASSADOR MENDELEVICH, BUT ENE WAS IMPRESSED THAT THE POLITICAL DECISIONS HAVE BEEN MADE IN MOSCOW WHICH WOULD FACILITATE AN AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM. WITHOUT PROVIDING DETAILS, ENE MENTIONED THAT INSPECTION IS NO LONGER A PROBLEM, ALTHOUGH DRAFTING CONCRETE TEXT WILL BE DIFFICULT. HE NOTED THAT HE HAD SUGGESTED A NUMERICAL THRESHOLD OF 8000 TROOPS FOR THE NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES WHICH HAD RAISED SOVIET HACKLES AND RESULTED IN THE RETORT THAT THE FINAL FIGURE WOULD BE BETWEEN L2 AND L8 THOUSAND. THE SOVIETS ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO SHOW MORE FLEXIBILITY ON STATIC INFORMATION IN THE CONTEXT OF NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES. ENE TOOK PAINS TO EXPLAIN THAT THE POLITICAL DECISIONS HAD BEEN MADE BUT THAT THERE WAS STILL RESISTANCE IN SOME QUARTERS TO MOVING VERY FAR.
5. ENE CLAIMED CREDIT FOR HAVING DRAFTED THE BUDAPEST APPEAL AND CLAIMED THAT CEAUSESCU WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE NECESSITY FOR CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS TO COMPLEMENT THE IDEAS EXPRESSED BY GORBACHEV IN HIS L5 JANUARY SPEECH ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. WTO DISCUSSIONS HAVE SUGGESTED A GENERAL REDUCTION IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES OF ABOUT 50 BY THE TURN OF THE CENTURY TO

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

MATCH THE DREAM OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT.
(COMMENT: ENE REFERRED TO THIS AS A DREAM,
PROBABLY A ROMANIAN ONE. END COMMENT) WTO
PREFERENCES FOR A FORUM REMAIN A CDE PHASE II AND
THEY UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF A POSITIVE
OUTCOME IN STOCKHOLM, ACCORDING TO ENE. HE OPINED
THAT THE SOVIETS WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY
SENSITIVE TO THE FACT THAT DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE
WOULD INVOLVE ONLY A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF U.S.
FORCES AND NOTHING ON U.S. TERRITORY. HE
PREDICTED THAT THIS ISSUE WOULD LOOM LARGE IN A
CDE DISARMAMENT PHASE.

6. ACCORDING TO ENE, LIVIA BOTA (FORMER DIRECTOR
OF UNIDIR IN GENEVA) RETURNED TO BUCHAREST TO
PARTICIPATE IN A TWO WEEK SEMINAR DEALING WITH
CURRENT INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS. DURING THAT
PERIOD, THE ROMANIAN GOVERNMENT DECIDED BOTA'S
14 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE IN CONNECTION WITH THE
UNITED NATIONS WOULD BE USEFUL IN BUCHAREST AND
THEY OFFERED HIM AN OFFICE DIRECTOR'S JOB IN THE
FOREIGN MINISTRY. BOTA ACCEPTED THE OFFER AND
HIS UNIDIR RESIGNATION WAS DRAFTED IN ENE'S
OFFICE. FOR REASONS WHICH ENE DID NOT ELABORATE,
BOTA'S RESIGNATION WAS MISINTERPRETED AND MADE AN
ISSUE BY THE MEDIA. IN TURN, THE ROMANIAN
GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD BOTA CHANGED AND
HARDENED. ENE INSISTED THAT WHEN THE WHOLE ISSUE
COOLS DOWN, THINGS WILL BE WORKED OUT. IN THE
MEANTIME, BOTA IS ALLEGEDLY WORKING FOR THE
FOREIGN MINISTRY IN BUCHAREST. BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05725
 SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS: 11TH ROUND

1. CDE XI -
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT: AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE PENULTIMATE ROUND OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE A SIGNIFICANT AGREEMENT APPEARS TO BE WITHIN REACH. DESPITE ALLIED SQUABBLES AND SOVIET FOOTDRAGGING, DRAFTING HAS PROGRESSED, PARTICULARLY IN THE KEY AREA OF NOTIFICATION. THUS, THE CONTOURS OF A POSSIBLE CDE ACCORD ARE CLEAR: A SOLID FORECASTING MEASURE, NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES BASED ON A COMBINED STRUCTURAL/NUMERICAL PARAMETER, A SUBTHRESHOLD FOR FUNCTIONALLY RELATED AIR ACTIVITIES, A SUBSTANTIAL OBSERVATION REGIME, LIMITED INSPECTION AND INFORMATION AND A NON-USE OF FORCE SECTION REFLECTING A WESTERN APPROACH TO SECURITY. A STOCKHOLM CONCLUDING DOCUMENT WILL NOT INCLUDE: NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR OR NAVAL ACTIVITIES OR OF TRANSITS THROUGH THE ZONE, OR A SEPARATE CONSTRAINTS MEASURE. WHILE THE OUTLINES OF THE AGREEMENT ARE VISIBLE, THE RESULTS ARE NOT GUARANTEED. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS COMMITTED TO A CDE AGREEMENT BECAUSE THEY KNOW THEY CAN'T GET AN ARMS REDUCTION CDE II WITHOUT IT, THE MILITARY IN PARTICULAR IS DRAGGING ITS FEET IN THE DRAFTING PROCESS. THIS WILL BE PARTICULARLY TRUE ON INSPECTION: OVER THE PAST WEEKS, MOSCOW HAS ACCEPTED BOTH THE PRINCIPLE OF INSPECTION AND ITS POSSIBLE IMPLEMENTATION IN THE CDE CONTEXT ON AN "EXPERIMENTAL BASIS." TRANSLATING THESE SOVIET PRONOUNCEMENTS INTO THE CONCRETE MODALITIES NEEDED FOR AN EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION REGIME WILL BE LIKE PULLING TEETH. OTHER UNRESOLVED ISSUES REMAIN, SUCH AS ESTABLISHING A REGIME WHICH INCLUDES NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE NEW ZONE, I.E., MOST OF THE EUROPEAN PART OF THE SOVIET UNION. WHILE RESOLVING THESE AND OTHER ISSUES WILL ENTAIL HARD BARGAINING, NOT LEAS: OF WHICH WITH OUR ALLIES, WE BELIEVE A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION MAY BE ATTAINABLE. STAY TUNED. END SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT.
4. NOTIFICATION: IN THE FINAL WEEK OF THE CONFERENCE, FOLLOWING MITTERAND'S TRIP TO MOSCOW, THE SOVIETS FINALLY BEGAN TO MOVE ON THE KEY ISSUES OF TYPES OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND, TO A LESSER DEGREE, ON GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE SOVIETS AGREED TO NOTE LANGUAGE ACCEPTING THE SUBTHRESHOLD APPROACH FOR AIR ACTIVITIES, I.E., INCLUDING INFORMATION ON THE PARTICIPATION OF AIR FORCE ACTIVITIES IN A NOTIFIABLE LAND FORCE ACTIVITY AS PART OF THE NOTIFICATION OF THE NOTIFIABLE LAND FORCE ACTIVITY. IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH US, SOVIET MILREP TATARNIKOV

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

SKETCHED OUT THE PRELIMINARY OUTLINES OF THE NOTIFICATION MEASURE: SEPARATE PARAGRAPHS FOR GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES, GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS, AIR ACTIVITIES, AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES, AIRBORNE ACTIVITIES, AND TRANSFERS. (AT THE FINAL PLENARY MEETING THE SOVIETS SUGGESTED 200 SORTIES AS THE "AIR" SUBTHRESHOLD AND WE COUNTERED BY OFFERING TO GO LOWER STILL.) IN KEEPING WITH THIS STRUCTURE, SEPARATE TEXTS ON AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS AND AIRBORNE ASSAULTS (PARACHUTE DROPS) ALSO WERE NOTED DURING THE FINAL WEEK OF THE ROUND. THE SOVIETS HAVE DROPPED TRANSITS AND TRANSFERS BUT ARE INSISTING ON SEPARATE NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE TRANSFER; IN FACT THEY ARE LINKING A SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM TO A SOLUTION OF INSPECTION.

ON GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS, THE SOVIETS FINALLY AGREED TO WORK ON THE BASIS OF THE LIKO (NNA) FORMULA, WITH ITS STRUCTURAL, NUMERICAL AND EQUIPMENT (TANK) ELEMENTS; HOWEVER, THEY RESIST ANY ELEMENT IN THE STRUCTURAL PORTION OF THE FORMULA WHICH WOULD IMPLY THAT A SINGLE DIVISION EXERCISE MIGHT BE INCLUDED, THEY ALSO ARE MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THEY WILL NOT COME DOWN AS LOW AS 12,000 IN THE NUMERICAL SECTION. MEANWHILE THE FRG MAKES ALMOST DAILY PLEAS TO US TO DROP THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH ENTIRELY AND SO FAR A STRICTLY NUMERICAL PARAMETER.

5. INFORMATION: ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS ARE PREPARED TO SWALLOW THE BITTER PILL OF INSPECTION IN STOCKHOLM, THEY WILL GIVE US LITTLE AS POSSIBLE ON INFORMATION. IN PARTICULAR, THEY HAVE TOLD US THAT THE ONLY ELEMENT OF STATIC INFORMATION WE THOUGHT FEASIBLE - LOCATION OF DIVISION HEADQUARTERS PROVIDED IN NOTIFICATION - IS "AS DIFFICULT A QUESTION FOR THEM AS AIR TRANSFERS ARE FORCES." AND THEY HAVE BEEN SAYING THAT THEY WILL NEVER AGREE TO THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT - PRESUMABLY BECAUSE IT IMPLIES THAT "NORMAL LOCATION" OF EVENTS WILL HAVE TO BE MOVED. MEASURE I - THE INDEPENDENT INFORMATION MEASURE - WAS BURIED THIS WEEK WHEN IN THE AGREED FRG-UK DEMARCHE TO GRINEVSKY WE SAID NATO WOULD NOT INSIST ON IT IF WE GOT NORMAL LOCATIONS OF PARTICIPATING UNITS AT DIVISION LEVEL AND ABOVE.

GRINEVSKY OFFERED LITTLE ENCOURAGEMENT THAT WE WOULD.

6. VERIFICATION: IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO SKETCH THE OUTLINES OF THE VERIFICATION MEASURE FROM THE SCANT FEW SENTENCES WHICH HAVE BEEN AGREED TO DATE. WHILE SOME DRAFTING WAS ACCOMPLISHED THIS ROUND ON A FRAMEWORK FOR VERIFICATION, THE EAST WORKED TO HINDER DRAFTING BY INSISTING ON A DELETERIOUS DISCUSSION OF FORMS OF VERIFICATION. RECENT SOVIET SIGNALS, HOWEVER, FROM BOTH WITHIN THE CONFERENCE AND MORE IMPORTANTLY IN SOVIET-FRENCH BILATERALS CONTACTS, HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGING. PARTICULARLY DURING THE

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

GORBACHEV-MITTERAND MEETINGS IN MOSCOW, THE SOVIETS INDICATED THAT THEY ARE NOW PREPARED TO ACCEPT BOTH THE PRINCIPLE OF ON-SITE INSPECTION FOR CSBM'S AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION ON AN EXPERIMENTAL BASIS DURING THIS PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE. IN HIS JULY 18 PLENARY STATEMENT, GRINEVSKY ESSENTIALLY OFFERED TO DRAFT AN INSPECTION MEASURE "IF OTHERS WOULD DROP INSISTENCE ON MEASURES WHICH WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT OUR SECURITY INTERESTS." WHAT HE HAS IN MIND ARE ISSUES LIKE OUT-OF-GARRISON, STATIC INFORMATION, AND TRANSFERS. WE CAN FORESEE THE BROAD OUTLINES OF A VERIFICATION MEASURE AS HAVING: TWO "FORMS" OF VERIFICATION -- INSPECTION WITH NO RIGHT OF REFUSAL AND NTM'S; ONE INSPECTION REQUEST PER YEAR PER STATE; AND SOME FORM OF PASSIVE QUOTA ON HOW MANY INSPECTIONS A STATE MUST ACCEPT PER YEAR; IN THE CONTEXT OF OVERALL COMPLIANCE WITH ALL MEASURES, WE CAN FORESEE SOME FORM OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT THAT CLARIFICATIONS CUM CONSULTATIONS (WHICH CANNOT BE USED TO BLOCK OR DELAY A REQUEST FOR INSPECTION) CAN PLAY A ROLE. PERHAPS THE MOST DIFFICULT TASK BEFORE US WILL BE PINNING DOWN THE DETAILED MODALITIES REQUIRED TO MAKE INSPECTION EFFECTIVE (E.G., AIR AND/OR GROUND INSPECTION, UNRESTRICTED ACCESS, AUTHORIZED EQUIPMENT, ETC.). THIS EFFORT WILL REQUIRE CONTINUED ALLIANCE UNITY IF THE EAST IS TO BE CONVINCED THAT NATO WILL NOT ACCEPT A PURELY COSMETIC INSPECTION REGIME. IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT WE ARE SINGING FROM THE SAME SHEET OF MUSIC, HOWEVER, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO RESOLVE SOME LINGERING INTRA-ALLIANCE DIFFERENCES, CHIEF AMONG THESE IS THE HANDLING OF RESTRICTED AREAS. MEANWHILE THE NNA ARE BECOMING MORE INTERESTED IN PLAYING A ROLE IN THE INSPECTION PROCESS AS "GUARANTORS OF NON-ABUSE "(I.E., OBSERVERS) OR FACILITATORS (I.E., PROVIDERS OF THE AIRCRAFT)

7. OBSERVATION: THE OBSERVATION MEASURE IS THE MOST DEVELOPED IN THE CONFERENCE TO DATE. THE EAST HAS ACCEPTED THAT OBSERVERS WILL BE INVITED FROM ALL PARTICIPATING STATES AND HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE THE TYPE OF DETAILED BRIEFINGS AND UPDATES TO OBSERVERS NATO HAS SOUGHT. ADDITIONALLY, MOST OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS OF THE OBSERVATION REGIME HAVE BEEN WORKED OUT. PROBLEMS REMAIN, HOWEVER, IN SEVERAL IMPORTANT AREAS. WHILE THE EAST HAS DROPPED ITS EARLIER PROPOSAL FOR A QUOTA ON OBSERVATIONS, IT HAS YET TO ACCEPT THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE THAT OBSERVERS WILL BE INVITED TO ALL NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES. THE EAST IS HOLDING OUT UNTIL THE THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION IS DECIDED, CLAIMING IT FEARS TOO GREAT AN ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN IF THE THRESHOLD IS LOW (AS DO SEVERAL NATO DELEGATIONS) BUT, MORE LIKELY, BECAUSE THE SOVIETS WANT TO AVOID PERMITTING OBSERVATION IN THE NEW PART OF THE CDE ZONE.

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

WE SUSPECT THAT IF THE NUMERICAL ELEMENT OF THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD WERE RELATIVELY HIGH THE EAST WOULD PROBABLY ACCEPT UNIVERSAL OBSERVATION BECAUSE THE GREATER PART OF THE NEW ZONE PROBABLY WOULD NOT BE CAPTURED, BUT THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO ACCEPT IT AT OUR FIGURE OF 10,000. AS OBTAINING OBSERVATION IN THE INTERIOR MILITARY DISTRICTS OF THE USSR IS A REQUIREMENT FOR THE FRG IN PARTICULAR, THIS COULD PROVE TO BE A SIGNIFICANT HURDLE IN THE FINAL ROUND. IN REGARD TO REDUCING THE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN OF A LOW NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD, THE MOST PROMISING APPROACH SEEMS TO BE A LIMITATION ON THE DURATION OF OBSERVATION (TIED TO WHEN THE ACTIVITY EXCEEDS THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL, ITS ACTIVE PHASE, OR A COMBINATION OF BOTH), WHICH COULD REDUCE THE BURDEN WITHOUT REQUIRING A HIGHER NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD OR A SEPARATE OBSERVATION TRIGGER. IN ADDITION, THE WEST WILL HAVE TO PRESS THE EAST HARD ON SCOPE OF OBSERVATION, I.E., WHAT THE OBSERVERS WILL ACTUALLY SEE OR DO, IF THE OBSERVATION REGIME IS TO BE MEANINGFUL. THE PROBLEM OF TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE OBSERVED HAS BEEN ALLEVIATED SOMEWHAT BY THE AGREEMENT TO INCLUDE INFORMATION ON AIR IN THE GROUND FORCE NOTIFICATION, WHICH SHOULD ELIMINATE EASTERN DEMANDS FOR A SEPARATE OBSERVATION PROGRAM FOR AIR ACTIVITIES. FINALLY, _____ PROGRESS WILL ALSO BE HAMPERED UNTIL THE THE BROADER CONFERENCE PROBLEM OF HOW TO DEAL WITH RESTRICTED AREAS, SENSITIVE POINTS, ETC. IS RESOLVED.

8. ANNUAL FORECASTS: PROGRESS ON THE ANNUAL CALENDAR WAS LIMITED THIS ROUND ALTHOUGH SOME AREAS OF CONVERGENCE WERE DEFINED. LANGUAGE WHICH PROVIDED FOR THE TYPE AND DESIGNATION, THE CHARACTER AND GENERAL PURPOSE AND THE NAME OF THE STATES PARTICIPATING IN THE ACTIVITY WAS NOTED. EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION ON BOTH THE AREA OF A MILITARY ACTIVITY AND ITS DURATION SAW NO FLEXIBILITY ON THE PART OF THE EAST WHO REMAIN OPPOSED TO PROVIDING GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES TO DEFINE THE LOCATION OF A MILITARY ACTIVITY OR TO PROVIDING PLANNED STARTING AND ENDING DATES. WE EXPECT A TOUGH UPHILL BATTLE TO GET ANY REASONABLY DETAILED INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE CALENDAR. THE EAST WILL BE HARD PRESSED TO AGREE TO ANYTHING OTHER THAN GENERAL OR AMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE IN THE CONTENT OF THE ANNUAL FORECAST. FURTHERMORE, WE EXPECT PARTICULARLY TOUGH OPPOSITION IN THE FIGHT FOR INFORMATION ON HEADQUARTERS' LOCATIONS AND THE DESIGNATION OF DIVISIONS AND BRIGADES/REGIMENTS. OUR CAUSE WILL BE AIDED LITTLE BY THE NNA. ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE ENDORSED A REASONABLY DETAILED CALENDAR, THEY HAVE DEMONSTRATED LITTLE RESOLVE IN DEFENDING THEIR PROPOSAL.

9. CONSTRAINTS: THE ROUND WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY THE JULY 10 NNA PROPOSAL: CEILINGS ON THE NUMBER AND SIZE OF

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

NON-FORECAST MILITARY ACTIVITIES (AIMED AT TRAINING ALERTS.) THE EAST, OVER THE PAST WEEK AND IN THE CLOSING PLENARY, HAS INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO DRAFT ON THE BASIS OF THIS PROPOSAL. ALTHOUGH EASTERN DELEGATES HAVE PAID LIP-SERVICE TO MORE TRADITIONAL CONSTRAINTS, WE BELIEVE THAT THEIR ATTENTION TO THE NNA PROPOSAL INDICATES A SIGNIFICANT EVOLUTION IN THEIR POSITION. THEY ARE NOW FOCUSING ON THE CONSTRAINING ELEMENTS OF THE CALENDAR. NATO HAS ENGAGED IN A LIMITED EXCHANGE ON THE DETAILS OF THE NNA PROPOSAL. HOWEVER, THERE HAS NOT BEEN EVEN AS MUCH AS A SUBTLE INDICATION THAT THE WESTERN POSITION ON MEASURES OF CONSTRAINT HAS SOFTENED.

10. NON-USE OF FORCE: A NON-USE OF FORCE SECTION IS EMERGING WHICH REFLECTS THE WESTERN APPROACH TO SECURITY, INCLUDING LANGUAGE ON COMPLIANCE, TERRORISM AND THE ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE PRINCIPLE. CONSEQUENTLY, THE EAST SEEMS TO BE LOSING ITS APPETITE FOR THE NUF MAIN COURSE SINCE THE MENU HAS BEEN REWRITTEN BY THE NNA AND THE WEST. THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE, IN FACT, IS CONSPICUOUS BY HIS FREQUENT ABSENCES DURING NUF DRAFTING. THE SOVIETS INSIST PRIVATELY THAT THEIR ONLY SINE QUA NON IS SOME REFERENCE TO THE DANGER OF "MILITARY FORCE." WE HAVE REJECTED THIS DEVELOPMENT OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE. LANGUAGE WAS NOTED THIS ROUND TYING THE NUF REAFFIRMATION TO THE ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF CONCRETE CSBM'S, TO THE UN CHARTER AND TO THE ERGA OMNES PRINCIPLE. BASED ON NATO'S APPROACH OF FLEXIBLE PARALLELISM NUF LANGUAGE HAS AND ONLY WILL BE NOTED WHEN THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL DRAFTING PROGRESS IN THE CSBM'S WORKING GROUP. FINALLY, THE U.S., WITH ALLIED SUPPORT, HAS BEGUN TO PUSH FOR A STRONG HUMAN RIGHTS SECTION. AT THE LAST PLENARY THE SOVIETS PUBLICLY STATED WHAT THEY HAVE BEEN PRIVATELY HINTING FOR THE LAST FEW WEEKS: THEY COULD ACCEPT A HUMAN RIGHTS PASSAGE; HOWEVER, IT IS UNCLEAR WHAT SORT OF SECTION THEY CAN ACCEPT AND AT WHAT PRICE, E.G., IN EXCHANGE FOR A REFERENCE TO "MILITARY FORCE."

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 05776

SUBJECT: NOTED TEXTS FOR ALL WORKING GROUPS

THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF ALL THE LANGUAGE THAT HAS BEEN REGISTERED IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK FOR ALL WORKING GROUPS AT CDE.

BEGIN TEXT:

A-1 (NON-USE OF FORCE):

...THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE IS, AS A SUBSTANTIAL AND INTEGRAL PART OF THE MULTILATERAL PROCESS INITIATED BY THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, TO UNDERTAKE, IN STAGES, NEW, EFFECTIVE AND CONCRETE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO MAKE PROGRESS IN STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND IN ACHIEVING DISARMAMENT, SO AS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO 'HE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL. ... (3/11/86)

THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZ.. THAT THE ADOPTED SET OF MU'UALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBMS, WHICH ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MADRID MANDATE, BY THEIR SCOPE AND NATURE AND BY THEIR IMPLEMENTATION SERVE TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THUS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE. (5/20/86)

...THE PARTICIPATING STATES, RECALLING THEIR OBLIGATION TO REFRAIN, IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL, FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, ACCORDINGLY REAFFIRM.. THEIR COMMITMENT TO RESPECT AND PUT INTO PRACTICE THE PRINCIPLE OF REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, AS LAID DOWN IN THE FINAL ACT. (6/17/86)

THEY WILL ABIDE BY THEIR COMMITMENT TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH ANY STATE, REGARDLESS OF THAT STATE'S POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC OR CULTURAL SYSTEM AND IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER OR NOT THEY MAINTAIN WITH THAT STATE RELATIONS OF ALLIANCE. (7/8/86)

A-2 (INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, COMMUNICATION):

THE CONFIDENCE-AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES TO BE AGREED UPON WILL BE PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION WHICH CORRESPOND TO THEIR CONTENT... .

(2/26/86)

ANY PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH HAS DOUBTS AS TO ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREED CSBMS WILL BE ALLOWED TO... (4/30/86)

THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH REQUESTS...WILL STATE THE REASONS FOR SUCH A REQUEST. (4/30/86)

THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH HAS RECEIVED SUCH A

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

REQUEST WILL...WITHIN THE AGREED PERIOD OF TIME. ...
(5/7/86)

THE REQUEST WILL BE ADDRESSED TO THE PARTICIPATING
STATE(S) ON WHOSE TERRITORY IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION
FOR CSBMS COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREED CSBMS IS IN DOUBT.
... (6/11/86)

THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH REQUESTS... WILL SPECIFY
THE AREA WHERE... (7/2/86)

A-3 (ANNUAL CALENDAR AND CONSTRAINTS):

EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL EXCHANGE, WITH ALL
OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, AN ANNUAL CALENDAR OF ITS
NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES, WITHIN THE ZONE OF
APPLICATION FOR CSBMS, FORECASTED FOR THE SUBSEQUENT
CALENDAR YEAR. IT WILL BE TRANSMITTED EVERY YEAR, IN
WRITING, THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, NOT LATER
THAN...FOR THE FOLLOWING YEAR. ...

TO BE DEFINED (3/6/86)

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 04 STOCKHOLM 05776
STATE FOR EUR/RPM DAVID JOHNSON AND PM/TMP STAN WEEKS
SUBJECT: NOTED TEXTS FOR ALL WORKING GROUPS

EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL LIST THE
ABOVE-MENTIONED ACTIVITIES CHRONOLOGICALLY AND WILL
PROVIDE INFORMATION ON EACH ACTIVITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE FOLLOWING MODEL: ... (5/22/86)

- TYPE OF MILITARY ACTIVITY AND ITS DESIGNATION
- GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PURPOSE OF THE MILITARY
ACTIVITY
- NAMES OF THE STATES INVOLVED IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
... (7/3/86)

B-1 (NOTIFICATION):

THE PARTICIPATING STATE WILL GIVE...IN WRITING THROUGH
DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS IN AN AGREED FORM OF CONTENT, TO ALL
OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES...DAYS OR MORE IN ADVANCE OF
THE START OF NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES...

...WILL BE GIVEN BY THE PARTICIPATING STATE ON WHOSE
TERRITORY THE ACTIVITY IN QUESTION IS PLANNED TO TAKE
PLACE EVEN IF THE FORCES OF THAT STATE ARE NOT ENGAGED
IN THE ACTIVITY OR THEIR STRENGTH IS BELOW THE
NOTIFIABLE LEVEL. THIS WILL NOT RELIEVE OTHER
PARTICIPATING STATES OF THEIR OBLIGATION TO GIVE..., IF
THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE PLANNED MILITARY ACTIVITY
REACHES THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL.

TO BE DEFINED (3/4/86)

UNDER THE TERMS OF THE MADRID MANDATE, THE ZONE OF
APPLICATION FOR CSBMS IS AS FOLLOWS:

ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY OF RIGHTS, BALANCE AND
RECIPROCITY, EQUAL RESPECT FOR THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF
ALL CSCE PARTICIPATING STATES, AND OF THEIR RESPECTIVE
OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE, THESE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WILL COVER THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AS WELL AS THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE. THEY WILL BE OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE AND POLITICALLY BINDING AND WILL BE PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION WHICH CORRESPOND TO THEIR CONTENT.

AS FAR AS THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE IS CONCERNED, THE MEASURES WILL BE APPLICABLE TO THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF ALL THE PARTICIPATING STATES TAKING PLACE THERE WHENEVER THESE ACTIVITIES AFFECT SECURITY IN EUROPE AS WELL AS CONSTITUTE A PART OF ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE WITHIN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AS REFERRED TO ABOVE, WHICH THEY WILL AGREE TO NOTIFY. NECESSARY SPECIFICATIONS WILL BE MADE THROUGH THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AT THE CONFERENCE.

NOTHING IN THE DEFINITION OF THE ZONE GIVEN ABOVE WILL DIMINISH OBLIGATIONS ALREADY UNDERTAKEN UNDER THE FINAL ACT. THE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES TO BE AGREED UPON AT THE CONFERENCE WILL ALSO BE APPLICABLE IN ALL AREAS COVERED BY ANY OF THE PROVISIONS IN THE FINAL ACT RELATING TO THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND CERTAIN ASPECTS OF SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT.

 IN THIS CONTEXT, THE NOTION OF ADJOINING SEA AREA IS UNDERSTOOD TO REFER ALSO TO OCEAN AREAS ADJOINING EUROPE. HEREINAFTER THE ABOVE MENTIONED WILL BE REFERRED TO AS "THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS". (3/11/86)
 THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL GIVE...IN WRITING THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS IN AN AGREED FORM OF CONTENT, TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES...DAYS OR MORE IN ADVANCE OF THE START OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.
 ...WILL BE GIVEN BY THE PARTICIPATING STATE ON WHOSE TERRITORY THE ACTIVITY IN QUESTION IS PLANNED TO TAKE PLACE EVEN IF THE FORCES OF THAT STATE ARE NOT ENGAGED IN THE ACTIVITY OR THEIR STRENGTH IS BELOW THE
 UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 04 STOCKHOLM 05776
 STATE FOR EUR/RPM DAVID JOHNSON AND PM/TMP STAN WEEKS
 SUBJECT: NOTED TEXTS FOR ALL WORKING GROUPS
 NO'IFIABLE LEVEL. THIS WILL NOT RELIEVE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES OF THEIR OBLIGATION TO GIVE..., IF THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE PLANNED MILITARY ACTIVITY REACHES THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL.

 TO BE DEFINED (3/11/86)
 MILITARY ACTIVITIES...CONDUCTED IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS AT OR ABOVE THE LEVELS DEFINED BELOW, WILL BE NOTIFIED. (5/13/86)
 ...WILL BE GIVEN IN WRITING IN THE FOLLOWING AGREED

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

FORM OF CONTENT:

...

- THE DESIGNATION OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
 - THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
 - THE NAMES OF THE STATES INVOLVED IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
 - ...OF COMMAND, ORGANIZING AND COMMANDING THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
- ... (6/13/86)

...

- CHANGES, IF ANY, IN RELATION TO INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR REGARDING THE ACTIVITY
- RELATIONSHIP OF THE ACTIVITY TO OTHER NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES. (6/24/86)

THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES IN AN AMPHIBIOUS ... LANDING ... IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS. THIS MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO ... WHENEVER THIS LANDING ... INVOLVES AT LEAST ... (7/15/86)

THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORMATIONS OF LAND FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES... CONDUCTED UNDER A SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH ANY POSSIBLE AIR OR NAVAL COMPONENTS. THIS MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION WHENEVER...

THE PARTICIPATION OF AIR FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE NOTIFICATION IF IT IS FORESEEN THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE ACTIVITY... OR MORE SORTIES BY AIRCRAFT, EXCLUDING HELICOPTERS, WILL BE FLOWN.

IN THIS CONTEXT, THE TERM LAND FORCES INCLUDES AMPHIBIOUS, AIRMOBILE AND AIRBORNE FORCES. (7/16/86)

THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES IN A PARACHUTE ASSAULT BY AIRBORNE FORCES IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS. THIS MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION WHENEVER THE PARACHUTE DROP INVOLVES AT LEAST ... (7/18/86)

B-2 (OBSERVATION):

A PARTICIPATING STATE WILL INVITE OBSERVERS FROM ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES TO...

THE HOST STATE WILL EXTEND THE INVITATIONS IN WRITING THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES AT THE TIME OF NOTIFICATION.

EACH PARTICIPATING STATE MAY SEND UP TO TWO OBSERVERS TO THE MILITARY ACTIVITY TO BE OBSERVED.

REPLIES TO THE INVITATION WILL BE GIVEN IN WRITING NOT LATER THAN...DAYS AFTER THE ISSUE OF THE INVITATION. IF THE INVITATION IS NOT ACCEPTED IN TIME IT WILL BE ASSUMED THAT NO OBSERVERS WILL BE SENT. (2/27/86)

OBSERVERS WILL BE PROVIDED EQUAL TREATMENT AND OFFERED EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES TO CARRY OUT THEIR FUNCTIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

(3/6/86)

THE INVITING STATE MAY DELEGATE SOME OF ITS
UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 04 STOCKHOLM 05776
STATE FOR EUR/RPM DAVID JOHNSON AND PM/TMP STAN WEEKS
SUBJECT: NOTED TEXTS FOR ALL WORKING GROUPS
RESPONSIBILITIES AS HOST TO ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE
ENGAGED IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY ON THE TERRITORY OF THE
INVITING STATE. IN SUCH CASES, THE INVITING STATE WILL
SPECIFY THE ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES IN ITS
INVITATION TO OBSERVE THE ACTIVITY. (3/13/86)

THE PARTICIPATING STATES ACCEPTING AN INVITATION WILL
PROVIDE THE NAMES AND RANKS OF THEIR OBSERVERS IN THEIR
REPLY TO THE INVITATION. (3/13/86)

THE INVITED STATE MAY DECIDE WHETHER TO SEND MILITARY
AND/OR CIVILIAN OBSERVERS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF ITS
PERSONNEL ACCREDITED TO THE HOST STATE. (4/17/86)

THE HOST STATE WILL PROVIDE OBSERVERS WITH
TRANSPORTATION TO THE AREA OF THE NOTIFIED ACTIVITY AND
BACK. THIS TRANSPORTATION WILL BE PROVIDED FROM EITHER
THE CAPITAL OR ANOTHER SUITABLE LOCATION TO BE ANNOUNCED
IN THE INVITATION, SO THAT OBSERVERS ARE IN A POSITION
BEFORE THE START OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME. (4/24/86)

THE HOST STATE WILL PROVIDE OBSERVERS WITH APPROPRIATE
MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION IN THE AREA OF THE MILITARY
ACTIVITY. (4/24/86)

THE HOST STATE WILL GUIDE THE OBSERVERS IN THE AREA OF
THE MILITARY ACTIVITY. (4/24/86)

THE INVITED STATE WILL COVER THE TRAVEL EXPENSES FOR ITS
OBSERVERS TO THE CAPITAL, OR ANOTHER SUITABLE LOCATION
SPECIFIED IN THE INVITATION, OF THE HOST STATE, AND
BACK. (5/1/86)

TOGETHER WITH THE INVITATION THE HOST STATE WILL PROVIDE
A GENERAL OBSERVATION PROGRAMME, INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING
INFORMATION:

- ...
- THE DATE, TIME AND PLACE OF ASSEMBLY OF OBSERVERS;
- PLANNED DURATION OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME;
- LANGUAGES TO BE USED IN INTERPRETATION AND/OR
TRANSLATION;
- ARRANGEMENTS FOR BOARD, LODGING AND TRANSPORTATION OF
THE OBSERVERS;

- ...

- ...

(6/26/86)

THE OBSERVERS WILL BE GRANTED, DURING THEIR MISSION, THE
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES ACCORDED TO DIPLOMATIC AGENTS
IN THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

(7/3/86)

A' THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME GIVE A
BRIEFING OF THE PURPOSE, THE BASIC SITUATION, THE PHASES
OF THE ACTIVITY AND POSSIBLE CHANGES AS COMPARED WITH

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

THE NOTIFICATION AND PROVIDE THE OBSERVERS WITH A DAILY SCHEDULE AS WELL AS A SKETCH INDICATING THE BASIC SITUATION. (7/3/86)

IN THE COURSE OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME GIVE THE OBSERVERS DAILY BRIEFINGS WITH THE HELP OF MAPS ON THE VARIOUS PHASES OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND INFORM THE OBSERVERS ABOUT THEIR POSITIONS GEOGRAPHICALLY ...

... (7/3/86)

THE HOST STATE WILL PROVIDE OBSERVERS WITH APPROPRIATE BOARD AND LODGING IN A LOCATION SUITABLE FOR CARRYING OUT THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME AND, WHEN NECESSARY, MEDICAL CARE. (7/17/86). END TEXT. BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05862
SUBJECT: US/USSR CDE CONSULTATIONS: RIDGWAY-GRINEVSKY
MEETING

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT
2. BEGIN SUMMARY. ASSISTANT SECRETARY RIDGWAY AND US CDE AMBASSADOR BARRY MET WITH SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR ON JULY 23 TO DISCUSS THE PROSPECTS OF A STOCKHOLM AGREEMENT. BOTH BARRY AND GRINEVSKY WERE GUARDIDLY OPTIMISTIC. THE DISCUSSION COVERED THE ROLE OF THE CDE IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS, AND KEY ISSUES IN THE DRAFTING OF THE CDE DOCUMENT, PARTICULARLY VERIFICATION/INSPECTION. END SUMMARY.
3. ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS RIDGWAY MET WITH SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR OLEG GRINEVSKY IN US CDE AMBASSADOR BARRY'S OFFICE ON JULY 23 TO DISCUSS THE PROSPECTS OF A CDE AGREEMENT. GRINEVSKY WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HIS INTERPRETER ANDREI GROSHEV; JIM WHITLOCK, ACTING DIRECTOR EUR/NE, AND USDEL MEMBER JON GUNDERSEN WERE ALSO PRESENT.
4. AFTER INITIAL PLEASANTRIES, BARRY SUGGESTED THAT HE AND GRINEVSKY SHOULD GIVE RIDGGWAY A "FRESH OBJECTIVE AND UNPREJUDICED" JOINT BRIEFING ON WHERE WE ARE IN STOCKHOLM. GRINEVSKY BEGAN BY PLACING THE CDE IN THE LARGER INTERNATIONAL PROSPECTIVE. GRINEVSKY SAID THAT A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME IN STOCKHOLM WOULD HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT NOT ONLY IN EUROPE, BUT IN THE LARGER EAST/WEST FRAMEWORK AS WELL AS IN US SOVIET BILATERAL RELATIONS. HE ARGUED THAT STOCKHOLM WAS A LOGICAL LINK TO LARGER US/USSR DISARMAMENT CONCERNS. MORE SPECIFICALLY, GRINEVSKY STATED THAT A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME IN STOCKHOLM WOULD BE A MAJOR STEP TOWARD A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE WHICH COULD LEAD TO A DISARMAMENT PHASE WITHIN THE CSCE PROCESS, I.E., CDE PHASE II. FINALLY, GRINEVSKY SAID THAT HE SAW A REAL POSSIBILITY FOR SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM BECAUSE: 1) THE ISSUES HERE ARE NOT AS SENSI'IVE AS THE ISSUES IN US SOVIET BILATERAL DISARMAMENT TALKS IN GENEVA. 2) THE CDE HAS ALREADY ESTABLISHED COMMON GROUND ON MOST OF THE RELEVANT ISSUES AND 3) THE MAJORITY OF PARTICIPATING STATES HERE INCLUDING THE US HAVE DEMONSTRATED THE POLITICAL WILL FOR A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.
5. RIDGWAY RESPONDED BY THANKING GRINEVSKY FOR HIS POSITIVE OVERVIEW ON THE PROSPECTS IN STOCKHOLM. SHE MAINTAINED THAT THE FOCUS OF THESE DISCUSSIONS MUST BE ON THE KEY QUESTIONS THAT APPEAR IN THE BROAD RANGE OF EAST/WEST NEGOTIATIONS SUCH AS VERIFICATION/INSPECTION. SINCE THERE WILL BE A US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL AGENDA FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, SHE ARGUED, WE MUST RESOLVE THESE KEY ISSUES IN A SATISFACTORY MANNER IN STOCKHOLM.
6. BARRY NOTED THAT THE IMPORTANT POLITICAL DECISIONS NECESSARY TO ATTAIN AN AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM HAVE

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

ALREADY BEEN 'AKEN BY THE US AND USSR. THE MAIN PROBLEM NOW IS THE LACK OF TIME REMAINING AND THE FACT THAT ALL THE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES JEALOUSLY GUARD THEIR RIGHTS AT THE CONFERENCE. FOR EXAMPLE, BARRY POINTED TO THE DIFFICULTY OF GETTING THE OTHER STATES TO EVEN AGREE ON AN EXTENSION OF WORK DURING THIS INTERSESSIONAL BREAK. BARRY ALSO SAID THAT DRAFTING ON SUCH ISSUES AS NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION, TRANSFERS, AND PARTICULARLY INSPECTIONS, WOULD REQUIRE A CONCERTED EFFORT ON THE PART OF ALL DELEGATIONS.

7. IN RESPONSE TO RIDGWAY'S QUESTION ON HOW BEST TO ATTAIN THE DESIRED RESULTS, BARRY SUGGESTED THAT NOTIFICATION ISSUES SHOULD BE RESOLVED ASAP. HE ADDED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT SOVIET CONCERNS REGARDING THE TRANSFER QUESTION COULD BE RESOLVED. ADDRESSING RIDGWAY'S QUERY, GRINEVSKY SUGGESTED THAT STOCKHOLM SHOULD NOW BE THE FOCUS OF DECISIONMAKING ON THE REMAINING KEY ISSUES. THE NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES WAS THE HEART OF THE PROBLEM, ACCORDING TO GRINEVSKY. IF THIS IS RESOLVED SATISFACTORILY, ALL OTHER RELATED QUESTIONS COULD BE RESOLVED. HE LIKENED THE QUESTION OF PARAMETERS, E.G., STRUCTURAL, NUMERICAL OR EQUIPMENTS, TO A RUBIKS CUBE; IT IS A QUESTION OF FINDING THE RIGHT COMBINATION. REGARDING OTHER KEY NOTIFICATION ISSUES, GRINEVSKY SAID THAT THE ISSUE OF TRANSFERS WAS A SENSITIVE ONE FOR BOTH THE US AND THE USSR NATIONS. GRINEVSKY STATED THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO RAISE THIS QUESTION OPENLY, THEREBY CONCENTRATING PUBLIC ATTENTION ON THE ISSUE. HE IMPLIED THAT THIS QUESTION COULD BE RESOLVED QUIETLY BEHIND THE SCENES. GRINEVSKY ADDED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE US PROBLEM REGARDING TRANSITS AND SUGGESTED THAT THIS PROBLEM COULD BE DROPPED IF TRANSFERS WERE RESOLVED. FINALLY, HE STATED THAT THE KEY UNRESOLVED QUESTION IN CONNECTION WITH INSPECTION IS WHAT MILITARY ACTIVITIES WILL BE NOTIFIED. GRINEVSKY OFFERED TWO REASONS FOR THIS ASSERTION: 1) THERE MUST BE A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THESE ACTIVITIES ARE SO NO FUTURE BODY COULD START BLAMING EACH OTHER FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT. (THE OUTF-GARRISON CONCEPT, GRINEVSKY NOTED, DOES NOT MAKE IT CLEAR WHAT ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE NOTIFIED.) 2) IT IS NECESSARY TO HAVE A CLEAR IDEA OF THESE MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN ORDER TO KNOW WHAT TO INSPECT.

8. BARRY ARGUED THAT DISCUSSION OF INSPECTION AND NOTIFICATION SHOULD PROCEED SIMULTANEOUSLY. BARRY ADDED THAT WE WERE ABLE TO RESOLVE THE AIR QUESTION INDEPENDENT OF RESOLVING ALL QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE NOTIFICATION OF GROUND ACTIVITIES, AND SUGGESTED THAT THE SAME SIMULTANEOUS APPROACH COULD APPLY REGARDING THE ABOVE ISSUES.

9. THE DISCUSSION BECAME SOMEWHAT MORE ANIMATED WHEN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

GRINEVSKY STATED THAT THERE NEEDS TO BE A US POLITICAL DECISION ON QUESTIONS OF WHAT TO NOTIFY IN ORDER 'O DETERMINE WHAT ACTIVITIES ARE TO BE INSPECTED. HE SAID I' WAS "ABNORMAL" THAT THE CONFERENCE COULD NOT EVEN DISCUSS OPENLY HOW MANY PEOPLE, WHAT SORT OF STRUCTURE, HOW MANY TANKS, ETC., OR EVEN USE THE WORD "NOTIFICATION" IN DRAFTING. GRINEVSKY WENT ON TO ARGUE THAT THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH, IN EFFECT, DEPENDED ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF NUMERICAL PARAMETERS. FOR EXAMPLE, HE SAID THAT IF WE AGREED ON AN 18,000 NUMERICAL PARAMETER THIS WOULD IMPLY A CERTAIN STRUCTURE; A 9,000 PARAMETER IMPLIES ANOTHER STRUCTURE. THEREFORE, PLACING STRUCTURE FIRST WAS, IN GRINEVSKY'S VIEW, "NONSENSE."

10. RIDGWAY THEN ASKED WHAT WAS ON THE MALTESE AGENDA. BARRY SAID HE DID NOT EXPECT MALTA TO REPEAT ITS HELSINKI PERFORMANCE, BUT VALETTA'S ACTIONS WERE ALWAYS DIFFICULT TO PREDICT. GRINEVSKY ALSO THOUGHT THAT MALTA'S APPROACH HAD CHANGED. HE ADDED THAT MALTA WAS INTERESTED IN THE FORMULA FOR POSTPONING NAVAL ACTIVITIES AND THAT VALETTA COULD NOT DROP THIS QUESTION COMPLETELY. BARRY SAID HE PRESUMED THAT THE ANSWER TO THIS "DEFERRAL" PROBLEM WOULD BE FOUND IN A CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT WHICH DID NOT SINGLE OUT ANY ISSUE; THEN EACH COUNTRY WOULD MAKE A UNILATERAL STATEMENT ON ITS OWN PET ISSUE AND OTHERS WOULD CHIME IN WITH THEIR COMMENTS

11. THIS CABLE HAS NOT BEEN CLEARED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY RIDGWAY.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 05863

SUBJECT: CDE: LATEST SOVIET POSITIONS

1. - SECRET- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: BASED ON A JULY 23 BARRY-GRINEVSKY CONVERSATION, DEBRIEFS OF ALLIED CONTACTS WITH GRINEVSKY AND USDEL CONTACTS WITH SOV DEL, WE OFFER A SNAPSHOT OF THE SOVIET POSITION ON THE CENTRAL ISSUES OF CDE. WE CAUTION THAT THE PICTURE CHANGES AS NEGOTIATIONS PROGRESS. PARTICULARLY ON INSPECTION, SOVIET THINKING IS IN A STATE OF FLUX.

3. VERIFICATION:

--SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF INSPECTION IN THIS PHASE OF CDE IS LINKED TO THE WESTERN POSITION ON OUT-OF-GARRISON AND TRANSFERS.

--THE REASON FOR THE LINKAGE TO OOG IS THAT THE SOVIETS FEAR THAT WE WOULD USE OOG TO JUSTIFY INSPECTIONS OF ANOMALOUS EVENTS LIKE THE CHERNOBYL CLEANUP.

--THERE MUST BE A CLEAR DEFINITION OF NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES BEFORE INSPECTION LANGUAGE CAN BE DRAFTED; THE SOVIET LIST WOULD INCLUDE GROUND AND COMBINED ARMS EXERCISES, AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS, AIRBORNE DROPS, TRANSFERS AND MOVEMENTS. ALL OF THESE COULD BE INSPECTED, EVEN THE AIR COMPONENT OF A COMBINED ARMS EXERCISE.

--THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A PASSIVE QUOTA; THE SOVIET POSITION IS 1-2 INSPECTIONS A YEAR.

-- THE USSR HAS NO INTEREST IN A RIGHT OF REFUSAL, BUT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A CLOSED AREA/SENSITIVE POINT REGIME. THE SC-1 APPROACH TO THIS "DOES NOT LOOK BAD"; THE USSR WOULD NOT BE INTERESTED IN EXCHANGING LISTS OF SENSITIVE POINTS.

--REASONS FOR AN INSPECTION REQUEST WOULD HAVE TO BE CITED; THIS WOULD BE PART OF THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS.

--BUT INSPECTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE PROMPT; THE KIND OF TIME FRAMES CONTAINED IN SC-1 SEEM GENERALLY IN LINE.

--BOTH AIR AND GROUND MODALITIES ARE ACCEPTABLE AND IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE INSPECTING STATE TO CHOOSE; IT ALSO MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE INSPECTING STATE TO DETERMINE WHERE IN THE DESIGNATED INSPECTION AREA INSPECTORS VISIT (SENSITIVE POINTS EXCLUDED.)

INSPECTION MODALITIES SHOULD BE DISTINGUISHED FROM OBSERVATION MODALITIES.

--BUT THE INSPECTED STATE WOULD HAVE TO SUPPLY THE AIRCRAFT: "THERE WOULDN'T BE TIME" FOR NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT TO GET TO THE SCENE.

--LIKewise THERE IS LITTLE SOVIET INTEREST IN THE IDEA OF NEUTRAL OBSERVERS OF THE INSPECTION PROCESS; SELECTING AND GATHERING THEM WOULD BE TOO MUCH OF A PROBLEM.

--IT SHOULD BE UP TO EACH INSPECTING STATE TO DECIDE HOW TO TREAT AN INSPECTION REPORT - "RAISE A SCANDAL OR

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

THROW IT AWAY." THERE IS NO PARTICULAR SOVIET INTEREST IN EX POST FACTO CONSULTATIONS.

--INSPECTION SHOULD BE CALLED INSPECTION, NOT SOME EUPHEMISM.

--THE SOVIET DELEGATION IS "THINKING" ABOUT THE TRADEOFF IMPLICIT IN SPECIFYING VARIOUS MEANS OF VERIFICATION IN RETURN FOR SPECIFYING THE INSPECTED STATE'S RIGHT TO CHOOSE AND USE WHATEVER MEANS IT SELECTS.

--SOVIET THINKING IS DETERMINED MORE BY THE WESTERN PROPOSAL ON INSPECTION SC-1 THAN BY THE SOVIET MODEL IN MBFR.

--DRAFTING ON INSPECTION CAN ONLY BE ACCOMPLISHED IN A SMALL GROUP, NOT IN A 35 NATION WORKING GROUP.

3. NOTIFICATION:

--SOVIET INSTRUCTIONS ARE TO RESOLVE THE STRUCTURAL AND NUMERICAL ELEMENTS OF THE GROUND FORCE PARAMETER TOGETHER; THEY CANNOT DROP THEIR INSISTENCE ON 2 OR MORE DIVISIONS UNLESS THEY ARE SURE THAT THE NUMBER IS HIGH ENOUGH TO PROTECT SINGLE DIVISION EXERCISES.

--MUCH OF SOVIET FEAR OF THE NNA NOTIFICATION FORMULAS WHICH IMPLICITLY OR EXPLICITLY IDENTIFY REGIMENTS AS THE UNIT OF ACCOUNT STEMS FROM FEAR THAT THE WEST WILL INSIST ON DESIGNATION AND NORMAL LOCATIONS OF PARTICIPATING REGIMENTS. ASSURANCES THAT THIS IS NOT THE CASE "HAVE HELPED" THEM TO ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF UNITS."

4. INFORMATION:

--ALTHOUGH READY TO ACCEPT INSPECTION, THEY WILL NOT ACCEPT THE IDEA OF "STATIC INFORMATION" - I.E. DESIGNATION AND HEADQUARTERS LOCATION OF DIVISIONS.

5. TRANSFERS:

--IN RETURN FOR DROPPING TRANSITS, THE SOVIETS INSIST ON INCLUDING TRANSFERS IN THE NOTIFICATION REGIME. THEY MIGHT BE PREPARED TO INCLUDE INFORMATION ON TRANSFERS IN THE NOTIFICATION OF LARGER EXERCISES RATHER THAN ASKING FOR SEPARATE NOTIFICATION.

--BUT THEY ALSO WANT NOTIFICATION OF THE PERMANENT STATIONING OF NEW UNITS ABOVE THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL IN THE ZONE ("TO TAKE CARE OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT WE WILL SEND TWO SIBERIAN ARMIES TO POLAND.")

6. MOVEMENTS:

--BECAUSE THEY ARE UNWILLING TO ACCEPT THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT OR ITS NNA VERSION "NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATION," THE SOVEITS STILL INSIST ON A SEPARATE NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS WITHIN THE ZONE ABOVE THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL.

--THEY SAY THEY ARE PREPARED TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ABOUT SUCH MOVEMENTS OF THEIR OWN AND PERMIT OBSERVATION AND INSPECTION OF SUCH MOVEMENTS (PROVIDED THAT THEY ARE ABOVE THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL.)

BARRY

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05875

SUBJECT: JOCKEYING ON THE SOVIET DELEGATION

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE MAJOR SOVIET ACTORS ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES -- THE PARTY, THE KGB AND THE MILITARY -- HAVE OFTEN BEEN COMPARED TO THE LEGS OF A STOOL: WHENEVER ONE LEG THREATENS TO UNBALANCE THE STOOL BY TRYING TO PREDOMINATE, THE OTHER TWO COMBINE FORCES TO BRING IT DOWN. THE CDE NEGOTIATIONS, A MILITARY-SECURITY FORUM WHERE POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS ALSO ARE IMPORTANT, IS A USEFUL MICROCOSM IN WHICH TO STUDY THE PRESENT JOCKEYING FOR POWER IN MOSCOW BY THE PARTY, THE KGB AND THE MILITARY IN THE CONTENTS OF GORBACHEV'S "NEW WAY OF THINKING" ON ARMS CONTROL. BASED ON WHAT WE HAVE OBSERVED HERE, IT APPEARS TO US THAT THE POLITICAL (PARTY) LEADERSHIP, REPRESENTED HERE BY THE MFA, HAS JOINED FORCES WITH THE KGB AND THAT THE MILITARY IS FIGHTING AN AGGRESSIVELY DEFENSIVE BATTLE INTERNALLY WITHIN THE SOVIET DELEGATION AS WELL AS EXTERNALLY IN THE CONFERENCE. AT DIFFERENT TIMES DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS, DELEGATION HEAD GRINEVSKY AND GENERAL STAFF REP TATARNIKOV HAVE APPEARED TO HOLD THE UPPER HAND. THIS HAS BEEN REFLECTED PARTICULARLY CLEARLY DURING THE DRAFTING PHASE IN INCREASING SIGNS OF DIFFERENCES OF STRATEGY AND TACTICS BETWEEN POLITICAL AND MILITARY MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION. HOWEVER, IN THE END GAME NEGOTIATIONS, GIVEN PAST SOVIET BEHAVIOR AND RECENT EVIDENCE THAT MOSCOW WANTS AN AGREEMENT AT STOCKHOLM, WE EXPECT POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS TO PREVAIL. IN OUR VIEW, THE GENERAL STAFF WILL CONTINUE TO RESIST MAKING COMPROMISES ON SUBSTANCE, BUT IN THE END WILL KNUCKLE UNDER WITHOUT SURRENDERING. RATHER, IT WILL TRY TO SET THE STAGE FOR RE-FIGHTING THE BATTLES IT LOSES HERE BY PROPOSING (AS THE PRICE THE CONFERENCE HAS TO PAY FOR THESE COMPROMISES) THAT "UNRESOLVED" ISSUES BE DEFERRED UNTIL THE NEXT PHASE. END SUMMARY.

3. THE MAJOR SOVIET ACTORS ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES -- THE PARTY, THE KGB AND THE MILITARY -- HAVE OFTEN BEEN COMPARED TO THE LEGS OF A STOOL: WHENEVER ONE LEG THREATENS TO UNBALANCE THE STOOL BY TRYING TO PREDOMINATE, THE OTHER TWO COMBINE FORCES TO BRING IT DOWN. THE CDE NEGOTIATIONS, A MILITARY-SECURITY FORUM WHERE POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS ALSO ARE IMPORTANT, IS A USEFUL MICROCOSM IN WHICH TO STUDY THE PRESENT JOCKEYING FOR POWER IN MOSCOW BY THE PARTY, THE KGB AND THE MILITARY FOR CONTROL OF GORBACHEV'S "NEW WAY OF THINKING" ON ARMS CONTROL. THESE ISSUES RECENTLY CAME TO A HEAD WHEN THE POLITBURO DISCUSSED CDE ISSUES ON JULY 10; THE "NEW THINKERS" SEEM TO HAVE CARRIED THE DAY. WE HAVE HAD TWO AND A HALF YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS IN STOCKHOLM, BOTH BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL. HERE ARE SOME OF THE DELEGATION'S THOUGHTS:

4. THE MAJOR PLAYERS ON THE SOVIET DELEGATION: THE MAJOR

177

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

ACTORS ON THE SOVIET DELEGATION ARE: ON THE POLITICAL SIDE: AMBASSADOR OLEG GRINEVSKY, HEAD OF DELEGATION AND KGB REPRESENTATIVE IVAN ROZANOV. MFA REPRESENTATIVES YURIY RAKHMANINOV, WHO LIMITS HIMSELF TO THE NON-USE OF FORCE, BUT ACTS AS THE ACTING HEAD OF DELEGATION WHEN GRINEVSKY IS AWAY, AND VLADIMIR YEROFEYEV, WHO ACTS AS GRINEVSKY'S TROUBLE-SHOOTER WHEN PERIPHERAL ISSUES THREATEN TO DEADLOCK THE CONFERENCE, PLAY LESSER, IF ANY, ROLES IN DETERMINING POLICY. ON THE MILITARY SIDE: MAJOR GENERAL VIKTOR TATARNIKOV.

5. BACKGROUND: THE RELATIVE INFLUENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THESE THREE INSTITUTIONS HAS WAXED AND WANED OVER TIME, WITH THE MAIN COMPETITION OCCURRING BETWEEN GRINEVSKY AND TATARNIKOV. THE NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE DIVIDED INTO THREE PHASES: 1) THE FIRST YEAR (1984) OF PLENARY MEETINGS SETTING FORTH PARTY LINE POSITIONS WHEN GRINEVSKY WAS THE MAIN DEFENDER OF THE SOVIET POSITION; 2) THE SECOND YEAR (1985) OF WORKING GROUP DEBATES WHEN TATARNIKOV WAS THE MOST VISIBLE SOVIET DELEGATE; AND 3) THE FINAL YEAR (1986) WHEN ACTUAL DRAFTING OCCURRED.

6. IN THE EARLY MONTHS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, DIFFERENCES OF APPROACH BETWEEN GRINEVSKY AND TATARNIKOV WERE NOT APPARENT SINCE GRINEVSKY'S PLENARY STATEMENTS BASICALLY REFLECTED THE PARTY LINE WHICH, IN TURN, REFLECTED THE CONCERNS OF THE GENERAL STAFF. GRINEVSKY'S CONTRIBUTION WAS TO PACKAGE THE AGREED PARTY LINE IN TERMS COMPREHENSIBLE TO WESTERN DELEGATIONS AND PUBLICS. THESE CONCERNS INCLUDED: 1) THE LONG-TERM SOVIET OBJECTIVE OF HAVING A DRDIT DE REGARD OVER NATO DEFENSE DECISIONS THROUGH PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WHICH SEEKS TO DIVORCE U.S. AND EUROPEAN SECURITY CONCERNS BY STRESSING "OUR COMMON (EUROPEAN) HOME"; 2) THE MEDIUM TERM OBJECTIVE OF EXTENDING THE CDE ZONE OF APPLICATION WESTWARD INTO THE ATLANTIC TO CAPTURE U.S. FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS AND REINFORCEMENTS AND TO REDRESS BREZHNEV'S UNILATERAL EXTENSION AT MADRID OF THE ZONE EASTWARD TO THE URALS; AND 3) THE SHORTER TERM OBJECTIVE OF MINIMIZING THE EFFECTS OF ANY CDE CSBM'S ON SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES. IN AN EFFORT TO ACHIEVE THEIR LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE, THE SOVIETS HAVE USED STOCKHOLM AS A PUBLIC FORUM WHERE THEY CAN EXPLOIT EUROPEAN CONCERNS ABOUT "THE ARMS RACE" AND DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. WEAPONS SYSTEMS, SUCH AS PERSHING-2'S, IN EUROPE. THEY HAVE TRIED TO ACHIEVE THE SECOND OBJECTIVE BY DESTROYING THE MADRID MANDATE'S FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO AIR AND THE THIRD BY STALLING ON THE DRAFTING OF SPECIFIC MODALITIES AND OTHER DETAILS ON INDIVIDUAL MEASURES. DURING THIS EARLY STAGE, GRINEVSKY WAS THE MOST VISIBLE MEMBER OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION WITH TATARNIKOV AND ROZANOV (AND HIS STOLID PREDECESSOR IVANOV) NATURALLY IN THE BACKGROUND.

7. HOWEVER, THE CONFERENCE'S TRANSITION IN LATE

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

1985-EARLY 1986 FROM FORMAL PLENARY MEETINGS, WHERE HEADS OF DELEGATION PRESENTED INITIAL NATIONAL AND ALLIANCE NEGOTIATING POSITIONS AND PROPOSALS, TO INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS, WHERE DELEGATIONS WERE REPRESENTED AT A WORKING LEVEL, GAVE THE GENERAL STAFF REPRESENTATIVE A FORUM FOR ARGUING THE MERITS OF SOVIET GENERAL STAFF POSITIONS.

8. THE NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF) GROUP HAS BEEN A SPECIAL CASE, WHERE ONLY THE POLITICAL SIDE OF THE DELEGATION HAS BEEN VISIBLE. EARLY IN THE CONFERENCE RAKHMANINOV WAS VERY VISIBLE IN THE NUF WORKING GROUP WHERE HE PUSHED A NUF TREATY AND NON-FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INSISTED THAT THERE MUST BE EQUAL TREATMENT FOR "POLITICAL-MILITARY" CSBM'S (NUF) AND FOR "MILITARY-TECHNICAL" CSBM'S (EVERYTHING ELSE); IN RECENT MONTHS, ESPECIALLY DURING THE DRAFTING PHASE, HE HAS PRACTICALLY DROPPED OUT OF SIGHT. THIS CAN BE EXPLAINED IN PART BY HIS INADEQUATE COMMAND OF ENGLISH AND PARTLY BY HIS ADMISSION THAT NOW IT IS CLEAR THAT THERE WILL BE A NUF SECTION IN A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT, HE WOULD BE SATISFIED WITH CUTTING AND PASTING LANGUAGE FROM THE HELSINKI ACT. HE MAY EVEN BE SOMEWHAT DISQUIETED BY THE WAY THE WEST HAS TAKEN CONTROL OF THE CONTENT OF THE NUF SECTION, SUPPORTED BY THE NNA AND, ON CERTAIN ISSUES, EVEN TACITLY BY A NUMBER OF EAST EUROPEAN DELEGATIONS. THE ONLY ISSUE HE RAISES NOW IS INCLUSION OF THE TERM "MILITARY" OR "ARMED" FORCE IN THE DOCUMENT. OTHERWISE, HE SITS BACK IN THE DRAFTING SESSIONS WITH A BEATIFIC SMILE ON HIS FACE, CLEARLY NOT UNDERSTANDING THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DISCUSSION AND LETS THE CAPABLE HUNGARIAN DEPUTY (KORMENDY) NEGOTIATE FOR THE EAST.

9. TATARNIKOV, A PRACTICED PUBLIC SPEAKER, INITIALLY REPRESENTED THE SOVIET UNION AT ALL FOUR WORKING GROUPS DEALING WITH MILITARY ISSUES. TATARNIKOV EVEN DOMINATED THE SINGLE WORKING GROUP (A-2 ON INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, COMMUNICATIONS) WHERE ROZANOV REPRESENTED THE USSR. THEN, WHEN THE SOVIETS AGREED TO DISCUSS INFORMATION IN THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION IN B-1, TATARNIKOV STOPPED ATTENDING THE A-2 GROUP, BUT MADE SURE THAT THE GENERAL STAFF'S INTERESTS WOULD BE PROTECTED BY HAVING HIS SUBORDINATE, COLONEL IGOR BOGDANOV, SHARE THE SOVIET SEAT WITH ROZANOV. AS HAS BEEN THE CASE ON SOVIET DELEGATIONS TO U.S.-SOVIET NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL TALKS, TATARNIKOV'S ACCESS TO MILITARY INFORMATION WHICH APPARENTLY WAS NOT AVAILABLE TO OTHER MEMBERS OF HIS DELEGATION FURTHER STRENGTHENED HIS NEGOTIATING POSITION BOTH EXTERNALLY IN THE CONFERENCE AND INTERNALLY VIS-A-VIS OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION AND THE WTO. A FORMIDABLE ADVERSARY, HE WAS SOON SEEN AS THE EASTERN FORCE TO BE RECKONED WITH -- AT TIMES OVERSHADOWING EVEN GRINEVSKY AS ISSUES BECAME INCREASINGLY MILITARY AND HIGHLY TECHNICAL.

179

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

10. THE KGB'S INTEREST, AND THEREFORE ROLE, IN THE CDE NEGOTIATIONS ARE LESS CLEAR-CUT THAN THOSE OF THE GENERAL STAFF. WE ASSUME THAT THEY SEEK TO LIMIT CSBM'S WHICH INCREASE WESTERN INFORMATION ABOUT SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND CONTACTS BY SOVIET CITIZENS, AND ESPECIALLY BY SOVIET SOLDIERS, WITH WESTERN OBSERVERS OR INSPECTORS.

11. EARLY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE KGB WAS REPRESENTED BY A HIGHLY BOMBASTIC, POLEMICAL MAN, BORIS IVANOV, WHO ENDED UP BORING WESTERN REPS WITH HIS FIVE-MINUTE DIATRIBES ON U.S. INF DEPLOYMENTS IN EUROPE AND HIS ZEALOUS SUPPORT FOR SOVIET PROPOSALS WHICH OTHER DELEGATIONS INCREASINGLY SAW AS NON-STARTERS (NON-FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONES AND A EUROPEAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN). PERHAPS EVEN THE SOVIETS SAW THAT THEY HAD REACHED THE POINT OF DIMINISHING RETURNS IN USING IVANOV TO INFLUENCE OTHER DELEGATIONS: IN EARLY 1985 HE WAS REPLACED BY IVAN ROZANOV WHOSE MESSAGE AND NEGOTIATING STYLE WAS MORE SOPHISTICATED AND MORE PALATABLE TO WESTERN DELEGATES.

12. ROZANOV, IN CONTRAST TO HIS PREDECESSOR, WAS WILLING TO SET ASIDE POLEMICS AND TO DISCUSS THE FULL SPECTRUM OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY ISSUES, INCLUDING THOSE WHICH NORMALLY ELICIT A NEURALGIC REACTION FROM SOVIETS, E.G., ON-SITE INSPECTION, INFORMATION. RELATIVELY EARLY ON HE HINTED AT AREAS OF FLEXIBILITY IN THE SOVIET POSITION AND, ON INSPECTION, SAID SEVERAL MONTHS AGO THAT IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS THERE WOULD BE AGREEMENT ON SOME FORM OF ON-SITE INSPECTION. ONLY RECENTLY HAVE THE SOVIETS INDICATED PUBLICLY THAT THIS MAY BE POSSIBLE.

13. AS SOVIET BLOCKAGE OF SUBSTANTIVE DRAFTING BECAME CLEAR FOR ALL TO SEE, ROZANOV EXPRESSED IRRITATION THAT TATARNIKOV, "THE MOST PEDANTIC PERSON ON OUR DELEGATION", WAS THE FOCUS OF ATTENTION AT THE CONFERENCE AND CRITICIZED THE MILITARY IN GENERAL AS "INEPT NEGOTIATORS." IN A SUBSEQUENT MEETING HE SOFTENED HIS CRITICISM BY SAYING THAT WHILE HE ADMIRERED TATARNIKOV AS A COMPETENT MILITARY PROFESSIONAL, THE SOVIET GENERAL HAD VERY NARROW INSTRUCTIONS AND NO LICENSE TO DEVIATE FROM THEM. INTRUSION BY GENERAL STAFF REPRESENTATIVES INTO HIS AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY CLEARLY RANKLES ROZANOV WHO LEFT THE ROOM ONE DAY WHEN BOGDANOV SUBMITTED A PARTICULARLY UNCOMPROMISING TEXT. ROZANOV, MOREOVER, HAS DISTANCED HIMSELF FROM THE GENERAL STAFF'S CONSERVATIVE APPROACH, ARGUING IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS THAT THERE WILL BE NO AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM UNLESS THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES ("POLITIKI") STEP IN AND PREVAIL OVER THE MILITARY REPS WHOSE TASK, IN HIS VIEW, IS TO DEFEND THEIR MILITARY DOCTRINES, NOT TO MAKE THE COMPROMISES NECESSARY TO NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM. ROZANOV HAS PLACED

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

HIMSELF SQUARELY ON THE POLITICAL SIDE OF THE EQUATION AND HAS INITIATED A SERIES OF PERIODIC MEETINGS WITH A USDEL MEMBER TO DISCUSS THE FULL RANGE OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL ISSUES AT THE CONFERENCE.

14. SOVIET BACKPEDALING: WE HAVE OBSERVED ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL DECISIONS APPEARING TO BE UNDERCUT IN THEIR EXECUTION BY MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION. WE RECOGNIZE THAT IT IS COMMON SOVIET NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR TO AGREE TO SOMETHING IN PRINCIPLE IN A GRAND PUBLIC GESTURE AND THEN IN PRIVATE NEGOTIATIONS TO COME UP WITH FINE PRINT WHICH EITHER TAKES THE TEETH OUT OF THE PRINCIPLED AGREEMENT OR INSERTS UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS. HOWEVER, WE THINK THAT THERE IS MORE TO IT THAN THAT. THE SOVIET DELEGATION SEVERAL TIMES HAS RESISTED CARRYING OUT THE SPIRIT AND LETTER OF GORBACHEV'S PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS ON CDE ISSUES. MOREOVER, WITHIN THE SOVIET DELEGATION ITSELF GRINEVSKY AND TATARNIKOV HAVE CONVEYED DIFFERENT MESSAGES IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH WESTERN DELEGATIONS -- AT TIMES EVEN CONTRADICTING EACH OTHER. AND, FINALLY, ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, TATARNIKOV HAS TAKEN INITIATIVES WHICH HAVE BLOCKED PROGRESS IN THE CONFERENCE WITHOUT BOTHERING TO INFORM GRINEVSKY OF HIS ACTIONS. GRINEVSKY HAS BEEN VISIBLY ANGRY WHEN WESTERN DELEGATES HAVE INFORMED HIM OF POSITIONS TAKEN BY TATARNIKOV WITHOUT CONSULTING HIM. SOME EXAMPLES OF SOVIET BACKPEDALLING FOLLOW:

-- GORBACHEV HAS MADE A POINT OF USING FRANCO-SOVIET SUMMITS AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE MUCH-PUBLICIZED CONCESSIONS ON CDE ISSUES. DURING HIS TRIP TO PARIS IN OCTOBER, 1985, GORBACHEV MADE A SPLASH WHEN HE ANNOUNCED THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE INCLUDING NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN AN ANNUAL CALENDAR. WESTERN AND NNA DELEGATIONS VIEWED THIS AS A MAJOR SIGNAL THAT THE SOVIETS WERE READY TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON THE SUBSTANCE OF CSBM'S. HOWEVER, WHEN THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN STOCKHOLM REVEALED THE DETAILS OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, ITS INCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES, IN ADDITION TO GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES, RENDERED THE SOVIET PROPOSAL UNACCEPTABLE.

-- DURING THE RECESS IN JANUARY 1986 GORBACHEV MADE A STATEMENT IN WHICH HE INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD BE WILLING TO POSTPONE NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNTIL THE NEXT PHASE OF THE CDE. UNTIL THAT TIME THE SOVIETS HAD USED INSISTENCE ON INCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES -- WHICH THE WEST AND EVEN MOST OF THE NNA AGREED WERE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE MADRID MANDATE AND, THEREFORE, UNACCEPTABLE -- TO BLOCK PROGRESS IN THE CONFERENCE. WE RETURNED TO STOCKHOLM LATE IN JANUARY EXPECTING THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO IMPLEMENT GORBACHEV'S GESTURE. THIS DID NOT HAPPEN. INSTEAD, THE SOVIET DELEGATION TRIED TO GET LANGUAGE REGISTERED

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

FORMALLY BY THE CONFERENCE TO THE EFFECT THAT ALL NAVAL ACTIVITIES WOULD BE DEFERRED UNTIL THE NEXT PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE, IN WHAT WE INTERPRET AS THE GENERAL STAFF'S ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE WHATEVER FUTURE MANDATE THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING MAY AGREE TO.

-- AT ABOUT THE TIME THE SOVIETS PROPOSED DEFERRING NAVAL ACTIVITIES THEY STARTED PUSHING THEIR NEXT, AND MUCH MORE THORNY, OBSTACLE BY PROPOSING THAT THAT ALL AIR ACTIVITIES -- INCLUDING INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES -- BE NOTIFIED. THE HIGH PARAMETER -- 700 SORTIES -- WHICH THE SOVIETS PROPOSED WAS INTENDED TO CAPTURE THE PRINCIPLE OF INDEPENDENT AIR WHILE NOT ACTUALLY CAPTURING SOVIET AIR ACTIVITIES. SINCE MANY INTERPRET THE "WHOLE OF EUROPE" IN THE MANDATE AS INCLUDING THE AIR SPACE ABOVE EUROPE, IT WAS MUCH MORE DIFFICULT FOR US TO REJECT THIS SOVIET PROPOSAL OUT OF HAND. INSTEAD WE HAD TO ARGUE THAT SUCH ACTIVITIES ARE UNVERIFIABLE. THIS SOVIET-CREATED OBSTACLE BLOCKED PROGRESS ON THE KEY ISSUES OF TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED AND PARAMETERS UNTIL THE FINAL WEEK OF THIS (PENULTIMATE) ROUND. ONCE AGAIN THE SOVIETS USED A FRANCO-SOVIET SUMMIT -- THIS TIME MITTERAND'S JULY VISIT TO MOSCOW -- TO UNVEIL IMPORTANT SOVIET CONCESSIONS. THEY AGREED TO DEAL WITH AIR ACTIVITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES AND ACCEPTED ON-SITE INSPECTION IN PRINCIPLE, THE WEST'S SINE QUA NON FOR AN AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM.

-- HOWEVER, AS THEY MOVED FORWARD ON AIR, TYPES OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS, INDICATING THAT THEY COULD ACCEPT SOME SORT OF COMBINED (STRUCTURAL, NUMERICAL, EQUIPMENT) PARAMETER WHICH WOULD TRIGGER NOTIFICATION, THEY ONCE AGAIN BEGAN PUSHING ANOTHER DIFFICULT ISSUE: TRANSFERS. MOREOVER, IN PUBLIC FOR THE FIRST TIME THEY RAISED THE ISSUE OF TRANSITS -- APPARENTLY AS BARGAINING FAT SINCE, IN PRIVATE, THEY INDICATED THAT IF WE WOULD AGREE TO NOTIFY TRANSFERS SEPARATELY, THEY WOULD DROP TRANSITS.

15. POLITICAL-MILITARY COMPETITION: AS THESE EXAMPLES INDICATE, THE GENERAL STAFF HAS HAD THE PREDOMINANT VOICE IN DETERMINING THE SUBSTANCE OF SOVIET PROPOSALS AT STOCKHOLM AND THE PARTY, REPRESENTED HERE BY GRINEVSKY, HAS PACKAGED AND PROPAGATED THEM. HOWEVER, WHEN PUSH HAS COME TO SHOVE ON SPECIFIC ISSUES, SO FAR POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS HAVE PREVAILED OVER GENERAL STAFF POSITIONS: HOWEVER, THE POLITICAL SIDE APPARENTLY WAS NOT STRONG ENOUGH TO RUN ROUGHSHOD OVER THE GENERAL STAFF WHICH HAS BEEN ABLE TO DELAY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF GORBACHEV'S PROPOSALS BY IMPOSING UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS.

16. RIVALRY BETWEEN GRINEVSKY AND TATARNIKOV: GRINEVSKY'S RELATIONSHIP WITH TATARNIKOV, TO THE EXTENT THAT WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO OBSERVE IT, HAS CHANGED AS THE NATURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE CHANGED: EARLY IN THE

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

NEGOTIATIONS, GRINEVSKY FELT FREE TO MEET WITH HIS U.S. COUNTERPART ALONE TO PRESENT THE GENERAL SOVIET POSITION ON BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY ISSUES. AS ONE WESTERN MILREP OBSERVED RECENTLY, GRINEVSKY'S ROLE DURING THE EARLY MONTHS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WAS TO PRESENT THE GENERAL STAFF'S VIEW IN DIPLOMATICALLY ACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE. TATARNIKOV SIMILARLY MET WITH THE U.S. DEPUTY AND JCS AND OSD REPS TO DISCUSS "MILITARY-TECHNICAL" ISSUE "SOLDIER TO SOLDIER". HOWEVER, AFTER THE CONFERENCE RESUMED IN LATE JANUARY 1986 AND ACTUAL DRAFTING OF COMPROMISE LANGUAGE APPEARED TO BE IMMINENT, GRINEVSKY INSISTED ON HAVING HIS GENERAL STAFF REPRESENTATIVE WITH HIM AT PRIVATE BILATERAL MEETINGS. IN THESE MEETINGS TATARNIKOV, NOT GRINEVSKY, USUALLY HAS SPOKE FOR THE SOVIET SIDE ON MILITARY ISSUES.

17. MORE RECENTLY, SINCE HIS TWO TRIPS TO MOSCOW THIS ROUND, GRINEVSKY SEEMS TO FEEL THAT HE HAS THE UPPER HAND AGAIN. HE AGAIN HAS SUGGESTED PRIVATE MEETINGS WITH HIS U.S. COUNTERPART AND WHEN THE U.S. AND SOVIET AMBASSADORS HAVE MET WITH HANSEN AND TATARNIKOV, GRINEVSKY HAS NOT BEEN CAREFUL TO SEE THAT EVERYTHING IS INTERPRETED FOR TATARNIKOV. ON OCCASIONS WHEN HE APPEARS TO THINK THAT U.S. COMMENTS MAY INFLUENCE HIS INFLEXIBLE MIL REP, E.G., WHEN WE EXPLAINED OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE LIKO FORMULA ON GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS AS A MOVE TOWARD THE SOVIET POSITION, HE DID INSIST ON CAREFUL INTERPRETATION.

18. CONVERSELY, TATARNIKOV HAS SEEMED TO SENSE A CHANGE IN THE WIND FROM MOSCOW AND, APPARENTLY FEARING THAT GRINEVSKY MAY OUTFLANK HIM IF HE HOLDS OUT TOO LONG, HAS NEGOTIATED SERIOUSLY FOR THE FIRST TIME THIS ROUND WITH U.S. ON AIR, GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS, TRANSFERS, ETC. HE HAS BEEN EAGER TO NAIL DOWN AGREEMENT ON THE TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED BEFORE THE OFFICIAL END OF THE SESSION, AGAIN APPARENTLY WORRIED BY WHAT GRINEVSKY MIGHT AGREE TO DURING THE WEEK OF INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS (JULY 21-25) WHICH THE FRENCH AND THE SOVIETS PROPOSED AFTER THEIR RECENT SUMMIT. GRINEVSKY HAS GIVEN TATARNIKOV A FIRST CRACK GO AT DRAFTING COMPROMISE LANGUAGE ON THESE ISSUES, BUT HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WILL REMAIN FOR THE WEEK OF INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS. SINCE TATARNIKOV'S COUNTERPART ON THE U.S. DELEGATION (HANSEN) MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE HAD TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON FOR CONSULTATIONS, THE PRESSURE WAS ON TATARNIKOV DURING THE FINAL WEEK OF THE ROUND TO PROTECT THE GENERAL STAFF POSITION. (IT WAS NOT COINCIDENTAL THAT DURING THE FINAL WEEK, THE CONFERENCE NOTED TEXTS ON GROUND, AIR, AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE ACTIVITIES. TATARNIKOV WAS NOT WILLING TO ACCEPT THE CONDITIONS WE PLACED ON AGREEMENT TO NOTE LANGUAGE ON TRANSFERS.)

19. CONCLUSION: THUS, BASED ON WHAT WE HAVE OBSERVED HERE, IT APPEARS TO US THAT THE POLITICAL (PARTY)

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

LEADERSHIP, REPRESENTED HERE BY THE MFA, HAS JOINED FORCES WITH THE KGB AND THAT THE MILITARY IS FIGHTING AN AGGRESSIVELY DEFENSIVE BATTLE INTERNALLY WITHIN THE SOVIET DELEGATION AS WELL AS EXTERNALLY IN THE CONFERENCE. AT DIFFERENT TIMES DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS, GRINEVSKY AND TATARNIKOV HAVE APPEARED TO HOLD THE UPPER HAND. THIS HAS BEEN REFLECTED PARTICULARLY CLEARLY DURING THE DRAFTING PHASE IN INCREASING SIGNS OF DIFFERENCES OF STRATEGY AND TACTICS BETWEEN POLITICAL AND MILITARY MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION. HOWEVER, IN THE END GAME NEGOTIATIONS, GIVEN PAST SOVIET BEHAVIOR AND RECENT EVIDENCE THAT MOSCOW WANTS AN AGREEMENT AT STOCKHOLM, WE EXPECT POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS TO PREVAIL. IN OUR VIEW, THE GENERAL STAFF WILL CONTINUE TO RESIST MAKING COMPROMISES ON SUBSTANCE, BUT IN THE END WILL KNUCKLE UNDER WITHOUT SURRENDERING. RATHER, THE GENERAL STAFF WILL TRY TO SET THE STAGE FOR RE-FIGHTING THE BATTLES IT LOSES HERE BY PROPOSING (AS THE PRICE THE CONFERENCE HAS TO PAY FOR THESE COMPROMISES) THAT "UNRESOLVED" ISSUES BE DEFERRED UNTIL THE NEXT PHASE .

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 05876

SUBJECT: CDE: SOVIETS ON INSPECTIONS

REFS: A. STOCKHOLM 5425; B. STOCKHOLM 5703

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. ALL SIGNS ARE THAT THE USSR HAS BITTEN THE BULLET AND MADE THE DIFFICULT DECISION TO ACCEPT A LIMITED NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS, IN PRACTICE AS WELL AS PRINCIPLE AND WITH NO RIGHT OF REFUSAL, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CSBMS AGREED HERE IN STOCKHOLM. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET CURRENT PUBLIC POSITION ON INSPECTIONS REMAINS UNACCEPTABLE TO US, FROM A VARIETY OF INDICATORS WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PIECE TOGETHER THEIR PROBABLE FINAL POSITION, ONE WHICH WE WOULD FIND ACCEPTABLE. THE CRITICAL JOB WILL BE DRAFTING MODALITIES TO MAKE AN INSPECTION REGIME EFFECTIVE. END SUMMARY.

3. IN A WORKING GROUP MEETING JULY 9, SOVIET DELEGATE ROZANOV OUTLINED THE FOLLOWING MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE PUBLIC SOVIET POSITION ON INSPECTION/VERIFICATION FOR CSBMS (REF A): (COMMENT: SINCE THIS WORKING GROUP MEETING PRECEDED THE JULY 1 POLITBURO MEETING AT WHICH CDE WAS DISCUSSED AND THE INSPECTION ISSUE PRESUMABLY DECIDED, WE DO NOT THINK MUCH IMPORTANCE SHOULD BE PLACED ON THIS STATEMENT. END COMMENT)

-- ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF ON-SITE INSPECTION IN A CSBMS CONTEXT, BROADLY DEFINED;

-- AGREEMENT TO RECORD THIS PRINCIPLE IN A STOCKHOLM CONCLUDING DOCUMENT IF DIRECTLY LINKED TO IMPLICIT AGREEMENT THAT THERE WILL BE A FUTURE DISARMAMENT/REDUCTION STAGE FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND WEAPONS, AS FORESEEN IN THE WTO BUDAPEST APPEAL;

--DEFERRAL OF THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE TO THIS FUTURE DISARMAMENT/REDUCTION STAGE. PARTICIPATING STATES LACK THE NECESSARY PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE TO IMPLEMENT INSPECTION AT THE STOCKHOLM CSBM STAGE.

-- WHILE DEFERRING PRACTICAL APPLICATION, THE USSR HAS LEFT ROOM FOR EXPERIMENTATION AND TEST RUNS OF INSPECTION EVEN BEFORE THE NEGOTIATION ON, AND ADOPTION OF, DISARMAMENT/REDUCTION MEASURES, I.E. "DURING VIENNA" CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING;

-- ONE OF THE PURPOSES OF SUCH TEST RUNS WOULD BE TO ENSURE THAT THE INSPECTION MODALITIES DEVELOPED WOULD NOT BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR THE TASK OR TOO "STRINGENT."

-- A REFERENCE TO OBSERVATION IN THE CONTEXT OF INSPECTION, I.E. INSPECTION "AS ONE OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE MACHINERY FOR COMPLIANCE AND OBSERVANCE OF CSBMS," AND "INSPECTION AND OBSERVATION OF. . .";

4. IN THE CLOSING PLENARY OF ROUND XI (07/18/86), USSR AMB. GRINEVSKY STATED THAT, IF OTHERS WOULD TAKE SOVIET SECURITY CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT, THE USSR WAS PREPARED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT WESTERN AND NNA COMMENTS THAT THE

SECRET

25X1

PRINCIPLE OF INSPECTION ALONE WAS NOT GOOD ENOUGH (REF B). FROM THIS SPEECH AND SUBSEQUENT CONTACTS WITH SOVIETS AND OTHER EASTERNERS, THE FOLLOWING PICTURE OF THE USSR POSITION IS BEGINNING TO EMERGE:

- THE SOVIETS HAVE, IN FACT, ACCEPTED BOTH PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE OF INSPECTION IN THE STOCKHOLM CDE CONTEXT.
- INSPECTION SHOULD BE APPLIED ON A LIMITED AND EXCEPTIONAL BASIS AND BE TIED CLOSELY TO "REAL" VIOLATIONS, AS OPPOSED TO LESS CONCRETE "DOUBTS." IN THIS CONTEXT, THE ROLE OF CLARIFICATIONS AND/OR CONSULTATIONS WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR THEM, AND THEY MAY SEEK SUCH AN EXCHANGE AS A PRE-CONDITION TO AN INSPECTION.
- THEY SEEM TO BE HEADING FOR A PASSIVE QUOTA OF ONE OR TWO INSPECTIONS TO BE CONDUCTED ON A PARTICIPATING STATE'S TERRITORY PER YEAR.
- THEY CAN ACCEPT A "NO RIGHT OF REFUSAL" REGIME UNDER THE APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES AND, IN THIS CONTEXT, BOTH THE NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS ALLOWED AND THE CRITERIA FOR WHAT AREAS WILL BE RESTRICTED OR EXCLUDED FROM INSPECTION WILL BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT FOR THEM. IN SOME INFORMAL CONTACTS, THEY HAVE INDICATED A NEED FOR LARGE RESTRICTED AREAS, ON THE ORDER OF 20-25 OF A STATE'S TERRITORY. OF THIS TERRITORY, SOME WOULD BE PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED, WHICH WOULD BE ANNOUNCED, AND SOME OF IT DECLARED AS NEEDED AND NOT ANNOUNCED IN DETAIL. IN OTHER CONTACTS, THEY HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE SC.1 APPROACH OF EXCEPTIONS TO THE INSPECTION REGIME WOULD BE ADEQUATE. IN THE COURSE OF AN ACTUAL INSPECTION, THEY SEEM TO ENVISAGE THAT, AS WITH OBSERVERS, INSPECTORS WOULD BE GUIDED BY HOST COUNTRY AND THUS STEERED AWAY FROM SENSITIVE POINTS NOT KNOWN OR PREVIOUSLY DECLARED.
- THEY ENVISAGE DEVELOPING CONCRETE MODALITIES FOR APPLICATION AS PART OF THE CSBM REGIME ADOPTED HERE IN STOCKHOLM, ALTHOUGH THEY WANT TO ALLOW ROOM TO REFINE THE MODALITIES AS NECESSARY. MODALITIES ALONG THE LINES LAID OUT IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED MEASURE 5 MAY HEAD IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. IN A CHANGE OF POSITION, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS HAVE NOW COMPLETELY DISAVOWED THE CONCEPT OF "EXPERIMENTAL" INSPECTION. ROZANV, WHO INTRODUCED THE CONCEPT, TOLD THE FRG ON JULY 23 THAT IF INSPECTION IS AGREED HERE IT WILL NOT BE EXPERIMENTAL.
- THEY ACCEPT AERIAL INSPECTIONS, THOUGH THEY APPARENTLY WANT TO SUPPLY THE AIRCRAFT. SO FAR, THEY HAVE SHOWN LITTLE INTEREST IN THE IDEA OF NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT/NEUTRAL OBSERVERS.

5. COMMENT:

- MOST IMMEDIATELY, SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF INSPECTION AS PART OF A CDE CSBM REGIME OPENS UP THE POSSIBILITY THAT STOCKHOLM WILL, IN FACT, REACH A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME;

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

-- A KEY IN UNLOCKING THE FINAL DOOR FOR INSPECTION MAY LIE IN HOW RESTRICTED/EXCEPTED AREAS ARE RESOLVED, AND HOW THE SOVIETS WANT TO FIT CLARIFICATIONS/CONSULTATIONS INTO THE OVERALL COMPLIANCE REGIME. THE EAST WILL HAVE SUPPORT FROM THE NNA REGARDING A ROLE OF SOME KIND FOR CLARIFICATIONS AND CONSULTATIONS IN AN OVERALL COMPLIANCE REGIME, THOUGH THE MAJORITY OF THE NNA SHARE OUR VIEW THAT NEITHER CLARIFICATIONS NOR CONSULTATIONS CAN SERVE TO DELAY, OR AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR, INSPECTION. AT THIS POINT, MANY NNA ARE LOOKING AT CONSULTATIONS AS A POST-INSPECTION MECHANISM TO SERVE DETERRENT PURPOSES AND TO HOLD PARTICIPATING STATES POLITICALLY ACCOUNTABLE. SOME NNA CLEARLY ENVISAGE SOME KIND OF FOLLOW-UP REPORTS, PARTICULARLY IF REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE RESULTS OF INSPECTION ARE EITHER AMBIGUOUS OR INDICATIVE OF CLEAR VIOLATIONS. WE HAVE MORE SYMPATHY FOR THE CURRENT SOVIET VIEW THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO PRESCRIBED FOLLOW-UP TO AN INSPECTION; EACH INSPECTING STATE WOULD DECIDE FOR ITSELF WHAT TO DO WITH ITS INSPECTION REPORT.

-- THE REFERENCES TO THE WTO BUDAPEST PROPOSAL AND TO THE APPLICABILITY OF INSPECTION FOR CSBMS "IN THE PROCESS OF MONITORING REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS" INDICATE THAT THE EAST IS PURSUING A CDE STAGE II OUTCOME FROM VIENNA BASED UPON ITS BUDAPEST PROPOSAL. THUS CDE SEEMS TO BE THEIR PREFERRED OPTION FOR PURSUIT OF THE BUDAPEST PROPOSAL, AND INSPECTION, A WESTERN CONCEPT AND OBJECTIVE, SERVES AS A LINK FROM STOCKHOLM TO THE NEW FORUM FOCUSING ON REDUCTIONS/DISARMAMENT.

6. SUBSTANCE/STRATEGY/TACTICS. WE HAVE POCKETED THE SOVIET AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO INSPECTION AND INTEND TO POCKET THEIR IMPLICIT AGREEMENT TO OPERATIONALIZE INSPECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF CSBM'S. AS THE SOVIETS TRY TO LINK INSPECTION, AND OTHER CDE ISSUES, WITH THE FUTURE OF CDE, WE HAVE ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT IS UP TO THE CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING(S) TO DECIDE THE FUTURE COURSE OF EVENTS; I.E. WE CANNOT DECIDE IN STOCKHOLM TO MOVE TO A CDE STAGE II WHERE INSPECTIONS WOULD BE FURTHER DEVELOPED.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 05905

SUBJECT: CDE: MORE ON SOVIET POSITIONS

REF: STOCKHOLM 5863

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BASED ON A LENGTHY MEETING BETWEEN SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY AND UK AND FRG AMBASSADORS JULY 24 AND A BRIEF BARRY - GRINEVSKY ENCOUNTER JULY 25, WE HAVE THE FOLLOWING TO ADD TO REFTEL ACCOUNT OF SOVIET POSITIONS:

A. VERIFICATION:

-- EVEN IF A NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT COULD BE PERMANENTLY STATIONED IN A NEARBY NEUTRAL CAPITAL AND KEPT CONSTANTLY AVAILABLE, USSR OBJECTIONS TO AIR INSPECTION BY NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT WOULD NOT BE MET;
-- NOR WOULD IT HELP TO HAVE A SOVIET NAVIGATOR ON BOARD THE NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT TO CONTROL ITS ROUTING AND ALTITUDE UNTIL IT REACHED THE DESIGNATED INSPECTION AREA;
-- ON THE OTHER HAND, INSPECTORS COULD BRING THEIR OWN EQUIPMENT (OF A KIND TO BE MUTUALLY AGREED, INCLUDING PHOTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT) TO USE ABOARD A SOVIET AIRCRAFT;
-- THE USE OF SOVIET HELICOPTERS IN AN AIR INSPECTION IS NOT EXCLUDED.

B. AIR SUB-THRESHOLD:

-- GRINEVSKY REACTED TO BARRY'S PROPOSAL OF AN AIR THRESHOLD OF 100 BY SAYING THAT 200 WAS AS LOW AS HE COULD GO AND THAT "THE FRENCH AND GERMANS HAVE ALREADY ACCEPTED IT."

C. AMPHIBIOUS THRESHOLD:

-- IN RESPONSE TO PRESSURE TO ACCEPT THE NATO THRESHOLD OF 3 BATTALIONS/3,000 TROOPS FOR AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS, GRINEVSKY STUCK WITH 5,000 TROOPS, WHICH, HE CLAIMED, WOULD PROVIDE "A NUMBER" OF NOTIFICATIONS.

D. GROUND FORCE/COMBINED THRESHOLD:

-- GRINEVSKY PROPOSED TO THE BRITISH AND GERMANS A SPLIT-LEVEL NOTIFICATION/OBSERVATION THRESHOLD WITH THE NUMERICAL PART OF THE OBSERVATION THRESHOLD AT 20,000. THEY REJECTED THIS AS WORSE THAN THE CURRENT SOVIET OFFER OF AN 18,000 TROOP COMMON THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION/OBSERVATION.

-- RESPONDING TO BARRY'S COMMENT THAT SOME EAST EUROPEANS HAD SAID THAT MOSCOW COULD ACCEPT A NOTIFICATION PARAMETER OF 10,000 IN THE CONTEXT OF A SPLIT PARAMETER, GRINEVSKY ANGRILY DENIED THAT 10,000 COULD EVER BE A FIGURE;

-- BARRY IN TURN SAID THAT THE US HAD NO INTEREST IN THE SPLIT-LEVEL IDEA AND BELIEVED THAT ALL NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE OBSERVED.

E. MOVEMENTS:

-- GRINEVSKY SAID THAT THE SOVIET APPROACH TO MOVEMENTS WAS BROADER THAN THAT IN SC.7, WHICH ONLY CALLS FOR

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

NOTIFYING MOVEMENTS TO AND FROM THE EXERCISE AREA. THE SOVIET APPROACH WOULD CAPTURE ALL MOVEMENTS OF UNITS OVER THE THRESHOLD IF THE MOVEMENTS WENT FURTHER THAN A CERTAIN DISTANCE.

F. COMMUNICATIONS:

-- THE SOVIETS WILL CALL FOR COMMUNICATIONS THROUGH NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS AND SPECIFICALLY RULE OUT MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CHANNELS "FOR THE PRESENT."

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06370

SUBJECT: CDE--BONN MEETING

1. CDE XII - 002

2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

-

3. SUMMARY: AT THE FRG'S INVITATION, CLOSC ALLIES MET ON 11 AUGUST FOR A WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSION OF CDE ISSUES IN PREPARATION FOR THE FINAL ROUND. THE DISCUSSION FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON NOTIFICATION THRESHOLDS AND INSPECTION. IT SHOULD PROVIDE A BASIS FOR NEXT WEEKEND'S NATO CDE MEETING IN THE HAGUE AND WAS USEFUL AS A NUMBER OF ISSUES/POSITIONS WERE CLARIFIED: ALLIED SUPPORT FOR A COMBINED STRUCTURAL/NUMERICAL NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD WAS SOLIDIFIED; GENERAL CONSENSUS FOR A "TIME CONSTRAINT" WAS ESTABLISHED; AND DIVERGENT ALLIED POSITIONS ON RESTRICTED AREAS AND INSPECTIONS WERE IDENTIFIED. THE DAY-LONG SESSION WAS CHAIRED BY DR. RUDIGER HARTMANN, FRG. OTHER PARTICIPANTS INCLUDED: FRG - AMB KLAUS CITRON, DR. BUERSTEDDE, COL KAHMANN, DR. DUERR; UK - MR. PAUL LEVER, MR. MACKLEY, COL SPEIGHT; FRANCE - AMB PAUL-HENRI GASCHIGNARD, COL MERIC, MR. CARRE; US - AMB ROBERT BARRY, MS WALKER, MS PARRY, MAJ TYO. END SUMMARY.

4. NOTIFICATION: IN INTRODUCING THE SUBJECT OF NOTIFICATION THRESHOLDS, HARTMANN IDENTIFIED SEVERAL FRG OBJECTIVES: 1) TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF NOTIFICATIONS FOR BOTH NATO AND THE WTO OVER THAT PROVIDED UNDER THE FINAL ACT; 2) TO ESTABLISH THE APPLICATION OF A NOTIFICATION/OBSERVATION REGIME IN SOVIET TERRITORY EAST OF THE FINAL ACT'S 250 KM DEMARCATION; 3) TO ENSURE THAT THE FRG DOES NOT PROVIDE THE VAST MAJORITY OF NATO NOTIFICATIONS; 4) TO ESTABLISH A ROUGH BALANCE BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN NOTIFICATIONS; AND 5) TO ENSURE THAT THE NNA ARE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE MORE NOTIFICATIONS THAN UNDER THE FINAL ACT. HE THEN ARTICULATED FRG CONCERNS REGARDING THE CURRENT ALLIED POSITION ON NOTIFICATION: THAT THE FORMULA FOCUSES ON MULTIDIVISIONAL ACTIVITIES ONLY; THAT ALL SOVIET SINGLE DIVISION EXERCISES WOULD BE EXEMPTED; THAT THE WTO AND NATO WOULD BE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE ONLY 5-6 NOTIFICATIONS EACH; AND, THAT ALL NATO NOTIFICATIONS WOULD BE MADE BY THE FRG.

5. THE US ARGUED THAT, IN ITS VIEW, THESE CONCERNS WOULD NOT BE OPERATIVE UNDER THE "AT LEAST TWO MOBILE COMBAT UNITS" FORMULA ENDORSED BY THE ALLIANCE. BOTH THE US AND FRANCE ARGUED THAT STRUCTURE WAS ESSENTIAL FOR VERIFICATION AND ULTIMATELY FOR AN AGREEMENT. FURTHER ELABORATION OF THE FRG INTERPRETATION REVEALED A KEY

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

MISUNDERSTANDING: THE FRG HAD TAKEN THE US FOCUS ON MULTIDIVISIONAL EXERCISES TO MEAN THAT IN THE CURRENT FORMULA "UNITS" REFERRED TO DIVISIONS, RATHER THAN BRIGADES OR REGIMENTS. ALL ALLIES AGREED THAT "UNITS" CANNOT BE INTERPRETED AS DIVISIONS. BASED ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE STRUCTURE REQUIRED BY ANY ACCEPTABLE FORMULA WOULD BE BELOW DIVISIONAL LEVEL, THE FRG DROPPED ALL HINTS THAT NATO SHOULD CONSIDER DROPPING STRUCTURE FROM THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD.

6. THE FRG THEN PRESENTED THE FOLLOWING FORMULA, WHICH WOULD CEMENT THIS UNDERSTANDING VIS-A-VIS STRUCTURE BY USING THE WORDS "BELOW DIVISIONAL LEVEL." BEGIN TEXT:

"THIS MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION WHEN IT INVOLVES AT LEAST TWO COMBAT UNITS WITH MOTORIZED LAND OR AIR OR SEA TRANSPORTATION MEANS BELOW DIVISIONAL LEVEL WHICH MAY BE SUBORDINATED TO MORE THAN ONE DIVISION WITH A TOTAL NUMBER OF AT LEAST 10,000 TROOPS INCLUDING SUPPORT TROOPS OR 250 MAIN BATTLE TANKS." END TEXT. THERE ARE SEVERAL OBVIOUS PROBLEMS WITH THIS TEXT (E.G., "MOTORIZED LAND OR AIR OR SEA TRANSPORTATION MEANS" COULD REQUIRE NOTIFICATION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES; TWO UNITS CANNOT BE SUBORDINATE "TO MORE THAN ONE DIVISION"), BUT IT WAS CLEAR FROM THE DISCUSSION THAT THE GERMAN MOTIVATION IN PRODUCING THIS TEXT WAS TO ESTABLISH AN UNAMBIGUOUS UNDERSTANDING THAT UNITS BELOW THE DIVISION LEVEL, I.E., REGIMENTS AND BRIGADES, ARE THE FOCUS OF OUR FORMULA.

7. A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE CONCEPT OF A DIFFERENTIATED THRESHOLD (LOWER FOR NOTIFICATION THAN OBSERVATION) REVEALED GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT A SINGLE THRESHOLD IS PREFERABLE. A SINGLE THRESHOLD AS HIGH AS 14-15,000, HOWEVER, WOULD NOT BE DESIRABLE. IF NATO PROVED UNSUCCESSFUL IN NEGOTIATING A SINGLE THRESHOLD BELOW THIS LEVEL, ALLIES THOUGHT WE MIGHT THEN WANT TO CONSIDER A SPLIT THRESHOLD WITH THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD LOW ENOUGH TO REQUIRE NOTIFICATION OF ACTIVITIES EAST OF THE 250 KM DEMARCATION IN THE USSR AND THEREBY OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF INSPECTION IN THAT AREA.

8. TURNING TO THE ISSUE OF ESTABLISHING A MINIMUM NUMBER OF NOTIFICATIONS, FRANCE ENDORSED THE CONCEPT OF AGREEING TO A MINIMUM NUMBER OF NOTIFICATIONS AND THE FRG SUGGESTED THAT NATO MIGHT WANT TO CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE: BEGIN TEXT:
"TO ACHIEVE A FAIR AND EQUITABLE OUTCOME, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE DIFFERENT NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

ALLIANCES IN EAST AND WEST, AND THE DIFFERENT MAGNITUDE OF THE MILITARY FORCES OF STATES INVOLVED, THE FOLLOWING AGREEMENT IS ENVISAGED:

IT IS THE COMMON UNDERSTANDING THAT THE THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION AS CONTAINED IN WILL LEAD TO AT LEAST 20 NOTIFICATIONS PER CALENDAR YEAR OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT BY THE RESPECTIVE GROUPS OF COUNTRIES WHICH USED TO HAVE EXERCISE WITH MEMBERS OF THEIR GROUPS DURING THE LAST 5 YEARS."
END TEXT.

THE US AND UK TRIED TO DISSUADE THE FRG AND FRANCE FROM THIS APPROACH, ARGUING THAT WE SHOULD GET AGREEMENT TO THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD WHICH WILL PROVIDE THE NUMBER OF NOTIFICATIONS NATO WANTS, NOT THE REVERSE.

9. IN AN INCONCLUSIVE DISCUSSION OF THE INFORMATION ELEMENTS OF NOTIFICATION AND THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT, THE US AND UK STRONGLY SUPPORTED GETTING AGREEMENT TO INFORMATION ON DESIGNATIONS AND LOCATIONS OF DIVISIONS. THE US SUGGESTED THAT ITS POSITION ON TRANSFERS (OUR WILLINGNESS TO IDENTIFY ARRIVAL BASES WHEN TROOPS BEING TRANSFERRED ARE TO PARTICIPATE IN A NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY) COULD BE USED TO PRESS THE EAST FOR DIVISION LOCATIONS, AS COULD OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER THE EASTERN POSITION ON MOVEMENTS. WHILE ALLIES AGREED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE THE DEMANDEURS ON LANGUAGE HANDLING MOVEMENTS, THE FRG IN PARTICULAR SUGGESTED THIS WAS AN ISSUE ONLY THE US COULD SOLVE. ALTHOUGH ALLIES HAD NO SUGGESTIONS FOR LANGUAGE BETTER IN TERMS OF ALLIANCE INTERESTS THAN OUT-OF-GARRISON, IT WAS RECOGNIZED THAT THE SOVIETS MAY BLOCK PROGRESS IN OTHER AREAS (I.E., INSPECTION) IF NATO REMAINS RIGID IN ITS ENDORSEMENT OF OOG. ALLIES AGREED THAT ANY MODIFICATION IN THE OOG CONCEPT WOULD HAVE TO PROTECT THE US POSITION ON TRANSITS AS WELL AS AVOID COMPLICATING VERIFICATION.

10. IN A BRIEF FORAY INTO THE SUBJECT OF EXCEPTIONS, THERE WAS GENERAL ENDORSEMENT OF THE US IDEA THAT ALERTS SHOULD NOT BE COVERED BY ANY PASSIVE INSPECTION QUOTA. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE DISCUSSION ON NOTIFICATION, THE US AGAIN RAISED WASHINGTON CONCERNS WITH THE PHRASE "SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND" AND ASKED ALLIES TO CONSIDER SUBSTITUTING THE WORDS "COMMON ACTIVITY." ALTHOUGH INITIAL ALLIED REACTION WAS TO RAISE CONCERN THAT NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF WINTEX WOULD BE REQUIRED, ALLIES SEEMED TO RECOGNIZE THE STRENGTH WITH WHICH THE US POSITION IS HELD AND ALL AGREED TO RE-EXAMINE THE ISSUE AND PROVIDE FORMAL REACTIONS IN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

STOCKHOLM.

11. THE LUNCHTIME DISCUSSION FOCUSSED ON TWO PROCEDURAL ISSUES. FIRST, HARTMANN SUGGESTED THAT A SIMILAR MEETING SHOULD TAKE PLACE ON THE FRINGES OF THE 27-28 AUGUST HIGH-LEVEL TASK FORCE MEETING IN BRUSSELS. DESPITE GENTLE US DISCOURAGEMENT (BASED ON THE FACT THAT NO STOCKHOLM REPRESENTATIVES COULD BE PRESENT AT THAT TIME) THE FRG MAY MAKE A FORMAL REQUEST. SECOND, DURING A TOUR DE TABLE REGARDING THE FINAL HANDLING OF A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT, THE US PROPOSED THAT ANY DOCUMENT BE ADOPTED IN STOCKHOLM AND IMPLEMENTED DURING THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE. GENERAL SUPPORT WAS EXPRESSED FOR THIS APPROACH, ALTHOUGH THE PRECISE DATE FOR IMPLEMENTATION WILL NO DOUBT BE A FAVORITE SUBJECT FOR UPCOMING NATO CAUCUS MEETINGS.

12. INSPECTION. UNLIKE THE AMICABLE MORNING SESSION ON NOTIFICATION, THE AFTERNOON DISCUSSION OF INSPECTION REVEALED SIGNIFICANT DIVERGENCIES IN ALLIED VIEWS. HARTMANN'S PRESENTATION OF FRG OBJECTIVES INDICATED THAT THE FRG IS INTERESTED IN A BROAD SYSTEM OF RESTRICTED AREAS CHARACTERIZED BY: 1) RESTRICTED AREAS NOTIFIED IN ADVANCE (EXCHANGED); 2) THE ABILITY TO CHANGE RESTRICTED AREAS WITH ADVANCE NOTICE; 3) INSPECTION WITHIN RESTRICTED AREAS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE PRECLUDED--THE INSPECTED STATE WOULD DECIDE ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS WHETHER OR NOT TO "ACTIVATE" ITS RESTRICTED AREAS; AND 4) VERY LIMITED TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS WHICH WOULD BE HANDLED UNDER THE RUBRIC OF SENSITIVE POINTS. THE FRG ACCOMPANIED THEIR ORAL PRESENTATION WITH THE FOLLOWING FORMULA: BEGIN TEXT.

"FOR THE PURPOSE OF VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH A MILITARY ACTIVITY WHICH IS NOTIFIABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH (M 3), AN INSPECTING STATE IS PERMITTED TO DESIGNATE THE AREA IN WHICH AN INSPECTION IS TO BE CARRIED OUT ON THE TERRITORY OF A PARTICIPATING STATE WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S.

SUCH AN AREA WILL BE REFERRED TO AS A 'DESIGNATED AREA'. THE DESIGNATED AREA WILL INCLUDE, INTER ALIA, TRAINING AREAS AND PUBLIC TERRAIN BUT WILL BE LIMITED TO PLACES WHERE NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES CAN BE CONDUCTED. IN A DESIGNATED AREA, THE INSPECTING STATE WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INSPECTED STATE, BUT THE INSPECTORS WILL BE PERMITTED ACCESS, ENTRY AND UNOBSTRUCTED SURVEY EXCEPT FOR SENSITIVE POINTS OR ACTIVATED RESTRICTED AREAS, NOT INCLUDING TRAINING AREAS. SENSITIVE POINTS WILL BE DECLARED AT LATEST

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

AT THE TIME OF THE INSPECTION. THE INDIVIDUAL SENSITIVE POINT SHOULD NOT EXCEED X SQUARE MILES. RESTRICTED AREAS SHOULD BE AS FEW IN NUMBER AND AS LIMITED IN EXTENT AS POSSIBLE NOT EXCEEDING X PCT OF THE EUROPEAN TERRITORY OF THE PARTICIPATING STATE AND ITS ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS DIRECTLY SUBORDINATED TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PARTICIPATING STATE WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S. RESTRICTIVE AREAS ARE TO BE NOTIFIED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR. ANY CHANGE IN THE NUMBERS OF GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES OF RESTRICTED AREAS IS TO BE NOTIFIED AT LEAST TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE. ACCESS TO RESTRICTED AREAS SHOULD BE PERMITTED UNLESS THE RESTRICTION IS ACTIVATED. THE NOTIFICATION OF ACTIVATION HAS TO OCCUR AT LATEST WHEN A REPLY TO AN INDIVIDUAL INSPECTION REQUEST IS GIVEN." END TEXT.

13. A DISCUSSION OF THE FRG FORMULA INDICATED THAT THE GERMANS ARE UNWILLING TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO A NUMBER FOR THE PERCENTAGE OF PRAS. APPARENTLY, THEY ARE WILLING TO GO AS LOW, OR AS HIGH, AS THE SOVIET UNION. COMMENT: THE FRG SEEMS QUITE WILLING TO HIDE BEHIND THE SOVIET POSITION ON RAS. THE SOVIETS HAVE THUS FAR ONLY TALKED IN TERMS OF FIGURES AS HIGH AS 20-25 PCT. ALTHOUGH THE TURKS HAVE NOT YET CLARIFIED THEIR POSITION WITH US, THEY TOO MAY BE CONTENT TO LAY BACK AND LET THE SOVIETS DRIVE THE

PERCENTAGE OF RAS UP TO AN "ACCEPTABLY" HIGH LEVEL. ONE INTERESTING THRUST IN THE FRG FORMULA IS THEIR USE OF THE PHRASE "ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS." THE GERMANS ARE TRYING TO INSTITUTE A REQUIREMENT THAT THE PERCENTAGE OF RAS WOULD HAVE TO BE EVENLY SPREAD OVER THE SOVIET REPUBLICS IN AN ATTEMPT TO AVOID THE ENTIRE WESTERN MDS FALLING UNDER A RA. END COMMENT.

14. BY WAY OF COMMENT ON THE FRG PROPOSAL, THE US PRESENTED AN OPPOSITE APPROACH: DEFINING WHERE INSPECTION CAN TAKE PLACE, RATHER THAN WHERE IT CANNOT. BY ESTABLISHING A NARROWLY DEFINED UNDERSTANDING OF SENSITIVE POINTS AND AVOIDING THE ISSUE OF PRAS ALTOGETHER, WE COULD AT LEAST RAISE THE POLITICAL COST TO THE SOVIETS OF INVOKING "SENSITIVE POINTS" IN ORDER TO AVOID INSPECTION. COMMENT: OPERATIONALLY, THE TWO OPTIONS OF EITHER COMBINING SENSITIVE POINTS WITH PRAS DECLARED IN ADVANCE OR ALLOWING A NARROW "SENSITIVE POINTS" LOOPHOLE MIGHT BE THE SAME: THE SOVIETS COULD AVOID INSPECTION. THE SECOND OPTION, HOWEVER, WOULD AT LEAST RAISE THE POLITICAL COST TO THE SOVIETS OF USING THE LOOPHOLE. DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT IF WE MUST HAVE PRAS (THE DIRECTION THE FRG AND TURKEY

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

WILL DRIVE US), IT WOULD BE BETTER IF THEY WERE DECLARED IN ADVANCE. OUR CONCERN WITH THIS APPROACH IS THAT WE NOT LEGITIMIZE PRAS SO LARGE AS TO RENDER THE INSPECTION REGIME USELESS. AND THAT WE NOT COMPEL THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A RESTRICTED AREA REGIME WHERE IT HAS NOT HERETOFORE EXISTED. HOPEFULLY, THE "SENSITIVE POINTS" CONCEPT, WHICH COULD BE INVOKED AT THE TIME OF INSPECTION, WILL SUFFICE FOR MANY PARTICIPATING STATES. END COMMENT.

15. THE UK PREFERENCE REMAINS FOR NO PRAS; HOWEVER, IF WE MUST HAVE THEM THE UK WOULD PREFER AN EXCHANGE SUCH AS THE FRG PROPOSED. THE DISCUSSION REVEALED SOME FRENCH SUPPORT FOR THE US APPROACH--THEY TOO DISLIKE THE CONCEPT OF RAS IN GENERAL--UNFORTUNATELY FOR DIFFERENT REASONS. THEY INSIST THAT INSPECTORS WILL BE "GUIDED" OR "ACCOMPANIED" AND THEREFORE, WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO GO WHEREVER THEY WANT. FRANCE FURTHER ARGUED THAT WE SHOULD RESERVE A TOUGH POSITION ON INSPECTION FOR DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS, NOT THE CDE. THE US STRONGLY DISAGREED WITH THE

FRENCH APPROACH, ARGUING THAT INSPECTORS ARE NOT OBSERVERS AND MUST HAVE THE "KEYS TO THE CAR." FURTHERMORE, THE PRECEDENTIAL NATURE OF ANY CDE AGREEMENT ON INSPECTION INCREASES THE IMPORTANCE THAT CDE AGREE ONLY TO AN INSPECTION REGIME WHICH WILL WORK. IN RESPONSE TO THE FRG APPROACH, THE US INDICATED IT WAS SKEPTICAL THAT AN EXCHANGE OF PRAS WOULD BE SUPPORTED BY THE CONFERENCE. WE INDICATED THAT THE US COULD LOOK FAVORABLY UPON THE FRG "EXCHANGE" APPROACH ONLY IF THE PERCENTAGE OF PRAS WAS VERY SMALL. THE US WILL NOT SUPPORT THE LEGITIMIZATION OF LARGE PRAS.

16. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING, TWO OTHER TOPICS WERE COVERED BRIEFLY. ON PASSIVE QUOTAS, THE US PROPOSED, AND ALLIES SUPPORTED, THAT THE NNA BE EXCLUDED FROM ANY QUOTA. THAT IS, IF WE NEGOTIATE A PASSIVE INSPECTION QUOTA, NATO WOULD ONLY BE REQUIRED TO ACCEPT A CERTAIN NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS FROM MEMBERS OF THE WTO, AND VICE VERSA, BUT WITHIN THE LIMITATIONS OF THE ACTIVE INSPECTION QUOTA, INSPECTIONS FROM THE NNA WOULD NOT BE COUNTED AGAINST THE PASSIVE QUOTA. ON CONSTRAINTS, THE US PROPOSED THAT NATO ENDORSE A "TIME" CONSTRAINT REQUIRING THAT ACTIVITIES ABOVE 40,000 BE FORECAST TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE. WE ARGUED THAT THIS WILL HELP THE ALLIES DEFUSE THE ISSUE OF CONSTRAINTS, AVOIDING BOTH SUBSTANCE AND A STATEMENT ON THE PRINCIPLE. ALL ALLIES SUPPORTED THE CONCEPT OF TIME CONSTRAINTS ALTHOUGH FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE APPROPRIATE PARAMETERS WILL BE NECESSARY. THE UK AND FRG HAD

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

THE FIGURE 75,000 IN MIND AND HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING
A PROVISION REQUIRING THAT ACTIVITIES UP TO 75,000
COULD BE ADDED TO THE CALENDAR BUT ACTIVITIES ABOVE
75,000 COULD NOT BE ADDED AND WOULD HAVE TO BE
NOTIFIED AS ALERTS IN THE CONTEXT OF A TIME
CONSTRAINT, AND BUILDING ON THE EARLIER US
SUGGESTION THAT ALERTS BE EXEMPTED FROM ANY PASSIVE
INSPECTION QUOTA, THE FRG SUGGESTED THAT NATO
CONSIDER ADDITIONAL OR "PENALTY" INSPECTIONS FOR
ALERTS. COMMENT: THIS IS FIRST FRG CONSIDERATION
OF ANY CONSTRAINT ON NON-FORECAST ACTIVITIES. THEIR
ENDORSEMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF ADDITIONAL INSPECTIONS
IS ALSO NOTEWORTHY. END COMMENT.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 06369
 SUBJECT: CDE ROUND XII: U.S. DELEGATION GOALS
 REF: (A) STATE 018606 (B) STOCKHOLM 5710 (C) STOCKHOLM 3458

1. CDE XII-003. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. BASED ON WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS, AUGUST 7 IG MEETING, DISCUSSION WITH JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AUGUST 8 AND MEETING WITH UK, FRENCH AND FRG AUGUST 11 IN BONN, U.S. DEL BELIEVES THAT ITS GOALS IN THE FINAL ROUND OF CDE SHOULD BE:
 - A. GENERAL:
 WE WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE AN AGREEMENT WHICH MEETS THE GOALS DESCRIBED IN REFTTEL A.
 - B. NOTIFICATION REGIME:
 - ONLY A THRESHOLD BASED ON STRUCTURAL, NUMERICAL AND EQUIPMENT PARAMETERS IS ACCEPTABLE. THE COMBINED THRESHOLD SHOULD FOCUS ON MULTI-DIVISIONAL ACTIVITIES BUT NOT EXCLUDE NOTIFICATION OF DIVISION-LEVEL EXERCISES.
 -
 - TO THAT END, STRUCTURE MUST BE BASED ON 2 OR MORE REGIMENTS/BRIGADES, NOT 2 OR MORE DIVISIONS. NUMERICAL THRESHOLD SHOULD BE LOW ENOUGH TO ENSURE OBSERVATION ON SOVIET TERRITORY; AT LEAST FORECASTING AND NOTIFICATION PROVISIONS MUST COVER ACTIVITIES IN THE SOVIET UNION EAST OF THE FINAL ACT 250 KM DEMARCATION TO PROVIDE A BASIS FOR INSPECTION IN THE NEW ZONE. TANK THRESHOLD SHOULD BE IN RANGE 150-200.
 - SINGLE THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION/OBSERVATION IS GREATLY PREFERABLE TO A SPLIT-LEVEL THRESHOLD; WE WILL EXPLORE LATTER ONLY IF NECESSARY TO ENSURE SOME NOTIFICATION/INSPECTION IN NEW ZONE.
 - THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT AS CURRENTLY FORMULATED REMAINS OUR STRONG PREFERENCE; IF NECESSARY IN ORDER TO PERMIT DRAFTING ON INSPECTION MODALITIES, WE WILL EXPLORE ALTERNATIVES FOR THE SC.1 FORMULATION ON CUT-OF-GARRISON. TO BE ACCEPTABLE, ANY FORMULATION MUST PROTECT TRANSITS AND MUST BE ALL-ENCOMPASSING ENOUGH TO AVOID CIRCUMVENTION. IN THIS CONTEXT, WE WILL ALSO EXPLORE FORMULATIONS ON TRANSFERS AND RESTATIONING TO SEE IF ACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE CAN BE DEVELOPED.
 - WE WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SUBSTITUTE CONCEPT OF "COMMON ACTIVITY" FOR "SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND" IN NOTIFICATION FORMULA.
 - WE WILL ACCEPT AN AIR SUB-THRESHOLD OF 200 SORTIES.
 - WE WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK MAXIMUM ATTAINABLE INFORMATION IN BOTH FORECASTING AND NOTIFICATION MEASURES.
 - C. INSPECTION:
 - AN EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION REGIME MUST BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF ANY STOCKHOLM AGREEMENT. ELEMENTS OF SUCH A REGIME MUST INCLUDE AN EFFECTIVE STRUCTURAL NOTIFICATION/FORECAST THRESHOLD AND EFFECTIVE MODALITIES - I.E. PROMPT ADMISSION OF INSPECTORS TO DESIGNATED AREA, NO BUILT-IN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

DELAY MECHANISMS, SUFFICIENT ACCESS WITHIN THE DESIGNATED AREA, NO RIGHT OF REFUSAL OR, UPON REFUSAL, AUTOMATIC SUSPENSION OF ALL PARTIES' OBLIGATIONS. WE WILL PURSUE BOTH GROUND AND AERIAL INSPECTION.

-- WE WILL SEEK A PASSIVE QUOTA UNDER WHICH NO STATE HAS TO ACCEPT MORE THAN FIVE INSPECTIONS A YEAR FROM MEMBERS OF AN ALLIANCE TO WHICH IT DOES NOT BELONG; WE WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT AN ACTIVE QUOTA OF ONE INSPECTION PER STATE PER YEAR.

-- ON RESTRICTED AREAS, OUR FIRST PREFERENCE IS FOR A FORMULA WHICH DEFINES WHAT CANNOT BE RESTRICTED RATHER THAN WHAT CAN BE (REFTEL B). IF THIS IS NOT NEGOTIABLE, OUR FALLBACK WOULD BE FOR A SENSITIVE POINT/RESTRICTED AREA REGIME WITH MINIMAL PERMANENT RESTRICTED AREAS (E.G. 10 PERCENT OR LESS), NO TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS AND WITH EXCHANGES OF LISTS OF RESTRICTED AREAS (BUT NOT SENSITIVE POINTS, WHICH WOULD BE INDICATED AT THE TIME OF AN INSPECTION).

-- WE WILL NOT ACCEPT ANY VERIFICATION REGIME WHICH MAKES INSPECTION NEGOTIABLE THROUGH A PROCESS OF CONSULTATION OR THROUGH PROVISIONS THAT SUGGEST THAT INSPECTED STATE CAN SUGGEST ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF VERIFICATION TO INSPECTIONS. HOWEVER, IF IT IS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED THAT CHALLENGING STATE HAS THE RIGHT TO USE WHATEVER FORM OF VERIFICATION IT CHOOSES, NTMS MAY BE DESCRIBED AS A MEANS OF VERIFICATION.

-- THE PREFERRED WAY OF DEALING WITH CLARIFICATIONS IS AS PART OF THE COMMUNICATIONS MEASURE OR AS PART OF EACH INDIVIDUAL MEASURE.

-- REFUSAL OF AN INSPECTION TO WHICH A CHALLENGING STATE IS ENTITLED UNDER AGREEMENT SHOULD CONSTITUTE NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT AND RESULT IN AUTOMATIC SUSPENSION OF ALL PARTIES' OBLIGATIONS. CONSENSUS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO REINSTATE OBLIGATIONS. CONSENSUS COULD BE ACHIEVED BY A SITTING CSCE BODY OR AN AD-HOC MEETING OF CSCE AMBASSADORS.

D. FORECASTING:

-- IF THE ALLIES CONCUR, WE WILL SUPPORT A MEASURE TO STRENGTHEN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR BY PROVIDING THAT EXERCISES ABOVE LEVEL OF 40,000 MUST BE NOTIFIED 2 YEARS IN ADVANCE. WE WILL ALSO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF ADDITIONAL INSPECTIONS FOR EXCEPTIONS (I.E. FOR NON-FORECAST ACTIVITIES).

E. OBSERVATION:

-- WE WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE THE POSITION THAT OBSERVATION OF AMPHIBIOUS/AIR PARADROP ACTIVITIES CAN ONLY TAKE PLACE ON LAND AT THE POINT OF INTERSECTION.

F. IMPLEMENTATION:

-- OUR POSITION IS THAT MEASURES AGREED TO BY THE

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE MUST BE ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS BEFORE THE CONFERENCE ADJOURNS. A FIXED DATE FOR IMPLEMENTATION SHOULD BE ALSO AGREED BY CONSENSUS IN STOCKHOLM - E.G. NOV. 15, 1986 TO ALLOW FOR THE EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL CALENDARS FOR 1987 AND FOR NOTIFICATION OF ACTIVITIES WHICH BEGIN IN JANUARY, 1987. IMPLEMENTATION IN VIENNA WILL ESTABLISH THE SUBORDINATION OF THE CDE TO CSCE.

G. DEFERRAL OF ISSUES:

-- FORMULA CONTAINED IN REF C IS THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE WAY OF DEALING WITH ISSUES NOT RESOLVED IN STOCKHOLM -- I.E. NO ISSUES CAN BE SINGLED OUT FOR ATTENTION AT POST-VIENNA CDE. IF, AS EXPECTED, OTHERS MAKE UNILATERAL STATEMENTS PLUGGING THEIR OWN ISSUES, U.S. REP WILL MAKE HIS OWN UNILATERAL STATEMENT IN REBUTTAL.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06449
 SUBJECT: NUF UPDATE
 REF: STOCKHOLM 5776
 1. CDE XII - 004
 2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
 3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS CABLE CONTAINS TEXTS ON SOVEREIGN EQUALITY, COMPLIANCE AND THE PRIMACY OF THE UN CHARTER WHICH ARE RIPE FOR NOTATION AND TEXTS ON TERRORISM AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY CURRENTLY UNDER DISCUSSION. END SUMMARY.
 -
 4. WASHINGTON WILL HAVE SEEN TEXTS ALREADY NOTED ON A PROVISIONAL BASIS IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK (SEE REFTTEL). IN ADDITION TO THOSE TEXTS THE FOLLOWING THREE TEXTS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED IN THE INFORMAL COFFEE GROUP AND MAY BE NOTED AS EARLY AS TUESDAY, AUGUST 19.
 SOVEREIGN EQUALITY:
 "THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECONFIRM.. THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF STATES AND STRESS.. THAT ALL STATES HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW."
 (LANGUAGE BASED ON WESTERN TEXT AND DERIVED FROM HELSINKI FINAL ACT, PRINCIPLE 1, P.78)
 COMPLIANCE:
 "THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL FULFILL IN GOOD FAITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW; THEY ALSO STRESS.. THAT STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR COMMITMENTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CSCE IS ESSENTIAL FOR BUILDING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY."
 (LANGUAGE BASED ON WESTERN AND NNA TEXTS AND DERIVED FROM HELSINKI FINAL ACT, PRINCIPLE 10, P.82)
 (BEGIN COMMENT: WASHINGTON WILL RECALL THAT THE CONCEPTS OF "COMPLIANCE" AND "EQUAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES" WERE ACCEPTED (RELUCTANTLY) IN THE WESTERN TEXT AT U.S. INSISTENCE (THE EARLIER EC-12 TEXT DID NOT CONTAIN THESE ELEMENTS). SOME OF OUR ALLIES ARGUED AT THE TIME THAT THESE CONCEPTS WERE NOT "MARKETABLE" WITH THE EAST OR EVEN THE NNA. THE WORKING GROUP IS NOW CLOSE TO NOTING THESE TEXTS. IN OUR VIEW, THIS EPISODE ONCE AGAIN DEMONSTRATES THE FOLLY OF TRYING TO INCORPORATE AN ANTICIPATED EASTERN RESPONSE IN OUR INITIAL NEGOTIATING POSITION, I.E., PRENEGOTIATIONS. END COMMENT.)
 -
 PRIMACY OF THE UN CHARTER:
 "THE PARTICIPATING STATES CONFIRM.. THAT IN THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ANY TREATY OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER WILL PREVAIL, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 103 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS."

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

(LANGUAGE TAKEN VERBATIM FROM HELSINKI FINAL ACT, P.82)

5. THE FOLLOWING NEW LANGUAGE ON TERRORISM HAS BEEN DISCUSSED IN THE COFFEE GROUP:

WESTERN COMPROMISE PROPOSAL (TABLED BY FRG):

"THE PARTICIPATING STATES CONDEMN.. TERRORISM, INCLUDING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. REAFFIRMING THEIR COMMITMENTS UNDER THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT, THEY EXPRESS.. THEIR DETERMINATION TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM, BOTH AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL AND THROUGH INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. THEY WILL TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN PREVENTING THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES FROM BEING USED FOR THE PREPARATION, ORGANIZATION OR COMMISSION OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING THOSE DIRECTED AGAINST OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES AND THEIR CITIZENS."

(LANGUAGE DERIVED FROM MADRID DOCUMENT, P.34-35)

YUGOSLAVIAN COMPROMISE PROPOSAL:

"THE PARTICIPATING STATES CONDEMN TERRORISM IN ANY FORM AND EMPHASIZE THE NECESSITY TO TAKE RESOLUTE MEASURES TO COMBAT IT. THEY EXPRESS THEIR DETERMINATION TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES, BOTH AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL AND THROUGH INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, FOR THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF TERRORIST, SUBVERSIVE OR OTHER ACTIVITIES DIRECTED TOWARDS THE VIOLENT OVERTHROW OF THE

-
REGIME OF ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE. THIS ALSO INCLUDES MEASURES TO PROHIBIT ON THEIR TERRITORIES ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES OF PERSONS, GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS THAT INSTIGATE, ORGANIZE OR ENGAGE IN THE PERPETRATION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM."

(LANGUAGE DERIVED FROM MADRID DOCUMENT, P.34-35)

MALTESE PROPOSAL (INTENDED AS INTRODUCTORY LANGUAGE TO THE TERRORISM TEXT):

"THEY EXPRESSED THEIR READINESS TO CONTRIBUTE THROUGH DIALOGUE TO THE PROGRESSIVE ELIMINATION OF THE CAUSES UNDERLYING SUCH ACTS."

(LANGUAGE DERIVED FROM VALETTA DECLARATION)

THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE SELECTED SOME OF THE MOST QUESTIONABLE LANGUAGE ON TERRORISM FROM BOTH THE MADRID DOCUMENT AND THE NNA TEXT. IN PARTICULAR, WE HAVE ARGUED THAT THE REFERENCE TO THE PREVENTION OF "SUBVERSIVE OR OTHER ACTIVITIES DIRECTED TOWARDS THE VIOLENT OVERTHROW OF ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE" FOCUSES ON JUST ONE ASPECT OF TERRORISM (AND AN ISOLATED ONE AT THAT). (BEGIN COMMENT: THIS PASSAGE REFLECTS A YUGOSLAV PREOCCUPATION BASED ON "BOTTOM LINE" INSTRUCTIONS, WHICH IS TACITLY, IF TEPIDLY, SUPPORTED BY THE OTHER NNA. END COMMENT.) THE WEST, FURTHERMORE, REJECTS THE MALTESE PROPOSAL. IN THE COFFEE GROUP WE HAVE ARGUED THAT THE TERRORISM TEXT MUST BE DYNAMIC AND ACTION ORIENTED NOT A STUDY OF THE

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

UNDERLYING CAUSES OF TERRORISM. AND BESIDES DO WE WANT
A "DIALOGUE" WITH TERRORISTS?

7. THE NUF COFFEE GROUP IS ALSO CURRENTLY DISCUSSING
WESTERN AND NNA TEXTS ON TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. THE
EAST, PARTICULARLY POLAND, HAS STRONGLY OBJECTED TO THE
WESTERN TEXT, TELLING US IN PRIVATE THAT THEY CONSIDER
THE LANGUAGE AIMED AT THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE. THE EAST
SAYS IT CAN LIVE WITH THE NNA TEXT. BASED ON OUR
INFORMAL SOUNDINGS, THE FOLLOWING TEXT MIGHT WIN
CONSENSUS:

-
"NO TERRITORIAL OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION RESULTING FROM
THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS LEGAL."
(DERIVED FROM HELSINKI FINAL ACT, PRINCIPLE 4, P.79)

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06465

SUBJECT: CDE: ADJOURNMENT DATE

REFS: (A) STATE 249735

- (B) EMBBERLIN 02711

1. CDE XII - 005.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. U.S. CDE DEL APPRECIATES BOTH THE SPEED AND THE COMPREHENSIVE WAY IN WHICH OUR EAST EUROPEAN EMBASSIES HAVE FORWARDED THE "DEMARCHE TO EASTERN EUROPEAN CAPITALS ON EVE OF CDE'S CONCLUDING ROUND," WHICH WE BELIEVE WILL SERVE TO REINFORCE BOTH OUR COMMITMENT TO SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM, AND THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH WE APPROACH NEGOTIATIONS DURING THIS FINAL ROUND.
4. WE NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF SAID DEMARCHE, THE GDR HAS RAISED QUESTIONS CONCERNING U.S. FLEXIBILITY ON WORKING BEYOND THE SEPTEMBER 19 CDE ADJOURNMENT DATE (REF B). WE WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT FOR US, SEPTEMBER 19 IS AN ABSOLUTE DEADLINE AND THAT A FINAL DOCUMENT MUST BE COMPLETE BY THAT DATE. WE WOULD LIKE TO REINFORCE THIS POINT; TO SIGNAL ANY FLEXIBILITY ON THIS QUESTION, PARTICULARLY AT THE OUTSET OF OUR FINAL ROUND COULD, IN OUR VIEW, DETRIMENTALLY IMPACT ON THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE REFERENCE TO A LATE DEPARTURE WAS NOT FOR THIS FINAL ROUND BUT RATHER TO THE LAST ROUND, ROUND 11, WHICH CONCLUDED FORMALLY ON JULY 18. IN TURN, THE EARLY RETURN REFERRED TO ROUND 12, THE FINAL ROUND, WHICH COMMENCES FORMALLY ON AUGUST 19. BARRY
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

Secret

Secret