



**Directorate of  
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**Soviet Bloc and Neutral/Nonaligned  
Country Statements at the  
CSCE Stockholm Conference on  
Confidence- and Security-Building  
Measures and Disarmament  
in Europe (CDE)  
(CDE-IX & CDE-X)**

**28 January - 14 March 1986  
15 April - 23 May 1986**

**Volume II**

25X1

**A Reference Aid**

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*CR 86-11187  
June 1986*

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
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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 02110

SUBJECT: SOVIET CDE SPEECH 3/14/86

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF SPEECH BY SOVIET CDE  
AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY IN PLENARY 3/14/86.

BEGIN TEXT:

MR. CHAIRMAN,  
THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, LIKE ALL THE OTHER INTERNATIONAL FORA, IS WOVEN INTO THE FABRIC OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND IS AFFECTED BY IMPORTANT EVENTS THAT TAKE PLACE IN THE WORLD. THE XXXII CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION WAS AN EVENT OF HISTORIC AND INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE, WHICH DEMONSTRATED VIVIDLY THAT THE FOREIGN POLICY COURSE OF THE SOVIET UNION IS AIMED AT PRESERVING AND STRENGTHENING UNIVERSAL PEACE. THE PARTY CONGRESS PROVIDED ANSWERS TO THE URGENT PROBLEMS FACING MANKIND, THOSE OF WAR AND PEACE. NEVER HAVE PEOPLE ENCOUNTERED SUCH DEADLY THREAT. AT THE SAME TIME NEVER HAVE THE POSSIBILITIES TO PRESERVE AND STRENGTHEN PEACE BEEN SO REAL. THE POTENTIAL OF PEACE FORCES IS GROWING.

SAFE AND JUST PEACE REQUIRES COLLECTIVE EFFORTS OF ALL STATES. IN THIS CONNECTION THE PARTY CONGRESS CALLED ON BEHALF OF THE CPSU UPON ALL GOVERNMENTS TO COOPERATE MORE CLOSELY AND PRODUCTIVELY TO GAIN SUCCESS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST WAR, WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE AN HISTORIC VICTORY OF ALL MANKIND, EVERY HUMAN BEING ON OUR PLANET. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OCCUPIES AN IMPORTANT PLACE IN THE PROGRAMME FOR PEACE AS LAID DOWN BY THE PARTY CONGRESS. SECURITY ASSURANCE HAS ACQUIRED THE DIMENSIONS OF A POLITICAL TASK THAT CAN BE SOLVED ONLY THROUGH A TURN FROM CONFRONTATIONAL POLICIES OF STRENGTH TO COOPERATION IN BUILDING DEPENDABLE AND EQUITABLE FOR ALL STATES SECURITY, INCLUDING THROUGH THE ELABORATION OF COMPREHENSIVE MEASURES DESIGNED TO ENHANCE SECURITY. AND THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IS CALLED UPON TO DO PRECISELY THIS THING.

MR. CHAIRMAN, REVIEWING THE WORK DONE DURING THE PREVIOUS YEAR ONE COULD, APPARENTLY, CONCLUDE THAT, ON THE WHOLE, A POSITIVE, THOUGH SLOW, DYNAMIC HAS BEGUN AT THE CONFERENCE. LAST OCTOBER THE CONFERENCE WAS ABLE TO IDENTIFY THE RANGE OF TOPICS FOR DRAFTING AND POSSIBLE INCLUSION IN A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT, THAT IS TO OUTLINE THE SHAPE OF A FUTURE AGREEMENT. AFTER THAT WE MOVED INTO THE STAGE OF CONSIDERING IN CONCRETE TERMS TEXTS OF AGREEMENTS. AND, FINALLY, THIS SESSION SUCCEEDED IN AGREEING, PRELIMINARY, ON SOME FIRST LANGUAGE REGARDING NON-USE OF FORCE, NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MANOEUVRES, EXCHANGES OF ANNUAL PLANS OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES, INVITATION OF OBSERVERS, ETC. ALTHOUGH THIS DEVELOPMENT IS, IN ITSELF, POSITIVE, ONE CANNOT FAIL TO SEE THAT THINGS ARE MOVING TOO SLOWLY AT

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THE CONFERENCE, THAT LANGUAGE WHICH HAS BEEN DEFINED CONCERNS ONLY SECONDARY, PERIPHERAL MATTERS AND THE NEGOTIATING MACHINERY HAS NOT BEEN FULLY ENGAGED. IT IS ONLY NATURAL, PARTICULARLY WITH ANOTHER ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS IN VIEW, TO ASK A QUESTION, WHY IS THIS CONTRADICTORY STATE OF AFFAIRS AT THE CONFERENCE? THE SOVIET UNION, SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND MANY WEST-EAST EUROPEAN STATES, NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED ABOVE ALL, HAVE DONE A LOT TO ACCELERATE THE PACE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, TO IMPART THEM A CONCRETE AND BUSINESS-LIKE CHARACTER. AS MIKHAIL GORBACHEV STATED AT THE XXXII PARTY CONGRESS, THE SOVIET UNION HAS UNDERTAKEN ACTIVE EFFORTS TO GIVE A FRESHIMPETUS TO THE STOCKHOLM NEGOTIATIONS. WHAT HAS THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES DONE IN CONCRETE TERMS FOR THIS PURPOSE?

FIRST, DURING THE SOVIET-FRENCH SUMMIT MEETING EARLY ON OCTOBER 1985 MIKHAIL GORBACHEV EXPRESSED THE READINESS OF THE SOVIET UNION TO ACCEPT THE IDEA OF SOME STATES, NEUTRAL ABOVE ALL, TO EXCHANGE MUTUALLY ANNUAL PLANS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATIONS. THIS STEP OPENED UP THE WAY FOR A BUSINESS-LIKE CONSIDERATION AND NEGOTIATION OF THIS IMPORTANT MEASURE THAT CAN BECOME A SERIOUS SAFETY FUSE AGAINST OUTBREAK OF MILITARY CONFLICT.

SECOND, IN THE STATEMENT BY GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV OF JANUARY 15 IT WAS PROPOSED THAT SINCE IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE, FOR THE TIME BEING, TO SOLVE COMPREHENSIVELY THE ISSUE OF NOTIFICATION REGARDING MAJOR LAND, NAVAL AND AIR FORCE MANOEUVRES, THEN WHY NOT EXPLORE WAYS TO SOLVE IT IN PARTS, TO AGREE NOW ON NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR LAND AND AIR FORCE MANOEUVRES, POSTPONING THE QUESTION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNTIL THE NEXT STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE. THIS PROPOSAL OPENS UP THE WAY TO THE SOLUTION OF A MAJOR OUTSTANDING ISSUE, AT THE CONFERENCE.

THIRD, ON THE QUESTION OF THE LIMITATION OF THE SCALE OF MILITARY MANOEUVRES, THE BULGARIAN DELEGATION STATED AT THIS SESSION ON BEHALF OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE APPROACH OF THE NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED COUNTRIES, IN ACCORDANCE WITH WHICH THE SCALE OF MILITARY MANOEUVRES MUST NOT EXCEED FIVE TIMES MORE THAN THE LEVEL OF NOTIFIABLE MANOEUVRES. THE DELEGATION OF THE GDR ALSO TABLED A PROPOSAL ON THE LIMITATION OF THE NUMBER OF AMPHIBIOUS AND AIR-BORNE TROOPS INVOLVED IN THE MANOEUVRES AT THE LEVEL OF SEVEN THOUSAND MEN.

DO NOT THESE PROPOSALS PAVE THE WAY TO ADOPTING ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT CBM WHICH WOULD ELIMINATE SUSPICION AND PREVENT MISINTERPRETATION OF ANOTHER SIDE'S ACTIVITIES?

FOURTH, THE POLISH DELEGATION INTRODUCED BROAD PROPOSALS ON THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS WHICH MADE IT POSSIBLE TO

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ELABORATE CERTAIN AGREED LANGUAGE, INCLUDING ON THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS FROM ALL PARTICIPATING STATES. ALL THIS MEANS GENUINE PRACTICAL CARE FOR AND NOT LIP SERVICE TO THE CONFERENCE NOT MARKING TIME. WE ALSO WELCOME CONSTRUCTIVE TIPS BY THE NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED COUNTRIES WHICH LEAD TO THE ELABORATION OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS ON THE QUESTIONS CONSIDERED AT THE CONFERENCE. IN THIS REGARD IT WOULD SEEM THAT SC.7 SUBMITTED BY THEM HAS A GREAT POTENTIAL FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT AND CONCRETIZATION. THIS, IN PARTICULAR, IS BORN OUT BY MANY CONCRETE PROVISIONS INTRODUCED FOR DRAFTING BY THE NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED COUNTRIES IN THE WORKING GROUPS.

UNFORTUNATELY, WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED AN EQUALLY SIGNIFICANT RESPONSE FROM THE NATO COUNTRIES. IT CONCERNS, IN THE FIRST PLACE THE INITIATIVE BY MIKHAIL GORBACHEV OF JANUARY 15 REGARDING THE SOLUTION OF THE ISSUE OF NOTIFICATIONS IN PARTS AND THE POSTPONEMENT OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNTIL THE NEXT STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE. OBVIOUSLY, WE HAVE TAKEN NOTE OF THE MANY GOOD WORDS PRONOUNCED AT THE CONFERENCE WITH REGARD TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL. UNFORTUNATELY, THEY HAVE NOT BEEN SUPPORTED BY ACTIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, BEYOND THE WALLS OF THIS HALL STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN AND ARE BEING MADE THAT ARE DESIGNED TO DISTORT THE ESSENCE OF THE SOVIET INITIATIVE, TO PRESENT IT AS IF THE SOVIET UNION PRACTICALLY AGREED TO REMOVE THE QUESTION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES FROM THE NEGOTIATING TABLE ALTOGETHER. SUCH SUBSTITUTION AT SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS IS SIMPLY INAPPROPRIATE. IT WOULD HARDLY GIVE ITS AUTHORS ANY PROPAGANDA DIVIDENDS BUT RATHER CAN DO DAMAGE AND NOT A SMALL ONE, TO OUR BUSINESS.

AS REGARDS THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IS IN A POSITION OF TAKE A DECISION ON THE POSTPONEMENT OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNTIL THE NEXT STAGE, IT WOULD SEEM TO US THAT IT IS QUITE RESOLVABLE IF ONE IS TO APPROACH IT WITHOUT BIAS.

THE MADRID MANDATE PROMPTS THE PARTICIPATING STATES TO SEEK "TO UNDERTAKE, IN STAGES", THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE. IN THIS CONNECTION IT STATES THAT THE DECISIONS TO BE ADOPTED "WILL COME INTO FORCE IN THE FORMS AND ACCORDING TO THE PROCEDURE TO BE AGREED UPON BY THE CONFERENCE". PURSUANT TO THE DECISION OF THE PREPARATORY MEETING OF NOVEMBER 11, 1983 WE SHOULD, OURSELVES, MAKE "ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONCLUDING THE FIRST STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE." IT FOLLOWS FROM HERE THAT THE CONFERENCE MAY DECIDE ON POSTPONING NAVAL ACTIVITIES TILL THE NEXT STAGE IN THE FORM THAT WILL BE CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE FOR THE OCCASION. IN SO DOING, WE, OBVIOUSLY, DO NOT IMPINGE IN ANY WAY ON THE PREROGATIVES OF THE VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING WHICH, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE RESULTS REACHED AT THE

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FIRST STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE, WILL CONSIDER WAYS AND APPROPRIATE MEANS FOR THE PARTICIPATING STATES TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS FOR SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE, INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF SUPPLEMENTING THE MADRID MANDATE FOR THE NEXT STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE. I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE NEGOTIATORS WILL HAVE THE POLITICAL WILL TO REACH SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING, RECORDING IT, NATURALLY, IN AN APPROPRIATE MANNER, WHICH WOULD FIT INTO THE FRAMEWORK OF THE BASIC DOCUMENTS REFERRED TO ABOVE. WHAT IS NEEDED HERE IS FLEXIBILITY, MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND, ABOVE ALL, THE DESIRE FOR PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

AT THIS JUNCTURE THE SUBJECT MATTER OF NOTIFICATION IS, APPARENTLY, THE MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM FACING THE CONFERENCE. AS MANY WAY WELL RECALL, THE LAST SESSION CAME UP LITERALLY AGAINST ITS SOLUTION. IN THIS SESSION, TOO, ALL WORKING GROUPS APPROACHED A LINE WHERE IN ORDER TO MOVE FURTHER FORWARD A CLEAR REPLY IS REQUIRED AS TO WHAT TYPES OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES WILL BE NOTIFIED. SO IT IS IMPOSSIBLE IN ANY CASE TO SHUN ITS SOLUTION, TO SIT OUT OR HIDE BEHIND FORMALISTIC PRETEXTS.

LET US TAKE ANOTHER QUESTION - NON-USE OF FORCE. ADVANCEMENT ON IT CAN BE QUALIFIED AS MORE THAN MODEST. ONLY ONE FORMULA HAS BEEN AGREED, AND COMPLETELY REPRODUCED FROM THE MADRID MANDATE AT THAT. NOT TOO MUCH FOR THE TWO YEARS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

HOWEVER AT THE END OF THE SESSION NATO COUNTRIES BEGAN TO SUBMIT THE NON-USE OF FORCE WORKING PAPER, RESORTING TO THE ALREADY FAMILIAR METHOD OF INTRODUCING IT BY PARTS. HOW ARE WE TO TAKE IT?

OBVIOUSLY, THE DETERMINATION OF POSITIONS, EVEN WITH A TWO-YEAR DELAY, IS IN ITSELF USEFUL. BUT WHY IS THIS EXTENDED INTRODUCTION OF THE PAPER FOR LONG MONTHS? WHAT DOES IT MEAN? STEPPING ON THE BRAKES WHEN A SLOW MOVEMENT FORWARD BEGAN?

INCIDENTALLY, IT IS CLEAR FROM THE CLARIFICATIONS GIVEN BY THE AUTHORS OF THAT PAPER AT THE MEETINGS OF THE WORKING GROUP THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE IN MIND EITHER TO GIVE CONCRETE EXPRESSION OR GIVE EFFECT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS THE MILITARY ASPECT. WELL, LET US HOPE THAT DURING THE INTERSESSION THE AUTHORS OF THIS PROPOSAL WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO CORRECT THIS OBVIOUS INCONSISTENCY WITH THE COURSE AND OBJECTIVE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

WE SHOULD SAY THAT NOT ALL IS RIGHT WITH THE DRAFTING PROCESS ITSELF. ONE CAN HARDLY REGARD AS MANIFESTATION OF THE FLEXIBILITY, CONSIDERATION FOR THE VIEWS AND INTERESTS OF THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE THE SITUATION WHETHER CERTAIN DELEGATIONS SIMPLY INTRODUCE BY PARTS LANGUAGE REPRODUCED FROM THEIR OLD PROPOSALS. THE ENTIRE CRAFT OF DIPLOMACY IS BEING

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REDUCED IN THIS CASE TO WORK WITH SCISSORS. CERTAINLY, BRINGING TOGETHER THE POSITIONS OF THE 35 PARTICIPATING STATES IS NOT A SIMPLE MATTER. THERE MAY BE OBJECTIVE DIFFICULTIES IN THE ELABORATION OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE FORMULAS. EXPERIENCE AND SKILL SHOULD BE ACCUMULATED HERE, THE MORE SO AS CONFIDENCE-AND SECURITY-BUILDING IS A NEW FIELD OF DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER WE SHOULD SAY DIRECTLY THAT THERE ARE IMPEDIMENTS AT THE CONFERENCE WHICH ARE OF AN ARTIFICIAL CHARACTER. HOW DO WE VIEW THE TASKS AND PROSPECTS OF THE NEXT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE? WE BELIEVE THAT OUR MAIN TASK IS TO GET DOWN BOLDLY AND WITH DETERMINATION TO SOLVING THE OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS AT THE CONFERENCE. ONE SHOULD NOT ONLY SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF THE SUBJECT OF NOTIFICATION BUT, WITH ACCOUNT OF IT, GET DOWN TO DEFINING PARAMETERS OF SUCH NOTIFICATION. IT IS TIME TO MOVE FORWARD THE QUESTIONS OF CONSTRAINTS AND NON-USE OF FORCE, SOLVE THE DIFFICULTIES EXISTING IN INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION. THESE ARE ALL REAL PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE BEEN REPEATEDLY DISCUSSED AT THE CONFERENCE AND THEY CANNOT BE IGNORED. OBVIOUSLY, IT IS NECESSARY TO SPEED UP THE DRAFTING PROCESS, TO SEEK ADDITIONAL WAYS AND POSSIBILITIES FOR IT THROUGH THE USE, FOR EXAMPLE, OF INFORMAL CONTACT GROUPS TO SOLVE CERTAIN QUESTIONS. AS THIS SESSION HAS SHOWN THERE EXIST QUITE A FEW PROBLEMS IN THE WAY OF REACHING AN AGREEMENT. BUT WE ARE NOT AMONG THOSE WHO PAINT THE PROSPECTS IN DARK HUES DOOMING THE CONFERENCE TO FAILURE ALREADY TODAY. DESPITE THE DIFFICULTIES AND THE BRIEF TIME LEFT, THE CONFERENCE HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR A SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION THIS YEAR BEFORE THE VIENNA MEETING BY ADOPTING A SUBSTANTIVE AND MEANINGFUL DOCUMENT. WE NEED ONLY ROLL UP OUR SLEEVES, NOT MARK TIME BUT PAVE THE WAY FOR AN AGREEMENT, NOT SEEK UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES BUT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE VIEWS AND INTERESTS OF OTHER CO-NEGOTIATORS. THIS WILL SECURE A SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE CONFERENCE. END TEXT.

CURTIN  
END OF MESSAGE  
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Unofficial translation

S T A T E M E N T

by Oleg A. GRINEVSKY,  
Ambassador at Large,

Head of the USSR Delegation  
to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-  
Building Measures and Disarmament in  
Europe

Stockholm, March 14, 1986

Mr. Chairman,

The Stockholm conference, like all the other international fora, is woven into the fabric of international relations and is affected by important events that take place in the world. The XXVII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was an event of historic and international significance, which demonstrated vividly that the foreign policy course of the Soviet Union is aimed at preserving and strengthening universal peace.

The Party Congress provided answers to the urgent problems facing mankind, those of war and peace. Never have people encountered such deadly threat. At the same time never have the possibilities to preserve and strengthen peace been so real. The potential of peace forces is growing.

Safe and just peace requires collective efforts of all states. In this connection the Party Congress called on behalf of the CPSU upon all governments to cooperate more closely and productively to gain success in the fight against war, which would constitute an historic victory of all mankind, every human being on our planet.

International security occupies an important place in the programme for peace as laid down by the Party Congress. Security assurance has acquired the dimensions of a political task that can be solved only through a turn from confrontational policies of strength to cooperation in building dependable and equitable for all states security, including through the elaboration of comprehensive measures designed to enhance security.

And the Stockholm conference is called upon to do precisely this thing.

..

Mr. Chairman,

Reviewing the work done during the previous year one could, apparently, conclude that, on the whole, a positive, though slow, dynamic has begun at the Conference. Last October the Conference was able to identify the range of topics for drafting and possible inclusion in a concluding document, that is to outline the shape of a future agreement. After that we moved into the stage of considering in concrete terms texts of agreements. And, finally, this session succeeded in agreeing, preliminary, on some first language regarding non-use of force, notification of major military manoeuvres, exchanges of annual plans of notifiable military activities, invitation of observers, etc.

Although this development is, in itself, positive, one cannot fail to see that things are moving too slowly at the Conference, that language which has been defined concerns only secondary, peripheral matters and the negotiating machinery has not been fully engaged. It is only natural, particularly with another round of negotiations in view, to ask a question, why is this contradictory state of affairs at the Conference?

The Soviet Union, socialist countries and many West-European states, neutral and nonaligned above all, have done a lot to accelerate the pace of the negotiations, to impart them a concrete and business-like character. As Mikhail Gorbachev stated at the XXVII Party Congress, the Soviet Union has undertaken active efforts to give a fresh impetus to the Stockholm negotiations.

What has the Soviet Union and the socialist countries done in concrete terms for this purpose?

First, during the Soviet-French summit meeting early in October in 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev expressed the readiness of the Soviet Union to accept the idea of some states, neutral above all, to exchange mutually annual plans of military activities which are subject to notifications. This step opened up the way for a business-like consideration and negotiation of this important measure that can become a serious safety fuse against outbreak of military conflict.

Second, in the Statement by General Secretary Gorbachev of January 15 it was proposed that since it was not possible, for the time being, to solve comprehensively the issue of notification regarding major land, naval and air force manoeuvres, then why not explore ways to solve it in parts, to agree now on notification of major land and air force manoeuvres, postponing the question of naval activities until the next stage of the Conference. This proposal opens up the way to the solution of a major outstanding issue at the Conference.

Third, on the question of the limitation of the scale of military manoeuvres, the Bulgarian delegation stated at this session on behalf of the socialist countries their acceptance of the approach of the neutral and nonaligned countries, in accordance with which the scale of military manoeuvres must not exceed five times more than the level of notifiable manoeuvres. The delegation of the GDR also tabled a proposal on the limitation of the number of amphibious and air-borne troops involved in the manoeuvres at the level of seven thousand men.

Do not these proposals pave the way to adopting one of the most important CBM which would eliminate suspicion and prevent misinterpretation of another side's activities?

Fourth, the Polish delegation introduced broad proposals on the invitation of observers which . . . made it possible to elaborate certain agreed language, including on the invitation of observers from all participating States. All this means genuine practical care for and not lip service to the Conference not marking time.

We also welcome constructive steps by the neutral and nonaligned countries which lead to the elaboration of mutually acceptable agreements on the questions considered at the Conference. In this regard it would seem that SC.7 submitted by them has a great potential for further development and concretization. This, in particular, is born out by many concrete provisions introduced for drafting by the neutral and nonaligned countries in the working groups.

Unfortunately, we have not received an equally significant response from the NATO countries. It concerns, in the first place the initiative by Mikhail Gorbachev of January 15 regarding the solution of the issue of notifications in parts and the postponement of naval activities until the next stage of the Conference.

Obviously, we have taken note of the many good words pronounced at the Conference with regard to the Soviet proposal. Unfortunately, they have not been supported by actions. At the same time, beyond the walls of this hall statements have been and are being made that are designed to distort the essence of

the Soviet initiative, to present it as if the Soviet Union practically agreed to remove the question of naval activities from the negotiating table altogether. Such substitution at serious negotiations is simply inappropriate. It would hardly give its authors any propaganda dividends but rather can do damage and not a small one, to our business.

As regards the question of whether the Stockholm Conference is in a position of take a decision on the postponement of naval activities untill the next stage, it would seem to us that it is quite resolvable if one is to approach it without bias.

The Madrid mandate prompts the participating States to seek "to undertake, in stages", the aim of the Conference. In this connection it states that the decisions to be adopted "will come into force in the forms and according to the procedure to be agreed upon by the Conference". Pursuant to the decision of the Preparatory Meeting of November 11, 1983 we should, ourselves make "arrangements for concluding the first stage of the Conference". It follows from here that the Conference may decide on postponing naval activities till the next stage in the form that will be considered appropriate for the occasion.

In so doing, we, obviously, do not impinge in any way on the prerogatives of the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting which, taking into account the results reached at the first stage of the Conference, will consider ways and appropriate means for the participating States to continue their efforts for security and disarmament in Europe, including the question of supplementing the Madrid mandate for the next stage of the Conference.

I am confident that the negotiators will have the political will to reach such an understanding, recording it, naturally, in an appropriate manner, which would fit into the framework of the basic documents referred to above. What is needed here is flexibility, mutual understanding and, above all, the desire for progress in the negotiations.

At this juncture the subject matter of notification is, apparently, the most serious problem facing the Conference. As many may well recall, the last session came up literally against its solution. In this session, too, all working groups approached a line where in order to move further forward a clear reply is required as to what types of military activities will be notified. So it is impossible in any case to shun its solution, to sit out or hide behind formalistic pretexts.

Let us take another question - non-use of force. Advancement on it can be qualified as more than modest. Only one formula has been agreed, and completely reproduced from the Madrid mandate at that. Not too much for the two years of the negotiations

However at the end of the session NATO countries began to submit the non-use of force working paper, resorting to the already familiar method of introducing it by parts. How are we to take it?

Obviously, the determination of positions, even with a two-year delay, is in itself useful. But why is this extended introduction of the paper for long months? What does it mean? Stepping on the brakes when a slow movement forward began?

Incidentally, it is clear from the clarifications given by the authors of that paper at the meetings of the working group that they do not have in mind either to give concrete expression or give effect to the principle of non-use of force, particularly as regards the military aspect. Well, let us hope that during the intersession the authors of this proposal will have an opportunity to correct this obvious inconsistency with the course and objectives of the negotiations.

We should say that not all is right with the drafting process itself. One can hardly regard as manifestation of flexibility, consideration for the views and interests of the other participants in the Conference the situation where certain delegations simply introduce by parts language reproduced from their old proposals. The entire craft of diplomacy is being reduced in this case to work with scissors.

Certainly, bringing together the positions of the 35 participating States is not a simple matter. There may be objective difficulties in the elaboration of mutually acceptable formulas. Experience and skill should be accumulated here, the more so as confidence- and security-building is a new field of diplomatic negotiations. However we should say directly that there are impediments at the Conference which are of an artificial character.

How do we view the tasks and prospects of the next round of negotiations in light of the above? We believe that our main task is to get down boldly and with determination to solving



the outstanding problems at the Conference. One should not only solve the problem of the subject of notification but, with account of it, get down to defining parameters of such notification. It is time to move forward the questions of constraints and non-use of force, solve the difficulties existing in information and verification. These are all real problems which have been repeatedly discussed at the Conference and they cannot be ignored.

Obviously, it is necessary to speed up the drafting process, to seek additional ways and possibilities for it through the use, for example, of informal contact groups to solve certain questions.

As this session has shown there exist quite a few problems in the way of reaching an agreement. But we are not among those who paint the prospects in dark hues dooming the Conference to failure already today. Despite the difficulties and the brief time left, the Conference has the potential for a successful completion this year before the Vienna meeting by adopting a substantive and meaningful document. We need only roll up our sleeves, not mark time but pave the way for an agreement, not seek unilateral advantages but take into account the views and interests of other co-negotiators. This will secure a successful completion of the Conference.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01976  
 SUBJECT: NINTH ROUND WRAP-UP AND ASSESSMENT

1. CDE IX - 112
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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 3. BEGIN SUMMARY AND OVERALL ASSESSMENT: THE WEST ATTAINED ITS MINIMAL OBJECTIVE DURING THE NINTH ROUND: DRAFTING HAS BEGUN IN ALL FIVE WORKING GROUPS. WE ARE FAR FROM SATISFIED, HOWEVER. OUR COLLECTIVE EFFORTS HAVE SO FAR ONLY PRODUCED A FEW SPARSE SENTENCES, MANY RECYCLED FROM THE MADRID MANDATE AND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. ON THE MARGINS, HOWEVER, THE EAST HAS AGREED THAT NOTIFICATION THRESHOLDS SHOULD BE WELL BELOW THOSE SET IN HELSINKI, THAT OBSERVERS SHOULD BE INVITED FROM ALL PARTICIPATING STATES, AND THAT ANNUAL CALENDARS OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE EXCHANGED. HOWEVER, LITTLE HEADWAY HAS BEEN MADE ON THE MOST CONTENTIOUS ISSUES -- INSPECTION, INFORMATION, NOTIFICATION PARAMETERS.

- THIS LACK OF PROGRESS CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO BOTH TRANSITORY AND FUNDAMENTAL FACTORS. THE COORDINATORS' TENDENCY TO CONSULT FIRST WITH THEIR NNA COLLEAGUES AND TO USE SC.7 AS A BASIS FOR DRAFTING FALLS IN THE FORMER CATEGORY, AS DOES THE WEST'S DIFFICULTY WITH ITS OWN CUMBERSOME MACHINERY. OF MORE FUNDAMENTAL CONCERN, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN THE SOVIET RELUCTANCE TO ENGAGE SERIOUSLY IN THE DRAFTING PROCESS. PART OF THIS MAY BE DUE TO AN INCREASINGLY APPARENT SPLIT BETWEEN THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SIDES OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION, WHICH MAY TURN ON THE EMBRYONIC QUESTION: CAN MOSCOW ACCEPT MORE THAN A MINI-PACKAGE? IF NOT, THE SOVIETS MAY JUST BIDE THEIR TIME AND SAVE CONCESSIONS FOR THIS SUMMER, ANTICIPATING THAT THE WEST WILL SETTLE FOR A MINI-PACKAGE. THIS, OF COURSE, IS A RECIPE FOR STALEMATE.

- THE NEXT ROUND IS CRUCIAL. TO AVOID AN EARLY STALEMATE WE MUST BE ABLE TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF GROUND FORCE THRESHOLDS AND FUNCTIONALLY RELATED AIR IN APRIL. THE SOVIETS MUST BE PREPARED TO DROP THEIR INSISTENCE ON THE CONFERENCE'S AGREEING TO POSTPONE THE NAVAL ISSUE AND THE INCLUSION OF TRANSFERS/TRANSITS. IF THAT HAPPENS WE HOPE THE DRAFTING PROCESS WILL GAIN MOMENTUM. THE CHANCES ARE ABOUT 50-50. END SUMMARY AND OVERALL ASSESSMENT.

-  
 4. NOTIFICATION: AS IN THE OTHER WORKING GROUPS, PROGRESS IN THE NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP WAS MARGINAL. THE SOVIETS SAY NO FURTHER SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS ON NOTIFICATION WILL OCCUR UNTIL AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON THE THRESHOLDS FOR ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION, I.E., ON WHAT TO DO WITH NAVAL AND AIR

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ACTIVITIES AND TRANSFERS. BILATERALLY THE SOVIETS HAVE SIGNALLED THEIR ACCEPTANCE THAT AIR ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE ARE IN SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES BUT THIS DEVELOPMENT HAS NOT YET BEEN MANIFEST IN THE DRAFTING GROUP DISCUSSIONS.

- DURING THE NINTH ROUND, THE SOVIETS DRAGGED THEIR FEET, PREFERRING INSTEAD TO PRESS FOR AN "ANSWER" TO THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT OF JANUARY 15, WHICH PROPOSED POSTPONING NEGOTIATIONS ON NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNTIL THE NEXT PHASE OF THE CDE. THE SOVIETS SAID FIRST PRIVATELY AND THEN PUBLICLY THAT THEY WANTED THE CONFERENCE SOMEHOW TO POSTPONE ALL NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNTIL AFTER VIENNA. OUR REFUSAL TO CONSIDER SUCH A STEP ON SUBSTANTIVE, PROCEDURAL, AND PRAGMATIC GROUNDS ANNOYED THEM BUT THEY RECEIVED LITTLE SUPPORT FROM THE NNA OR EVEN THEIR OWN GROUP. WE OFFERED THEM A WAY OUT IN AMBASSADOR BARRY'S END OF ROUND SPEECH, WHICH NOTED THE OBVIOUS FACT THAT ANY GOVERNMENT CAN PROPOSE WHATEVER IT LIKES IN A POSSIBLE POST-VIENNA CDE AS LONG AS IT FITS THE MANDATE BUT CITES ALL THE REASONS WHY STOCKHOLM CAN'T TAKE DECISIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE. INITIAL COMMENTS BY SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN DELEGATIONS AFTER THE FINAL PLENARY SUGGEST THAT THEY MAY CHOOSE THIS WAY OUT OF A DILEMMA OF THEIR OWN MAKING. WE THINK THEY WILL CONTINUE TO INSIST ON AGREEMENT ON WHAT KIND OF AIR ACTIVITIES ARE TO BE NOTIFIED BEFORE PERMITTING PROGRESS ON CSBM'S. WE CONTINUE TO STRESS THAT INDEPENDENT AIR IS UNACCEPTABLE TO US, AND THE ALLIES GRUDGINGLY GO ALONG WITH US. WE THINK THE EAST WILL AGREE TO A FORMULA ON FUNCTIONALLY RELATED AIR BUT ONLY ONE WHICH PROVIDES SOME DETAILED INFORMATION AT THE TIME OF NOTIFICATION.

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5. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION/COMMUNICATIONS: ONLY MINIMAL PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON THESE ISSUES THIS ROUND. THE SOVIETS HAVE BLOCKED ALL DRAFTING ON INFORMATION BY RESORTING TO PROCEDURAL ARGUMENTS. WE ARE LOOKING INTO WAYS OF BREAKING THIS PROCEDURAL DEADLOCK WHILE PRESSING OUR POSITION ON STATIC INFORMATION; MEANWHILE THE NNA ARE GROWING IMPATIENT WITH SOVIET BLOCKING TACTICS.

- ON VERIFICATION, ONE DRAFTING SUCCESS WAS SCORED WITH AGREEMENT TO "NOTE" A TEXT DRAWN FROM MANDATE LANGUAGE ON THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF CSBM'S. THE EAST CONTINUES TO PLUG NTM'S AND CONSULTATIONS BUT HINTS THAT THEY MAY AGREE TO SOMETHING ALONG THE LINES OF THE NNA'S "OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST" PROPOSAL. WE KEEP SAYING THIS IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO US, BUT OUR ALLIES SIGNAL SOFTNESS. OUR STRESS ON INSPECTION HAS RESULTED IN A FORMAL EASTERN DENIAL THAT SUCH INTRUSIVE VERIFICATION IS REQUIRED FOR CSBM'S.

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PRIVATELY, SOME EASTERN DELEGATIONS HAVE HINTED THAT MOSCOW REALIZES THAT SOME FORM OF MANDATORY ON-SITE INSPECTION MAY HAVE TO BE SWALLOWED IN THE END-GAME IF IT REMAINS THE ONLY OBSTACLE TO AN AGREEMENT.

6. OBSERVATION: SOME PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON THIS, PERHAPS BECAUSE IT IS THE LEAST CONTENTIOUS ISSUE BEFORE THE CONFERENCE. BUT THE EAST HAS BLOCKED ANY SERIOUS DRAFTING ON THE THE CORE ISSUES OF DURATION AND SCOPE OF OBSERVATION UNTIL A DECISION HAS BEEN MADE ON THE PARAMETERS FOR ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED. THE MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROUND WAS THE EASTERN AGREEMENT THAT INVITATIONS FOR OBSERVATION WILL BE SENT TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES. ONLY WILLING TO SWALLOW HALF A LOAF ON OBLIGATORY INVITATION HOWEVER, THEY SUBSEQUENTLY PROPOSED THAT EACH STATE ONLY BE OBLIGED TO INVITE OBSERVERS TO A MAXIMUM OF FIVE NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES PER YEAR. BY ROUND'S END EASTERN RELUCTANCE TO DRAFT EVEN ON THE MORE PERIPHERAL ISSUES (E.G., COSTS) WAS INCREASINGLY EVIDENT, APPARENTLY AS PART OF THEIR STRATEGY NOT TO LET PROGRESS ON CSBM'S OUTPACE DEVELOPMENT IN THE AREAS MORE DEAR TO THEIR HEARTS, SUCH AS NON-USE OF FORCE.

7. ANNUAL FORECASTS: AS A LARGELY NONCONTROVERSIAL ISSUE, SIGNIFICANT AREAS OF COMMON GROUND REGARDING THE CONTENT OF THE CALENDAR HAVE EMERGED. NEVERTHELESS, DRAFTING WAS SURPRISINGLY DIFFICULT. THIS HAS BEEN DUE PRIMARILY TO VARIOUS LINKAGES: IN THE PAST THE EAST HAS PREVENTED PROGRESS ON THE CONTENT OF FORECASTS BY LINKING IT WITH THE CENTRAL PROBLEM OF WHAT ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION (SEE PARA 4); AND THERE WERE HINTS THAT BOTH THE NNA AND EAST WILL ATTEMPT TO HOLD DRAFTING ON FORECASTS HOSTAGE TO DRAFTING ON CONSTRAINTS.

8. CONSTRAINTS: THE LINES WERE DRAWN THIS ROUND WHEN THE EAST CONTINUED ITS STRONG SUPPORT OF THE NNA PROPOSAL FOR A CEILING ON THE SIZE OF MILITARY EXERCISES OF FIVE TIMES THE NOTIFICATION LEVEL. THE NNA'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS CONSTRAINTS WAVERED A LITTLE; THEY LIKED THE CONCEPT OF CEILINGS, BUT RECOGNIZED THAT IT WAS A NON-STARTER FOR THE WEST; CONSEQUENTLY, THEY APPEARED TO BE MOVING TOWARD THE VIEW THAT THE ONLY PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO CONSTRAINTS IS ONE WHICH WOULD ENHANCE THE CONSTRAINING EFFECT OF THE FORECAST -- A VIEW WHICH THE EAST REJECTED. THE IRISH DELIVERED A PROPOSAL DESIGNED TO ACCOMPLISH THIS WHICH RECEIVED A COOL RESPONSE PUBLICLY, BUT APPEALED TO SOME OF OUR ALLIES PRIVATELY.

9. NON-USE OF FORCE: WHILE ONLY ONE CONSENSUS PHRASE WAS REGISTERED IN THE COORDINATOR'S TEXTBOOK DURING THE NINTH ROUND, THE CONTOURS OF A NUF SECTION ARE ALREADY

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EASILY DISCERNIBLE. THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT AT LEAST FOUR CORE ELEMENTS SHOULD BE REFLECTED IN A NUF TEXT: 1) THE LINK BETWEEN CSBM'S AND THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE; 2) THE NUF PRINCIPLE ITSELF; 3) THE INHERENT RIGHT OF COLLECTIVE AND INDIVIDUAL SELF-DEFENSE; AND 4) THE INTERRELATIONSHIP AMONG ALL TEN PRINCIPLES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. CSCE PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS SUCH AS HUMAN RIGHTS, PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AND TERRORISM HAVE

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STRONG SUPPORT AMONG MOST NATO AND NNA DELEGATIONS. THE EAST, OF COURSE, WOULD LIKE TO THROW ITS OWN PROPOSALS, SUCH AS NON-FIRST-USE AND A NUF PROHIBITION IN SPACE, INTO THE NUF LOTTERY; HOWEVER, THE SOVIET DRAFT TREATY ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE (SC.6) HAS BEEN LARGELY DISCREDITED AS A SERIOUS CONTENDER FOR DRAFTING. DURING THE COMING ROUNDS, THEN, THE DIFFICULTY WILL NOT BE IN SOLIDIFYING COMMON GROUND BUT IN NOT LETTING IT CONGEAL TOO QUICKLY.

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END OF MESSAGE  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 02018

SUBJECT: CDE: END OF ROUND NINE ASSESSMENT ON POSSIBLE SOVIET OBJECTIVES, STRATEGY AND TACTICS

1. CDE IX - 115.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY. GENERAL SOVIET OBJECTIVES APPEAR TO BE TWOFOLD: (1) A DROIT DE REGARD OVER THE EUROPEAN SECURITY PROCESS WITH THE RELATED OBJECTIVE OF ENSURING CONTINUITY IN THE CDE PROCESS; AND (2) MAXIMIZING THEIR OWN POLITICAL AND MILITARY SECURITY POSITION WITHIN THIS PROCESS. PRIMARY TACTICS ARE REFLECTED IN A DAMAGE-LIMITING EXERCISE -- TO RECOUP THE HIGH PRICE PAID IN EXTENDING THE ZONE OF APPLICATION OF CSBMS TO THE URALS, AND TO STALL ON DRAFTING WHILE APPEARING TO BE POSITIVE, AND FORTHCOMING BY MAKING SO-CALLED "CONCESSIONS" OR BY PRESENTING NEW PROPOSALS, ALBEIT DEVOID OF ANY SIGNIFICANT SUBSTANCE OR MOVEMENT FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE. THESE EFFORTS SEEM TO BE AIMED AT SECURING A "MINI-PACKAGE," ALTHOUGH IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THEY MIGHT BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT NO AGREEMENT AT ALL. EITHER SCENARIO COULD POTENTIALLY BE PLAYED TO THEIR ADVANTAGE AT THE CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE IN VIENNA. END SUMMARY.
4. SOVIET OBJECTIVES: THE SOVIETS HAVE TWO PRIMARY OBJECTIVES: (1) THE LONGSTANDING OBJECTIVE OF DROIT DE REGARD OVER THE EUROPEAN SECURITY PROCESS -- COUPLED WITH A NEAR TERM OBJECTIVE OF ENSURING CONTINUITY IN THE CDE PROCESS; (2) MAXIMIZING THEIR OWN POLITICAL AND MILITARY POSITIONS WITHIN THIS PROCESS. THESE OBJECTIVES COMPLIMENT EACH OTHER SINCE CONTINUITY IN THE PROCESS WOULD PROVIDE BOTH TIME AND THE FORUM TO CHIP AWAY PATIENTLY AT WESTERN POSITIONS, THUS MAXIMIZING SOVIET POLITICAL AND MILITARY SECURITY INTERESTS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE PRICE OF CONTINUITY MAY REQUIRE SOVIET COMPROMISES WHICH THEY PERCEIVE AS ERODING THEIR SECURITY POSTURE, SUCH AS MEASURES WHICH WOULD AFFECT, FOR THE FIRST TIME, SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES ON SOVIET TERRITORY. AT MADRID, BOTH FACTORS WERE PRESENT -- THEY GOT THE CDE SECURITY FORUM BUT HAD TO PAY A BIG PRICE: THE MANDATE'S FUNCTIONAL APPROACH AND THE EXTENSION OF THE ZONE OF APPLICATION OF ANY AGREED CSBM'S TO THE URALS. THUS, AT THE CDE, THEY ARE SEEKING TO REGAIN WHAT THEY LOST IN MADRID WHILE, AT THE SAME TIME, TRYING TO ENSURE CONTINUITY IN THE PROCESS.
5. CONTINUITY. A KEY QUESTION IS WHETHER BOTH OBJECTIVES CAN BE SERVED AT THE SAME TIME. TO DATE THE WESTERN THREAT TO TURN ITS BACK ON A MINI-PACKAGE HAS BEEN CREDIBLE AND WE BELIEVE THE SOVIETS UNDERSTAND THEY WILL HAVE TO MAKE CONCESSIONS IN THE MILITARY FIELD AND ON TRANSPARENCY IN ORDER TO SECURE U.S. AGREEMENT AND TO ENSURE THAT THERE WILL BE A POST-VIENNA CDE. IN THE FACE OF PROBABLE ALLIED PRESSURES FOR ANY AGREEMENT, EVEN A

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MINI-PACKAGE, THIS THREAT MAY GROW LESS CREDIBLE. IN ADDITION, THE SOVIETS MAY BELIEVE THAT THEIR INFLUENCE IN THE EUROPEAN SECURITY PROCESS AND CSCE/CDE CONTINUITY CAN BE ENSURED UNDER A VARIETY OF POSSIBLE SCENARIOS, INCLUDING NO AGREEMENT.

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6. SOVIET STRATEGY AND TACTICS. THUS, WHILE CONTINUITY IS A SOVIET OBJECTIVE, IT IS NOT DOMINANT, BUT RATHER SUBSUMED UNDER WHAT WE SEE HERE AS A TWO-PRONGED SOVIET APPROACH: (1) ATTEMPTS TO PORTRAY THEMSELVES IN AS POSITIVE A LIGHT AS POSSIBLE, AND (2) ATTEMPTS TO MAXIMIZE THEIR OWN MILITARY AND POLITICAL POSITION. BECAUSE THE MANDATE REQUIRES A QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT OVER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, WHICH WOULD INVOLVE SOME MILITARY AND POLITICAL SACRIFICE ON THE PART OF THE USSR, THIS IS ESSENTIALLY A DAMAGE-LIMITING EXERCISE. THE KEY COMPONENTS ARE: (1) ATTEMPTS TO REDRESS THE ZONE ISSUE AND (2) NEGOTIATING SO AS TO MINIMIZE THE EFFECT OF ANY AGREED CSBMS ON SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITIES, A COMPONENT MANIFESTED THROUGH A SOVIET STALL ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHILE THEY MAINTAIN THE ILLUSION OF CONTRIBUTING TO PROGRESS. AS NOTED, THE ACCEPTABLE OUTCOMES WOULD BE A "MINI-PACKAGE" OR NO AGREEMENT; EITHER AT LITTLE OR NO COST -- WITH PROBABLE CONTINUATION OF THE PROCESS.

7. THE ZONE. THE SOVIET MILITARY CHAFES UNDER THE AGREEMENT AT MADRID TO EXTEND THE ZONE TO THE URALS. THEY ARE TRYING TO UNDO THE MANDATE AND SEE TWO POSSIBILITIES -- EITHER IN STOCKHOLM OR BY SETTING THE STAGE HERE FOR DOING SO IN VIENNA. THEIR OBJECTIVE IS EITHER A RECIPROCAL EXTENSION OF THE ZONE TO THE WEST, CAPTURING NAVAL FORCES AND FORCES BASED IN THE U.S., OR TO OPERATIONALIZE THE DEFINITION OF THE ZONE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO REVERT BACK TO THE HFA DEFINITION. THEY HAVE, IN FACT, BEEN PURSUING BOTH OBJECTIVES SIMULTANEOUSLY HERE IN STOCKHOLM IN A VARIETY OF WAYS, E.G.:

A. INITIAL EASTERN PROPOSALS -- PRIMARILY DECLARATORY -- SERVED TO DIVERT THE ATTENTION FROM CONCRETE CSBMS WHICH COVER THE ZONE OF THE MANDATE.

B. LATER EASTERN PROPOSALS -- WGB.1-4 -- WHICH INCLUDED PROPOSALS FOR NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES, AS WELL AS MOVEMENTS (TRANSFERS), WERE ALL BASED UPON THE SAME OBJECTIVES -- EXTEND THE ZONE, CAPTURE NAVAL AND U.S. HOME-BASED FORCES, AND DESTROY THE MANDATE BY DESTROYING THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH.

C. THE JANUARY 15 GORBACHEV STATEMENT -- AIMED AT SECURING A PLACE FOR NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN A SUBSEQUENT PHASE OF THE CDE. IT SETS THE STAGE FOR REDEFINING THE MANDATE IN VIENNA.

D. PROPOSALS TABLED, OR MADE VERBALLY, THIS ROUND IN THE FOUR CONCRETE CSBM WORKING GROUPS -- NOTIFICATION (TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE COVERED); INFORMATION, VERIFICATION

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AND COMMUNICATION (INFORMATION IN THE CONTENTS OF NOTIFICATION); OBSERVATION; AND ANNUAL FORECASTS AND CONSTRAINING MEASURES (ON BOTH SUBJECTS) CONTAIN EITHER ONE OR BOTH OF TWO NOTABLE FEATURES: (1) A REFERENCE TO THE ZONE IN TERMS INCONSISTENT WITH THE MANDATE AND UNACCEPTABLE TO US; AND/OR (2) AN EMPHASIS ON INDEPENDENT AIR AND MOVEMENTS/TRANSFERS (WHICH WE CAN ALSO READ AS ATTEMPTING TO CAPTURE POINT OF ORIGIN, AND NOTIFICATION OF U.S. TRANSITS). THE INTRODUCTION OF UNACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE REFERRING TO THE ZONE RESULTED IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONTACT GROUP TO FIND AN AGREED REFERENCE TO THE ZONE. THE RESOLUTION OF THAT ISSUE -- AT LEAST FOR NOW -- MEANS THAT THEY LOST THAT SKIRMISH. WE DOUBT THE BATTLE IS OVER.

OTHER PROPOSALS, WHILE NOT EXPLICITLY CONTAINING THESE FEATURES, COULD BE AIMED AT SERVING THE SAME PURPOSES. THEIR PROPOSAL FOR A QUOTA OF FIVE ON THE NUMBER OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES TO BE OBSERVED MAY BE AN ATTEMPT TO PREVENT OBSERVATION OF ACTIVITIES IN THE SOVIET INTERIOR -- THAT AREA COVERED BY THE EXTENSION THE ZONE TO THE URALS. HUNGARY'S VERIFICATION PROPOSAL ALSO SERVES TO PROTECT SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THAT IT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION.

8. THE HOPED FOR EFFECT OF SOVIET STALLING TACTICS WILL BE TO REACH THE FINAL SESSION WITH ONLY A FEW RELATIVELY INSIGNIFICANT POINTS AGREED, RESULTING IN EITHER A "MINI-PACKAGE" OR NO AGREEMENT. EXAMPLES:

A. THE JANUARY 15 GORBACHEV PROPOSAL WAS TOUTED AS A POSITIVE SOVIET MOVE -- A SIGNIFICANT CONCESSION DESIGNED TO BREAK THE IMPASSE AT THE CONFERENCE. THE POSITION THAT NO PROGRESS IS POSSIBLE UNTIL ACCEPTANCE OF THIS PROPOSAL BY THE U.S./WEST, AND THAT SOME KIND OF AN AGREEMENT REGARDING THIS PROPOSED UNDERSTANDING BE RECORDED IN SOME WAY -- MAY BE COINED TO JUSTIFY BLOCKING PROGRESS.

B. PROPOSALS. THIS ROUND IN WORKING GROUPS. THE FACT THAT PROPOSALS REFLECTING MODEST BUT NON-SUBSTANTIVE MOVEMENT ARE FINALLY BEING TABLED BY THE EAST PLAYS INTO THE POSITIVE IMAGE APPROACH.

-- MINOR CONCESSIONS ON THE OBSERVATION ISSUE, FOR EXAMPLE, RECEIVED GREAT FANFARE. IN FACT, THE MAJOR SO-CALLED "CONCESSION" -- THAT ALL PARTICIPATING STATES SHOULD BE INVITED TO OBSERVE -- SIMPLY REFLECTED ACCEPTANCE OF REALITY BECAUSE OF MANDATE REQUIREMENTS FOR OBLIGATION AND EQUALITY. THEY HAVE NOT ACCEPTED, HOWEVER, THAT ALL NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE OBSERVED.

-- VERIFICATION LANGUAGE HAS BEEN TABLED AND IT HAS BEEN WELCOMED. HOWEVER, IT IS IMPRECISE AND FRAGMENTARY. IT SEEKS TO BUILD AN UNWIELDLY SYSTEM OF REQUESTS/ CLARIFICATIONS/CONSULTATIONS THAT, IN PRACTICE, WOULD DEFEAT THE PURPOSE OF VERIFICATION. THE ONLY LANGUAGE

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"NOTED" TO DATE IN THIS GROUP IS MANDATE LANGUAGE. HUNGARY, IN THE LAST WORKING GROUP MEETING, IMPLIED THAT MORE ON VERIFICATION WAS COMING -- A STATEMENT CORROBORATED BY THE BULGARIAN AMBASSADOR WHO, IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS, HAS SAID THAT THE EAST WILL PRESENT ADDITIONAL VERIFICATION TEXT WHICH WILL GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF MOVING TOWARD THE NNA APPROACH OF "OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST." IT IS LIKELY, ONCE AGAIN, TO BE TOUTED AS YET ANOTHER SOVIET CONCESSION IN ORDER TO MOVE THINGS FORWARD; WE EXPECT THAT IT WILL NOT ENDORSE THE RIGHT TO INSPECTION AND WILL INTRODUCE A SERIES OF PRELIMINARY STEPS TO BE TAKEN BEFORE A REQUEST CAN BE MADE.

-- WHILE THEY HAVE TABLED A TEXT ON INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN THE CONTENTS OF NOTIFICATION, THE INFORMATION REQUESTED EITHER PRESENTS NO IMPROVEMENT OVER THAT PROVIDED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT OR PURSUES SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN TERMS OF REDEFINING THE ZONE AND DESTROYING THE MANDATE'S FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. MOREOVER, BY SEEKING TO DISCUSS INFORMATION TO BE INVOLVED IN A NOTIFICATION IN THE "INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, COMMUNICATION" WORKING GROUP, THEY PURSUE THE TWIN OBJECTIVES OF ELIMINATING ANY CONSIDERATION OF INDEPENDENT INFORMATION ALONG THE LINES OF MEASURE 1/SC.1 AND OF LIMITING DISCUSSIONS ON VERIFICATION.

-- EARLY THIS ROUND, THE EAST MAXIMIZED PRESENTATION OF A NEW PROPOSAL ON LIMITATIONS BY PRESENTING IT IN PLENARY. THE SO-CALLED CHANGE IN POSITION WAS CAST IN TERMS SIMILAR TO THOSE EMPLOYED BY THE NNA IN SC.7 -- THE LIMIT SHOULD APPLY AT A LEVEL FIVE TIMES THE LEVEL OF NOTIFICATION. LATER, THEY MADE AN ADDITIONAL PROPOSAL ON CEILINGS IN THE WORKING GROUP. AS IT HAS BEEN MADE UNEQUIVOCALLY CLEAR THAT THE WEST WILL NOT ACCEPT CEILINGS, SOVIET MOVEMENT IN THIS DIRECTION COSTS THEM NOTHING AND GIVES THEM THE AURA OF FLEXIBILITY.

-- A BIG TO-DO WAS MADE FOLLOWING THE GORBACHEV "CONCESSION" IN PARIS THAT THE SOVIET UNION ACCEPTED THE NOTION OF ANNUAL FORECAST/ CALENDARS. THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THIS PROPOSAL WAS INEVITABLE. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS NOT CLEAR WHAT THEY ENVISAGE, ALTHOUGH WE SUSPECT IT WILL NOT CONTAIN THE LEVEL OF DETAIL EITHER WE OR THE NNA ARE AFTER.

C. THE EAST HAS BEEN DRAGGING ITS FEET WHEN IT COMES TO CONCRETE DRAFTING IN MOST OF THE WORKING GROUPS. THEY GENERALLY INSIST ON DRAFTING BEHIND THE SCENES, USING THE COORDINATOR AS A GO-BETWEEN, WHERE THEY CAN'T BE PUT ON THE SPOT BY THE WEST. WHILE ALLOWING AN UNOBJECTIONABLE SENTENCE OR TWO TO BE "NOTED," THEY HAVE NOT BEEN RECEPTIVE TO DISCUSSING LANGUAGE ON MORE SIGNIFICANT ISSUES, MUCH LESS ENGAGING IN THE GIVE AND TAKE AND CREATIVE EXCHANGE REQUIRED BY DRAFTING.

9. POTENTIAL IMPACT ON CSCE. IF THE SOVIETS ARE SEEKING

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A "MINI-PACKAGE" OUTCOME, IT COULD SERVE THEIR PURPOSE BY DIVERTING PRESSURE FROM THEMSELVES ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES; A STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT COULD BE MARKETED AS BOTH A GREAT CSCE AND SOVIET SUCCESS. BUT, IF THE SOVIETS ARE REALLY PREPARED TO ACCEPT NO AGREEMENT HERE, THEY COULD PROBABLY FIND A WAY TO USE SUCH AN OUTCOME TO THEIR ADVANTAGE AS WELL -- IN BALANCING WESTERN ACCUSATIONS ON SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AGAINST WHAT THEY WILL CONTEND IS WESTERN RESPONSIBILITY FOR LACK OF PROGRESS IN THE SECURITY BASKET.

NEXT ROUND

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10. SOVIET TACTICS FOR THE NEXT ROUND WILL PROBABLY FOLLOW THE FAMILIAR PATTERN: A PUBLIC "CONCESSION" ANNOUNCEMENT AT THE BEGINNING FOLLOWED BY STONEWALLING ON DRAFTING EXCUSED BY THE LACK OF A WESTERN COUNTER-CONCESSION. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER WILL SPEAK TO THE OPENING PLENARY ON APRIL 15; HE WILL TOUT WHATEVER THE WTO FOREIGN MINISTERS HAVE TO SAY ON CDE; PROBABLY A SLIGHT DOWNWARD ADJUSTMENT OF THEIR GROUND-FORCE NUMERICAL THRESHOLD (SAY TO 18,000) OR A MOVE TOWARDS THE NNA CONCEPT OF VERIFICATION.

11. THE SCENE HAS ALREADY BEEN SET FOR THE SUBSEQUENT STONEWALLING. IN HIS END-OF-ROUND SPEECH GRENEVSKIY WARNED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PROGRESS ON SUBSTANCE UNLESS THE WEST CAME TO TERMS ON AIR ACTIVITIES AND/OR "AGREEMENT TO POSTPONE THE NAVAL ISSUE." WE SUSPECT THEY WILL FALL OFF THE LATTER, SINCE EVEN THE OTHER PACT DELEGATIONS RECOGNIZE IT IS A NON-STARTER. THE BIG QUESTION IS WHETHER THEY WILL TAKE WHAT THE WEST OFFERS ON FUNCTIONAL AIR AND PERMIT DRAFTING TO PROCEED ON GROUND-FORCE CSBMS. IN PART, THIS WILL DEPEND ON HOW SUCCESSFUL WE ARE IN OUR OWN PUBLIC RELATIONS AND IN MAKING THEM TAKE THE BLAME FOR STALLING THE CONFERENCE.

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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01972  
 SUBJECT: CDE: VERIFICATION, WHERE WE STAND

1. CDE IX - 114.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: EVEN THOUGH IT MIGHT BE THE LAST BRICK IN THE EDIFICE OF A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT IN STOCKHOLM, DELEGATION BELIEVES ON-SITE VERIFICATION BY INSPECTORS IS ATTAINABLE. INSPECTION AS THE SINE QUA NON FOR U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF AN AGREEMENT IS KNOWN AND UNDERTOOD BY THE CONFERENCE. THE NNA HAVE NOT SERVED TO BRIDGE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EAST AND WEST BUT HAVE PURSUED THEIR OWN CONCEPTS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO CREATE TACTICAL DISADVANTAGES FOR THE WEST. AS A CONSEQUENCE THERE IS LITTLE REAL SUPPORT BY ANYONE OTHER THAN THE U.S. DEL FOR THE DETAILS OF INSPECTION AS SET FORTH IN SC.1. THE NNA APPROACH TO VERIFICATION WAS CREATED TWO YEARS INTO THE CONFERENCE AND REFLECTS NEGOTIATIONS TO THAT POINT. IT THEREFORE CONTAINS THEIR CONCEPT OF WHAT THEY THINK THE EAST CAN ACCEPT RATHER THAN WHAT WOULD ENSURE VERIFICATION. ALLIES ARE DRAWN TO THE NNA CONCEPT BECAUSE OF ITS NEGOTIABILITY, GLIMPING IN IT A MEANS OF SATISFYING THE U.S. REQUIREMENT FOR INSPECTION. SOME NNA HAVE EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO BEEF UP THEIR PROPOSAL. THESE FACTORS MAKE IT NECESSARY TO EVALUATE HOW WE PURSUE OUR SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIVES MOST EFFECTIVELY. SEE PARA 12. END SUMMARY.
4. DESPITE THE INABILITY TO DRAFT SIGNIFICANT LANGUAGE ON VERIFICATION THUS FAR IN THE CDE, THE PERCEPTION PERSISTS THAT A FINAL AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM WILL CODIFY OUR ACCESS TO SOVIET TERRITORY TO THE URALS THROUGH SOME FORM OF ONSITE INSPECTION. REGARDLESS OF A GENERAL LACK OF CONFERENCE SUPPORT FOR AN INSPECTION REGIME AS RIGOROUS AS THAT IN SC.1/A, THE DELEGATION HAS REPEATEDLY MADE CLEAR THAT THIS IS A SINE QUA NON FOR U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF A FINAL DOCUMENT, IN FACT, WE HAVE STATED AT THE CONFERENCE AND IN PUBLIC FORUMS OUR WILLINGNESS TO WALK AWAY FROM STOCKHOLM WITHOUT AN AGREEMENT IF IT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR INSPECTION. SOME OF OUR ALLIES ARE SOFTER ON THIS ISSUE THAN WE, BUT ALL SUPPORT THE BASIC CONCEPT.
5. THE NEGOTIATIONS HERE ARE, HOWEVER, UNLIKE ANY PREVIOUS CSCE MEETINGS BECAUSE THE NNA DO NOT PLAY THEIR USUAL BRIDGING ROLE. RATHER, THEY CONTINUE TO PUSH THEIR OWN CONCEPTS, UPON WHICH IT TOOK THEM TWO YEARS TO AGREE. THIS HAS WORKED VERY MUCH TO THE TACTICAL DISADVANTAGE OF THE WEST SINCE THE NNA, WHO SAY THEY ALSO WANT EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS, HAVE REJECTED MANY OF THE CONCEPTS IN SC-1/A BOTH ON GROUNDS OF SUBSTANCE AND OF TACTICS. ALMOST WITHOUT EFFORT, THE SOVIETS HAVE OBTAINED NNA SUPPORT FOR REJECTING SOME ASPECTS OF SC-1 AND MOVING TOWARD THE EASTERN VIEW -- NNA EMPHASIS ON "REQUEST" AND NATO EMPHASIS ON "RIGHT"

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(VIS-A-VIS VERIFICATION) BEING A CASE IN POINT.

- -- ON TACTICS, FOR EXAMPLE, THE NNA HAVE JUDGED THAT THE WORD "INSPECTION" IS ANATHEMA TO THE SOVIETS AND HAVE REFUSED TO ACCEPT ITS USE IN THE CONFERENCE, EVEN THOUGH SOME WILL PRIVATELY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT "OBSERVATION ON REQUEST" IS, FOR THEM, INSPECTION BY ANOTHER NAME.

- -- ON SUBSTANCE, THEY REJECT THE IDEA OF ANY QUOTA AND ARGUE THAT VERIFICATION, E.G., OBSERVATION ON REQUEST, CANNOT BE BASED ON A QUOTA SYSTEM BUT MUST BE AVAILABLE TO ALL STATES WHENEVER A LEGITIMATE NEED ARISES. PART OF THIS SUBSTANTIVE POSITION IS BASED UPON A CONCERN THAT A QUOTA SYSTEM COULD BE EXHAUSTED BY SOVIET FEINTS. THEY ALSO SEE THE POSSIBILITY FOR ABUSE BY THE WEST AND HAVE ANTICIPATED SOVIET SENSITIVITIES IN THIS REGARD.

- -- FURTHER, THE NNA SAY, AT LEAST, THAT THEY DO NOT RECOGNIZE THE REQUIREMENT FOR RESTRICTED AREAS WHICH COULD BE IMPOSED TO PRECLUDE VERIFICATION OF ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE IN THE FIELD BY GROUND FORCES AWAY FROM THEIR NORMAL LOCATIONS; THEY CONTEND THAT THIS IS A GIANT LOOPHOLE WHICH UNDERMINES VERIFICATION. THEY ARGUE THAT THEIR TWO DEVICES BETTER ACCOMPLISH THE REASONABLE OBJECTIVE OF RESTRICTED AREA'S -- AVOIDANCE OF INSPECTION OF SENSITIVE AREAS SUCH AS GARRISONS: FIRST, THE SUPREME NATIONAL INTEREST CLAUSE AND SECOND, THE EXCLUSION OF "MOVEMENTS" ARRANGED AT SHORT NOTICE (I.E., MOBILIZATION AND THE MOVE TO GENERAL DEFENSE POSITIONS) FROM PRIOR NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION, AS WELL AS OBSERVATION ON REQUEST. THERE IS, HOWEVER, SOME INCONSISTENCY IN THEIR APPROACH, INSOFAR AS THEY TOO, IN THEIR OWN DOCUMENT, ALLUDE TO RESTRICTED AREAS -- SOME SAY THEY HAVE IN MIND NARROW EXCEPTIONS (E.G., GARRISONS) WHILE THE YUGOSLAVS THINK TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS COULD ALSO BE NECESSARY -- WHICH WOULD ALSO BE EXCEPTED FROM "OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST." (COMMENT: WE HAVE ARGUED THAT THIS APPROACH, COUPLED WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF REFUSING AN "OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST" ON GROUNDS OF SUPREME NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS, CONTAINS NOT ONLY THE RESTRICTED AREA LOOPHOLE THEY PERCEIVE TO EXIST IN SC.1/A, BUT THE ADDITIONAL LOOPHOLE OF BEING ABLE TO REFUSE ANY INSPECTION. END COMMENT)

6. WHILE THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF REPRESENTATIVE (GEN TARTARNIKOV) HAS RESTRICTED HIMSELF TO SAYING THAT THEY ARE STUDYING THE NNA APPROACH, HIS KGB COLLEAGUE (ROZANOV) HAS SAID BILATERALLY THAT AT THE END OF THE DAY THE SOVIETS WILL ACCEPT SOME FORM OF ON-SITE VERIFICATION. OTHERS IN THE EASTERN GROUP, ESPECIALLY THE GDR AND HUNGARY, HAVE BEEN MORE VOCAL IN THE CORRIDORS IN EXPRESSING THE VIEW THAT "OBSERVATION ON REQUEST" IS THE ANSWER TO ADEQUATE VERIFICATION IN A FINAL AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM. IN THE WORKING GROUP, THE EAST HAS DEFINED VERIFICATION AS A FIVE OR SIX-STEP PROCESS: 1) USING NTMS

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IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL NORMS, 2) A REQUEST FOR CLARIFYING INFORMATION WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE EVIDENCE UPON WHICH THE REQUEST WAS MADE, 3) THE STATE RECEIVING THE REQUEST COULD RESPOND WITH AN APPROPRIATE EXPLANATION, 4) THE REQUESTING STATE MIGHT PROPOSE MULTI- OR BI-LATERAL CONSULTATIONS, 5) IF NEEDED, ON A TEMPORARY BASIS, A CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION COULD BE CALLED INTO BEING AND FINALLY 6) THE INTEREST OF VERIFICATION MIGHT BE SERVED BY THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS. AND WE HAVE HEARD IN RECENT DAYS THAT THE WTO VERIFICATION PROPOSAL TABLED IN THE APPROPRIATE WORKING GROUP BY HUNGARY (INCORPORATING ELEMENTS 1, 2, 3, AND 4 OF THE AFORE-MENTIONED FIVE OR SIX-STEP PROCESS) WILL BE SUPPLEMENTED SOON TO BRING IT CLOSER INTO LINE WITH THE SC.7 "OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST" APPROACH.

7. THE WEST HAS BEEN UNIFORMLY CRITICAL OF SOME ASPECTS OF THE NNA APPROACH, MOST PARTICULARLY, THE RIGHT OF REFUSAL. SOME NNA (AUSTRIA, SWITZERLAND AND SWEDEN) ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT THIS PROVISION IS A HUGE LOOPHOLE AND AGREE THAT IT NEEDS TO BE TIGHTENED UP. THEY SAY THAT THE SC-7 APPROACH IS ITSELF A COMPROMISE IN ORDER TO REACH A COMMON POSITION BECAUSE YUGOSLAVIA AND FINLAND OPPOSE ON-SITE VERIFICATION AS A WESTERN PREOCCUPATION. SWITZERLAND HAS ALREADY UNDERTAKEN EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD BY ARGUING PUBLICALLY THAT REFUSAL OF INSPECTION ON THE GROUNDS OF "SUPREME NATIONAL INTEREST" COULD ONLY OCCUR WHEN A NATION'S SOVEREIGNTY OR NATIONAL INTEGRITY WAS BEING THREATENED AND BY THAT TIME ANY CSBM'S AGREEMENT WOULD NO LONGER BE IN FORCE. (COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE NOT STATED AS MUCH, THE SWISS ARGUMENT LEADS ONE TO THE CONCLUSION THAT AUTOMATIC ABROGATION OF THE AGREEMENT IS ENTAILED IN THEIR "SUPREME NATIONAL INTEREST" CLAUSE. END COMMENT) SWITZERLAND HAS ALSO ARGUED ITS CASE FOR "AD HOC CONSULTATIONS" (THEIR IDEA OF A SALON DES AMBASSADEURS) AS BEING A NECESSARY ADJUNCT TO THE CONCEPT OF ON-SITE VERIFICATION SINCE SUCH CONSULTATIONS WOULD BE CALLED INTO BEING IF A REQUEST WERE TO BE DENIED. THIS, THEY SAY, WOULD ADD TO THE POLITICAL COST OF DENYING A REQUEST FOR ON-SITE VERIFICATION. (COMMENT: AT THIS POINT, THE NNA TIE CONSULTATIONS MORE TO THE REFUSAL OF AN INSPECTION, THAN TO THE REQUEST AS THE EAST DOES. END COMMENT) SO FAR, HOWEVER, THE ROLE OF TIGHTENING UP THE DENIAL LOOPHOLE IN THE NNA APPROACH HAS BEEN LEFT ALMOST ENTIRELY TO THE SWISS.

8. SEVERAL ALLIES ARE NOW SAYING BOTH IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE THAT THEY SEE THE SC-7 APPROACH AS THE ONLY POSSIBILITY FOR ACHIEVING ON-SITE VERIFICATION. THE FRENCH MILREP, WHO IS RECOGNIZED AS BEING A "LOOSE CANNON", HAS STATED IN A DRAFTING GROUP SESSION THAT FRANCE HOPES A SOLUTION "ALONG THESE LINES" OBSERVATION ON REQUEST CAN BE FOUND. FOR THIS HE WAS SEVERELY

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CENSORED BY THE REST OF THE WESTERN GROUP. NEVERTHELESS, HE APPEARS TO BE EXPRESSING A FRENCH NATIONAL POSITION. IN AN EARLIER MEETING OF NATO EXPERTS, HE STATED THAT FRANCE WILL "NEVER" ALLOW THEIR FORCES TO BE "INSPECTED". AND IN A CLUSTER CAUCUS, HE HAS REFERRED TO THE SC-1 INSPECTION PROPOSAL AS "CRAZY". THE NETHERLANDS MILREP, FOR QUITE DIFFERENT REASONS, HAS STATED THAT THE HAGUE IS LOOKING FAVORABLY AT THE NNA APPROACH. THE REAL KEEPERS OF ORTHODOXY IN REGARD TO THE SC-1 APPROACH REMAIN, AS USUAL, THE U.S., U.K., PORTUGAL, AND TURKEY WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM BELGIUM. THE FRENCH APPROACH IS PARTICULARLY TROUBLING SINCE THEY SEEM NOT CONSTRAINED BY A COMMON ALLIANCE POSITION UNLESS IT HAPPENS TO COINCIDE WITH THEIR OWN NATIONAL POSITION.

9. THE CURRENT FRENCH CONCEPT OF NOT INSISTING ON RESTRICTED AREAS, APART FROM GARRISONS AND OTHER SENSITIVE POINTS AS DESCRIBED IN SC-1, IS TIED TO THE IDEA OF A THREE DAY DELAY IN CARRYING OUT AN INSPECTION. THAT IS TANTAMOUNT TO NO INSPECTION AT ALL IN MANY CASES AND FEEDS RIGHT INTO THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF CONSULTATIONS BEFORE INSPECTIONS --SOMETHING WE HAVE SPENT A GREAT DEAL OF TIME IN ARGUING AGAINST. THE GERMANS, ON THE OTHER HAND, INSIST ON SOME KIND OF MECHANISM, I.E., RESTRICTED AREAS, WHICH WOULD ALLOW THEM TO IMPLEMENT DEPLOYMENTS NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT FORWARD DEFENSE WITHOUT HAVING THESE DEPLOYMENTS, IN THEIR GENERAL DEFENSE POSITIONS, SUBJECT TO INSPECTIONS.

10. ALTHOUGH WESTERN DELEGATIONS IN STOCKHOLM ALL SEEM TO HAVE DOUBTS IN THIS REGARD, NATO DOCUMENT C-M(83)56 (REVISED) STATES IN PARA 5(F) THAT ONE OF THE OBJECTIVES OF CSBMS IS: "TO FACILITATE POLITICAL DECISIONS BY THE ALLIES ON MILITARY ACTIONS IN PERIODS OF TENSION OR CRISIS. . ." MANY SEE THIS AS PLACING NATO IN A CATCH-22 POSITION HAVING THE REQUIREMENT TO BE ABLE TO IMPLEMENT DEFENSIVE MEASURES IN TIME OF CRISIS WHILE AT THE SAME TIME HAVING THE POLITICAL REQUIREMENT TO HAVE FUTURE CSBM'S FUNCTION AS CRISIS MANAGEMENT TOOLS. THE SOLUTION MOST FREQUENTLY ARRIVED AT IS TO PUT GENERAL DEFENSE POSITIONS IN RESTRICTED AREAS, OR AT LEAST TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS, THEREBY ALLOWING THE SOVIETS THE SAME POSSIBILITY AND SIMPLY ACCEPTING THE DEGRADATION IN VERIFICATION.

11. AT THE SAME TIME, THE NEGOTIATION IN STOCKHOLM OF RESTRICTED AREAS FOR ALL THE RELEVANT CSCE STATES BASED UPON ANY COMMON FORMULA WOULD SEEM TO BE A GARGANTUAN TASK, ESPECIALLY ON TOP OF THE OBJECTIVE OF NEGOTIATING AN EFFECTIVE MEASURE FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION. CONTEMPLATING THIS IN LIGHT OF NATO'S INABILITY TO REACH AGREEMENT, MAKES A NEGOTIATOR'S HEAD SPIN.

12. WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE US? ANSWERING THIS QUESTION IS NOT EASY, INDEED THERE MAY NOT BE ANY SINGLE ANSWER. IT

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IS, HOWEVER, BECOMING INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT INSPECTION, AS DEVELOPED IN SC-1/A, IS A U.S. PREOCCUPATION SHARED IN ITS REAL BY FEW OTHERS. THE FRG INTEREST IS IN SECURING AN AGREEMENT WHICH LOCKS IN ATLANTIC TO THE URALS AS A FUTURE ZONE FOR ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE, THE FRENCH ARE ENIGMATIC -- AT BEST. OTHERS HAVE DIFFERENT MOTIVATIONS, NOT ALWAYS EXPLICABLE. PARADOXICALLY, THE SWEDES AND SWISS MAY BE AMONG THOSE WHO MOST WANT REAL VERIFICATION. AT THIS STAGE, DELEGATION BELIEVES IT POSSIBLE TO REACH A RESULT WHICH WILL RESULT IN THE POSSIBILITY TO CONDUCT INSPECTIONS. BUT THE LACK OF GENERAL SUPPORT FOR THE INSPECTION REGIME IN SC.1/A, THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH THE RESTRICTED AREA DEBATE WILL POSE, AND GENERAL EASTERN STRATEGY TO DELAY CONFERENCE ATTENTION ON VERIFICATION (OTHER THAN NTM), MEANS THAT IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR US TO REDIRECT OUR EFFORTS IN ORDER TO OBTAIN OUR REAL REQUIREMENTS. THE BEST APPROACH SEEMS TO BE TO REFASHION THE NNA APPROACH SO THAT INSPECTION IS A RIGHT, KEED TO CSBM'S IMPLEMENTATION, THAT CANNOT BE REFUSED WITHOUT PLACING THE CONTINUED VALIDITY OF CSBMS IN JEOPARDY ARE OBTAINABLE BY EXPLOITING THE NNA APPROACH. DELEGATION WOULD APPRECIATE WASHINGTON CONSIDERATION OF THIS ISSUE.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01973  
 SUBJECT: RUSSIAN LANGUAGE SERVICES AT CSCE MEETINGS  
 REF: A) 85 STOCKHOLM 870, B) 85 STOCKHOLM 7654

1. CDE IX - 113
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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 3. BEGIN SUMMARY: WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE ISSUE OF RUSSIAN LANGUAGE SERVICES AT THE APRIL MEETING ON HUMAN CONTACTS IN BERN AND AT THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING SCHEDULED TO OPEN IN NOVEMBER 1986 ALREADY IS BEING ADDRESSED BY THE LOCAL SECRETARIATS. BASED ON OUR EXPERIENCE IN STOCKHOLM, WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO BREAK CSCE PRECEDENT AND THE SOVIET MONOPOLY ON RUSSIAN LANGUAGE EXPERTS HIRED BY CSCE SECRETARIATS. WE URGE AMEMBASSIES BERN AND VIENNA TO RAISE THIS MATTER WITH APPROPRIATE SWISS AND AUSTRIAN OFFICIALS. (TALKING POINTS PROVIDED PARA 6.)

4. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE ISSUE OF RUSSIAN LANGUAGE SERVICES AT THE APRIL MEETING ON HUMAN CONTACTS IN BERN AND AT THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING ALREADY HAS BEEN ADDRESSED. WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO BREAK CSCE PRECEDENT AND THE SOVIET MONOPOLY ON RUSSIAN LANGUAGE EXPERTS HIRED BY CSCE SECRETARIATS.

5. ACCORDING TO INFORMATION WHICH THE SWEDISH EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AF SILLEN PROVIDED US ON MARCH 14, THE SWISS SECRETARIAT HAS HIRED A NON-SOVIET RUSSIAN LANGUAGE EXPERT FOR THE RUSSIAN BOOTH IN BERN. WE THINK THAT THIS IS A VERY POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT AND URGE OUR EMBASSY AND DELEGATION TO THE MEETING TO SUPPORT THE SWISS SECRETARIAT'S DECISION.

6. AF SILLEN ALSO TOLD US THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE PRESSURED THE AUSTRIAN SECRETARIAT TO FOLLOW CSCE PRACTICE AND TO HIRE ONLY SOVIET-PROVIDED RUSSIAN LANGUAGE STAFF FOR THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING. WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT NOT TO LET THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO PROVIDE ALL OF THE SECRETARIAT'S RUSSIAN LANGUAGE EXPERTS. WE URGE EMBASSY VIENNA TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH THE AUSTRIAN MFA DEPARTMENT IN CHARGE OF ORGANIZING THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING, STRESSING THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- IN CSCE MEETINGS ALL OF THE LANGUAGE EXPERTS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE SPECIALISTS, HAVE BEEN INDEPENDENT FREE-LANCERS WHO HAVE WORKED AS TECHNICAL EXPERTS FOR THE NEUTRAL SECRETARIAT.

-  
 -- THE MOSCOW-BASED RUSSIAN LANGUAGE EXPERTS PROVIDED BY THE SOVIET MFA CLEARLY ARE NEITHER INDEPENDENT NOR FREE-LANCERS. THEY ARE SOVIET GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AND AT STOCKHOLM THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS WHEN IT HAS BEEN ALL TOO CLEAR FOR WHOM THESE LANGUAGE EXPERTS REALLY WORK (SEE REFTELS).

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-- AT THE CDE SOVIET ABUSES OF THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE BOOTH AND TRANSLATION SERVICES ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS HAS SERIOUSLY HURT THE SECRETARIAT'S INDEPENDENCE AND CREDIBILITY AS A NEUTRAL PARTY. FOR EXAMPLE:

- -- DURING A PLENARY SESSION LAST YEAR, THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR'S INTERPRETER, WHO ALSO IS THE NUMBER TWO IN THE SOVIET MFA'S LANGUAGE SERVICES DEPARTMENT, EDUARD ZAYTSEV, KICKED THE REGULAR (SOVIET) INTERPRETER OUT OF THE BOOTH SO THAT HE (ZAYTSEV) COULD INTERPRET A STATEMENT DELIVERED BY THE U.S. DEPUTY, WHICH HE DID VERY SARCASTICALLY.

- -- WHEN THE WEST TABLED ITS PROPOSAL IN EARLY 1985, THE SOVIET TRANSLATOR WORKING IN THE SECRETARIAT, WHOSE ENGLISH WAS NOT UP TO THE TASK AND WHO WAS VISIBLY INTIMIDATED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION INTERPRETER, NOW GORBACHEV'S PERSONAL INTERPRETER, PROVIDED THE SOVIET DELEGATION HIS FIRST DRAFT. THE SOVIET DELEGATION, INCLUDING THE MILITARY, WOULD STUDY IT AND WOULD THEN PROVIDE THE SECRETARIAT TRANSLATOR WITH THE SOVIET DELEGATION'S CLEARED TRANSLATION -- ALL OF THIS BEFORE WE, THE SPONSORS, EVER SAW THE TRANSLATION. ALL OF THIS BECAME CLEAR WHEN WE PROTESTED A NUMBER OF EGREGIOUS MISTRANSLATIONS WHICH THE SOVIETS HAD DELIBERATELY INTRODUCED TO GIVE THEMSELVES AMMUNITION. THE WORST CASE OF THIS WAS THE TRANSLATION OF THE TERM "IN EXACT GEOGRAPHIC TERMS" INTO RUSSIAN AS "GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES." SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY USED THE RUSSIAN VERSION IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE BBC THE FOLLOWING DAY TO SUPPORT THE SOVIET CASE THAT THE WEST WAS SEEKING TARGETING INFORMATION FOR ITS PERSHING-2'S AND CRUISE MISSILES.

7. THE SOVIETS ROUTINELY TRY TO PORTRAY US AS THE TROUBLEMAKERS IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SECRETARIAT. WE POINT OUT THAT IT IS THEY WHO ARE ASKING FOR SPECIAL PRIVILEGES. WHAT WE ARE SEEKING IS EQUAL TREATMENT: RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE SPECIALISTS SHOULD BE HIRED ACCORDING TO THE SAME CRITERIA AND FROM THE SAME FREE-LANCE SOURCES AS THE OTHER LANGUAGE SPECIALISTS. IT IS THE SOVIETS WHO ARE TRYING TO INTERFERE WITH THE NORMAL HIRING PRACTICE.

8. BASED ON OUR EXPERIENCE IN STOCKHOLM, WE CAN PREDICT THAT IF THE AUSTRIAN SECRETARIAT HIRES NON-SOVIET RUSSIAN LANGUAGE EXPERTS, THE SOVIETS WILL COMPLAIN AT THE VIENNA MEETING ABOUT THE "ARCHAIC" RUSSIAN USED BY NON-SOVIET INTERPRETERS AND WILL TRY TO BULLY THE SECRETARIAT INTO LETTING THEM GO. THIS, OF COURSE, IS NO REASON FOR THE AUSTRIANS TO GIVE THE SOVIETS WHAT THEY WANT. FOR YOUR BACKGROUND THIS IS WHAT HAPPENED IN STOCKHOLM. DURING THE FIRST CDE ROUND THE SWEDISH SECRETARIAT HIRED A LOCAL RUSSIAN SPEAKER. THE LATTER WAS SO HARSHLY CRITICIZED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION FOR

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HIS "ARCHAIC RUSSIAN" ETC., THAT THE SWEDISH SECRETARIAT LET HIM GO AFTER ONE ROUND. (WE DID NOT HEAR ABOUT THIS UNTIL MUCH LATER, WHEN A SERIES OF ABUSES BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE BOOTH AND TRANSLATION SERVICES, CAUSED US TO INVESTIGATE THE SITUATION.)

9. WE HAVE WORKED CLOSELY WITH THE SECRETARIAT HERE IN STOCKHOLM AND HAVE POINTED OUT THAT THE RUSSIAN BOOTH IS THE ONLY BOOTH WHICH DOES NOT RECRUIT INDEPENDENT FREE-LANCE INTERPRETERS. THEY HAVE TOLD US THAT COMPETENT FREE-LANCERS INTO RUSSIAN DO NOT EXIST. IN ORDER TO DISPROVE THIS UNFOUNDED ASSERTION WE HAVE IDENTIFIED AND CONTACTED RUSSIAN LANGUAGE FREE-LANCERS WHO HAVE BEEN HIGHLY RATED BY PROFESSIONAL INTERPRETING ORGANIZATIONS. WE HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THEY APPLY TO WORK AT THE CDE -- ONLY TO HAVE THEM TURNED DOWN BY THE SECRETARIAT FOR VARIOUS VAGUE REASONS (THE REAL REASON: NOT-SO-VEILED THREATS FROM THE SOVIET DELEGATION).

10. HOWEVER, OUR CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING HAS HAD A BENEFICIAL EFFECT: RECENTLY THE SWEDISH EXECUTIVE SECRETARY HIRED AN AUSTRIAN FREELANCER WHO IS AN EXPERIENCED INTERPRETER INTO RUSSIAN. WHEN HE TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT THEY SHOULD SEND ONE FEWER INTERPRETERS FOR THE NEXT SESSION, THEY REACTED BY SENDING IN ONE OF THEIR CDE AMBASSADORS (YEROFEYEV) TO ARGUE THAT THE AUSTRIAN'S RUSSIAN WAS ARCHAIC, THAT HE HAD NO RECENT EXPERIENCE IN THE BOOTH (UNTRUE) AND DID NOT KNOW THE SPECIALIZED CDE VOCABULARY -- THE NORMAL LITANY OF ARGUMENTS THE SOVIETS TROT OUT EACH TIME THEIR MONOPOLY ON THE RUSSIAN BOOTH IS CHALLENGED. IN THE END THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY COMPROMISED AND AGREED THAT THE SOVIETS COULD SEND THEIR NORMAL NUMBER OF INTERPRETERS AND THAT THE AUSTRIAN WOULD STAY AS AN "ADVISOR." THE SOVIETS DID NOT WANT HIM TO WORK IN THE BOOTH. WE ARE PUSHING THE EXECUTARY SECRETARY TO INSIST THAT HE WORK IN THE BOOTH. WHILE THIS IS LESS THAN A COMPLETE VICTORY, IT IS AN IMPORTANT STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION WHICH, WE THINK, SHOULD BE FOLLOWED UP IN FUTURE CSCE MEETINGS. WE ALSO WOULD APPRECIATE HEARING ABOUT FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN BERN AND VIENNA ON THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE BOOTH AND TRANSLATION SERVICES.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01779  
 SUBJECT: KEY CDE ISSUES FOR INTERSESSION  
 REFS: A. STOCKHOLM LL49; B. STOCKHOLM L447;  
 C. STOCKHOLM L72L; D. STOCKHOLM L292;  
 E. STOCKHOLM L5L7; F. STOCKHOLM L720  
 L. CDE IX - 093  
 2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.  
 3. SUMMARY: USDEL BELIEVES THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR POSITION ON TWO ISSUES, THRESHOLDS AND TREATMENT OF FUNCTIONALLY RELATED AIR ACTIVITIES, MUST BE COMPLETED BEFORE CDE ROUND X STARTS ON APRIL L5. A THIRD ISSUE, POSSIBLE ADDITION OF CONSTRAINING ELEMENTS TO MEASURE TWO, WILL NEED TO BE SETTLED BY EARLY IN THE ROUND. WE REQUEST THAT THE WORK PROGRAM FOR THE CONSULTATIVE PERIOD MARCH L7 - APRIL LL BE ARRANGED TO CONCENTRATE ON THESE ISSUES. ACTION REQUEST PARA 9. END SUMMARY.  
 4. WITH TWELVE NEGOTIATING WEEKS REMAINING BEFORE JULY L9, WE HAVE REACHED THE POINT AT WHICH RESOLUTION OF THE KEY ISSUES HAS BECOME URGENT. USDEL BELIEVES THAT THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF OUR POSITIONS ON THRESHOLDS AND ON FUNCTIONALLY-RELATED AIR ACTIVITIES MUST BE WORKED OUT BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF ROUND X APRIL L5. THOUGH SOMEWHAT LESS URGENT, THE ISSUE OF ADDING CONSTRAINING ELEMENTS TO MEASURE TWO ALSO REQUIRES PRIORITY ATTENTION BY WASHINGTON.  
 5. WE SEE THE NEED TO ACHIEVE CONSENSUS BY JULY L9 ON THE BULK OF A CDE FINAL DOCUMENT IN ORDER TO PUT MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS TO ACCEPT ON-SITE INSPECTION IN THE LAST ROUND IN AUGUST-SEPTEMBER. IN OUR VIEW, THE SOVIETS WILL NOT CONCEDE ON-SITE INSPECTION, THE MEASURE WE HAVE IDENTIFIED AS THE SINE QUA NON OF AN ACCEPTABLE CSBM REGIME, UNTIL THE LAST MINUTE AND THEN ONLY IF THEY SEE IT AS THE FINAL BRICK REQUIRED TO MAKE THE WHOLE EDIFICE STAND. U.S. NEGOTIATING STRATEGY SHOULD, THEREFORE, AIM AT OVERCOMING AS MANY OF THE KEY STUMBLING BLOCKS IN THE DRAFTING PROCESS (I.E. THRESHOLDS, INFORMATION) PRIOR TO THE FINAL ROUND AS POSSIBLE, WHILE MAINTAINING THE REQUIREMENTS OF OUR SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIVES. THE EAST, FOR ITS PART, IS PURSUING A STRATEGY WHICH WOULD DELAY THE RESOLUTION OF ALL THE KEY ISSUES UNTIL THE END-GAME; IN THIS WAY THEY HOPE TO PUT SIGNIFICANT PRESSURE ON THE WEST TO MAKE SEVERAL MAJOR CONCESSIONS AS THE END APPROACHES.  
 6. OUR SENSE OF URGENCY IS HEIGHTENED BY THE FACT THAT IT WILL TAKE TIME TO BRING THE ALLIES ALONG ON WHATEVER NEW POSITIONS WE COME UP WITH. ANY CHANGE IN OUR POSITION ON THRESHOLDS WILL BE LOOKED AT WITH PARTICULAR CARE, ESPECIALLY IN BONN. WE -- AND ALL OUR ALLIES -- WANT TO AVOID PUTTING THESE ISSUES BACK INTO THE NATO MACHINERY; BUT EVEN IF WE DEAL WITH THEM IN STOCKHOLM IT WILL PROBABLY TAKE CAPITALS WEEKS TO

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REGISTER THEIR VIEWS. THESE WEEKS HAVE TO BE SUBTRACTED FROM THE TWELVE REMAINING BEFORE JULY L9.

7. THE SOVIETS ARE SAYING THAT THEY WILL NOT DRAFT ON THE MAJOR ISSUES OF NOTIFICATION, FORECASTING AND OBSERVATION UNTIL THERE IS AGREEMENT ON HOW TO TREAT AIR ACTIVITIES. WE BELIEVE THEY WILL SETTLE FOR FUNCTIONALLY RELATED AIR, AND WE HAVE MADE IT AMPLY CLEAR THAT INDEPENDENT AIR IS OUT. BUT BEFORE WE CAN TEST THEM ON THIS WE WILL NEED A MORE REFINED POSITION ON WHAT INFORMATION WE ARE PREPARED TO PROVIDE ON FUNCTIONALLY RELATED AIR AND WHAT THE MODALITIES FOR OBSERVATION WILL BE.

8. REFS A-C GIVE USDEL VIEWS CONCERNING THE "DIVISION-EQUIVALENT" FORMULATION OF THE THRESHOLD FOR FORECAST/NOTIFICATION/OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES. REFS D AND E GIVE USDEL VIEWS ON THE TREATMENT OF AIR ACTIVITIES FUNCTIONALLY RELATED TO NOTIFIABLE GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES. REF F DESCRIBES INITIAL USDEL THINKING ON ADDING CERTAIN ELEMENTS TO THE ANNUAL FORECAST IN ORDER TO ENHANCE ITS CONSTRAINING EFFECT.

9. ACTION: REQUEST PM/TMP ARRANGE A WORK PROGRAM FOR THE CDE INTERSESSION MARCH L7 - APRIL LL WHICH WILL FOCUS INTENSIVE DISCUSSION ON THESE ISSUES WITH THE GOAL OF SETTLING AT LEAST THE FIRST TWO BY THE START OF THE NEXT ROUND.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01148

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION THRESHOLDS

1. CDE IX - 049.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: OSD MEMORANDUM OF 27 DEC 1985 SETS FORTH SEVERAL CONCEPTS FOR POSSIBLE MODIFICATIONS OF THE NATO CSBMS PROPOSALS AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. INCLUDED WERE POSSIBILITIES FOR RAISING THE THRESHOLD AS WELL AS ALTERING IT CONCEPTUALLY FROM ONE DIVISION TO THAT OF A DIVISION-EQUIVALENT. AS DRAFTING INTENSIFIES IN STOCKHOLM, USDEL BELIEVES IT IMPORTANT TO BEGIN TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR MOVING TO THE THRESHOLD CONCEPTS OUTLINED IN THE OSD MEMO. SEE PARA 14 FOR ACTION REQUESTED. END SUMMARY
4. MEASURE THREE OF SC-1 ESTABLISHES A THRESHOLD FOR THE NOTIFICATION OF GROUND ACTIVITIES -- AND THUS FOR OBSERVATION AND ANNUAL FORECASTS -- OF ONE DIVISION OUT-OF-GARRISON. FURTHER DEFINITION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES A DIVISION OUT-OF-GARRISON OR EQUIVALENT FORMATION INCLUDES THREE THRESHOLD ELEMENTS: ONE-HALF OR MORE OF A DIVISION'S COMBAT ELEMENTS (I.E., REGIMENTS OR BRIGADES), AT LEAST 6000 TROOPS, (X) MAIN BATTLE TANKS OR (Y) ARMORED CARRIERS. A THRESHOLD AT THIS LEVEL WOULD REQUIRE APPROXIMATELY 70-100 NOTIFICATIONS PER YEAR FROM THE WARSAW PACT AND APPROXIMATELY 60-80 FROM NATO WITH CORRESPONDING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ANNUAL FORECAST AND OBSERVATIONS. WE JUDGE THAT THE REQUIREMENT TO OBSERVE AND ACCEPT OBSERVERS TO THIS LARGE NUMBER OF EXERCISES WOULD BE EXCESSIVE.
5. AN EQUALLY SIGNIFICANT CONCERN, FROM USDEL'S PERSPECTIVE, WOULD BE THE REQUIREMENT TO MONITOR A LARGE NUMBER OF EASTERN EXERCISES FOR VERIFICATION PURPOSES. WHILE WE JUDGE THAT AN INSPECTOR'S TASK WOULD BE GREATLY FACILITATED BY A LOW THRESHOLD (THE NEED TO ASCERTAIN THE PRESENCE OF SIGNIFICANTLY FEWER TANKS AND OTHER SIGNATURE ITEMS), THE BURDEN ON OUR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES TO MONITOR EFFECTIVELY FOR VERIFICATION PURPOSES A LARGE NUMBER OF WHAT COULD BE JUDGED TO BE MILITARILY INSIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES WOULD NOT BE WARRANTED.
6. INITIAL CONTACTS WITH THE TURKISH DELEGATION HAVE INDICATED THAT ANKARA CANNOT ACCEPT ANY INFORMATION PROVISION WHICH WOULD DIVULGE THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND SUBORDINATION OF THEIR ARMED FORCES. THUS, THEY ARE UNWILLING TO INDICATE THAT ANY TWO MAJOR COMBAT ELEMENTS -- E.G., TWO BRIGADES -- ARE SUBORDINATE TO A SPECIFIC COMMAND ENTITY, INCLUDING DIVISION. THIS HAS BEEN A MAJOR (AND NOT WELL UNDERSTOOD) PROBLEM THE TURKS HAVE HAD WITH MEASURE ONE AND, TO A LESSER DEGREE, WITH MEASURE THREE.
7. ALTHOUGH FRENCH DIFFICULTIES WITH THRESHOLDS HAVE

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NOT SURFACED IN THE NEGOTIATION, WE UNDERSTAND THEY OBJECT TO A DIVISIONAL THRESHOLD BY ITSELF BECAUSE OF THE SMALL SIZE OF THEIR DIVISIONS. IN ADDITION, SEVERAL PARTICIPATING STATES DO NOT HAVE DIVISIONS IN PEACETIME.

8. USDEL BELIEVES THAT THE CONCERNS INCURRED BY A LARGE NUMBER OF NOTIFICATIONS, THE TURKISH DIFFICULTIES WITH SUBORDINATION AND THE FACT THAT SOME GROUND FORCE ESTABLISHMENTS HAVE NO DIVISIONS IN PEACETIME COULD BE EFFECTIVELY DEALT WITH BY MOVING TO THE CONCEPT OF DIVISION-EQUIVALENT. AT THE SAME TIME IT WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE A LARGE SUBSTANTIVE MOVE FROM OUR PRESENT FOCUS ON THE DIVISION AS REGARDS THE SOVIET AND WTO GROUND FORCES (A DIVISION EQUIVALENT FOR THE WTO ESTABLISHED AS FOUR REGIMENTS IS NOT A GREAT DEAL DIFFERENT THAN ONE-HALF OR MORE OF THE MAJOR COMBAT ELEMENTS OF TWO DIVISIONS).

9. THIS APPROACH WOULD MEAN THAT A DIVISION-EQUIVALENT WOULD HAVE TO BE ESTABLISHED FOR EACH PARTICIPATING STATE ALONG THE LINES SET FORTH IN THE OSD PAPER. WE HAVE NOT BROACHED THIS IDEA WITH ANY DELEGATION OTHER THAN THE TURKS, WHO VOICED NO PRELIMINARY OBJECTION, BUT WE SEEM TO RECALL THAT THE FRENCH HAD EARLIER OPTED FOR A NOT TOO DISSIMILAR APPROACH IN THE CBMS WORKING GROUP AT EVERE WHEN THE PACKAGE WAS BEING PUT TOGETHER.

10. WE HAVE NOT YET COME FULLY TO GRIPS WITH THE QUESTION OF NUMERICAL FIGURES FOR (X) TANKS AND (Y) AC'S AS CURRENTLY SET FORTH IN SC-1. OUR INCLINATION IS TO ADOPT THE 240 FIGURE FOR TANKS AS ALREADY AGREED AND ACCEPTED IN NATO AND TO DROP ALTOGETHER THE (Y) FIGURE FOR AC'S, UNLESS IT CAN BE REDUCED FROM THE CURRENT LEVEL OF 615 TO SOMETHING WHICH CORRESPONDS MORE DIRECTLY TO THE NUMBER EXPECTED TO BE INVOLVED IN A NORMAL WTO EXERCISE AT THE DIVISION-EQUIVALENT LEVEL. (COMMENT: WE EXPECT THE NNA NUMBERS FOR EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS, ONCE THEY SURFACE, TO BE SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER THAN WHAT WOULD NORMALLY CORRESPOND TO TO&E FIGURES; WE SEE TACTICAL ADVANTAGE TO LOWER FIGURES WHICH ALIGN US WITH THE NNA AND SUBSTANTIVE ADVANTAGE TO LOWER FIGURES FOR THE INSPECTION ASPECT OF VERIFICATION INsofar AS SUCH FIGURES PROTECT OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS. END COMMENT)

11. THE BASIS OF THE NEW THRESHOLDS WOULD BE A DIVISION-EQUIVALENT (E.G., FOUR REGIMENTS FOR THE WTO, THREE BRIGADES FOR THE U.S. AND THE FRG) "NOT IN ANY GARRISON" -- AS INDICATED IN THE OSD PAPER -- WITH THE CURRENT SC-1 FIGURE OF 6,000 TROOPS BEING CHANGED TO 12,000 TROOPS AND THE (X) FIGURE FOR MAIN BATTLE TANKS BEING ESTABLISHED AT 240. THE (Y) FIGURE FOR AC'S WILL NEED TO BE SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER THAN 615 OR ELIMINATED ALTOGETHER.

12. IN OUR JUDGEMENT, THE CHANGE IN THRESHOLDS WE ARE PROPOSING WOULD NOT SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCE OUR ABILITY TO VERIFY A CSBM AGREEMENT. TO DO THAT, USING INSPECTORS,

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WE THINK IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH AN EQUIPMENT THRESHOLD, E.G., TANKS, SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER THAN THE EQUIPMENT NUMBERS WHICH WOULD ACTUALLY PARTICIPATE IN A ROUTINE WTO ACTIVITY. USDEL MEMBERS GAVE ACTIVE AND POSITIVE CONSIDERATION TO RETAINING THE CURRENT THRESHOLDS IN THE ANNUAL FORECAST, (BUT RAISING THE NOTIFICATION/OBSERVATION) AS MENTIONED IN THE OSD PAPER, AND ESTABLISHING AN EQUIPMENT THRESHOLD OF 125 TANKS. THIS WOULD HAVE PROVIDED INSPECTORS WITH A REASONABLE TASK OF COUNTING ONLY A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF TANKS EXPECTED TO PARTICIPATE (RATHER THAN TO&E FIGURES OR THE ACTUAL NUMBER PARTICIPATING) USING THE HALF OR MORE OF MAJOR COMBAT ELEMENTS FORMULA CURRENTLY IN SC-1. JCS REPS AND DIA REP ON DELEGATION FAVORED THIS APPROACH. IN ADDITION, A LARGE NUMBER OF EXERCISES ON AN ANNUAL CALENDAR WOULD ESTABLISH A PATTERN OF ROUTINE MILITARY ACTIVITY. OTHERS THOUGHT THAT TWO DIFFERENT THRESHOLDS, ONE FOR FORECASTS AND ONE FOR NOTIFICATION/OBSERVATION WOULD COMPLICATE THE MONITORING PROBLEM AND CLUTTER UP THE ANNUAL FORECAST WITH A LOT OF INSIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES THEREBY DEGRADING RATHER THAN STRENGTHENING IT. ALL IN USDEL AGREE THAT NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION SHOULD OCCUR AT A LEVEL COMMENSURATE WITH A FULL DIVISION.

13. THE MOVE TO THE DIVISION-EQUIVALENT THRESHOLD COULD ENHANCE OUR POSITION THAT INSPECTION IS NECESSARY FOR FOR A CDE AGREEMENT SINCE ACTIVITIES WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE INSPECTION WOULD HAVE TO EXCEED A LEVEL WHICH IS, WITHIN THE CSCE CONTEXT, ARGUABLY MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT. AND THE DESIGNATION OF THRESHOLDS FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT PROVIDES SUPPORT FOR THE ARGUMENT THAT ONE OF THE TASKS TO BE CONDUCTED BY INSPECTORS, REGARDLESS OF ITS FEASIBILITY, WOULD BE TO COUNT MAIN BATTLE TANKS TAKING PART IN THE ACTIVITY IN THE FIELD.

14. ACTION: REQUEST WASHINGTON APPROVAL TO BEGIN TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK AMONG ALLIES TO PURSUE REVISION OF THE THRESHOLD ALONG THE LINES DESCRIBED ABOVE. SINCE NOTIFICATION LIES AT THE CORE OF THE NEGOTIATION HERE, AND THRESHOLDS AT THE CENTER OF NOTIFICATION, WE REQUEST A RESPONSE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BARRY  
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

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**S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 01447**  
**SUBJECT: THE CONTINUING SAGA OF NOTIFICATION**  
**THRESHOLDS**

REF: A. STOCKHOLM 1148, B. STOCKHOLM 1260

1. CDE IX - 073.

2. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. SUMMARY: DELEGATION UNDERSTANDS THAT WASHINGTON IS IN BASIC AGREEMENT WITH IDEA OF RAISING THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD (REF A), BUT IS CONCERNED OVER THE RELATIVE UTILITY OF A "DIVISION EQUIVALENT" OR A "ONE-HALF OR MORE ELEMENTS OF TWO DIVISIONS" FORMULATION. OBVIOUSLY THE ISSUE OF NOTIFICATION THRESHOLDS IS NOT CLEAR CUT, AND THE TURKISH RESPONSE TO U.S. CONSULTATIONS REGARDING MEASURE ONE (REF B) DID LITTLE TO ILLUMINATE OUR OPTIONS. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS OUR CONSIDERED JUDGMENT THAT A "DIVISION EQUIVALENT," RATHER THAN "ONE-HALF OR MORE OF THE ELEMENTS OF TWO DIVISIONS," IS THE THRESHOLD WE SHOULD PURSUE. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES FURTHER DETAIL ABOUT WHY WE HAVE COME TO THIS CONCLUSION WHILE ADDRESSING SOME SPECIAL CONCERNS WASHINGTON HAS RAISED. ACTION REQUESTED IN PARA 9. END SUMMARY.

4. NEGOTIATING CONCERNS. THE CONCEPT OF "DIVISION EQUIVALENT" WOULD ENGENDER A GREAT DEAL MORE SUPPORT THAN "ONE-HALF OR MORE ELEMENTS OF TWO DIVISIONS," ALTHOUGH THE PRACTICAL IMPACT OF THESE TWO FORMULATIONS IS THE SAME. THE LATTER GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF GREATER COMPLEXITY, WHEREAS "DIVISION EQUIVALENT," AS THE BASIS FOR THE NNA APPROACH TO THRESHOLDS, ALREADY COMMANDS SIGNIFICANT CREDIBILITY. EVENTUAL NATO SUPPORT FOR THE NNA THRESHOLD MIGHT ALSO ALLOW US TO SET UP A TRADE FOR THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT, OR SOME OTHER SUBSTANTIAL ITEM. IF NATO AND THE NNA CAN FORM A UNITED FRONT, WE WILL PUT CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE ON THE EAST TO AGREE TO THIS TYPE OF APPROACH. IN ADDITION, DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT THE VERIFIABILITY OF THE TWO THRESHOLDS IS ROUGHLY THE SAME AND THAT, IN FACT, A THRESHOLD BASED ON "ONE-HALF OR MORE OF THE MAJOR COMBAT ELEMENTS OF TWO DIVISIONS" HAS A SIGNIFICANT SUBSTANTIVE DRAWBACK.

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5. STRUCTURAL PARAMETER VS. NUMERICAL PARAMETER. DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD BASED ON ONE-HALF OR MORE OF THE MAJOR COMBAT ELEMENTS OF TWO DIVISIONS WOULD, IN PRACTICE, HAVE ONE SERIOUS FLAW. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF EXERCISES ASSOCIATED WITH AUTUMN FORGE, NATO DOES NOT HAVE EXERCISES WHICH WOULD TRIGGER THE STRUCTURAL PART OF THIS THRESHOLD (I.E., TWO BRIGADES FROM ONE DIVISION AND TWO FROM ANOTHER PARTICIPATING IN THE SAME EXERCISE). NATO ACTIVITIES WOULD ONLY BE CAPTURED UNDER THE NUMERICAL PARAMETER OF

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THE THRESHOLD. THE ONE-HALF OR MORE OF TWO DIVISIONS THRESHOLD WOULD, THEREFORE, EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATE THE STRUCTURAL PARAMETER AS THE BASIS FOR NOTIFICATION FOR NATO ACTIVITIES. A DIVISION EQUIVALENT THRESHOLD WOULD MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF THE STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD BECAUSE IT CORRESPONDS TO NATO EXERCISE PRACTICES.

6. TURKEY AND MEASURE ONE. DELEGATION BELIEVES THE TURKS ARE QUITE SERIOUS ABOUT WHAT THEY WILL AND WILL NOT PROVIDE IN THE WAY OF INFORMATION ON THEIR MILITARY FORCES. AS DISCUSSED IN REF B, THE TURKS HAVE INDICATED THAT, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING, THEY ARE ONLY WILLING TO PROVIDE SUBORDINATION OF FORCES INVOLVED IN FORECAST ACTIVITIES. THIS MEANS THAT REGARDLESS OF THE THRESHOLD (ONE-HALF OR MORE ELEMENTS OF TWO DIVISIONS OR DIVISION EQUIVALENT) THERE MAY NOT BE A CONFERENCE-WIDE DATA BASE THAT WILL MAKE PUBLIC ACCUSATIONS ABOUT NON-COMPLIANCE MORE CONVINCING. (COMMENT: WE STILL HOPE TO BE ABLE TO PERSUADE THE NNA TO INCLUDE SUBORDINATION OF FORCES IN THE FORECAST AND NOTIFICATION. END COMMENT) THIS PROBLEM IS NOT PARTICULARLY SERIOUS FROM A STRICTLY NATO PERSPECTIVE SINCE NATO MAINTAINS A CLASSIFIED WARSAW PACT ORDER OF BATTLE THAT ACCURATELY REFLECTS LOCATION AND SUBORDINATION OF DIVISIONS AND REGIMENTS. OVER TIME, STATIC INFORMATION ON DIVISIONS AND SUBORDINATION OF REGIMENTS CONTAINED IN THE FORECAST COULD HELP ESTABLISH AN UNCLASSIFIED DATA BASE THAT ALL PARTICIPATING STATES COULD USE TO PUBLICALLY IDENTIFY REGIMENTS DETECTED CONDUCTING NON-NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES.

7. VERIFICATION. DELEGATION VIEW OF THE VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR A DIVISION EQUIVALENT THRESHOLD IS, AS STATED IN REF A, THAT MONITORING WOULD BE NO MORE DIFFICULT THAN WITH A ONE-HALF OR MORE OF TWO DIVISIONS THRESHOLD BASED ON THE CONCEPT OF "NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATION." IN EITHER CASE, THE ACTIVITY ITSELF WOULD BE THE FOCUS OF OUR VERIFICATION EFFORTS. IN NEITHER CASE WOULD WE INTEND TO EXAMINE GARRISONS FOR EVIDENCE OF OUT-OF-GARRISON ACTIVITY, I.E., EMPTY GARRISONS. THIS WOULD BE AN EXTREMELY DEMANDING AND UNRELIABLE APPROACH TO DETERMINING UNNOTIFIED OUT-OF-GARRISON ACTIVITIES. MAJOR ITEMS OF COMBAT EQUIPMENT ARE NORMALLY GARAGED AND LEVELS OF ACTIVITY, AS REFLECTED IN IMAGERY, WOULD GIVE NO CLEAR INDICATION OF LEVELS OF OCCUPANCY. MOST SOVIET GROUND FORCES UNITS IN THE USSR, AND MOST NSWP GROUND FORCES, ARE MANNED WELL BELOW THEIR INTENDED WARTIME STRENGTHS. ACTIVITY PATTERNS WITHIN GARRISONS THEREFORE WOULD TEND TO SUGGEST LESS THAN FULL OCCUPANCY. THE BURDEN OF THE PROOF WOULD STILL BE TO FIND, MEASURE, AND RECORD THE ACTIVITIES IN THE FIELD. DELEGATION BELIEVES, THEREFORE, THERE WOULD BE NO DEGRADATION OF OUR MONITORING CAPABILITY BY MOVING TO A DIVISION

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EQUIVALENT VERSUS A ONE-HALF OR MORE OF TWO DIVISION THRESHOLD.

8. COMPLEXITY OF "DIVISION EQUIVALENT." AS SET OUT IN THE OSD PAPER, THE CONCEPT OF DIVISION EQUIVALENT RAISES SEVERAL COMPLICATED ISSUES: RESTRICTED AREAS, DEFINITION OF DIVISION EQUIVALENT, AND GEOGRAPHIC BOUNDARIES. WE BELIEVE THE LATTER TWO CAN BE HANDLED IN A RELATIVELY SIMPLE AND STRAIGHTFORWARD MANNER.

-- RESTRICTED AREAS. THIS PROBLEM, OF COURSE, WILL HAUNT US REGARDLESS OF THE THRESHOLD WE AGREE UPON. IT IS THE DELEGATION ASSESSMENT THAT A RESTRICTED AREA DEFINITION AS NARROW AS THAT ENVISAGED IN THE OSD PAPER WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO GET AGREEMENT ON AT THE CONFERENCE. THEREFORE, WE DO NOT WANT TO ABANDON THE CURRENT OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT BASED ON "NORMAL

PEACETIME LOCATION" IN FAVOR OF ONE BASED ON A NARROW DEFINITION OF RESTRICTED AREAS. FURTHERMORE, DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT THE USE OF A DIVISION EQUIVALENT THRESHOLD CAN BE CONSISTENT WITH MAINTAINING THE CURRENT CONCEPT OF OUT-OF-GARRISON AND NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATIONS. THE RESTRICTED AREA PROBLEM AND THE TURKS UNWILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE LOCATION FOR FORCES PARTICIPATING IN FORECAST ACTIVITIES ALSO MAKE A STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD OF ONE-HALF OR MORE ELEMENTS OF TWO DIVISIONS A PROBLEMATIC SOLUTION, WITHOUT OFFERING THE BENEFITS OF A DIVISION EQUIVALENT.

-- DEFINITION OF DIVISION EQUIVALENT. DELEGATION BELIEVES REQUIRING EACH COUNTRY TO DEFINE ITS OWN DIVISION EQUIVALENT IS NOT AN IMPOSSIBLE TASK, ALTHOUGH IT COULD RESULT IN A STAND-OFF WITH THE EAST REFUSING TO DEFINE ACCURATELY A DIVISION EQUIVALENT FORMATION (I.E., AS 4 REGIMENTS). AT THIS POINT WE ARE TRYING TO ASSESS THE POTENTIAL DIFFICULTIES OF THIS REQUIREMENT AS WELL AS EXPLORE OTHER POSSIBLE MEANS OF HANDLING THE DEFINITIONAL PROBLEM.

-- GEOGRAPHIC BOUNDARIES. AS EXPLAINED IN THE OSD PAPER, A DIVISION EQUIVALENT THRESHOLD WOULD REQUIRE SOME MECHANISM FOR EXCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY THAT NATO REGIMENTS FROM DIFFERENT DIVISIONS, FAR APART IN LOCATION AND PURPOSE, WOULD BE CAPTURED UNDER THE THRESHOLD. DELEGATION BELIEVES THE NEGOTIATION OF AGREED GEOGRAPHIC BOUNDARIES WOULD BE A DIFFICULT AND DIVISIVE EXERCISE AND THEREFORE, RECOMMENDS THAT WE MAINTAIN THE CONCEPT OF "A COMMON ACTIVITY UNDER A SINGLE COMMAND." DELEGATION RECOGNIZES SOME POTENTIAL DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN DEMONSTRATING "COMMON ACTIVITY UNDER A SINGLE COMMAND" IN THE CASE OF NON-NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES. DELEGATION BELIEVES IT HIGHLY PROBABLE THAT NON-NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES EXCEEDING AGREED THRESHOLDS WOULD INVOLVE MILITARY UNITS IN THE SAME TRAINING AREAS

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OR OPERATING CONTIGUOUSLY. PHYSICAL PROXIMITY WOULD, IN

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AND OF ITSELF, MAKE THE DEMONSTRATION OF "COMMON ACTIVITY" EASIER. FOR FORECAST OR NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES, THE SUBORDINATION PROVIDED IN THE FORECAST MUST BE SUFFICIENT TO MAKE THE CASE FOR "COMMON ACTIVITY UNDER A SINGLE COMMAND" (I.E., REGIMENTS SUBORDINATE TO A CERTAIN DIVISION, WILL, WHEN PARTICIPATING IN AN ACTIVITY, BE ASSUMED TO BE PARTICIPATING UNDER THE SINGLE COMMAND OF THAT DIVISION). FURTHERMORE, DESPITE THE POTENTIAL DIFFICULTIES WITH NON-NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES, THE CONCEPT OF "COMMON ACTIVITY" IS A BASIC AND MILITARILY REASONABLE ONE. DELEGATION WOULD NOT WANT TO ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH CONFERENCE SUPPORT FOR NOTIFYING SMALL INDIVIDUAL AND INDEPENDENT ACTIVITIES.

9. DELEGATION VIEW IS THAT WHILE NOT A PERFECT SOLUTION, A DIVISION EQUIVALENT THRESHOLD HAS SIGNIFICANT NEGOTIATING AND SUBSTANTIVE ADVANTAGES OVER A THRESHOLD OF ONE-HALF OR MORE ELEMENTS OF TWO DIVISIONS. DELEGATION BELIEVES IT CAN BE PURSUED WHILE MAINTAINING THE CURRENT APPROACH TO OUT-OF-GARRISON AND INFORMATION EXCHANGE, WITHOUT COMPLICATING OUR VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS OR PLACING UNDUE CONFIDENCE IN A SOLUTION TO THE RESTRICTED AREA ISSUE. DELEGATION REQUESTS WASHINGTON AUTHORITY TO PROCEED WITH THE EXPLORATION OF THE CONCEPT OF "DIVISION EQUIVALENT" WITH KEY ALLIES.

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**S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 01721**  
**SUBJECT: DIVISION-EQUIVALENT THRESHOLD**  
**REF: STOCKHOLM 01447**  
 1. CDE IX - 094  
 2. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

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 3 **SUMMARY: USDEL CDE BELIEVES THAT THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGES, BOTH TACTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE, TO PURSUING A "DIVISION EQUIVALENT" FORMULATION AS THE BASIS FOR NOTIFICATION. THE FOLLOWING IS FURTHER DELEGATION REASONING ON THIS ISSUE. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THIS CABLE DOES NOT PRESENT ALL DELEGATION ARGUMENTS, BUT ONLY THE ESSENTIAL POINTS THAT WE BELIEVE WILL FURTHER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS COMPLEX ISSUE AND STIMULATE DISCUSSION NEEDED TO RESOLVE IT DURING THE INTERSESSIONAL. END SUMMARY**

4. **DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN USDEL MEMBERS AND WASHINGTON INDICATED THAT THE DELEGATION'S VIEWS ON "DIVISION EQUIVALENT" AS PRESENTED IN REFERENCE REQUIRE ADDITIONAL CLARIFICATION. AS NOTED IN REFERENCE, THE DELEGATION WAS STILL DEBATING HOW TO HANDLE TWO KEY ISSUES: HOW TO DEFINE 'DIVISION EQUIVALENT' AND WHERE TO SET THE EQUIPMENT THRESHOLD. BOTH ISSUES HAVE NOW BEEN FIRMED UP WITHIN THE DELEGATION, AND THE FOLLOWING SHOULD PROVIDE THE NEEDED ELABORATION TO CLARIFY DELEGATION THOUGHTS ON THESE ISSUES.**

5. **DEFINITION OF A DIVISION EQUIVALENT: THE CONCEPT OF A "DIVISION EQUIVALENT" HAS THE SAME OPERATIONAL IMPACT AS "ONE- HALF OR MORE OF TWO DIVISION" SINCE ONE-HALF OR MORE OF TWO SOVIET DIVISIONS IS 4 REGIMENTS, I.E., A "DIVISION EQUIVALENT". THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGES TO USING A "DIVISION EQUIVALENT" IN LIEU OF THE LATTER FORMULATION. FIRST, IT PROVIDES ONE SIMPLE DEFINITION OF A DIVISION THAT IS APPLICABLE TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES REGARDLESS OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THEIR GROUND FORCES. THE MANDATE LANGUAGE ON EQUALITY OF RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS AS WELL AS CSCE PRINCIPLES MAKES SUCH A DEFINITION ALMOST A SINE QUA NON FOR ACCEPTANCE. SECOND, IT PROVIDES NATO A TACTICAL ADVANTAGE OVER THE EAST BY ALLOWING NATO TO AGREE "RELUCTANTLY" TO A COMPROMISE VERSION OF THE NNA PROPOSAL FOR A "DIVISION EQUIVALENT". LASTLY, IT GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF WESTERN FLEXIBILITY IN MOVING AWAY FROM THE 'ONE-HALF OR MORE...' FORMULATION IN SC.1/A WHICH HAS NOT FOUND ANY**

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**SUPPORT OUTSIDE NATO BECAUSE OF PERCEPTIONS THAT IT RESULTS IN UNEQUAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. IT THUS PROVIDES LANGUAGE THAT IS MORE ACCEPTABLE, AND HENCE MORE NEGOTIABLE.**

6. **THE DELEGATION HAS DROPPED FROM SERIOUS CONSIDERATION THE POSSIBLE REQUIREMENT FOR EACH STATE TO**

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PROVIDE ITS OWN DEFINITION OF ITS "DIVISION EQUIVALENT" BY DECLARING THE NUMBER OF BRIGADES/REGIMENTS IT CONTAINS. APART FROM THE NEGOTIATING DIFFICULTIES WE FORESEE WITH THIS APPROACH, THE DELEGATION'S PRINCIPAL CONCERN IS THAT IT WOULD ALLOW STATES TO CIRCUMVENT NOTIFICATION BY CONDUCTING EXERCISES WITH LESS THAN THE AGREED NUMBER OF BRIGADES/REGIMENTS, BUT WITH PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT LEVELS THAT EXCEED ESTABLISHED THRESHOLDS. LANGUAGE CONTAINED IN MEASURE 3 OF SC.1/A AND IN SC.7 PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH CIRCUMVENTION BY STIPULATING THAT ANY OTHER GROUP OF FORCES NOT ORGANIZED INTO A DIVISION IS SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION WHENEVER IT EXCEEDS ESTABLISHED PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS. INCORPORATING SUCH A PROVISION INTO THE DEFINITION OF A "DIVISION EQUIVALENT", HOWEVER, WOULD NULLIFY THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE DECLARATION OF INDIVIDUAL DIVISION EQUIVALENTS SINCE THE BASIS FOR NOTIFICATION WOULD SWITCH FROM STRUCTURE TO PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT. EXAMPLE: IF THE U.S. "DIVISION EQUIVALENT" WAS SET AT 3 BRIGADES AND THE EQUIPMENT THRESHOLD WAS 250 TANKS, THE U.S. WOULD BE REQUIRED TO NOTIFY EXERCISES CONDUCTED AT LESS THAN ITS DECLARED "DIVISION EQUIVALENT." IF THE EQUIPMENT THRESHOLD WAS RAISED TO REFLECT ACCURATELY 3 U.S. BRIGADES, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE SET AT BETWEEN 290 AND 348 TANKS: SUCH A HIGH THRESHOLD, HOWEVER, WOULD PREVENT NOTIFICATION OF A SOVIET "DIVISION EQUIVALENT"--4 REGIMENTS. THIS IS THE "CATCH 22" THAT RESULTS FROM ATTEMPTING TO CREATE A BALANCE BETWEEN INHERENTLY UNEQUAL STRUCTURES.

7. THE USDEL BELIEVES THAT TRYING TO ARTIFICIALLY CREATE A STRUCTURAL BALANCE BETWEEN U.S. AND SOVIET DIVISIONS WILL NOT ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES. THE DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT THE BEST APPROACH TO TAKE IN DEFINING A "DIVISION EQUIVALENT" IS TO ESTABLISH A NUMERICAL BALANCE, NOT JUST BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION, BUT BETWEEN ALL CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS. THIS IS THE ONLY WAY TO REFLECT ACCURATELY THE OVERALL CAPABILITY, AND THUS THE THREAT POTENTIAL, OF THE FORCES IN QUESTION. SOME MIGHT VIEW THIS APPROACH AS A MAJOR DEVIATION FROM THE NATO POSITION ON THE PRIMACY OF THE STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD: IT IS NOT. IT SERVES TO UNDERSCORE, NOT DIMINISH, THE IMPORTANCE OF STRUCTURE BY ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE, YET SIMPLE DEFINITION OF A DIVISION; ONE THAT APPLIES TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES AND RETAINS THE ADVANTAGES OF MONITORING STRUCTURE AS A KEY INDICATOR OF COMPLIANCE. THIS IS IN ESSENCE WHAT WE HAVE LONG BEEN STRIVING TO ACHIEVE IN THIS CONFERENCE. USDEL BELIEVES THAT THE FOLLOWING FORMULATION STRENGTHENS ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF A STRUCTURAL

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THRESHOLD, WHILE PROVIDING THE TACTICAL ADVANTAGES REQUIRED TO SUCCESSFULLY NEGOTIATE NOTIFICATION PARAMETERS THAT PRESERVE OUR OBJECTIVES INTACT.

NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES

A MILITARY LAND FORCE ACTIVITY, THAT IS, ALL MILITARY EXERCISE ACTIVITY INVOLVING ONE OR MORE GROUND FORCE DIVISION EQUIVALENT FORMATIONS, CARRYING OUT A COMMON MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS, AWAY FROM THEIR NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATIONS, INCLUDING THE MOVEMENT OF TROOPS TO AND FROM THE EXERCISE AREA, WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION.

A DIVISION EQUIVALENT FORMATION, FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS AGREEMENT, IS DEFINED AS A MILITARY GROUND FORCE COMPOSED OF

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MAJOR COMBAT UNITS ON THE BRIGADE/REGIMENT LEVEL, THAT IS, TANK, INFANTRY, MOTORIZED RIFLE, OR AIRBORNE BRIGADES/REGIMENTS AND AT LEAST ONE SUPPORTING ARTILLERY, ENGINEER OR HELICOPTER ELEMENT, WITH

--AN AGGREGATE TOTAL OF AT LEAST . . . COMBAT, COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT TROOPS; OR WITH

--A TOTAL OF AT LEAST . . . TANKS.

EXERCISE IS DEFINED ACCORDING TO THE DEFINITION OF THE RUSSIAN WORD UCHENIYE AS CONTAINED IN VOYENNY ENTSIKLOPEDICHESHIY SLOVAR, DATED 1983.

THE USE OF THE PHRASE "MAJOR COMBAT UNITS", WITHOUT REGARD TO NUMBER, COMPENSATES FOR STRUCTURAL VARIATION AMONG DIVISIONS, WHILE INDICATING THAT AT LEAST 2 BRIGADES/REGIMENTS MUST BE AWAY FROM THEIR NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATIONS CARRYING OUT A COMMON MILITARY ACTIVITY. THE ADVANTAGES OF THIS FORMULATION ARE TWOFOLD. FIRST, IT PROVIDES A STRUCTURAL BALANCE AT THE DIVISION LEVEL BY DEFINING "DIVISION EQUIVALENT" IN TERMS COMMON TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES (BRIGADES/REGIMENTS, PERSONNEL, AND EQUIPMENT). SECOND, IT ELIMINATES THE NECESSITY OF AN ADDITIONAL PROVISION FOR THE NOTIFICATION OF EXERCISES CONDUCTED WITH FORCES NOT ORGANIZED INTO A DIVISION BY NOT SPECIFYING THAT BRIGADES/REGIMENTS ARE SUBORDINATE TO A DIVISION HEADQUARTERS. THIS FORMULATION, THEREFORE, COVERS ALL CONTINGENCIES.

8. EQUIPMENT THRESHOLD: FOUR OBJECTIVES WERE CONSIDERED BY THE USDEL IN SELECTING 250 TANKS AS THE EQUIPMENT THRESHOLD FOR A "DIVISION EQUIVALENT:" 1) THE THRESHOLD MUST PRECLUDE THE NOTIFICATION OF U.S.

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EXERCISES CONDUCTED BY AT LEAST 2 ARMOR BRIGADES, I.E., IT MUST BE GREATER THAN 232; 2) IT MUST CORRESPOND AS

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CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE TO A LEVEL OF EQUIPMENT CONTAINED IN A NATO AND WTO DIVISION IN ORDER TO REFLECT A "DIVISION EQUIVALENT;" 3) IT MUST APPROXIMATE THE LEVEL OF EQUIPMENT EXPECTED TO PARTICIPATE IN SOVIET EXERCISES CONDUCTED WITH ELEMENTS OF 2 DIVISIONS, I.E., 4 REGIMENTS; AND 4) IT MUST BE LOW ENOUGH TO PROVIDE INSPECTORS A REALISTIC TARGET BY WHICH TO MEASURE COMPLIANCE.

9. THE FIRST OBJECTIVE TO PROTECT U.S. ARMY REQUIREMENTS WAS OF PARAMOUNT CONCERN, AND THE 250 TANK THRESHOLD PRECLUDES NOTIFICATION OF 2 U.S. ARMOR BRIGADES. THIS FIGURE ALSO REPRESENTS A CROSS SECTION OF THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF TANKS IN A NATO AND WTO MOTORIZED RIFLE/TANK DIVISION, THEREBY REFLECTING NOT ONLY A "DIVISION EQUIVALENT," BUT THE NUMBER OF TANKS EXPECTED IN EXERCISES CONDUCTED WITH 4 SOVIET REGIMENTS. THE FINAL OBJECTIVE TO FACILITATE THE TASK OF INSPECTORS IS ACCOMPLISHED BY ESTABLISHING A LOW THRESHOLD FOR MONITORING COMPLIANCE.

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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01909

SUBJECT: FRG POSITION ON CDE THRESHOLDS

1. CDE IX - 106.

2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. ACTING ON INSTRUCTIONS, GENERAL SCHMIDBAUER, SENIOR FRG MILREP AT CDE, MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO US DEPUTY:

- -- THE FRG CANNOT BECOME A SPECIAL ARMS CONTROL ZONE WITHIN THE CDE ZONE; NOTIFICATION PARAMETERS WHICH ARE FINALLY AGREED MUST FIND SOME APPLICATION TO ALLIES OUTSIDE THE FRG;

- -- THE SOVIETS MUST NOTIFY EXERCISES ON THEIR TERRITORY IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO CONFIRM THAT THE ZONE EXTENDS TO THE URAL MOUNTAINS, I.E., SOVIET NOTIFICATIONS MUST OCCUR IN AREAS BEYOND THE CURRENT HELSINKI 250 KILOMETER REQUIREMENT.

- -- FRG ANALYSIS SHOWS THAT IF THE NUMERICAL TOTALS WERE CHANGED TO 10,000 TROOPS, THE WARSAW PACT WOULD HAVE TO NOTIFY 25 EXERCISES, 11 OF WHICH WOULD BE IN THE USSR; THERE WOULD BE, ACCORDING TO THEIR ANALYSIS, APPROX 17 NOTIFICATIONS ON FRG TERRITORY PLUS "SOME" OTHERS BY OTHER NATO COUNTRIES.

- -- THE SAME ANALYSIS SHOWS THAT IF THE NUMERICAL FIGURE WERE CHANGED TO 15,000, THE WARSAW PACT WOULD NOTIFY ONLY FOUR EXERCISES ON SOVIET TERRITORY, NONE EAST OF THE HELSINKI 250 KILOMETER STRIP; NATO NOTIFICATIONS AT THIS LEVEL WOULD OCCUR ONLY ON FRG TERRITORY.

4. AMB. HANSEN INFORMED SCHMIDBAUER THAT WE BELIEVE THE SOVIETS HAVE A REQUIREMENT TO EXERCISE THEIR DIVISIONS ON A RELATIVELY REGULAR BASIS, IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR LOCATION, ACCORDING TO THEIR MANNING STATUS AND THAT SHOULD ENSURE NOTIFICATIONS BEYOND THE 250 KILOMETER STRIP. SCHMIDBAUER INDICATED BONN WOULD BE MOST INTERESTED IN US ANALYSIS AS TO THE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF SOVIET EXERCISES UNDER VARIOUS NUMERICAL THRESHOLDS.

5. REQUEST APPROPRIATE WASHINGTON AGENCIES EVALUATE THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY BONN IN THE CONTEXT OF CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF A THRESHOLD FOR USE IN STOCKHOLM NEXT SESSION.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STOCKHOLM 00636

1. CDE IX - 003

2. AS THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE (CDE) MOVES INTO ITS FINAL STAGES AND ASSUMES HIGHER VISIBILITY, WE NEED TO BE SURE WE ARE ALL SPEAKING ABOUT IT IN THE SAME WAY IN OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS. FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN POINTS USDEL CDE IS MAKING PUBLICLY ABOUT THE PURPOSE OF THE CONFERENCE AND THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME IT SEEKS ESTABLISH. (NOTE THAT THESE POINTS REPRESENT A SHIFT ON SOME POINTS FROM EARLIER POSITIONS.)

3. -- THE CDE IS A NEGOTIATION AIMED AT RISK REDUCTION AS OPPOSED TO ARMS REDUCTION, WHICH IS THE PURPOSE OF OTHER, PERHAPS MORE TRADITIONAL ARMS CONTROL TALKS; THE TWO TRACKS ARE MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY AND PURSUIT OF BOTH IS A BASIC OBJECTIVE OF US SECURITY POLICY;

-- SUCCESS IN CDE WILL MAKE THE MILITARY SITUATION IN EUROPE MORE PREDICTABLE AND THUS MORE STABLE BY ESTABLISHING A NORM FOR ACCEPTED, ROUTINE MILITARY POSTURES AND ACTIVITIES ON THE CONTINENT;

-- IT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO LOWERING THE BARRIERS OF SUSPICION AND MISTRUST WHICH NOW DIVIDE EAST AND WEST AND WILL, THUS, MAKE THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE LESS LIKELY AND REDUCE THE RISK OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE;

-- IT WILL MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT AND POLITICALLY MUCH MORE COSTLY FOR ANY STATE TO USE MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND THE THREAT OF FORCE FOR POLITICAL INTIMIDATION (AS HAPPENED IN POLAND IN 1981 AND IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN 1968).

4. OUR STANDARD LANGUAGE ON CDE EMPHASIZES THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL POINTS:

-- ANY AGREEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES WILL BE CONSISTENT WITH THE MADRID MANDATE; IT WILL BE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT AND VERIFIABLE;

-- THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE CSCE PROCESS BEGUN IN HELSINKI IN 1975; THE RESULTS IN STOCKHOLM WILL BE EVALUATED BY THE VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING (BEGINNING IN NOVEMBER, 1986), WHICH WILL ALSO EVALUATE PROGRESS IN ALL THE OTHER PARTS OF THE OVERALL CSCE PROCESS, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS. MAINTAINING THE BALANCE AMONG ALL PARTS OF CSCE WILL BE AN IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE OF THE US IN VIENNA;

-- THROUGHOUT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, ALLIED UNITY HAS BEEN AN IMPORTANT ASSET IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS; IT HAS BEEN A KEY FACTOR IN KEEPING CDE TO ITS PROPER COURSE AS A CONFERENCE DEVOTED TO

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DEVELOPING CONCRETE MILITARY MEASURES, AS OPPOSED TO DECLARATORY MEASURES.

5. CONSULTATIONS WITH WASHINGTON AGENCIES IN RECENT MONTHS HAVE PERSUADED US TO DROP A COUPLE OF ELEMENTS IN OUR PUBLIC POSITION WHICH HAVE NOT HELD UP TO THE SCRUTINY OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. THEY ARE:

-- SURPRISE ATTACK: OUR CONCLUSION IS THAT THE KIND OF CSBM'S IN THE NATO PACKAGE IS LARGELY IRRELEVANT TO THE PROBLEM OF SURPRISE ATTACK. FURTHERMORE, CITING SURPRISE ATTACK AS A REASON FOR CSBM'S WEAKENS OUR ARGUMENT AGAINST NUMERICAL CONSTRAINTS, WHICH COULD BE SAID TO MAKE SURPRISE ATTACK MORE DIFFICULT;

-- MISINTERPRETATION/MISCALCULATION: WE ARE PERSUADED BY THE ARGUMENT THAT THE DANGERS OF FALSE NEGATIVE INDICATORS ARE GREATER THAN THE DANGERS OF FALSE POSITIVES. EMPHASIZING THE DANGER OF WAR THROUGH MISCALCULATION COULD MAKE NATO MORE RELUCTANT TO RESPOND TO WARNING INDICATORS AND MORE PRONE TO INSIST ON "CONSULTATIONS" RATHER THAN DEFENSIVE MILITARY STEPS AS A RESPONSE TO AMBIGUOUS SOVIET MOVES.

6. IF WASHINGTON AGENCIES HAVE OTHER CENTRAL THEMES TO SUGGEST, USDEL WOULD WELCOME THEM. OTHERWISE, USG PUBLIC COMMENTS, STATEMENTS AND MATERIALS ON CDE SHOULD BE REVIEWED FOR CONSISTENCY WITH THIS LINE.

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END OF MESSAGE

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S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 00901  
SUBJECT: MEASURE ONE AND THE TURKISH PROBLEM  
REF: A.) STOCKHOLM 00819; B.) ANKARA 01243  
1. CDE IX - 032.  
2. S - ENTIRE TEXT.  
3. USDEL CDE APPRECIATES AMERICAN EMBASSY ANKARA'S QUICK RESPONSE (REF B) TO OUR SUGGESTIONS OUTLINED IN REF A. WE RECOMMEND THAT EMBASSY ANKARA SHOULD HOLD OFF ON APPROACHING THE TURKISH MFA UNTIL USDEL RECEIVES AN INITIAL RESPONSE FROM THE TURKISH CDE DELEGATION IN STOCKHOLM. (WE ARE UNSURE IF TURKISH DELEGATION, IN FACT, HAS APPROACHED THE MFA ON THIS MATTER, SINCE THE TGS AND MOD HAVE BEEN THE FOCAL POINTS OF DISCUSSION SO FAR.)  
4. USDEL CDE WILL INFORM AMERICAN EMBASSY ANKARA, AS WELL AS ALL OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES, OF TURKISH FEEDBACK TO OUR PROPOSALS IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT OF THAT INFORMATION.  
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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01260

SUBJECT: TURKISH RESPONSE ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE

REF: STOCKHOLM 00819

1. CDE IX - 057.

2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. SUMMARY: DEPUTY HEAD OF TURKISH CDE DELEGATION MET WITH MEMBERS OF USDEL TO PROVIDE OFFICIAL TURKISH POSITION ON POSSIBLE WAYS OF DEALING WITH THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AS OUTLINED IN THE OSD PAPER OF 27 DECEMBER 1985 AS EXPLAINED TO HIM PREVIOUSLY BY USDEL. TURKISH DEPUTY PROVIDED A PAPER WHICH EXPLAINS THAT ANKARA IS WILLING TO: PROVIDE INFORMATION ON FORCES INVOLVED IN NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES DOWN TO THE REGIMENT/ BRIGADE LEVEL; PROVIDE A LIST OR MAP TRACE OF ITS RESTRICTED AREAS BASED UPON CONCEPT WHICH MAKES A GARRISON TOWN SYNONOMOUS WITH RESTRICTED AREA; IDENTIFY WHAT A DIVISIONEQUIVALENT WOULD BE IN THE TURKISH ARMY. TURKS SEE A NEED TO PUSH FOR ACCEPTANCE OF MEASURE I WITH EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION DOWN TO DIVISION LEVEL ONLY.

END SUMMARY

4. IN RESPONSE TO CONSULTATIONS IN STOCKHOLM BETWEEN USDEL MEMBERS (REF A) AND DEPUTY HEAD OF TURKISH CDE DELEGATION BOLUKBASI, TURKISH AUTHORITIES HAVE AGREED TO THE PROVISIONS SET FORTH IN THE FOLLOWING THREE PARAGRAPHS WHICH WERE GIVEN TO USDEL MEMBERS IN WRITING:

FIRST STEP:

- A. LISTS OF UNITS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF ANNUAL FORECASTS (MEASURE II) WITH SUBORDINATION INDICATED DOWN TO BRIGADE/ REGIMENT LEVEL MAY BE PROVIDED. INFORMATION ON LOCATIONS OF THESE UNITS WILL NOT BE GIVEN, AS NOT REQUIRED BY THE NEW U.S. APPROACH.
- B. DESIGNATION OF EACH COUNTRY'S RESTRICTED AREAS MAY BE PROVIDED. EVERY LOCATION, TOWN, CITY WHERE THERE IS A GARRISON OF A MILITARY UNIT WILL BE CONSIDERED A RESTRICTED AREA. THIS CAN BE DONE THROUGH EXCHANGING MAPS MAPTRACES OR LISTS INCLUDING THE NAMES OF THE TOWNS, CITIES.

SECOND STEP:

- A. DESIGNATION OF RESTRICTED AREAS (SAME AS OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH "B" OF THE FIRST STEP.
- B. EACH COUNTRY WILL IDENTIFY WHAT IS A DIVISION-EQUIVALENT FOR IT.

5. NOTING THAT THESE PROVISIONS WOULD APPLY REGARDLESS OF WHICH OF THE TWO STEPS WERE ADOPTED, THE TURKISH PAPER ALSO ADDRESSED THE CONTENT OF MEASURE ONE IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER:

- A. INDEPENDENT INFORMATION CAN BE EXCHANGED AS REQUIRED UNDER MEASURE I OF SC-1/AMPLIFIED ON DESIGNATION, NORMAL HEADQUARTERS LOCATION AND COMPOSITION OF GROUND FORCES DOWN TO THE LEVEL OF DIVISION.
- B. IF SIMILAR INFORMATION ON LAND-BASED AIR FORCES

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IS REQUIRED, WE ARE ALSO PREPARED TO PROVIDE SUCH INFORMATION ON WING/AIR REGIMENT FORMATIONS, PROVIDED THAT THE TERM WING/AIR REGIMENT FORMATION IS QUALIFIED AS INCLUDING AT LEAST TWO SQUADRONS OR COMPRISING AT LEAST 40 AIRCRAFT.

6. BOLUKBASI CONFIRMED THAT EITHER APPROACH WAS ACCEPTABLE TO ANKARA. (COMMENT: BOTH BOLUKBASI AND AMBASSADOR OZGUL INDICATED TO U.S. DEPUTY THAT TURKISH DEL AT NATO ARGUED AGAINST TURKISH ACCEPTANCE OF EITHER APPROACH. END COMMENT) USDEL DID NOT ASK IF THE TWO APPROACHES COULD BE COMBINED OR IF WE COULD CHOOSE SELECTIVELY FROM THE FOUR PARAGRAPHS. BOLUKBASI CONFIRMED THAT TURKISH WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE SUBORDINATION APPLIED ONLY TO THOSE UNITS INVOLVED IN ACTIVITIES WHICH WOULD BE INCLUDED ON THE ANNUAL FORECAST; THEY WILL NOT PROVIDE SUCH INFORMATION DOWN TO BRIGADE/REGIMENT LEVEL ON ALL THEIR FORCES AS CALLED FOR IN MEASURE ONE. WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF MEASURE II, THEY WILL PROVIDE INFORMATION WHICH INCLUDES ARMY, CORPS, DIVISION, AS WELL AS BRIGADE AND REGIMENT.

7. IN INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS AFTER BOLUKBASI HAD DELIVERED THE TURKISH PAPER, HE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- -- ANY FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE MEASURE I ISSUE SHOULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE 16, I.E., THE NATO CAUCUS IN STOCKHOLM. THIS SHOULD NOT BE ISSUE PURSUED FURTHER ON A BILATERAL BASIS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND TURKISH DELEGATIONS.
- -- IF ANY WESTERN DELEGATION IS OF THE VIEW THAT A MORE FORTHCOMING TURKISH POSITION IS REQUIRED, THAT DELEGATION SHOULD MAKE THEIR VIEWS KNOWN WITHIN THE NATO CAUCUS.
- -- THE ALLIANCE SHOULD CONTINUE TO ARGUE FOR MEASURE I AT THE DIVISION LEVEL. IF ANY CHANGE IS CONTEMPLATED, THE TURKISH DELEGATION WOULD APPRECIATE CONSULTATIONS IN ADVANCE.

8. BOLUKBASI, IN EXPLAINING THAT HIS AUTHORITIES HAVE NO DIFFICULTY WITH THE APPROACHES EXPLAINED IN PARA 4, SAID HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND THE NECESSITY FOR IDENTIFYING AND EXCHANGING LISTS OF RESTRICTED AREAS. NOTING THE INABILITY OF THE IMS AT NATO TO REACH A COMMON POSITION AFTER THREE YEARS OF DELIBERATIONS, HE QUESTIONED THE ADVISABILITY OF TRYING TO NEGOTIATE SUCH A DIFFICULT ISSUE AMONG 35 IN THE TWENTY OR SO WEEKS WHICH REMAIN. IN HIS VIEW, ALL THAT WAS NEEDED WAS TO ENSURE THAT RESTRICTED AREAS, AS DEFINED IN MEASURE 5, ARE NOT LIABLE TO INSPECTION OR OBSERVATION AND TO MAKE SURE THAT TRAINING AREAS CANNOT BE DESIGNATED AS RESTRICTED AREAS.

9. FOR USMISSION USNATO: IN LIGHT OF PARA 6 AND 7 ADVISE NOT TO INITIATE ANY MEASURE ONE DISCUSSION WITH

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TURKISH OR ANY OTHER DEL WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH  
USCDE DEL IN STOCKHOLM.  
10. FOR WASHINGTON: WE DO NOT BELIEVE AN APPROACH TO THE  
TURKS IN ANKARA ON THIS ISSUE IS NECESSARY AT THIS TIME.  
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 00974

SUBJECT: GRINEVSKY VISIT TO WASHINGTON

1. CDE IX-037 - CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ON RETURNING TO STOCKHOLM, I TOLD SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY THAT I WOULD LIKE TO FORMALIZE MY INVITATION TO HIM TO VISIT WASHINGTON FOR CDE CONSULTATIONS DURING THE MARCH-APRIL BREAK. HE SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE SOVIET REPLY WOULD COME FROM MOSCOW, BUT WOULD BE POSITIVE.

3. HE SAID HE WAS IN OUR HANDS AS TO DATES AND PROGRAM. GIVEN THE FACT THAT THERE WILL PROBABLY BE A NAC IN BRUSSELS ON APRIL 11 AND A PRE-NAC CAUCUS APRIL 10, AND THAT THERE MIGHT BE AN OCCASION FOR ME TO MEET WITH THE PRESIDENT APRIL 7 OR 8, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT APRIL 3-4 MIGHT BE THE DATES TO SHOOT FOR. IF THIS IS AGREEABLE TO WASHINGTON THE FORMAL PROPOSAL MIGHT BEST BE MADE IN MOSCOW AND PARALLELED HERE.

4. I ASKED GRINEVSKY IF HE WANTED TO BRING ANYONE WITH HIM BUT HE DID NOT RISE TO THE BAIT.

5. AS TO A PROGRAM, WE SUGGEST SOMETHING SIMILAR TO THAT SET UP WHEN GRINEVSKY VISITED WASHINGTON IN 1984. WE DO NOT HAVE THE RELEVANT TRAFFIC, BUT WE RECALL THAT HE BACKED OUT OF MEETINGS WITH JCS AND OSD AT THE LAST MOMENT (POSSIBLY BECAUSE SOVIETS ARE UNABLE TO RECIPROCATE).

NEVERTHELESS WE THINK IT WORTHWHILE TO PROPOSE SUCH MEETINGS THIS TIME, AS WELL AS MEETINGS WITH STATE, NSC AND ACDA. WE SHOULD HOST A LUNCH IN THE DEPARTMENT; PRESUMABLY SOVIET EMBASSY WILL HAVE A RECEPTION AS WELL.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01678

SUBJECT: GRINEVSKY VISIT

REF: STATE 061341

1. CDE IX-092. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. GRINEVSKY SAYS THAT HE HAS HEARD NOTHING FROM MOSCOW ABOUT HIS WASHINGTON VISIT BUT DATES OF APRIL 3 AND 4 LOOK GOOD TO HIM IN PRINCIPLE. HE WILL CONTACT MOSCOW BEFORE THE END OF THE SESSION AND TRY TO CONFIRM BEFORE THE END OF THE SESSION ON MARCH 14.
3. MEANWHILE WE SUGGEST THAT DEPARTMENT GO AHEAD AND BLOCK OUT A SCHEDULE ALONG THE LINES OF REFTEL. GRINEVSKY SAID THAT THE LIST OF APPOINTMENTS SUGGESTED SOUNDED FINE TO HIM.
4. AS WAS THE CASE IN 1984, WE SUGGEST THAT THE FIRST MORNING SESSION BE A BARRY/GRINEVSKY BILATERAL. WE WOULD ALSO SUGGEST A 7TH FLOOR LUNCH APRIL 3. BARRY WOULD PLAN TO INVITE GRINEVSKY TO DINNER ON APRIL 4.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STOCKHOLM 01047  
SUBJECT: ODINZOV REQUEST  
REF: ROME 30L9  
L. CDE IX - 040  
2. LIMITED OFFICIAL USE - ENTIRE TEXT.  
3. WE WOULD BE GLAD TO MEET WITH ODINZOV TO DISCUSS  
CDE AND ITS RELATION TO US POLICY TOWARDS EUROPE. WE  
WOULD NOT BE IN A POSITION TO ENGAGE IN SPECULATIVE  
DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM ON BACKGROUND OR ANY OTHER BASIS.  
IF ODINZOV WOULD LIKE TO VISIT ON THAT BASIS WE WOULD  
WELCOME HIM HERE. PLEASE ADVISE.  
BARRY  
END OF MESSAGE  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01143  
SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF FINNISH EXERCISE  
L. CDE IX - 047  
2. C - REQUEST ANY INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON FINNISH  
EXERCISE TAMMI 86 REPORTED IN JANE'S DEFENSE WEEKLY AS  
HELD BETWEEN 17-22 JANUARY, 1986. WAS THIS EXERCISE  
NOTIFIED UNDER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT? DID U.S.  
OBSERVERS ATTEND?  
3. U - JANE'S DEFENSE WEEKLY 8 FEBRUARY REPORTED THAT  
TAMMI 86 WAS FINLAND'S LARGEST MILITARY EXERCISE IN  
OVER FORTY YEARS INVOLVING TWELVE THOUSAND MEN AND TWO  
THOUSAND VEHICLES. ACCORDING TO JANE'S, MILITARY  
ATTACHES FROM FIFTEEN COUNTRIES OBSERVED THE EXERCISE.  
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END OF MESSAGE

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S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 01227  
 SUBJECT: CDE COMMENTS ON COMPARISON OF MBFR ASSOCIATED  
 MEASURES AND CDE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-  
 BUILDING MEASURES

REF: MBFR VIENNA 131

1. CDE IX - 053
2. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

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 3. BEGIN SUMMARY: U.S. CDE DEL APPRECIATES USEFUL  
 COMPARISON OF WESTERN CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING  
 MEASURES (CSBM'S) AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES (AM'S)  
 PROVIDED REFTEL. WE BELIEVE THE SIMILARITY OF SEVERAL  
 OF THE MEASURES BEING NEGOTIATED IN STOCKHOLM AND VIENNA  
 INDICATES A NEED FOR INCREASED CONTACT BETWEEN OUR  
 DELEGATIONS. SPECIFICALLY, WE NOTE THAT THE "CSBM-7"  
 CALLING FOR A CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION IDENTIFIED REFTEL  
 IS NOT PART OF THE AGREED NATO PACKAGE AND THAT THERE  
 ARE NO PLANS TO TABLE SUCH A MEASURE DURING THIS PHASE  
 OF THE CDE. WE HAVE ALSO MADE AN EFFORT TO HIGHLIGHT  
 SEVERAL OTHER POTENTIAL PROBLEM (AND OPPORTUNITY) AREAS  
 FOR CONSIDERATION, INCLUDING HOW THE RESPECTIVE MEASURES  
 DEAL WITH TRANSITS OF U.S. FORCES THROUGH THE ZONES OF  
 APPLICATION TO THIRD DESTINATIONS. USDEL HAS ALSO  
 IDENTIFIED A CONTACT PERSON FOR MBFR AND REQUESTS THAT  
 VIENNA IDENTIFY HIS COUNTERPART FOR CDE. END SUMMARY.

4. BECAUSE OF THE SURFACE SIMILARITY OF MANY WESTERN  
 PROPOSED AM'S AND CSBM'S, THEIR DISSIMILARITIES TEND TO  
 STAND IN SHARP FOCUS AND ARE LIKELY TO BE CLOSELY  
 SCRUTINIZED BY THE EAST BOTH HERE AND IN VIENNA.  
 NOTWITHSTANDING THAT MBFR AND CDE OPERATE ON VERY  
 DIFFERENT TERMS OF REFERENCE AND THAT IT WOULD BE BEST  
 TO MAINTAIN AS MUCH SUBSTANTIVE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE TWO  
 FORA AS POSSIBLE, OUR EASTERN COUNTERPARTS ARE UNLIKELY  
 TO RESIST THE TEMPTATION TO PICK AND CHOOSE FROM WESTERN  
 AM'S AND CSBM'S WHAT IS MOST ADVANTAGEOUS (OR LEAST  
 DETRIMENTAL) TO THEIR INTERESTS. THIS COULD BECOME  
 PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IF ONE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS  
 OUTPACES THE OTHER AND BEGINS TO ESTABLISH PRECEDENT FOR  
 WHAT THE WEST (OR THE EAST) IS WILLING TO ACCEPT IN SUCH  
 AREAS AS INFORMATION EXCHANGE, NOTIFICATION,  
 VERIFICATION, ETC. OF COURSE, AREAS OF CONCERN FOR EACH  
 OF OUR DELEGATIONS WILL DIFFER DEPENDING ON THE COURSE  
 OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND OUR OWN PARTICULAR PERSPECTIVES,  
 BUT FROM THE STOCKHOLM PERSPECTIVE WE HAVE IDENTIFIED  
 BELOW SEVERAL POTENTIAL PROBLEMS, AS WELL AS OPPORTUNITY  
 AREAS, IN THE AM/CSBM OVERLAP.

- 5. CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION:  
 -- REFTEL REFERS TO A NATO AGREED "CSBM-7" CALLING FOR  
 A CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION AND INDICATES THAT THIS  
 MEASURE IS BEING HELD FOR TABLING IN STOCKHOLM "AT THE

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TACTICALLY MOST ADVANTAGEOUS MOMENT." SUCH A CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION MEASURE OR "CSBM-7" WAS NOT AGREED TO AS PART OF THE NATO PACKAGE AND THE ALLIANCE HAS NO PLANS TO TABLE SUCH A MEASURE AT ANY TIME DURING THIS PHASE OF THE CDE CONFERENCE. AN EMBRYONIC MEASURE ALONG THESE LINES WAS CONSIDERED DURING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATO CSBM PACKAGE, BUT WAS STILLBORN. SOME ALLIES, E.G., THE FRG, ARE VERY SYMPATHETIC TO THE CONCEPT, BUT IT IS ANATHEMA TO THE FRENCH; WE ALSO STRONGLY OPPOSE IT BECAUSE IT COULD TURN OUT TO BE A SUBSTITUTE FOR VERIFICATION, COULD COMPLICATE NATO CRISIS DECISION-MAKING, AND COULD ESTABLISH A SOVIET DROIT DE REGARD OVER NATO SECURITY DECISIONS. USDEL IS UNAWARE OF ANY ONGOING WORK IN BRUSSELS ON SUCH A MEASURE. WE UNDERSTAND, OF COURSE, THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF MBFR VERIFICATION THE TIME FACTOR IS NOT AS CRITICAL AND A SHORT DELAY FOR CONSULTATIONS WOULD NOT HAVE AS DAMAGING AN EFFECT ON THE THE ABILITY OF INSPECTORS TO ASSESS COMPLIANCE.

6. INFORMATION EXCHANGE (CSBM-1 AND AM-6):

-- WHILE IT IS CLEAR THAT AN EXCHANGE OF STATIC INFORMATION OF FORCE STRUCTURE SERVES DIFFERENT PURPOSES FOR MBFR AND CDE, PROGRESS IN VIENNA ON AM-6 COULD HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT ON THE WESTERN POSITION IN STOCKHOLM. INDICATIONS OF SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE STATIC INFORMATION ALONG THE LINES OF AM-6 (I.E., INFORMATION DISAGGREGATED DOWN TO THE BATTALION LEVEL) COULD PROVIDE AN IMPETUS TO OUR EFFORTS TO REQUIRE A STATIC INFORMATION EXCHANGE ALONG THE LINES OF OUR MEASURE 1 (I.E., INFORMATION DISAGGREGATED AT LEAST DOWN TO THE DIVISION LEVEL). CONVERSELY, THE WESTERN DROPPING OF PRIOR AGREED DATA IN THE DECEMBER PROPOSAL AT MBFR ALSO COULD HAVE IMPLICATIONS IN STOCKHOLM. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT YET PICKED UP ON IT, THEY COULD USE THAT DEVELOPMENT TO SUPPORT THEIR ARGUMENTS AT CDE AGAINST THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DATA BASE.

7. ANNUAL FORECAST AND NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS (CSBM'S 2-3, AND AM-2):

-- CSBM'S-2 AND -3 MAKE NO PROVISION FOR THE NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENT EITHER INTO OR WITHIN THE CDE ZONE, BUT SIMPLY FORECAST AND NOTIFY SUCH ACTIVITY WHEN IT CONSTITUTES AN OUT-OF-GARRISON ACTIVITY. THEREFORE, SUCH ACTIVITIES ARE NOT NOTIFIED UNLESS AND UNTIL FORCES ARRIVING FROM OUTSIDE THE ZONE LEAVE THEIR ARRIVAL BASES IN EUROPE TO ENGAGE IN A NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY. THIS APPROACH, AS NOTED REFTTEL, ENABLES U.S. FORCES TRANSITING THE CDE ZONE TO OTHER GEOGRAPHIC AREAS (E.G., MIDDLE EAST) TO BE INSULATED FROM THE NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT. AM-2, ON THE OTHER HAND, DOES PROVIDE FOR BOTH THE ANNUAL FORECAST AND 30-DAY PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF THE MOVEMENT

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BY ANY ONE PARTY INTO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS OF ONE OR MORE DIVISION FORMATIONS AND ANY AGGREGATE OF 25,000 OR MORE GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL WITHIN A CALENDAR MONTH.

-- A POTENTIAL PROBLEM ARISES FROM THIS SITUATION. CSBM'S-2 AND -3 ARE CONSTRUCTED TO PROTECT TRANSITS OF U.S. FORCES THROUGH EUROPE TO OTHER POINTS FROM THE NOTIFICATION AND FORECAST REQUIREMENTS. AM-2 DOES NOT SEEM TO PROVIDE ANY EXEMPTION FOR THE TRANSIT OF FORCES AT OR ABOVE THE THRESHOLD THROUGH THE REDUCTION AREA. AS A NUMBER OF U.S. TRANSITS THROUGH THE THE CDE ZONE MIGHT ALSO TRANSIT THE REDUCTIONS AREA, THE REQUIREMENT FOR NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS UNDER AM-2 COULD EFFECTIVELY NEGATE OUR EFFORT TO PROTECT SUCH TRANSITS IN A CDE AGREEMENT. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY CLARIFICATION MBFR DEL CAN PROVIDE ON THIS POINT IF OUR INTERPRETATION OF THE WESTERN MBFR PROPOSAL IS MISTAKEN OR ANY OTHER COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE ON THIS PROBLEM.

8. TIMEFRAME FOR NOTIFICATION (CSBM-3 AND AM-1):

-- THE CURRENT NATO POSITION IN STOCKHOLM CALLS FOR ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES 45 DAYS PRIOR TO THE START OF THE ACTIVITY VICE THE 30 DAYS

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PROPOSED BY AM-1. AS 30 DAYS IS ALSO THE CURRENT EASTERN PROPOSAL IN STOCKHOLM FOR NOTIFICATION, OUR MBFR POSITION MIGHT BE USED AGAINST US HERE, PARTICULARLY AS THIS MEASURE IS NOT AS SUSCEPTIBLE AS SOME OTHERS TO THE ARGUMENT THAT IT IS AIMED AT DIFFERENT PURPOSES AND OBJECTIVES.

9. VERIFICATION (CSBM-5 AND AM-4):

-- IN GENERAL, WE CAN FORESEE A POSITIVE IMPACT ON THE PROSPECTS FOR OUR VERIFICATION MEASURE IN STOCKHOLM IF PROGRESS IS MADE IN VIENNA ON THE MORE INTRUSIVE AND STRINGENT PROVISIONS OF AM-4. CONVERSELY, HOWEVER, SHOULD PROGRESS ON VERIFICATION AT CDE PRECEDE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS AT MBFR, WE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED BY EASTERN ATTEMPTS TO USE WHAT WE EXPECT TO BE THE LESS INTRUSIVE PROVISIONS AGREED AT STOCKHOLM AS A LEVER TO DILUTE AM-4'S INSPECTION MODALITIES.

10. MERGER OF MBFR AND CDE:

THE IDEA THAT MBFR AND CDE MIGHT BE MERGED WHEN CDE ENTERS ITS DISARMAMENT PHASE HAS OCCASIONALLY COME UP HERE IN STOCKHOLM. WE HAVE BAD-MOUTHED THE IDEA BECAUSE:

-- THIS WOULD REOPEN THE QUESTION OF THE CDE ZONE AND GIVE THE SOVIETS THE OPPORTUNITY TO RECOUP BREZHNEV'S CONCESSION ON "EUROPE TO THE URALS."

-- WE DON'T WANT THE NNA IN THE MBFR GAME, BUT WE'LL NEVER BE ABLE TO EXCLUDE THEM FROM CDE.

-- WE'RE NOT EAGER FOR CDE TO MOVE INTO A "DISARMAMENT STAGE" IN ANY CASE.

A SECOND POSSIBILITY WHICH HAS SOMETIMES BEEN DISCUSSED HERE IS THAT MBFR MIGHT BE INDEFINITELY RECESSED IF THE

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LATEST WESTERN OFFER IS REBUFFED. OUR REACTION HAS BEEN THAT THIS WOULD CREATE CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE TO DISCUSS MBFR IN A CONTINUED CDE, WITH ALL THE ABOVE PROBLEMS.

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11. IT IS OUR VIEW THAT INCREASED AND REGULAR CONTACT BETWEEN OUR DELEGATIONS WILL BE NEEDED IN THE MONTHS AHEAD, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF INTENSIFIED WORK IN BOTH VIENNA AND STOCKHOLM. IN ORDER TO FACILITATE SUCH CONTACT WE HAVE DESIGNATED EDWIN NOLAN AS THE DELEGATION'S CONTACT PERSON FOR MBFR. WE REQUEST THAT MBFR DEL IDENTIFY ITS POINT OF CONTACT FOR CDE SO THAT WE CAN BEGIN A REGULAR DIALOGUE. WE BELIEVE THIS IS THE BEST MEANS OF FACILITATING AN EXCHANGE OF IDEAS AND OF CLARIFYING ISSUES AND POTENTIAL PROBLEMS AREAS SUCH AS WE HAVE IDENTIFIED.

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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01720  
 SUBJECT: MODIFYING NATO'S MEASURE TWO  
 REF: STOCKHOLM 01447

1. CDE IX - 054.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

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 3. BEGIN SUMMARY: DELEGATION HAS CONSIDERED VARIOUS OPTIONS FOR MODIFYING MEASURE TWO, BASED ON OSD PAPER AND DEVELOPMENTS IN WORKING GROUP A-3. DELEGATION BELIEVES WE SHOULD DISCUSS WITH KEY ALLIES THE IDEA OF PROPOSING ADDITIONAL INSPECTIONS FOR NON-FORECAST ACTIVITIES. WE ARE SEEKING WASHINGTON APPROVAL NOW OF THIS APPROACH TO MODIFYING MEASURE TWO FOR USE IN THE APPROPRIATE TACTICAL SITUATION. DELEGATION WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE WASHINGTON VIEWS ON THE CONCEPT OF A CEILING ON THE NUMBER OF ALERT ACTIVITIES. ACTION REQUIRED IN PARA 8. END SUMMARY

4. DELEGATION BELIEVES MODIFYING MEASURE TWO BY PROPOSING ADDITIONAL INSPECTIONS FOR NOTIFIED BUT NON-FORECAST ACTIVITIES WOULD SERVE SEVERAL IMPORTANT PURPOSES.

-- IT WOULD PROVIDE US TACTICAL LEVERAGE BY MAKING THE ANNUAL CALENDAR MORE "CONSTRAINING" AND, THEREFORE, DEFLECT ATTENTION FROM THE IRISH PROPOSAL (SEPTEL).

-- IT WOULD ALSO STRENGTHEN THE LINK BETWEEN THE ANNUAL FORECAST AND INSPECTION. DELEGATION CONTINUES TO STRESS THE NEED FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION VIGOROUSLY AND WOULD LIKE TO USE THE ANNUAL FORECAST TO REINFORCE OUR POSITION THAT INSPECTION IS OUR SINE QUA NON.

-- DELEGATION ALSO SEES VALUE IN MAKING THE ANNUAL FORECAST A MORE ACCURATE BASELINE OF MEANINGFUL MILITARY ACTIVITIES. TO THE EXTENT THAT WE CAN INCREASE THE INCENTIVES TO USE THE ANNUAL FORECAST ACCURATELY, WE WILL SUCCEED IN MAKING IT A SOURCE OF MORE CORRECT INFORMATION REGARDING MILITARY ACTIVITIES.

5. IN OUR VIEW, THE RIGHT TO AN ADDITIONAL INSPECTION WOULD BE GRANTED ANYTIME AN ACTIVITY WAS NOTIFIED BUT NOT FORECAST. IN PRACTICE, THIS WOULD USUALLY MEAN TARGETTING ADDITIONAL INSPECTIONS ON ALERT ACTIVITIES. AS IT IS ALERT ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE THE FOCUS OF SUBSTANTIAL NNA CONCERN, BOTH IN TERMS OF MAINTAINING SOME DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY AND PROVIDING SOME SORT OF LIMITS ON THEM, WE BELIEVE A PROPOSAL TO SUBJECT ALERTS

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 TO ADDITIONAL INSPECTIONS WOULD PROVE USEFUL IN COUNTERING NNA ARGUMENTS THAT WE ARE NOT INTERESTED IN MAKING THE FORECAST MORE "CONSTRAINING." AT THE SAME TIME, IT WOULD HIT THE NNA ON A POINT OF VULNERABILITY. WE DO NOT FORESEE USING THIS PROVISION TO DEAL WITH NON-NOTIFIED AND NON-FORECAST (I.E., SUSPECTED) ACTIVITIES. THE EXISTING ACTIVE INSPECTION LIMIT OF TWO

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PER COUNTRY WOULD HAVE TO HANDLE THE NON-NOTIFIED/  
NON-FORECAST PROBLEM AS WELL AS FORECAST ACTIVITIES.  
6. ADDITIONAL INSPECTIONS ARE OBVIOUSLY RESTRAINING,  
AND WOULD ESTABLISH AN INCENTIVE TO COMPLY WITH THE  
FORECAST, SO THAT IT COULD HAVE AN INHIBITING EFFECT ON  
THE USE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE  
FORECAST BY COMPLICATING A NATION'S DECISION TO BREAK  
OUT OF THE FORECAST. IN THIS WAY, A PENALTY INSPECTION  
MIGHT ALSO COMPLICATE A STATE'S DECISION TO DEVELOP A  
NON-FORECAST MILITARY ACTIVITY IN RESPONSE TO AN  
UNEXPECTED POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN ANOTHER STATE; I.E.,  
IT COULD HELP INHIBIT THE USE OF A MILITARY ACTIVITY FOR  
POLITICAL INTIMIDATION. DELEGATION DOES NOT, OF COURSE,  
INTEND TO SELL THIS MODIFICATION OF THE ANNUAL FORECAST  
AS A CONSTRAINT PER SE, BUT, DEPENDING ON THE TACTICS  
REQUIRED AT THE TIME, WOULD USE THIS AS A MEANS TO MAKE  
THE CALENDAR MORE "CONSTRAINING."

7. DELEGATION WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE WASHINGTON REVIEW  
OF ANOTHER POTENTIAL OPTION FOR INCREASING THE  
"CONSTRAINING" EFFECT OF THE ANNUAL FORECAST. THE  
CONCEPT OF AN OVERALL CEILING ON THE NUMBER OF  
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS SECDEF, JCS AND USIA FOR INFO  
ACTIVITIES NEITHER FORECAST NOR NOTIFIED IN ADVANCE HAS  
BEEN PROPOSED IN TERMS OF A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL  
ACTIVITIES FORECAST BY THE IRISH. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT,  
THE NORMAL PATTERN OF NATO ALERT ACTIVITIES IS VERY  
REGULAR; THEREFORE, THEORETICALLY A CEILING ON THE  
NUMBER COULD HAVE NO PRACTICAL EFFECT ON NATO. MOST  
IMPORTANTLY, UNLIKE A TWO-YEAR FORECAST REQUIREMENT FOR  
LARGE-SCALE ACTIVITIES, A CEILING ON ALERTS DOES NOT  
IMPLICITLY ENDORSE ARGUMENTS VIS-A-VIS LARGE-SCALE  
ACTIVITIES AS THE THREAT TO EUROPE. IT IS ALSO

APPEALING BECAUSE IT WOULD, THEORETICALLY, AFFECT ALL  
CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS. IT MIGHT EVEN PROVE  
"CONSTRAINING" FOR THE EAST. FURTHERMORE, IT WOULD  
SERVE AS AN INCENTIVE TO USE THE FORECAST ACCURATELY.  
DESPITE THE PRACTICAL BENEFITS OF SUCH A PROPOSAL IN THE  
NEGOTIATIONS, WE ARE CONCERNED THAT OUR CAPABILITY TO  
MONITOR FOR EVIDENCE OF ALERTS IS VERY LIMITED.  
MOREOVER, DELEGATION IS WARY OF ENGAGING IN THE  
CONSTRAINTS DEBATE TO THIS DEGREE. DESPITE THESE  
CONCERNS, WE WOULD APPRECIATE WASHINGTON'S VIEWS OF THIS  
TYPE OF "CONSTRAINT." (COMMENT: THIS APPEARS TO BE A  
LIMIT ON ALERTS ALTHOUGH WE HAVE BEEN TOLD PRIVATELY  
THAT THE IRISH PROPOSAL FORESEES AN EXCEPTION CLAUSE FOR  
ALERTS. IF SUCH A CLAUSE WERE INSTITUTED, THE IRISH  
PROPOSAL WOULD HAVE NO AFFECT ON NATO BECAUSE WE WILL  
FORECAST ALL OUR ACTIVITIES EXCEPT ALERTS. A LIMIT ON  
ACTIVITIES NOT FORECAST, WITH AN EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE FOR  
ALERTS, WOULD ACTUALLY BE TARGETTED AT THE USE OF

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MILITARY FORCE FOR POLITICAL INTIMIDATION. END COMMENT)  
8. ACTION: REQUEST WASHINGTON APPROVAL FOR DELEGATION  
TO DISCUSS THE "ADDITIONAL INSPECTION" MODIFICATION  
DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 5 WITH KEY ALLIES WITH A VIEW  
TOWARDS ESTABLISHING SUPPORT FOR THIS APPROACH. WE HOPE  
THAT THESE CONSULTATIONS WILL HELP DELEGATION TO  
FORMULATE AN AGREED USG APPROACH.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01292

SUBJECT: INDEPENDENT AIR ISSUE/VISITING ALLIES

1. CDE IX - 61

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. BEGIN SUMMARY: WITH SEVERAL INFLUENTIAL ALLIES VISITING WASHINGTON IN THE NEXT WEEK, WE WOULD SUGGEST DEPARTMENT USE THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONFIRM U.S. POSITION ON AN INDEPENDENT AIR CSBM. EAST IS EXERTING CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE ON NATO TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING ON AN INDEPENDENT AIR CSBM REGIME AS QUID PRO QUO FOR GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 OFFER TO DEFER NAVAL ACTIVITIES TO A LATER STAGE OF CDE; MOST ALLIES APPEAR TO BE SOFTENING THEIR VIEWS AND HAVE PRIVATELY INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO EXPLORE THE ISSUE. END SUMMARY

4. THE SOVIETS ARE PUSHING THE VIEW THAT GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 OFFER TO DEFER DISCUSSIONS OF NAVAL ACTIVITY TO A LATER CDE STAGE IS A MAJOR CONCESSION WHICH THE WEST MUST MATCH. AMB GRINEVSKY HAS ACTIVELY LOBBIED NATO AMBASSADORS FOR SOME SORT OF WRITTEN PLEDGE TO DISCUSS NAVAL AT A LATER STAGE; OUR COLLECTIVE RESPONSES HAVE BEEN UNITED IN AFFIRMING THAT ONLY VIENNA CAN DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THERE WILL BE OTHER CONFERENCES AND WHAT WILL BE DISCUSSED.

5. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT DISCUSSIONS OF NAVAL ISSUES WILL RECEDE INTO THE BACKGROUND; HOWEVER, THE QUID THE EAST SEEKS IN RETURN IS AGREEMENT TO INCLUDE AN INDEPENDENT AIR CSBM IN THIS STAGE OF CDE. WE HAVE TOLD THE SOVIETS AND OTHERS THAT THE US WILL NEVER ACCEPT INDEPENDENT AIR AS AN APPROPRIATE SUBJECT FOR THIS CONFERENCE. ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY, HOWEVER, IS NOT AS FIRM ON THIS SUBJECT AS WE WOULD LIKE. THE FRENCH HAVE SAID THAT THEY COULD ACCEPT AN INDEPENDENT AIR CSBM, ALTHOUGH THEY DENY ANY INTENTION TO PROPOSE ONE. THE ITALIANS, LIKEWISE, BELIEVE WE SHOULD BE MORE FORTHCOMING. TO A LESSER EXTENT, THE BRITISH AND FRG HAVE RAISED THE ISSUE AS A POSSIBILITY THEY COULD ENTERTAIN. THE SMALLER "WETS" - E.G. DENMARK, NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, SPAIN - ALL COULD EASILY ACCEPT INDEPENDENT AIR.

6. FOLLOWING ARE POINTS WE HAVE MADE WITH ALLIES HERE EXPLAINING WHY WE REJECT AN INDEPENDENT AIR CSBM:

-- IT COULD NOT BE VERIFIED; EVEN A VERY INTRUSIVE VERIFICATION SYSTEM WOULD FALL SHORT OF ANY REASONABLE DEFINITION OF EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION.

-- IT WOULD UNDERMINE THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH SO CAREFULLY PROTECTED BY THE WEST IN STOCKHOLM BY REQUIRING NOTIFICATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES INDEPENDENTLY OF NOTIFIABLE GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY.

-- IT WOULD SET THE STAGE FOR THE NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL EXERCISES AT A LATER DATE, GIVING SUSTENANCE TO SOVIET POSITION THAT THE ISSUE WILL BE

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TAKEN UP IN SECOND STAGE OF CDE.

-- IT DEFLECTS ATTENTION FROM THE MAIN WESTERN OBJECTIVE OF CDE, WHICH IS TO ESTABLISH CSBMS TO ENHANCE CONFIDENCE ABOUT GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES.

-- IT RAISES ANEW THE QUESTION OF NOTIFYING NON-EUROPEAN TRANSITS AND EUROPEAN BOUND REINFORCEMENTS BY AIRCRAFT THAT MIGHT PASS OVER THE TERRITORY REFERRED TO AS THE WHOLE OF EUROPE.

-- IT WOULD REDUCE DEPLOYMENT FLEXIBILITY FOR NATO AIR ASSETS.

7. GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE TO THE U.S., AND OUR LACK OF FLEXIBILITY ON IT, REQUEST WASHINGTON REINFORCE TO OUR VISITING FRENCH, UK AND FRG DELEGATIONS THE FIRMNESS OF OUR POSITION ON INDEPENDENT AIR.

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END OF MESSAGE

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SUBJECT: MOVING THE SOVIETS AND OTHERS AWAY FROM  
- INDEPENDENT AIR

1. CDE - 078. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.  
2. BOTH AMBASSADOR BARRY AND I ARE COMMITTED TO THE POSITION THAT A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT AT STOCKHOLM WILL NOT/NOT INCLUDE A CSBM DEALING WITH INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES. THE DELEGATION IS COMPLETELY UNITED ON THIS ISSUE. OUR JCS AND ACDA REPS HAVE DONE A YEOMAN'S JOB IN AD HOC GROUPS HERE DESIGNED TO DEVELOP ARGUMENTS AGAINST A CSBM DEALING WITH INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES. NEVERTHELESS, SEVERAL OF OUR ALLIES REMAINED UNCONVINCED AND ARE EXPLORING VARIOUS OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE ISSUE. WE DO NOT HAVE ANY FURTHER DETAILS, BUT IT IS CLEAR THERE IS SOME SOFTNESS ON INDEPENDENT AIR IN THE WESTERN CAMP. WE EXPECT THE EAST TO ATTEMPT TO EXPLOIT THIS SOFTNESS, FOR SUBSTANTIVE AND POLITICAL REASONS, E.G., TO EXACERBATE DIFFERENCES OF VIEW BETWEEN U.S. AND ITS ALLIES.

3. IN OUR VIEW, THE 15 JAN GORBACHEV STATEMENT EFFECTIVELY REMOVED INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES FROM OUR AGENDA IN STOCKHOLM. CONTINUED EASTERN REFERENCE TO THIS ISSUE IS FOR TACTICAL REASONS AS THE SOVIETS ARE ATTEMPTING TO PARLAY THEIR "OFFER" TO DELAY A NAVAL CSBM AS A "CONCESSION" WHICH WOULD REQUIRE A "REGISTERED" AGREEMENT BY THE CONFERENCE TO DEAL WITH NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN THE NEXT CDE PHASE AND A COUNTER-CONCESSION FROM THE WEST ON INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES. WE HAVE SOME CONCERN THAT THE SOVIET TACTICS WILL HAVE EFFECT ON THOSE OF OUR ALLIES WHO BELIEVE THAT INDEPENDENT AIR IS A LEGITIMATE SUBJECT FOR STOCKHOLM BECAUSE THE MANDATE DOES NOT SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDE THE NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES WHICH TAKE PLACE OVER EUROPE. BECAUSE OF THE APPARENT WILLINGNESS OF SOME TO MOVE DOWN THE ROAD THE SOVIETS ARE SUGGESTING, WE SEE THE PROBLEM IN TACTICAL AS WELL AS SUBSTANTIVE TERMS. THE ISSUE, THEN, REQUIRES DEFT TACTICAL HANDLING BY THE DELEGATION BOTH AS REGARDS THE SOVIETS AND SOME OF OUR ALLIES.

4. IN SPITE OF THE RECENTLY TABLED EASTERN LANGUAGE DEALING WITH THE NOTIFICATION OF AIR MANEUVERS SEPTEL), AMBASSADOR BARRY AND I BELIEVE THE KEY TO MEETING OUR SUBSTANTIVE CONCERNS, AS WELL AS OUR TACTICAL ONES, MAY LIE IN THE PUBLIC SOVIET ACKNOWLEDGEMENT, REPEATED TO US BILATERALLY, THAT 90 PERCENT OF THE AIR ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE ARE FUNCTIONALLY LINKED TO THE SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES. IN THE NEAR TERM, THEY WILL NOT EXPLICITLY ACCEPT OUR INTERPRETATION OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH AS APPLIED TO AIR ACTIVITIES SINCE THAT WOULD SIGNAL AN ACCEPTANCE OF OUR INTERPRETATION OF THE MANDATE AND FORECLOSE ANY FUTURE OPTION THEY MAY THINK

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THEY HAVE FOR NAVAL ACTIVITIES. NEVERTHELESS, WE BELIEVE THAT IF WE PLAY OUR CARDS RIGHT, THE SOVIETS EVENTUALLY HAVE TO ACKNOWLEDGE FUNCTIONALISM AS THE ONLY PRAGMATIC WAY TO DEAL WITH AIR ACTIVITIES.

5. IN THE MEANTIME, HOWEVER, WE MUST ATTEMPT TO DEPRIVE THE SOVIETS OF THE TACTICAL LEVERAGE THEY PERCEIVE THEY HAVE IN HANGING THE SHADOW OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES OVER THE CONFERENCE. WE BELIEVE APPARENT SOVIET CONCERNS VIS-A-VIS THE LACK OF U.S. RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV CAN BE USED TO ELIMINATE THIS LEVERAGE AND REINFORCE OUR POSITION ON INDEPENDENT AIR. AMBASSADOR BARRY'S AND MY INSTINCTS ARE THAT WE SHOULD GIVE THE SOVIETS A POLITICAL RESPONSE ON CDE TO WHAT THEY TERM A POLITICAL MOVE BY GORBACHEV, AND, IN THE PROCESS, TO REMOVE THE NAVAL ACTIVITIES SHADOW FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE BELIEVE THIS POLITICAL RESPONSE COULD TAKE THE FORM OF AN INSTRUCTED DEMARCHE TO GRINEVSKY WHICH WOULD ACKNOWLEDGE THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT BUT MAKE NO COMMITMENTS.

6. THE INSTRUCTED DEMARCHE MIGHT PICK UP ELEMENTS OF THE JAN 15 STATEMENT WITH WHICH WE AGREE, E.G.,

- -- SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM IS POSSIBLE
- -- RECOGNITION THAT LOWER NOTIFICATION THRESHOLDS ARE REQUIRED
- -- THE NEED TO BUILD ON COMMON GROUND
- -- NO FURTHER DISCUSSION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN STOCKHOLM, SINCE SUCH DISCUSSIONS WOULD BLOCK AGREEMENT.

7. IN ADDITION, SUCH A DEMARCHE MIGHT MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- -- THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE MUST FOLLOW THE TERMS OF ITS MANDATE, IT IS NOT EMPOWERED TO TAKE UP DISCUSSIONS OR MAKE DECISIONS ABOUT WHAT SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN A POSSIBLE POST-VIENNA PHASE OF THE CDE OR EVEN IF THERE SHOULD BE A POST-VIENNA PHASE. THAT DECISION WILL BE MADE BY THE 35 PARTICIPATING STATES AT THE FOLLOW-UP MEETING IN VIENNA.

- -- KEEPING IN MIND THAT 90 PERCENT OF THE AIR ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE ARE FUNCTIONALLY LINKED TO GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES, WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS WITH THE SOVIET DELEGATION THEIR IDEAS FOR REFLECTING THIS FUNCTIONAL LINKAGE IN A NOTIFICATION REGIME.

8. THIS KIND OF APPROACH WOULD NOT COMMIT US TO ANYTHING EXCEPT TO LISTEN. HOWEVER, WE WOULD HAVE PROVIDED AN OFFICIAL U.S. RESPONSE TO THE SOVIETS WHICH POCKETS THE REMOVAL OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES. WE WOULD NOT BE GIVING UP ANYTHING ON AIR ACTIVITIES BUT WOULD, ONCE AGAIN, REAFFIRM THE FUNCTIONAL CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH WE WILL DISCUSS SUCH ACTIVITIES. WE WOULD,

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OF COURSE, SHARE THIS RESPONSE WITH THE ALLIES. THE  
FACT THAT WE WILL HAVE PROVIDED AN OFFICIAL U.S.  
RESPONSE CAN BE USED TO REINFORCE OUR FIRM POSITION  
AGAINST INCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND THE NEED FOR A  
UNITED ALLIANCE FRONT. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SOVIETS  
WILL HAVE GOTTEN THE CLEAR MESSAGE THAT BOTH INDEPENDENT  
AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES ARE OUT. AS A CONSEQUENCE,  
THEY WILL BE UNABLE TO SUSTAIN THEIR PRESENT TACTIC OF  
USING THE THREAT OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES TO PRESSURE OUR  
MORE PLIABLE ALLIES.

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END OF MESSAGE

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## C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STOCKHOLM 00978

SUBJECT: SOVIETS EXPELLED FROM FRANCE TURN UP AT CDE,  
PAPER CHARGES

1. (U) STOCKHOLM MORNING DAILY "SVENSKA DAGBLADET" (SVD) (IND. CONS.) REPORTED IN A FRONT-PAGE STORY FEBRUARY 10 THAT YURIY KRIVTSOV AND ANDREI ANDROSOV, BOTH OF WHOM HAD BEEN DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA AND EXPELLED FROM FRANCE IN APRIL 1983 FOR SPYING HAVE BEEN IN SWEDEN IN CONNECTION WITH THE STOCKHOLM CDE CONFERENCE. KRIVTSOV, 60, WORKED AS A TRANSLATOR FOR THE CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT DURING THE FOURTH CDE SESSION IN 1984, ACCORDING TO THE NEWSPAPER. "AN INFORMED SOURCE" IS QUOTED AS SAYING KRIVTSOV THEN RETURNED TO MOSCOW TO TAKE A HIGH POST FOR THE KGB, IN WHICH HE HOLDS THE RANK OF GENERAL. ANDROSOV, 36, IS IDENTIFIED AS THE SON OF STANISLAV ANDROSOV, REPORTEDLY THE KGB RESIDENT AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON. THE YOUNGER ANDROSOV WAS A MEMBER OF THE SOVIET CDE DELEGATION DURING 1985 AND HAS BEEN SEEN AT THE CURRENT SESSION.

2. (U) SWEDISH SECURITY POLICE (SAPO) CHIEF SVEN-AKE HJALMROTH IS QUOTED IN THE SVD ARTICLE "WE ARE AWARE THAT THESE TWO WERE EXPELLED FROM FRANCE FOR ILLEGAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY. WE HAVE INFORMED THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. I WON'T COMMENT ON WHAT OTHER MEASURES WE MAY HAVE TAKEN." CDE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JAN AF SILLEN TOLD SVD THAT IT WAS NOT UP TO THE CONFERENCE TO PASS AN OPINION ON THE MAKEUP OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION. "IF SWEDISH AUTHORITIES HAVE SOMETHING AGAINST THE PARTICIPANTS, THEY OUGHT TO DENY THEM ENTRY PERMISSION." AF SILLEN DID NOT COMMENT ON THE FACT THAT KRIVTSOV WAS EMPLOYED BY HIS SECRETARIAT. THE SWEDISH MFA REFUSED TO COMMENT ON THE STORY. SVD SPECULATES THAT THE SPIES WERE SENT TO STOCKHOLM BECAUSE THEY WERE "VERY CAPABLE DIPLOMATS. A WELL-KNOWN FACT IN INTELLIGENCE CIRCLES IS THAT THE LEADING SOVIET DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATORS ARE CONNECTED TO THE KGB ITSELF."

3. (LOU) COMMENT: THE SWEDISH PRESS, AND "SVENSKA DAGBLADET" IN PARTICULAR, HAVE REPEATEDLY TRIED TO EXPOSE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE OPERATIVES AND ACTIVITIES IN SWEDEN. ALTHOUGH THERE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE ANY SPECIAL PURPOSE FOR THE TIMING OF THIS PARTICULAR EXPOSE, SOVIET BEHAVIOR AND INTENTIONS TOWARD SWEDEN HAVE BEEN GETTING CLOSE ATTENTION IN THE RUN-UP TO OLOF PALME'S APRIL TRIP TO MOSCOW AND THE SWEDISH 5-YEAR DEFENSE COMMISSION'S REPORT LATER THIS SPRING.

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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 01344

SUBJECT: CDE DEPUTY TRAVEL TO BERLIN AND WARSAW

1. GDR AND POLISH REPS AT CDE HAVE FORMALLY EXTENDED INVITATIONS TO US DEPUTY AMB HANSEN TO VISIT THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPITOLS FOR CONSULTATIONS ON CDE/CSCE DURING NEXT BREAK IN CDE NEGOTIATIONS. AMB BUEHRING (GDR) HAS SUGGESTED AFTERNOON OF MONDAY, 24 MARCH, FOR A MEETING WITH GDR OFFICIALS. AMB KONARSKI (POLAND) HAS SUGGESTED EITHER WEDNESDAY, 26 MAR, OR THURSDAY, 27 MARCH FOR MEETINGS IN WARSAW.

2. KONARSKI SAID THAT WHILE WARSAW WOULD WISH TO DEVOTE MOST OF THE TIME TO CDE, THEY WOULD ALSO LIKE TO TOUCH ON CSCE IN GENERAL. AMB HANSEN WOULD APPRECIATE AS MUCH GUIDANCE AS POSSIBLE ON WASHINGTON VIEWS CONCERNING VIENNA, REALIZING THAT SUCH VIEWS MIGHT BE PRELIMINARY AND TENTATIVE.

3. FOR BERLIN: REQUEST CONFIRMATION OF MEETING DATES WITH GDR FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS FOR 24 MARCH. AMB HANSEN WOULD ALSO BE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY USIS-TYPE ACTIVITIES EMBASSY BERLIN MIGHT WISH TO ORGANIZE ON EITHER MONDAY OR TUESDAY AS TIME ALLOWS. WILL FORWARD TRAVEL PLANS ETC. WHEN FIRM.

4. FOR WARSAW: ACCORDING TO KONARSKY, FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS WILL PLAN FULL PROGRAM ONCE THEY HAVE CONFIRMATION OF VISIT THROUGH EMBASSY. FULL PROGRAM, AS ENVISIONED BY KONARSKY WOULD INCLUDE ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSIONS WITH POLISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. REQUEST EMBASSY CONTACT APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS TO MAKE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03012

SUBJECT: NATO CDE HEADS OF DELEGATION "BRAINSTORMING"  
SESSION IN BRUSSELS, APRIL 13, 1986

1. CDE X - 09.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY. THERE WERE NO SURPRISES AT THE MEETING OF NATO CDE HEADS OF DELEGATION APRIL 13 IN BRUSSELS. THE CRITICALITY OF ROUND TEN WAS RECOGNIZED AS WELL AS THE NEED FOR THE EAST TO MAKE A MOVE TO FACILITATE A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. FRANCE SAID IT WOULD "FREEZE" DRAFTING IN THE WORKING GROUP ADDRESSING NON-USE OF FORCE IF PROBLEMS WERE NOT RESOLVED IN OTHER WORKING GROUPS. WHILE THE POSSIBILITY OF FAILURE WAS RECOGNIZED, IT WAS AGREED THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE EFFORTS TO SEEK A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME BY MAINTAINING THE INITIATIVE AND SEEKING SOLUTIONS THROUGH THE DRAFTING PROCESS AS THE TIME FOR MAJOR, NEW WESTERN PROPOSALS HAS PAST. IT WAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE NNA SHOULD BE USED AS THE VEHICLE FOR COMPROMISE PROPOSALS, INASMUCH AS THE EAST WILL NOT ACCEPT ANYTHING PROPOSED BY THE WEST. THE WEST SHOULD BE FLEXIBLE, BUT THERE WERE VARYING VIEWS ON THE SCOPE AND TIMING OF SUCH FLEXIBILITY. IT WAS GENERALLY RECOGNIZED THAT FLEXIBILITY SHOULD BE EXERCISED WITH CAUTION. ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED AND RELATED THRESHOLDS AND VERIFICATION WERE IDENTIFIED AS KEY ISSUES. SEVERAL DELEGATIONS SUGGESTED THAT CDE SHOULD BE AN IMPORTANT ITEM ON THE AGENDA FOR THE MEETING OF NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS IN HALIFAX. END SUMMARY.
4. CONFERENCE PROSPECTS. SPEAKERS AGREED THAT THIS SESSION WAS CRITICAL TO SUCCESS; TIME IS RUNNING OUT AND THERE IS A SENSE OF URGENCY. THE EAST MUST MAKE A MOVE. WHILE A NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS OPENLY ACKNOWLEDGED THE POSSIBILITY OF FAILURE, THEY AGREED THAT OUR KEY OBJECTIVE WAS TO CONTINUE TO WORK FOR SUCCESS AND TO ENSURE THAT WE ARE SEEN TO BE DOING SO. ALL STATED OPPOSITION TO A "MINI-PACKAGE" OUTCOME. RESOLUTION OF ISSUES RELATED TO TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED AND RELATED PARAMETERS AS WELL AS AGREEMENT TO VERIFICATION THROUGH ON-SITE INSPECTION WERE IDENTIFIED AS KEY TO SUCCESS.
5. WESTERN STRATEGY AND TACTICS. NATO SHOULD MAINTAIN THE INITIATIVE IT GAINED DURING THE LAST SESSION: THERE IS WORK TO BE DONE; WE HAVE BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE READY TO DO IT; THE BEST WAY IS TO DRAFT ON CONCRETE MEASURES; TO THAT END, CERTAIN KEY ISSUES NEED TO BE RESOLVED; WE HOPE OTHERS ARE READY TO JOIN US IN THIS PROCESS. NATO COUNTRIES WILL EMPHASIZE THEIR READINESS TO SEEK SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS IN THE DRAFTING PROCESS. WHILE FLEXIBILITY IN APPROACH WAS STRESSED, THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT ON HOW IT SHOULD BE MANIFESTED. SOME DELEGATIONS (NORWAY, FOR ONE) SUGGESTED THAT SC.1 BE REVIEWED IN ORDER TO DETERMINE IF THERE IS "NEGOTIATING FAT." IF

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SO, AREAS FOR COMPROMISE SHOULD BE IDENTIFIED, AND SUBSEQUENTLY RAISED IN THE CONFERENCE. ONLY THROUGH THIS "GIVE AND TAKE," IT WAS ARGUED, WILL SUCCESS BE ACHIEVED. OTHERS (INCLUDING UK, PORTUGAL) ARGUED THAT TO COMPROMISE NOW WOULD SIMPLY RESULT IN NATO GIVING AND THE EAST TAKING, BY POCKETING COMPROMISES AND GIVING NOTHING IN RETURN. U.S. (BARRY) POINTED OUT THAT WHAT FLEXIBILITY WE HAVE SHOULD BE MANIFESTED DURING THE DRAFTING PROCESS ITSELF; THE TIME FOR TABLING OF NEW, COMPROMISE PROPOSALS BY THE WEST HAS PAST. HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT FOR IDEAS TO BE RECEIVED POSITIVELY BY THE EAST, THEY MUST APPEAR TO HAVE COME FROM THE NNA; THUS, THE NNA MAY BE THE BEST VEHICLE FOR EFFECTING NECESSARY COMPROMISES. SUPPORT WAS VOICED FOR USING AVAILABLE PROCEDURAL MECHANISMS TO FACILITATE PROGRESS, SUCH AS COFFEE/CONTACT GROUPS. AT LEAST ONE DELEGATION, FRANCE, EXPRESSED SOME RELUCTANCE TO CONDUCT SUBSTANTIVE WORK, AT LEAST ON A REGULAR BASIS, OUTSIDE OF THE WORKING GROUP FRAMEWORK. OTHERS AGREED THAT COFFEE GROUPS MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR NEGOTIATION OF SPECIFIC, CONCRETE MEASURES, BUT SHOULD NOT BE INDISCRIMINATELY ESTABLISHED.

6. SOVIET INTENTIONS. IT WAS NOTED THAT SCHEDULED INTER-SESSIONAL CONSULTATIONS WITH USSR AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY WITH U.S., UK, FRANCE, FRG, AND SPAIN HAD BEEN CANCELLED. FRANCE RECEIVED AMB. RAKHMANINOV IN HIS STEAD. THE REASON FOR CANCELLATION WAS NOT CLEAR, NOR ARE SOVIET INTENTIONS. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT IF THE CONFERENCE IS TO BE SUCCESSFUL, THE EAST WILL HAVE TO MAKE A MOVE THIS ROUND, ALTHOUGH THERE WAS SOME DOUBT THAT THEY WOULD. THEY COULD, FOR EXAMPLE, WITHHOLD COMPROMISE ON SPECIFIC ISSUES UNTIL VERY LATE IN THE GAME, AND MAKE LAST MINUTE CONCESSIONS OF A MINOR NATURE AIMED AT CONCLUSION OF A "MINI-PACKAGE." IRRESPECTIVE OF INTENTIONS, IT WAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEY ARE TRYING TO ENSURE THAT ANY BLAME FOR LACK OF SUCCESS WILL FALL ON THE WEST.

FRG AMB. CITRON SUGGESTED "PERSONALLY" THAT, IN THE EVENT THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO STALL, COORDINATED HIGH-LEVEL DEMARCHES MIGHT BE MADE TO STRESS OUR INTEREST AND GET THEM TO MOVE. REACTIONS TO THIS SUGGESTION WERE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE, BUT IT WAS AGREED THAT NO DECISION NOW ON SUCH A COURSE OF ACTION NEED BE TAKEN. AMB. BARRY NOTED THAT IN THE COURSE OF CONTACTS ON DIFFERENT LEVELS WITH THE USSR, THE U.S. PERIODICALLY RAISED THE SUBJECT OF CDE IN ANY EVENT; U.S. AMBASSADOR HARTMAN HAD DONE SO RECENTLY. HE ASSUMED OTHERS DID AS WELL. AMB. BARRY THEN BRIEFED THE CONTENTS OF THE HARTMAN/SCHEVARDNADZE EXCHANGE. SEVERAL DELEGATIONS SUGGESTED THAT CDE, IN THE CONTEXT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, SHOULD BE A MAJOR AGENDA ITEM FOR DISCUSSION AT THE UPCOMING HALIFAX MEETING OF NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS. FRANCE FELT THE NEGOTIATIONS

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SHOULD BE CONDUCTED IN STOCKHOLM.

7. SUBSTANCE. U.S. (BARRY) IDENTIFIED THREE KEY AREAS FOR REAL PROGRESS THIS ROUND.

-- NOTIFICATION. RESOLUTION OF ISSUES RELATED TO ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED AND THRESHOLDS IS A TOP PRIORITY AND A KEY TO RESOLUTION OF MANY OTHER ISSUES. ALL AGREED. WE MUST ENSURE THAT THE FOCUS IS ON GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES. BARRY INDICATED THAT COORDINATOR LIDGARD, DURING INTERSESSIONAL CONSULTATIONS WITH U.S., HAD DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF TABLING A COORDINATOR'S PAPER COVERING THESE ISSUES WITH A FOCUS ON GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES. WHILE THE PAPER LIDGARD HAD IN MIND WAS VERY SIMILAR TO SC.7 PROPOSALS AND, AS SUCH, WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE AS OUTLINED TO THE U.S., BARRY SAID THAT THE U.S. WAS INCLINED TO ENCOURAGE HIM TO TABLE IT IN ORDER TO GET THE DISCUSSION GOING AND FOCUS ON GROUND ACTIVITIES. IT COULD BE AMENDED OR RE-WRITTEN AS NECESSARY, BUT AT LEAST IT WOULD REQUIRE THE EAST TO CONCENTRATE ON GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES AND RELATED THRESHOLDS. UK, FRANCE, AND FRG WERE DISSATISFIED WITH THE LIDGARD APPROACH; NONE WANTED PAPER TABLED AS IS. FRG SUGGESTED WEST WORK WITH LIDGARD TO BRING PAPER CLOSER INTO LINE WITH SC.1 APPROACH PRIOR TO ITS BEING TABLED.

-- ANNUAL FORECASTS. BARRY SUGGESTED THAT WAYS TO ENHANCE THE CONSTRAINING ELEMENTS OF ANNUAL FORECASTS BE EXAMINED, WITH A VIEW TO STAVING OFF CONSTRAINING MEASURES. ONE SUCH POSSIBILITY, HE NOTED, WAS THE IDEA OF ADDITIONAL INSPECTIONS FOR NON-FORECAST ACTIVITIES. OTHERS SUGGESTED CLOSER EXAMINATION OF THE IRISH PROPOSALS MADE DURING ROUND NINE. THESE COMMENTS PROMPTED UK STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT IT HAD NO FLEXIBILITY ON CONSTRAINTS.

-- VERIFICATION. BARRY REITERATED THAT ADEQUATE VERIFICATION INCORPORATING THE RIGHT TO ON-SITE INSPECTION WAS ESSENTIAL; THIS WAS ENDORSED STRONGLY BY OTHERS. ALL SEEMED TO SHARE THE VIEW THAT THIS WAS A PROBLEM THAT WOULD/COULD NOT BE RESOLVED UNTIL VERY LATE IN THE GAME. SPAIN STRESSED THAT ADEQUATE VERIFICATION WAS NOT A "BARGAINING CHIP."

ON OTHER ISSUES, THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS WERE MADE:

--NON-USE OF FORCE. DURING INTERSESSIONAL CONSULTATIONS WITH USSR CDE AMBASSADOR RAKHMANINOV, RAKHMANINOV SAID THAT THE WESTERN MOVE ON NUF LAST ROUND HAD BEEN RECEIVED POSITIVELY IN MOSCOW, BUT THEY MUST NOW WAIT FOR THE TABLING OF THE COMPLETE TEXT. THE USSR WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTIVE TO INCLUDING LANGUAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN SUCH A TEXT IF ALL TEN HFA PRINCIPLES ARE ENUMERATED. FRANCE STATED THAT IF THE DEADLOCK, DUE TO THE SOVIET UNION, CONTINUED ON OTHER ISSUES, SUCH AS NOTIFICATION AND INFORMATION, IT WOULD "FREEZE" DRAFTING IN THE WORKING GROUP ADDRESSING NUF. BOTH U.S. (BARRY) AND

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UK ECHOED THESE SENTIMENTS, AS DID SOME OTHERS. AMB. BARRY ALSO SAID THAT ANY NUF TEXT MUST HAVE LANGUAGE ON "HUMAN RIGHTS."

--INFORMATION. PROBLEM OF HOW TO DEAL WITH INFORMATION WAS RAISED. FRANCE SAID THAT DURING INTERSESSIONAL CONSULTATIONS WITH SWITZERLAND, FRANCE SUGGESTED THAT THERE BE SOME KIND OF AGREEMENT THAT THE NOTIFICATION GROUP ADDRESS ONLY INFORMATION RELATED TO THRESHOLDS (SUCH AS NUMBER OF TROOPS, EQUIPMENT, ETC.) AND THAT THE INFORMATION/VERIFICATION/COMMUNICATION GROUP ADDRESS OTHER INFORMATION WITHOUT SPECIFICATION OF WHERE THIS INFORMATION WOULD BE PLACED IN THE FINAL AGREEMENT.

8. ROLE OF THE NNA. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE NNA SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN NEGOTIATIONS, SO LONG AS IT IS CONSTRUCTIVE FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE. U.S. (BARRY) SUGGESTED THAT WE TRY TO WORK THROUGH THE NNA DURING NEGOTIATIONS, INASMUCH AS THE EAST WILL NOT ACCEPT NEW IDEAS OR COMPROMISES EMANATING DIRECTLY FROM THE WEST. UK EXPRESSED SOME SKEPTICISM THAT THE NNA CAN BE INFLUENCED SUFFICIENTLY IN OUR DIRECTION, NOTING THAT THE LIDGARD NOTIFICATION LANGUAGE IS NOT SUITABLE. THE NNA, HE NOTED, DID NOT RESOLVE THEIR DILEMMA LAST ROUND -- THE NEED TO BE IMPARTIAL COORDINATORS DESPITE THEIR DESIRE TO SUPPORT SC.7. NNA COORDINATORS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO BE MORE OBJECTIVE. U.S. AMB. BARRY SAID THAT THE NNA'S SHOULD BE DISCOURAGED FROM ATTEMPTING TO COME UP WITH SOME KIND OF A "BRIDGE PROPOSAL" FOR TWO REASONS: A "BRIDGE PROPOSAL" WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF NEUTRALIZING THE NEUTRALS AND TAKE SOME OF THEM WHO ARE MORE SUPPORTIVE OF THE WESTERN APPROACH OUT OF A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE AND THE OUTCOME WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE UNSATISFACTORY AS UNACCEPTABLE "PET" IDEAS WOULD STILL BE THERE. FURTHERMORE IT COULD NOT BE COMPLETED IN TIME TO BE HELPFUL IF, INDEED, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL AT ALL.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 02902  
---CORRECTED COPY FOR E.O. LINE  
ORIGINALLY PROCESSED AS 0568567.  
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR BARRY RETURNS TO STOCKHOLM AND  
- RESUMES CHARGE  
1. CDE X-04.  
2. AMBASSADOR ROBERT L. BARRY, HEAD OF U.S. DELEGATION  
RETURNED TO STOCKHOLM 04/14/86, 9:00 P.M. AND RESUMED  
CHARGE.  
3. SESSION X OF THE CONFERENCE CONVENED APRIL 15 AND  
WILL ADJOURN MAY 23, 1986.  
BARRY  
END OF MESSAGE

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**C O N F I D E N T I A L** STOCKHOLM 02983  
**SUBJECT:** CDE PLENARY STATEMENTS, APRIL 15, 1986  
**REF:** A) STOCKHOLM 2902, B) STOCKHOLM 2936

1. CDE X - 007
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. **BEGIN SUMMARY:** AT THE APRIL 15 PLENARY, IN ADDITION TO EXCHANGES ON LIBYA (REFTELS), DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER VAN DEN BROEK SPOKE ON BEHALF OF THE EC-12, AND POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER MARIAN ORZECZOWSKI OUTLINED THREE CONDITIONS FOR CDE TO SUCCEED. END SUMMARY.
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4. DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER VAN DEN BROEK MADE THE FOLLOWING REMARKS ON BEHALF OF THE EC-12:
  - CDE MUST TAKE A "SIGNIFICANT STEP FORWARD" FROM THE MEASURES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT (HFA). A "SO-CALLED MINI-PACKAGE" IS NOT GOOD ENOUGH,
  - CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY CONCERNS TRANSCEND THE MILITARY FIELD. BALANCE MUST BE STRUCK BETWEEN ALL PRINCIPLES OF THE HFA. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING MUST STRIVE FOR PROGRESS IN AREAS "WHERE LITTLE HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED;" JUSTICE MUST BE DONE CONSIDERING RESULTS OF OTTAWA AND BERN. IT IS IMPORTANT TO ACHIEVE RESULTS IN THE HUMAN CONTACTS MEETING IN BERN.
  - THE MANDATE PROVIDES THE ONLY BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION, ENSURING THAT RESULTS WILL BE CONCRETE, SUBSTANTIAL, WITH ADEQUATE SCOPE.
  - CONVERGENCE IS STILL NEEDED ON ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF AN AGREEMENT. IN THIS CONTEXT, INFORMATION MUST NOT BE LIMITED TO INFORMATION ON NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES.
  - WHAT ACTIVITIES ARE TO BE NOTIFIED: EC-12 WELCOMES GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 PROPOSAL TO DEFER QUESTION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES. STOCKHOLM CANNOT, HOWEVER, CHANGE THE CDE MANDATE (REFERRING TO ZONE, ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE) NOR DECIDE ON THE AGENDA FOR SUBSEQUENT STAGES OF THE CONFERENCE.
  - DETAILED INFORMATION IS NECESSARY IN AN EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL CALENDARS.
  - "ON-SITE INSPECTION" MUST BE PART OF A VERIFICATION REGIME. GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL ENCOURAGES POSSIBILITY OF ON-SITE INSPECTION AS PART OF A CDE AGREEMENT.
  - 
  - NUF: EC-12 IS PREPARED TO RENEW A COMMITMENT TO NUF IN THE CONTEXT OF AGREEMENT ON CONCRETE CSBM'S. CSBM'S GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE PRINCIPLE AND ARE THUS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE REAFFIRMATION ITSELF. (VAN DEN BROEK'S COMMENTS ON LIBYA ARE COVERED IN REF A.)
5. AFTER CRITICISM OF U.S. NUCLEAR TESTING AND OTHER ASPECTS OF U.S. POLICY, POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER MARIAN ORZECZOWSKI ENDORSED WARSAW PACT CALL FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS-FREE ZONES IN THE BALKANS, NORDIC, AND CENTRAL

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EUROPEAN CORRIDOR. HE CHARACTERIZED GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 PROPOSAL AS A "REAL, TANGIBLE PROGRAM" TO IMPROVE EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND TO RESTRAIN THE ARMS RACE. THE POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER INDIRECTLY CRITICIZED U.S. POLICY TOWARDS POLAND IN THE COURSE OF WARNING OF THE DANGERS IN ADDRESSING THE BALANCE OF THE HFA PRINCIPLES; THE WEST'S CONCEPT OF THIS BALANCE COULD "PARALYZE THE (HFA) PROCESS." TURNING SPECIFICALLY TO CDE, ORZECOWSKI OUTLINED THE FOLLOWING THOUGHTS:

-- THREE CONDITIONS MUST BE MET FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO SUCCEED: 1) PARTICIPANTS MUST REFRAIN FROM ACTIONS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE CONFERENCE OBJECTIVES; 2) PARTICIPANTS MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL; AND 3) "PROGRESSIVE RAPPROCHEMENT" MUST BE ACHIEVED THROUGH MUTUAL COMPROMISE. THE WEST HAS NOT RESPECTED THESE CONDITIONS, EVIDENCED BY ITS LACK OF "NEW PROPOSALS" IN THE SPIRIT OF COMPROMISE.

-- AGREEMENT IN SUBSTANCE SHOULD BE COMPLETED BEFORE JULY 18, SO THAT THE LAST SESSION (AUGUST 19 - SEPTEMBER 19) COULD BE USED FOR "TECHNICAL WORK."

-- A CDE AGREEMENT SHOULD INCLUDE THE WHOLE OF EUROPE FROM ATLANTIC TO URALS; BE MANDATORY FOR ALL MEASURES ADOPTED; INCLUDE "NEW MEASURES," I.E., LIMITATIONS; AND INCLUDE REDUCTION IN THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES.

-- THE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED IMMEDIATELY. THE CONFERENCE SHOULD RESUME ITS WORK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING. (ORZECOWSKI'S COMMENTS ON LIBYA ARE COVERED IN REF B.)

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 02904

SUBJECT: DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER'S CRITICISM OF U.S.  
- ACTIONS IN LIBYA

1. CDE X - 002
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE OPENING SESSION OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER ADDED TO HIS PREPARED STATEMENT ON THE CDE ON BEHALF OF THE EC-12 A CRITICISM OF U.S. ACTIONS IN LIBYA "IN HIS NATIONAL CAPACITY." AMBASSADOR BARRY RESPONDED TO THIS, AS WELL AS OTHER STATEMENTS CRITICIZING U.S. ACTIONS IN LIBYA. (SEE SEPTEL FOR FULL ACCOUNT.) END SUMMARY.

4. AFTER AN UNEXCEPTIONABLE STATEMENT ON THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE DELIVERED ON BEHALF OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER VAN DEN BROEK ADDED SOME REMARKS IN HIS "NATIONAL CAPACITY" ON THE EVENTS IN LIBYA. IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE PLENARY SESSION, DUTCH AMBASSADOR BUWALDA SHOWED AMBASSADOR BARRY A COPY OF THESE REMARKS WHICH, INTER ALIA, "DEPLORED" U.S. MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST LIBYA. BARRY TOLD BUWALDA THAT HE REGRETTED THAT THE DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER FELT COMPELLED TO RAISE THIS ISSUE AND THAT HE (BARRY) WOULD HAVE TO RESPOND. AFTER THIS BRIEF DISCUSSION, THE TEXT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT WAS SLIGHTLY MODIFIED TO CRITICIZE LIBYAN SUPPORT OF TERRORISM FIRST, AND THEN TO DEPLORE U.S. ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST LIBYA (IN THE TEXT WE WERE SHOWN THE ORDER WAS REVERSED). THE RELEVANT PORTION OF VAN DEN BROEK'S STATEMENT AND BARRY'S RESPONSE FOLLOWS.

5. BEGIN RELEVANT PORTION DUTCH STATEMENT:

"I SHOULD NOW LIKE TO MAKE SOME REMARKS IN MY NATIONAL CAPACITY ON THE SUBJECT WHICH IS VERY MUCH ON OUR MINDS TODAY.

"YESTERDAY THE 12 MET IN THE HAGUE TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEMS OF TERRORISM AND THE RESULTING INCREASE OF TENSION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. ON THAT OCCASION, WE HAVE AGREED ON CONCRETE MEASURES REGARDING STATES CLEARLY IMPLICATED IN SUPPORTING TERRORISM, SUCH AS LIBYA. WE ALSO UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR RESTRAINT ON ALL SIDES, AVOIDING FURTHER ESCALATION OF MILITARY TENSION IN THE REGION IN ORDER TO ENABLE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION.

"I REGRET TO SAY THAT MY GOVERNMENT DEPLORES THE MILITARY ACTION WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS FELT OBLIGATED TO RESORT TO THIS MORNING.

"WE FERVENTLY HOPE THAT FURTHER MILITARY ACTION CAN BE AVOIDED AND CALL UPON ALL PARTIES TO SHOW THE UTMOST RESTRAINT.

"THIS WILL EVIDENTLY REQUIRE ERADICATION OF INTERNATIONAL

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TERRORISM WHICH HAS LED TO THE EVENTS OF LAST NIGHT. ON THAT IMMEDIATE GOAL WE FEEL THAT ALL OF US SHOULD BE ABLE TO AGREE AND SHOULD JOIN OUR EFFORTS."

END TEXT.

6. BEGIN RELEVANT PORTION U.S. STATEMENT:

"SOME OF THE CRITICISM WE HAVE HEARD TODAY HAS NO DOUBT BEEN WELL MEANING; OTHERS HAVE SPOKEN IN HYPOCRITICAL AND, I WOULD SAY, HOSTILE TERMS.

"WE WELCOME THE DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY YESTERDAY, BUT CANNOT HELP WONDERING WHETHER EARLIER AND MORE FORCEFUL ACTIONS INVOLVING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STEPS MIGHT HAVE HAD A GREATER EFFECT IN PERSUADING COL. KHADHAFI TO DESIST FROM THE PLANS HE WAS MAKING AGAINST NOT ONLY U.S. INTERESTS BUT AGAINST ALL THE COUNTRIES OF THE MEDITERRANEAN LITTORAL."

END TEXT.

7. AFTER THE PLENARY SESSION, A NUMBER OF EC-12 AMBASSADORS (FRG, FRANCE, ITALY, UK) TOLD AMBASSADOR BARRY THAT THEY THOUGHT VAN DEN BROEK'S COMMENTS "UNNECESSARY."

8. WHILE THE PLENARY WAS STILL IN SESSION, VAN DEN BROEK GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS AND EMPHASIZING THAT HE SPOKE ONLY AS THE DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER, HE REPEATED THAT THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT "DEPLORES THIS ACTION" BY THE U.S. REFERRING AT LENGTH TO THE EC STATEMENT OF YESTERDAY, VAN DEN BROEK SAID HIS GOVERNMENT FEELS VERY STRONGLY ABOUT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. HE REGRETTED THAT "THE U.S. WAS FORCED TO TAKE THIS ACTION WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE NOT TAKE PLACE." HOWEVER MUCH THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT "DEPLORES" THIS INCIDENT, IT WILL NOT ALLOW IT TO DETRACT FROM DUTCH EFFORTS TO COMBAT TERRORISM.

9. SPEAKING TO THE PRESS AFTER THE PLENARY, AMBASSADOR BARRY OUTLINED THE MAIN POINTS OF HIS STATEMENT DURING THE SESSION (REPORTED SEPTEL).

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 02936  
 SUBJECT: CDE OPENING PLENARY/CRITICISM OF U.S. ON LIBYA  
 REF: CDE 002

1. CDE X - 005
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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 3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT APRIL 15 CDE PLENARY, U.S. MILITARY ACTION AGAINST LIBYA WAS CONDEMNED BY THE NETHERLANDS (SEPTEL), SOVIET UNION, POLAND, GDR, BULGARIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY, AND MALTA. AMBASSADOR BARRY DEFENDED U.S. RIGHT TO RETALIATE AGAINST LIBYAN TERRORISM. HE WAS SUPPORTED BY THE UK AND FRG. END SUMMARY.

4. POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER MARIAN ORZECZOWSKI LED WARSAW PACT ATTACK ON APRIL 14-15 U.S. MILITARY ACTION AGAINST LIBYA. ALLEGING THAT THE U.S. IS PURSUING A POLICY OF MILITARY CONFLICT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, HE "UNRESERVEDLY CONDEMNED" U.S. "ACT OF STATE TERRORISM." HE CHARACTERIZED IT AS "A FLAGRANT EXAMPLE OF A VIOLATION OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT."

5. BULGARIAN AMBASSADOR TODOROV CONDEMNED U.S. ACTIONS AS A VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF), ACHIEVED BY THE "LARGE-SCALE MANIFESTATION OF SEA POWER." HE ADDED THAT IT IS AN ACT OF "VANDALISM" REMINISCENT OF THE MIDDLE AGES; THE U.S., "QUITE LIGHT-HEARTEDLY, IS USING MILITARY FORCE TO IMPRESS ITS WILL ON OTHERS," THROUGH THE ATTACK ON "LIBYAN CITIES AND THE PEACEFUL POPULATION." THE BULGARIAN AMBASSADOR ALSO ALLEGED THAT THE U.S. ACTION WAS A "DELIBERATE VIOLATION" OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLE OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND VIOLATED LIBYAN SECURITY. FOLLOWING AMBASSADOR BARRY'S REMARKS, WHICH INCLUDED REFERENCES TO BULGARIAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM AND TO BULGARIA'S MISTREATMENT OF ITS TURKISH MINORITY, TODOROV COMMENTED THAT BARRY HAD BEEN HOSTILE TO BULGARIA THROUGHOUT HIS TOUR OF DUTY THERE. HE SAID BARRY HAD FANNED ALLEGATIONS OF BULGARIAN INVOLVEMENT IN PAPAL ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT, WHICH ROMAN COURT HAD FOUND UNTRUE, AND PRESSED FALSE CLAIMS OF GOB INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM AND DRUG SMUGGLING.

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 6. AMBASSADORS REZNIK (CSSR), BUHRING (GDR), AND SZIGETI (HUNGARY) ALSO "UNRESERVEDLY CONDEMNED" U.S. MILITARY ACTION. REZNIK CALLED IT AN "AGGRESSIVE POLICY," A DELIBERATE BREACH OF UN PRINCIPLES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. BUHRING, REFERRING TO THE WEST BERLIN TERRORIST ATTACK, NOTED GDR REJECTION OF TERRORISM. HOWEVER, HE CRITICIZED WEST BERLIN'S "DEFICIENCIES" IN COMBATING TERRORISM. SZIGETI CONVEYED HUNGARY'S CONCERN FOR THE "GRAVE SITUATION" ALLEGEDLY RISING FROM THE U.S. ACTION. HE URGED U.S. "SELF-RESTRAINT" AND CALLED ON THE U.S. TO IMMEDIATELY HALT MILITARY ACTIONS AND TO TAKE STEPS TO

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AVOID FURTHER CONFLICT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

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7. AFTER OTHER WARSAW PACT STATEMENTS AND FOLLOWING AMBASSADOR BARRY'S REMARKS, SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY CONDEMNED THE U.S. ACTION:

-- IT WAS AN "UNJUSTIFIED ACT OF AGGRESSION," WHICH RESULTED IN "BOMBARDMENT OF CIVILIAN AREAS" AND (TENS OF) CIVILIAN CASUALTIES.

-- U.S. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE ACT IS "WEAK INDEED." IT IS AN ATTEMPT TO LABEL AN "AGGRESSIVE ACT" AS CONCERN FOR SAFETY AND SECURITY OF U.S. INTERESTS. U.S. JUSTIFICATION IS BASED ON "GROUNDLESS ACCUSATIONS" -- "LIES" -- OF LIBYAN TERRORISM. LIBYA HAS REPEATEDLY REJECTED THESE ASSERTIONS.

-- U.S. ACTION IS INDICATIVE OF A TREND IN U.S. BEHAVIOR WHICH THREATENS PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. U.S.-LIBYAN ACTION IS AN EXAMPLE OF "U.S. INTERFERENCE," A TREND SUPPORTED BY OTHER U.S. ACTIONS, E.G., PRESENCE OF AN AMERICAN SQUADRON ON THE CRIMEAN SHORE, AND RECENT U.S. NUCLEAR EXPLOSION. U.S. ACTION AGAINST LIBYA IS "STRONGLY INTERLINKED" WITH CDE ISSUES, SUCH AS THE NON-USE OF FORCE. ALSO "MILITARY AGGRESSION" DISRUPTS THE ATMOSPHERE OF CONFIDENCE. THE U.S. ACTION IS AGAINST "PROGRESS" IN ENHANCING PEACE AND SECURITY.

8. MALTESE AMBASSADOR GAUCI "DEPLORED THE RECENT TURN OF EVENTS." HE CITED THE "EXTENSIVE DAMAGE AND HEAVY CIVILIAN CASUALTIES" OF THE U.S. MILITARY ACTION. HE ALLEGED THAT THE U.S. ACTION VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLES OF THE HFA, "PARTICULARLY PRINCIPLES 2 AND 5" -- NUF AND PSD (PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES). GAUCI STRESSED THAT THE GOM HAD URGED THE U.S. TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS WITH LIBYA; HE NOTED GOM "READINESS TO ASSIST IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE TO OPEN THE WAY FOR A JUST, LASTING RESOLUTION." FINALLY, HE WARNED THAT THE U.S. ACTION DEMONSTRATED THE NECESSITY OF EUROPEAN AND MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY TO PROCEED "HAND-IN-HAND" VIS-A-VIS ADOPTION OF CSBM'S. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE MALTESE AMBASSADOR INSISTED THAT NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN BE INCLUDED IN ANY CDE AGREEMENT.

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9. AMBASSADOR BARRY'S REPLY MADE FOLLOWING POINTS (FULL TEXT SEPTTEL):

-- HE CRITICIZED THE TONE OF "MORAL EQUIVALENCY" EQUATING LIBYA'S ILLEGAL ACTS WITH THE U.S. RESPONSE TO THOSE ACTS. LIBYA "HAS BEEN CONDUCTING A POLICY OF UNBRIDLED TERRORISM, NOT ONLY IN THE PAST WEEKS, BUT THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS." IN THIS CONTEXT HE QUESTIONED A CONCEPT OF PEACE AND SECURITY WHICH FAILS TO TAKE LIBYAN TERRORISM INTO ACCOUNT.

-- U.S. EVIDENCE CLEARLY LINKS LIBYA TO THE BOMBING IN WEST BERLIN. QADHAFI SENT ORDERS TO THE SO-CALLED LIBYAN

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PEOPLE'S BUREAUS, INCLUDING THE OFFICE IN EAST BERLIN, TO ATTACK U.S. CITIZENS AND FACILITIES. LIBYANS WITH TERRORIST RECORDS WERE SEEN AND IDENTIFIED IN WEST BERLIN BY U.S. AND WEST BERLIN SECURITY PERSONNEL. THE PEOPLE'S BUREAU INFORMED TRIPOLI OF THE APRIL 15 ATTACK, AND SUBSEQUENTLY INFORMED TRIPOLI THAT THE ATTACK WAS SUCCESSFUL AND COULD NOT BE TRACED.

-- THE SAME PATTERN OF LIBYAN TERRORISM HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED ELSEWHERE. VARIOUS ACTIVITIES ARE/WERE BEING PLANNED AGAINST AMERICAN INTERESTS. THESE PLANS INCLUDED ATTACKS ON U.S. CITIZENS IN LATIN AMERICA, AFRICA, EUROPE AND THE MIDEAST. IN TEN AFRICAN COUNTRIES, LIBYAN PEOPLE'S BUREAUS HAVE PLANNED ATTACKS AND MOUNTED SURVEILLANCE OF AMERICANS. LIBYANS ARRIVED IN ONE COUNTRY TO PLAN A BOMBING AND KIDNAPPING OF THE U.S. AMBASSADOR. LIBYAN "DIPLOMATS" ARE CARRYING OUT SURVEILLANCE OF AMERICAN DIPLOMATS AND THEIR FAMILIES IN LATIN AMERICA. LIBYAN AGENTS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO STRIKE AGAINST AMERICAN COMMERCIAL INTERESTS.

-- QADHAFI'S OWN COMMENTS ARE "PLAIN EVIDENCE" OF WHAT HE IS DOING. QADHAFI'S OWN WORDS POSE A THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY.

-- CRITICISM BY SOME OF THE U.S. ACTION IS HYPOCRITICAL AND HOSTILE. ALTHOUGH MILITARY FORCE MUST BE A LAST

RESORT, IT IS PERFECTLY LEGITIMATE UNDER THE UN CHARTER ONCE OTHER STEPS HAVE BEEN EXHAUSTED. THE U.S. EXERCISED ITS RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE BECAUSE OF THE "TERRORIST POLICY OF THE QADHAFI REGIME." THUS ALLEGATIONS THAT THE U.S. HAS VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UN AND HFA ARE A "GROSS MISINTERPRETATION" OF THE U.S. ACTION.

-- THE U.S. WELCOMES THE EC-12 DECISION YESTERDAY ON TERRORISM BUT EARLIER, MORE FORCEFUL ACTIONS MIGHT HAVE HAD A GREATER EFFECT IN DISSUADING QADHAFI FROM THESE PLANS. THESE PLANS THREATEN U.S. AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES ALIKE. IT IS HYPOCRITICAL TO CONDEMN U.S. ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO TERRORISM IF A COUNTRY IS OPPOSED TO TERRORISM.

-- IN RESPONSE TO THE BULGARIAN CHARACTERIZATION OF THE U.S. ACTION AS A RETURN TO THE MIDDLE AGES, BARRY CRITICIZED BULGARIA'S SUPPORT OF "NOTORIOUS TERRORIST GROUPS SUCH AS ABU NIDAL." U.S. DEMARCHES HAD NO VISIBLE EFFECT ON THIS POLICY. A RETURN TO THE MIDDLE AGES MIGHT ALSO APPLY TO GOB ACTIONS AGAINST THE ETHNIC TURKISH MINORITY IN BULGARIA.

10. IN SHORT STATEMENTS, AMBASSADORS EDES (UK) AND CITRON (FRG) LENT SUPPORT TO THE U.S. EDES POINTED OUT THAT THE U.S. HAD "INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE" DIRECTLY LINKING LIBYA WITH THE TERRORIST ATTACKS, OF WHICH THE WEST BERLIN BOMBING IS ONLY THE MOST RECENT EXAMPLE. THERE IS "EQUALLY INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE" OF WIDE-

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RANGING LIBYAN PLANS FOR FURTHER ATTACKS. THE BRITISH  
AMBASSADOR ALSO STRESSED THAT THE U.S. HAS THE RIGHT OF  
SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST SPECIFIC TARGETS IN A STATE WHOSE  
AUTHORITIES ARE INSTIGATING AND ENCOURAGING TERRORISM.  
FRG AMBASSADOR CITRON NOTED HIS SURPRISE AT THE NUMBER  
OF HYPOCRITICAL STATEMENTS. HE STRESSED THAT THERE "ARE  
REASONS" FOR THE U.S. ACTION, I.E., THE "MURDEROUS"  
BERLIN BOMBING.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 02937

SUBJ: AMB. BARRY'S REMARKS AT CDE OPENING PLENARY

1. CDE X - 03

2. MOST OF THE OPENING PLENARY OF CDE ROUND X TODAY (04/15/86) WAS TAKEN UP WITH STATEMENTS (REPORTED SEPTELS) ABOUT THE LIBYAN SITUATION, MOST OF THEM CRITICAL OF THE U.S. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF EXTEMPORANEOUS REMARKS AMBASSADOR ROBERT L. BARRY, HEAD, USDEL CDE, MADE IN RESPONSE:

BEGIN TEXT: MR. CHAIRMAN: I WAS GOING TO SAY HOW MUCH I ENJOYED BEING BACK IN STOCKHOLM, BUT I'M NOT REALLY SURE THAT'S THE CASE AFTER HEARING SOME OF THE COMMENTS THAT I HEARD TODAY. ON THE LAST OCCASION WHEN WE OPENED THE SESSION HERE IN STOCKHOLM AND COMMENTS WERE MADE ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, AND IN PARTICULAR ABOUT THE SITUATION WITH LIBYA, I EXPRESSED DEEP DOUBTS ABOUT THE TONE OF MORAL EQUIVALENCY WHICH HAD CREPT INTO THE DISCUSSION. BY MORAL EQUIVALENCY, I MEAN EQUATING AN ILLEGAL ACT WITH THE RESPONSE TO IT. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT TODAY WE HAVE GONE BEYOND MORAL EQUIVALENCY AND STOOD THE ENTIRE PRINCIPLE ON ITS HEAD. I WONDER, AS I LISTEN TO SOME OF THE COMMENTS MADE TODAY, EXACTLY WHAT CONCEPT OF PEACE AND SECURITY SOME PARTICIPATING STATES WHO HAVE SPOKEN TODAY MIGHT HAVE. I DON'T THINK ANYBODY IN THIS HALL TODAY SERIOUSLY DOUBTS THAT LIBYA HAS BEEN CONDUCTING A POLICY OF UNBRIDLED TERRORISM, NOT ONLY IN THE PAST WEEKS BUT OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS. BUT I DIDN'T HEAR ANYBODY TODAY, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE FIRST SPEAKER, WHO EVEN MENTIONED THIS FACT.

WHAT EVIDENCE DO WE HAVE LINKING LIBYA WITH THE BOMBING IN BERLIN THAT CAUSED US TO TAKE THE STEPS WE DID? WE LEARNED IN LATE MARCH THAT COL. QADHAFI HAD SENT ORDERS TO A NUMBER OF SO-CALLED PEOPLE'S BUREAUS INCLUDING THAT IN EAST BERLIN TO ATTACK U.S. CITIZENS AND FACILITIES. SUBSEQUENTLY, MEMBERS OF THE LIBYAN PEOPLE'S BUREAU WITH RECORDS OF PREVIOUS TERRORIST ACTIVITY WERE SEEN AND IDENTIFIED IN WEST BERLIN BY U.S. AND WEST BERLIN SECURITY PERSONNEL. ON THE EVENING OF APRIL 4, BERLIN TIME, WE LEARNED THAT THE LIBYAN PEOPLE'S BUREAU IN EAST BERLIN INFORMED TRIPOLI THAT AN ATTACK WOULD TAKE PLACE ON APRIL 5. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE LIBYAN PEOPLE'S BUREAU IN EAST BERLIN TOLD TRIPOLI THAT THE "OPERATION" HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL AND THAT IT COULD NOT BE TRACED.

THE SAME PATTERN OF LIBYAN PLANNING TO ATTACK AMERICANS AND OTHERS HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED ELSEWHERE, BUT FOR VARIOUS REASONS THERE HAVE BEEN NO FURTHER "SUCCESSSES." WE ALSO HAVE EVIDENCE AND INFORMATION THAT FURTHER ACTIVITIES OF THIS KIND WERE AND ARE BEING PLANNED TODAY. THESE ACTIVITIES ARE PLANNED AGAINST

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U.S. CITIZENS AND FACILITIES AND AIRCRAFT IN EUROPE, THE MIDDLE EAST, AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA. IN AFRICA, LIBYANS HAVE BEEN PLANNING ATTACKS AND CONDUCTING SURVEILLANCE OF U.S. FACILITIES IN TEN COUNTRIES. LAST WEEK, THREE LIBYAN AGENTS ARRIVED IN ONE AFRICAN STATE TO SET UP THE BOMBING OF OUR EMBASSY CHANCERY AND THE KIDNAPPING OF OUR AMBASSADOR. IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE LIBYANS HAVE PLANNED SEVERAL ATTACKS ON U.S. EMBASSIES AND HAVE ENCOURAGED OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS THERE TO CONDUCT SIMILAR ATTACKS. IN LATIN AMERICA, LIBYAN DIPLOMATS HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING AMERICAN DIPLOMATS AND DEPENDENTS. LIBYA HAS DIRECTED ITS AGENTS TO STRIKE AGAINST U.S. COMMERCIAL INTERESTS, INCLUDING U.S. INTERNATIONAL AIR CARRIERS.

BUT, YOU DON'T HAVE TO GO TO THIS EVIDENCE TO BELIEVE THAT COL. QADHAFI IS ENGAGED IN ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. QADHAFI IS HIS OWN SMOKING GUN. STATEMENTS WHICH HE MADE, INCLUDING REMARKS TO A CONCLAVE OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS FROM ALL AROUND THE WORLD, ARE PLAIN EVIDENCE OF WHAT HE IS DOING. AND IF THIS IS NOT A THREAT TO SECURITY, I REALLY DON'T KNOW WHAT IS.

SOME OF THE CRITICISM WE HAVE HEARD TODAY HAS BEEN NO DOUBT WELL-MEANING. OTHERS HAVE SPOKEN IN HYPOCRITICAL AND, I WOULD SAY, HOSTILE TERMS. I ASK YOU HONESTLY TO THINK TO YOURSELVES ABOUT YOUR OWN OPPOSITION TO TERRORISM AND HOW THAT HAS BEEN EXPRESSED. MILITARY FORCE IS INDEED A LAST RESORT. IT IS PERFECTLY LEGITIMATE UNDER THE UN CHARTER, BUT OTHER STEPS SHOULD BE EXHAUSTED FIRST. LET ME ASK YOU TO THINK FOR YOURSELVES OF YOUR STEPS TO DISCOURAGE THIS EXPRESSION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.

I WAS INTERESTED IN THE COMMENTS OF MY FRIEND, THE AMBASSADOR OF BULGARIA. I RECALL THE MANY APPROACHES I MADE TO HIS GOVERNMENT WHEN I WAS ACCREDITED TO HIS COUNTRY. BULGARIA SUPPORTED AND ASSISTED NOTORIOUS TERRORIST GROUPS, SUCH AS THE ABU NIDAL GROUP, WHICH TAKES TERRORIST ACTIONS NOT ONLY AGAINST THE UNITED STATES BUT AGAINST THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION ITSELF. THE DEMARCHES HAD NO VISIBLE EFFECT. AND WHEN BULGARIA SPOKE ABOUT THE UNITED STATES CARRYING OUT POLICIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES, I COULD NOT HELP THINKING OF THE POLICIES WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF BULGARIA IS CARRYING OUT AGAINST ITS TURKISH MINORITY.

WHEN THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WARSAW PACT CONDEMN US FOR LEGITIMATE SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST TERRORISM, I CANNOT HELP THINKING ABOUT THEIR VOCAL EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR QADHAFI AND THE CONCRETE EXPRESSION OF THAT SUPPORT, SUCH AS THE PRESENCE OF MILITARY ADVISERS AND SOPHISTICATED LONG-RANGE SA-5 MISSILES DESIGNED TO

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PROTECT A CLAIM WHICH THE COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW PACT THEMSELVES RECOGNIZE TO BE IN CONTRAVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. SUCH STEPS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE TERRORIST POLICIES OF THE QADHAFI REGIME. MY GOVERNMENT CERTAINLY WELCOMES THE DECISIONS OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY YESTERDAY, BUT WE CANNOT HELP WONDERING WHETHER EARLIER AND MORE FORCEFUL ACTIONS INVOLVING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STEPS MIGHT NOT HAVE HAD A GREATER EFFECT IN DISSUADING COL. QADHAFI FROM THE PLANS THAT HE WAS MAKING TO THREATEN NOT ONLY THE UNITED STATES BUT ALL THE COUNTRIES OF THE MEDITERRANEAN LITTORAL.

TO THOSE WHO SAY THAT WE HAVE VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, I THINK THIS IS A PERVERSE MISINTERPRETATION OF WHAT THE FINAL ACT SAYS. AND CERTAINLY IF YOU BELIEVE THAT DECISIONS MADE BY THIS CONFERENCE WILL RESTRAIN A PARTICIPANT'S RIGHT TO SELF DEFENSE, THEN I THINK WE ARE HEADED FOR DIFFICULT SAILING AHEAD.

I HAD HOPED TO START THIS CONFERENCE ON A MORE OPTIMISTIC NOTE. I HAD HOPED TO COME BACK TO A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT, AND IN FACT I WANTED TO SUPPORT SOMETHING THAT I SAW IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE WARSAW PACT FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING WHERE IT SPOKE OF THE NEED TO ACCELERATE THE WORK OF THIS CONFERENCE. MY GOVERNMENT AGREES THAT THIS IS AN ESSENTIAL TASK BEFORE US. THE WHITE HOUSE TODAY IS ISSUING A STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT REAGAN WHICH EMPHASIZES THAT THIS WILL BE THE MOST CRITICAL SESSION TO DATE. WE BELIEVE THAT IF SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IS MADE THERE WILL BE A GOOD CHANCE OF ACHIEVING A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT WHICH WILL INCREASE OPENNESS AND MAKE THE MILITARY SITUATION IN EUROPE MORE STABLE AND PREDICTABLE.

I HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED BY THE PRESIDENT "TO WORK WITH OUR ALLIES, THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES AND THE EAST TO FIND SOLUTIONS CONSISTENT WITH THE CONFERENCE MANDATE AND OUR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS." WE BELIEVE THAT PROGRESS AT THIS POINT CAN ONLY BE REACHED THROUGH THE DRAFTING PROCESS. AND WE ARE EAGER TO CONCENTRATE ON A FEW KEY AREAS WHICH WILL ENABLE US TO SPEED UP THE PROCESS. WE HOPE THAT AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED EARLY IN THIS ROUND ON THRESHOLDS FOR NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES. THESE THRESHOLDS MUST BE VERIFIABLE AND MUST RESULT IN EQUITABLE TREATMENT FOR ALL PARTICIPATING STATES. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS CAN BE ACHIEVED THROUGH STRUCTURAL AND NUMERICAL PARAMETERS AT LEVELS SIGNIFICANTLY BELOW THE 25,000 TROOP LEVEL OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

WE CONTINUE TO GIVE IMPORTANCE TO ON-SITE INSPECTIONS AS THE ONLY ADEQUATE MECHANISM FOR VERIFICATION OF CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH WOULD

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BE ACCESSIBLE TO ALL.  
MR. CHAIRMAN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE OTHER  
CO-SPONSORS OF SC.1 ARE PREPARED TO DRAFT INTENSIVELY  
NOW IN ALL SUBSTANTIVE AREAS WHERE CONSENSUS IS  
POSSIBLE. I THINK IT WOULD BE FRUITLESS TO ENGAGE IN  
ACCUSATIONS OF FOOTDRAGGING. I THINK IT IS EVIDENT TO  
ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THIS CONFERENCE WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN  
IN THE WORKING GROUPS TO SPEED THE DRAFTING PROCESS.  
AS THE CONFERENCE RESUMES, WE WILL BE SEEKING THROUGH  
THAT PROCESS TO IDENTIFY NEW AREAS OF CONSENSUS. WE  
ARE DETERMINED THAT THIS CONFERENCE WILL NOT FAIL  
THROUGH ANY LACK OF FLEXIBILITY, EFFORT OR COMMITMENT  
ON OUR PART. WE ASK ALL OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THE  
CONFERENCE TO JOIN US IN THIS COMMITMENT. IN THAT WAY,  
I BELIEVE WE CAN SUCCEED IN OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO ADOPT  
CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH CAN  
MAKE A REAL CONTRIBUTION TO REDUCING THE RISK OF  
MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE.  
THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN. END TEXT.  
BARRY  
END OF MESSAGE

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**C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03032**  
**SUBJECT: AGREED TEXT ON WORKING GROUP B-2 (OBSERVATION)**  
**1. CDE X - 009**  
**2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.**  
**3. WORKING GROUP B-2 (OBSERVATION) AGREED TO NOTE THE**  
**FOLLOWING TEXT IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK ON APRIL 17.**  
**BEGIN TEXT:**  
**THE INVITED STATES MAY DECIDE WHETHER TO SEND MILITARY**  
**AND/OR CIVILIAN OBSERVERS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF ITS**  
**PERSONNEL ACCREDITED TO THE HOST STATE.**  
**END TEXT.**  
**BARRY**  
**END OF MESSAGE**

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CONFIDENTIAL STOCKHOLM 03094  
 SUBJECT: NON-USE OF FORCE: SUGGESTED DEMARCHES  
 REF: STOCKHOLM 1910

1. CDE X - 013
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: TWO KEY POINTS BLOCK CONSENSUS ON A WESTERN TEXT ON NON-USE OF FORCE: HOW TO REAFFIRM THE NUF PRINCIPLE AND WHETHER TO INCLUDE HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE. PARAS 6 THROUGH 10 CONTAIN RECOMMENDED COURSE OF ACTION AND SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS. END SUMMARY.
- 
4. THE NATO MINI-CLUSTER ON NON-USE OF FORCE IS ATTEMPTING TO AGREE ON THE FINAL TWO ELEMENTS OF A WESTERN NUF TEXT. (FYI: THE FIRST ELEMENT INTRODUCED AT THE END OF THE LAST ROUND DEALT WITH THE LINK BETWEEN CONCRETE CSBM'S AND THE NUF PRINCIPLE; THE SECOND ELEMENT CONTAINS THE NUF PRINCIPLE ITSELF; AND THE THIRD ELEMENT LISTS COLLATERAL CONSIDERATIONS, SUCH AS HUMAN RIGHTS.) PORTIONS OF THE AGREED TEXT THEN WILL BE INTRODUCED AS DEEMED TACTICALLY ADVISABLE, IN CONFORMITY WITH THE ALLIANCE STRATEGY OF "FLEXIBLE PARALLELISM," I.E., CONTINGENT ON SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS IN OTHER WORKING GROUPS. THUS, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WE FIRST REACH CONSENSUS ON THE WESTERN PAPER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, IN ORDER TO ALLOW US TO CONTINUE OUR STRATEGY OF "FLEXIBLE PARALLELISM." HOWEVER, AS ANTICIPATED IN REFTTEL AND THE MARCH MEMO ON NUF STRATEGY AND TACTICS, TWO KEY ISSUES REMAIN UNRESOLVED: IN WHAT FORM TO REAFFIRM THE NUF PRINCIPLE AND WHETHER TO INCLUDE HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE.
5. THE NUF PRINCIPLE: THE EC-12 CONTINUE TO INSIST ON USING THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT PRINCIPLE 2 AS THE TAKEOFF POINT FOR THE WESTERN POSITION ON NON-USE OF FORCE. THEY ARGUE THAT BY QUOTING THE HFA PRINCIPLE IN TOTO, NATO, THROUGH PREEMPTIVE INTRODUCTION OF "DEVELOPED" LANGUAGE ON NUF, WILL MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE EAST AND SOME OF THE NNA TO "DEVELOP" THE PRINCIPLE IN DIRECTIONS WHICH ARE UNPALATABLE TO THE WEST. CONVERSELY, BY USING THE MINIMALIST LANGUAGE OF THE UN CHARTER, AS THE U.S. TEXT DOES, WE ARE BEGGING OTHERS TO DEVELOP THE PRINCIPLE. FINALLY, THEY ARGUE THAT WE CANNOT REJECT IN 1986 WHAT WE ACCEPTED IN 1975, I.E., HFA LANGUAGE. THE U.S. POSITION REFLECTS THE CONCISE, UNIVERSAL AND UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF THE UN CHARTER. WE (TURKEY AND CANADA SUPPORT THE U.S. POSITION) HAVE MADE SOME HEADWAY IN PERSUADING OUR EC-12 ALLIES AT LEAST TO ACCEPT REFERENCE TO THE UN CHARTER. HOWEVER, THEY STILL INSIST ON INCLUDING THE VERBATIM TEXT OF HFA PRINCIPLE 2. (ON THE MARGINS OF THE MEETINGS, THE FRENCH DELEGATION HAS TOLD US THEY SEE THE LOGIC OF OUR POSITION AND WILL ASK PARIS IF IT COULD
- 
- ACCEPT LANGUAGE SIMILAR TO THE U.S. TEXT COMBINED WITH A

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REFERENCE TO PRINCIPLE 2 OF THE HFA, BUT NOT QUOTING IT VERBATIM.) NEVERTHELESS, USDEL BELIEVES THAT DEMARCHES WILL BE NEEDED IN EC-12 CAPITALS TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE, IN ORDER TO AGREE ON A FINAL WESTERN TEXT IN THE NEAREST FUTURE.

**6. SUGGESTED DEMARCHE:**

-- THE U.S. CONTINUES TO HAVE STRONG OBJECTIONS TO EC-12 INVOLVEMENT IN WHAT IS CLEARLY A SECURITY -- AND HENCE, NATO -- ISSUE, I.E., CDE NEGOTIATIONS.

-- NEVERTHELESS, IN THE INTERESTS OF ACHIEVING A COMMON ALLIANCE POSITION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, WE HAVE RELUCTANTLY AGREED TO USE THE "DUTCH" TEXT, I.E., EC-12 TEXT, AS A BASIS FOR ALLIED DISCUSSION IN FORMULATING A NUF TEXT.

-- HOWEVER, ON THE CORE QUESTION OF HOW TO REAFFIRM THE NUF PRINCIPLE ITSELF, WE STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. FORMULA BASED ON UN CHARTER LANGUAGE IS PREFERABLE.

-- UN CHARTER LANGUAGE IS UNIVERSAL AND UNAMBIGUOUS. IT IS FAR SUPERIOR TO HELSINKI FINAL ACT LANGUAGE WHICH CONTAINS COMPROMISE SOLUTIONS AND REFLECTS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS LANGUAGE, E.G., ON DIRECT AND INDIRECT USE OF FORCE, MANIFESTATION OF FORCE, REPRISALS. (CLEARLY, IN LIGHT OF THE EVENTS IN LIBYA, THIS LATTER POINT IS PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE NOW; IT WOULD BE POLITICALLY UNWISE -- AND UNNECESSARY -- TO BRING UP THIS QUESTION GRATUITOUSLY IN A WESTERN DRAFT.)

**7. EC-12 ARGUMENTS AND SUGGESTED RESPONSES:**

-- ARGUMENT: THE NNA, INCLUDING SUCH NON-UN MEMBER STATES AS SWITZERLAND, COULD NOT ACCEPT LANGUAGE BASED ON THE UN CHARTER.

- SUGGESTED RESPONSE: THE NNA LANGUAGE IN SC.7 IS VERY CLOSE TO THE U.S. TEXT AND IS BASED ON THE UN CHARTER. THE NNA, INCLUDING THE SWISS, HAVE ACCEPTED REFERENCES TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

-- ARGUMENT: BY QUOTING HFA PRINCIPLE II IN TOTO WE PREVENT THE EAST AND SOME OF THE NNA FROM DEVELOPING THE PRINCIPLE.

- SUGGESTED RESPONSE: THE EAST AND OTHERS WILL TRY TO DEVELOP THE PRINCIPLE WHATEVER LANGUAGE WE INTRODUCE. UN CHARTER LANGUAGE IS LESS PRONE TO DEVELOPMENT. IN ANY CASE, WE CAN REFER TO PRINCIPLE II OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT IN OUR REAFFIRMATION.

-- ARGUMENT: WE CAN'T GO BACK NOW ON SOMETHING WE AGREED TO IN 1975.

- SUGGESTED RESPONSE: NOBODY IS GOING BACK ON ANYTHING. NATO SHOULD CHOOSE THE LANGUAGE THAT BEST REFLECTS ITS VIEWS OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE, I.E., FROM THE UN CHARTER. BESIDES THIS IS A NON-ISSUE, SINCE NEITHER THE EAST NOR THE NNA HAVE CHOSEN TO USE THE HFA

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LANGUAGE AS THE BASIS FOR THEIR NUF REAFFIRMATIONS.

8. HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EC-12 COULD ONLY AGREE TO VERY TEPID LANGUAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, BECAUSE OF STRONG ITALIAN AND -- TO A LESSER DEGREE -- DANISH OBJECTIONS TO EVEN INCLUDING A HUMAN RIGHTS REFERENCE IN A WESTERN NUF SECTION. THE ITALIANS, WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREOTTI REPORTEDLY PERSONALLY ENGAGED IN THE SUBJECT, ARGUE THAT BY INTRODUCING HUMAN RIGHTS INTO THE CDE CONTEXT WE PREJUDICE OUR ABILITY TO PREVENT THE EAST FROM BRINGING UP INAPPROPRIATE SUBJECTS SUCH AS SOVIET DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS IN OTHER CSCE FORA. ITALY'S EC-12 PARTNERS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO GET ROME TO AGREE EVEN TO LANGUAGE SIMILAR TO THE NNA LANGUAGE OF SC.7. AMBASSADOR BARRY HAS SCHEDULED CONSULTATIONS IN ROME ON APRIL 21; THE RELATIONSHIP OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND NON-USE OF FORCE IN STOCKHOLM WILL BE IN THE FOREFRONT OF THESE DISCUSSIONS.

9. SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS:

-- HUMAN RIGHTS IS A KEY ELEMENT IN THE WEST'S LARGER CONCEPT OF SECURITY, WHICH INCLUDES POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND HUMANITARIAN, AS WELL AS PURELY MILITARY, MATTERS.

-- IN STOCKHOLM, WE HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN REDIRECTING THE NUF AGENDA BY INTRODUCING THIS LARGER CONCEPT INTO WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS. REFERENCES TO HUMAN RIGHTS WERE PART OF OUR MARCH 11 CONCEPTUAL STATEMENT INTRODUCING THE WEST'S FIRST NUF ELEMENT.

-- ACCORDINGLY, THE EAST MAY BE HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT THE WISDOM OF A LENGTHY NUF TEXT. THIS IS IN OUR INTEREST, SINCE WE WILL WANT CONCRETE CSBM'S TO REMAIN THE OPERATIONAL AND OPTICAL HEART OF ANY STOCKHOLM CONCLUDING DOCUMENT.

-- SUPPORT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IS A KEY TO BIPARTISAN PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE CSCE PROCESS IN GENERAL, AND THE CDE IN PARTICULAR. MUCH OF CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST IN THE CDE CENTERS ON HAVING THE LARGER WESTERN CONCEPT OF SECURITY, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS, REFLECTED IN STOCKHOLM DISCUSSIONS.

-- IN ANY CASE, THE NNA LANGUAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS IS MUCH STRONGER THAN EC-12 LANGUAGE. THE NNA HAVE, IN EFFECT, LEGITIMIZED THE INTRODUCTION OF NATO LANGUAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS. IT WOULD BE BOTH SUBSTANTIVELY AND TACTICALLY UNWISE NOT TO PROPOSE HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE THAT GOES BEYOND THE NNA TEXT.

10. SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS (TO THE ITALIAN ARGUMENT THAT THE SOVIETS WILL BRING UP THEIR PET PEACE AND DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS IN FUTURE BASKET 3 CSCE FORA IN RESPONSE TO OUR INTRODUCTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CDE):

-- HUMAN RIGHTS DOES NOT ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS ON CSBM'S, THE CORE OF THE MANDATE WORK OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE.

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-- HUMAN RIGHTS REFERENCES WOULD ONLY BE INTRODUCED IN NON-USE OF FORCE DISCUSSIONS. WE HAVE, IN FACT, ALREADY INTRODUCED THIS CONCEPT IN DISCUSSIONS AND IT HAS BEEN FURTHER LEGITIMIZED BY THE NNA DOCUMENT. THIS REFLECTS THE GENERAL WESTERN APPROACH TO NON-USE OF FORCE AND SECURITY MATTERS.

-- REGARDLESS OF HOW WE HANDLE HUMAN RIGHTS HERE IN STOCKHOLM, THE SOVIETS WILL PURSUE ONGOING ATTEMPTS TO SUBVERT DISCUSSION IN OTHER CSCE FORA AS THEY SEE FIT.

-- NOT TO AGREE TO A HUMAN RIGHTS REFERENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF A NUF REAFFIRMATION WOULD COINCIDE WITH MOSCOW'S CSCE GAME PLAN, I.E., SEPARATING AND ACTIVELY PROMOTING THE SECURITY BASKET WHILE DOWNPLAYING THE HUMAN RIGHTS/CONTACTS BASKET.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03092  
SUBJECT: TERRORISM AND THE NON-USE OF FORCE  
REF: STOCKHOLM 1911

1. CDE X - 014
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. TURKEY SUBMITTED THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH ON TERRORISM TO THE NATO MINI-CLUSTER DISCUSSING A WESTERN TEXT ON NON-USE OF FORCE. AS WASHINGTON IS AWARE, USDEL HAS ALREADY SUBMITTED TWO ALTERNATIVE AMENDMENTS ON TERRORISM. THE TURKISH LANGUAGE IS BASED ON PORTIONS OF THOSE TWO ALTERNATIVES.

BEGIN TEXT:

REAFFIRMING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT ON TERRORISM, THEY CONDEMN THE VIOLENT ACTS OF TERRORISM WHICH REPRESENT THE USE OF FORCE IN ITS MOST BRUTAL, PRIMITIVE AND DIRECT FASHION. THE PARTICIPATING STATES REITERATE THEIR DETERMINATION TO TAKE RESOLUTE MEASURES, BOTH AT NATIONAL LEVEL AND THROUGH EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO PREVENT, SUPPRESS AND ELIMINATE TERRORISM. IN THE CONTEXT OF THE COMBAT AGAINST ACTS OF TERRORISM, THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM DIRECT OR INDIRECT ASSISTANCE TO TERRORIST ACTIVITIES OR TO SUBVERSIVE OTHER ACTIVITIES AND THEY WILL TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN PREVENTING THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES FROM BEING USED FOR THE PREPARATION, ORGANIZATION OR COMMISSION OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING THOSE DIRECTED AGAINST OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES AND THEIR CITIZENS. TO THIS END, THEY EXPRESS THEIR RESOLVE TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO PROHIBIT ON THEIR TERRITORIES ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES OF PERSONS, GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS THAT INSTIGATE, ORGANIZE OR ENGAGE IN PERPETRATION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM. IN THIS CONTEXT, THEY CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL ALSO TO REFRAIN FROM ACQUIESCING IN ACTIVITIES WITHIN THEIR TERRITORY DIRECTED TOWARDS THE COMMISSION OF SUCH ACTS WHICH INVOLVE A THREAT OF USE OF FORCE.

END TEXT.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03093

SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, APRIL 14-18, 1986

1. CDE X - 012

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AMBIVALENT SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN STOCKHOLM MAY REFLECT A CERTAIN AMBIVALENCE IN MOSCOW. ON THE ONE HAND, THE SOVIETS PROFESS TO WANT PROMPT PROGRESS; ON THE OTHER HAND, THE CANCELLATION OF THE VISIT OF SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY TO THE U.S. AND CERTAIN EUROPEAN CAPITALS AND THE RETURN TO HARSH SOVIET RHETORIC, PARTICULARLY REGARDING THE RECENT EVENTS SURROUNDING LIBYA, BRING INTO QUESTION SOVIET SERIOUSNESS. IF THE SOVIETS ARE NOT PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY, THEY WILL ATTEMPT TO USE LIBYA AS A CONVENIENT PRETEXT TO SHIFT THE BLAME FOR THE LACK OF PROGRESS IN THE CONFERENCE TO THE UNITED STATES. THE EAST EUROPEANS, FOR THEIR PART, DO NOT WANT A BREAKDOWN IN THE CONFERENCE. WEST EUROPEAN ALLIES SHARE OUR GENERAL CONCERN ABOUT TROUBLING SOVIET BEHAVIOR AND OUR GENERAL APPROACH TO END GAME NEGOTIATIONS, I.E., NEGOTIATION OF A SUBSTANTIAL PACKAGE OF CSBM'S, WHICH MUST INCLUDE INSPECTION, AND REJECTION OF A MINI-PACKAGE. THE NNA SEEM EAGER FOR PROGRESS BUT THIS DOES NOT MEAN THEY ARE READY TO GIVE UP ON THEIR PET ISSUES -- E.G., YUGOSLAVIA/CONSTRAINTS; CYPRUS/NUF. IN THE WORKING GROUPS, SUBSTANTIVE DRAFTING PROGRESS HAS BEEN LIMITED AT BEST. END SUMMARY.

4. SOVIET BEHAVIOR: THE QUESTION WHICH HAS PREOCCUPIED THE CONFERENCE SINCE THE TENTH SESSION OPENED IS: DO THE SOVIETS REALLY WANT TO DO BUSINESS? THE SIGNALS ARE MIXED. ON THE ONE HAND, THE SOVIETS PROFESS TO WANT PROMPT PROGRESS. SOVIET LT-GENERAL MIKHAILOV TOLD AMBASSADOR HANSEN AT A CONFERENCE IN SCOTLAND THAT THE SOVIET CDE DELEGATION ENTERS THIS ROUND WITH NEW INSTRUCTIONS. SOVIET DELEGATES IN THE OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION WORKING GROUPS HAVE BEEN RELATIVELY FORTHCOMING -- OR AT LEAST PARTICIPATING CONSTRUCTIVELY IN THE DRAFTING PROCESS. ON THE OTHER HAND, GRINEVSKY'S LAST-MINUTE, AND UNEXPLAINED, CANCELLATION OF HIS WASHINGTON (AND PARIS, LONDON, BONN AND MADRID) VISIT IN EARLY APRIL REFLECTED AT LEAST UNCERTAINTY IN MOSCOW ABOUT HOW TO PROCEED. ATTACKING THE U.S. FOR LIBYA WAS TO BE EXPECTED AT THE OPENING PLENARY, BUT CONTINUED ATTENTION TO THE ISSUE SUGGESTS A DESIRE TO EXPLOIT IT FOR TACTICAL REASONS.

5. WHAT ARE THE RUSSIANS UP TO? AMBIVALENT SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN STOCKHOLM MAY REFLECT A CERTAIN AMBIVALENCE IN MOSCOW. ONE THEORY -- TO WHICH USDEL ATTACHES SOME CREDENCE -- IS THAT THERE IS A SPLIT BETWEEN THE POLITICAL (FOREIGN MINISTRY AND KGB) AND MILITARY

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(GENERAL STAFF) ON THE SOVIET DELEGATION WHICH MAY REFLECT A SIMILAR DIVISION IN MOSCOW. SIGNS WERE THAT AT THE OPENING OF THIS ROUND THE POLITICAL SIDE HAD THE UPPER HAND. IN FACT, THE RECENT GORBACHEV CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTION PROPOSAL IMPLIES THAT THEY ARE SEEKING SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM. EVENTS SURROUNDING LIBYA, HOWEVER, MAY HAVE CAUSED A SHIFT IN THE BALANCE TOWARD THE MILITARY "HARD-LINERS." IN MOSCOW THIS WAS MANIFESTED BY THE CANCELLATION OF THE SHULTZ-SCHEVARDNADZE MEETING. IN STOCKHOLM, A RETURN TO HARSH SOVIET RHETORIC AFTER TWO DAYS OF CALM MAY REFLECT NEW MARCHING ORDERS. IF THE SOVIETS ARE NOT PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY THEY WILL ATTEMPT TO USE LIBYA AS A CONVENIENT PRETEXT TO SHIFT THE BLAME FOR THE LACK OF PROGRESS IN THE CONFERENCE TO THE UNITED STATES.

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6. THE EUROPEANS: WHILE SOVIET INTENTIONS ARE AS OPAQUE AS EVER, EAST EUROPEAN MOTIVES ARE CRYSTAL CLEAR. THEY DO NOT WANT A BREAKDOWN IN THE CONFERENCE. AND THEY SIGNAL THIS ALMOST FRANTICALLY. WEST EUROPEAN ALLIES SHARE OUR GENERAL CONCERN ABOUT TROUBLING SOVIET BEHAVIOR AND OUR GENERAL APPROACH TO END GAME NEGOTIATIONS, I.E., NEGOTIATION OF A SUBSTANTIAL PACKAGE OF CSBM'S WHICH MUST INCLUDE INSPECTION AND REJECTION OF A MINI-PACKAGE. THERE HAS BEEN, MOREOVER, SOME PROGRESS AMONG THE KEY CLOSE ALLIES ON COMING TO A COMMON POINT OF VIEW ON THE THRESHOLDS ISSUE. THE NNA SEEM EAGER FOR PROGRESS BUT THIS DOES NOT MEAN THEY ARE READY TO GIVE UP ON THEIR PET ISSUES -- E.G., YUGOSLAVIA/CONSTRAINTS; CYPRUS/NUF.

7. NOTIFICATION: THE FIRST NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP MEETING (FRIDAY) HAD MIXED RESULTS. THE SOVIETS INSISTED THAT AGREEMENT ON ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED MUST PRECEDE WORD ON GROUND FORCE THRESHOLDS. WHILE THEY WERE SILENT ON THE NEED TO "AGREE TO DEFER" THE NAVAL ISSUE, THEY ARGUED THAT TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED WERE GROUND, AIR, AND MOVEMENTS/TRANSFERS. AMPHIBIOUS FORCES, THEY NOTED, WOULD BE INCLUDED UNDER GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES.

8. NON-USE OF FORCE: CONSENSUS IS NEAR ON COMMON NATO LANGUAGE ON MOST ISSUES; HOWEVER, TWO KEY AND CONTENTIOUS ISSUES REMAIN UNRESOLVED: HOW TO REAFFIRM THE NUF PRINCIPLE AND WHETHER TO INCLUDE HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE (SEE SEPTTEL FOR SUGGESTED COURSE OF ACTION). IN THE WORKING GROUP, NO LANGUAGE WAS REGISTERED IN CONFORMITY WITH THE WESTERN APPROACH OF "FLEXIBLE PARALLELISM," I.E., THERE MUST BE SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS IN THE CSBM'S WORKING GROUPS IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY COMPARABLE PROGRESS ON NUF. THE FRENCH STATE FLATLY THAT THEY WILL NOT EVEN CONSIDER ANY DRAFT LANGUAGE TO REGISTER AMONG THE 16 UNTIL THERE IS MAJOR PROGRESS IN THE OTHER WORKING GROUPS. THE SOVIETS THREATEN TO

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REVERSE THE LINKAGE AND TO REFUSE TO DRAFT ON CSBM'S UNTIL THERE IS PROGRESS ON NUF. THE IMPASSE MAKES WESTERN WETS HIGHLY NERVOUS.

9. VERIFICATION: WITH KGB GENERAL ROZANOV REPLACING GENERAL TATARNIKOV, THE SOVIETS CAME BACK WITH SUBSTANTIVE DRAFTING SUGGESTIONS ON VERIFICATION LANGUAGE WHICH THE SWISS COORDINATOR (SCHENK) HAD SUBMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION -- LANGUAGE DESIGNED TO ENSURE THE RIGHT OF STATES TO CONDUCT A SPECIFIC KIND OF VERIFICATION, AS YET UNAGREED, I.E., "ANY PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH HAS DOUBTS AS TO ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREED CSBM'S WILL BE ENTITLED TO . . . ." THE WEST, OF COURSE, WILL INSIST THAT "INSPECTION" BE INSERTED WHERE THERE ARE NOW ELLIPSES. DISCUSSIONS ON THIS POINT ARE PROCEEDING, WITH THE EAST TRYING TO ESTABLISH THAT DOUBTS MUST BE WELL FOUNDED AND THAT EVEN THEN THERE WOULD BE ALTERNATIVES TO INSPECTION/OBSERVATION ON REQUEST (SUCH AS CONSULTATIONS). THE WEST IS RESISTING STRONGLY.

INFORMATION: IN THE NATO CAUCUS THE FRENCH PROPOSED TO DIVIDE INFORMATION SO THAT "DYNAMIC" INFORMATION (I.E., SC.1/AMPLIFIED, MEASURE 3, PARA F. SUBPARAS G, H, I) WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE NOTIFICATION CLUSTER WHILE MORE "STATIC" INFORMATION (I.E., NATO'S MEASURE 1, BUT ALSO THE REMAINDER OF PARA F OF MEASURE 3) WOULD BE ADDRESSED IN THE INFORMATION/VERIFICATION CLUSTER. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY IS TO DISCUSS INFORMATION IN B-1 AND A SUBORDINATE CONTACT GROUP. A THIRD IDEA IS TO CREATE A NEW CONTACT GROUP, PROBABLY CHAIRED BY FINNISH AMBASSADOR KAHILUOTO, TO DISCUSS THE PROCEDURAL ISSUE AND POSSIBLY THE SUBSTANCE AS WELL. THE ANNUAL CALENDAR WOULD REMAIN WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF WORKING GROUP A-3, SO AS TO ENSURE THAT THAT GROUP DOES NOT FOCUS SOLELY ON CONSTRAINTS.

10. OBSERVATION: THE OBSERVATION GROUP AGREED TO NOTE IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK A SENTENCE PERMITTING THE INVITED STATE TO DECIDE WHETHER IT WILL SEND MILITARY OR CIVILIAN OBSERVERS TO NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES. A CONTACT GROUP WILL MEET SHORTLY TO CONSIDER WHAT TYPES OF OPTICAL EQUIPMENT (E.G., BINOCULARS, CAMERAS) OBSERVERS WILL BE ALLOWED TO USE. WE ANTICIPATE THAT DRAFTING PROGRESS WILL CONTINUE IN THIS GROUP.

11. CONSTRAINTS: IN MARKED CONTRAST TO SOVIET WILLINGNESS IN OTHER WORKING GROUPS TO FOCUS ON AGENDA ITEMS, THE SOVIETS OPENED THE CONSTRAINTS DISCUSSION IN THE WORKING GROUP BY DELIVERING A PREPARED STATEMENT CONDEMNING THE U.S. "ATTACK ON THE MEDITERRANEAN SOVEREIGN COUNTRY OF LIBYA;" THE USSR ALSO SINGLED OUT THE UK FOR SUPPORTING THE U.S. IN LIBYA. THE U.S. CRITICIZED THE "INCREDIBLE HYPROCRISY" OF THE SOVIET

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UNION'S CHARGES IN THE LIGHT OF ITS INVASION AND CONTINUING OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN. THE UK ALSO RESPONDED TO EASTERN CRITICISM. THE CHANGE IN SOVIET BEHAVIOR AS THE WEEK PROGRESSED -- FROM RELATIVELY BUSINESSLIKE IN THE NUF (TUESDAY) AND INFORMATION/ VERIFICATION (WEDNESDAY) WORKING GROUPS BEFORE MOSCOW'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE CANCELLATION OF THE SHULTZ-SHEVARDNADZE MEETING TO STRIDENTLY POLEMICAL IN THE THURSDAY MEETING ON CONSTRAINTS -- MAY BE THE RESULT OF NEW INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW. WE HAVE LEARNED THAT, MEANWHILE, THE NNA'S ARE SPLIT ON HOW TO DEAL WITH CONSTRAINTS. WHEN SWEDEN TRIED THIS WEEK TO DISTRIBUTE TO OTHER NNA'S A PAPER ON THE CONSTRAINING ELEMENTS OF THE CALENDAR AS LAID OUT IN SC.7, YUGOSLAVIA'S REACTION WAS SO VIOLENT THAT THE EVER CAUTIOUS SWEDES BACKED DOWN. THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE EVIDENTLY DECIDED TO PRESS EVEN HARDER FOR CONSTRAINTS, THOUGH OTHER NNA'S HAVE SAID THEY RECOGNIZE THAT SUCH A MOVE WILL NOT BE APPROVED.

12. ANNUAL FORECASTS: THE EAST'S OBSTRUCTIVE BEHAVIOR WAS ALSO EVIDENT WHEN IT FIRST REJECTED A UK SUGGESTION THAT DISCUSSION OF FORECASTS BE POSTPONED UNTIL NEXT WEEK (GIVEN THE LATE HOUR) AND THEN STUDIOUSLY IGNORED WESTERN QUESTIONS.

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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 03091

SUBJECT: STATEMENT BY OLEG A.GRINEVSKY, APRIL 21, 1986

1. CDE X - 015

2. FOLLOWING IS THE STATEMENT MADE BY OLEG A. GRINEVSKY, AMBASSADOR AT LARGE, HEAD OF THE USSR DELEGATION TO THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY- BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE, IN STOCKHOLM ON APRIL 21, 1986. BEGIN TEXT:

MR. CHAIRMAN,

-- THE 11TH CONGRESS OF THE SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY OF GERMANY (SEC) IS CONCLUDING ITS WORK. THIS SIGNIFICANT EVENT PUT BERLIN IN THE FOCUS OF ATTENTION OF THE NUMEROUS FRIENDS OF THE GDR, OF THE BROAD EUROPEAN AND WORLD PUBLIC. PROBLEMS OF WAR AND PEACE OCCUPIED A GREAT PLACE AT THE CONGRESS.

-- THE REPORT OF THE SED CENTRAL COMMITTEE DELIVERED BY ERICH HONECKER AND THE STATEMENT BY GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE MIKHAIL GORBACHEV PROVIDE IMPORTANT ASSESSMENTS OF THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND REAL WAYS OUT OF THE EXISTING ACUTE SITUATION.

-- DISREGARDING THE PRESSING INTERESTS AND ASPIRATIONS OF ALL PEOPLES, CERTAIN QUARTERS HAVE TAKEN TO THE ROAD OF ACTUALLY UNDERMINING THE GENEVA ACCORDS, THE ROAD OF ACTIONS THAT ONLY FURTHER COMPLICATE THE ALREADY TENSE SITUATION IN THE WORLD.

-- IT CONCERNS FIRST OF ALL THE SINISTER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS IN NEVADA WHICH DESTROYED A UNIQUE CHANCE TO GIVE THE PROCESS OF DISARMAMENT A REAL START. IT ALSO CONCERNS THE IMPUDENT ACTION TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES AGAINST LIBYA THAT IS FRAUGHT WITH THE DANGER OF A SERIOUS WORSENING OF THE SITUATION IN THE WORLD. SUCH ACTIONS DAMAGE DIRECTLY THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN BOTH THE USSR AND THE USA AND BETWEEN EAST AND WEST IN GENERAL.

-- SET AGAINST A BROAD INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT, SUCH STEPS, WHICH ARE CONTRARY TO THE TASKS OF STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY, CANNOT BE VIEWED AS ISOLATED DEVELOPMENTS. THEY ALL ARE MANIFESTATIONS OF THE GENERAL POLICY OF SOLVING INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS BY FORCE, OF STEPPING UP THE ARMS RACE.

-- AT THIS MOMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY NO ONE MAY DODGE DISCHARGING ONE'S DUTY TO THE PRESENT AND SUCCEEDING GENERATIONS. AS FAR AS THE SOVIET UNION AND THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY ARE CONCERNED, THEY HAVE ACTED AND WILL CONTINUE TO ACT BEING FULLY AWARE OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITY. IN BERLIN THE SOVIET LEADER STATED WITH UTTER CERTAINTY THAT OUR PROPOSALS FOR ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND BRIDLING THE ARMS RACE HOLD GOOD, AND IF THE GOVERNMENTS OF WESTERN COUNTRIES ARE REALLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE FATE OF PEACE, IT IS HIGH TIME THEY BEGAN MATCHING THEIR WORDS WITH

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DEEDS.

-- WE WOULD LIKE SPECIFICALLY TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE TO THE STATEMENT BY THE GENERAL SECRETARY, PARTICULARLY TO ITS SECTION CONCERNING EUROPE, AS IT HAS DIRECT RELEVANCE TO THE TASK OF STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE, SECURITY AND TO DISARMAMENT ON OUR CONTINENT.

-- TWO GROUPINGS OF FORCES, STRESSED M. GORBACHEV, EACH THREE MILLION STRONG AND POSSESSING THE MOST ADVANCED TANKS, MISSILES AND PLANES, LET ALONE SMALL ARMS OF ALL TYPES, FACE EACH OTHER IN EUROPE. MOREOVER, WHAT IS CALLED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ARE CONSTANTLY BEING IMPROVED AND MADE MORE SOPHISTICATED AND POWERFUL, THEIR EFFECTS BECOMING MORE AND MORE LIKE THOSE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

-- THERE IS ANOTHER ASPECT TO THIS PROBLEM. WE ARE TOLD THAT WESTERN EUROPE CANNOT GIVE UP NUCLEAR WEAPONS, INCLUDING AMERICAN ONES, BECAUSE IN THIS CASE IT WOULD ALLEGEDLY FEEL LESS SECURE IN THE FACE OF THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION.

-- WHAT DO WE THINK NECESSARY TO SAY IN THIS CONTEXT?

-- TO BEGIN WITH, THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE WOULD CREATE A NEW SITUATION NOT ONLY FOR THE WEST BUT ALSO FOR OURSELVES. WE SHOULD NOT FORGET THAT INVASIONS OF OUR TERRITORY IN THE PRE-NUCLEAR AGE WERE MOUNTED FROM THE WEST, AND MORE THAN ONCE.

-- FROM THE CAPITOL OF THE GDR THE SOVIET UNION APPEALS TO ALL THE WEST EUROPEANS AND DECLARES: OUR COUNTRY WILL NEVER AND UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES BEGIN ARMED OPERATIONS AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE UNLESS WE AND OUR ALLIES BECOME TARGETS OF A NATO ATTACK.

-- OUR COUNTRY BACKS THIS POSITION WITH A NEW INITIATIVE NOW APPLYING TO THE CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND ARMED FORCES. THE USSR SUGGESTS THAT AGREEMENT BE REACHED ON SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS IN ALL THE COMPONENTS OF THE LAND FORCES AND TACTICAL AIR FORCES OF THE EUROPEAN STATES AND THE RELEVANT FORCES OF THE USA AND CANADA DEPLOYED IN EUROPE. THE FORMATIONS AND UNITS TO BE REDUCED SHOULD BE DISBANDED AND THEIR WEAPONRY EITHER DESTROYED OR STORED IN NATIONAL TERRITORIES. GEOGRAPHICALLY, REDUCTIONS, OBVIOUSLY, SHOULD COVER THE ENTIRE EUROPEAN TERRITORY FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS. LONGER-RANGE AND BATTLE-FIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS COULD BE REDUCED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS.

-- THE QUESTION OF DEPENDABLE VERIFICATION AT EVERY STAGE OF THIS PROCESS OFFERS ITSELF. BOTH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS AND INTERNATIONAL FORMS OF VERIFICATION, INCLUDING, IF NEED BE, ON-SITE INSPECTION, ARE POSSIBLE.

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-- IN SHORT, THIS IS A SUBJECT FOR SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT THE FORMULATION OF THE QUESTION IN A BROADER CONTEXT WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO CUT THE KNOT WHICH HAS BEEN GROWING TIGHTER AT THE VIENNA TALKS OVER SO MANY YEARS NOW.

-- THERE ARE NO TRAPS IN THE POLICY OF THE SOVIET UNION. IT EXTENDS AN OPEN HAND, NOT A FIST, TO THE WEST. WE ARE LOOKING FOR WAYS TO MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND TO THE LIMITATION OF THE ARMS RACE, TO OVERCOMING THE NEGATIVE TRENDS OF CONFRONTATION AND TO CREATING CONFIDENCE AS AN INHERENT COMPONENT OF RELATIONS AMONG STATES, INCLUDING THOSE IN EUROPE.

-- THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP CONSIDERS THAT IN THE PRESENT SITUATION FRAUGHT WITH DANGERS TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE IT IS IMPORTANT TO MAKE USE OF EVERY POSSIBILITY TO CORRECT AND NORMALIZE THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. IN THIS CONTEXT THE ENTIRE POTENTIAL OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE SHOULD NATURALLY BE UTILIZED.

-- MR. CHAIRMAN,

-- THIS SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE IS OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE. AND NOT ONLY BECAUSE TIME, AS THEY SAY IT, IS RUNNING OUT ON IT. THE TENSE AND ACUTE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION MAKES IT IMPERATIVE THAT MEASURES BE TAKEN WHICH WOULD HELP RESTORE CONFIDENCE AND STRENGTHEN SECURITY ON OUR CONTINENT. THEREFORE IT IS INCUMBENT ON THIS STAGE OF THE STOCKHOLM NEGOTIATIONS TO SEEK ENERGETICALLY SOLUTIONS TO THE MAIN OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS OF THE CONFERENCE, TO MOVE STEADILY ALONG THE ROAD OF NEGOTIATING A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT WHICH WOULD BOTH GIVE CONCRETE EXPRESSION AND EFFECT TO THE NON-USE-OF-FORCE PRINCIPLE AND INCLUDE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE MILITARY FIELD.

-- THE SOVIET UNION AND SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE MADE IMPORTANT STEPS TO REMOVE THE PILE-UPS THAT HAVE GROWN AT THE CONFERENCE AND MAKE HEADWAY IN ITS WORK. NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED COUNTRIES MAKE A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO THIS END. UNFORTUNATELY, WE ARE YET TO SEE ANY ACCOMMODATING MOVES ON THE PART OF SOME OTHER NEGOTIATORS, ALTHOUGH WE HEAR SOMETIMES PRONOUNCEMENTS ON THE NEED TO BREAK THE IMPASSE AT THE CONFERENCE. FOSSILIZED PROPOSALS AND RELUCTANCE TO BUDGE IN YEARS-LONG POSITIONS FORM THE MAIN OBSTACLES TO NEGOTIATION OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS. I THINK THAT THIS ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WILL REVEAL WHETHER WORDS ABOUT THE DESIRE TO MOVE AHEAD ARE BACKED UP BY PRACTICAL ACTIONS.

-- THE QUESTION OF NON-USE OF FORCE OCCUPIES AN IMPORTANT PLACE AT THE STOCKHOLM NEGOTIATIONS. GIVING CONCRETE EXPRESSION AND EFFECT TO THIS PRINCIPLE PROVIDES IN EFFECT A BASE FOR AND FILL WITH SUBSTANCE ALL MILITARY MEASURES WE ARE NEGOTIATING, CONSOLIDATE

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THEM AND MAKE THEM CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-ORIENTED.  
 -- IT IS TIME TO ADDRESS SERIOUSLY ONE OF THE CENTRAL ISSUES OF THE CONFERENCE - NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MANOEUVRES. IN ORDER TO MOVE AHEAD IN IT, IT IS ESSENTIAL TO IDENTIFY TYPES OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES THAT WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION. THE KEY TO SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM IS GIVEN IN THE JANUARY 15 SOVIET PROPOSAL. OUR PROPOSAL IS TO AGREE NOW ON NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MANOEUVRES OF GROUND AND AIR FORCES, MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS OF TROOPS AND POSTPONE THE QUESTION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNTIL THE NEXT STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE.

-- IT IS ALSO NECESSARY TO FOCUS ON SUCH AN IMPORTANT QUESTION AS THE LIMITATION OF THE SCALE OF MILITARY MANOEUVRES. WE EXPECT THAT A REALISTIC APPROACH WILL BE DEMONSTRATED TO THE CONSIDERATION OF THIS ISSUE WITH ACCOUNT TAKEN OF ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR REDUCING THE RISK OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE.

-- CERTAINLY, THERE ARE OTHER QUESTIONS AT THE CONFERENCE THAT AWAIT SOLUTION, E.G. EXCHANGES OF ANNUAL PLANS OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES, INVITATION OF OBSERVERS, ETC. OBVIOUSLY, ALL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES MUST BE PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION.

-- WE ARE IN FAVOUR OF THE MOST EFFECTIVE METHODS OF DRAFTING ON THE ENTIRE RANGE OF QUESTIONS AS DEFINED IN THE AGREEMENT OF OCTOBER 14, 1985. WE NEED TO SEEK CONCRETE RESULTS AT EACH AND EVERY WORKING GROUP MEETING. IT WOULD BE THE GREATEST PRODIGALITY TO WASTE OUR TIME ON ACADEMIC DISCUSSION LEADING AWAY FROM DRAFTING. ONE SHOULD VALUE ONE'S OWN TIME AND ONE'S CO-NEGOTIATORS' TIME.

-- MR. CHAIRMAN,

-- SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM, CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE BY ADOPTING A SUBSTANTIVE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT COULD GIVE A FRESH IMPETUS TO THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE CSCE PROCESS AND IMPROVEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL. IT WOULD ALSO ENSURE FAVOURABLE PREREQUISITES FOR THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING TO CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE POLITICAL CLIMATE AND REVIVAL OF DETENTE IN EUROPE AND THE WORLD OVER.

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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03114

SUBJECT: CDE WORKING GROUP AB MEETING

1. CDE X - 019
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE APRIL 21 WORKING GROUP AB MEETING, CONVENED AT SOVIET REQUEST, THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION EXCHANGED STATEMENTS AND RIGHTS OF REPLY ON LIBYA, AFGHANISTAN, AND CDE. YUGOSLAVIA, MALTA, AND CYPRUS SPOKE CRITICALLY OF U.S. ACTIONS AGAINST LIBYAN TERRORISM, INSISTING THAT CBM'S BE EXTENDED TO THE MEDITERRANEAN. IN A WELL-ORCHESTRATED PERFORMANCE THE SOVIETS ALSO RAISED GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL TO REDUCE CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, WHICH WAS SUPPORTED BY THE GDR, POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA. PORTUGAL, ROMANIA, AND THE FRG ALSO ENTERED THE FRAY ON TERRORISM AND U.S. ACTIONS AGAINST LIBYA. END SUMMARY.

4. SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY CITED THE "SINISTER NUCLEAR EXPLOSION IN NEVADA" AND U.S. ACTIONS AGAINST LIBYA AS EVIDENCE OF WORSENING U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN GENERAL. THE REMAINDER OF HIS PREPARED TEXT FOCUSED ON GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL TO REDUCE CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. (FULL TEXT SENT SEPTEL.)

5. AMBASSADOR HANSEN RESPONDED TO NONALIGNED AND SOVIET CRITICISM OF U.S. ACTIONS AGAINST LIBYA. IN THIS CONTEXT HE RAISED SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN AS VIOLATIONS OF PRINCIPLES II, VI, AND VII OF THE FINAL ACT AS WELL AS ARTICLE 2/4 OF THE UN CHARTER, AND THEN RETURNED TO THE CONCRETE CSBM-RELATED ISSUES BEFORE THE CONFERENCE. (FULL TEXT SENT SEPTEL.)

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#### 6. TERRORISM/LIBYA:

- A. IN A COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT, SUPPORTED BY OTHER NNA SPEAKERS, YUGOSLAVIA CONDEMNED U.S. ACTION AGAINST LIBYA. AMBASSADOR BOZOVIC UNDERScoreD THE LINK BETWEEN EUROPEAN AND MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY, AND SUPPORTED MALTA'S PROPOSALS IN THIS REGARD. HE ALSO CONDEMNED "ALL FORMS OF TERRORISM."

- B. MALTA (GAUCI) ALLUDED TO ITS EFFORTS TO MEDIATE BETWEEN LIBYA AND THE U.S. HE WARNED THAT MALTA'S AMENDED PROPOSALS ON THE MEDITERRANEAN WERE THE LEAST IT COULD ACCEPT TO JOIN CONSENSUS FOR AN AGREEMENT.

- C. CYPRUS (PAPADOPOULOS) PROMISED TO PRESS THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY LINK IN THE NON-USE OF FORCE WORKING GROUP.

- D. ROMANIA NOTED ITS "DEEP CONCERN" FOR U.S. ACTION, STRESSING IT WOULD "ACCEPT NO EXCUSES FOR THE USE OF FORCE."

- E. TURKEY (OZGUL) NOTED THE "SPECIAL IMPORTANCE" IT ATTACHES TO COMBATING TERRORISM, WHICH HAS A "DIRECT RELEVANCE" TO CDE, BUT DID NOT DIRECTLY REFER TO U.S.-

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LIBYAN ACTION.

- F. PORTUGAL (CUTILEIRO) "DEPLORED" THE "HYPOCRITICAL PROPAGANDA" INTRODUCED BY THOSE RAISING LIBYA IN CDE AND STRESSED THAT TERRORISM IS THE PRIMARY ISSUE -- "METHODS TO DEAL WITH IT" ARE SECONDARY.

- G. THE FRG (CITRON) CHASTISED THE SOVIETS FOR RAISING LIBYA WHILE NOTING UN CONDEMNATION OF SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN. REFERRING TO GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS -- "IDEAS FOR THE FUTURE" -- THE FRG AMBASSADOR JOINED THE U.S. IN CALLING FOR THE CONFERENCE TO GET DOWN TO THE BUSINESS AT HAND.

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8. AMBASSADOR KONARSKI (POLAND) OUTLINED THREE ASPECTS OF THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH HAVE RELEVANCE FOR CDE: 1) NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT HAS NOW BEEN "PROPERLY" SUPPLEMENTED WITH CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT; 2) THE PROPOSAL COVERS THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS, IN LINE WITH CSCE PRACTICE; AND 3) IT OPENS NEW PROSPECTS AFTER THIS CONFERENCE FOR THE DISARMAMENT STAGE.

HANSEN

END OF MESSAGE

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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 03095

SUBJECT: U.S. RESPONSE ON LIBYA IN WORKING GROUP AT STOCKHOLM MEETING, 21 APRIL 86

1. CDE X - 16.

2. IN RESPONSE TO YUGOSLAVIAN, CYRIOT, AND SOVIET INTERVENTIONS IN CDE WORKING GROUP AB, DEPUTY HEAD OF U.S. DELEGATION, AMBASSADOR HANSEN, MADE THE FOLLOWING REMARKS:

BEGIN TEXT:

MR. CHAIRMAN,

THIS CONFERENCE HAS BUT ONE AGENDA, THE NEGOTIATION OF A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES. IT IS NOT OUR BUSINESS TO DEAL WITH QUESTIONS RELATED THE REDUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE, OR INDEED ANY FORCES, AT THIS STAGE OF OUR WORK. DELEGATIONS AT THE CONFERENCE RECOGNIZE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THAT FACT. THUS, IT WOULD SEEM THAT THIS WORKING GROUP, WHICH IS CONDUCTED AT THE SENIOR LEVELS OF EACH DELEGATION, SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE PRODUCTIVELY USED BY GIVING POLITICAL DIRECTION TO THE DIFFICULT TASK OF DRAFTING CONCRETE LANGUAGE.

MR. CHAIRMAN,

INASMUCH AS WE ARE ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE CSCE PROCESS, LET ME RETURN TO THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT AND QUOTE FROM THE SECTION ON PRINCIPLES:

- THE PARTICIPATING STATES CONDEMN TERRORISM,
- INCLUDING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
- AS ENDANGERING OR TAKING INNOCENT HUMAN LIVES OR OTHERWISE JEOPARDIZING HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, AND EMPHASIZE THE NECESSITY TO TAKE RESOLUTE MEASURES TO COMBAT IT. THEY EXPRESS THEIR DETERMINATION TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM, BOTH AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL AND THROUGH INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION INCLUDING BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS, AND ACCORDINGLY TO BROADEN AND REINFORCE MUTUAL CO-OPERATION TO COMBAT SUCH ACTS.

TO THOSE WHO TODAY HAVE EXERCISED THE RIGHT TO CRITICIZE IMPLICITLY OR EXPLICITLY, MY GOVERNMENT, A SIMPLE QUESTION: WHAT HAVE YOU DONE TO IMPLEMENT THIS PART OF THE AGREEMENT MADE AT MADRID? WHAT DEGREE OF CO-OPERATION HAS EXISTED AMONG US IN COMBATING TERRORISM EMANATING FROM LIBYA? WHAT RESOLUTE MEASURES HAVE BEEN TAKEN?

SOME OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES HERE CONTINUED TO URGE THAT WE USE THE CSCE PROCESS TO EXTEND THE PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT TO THE WHOLE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IN ANY AREA IS A COOPERATIVE AND RECIPROCAL EFFORT WHICH REQUIRES PEACEFUL INTENT. LIBYA HAS MADE NO EFFORT TO DEMONSTRATE PEACEFUL

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INTENT, NOR HAVE THE LIBYAN COLONEL SHOWN ANY DISPOSITION TO COOPERATE ON AN INTERNATIONAL BASIS. SOME STATES REPRESENTED HERE PARTICIPATE WITH LIBYA IN OTHER FORUMS AND ARRANGEMENTS SUCH AS THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT. WHAT HAVE THESE STATES ACCOMPLISHED IN CURBING THE SENSELESS AND INDISCRIMINATE VIOLENCE CARRIED OUT AS LIBYAN STATE POLICY? VERY LITTLE. THOSE WHO FOR ANY REASON HAVE FAILED TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH THE LIBYAN COLONEL IN EFFORTS TO STOP TERRORISM HAVE NOT LIVE UP TO THEIR MORAL RESPONSIBILITIES OR TO THEIR INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS.

YET YOU WOULD ASK US TO PARTICIPATE IN GIVING A SENSE OF LEGITIMACY TO A GOVERNMENT WHICH SHELTERS, ADVOCATES AND CONDUCTS ACTS OF TERRORISM. WHILE WE WISH THE PEOPLE OF LIBYA NO ILL, OUR ANSWER IS A RESOUNDING NO. THE GROUND ON WHICH TERRORISM TAKES PLACE IS PREDOMINATELY EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST. THE TARGET IN RECENT YEARS, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN THE UNITED STATES, ITS CITIZENS, ITS ENTERPRISES, ITS REPRESENTATIVES. WE CRINGE AT AND ABHOR THE THOUGHT OF INNOCENT PEOPLE DYING THROUGH ACTS OF VIOLENCE ANYWHERE, ANYTIME. BUT INNOCENT CIVILIANS WERE NOT THE TARGETS IN THE ATTACK ON LIBYA.

TERRORISM IS INDISCRIMINATE. WHO DIED IN THE AIRPORTS AT VIENNA AND ROME? WHAT HAD THEY DONE TO REAP SUCH VIOLENCE? WHO DIES WHEN AN AIRLINER IS BLOWN UP IN MID-FLIGHT OR SHOT OUT OF THE SKY?

CONSIDER THE HORROR OF A GRANDMOTHER, A MOTHER AND A CHILD AS THEY FALL THOUSANDS OF FEET TO CERTAIN DEATH FROM AN AIRLINER WITH A HOLE BLOWN IN ITS SIDE THROUGH WHICH THEY AND ANOTHER MAN (KILLED BY THE INITIAL EXPLOSION) WERE SUCKED. ALL FOUR WERE AMERICAN CITIZENS, ALL FOUR WERE INNOCENT VICTIMS OF TERRORISM. ONLY THROUGH THE POWER OF A MIRACLE, WERE THE LIVES OF ALL INNOCENT PASSENGERS ON THAT TWA AIRCRAFT SAVED.

IS IT NOT OUR COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY TO DEAL WITH SUCH ATROCITIES? IS IT NOT PART OF THE AGREEMENTS WE HAVE MADE IN THE CSCE PROCESS? MANY EXPERTS BELIEVE IT IS JUST A MATTER OF TIME BEFORE TERRORISTS ACQUIRE NUCLEAR DEVICES. WITH WHAT CHALLENGE WILL WE THEN BE CONFRONTED? IN THAT CONNECTION, MY DELEGATION CAN EXPRESS SOME SATISFACTION IN THE POSSIBILITIES WHICH EXIST FOR TALKS BETWEEN U.S. AND SOVIET EXPERTS WHICH WILL DEAL WITH THE REDUCTION OF RISK IN THE CURRENT AND FUTURE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT, AS DESCRIBED IN THE JOIN DECLARATION OF THE GENEVA SUMMIT.

BUT IF THE INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION TO ENGAGE IN MUTUAL CO-OPERATION TO COMBAT TERRORISM IS NOT MET AND CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES CONTINUE TO FALL VICTIM TO TERRORIST ATROCITIES, THE GOVERNMENT MUST ENGAGE ITSELF IN ACTIONS DIRECTED AT DEFENDING ITS CITIZENS.

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TO DO LESS WOULD ENCOURAGE CONTINUED AGGRESSION AGAINST INNOCENT PEOPLE, INCLUDING CITIZENS OF THE COUNTRIES REPRESENTED BY MY DISTINGUISHED COLLEAGUES AROUND THIS TABLE. WE WILL MAKE UNMISTAKABLY CLEAR THAT SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM IS NOT COST-FREE. THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT TOLERATE TERRORISM AND WILL COMBAT IT WITH THE MEANS JUDGED MOST APPROPRIATE.

MR. CHAIRMAN,

AT MADRID, WE AGREED THAT IN STOCKHOLM WE WOULD INVOLVE OURSELVES IN THE NEGOTIATION OF A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY- BUILDING MEASURES DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE RISK OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE. WE DID NOT AGREE TO EXPAND OR OTHERWISE RE-WRITE ARTICLE 2/4 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. THAT WOULD HAVE MEANT THE CLOSING OF OUR CSCE EYES TO THE UNPROVOKED USE OF FORCE BY THE SOVIET UNION AGAINST THE AFGHAN PEOPLE WHO HAVE NOT AS MUCH AS HARMED A SINGLE SOVIET CITIZEN. DESPITE OUR CONTINUED CONDEMNATION OF THE SOVIET INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN, WHICH HAS NOW LASTED FOR MORE THAN SIX YEARS, IN CONTRAVENTION OF ARTICLE 2/4 OF THE UN CHARTER AND PRINCIPLE II OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, AS WELL AS ON PRINCIPLES VI AND VII, PRESIDENT REAGAN MADE THE DECISION TO SHOW GOOD FAITH BY ANNOUNCING OUR WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE IN STOCKHOLM. THIS WAS AN ATTEMPT TO DRAW THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES INTO NEGOTIATIONS ON CONCRETE CSBMS. IT WAS AND IS OUR HOPE THAT BY SHOWING FLEXIBILITY WE WOULD HAVE ADVANCED THE POSSIBILITY OF ATTAINING A SUBSTANTIVE, MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM ON A REGIONAL BASIS. IT IS CLEAR, MOREOVER, THAT A REAFFIRMATION OF THIS PRINCIPLE WILL FIND ITS PROPER PLACE IN A POSSIBLE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT.

MR. CHAIRMAN,

I BEGAN TODAY BY EXPRESSING MY DELEGATION'S DISMAY AT THOSE INTERVENTIONS WHICH WOULD LEAD US AWAY FROM THE COMMON GROUND WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH DURING MORE THAN TWO YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS. TIME MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO SLIP AWAY FROM US OR TO BE UTILIZED FOR PURPOSES OTHER THAN FURTHERING OUR WORK IN DRAFTING A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT.

IN A WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT POSTED ON APRIL 16TH, PRESIDENT REAGAN NOTED HE HAD INSTRUCTED THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO WORK WITH ALLIES, WITH THE NNA STATES AND WITH THE EAST, INDEED WITH ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE, TO FIND SOLUTIONS HERE WHICH ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE MADRID MANDATE AND OUR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. HE SAID, AND I QUOTE:

- THE CONFERENCE MUST AGREE ON THE LEVEL AND TYPES
- OF MILITARY ACTIVITY THAT WILL BE COVERED IN THE

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- CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. WE PLACE HIGH PRIORITY ON
- AGREEING ON A THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION OF
- GROUND FORCE AND COMBINED ARMS ACTIVITIES WHICH
- CAN BE VERIFIED AND WHICH WILL RESULT IN EQUITABLE
- TREATMENT FOR ALL 35 PARTICIPATING STATES.

WE WOULD NOTE THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FINAL ACT, WE COULD CONSIDER THAT GROUND FORCES MIGHT ALSO INCLUDE BOTH AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE TROOPS. BUT IN SO DOING, INDICATE OUR AGREEMENT THAT AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES COULD BE NOTIFIED AT A LEVEL SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER THAN THE THRESHOLD FOR THE NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES.

COMBINED ARMS ACTIVITIES HAVE BECOME THE NORM FOR LARGER EXERCISES IN EUROPE. WE ACKNOWLEDGE THE REQUIREMENT TO NOTIFY SUCH EXERCISES IN THEIR ENTIRETY INCLUDING PARTICIPATION BY THE DIFFERENT SERVICES AND BRANCHES OF ARMS. IN THE CASE OF PARTICIPATION BY AIR FORCES, WE COULD CONSIDER PROVIDING DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE EXTENT AND TYPE OF THEIR ACTIVITY.

THE APPROACH TO THE CONFERENCE WE HAVE ADOPTED WOULD INCLUDE INFORMATION ON THE PARTICIPATION IN NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF GROUND FORCE FORMATIONS, UNITS AND SUBUNITS WHICH ARE NOT PERMANENTLY STATIONED IN EUROPE. FORTY-FIVE DAYS IN ADVANCE OF THE BEGINNING OF A NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY, ALL PARTICIPATING STATES WOULD KNOW THAT SUCH TROOPS WOULD BE BROUGHT TO EUROPE. AND, AT THE MOMENT THEY LEAVE THEIR ARRIVAL BASE IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS, (USUALLY WITHIN 24 HOURS) THEY WOULD BE REGARDED, FOR PURPOSES RELATED TO CSBMS, THE SAME AS FORCES PERMANENTLY STATIONED IN THE ZONE.

MY DELEGATION IS PREPARED TO DRAFT LANGUAGE WHICH COVERS THE MOVEMENTS, WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS, OF TROOPS, UNIFORMED PERSONNEL OR YOUNG PEOPLE ABOUT TO BE INDUCTED IN THE ARMED FORCES, WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE ORGANIZED INTO MILITARY FORMATIONS, UNITS OR SUBUNITS. WE ARE PREPARED TO EXPLORE ALL QUESTIONS RELATING TO RAISING THE COMBAT STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES OF FORCES EITHER IN BEING OR WHICH CAN BE CREATED THROUGH MOBILIZATION.

MR. CHAIRMAN,

AT THIS STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THERE CAN BE NO PRETEXT FOR NOT ENGAGING IN THE DRAFTING OF A SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT. SINCE THERE IS NO REAL QUESTION ABOUT WHICH TYPES OF ACTIVITIES ARE TO BE NOTIFIED, IT MAKES GOOD SENSE TO BEGIN WITH ESTABLISHING THE THRESHOLD WHICH TRIGGERS THE NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES. WE ARE AT THE POINT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHERE WE MUST DECIDE: EITHER WE DO OR WE DON'T. THANK YOU. END TEXT. HANSEN

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03198

SUBJECT: CDE: DEAD IN THE WATER

1. CDE X-023 - CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: FOR THE MOMENT, NOTHING IS HAPPENING IN STOCKHOLM. THE SOVIETS ARE STALLING, THE ALLIES ARE TUGGING IN VARIOUS DIRECTIONS AND THE NEUTRALS ARE WRINGING THEIR HANDS BUT DOING LITTLE ELSE. AT THIS RATE IT'S GOING TO BE VERY HARD TO GET THE TITANIC MOVING AGAIN; THE BRITISH NEED SOME PRODDING (SEE PARA 7).  
END SUMMARY.
3. SOVIET NEGOTIATOR GRINEVSKY RETURNED TO MOSCOW "FOR PERSONAL REASONS" ON APRIL 22, LEAVING THE EASTERN NEGOTIATORS PEDALLING BACKWARDS IN MOST WORKING GROUPS. THEY FREELY CONCEDE THAT NOTHING WILL HAPPEN UNTIL HE RETURNS, "MAYBE NEXT WEEK". SPECULATION RUNS THAT HE IS:
  - GETTING READY TO REPLACE KARPOV OR KVITSINSKY
  - IN GENEVA
  - CONSULTING ON GORBACHEV'S APRIL 18 INITIATIVE
  - 
  - TAKING PART IN A REVIEW OF SOVIET PLANS FOR
  - CDE IN THE LIGHT OF LIBYA.
4. IN A MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR BARRY BEFORE HE LEFT, GRINEVSKY SEEMED READY TO GET DOWN TO SERIOUS BUSINESS. HE IMPLIED SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO DEAL WITH THE AIR ISSUE ON THE BASIS OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH AND SETTLE FOR A MINIMALIST FACE-SAVING FORMULA ON "DEFERRING" ASPECTS OF THE NAVAL QUESTION. HE SUGGESTED FLEXIBILITY IN FINDING WAYS TO SOLVE THE PROCEDURAL IMPASSE ON INFORMATION. BUT EASTERN NEGOTIATORS HAVE BEEN HIDING BEHIND ALL THESE PRETEXTS FOR NOT DRAFTING IN THE VARIOUS WORKING GROUPS, AND CLEARLY THEY WON'T COME OUT UNTIL GRINEVSKY RETURNS WITH NEW SIGNALS.
5. THE WESTERN TACTIC, AGREED UPON AT BRUSSELS, WAS TO EXPOSE EASTERN STALLING BY HIGHLIGHTING KEY AREAS WHERE WE WERE READY TO MOVE AHEAD BUT THEY WERE NOT. WE AGREED THAT THE TOP PRIORITY FOR US SHOULD BE NEGOTIATING A PARAMETER FOR NOTIFYING, OBSERVING AND FORECASTING GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES, AND WE BEGAN DISCUSSING OUR PREFERRED SOLUTION WITH THE UK, FRANCE AND THE FRG. THINGS SEEMED TO BE GOING SMOOTHLY UNTIL APRIL 23, WHEN UK AMBASSADOR EDES THREW A BUCKET OF VERY COLD WATER ON THE WHOLE PROCEEDING. HIS INSTRUCTIONS FROM LONDON EXPRESSED:
  - UNWILLINGNESS TO AGREE TO A "MAJOR CONCESSION" WHICH CHANGES SC.1 AMPLIFIED WITHOUT WIDER DISCUSSION OF THE ENTIRE WESTERN APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATIONS, INCLUDING THE WESTERN "BOTTOM LINE" AND TACTICS.
  - READINESS TO GO ALONG WITH "SENSIBLE MOVES" IF THERE WAS FURTHER CONSULTATION "INVOLVING CAPITALS".
  - A WARNING THAT "ANY SIGNIFICANT DEPARTURE" FROM SC.1 AMPLIFIED WOULD HAVE TO BE ELEVATED TO THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL.

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-- THE CONVICTION THAT WESTERN "CONCESSIONS" SHOULD COME "MUCH LATER".

-- SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE WHOLE QUESTION OF RAISING THE GROUND FORCE THRESHOLDS AND THE US FORMULA IN PARTICULAR.

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6. THE FRG AND FRENCH DELEGATIONS SHARE OUR VIEW THAT WE NEED TO DECIDE THE THRESHOLD ISSUE NOW AND IN STOCKHOLM RATHER THAN IN CAPITALS. ALL MADE THE POINT THAT THIS IS NOT A CONCESSION TO THE EAST BUT AN IMPROVEMENT ON SC.1 FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS. WHAT IS BEING DISCUSSED IS NOT A WESTERN PROPOSAL BUT A BOTTOM LINE TO BE SHARED AMONG CLOSE ALLIES SO THAT WE HAVE A SENSE OF DIRECTION IN THE NEGOTIATION. THE FRG AND FRANCE GENERALLY ACCEPT THE US FORMULA, ALTHOUGH THE FRENCH CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR INCLUSION OF THEIR CONCEPT OF DIVISIONAL COMMAND POSTS. THE UK AND FRG STILL BELIEVE 10,000 IS THE RIGHT NUMERICAL THRESHOLD, AND WE HAVE SAID WE'RE PREPARED TO RECOMMEND GOING ALONG, AT LEAST AT THE OUTSET. SOME EXPERT-LEVEL REDRAFTING IS IN PROGRESS HERE. BUT WE CAN'T GO MUCH FURTHER UNTIL THE BRITISH GET NEW INSTRUCTIONS, PARTICULARLY ON THE LOCUS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS. MEANWHILE THE UK DELEGATION IS SIDETRACKING NATO EFFORTS TO GET A SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF GROUND FORCE THRESHOLDS GOING IN WORKING GROUP B-1.

7. DETERMINED NEUTRAL COORDINATORS COULD BRING AT LEAST THE ILLUSION OF ORDER OUT OF THIS CHAOS, BUT FOR THE MOST PART THEY ARE WRINGING THEIR HANDS AND PLAYING UP THEIR OWN GROUP'S CONCERNS, SUCH AS CONSTRAINTS AND NUF.  
8. COMMENT AND ACTION REQUESTED:

UNTIL GRINEVSKY GETS BACK TO TOWN, WE WON'T KNOW WHICH WAY THE SOVIETS WILL JUMP HERE. WE STILL THINK THAT THEY NEED A SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM TO PROMOTE THE GORBACHEV APRIL 18 INITIATIVE ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS. BUT THEY MAY DECIDE THAT BOTH MBFR AND CDE ARE WORKING AGAINST THEIR INTEREST AND THAT BOTH SHOULD BE TORPEDOED AND A NEW FORUM CREATED. IN ANY CASE, NATO NEEDS TO DEMONSTRATE ITS INTEREST IN AN AGREEMENT BY TRYING TO MOVE AHEAD ON OUR ISSUES - E.G. GROUND FORCE CSBMS.

TO DO THIS, WE NEED TO DEAL WITH UK OBJECTIONS, WHICH ARISE MORE FROM AMBASSADOR EDE'S SENSE OF TACTICS THAN FROM CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS IN LONDON. AMBASSADOR HANSEN'S LONDON CONSULTATIONS BEFORE THIS ROUND DEMONSTRATED THAT.

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LONDON NEEDS TO BE PERSUADED THAT CDE IS NOT A RUNAWAY ROGUE ELEPHANT WHICH NEEDS TO BE SLOWED DOWN BUT A NEARLY IMMOVABLE OBJECT. THE END IS NOT NEAR; IT IS NOW. A ROUND OF EXPERTS' CONSULTATIONS IN CAPITALS

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IS A HOPELESS IDEA WHICH WOULD DOOM US FOR THE REST OF  
THE ROUND TO INACTION ON THE AREA OF PRIMARY INTEREST TO  
THE WEST. IF THE UK-US CONSULTATIONS ARE STILL IN  
PROGRESS IN WASHINGTON, WE SUGGEST RAISING THE ISSUE  
THERE; IF NOT, A DISCUSSION WITH TIMOTHY DAUNT IN LONDON  
MIGHT BE IN ORDER.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03402  
SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK TEXT IN  
- B-2 (OBSERVATION)

1. CDE X - 033
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. WORKING GROUP B-2 (OBSERVATION) AGREED TO NOTE THE FOLLOWING THREE TEXTS IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK ON APRIL 24. THE TEXTS WERE AGREED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THEIR ORDER IN A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT.

-  
BEGIN TEXT:

THE HOST STATE WILL PROVIDE OBSERVERS WITH TRANSPORTATION TO THE AREA OF THE NOTIFIED ACTIVITY AND BACK. THIS TRANSPORTATION WILL BE PROVIDED FROM EITHER THE CAPITAL OR ANOTHER SUITABLE LOCATION TO BE ANNOUNCED IN THE INVITATION, SO THAT OBSERVERS ARE IN POSITION BEFORE THE START OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAM.

THE HOST STATE WILL GUIDE THE OBSERVERS IN THE AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY.

THE HOST STATE WILL PROVIDE OBSERVERS WITH APPROPRIATE MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION IN THE AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY.

END TEXT.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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**C O N F I D E N T I A L** STOCKHOLM 03257  
**SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, APRIL 21-25, 1986**

1. CDE X - 028
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. **BEGIN SUMMARY: DRAFTING PROGRESS IN STOCKHOLM HAS BEEN GLACIAL, AT BEST. ONLY THE OBSERVATION WORKING GROUP COULD JUSTIFIABLY POINT TO ANY PROGRESS -- AND THAT ON UNCONTROVERSIAL SUBJECTS. ON THE KEY ISSUE OF NO'IFICATION, MOVEMENT WAS RETROGRADE, NOT FORWARD. THE SOVIE'S RETURNED TO SHOPWORN POSITIONS IN PUBLIC AND PUSHED THEIR OWN BRAND OF SEQUENTIALISM, I.E., THERE CAN BE NO DRAFTING ON ANY SIGNIFICANT ELEMENTS OF THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES UN'IL THE CONFERENCE AGREES 'O THEIR AGENDA ON WHAT TYPES OF ACTIVITIES ARE TO BE NO'IFIED. WHILE 'HE SOVIETS HAVE REFUSED TO ENGAGE IN SERIOUS NEGO' IATION ON INFORMATION/VERIFICATION AND ANNUAL CALENDARS, THEY HAVE ACCUSED THE WEST OF FOOTDRAGGING ON CONSTRAINTS AND NON-USE OF FORCE. THUS, PENDING THE RETURN OF SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY FROM MOSCOW, THE EAST HAS ADOPTED A STALLING TACTIC WHILE PREPARING THE GROUND FOR BLAMING THE WEST IF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE SHOULD FAIL. INTERNALLY, NATO HAS REACHED A FRAGILE CONSENSUS ON A WESTERN NUF TEXT WHICH REFLECTS ALL MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE U.S. POSITION, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS AND VERIFICATION/COMPLIANCE LANGUAGE. END SUMMARY.**
4. **ASSESSMENT: THE SOVIETS SEEM TO BE IN A HOLDING PATTERN AND, UNTIL THEY GET NEW MARCHING ORDERS, ANY MOVEMENT WILL BE GLACIAL. IN AN UNUSUAL MOVE, SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY RETURNED TO MOSCOW "FOR PERSONAL REASONS" ON APRIL 22. IN HIS ABSENCE WARSAW PACT NEGOTIATORS PEDED BACKWARD IN ALL OF THE WORKING GROUPS EXCEPT NON-USE OF FORCE AND OBSERVATION. IN THE WORKING GROUPS THE SOVIETS CONTINUED TO PUSH THEIR BRAND OF "SEQUENTIALISM," REFUSING TO ADDRESS SPECIFIC NOTIFICATION PARAMETERS UNTIL THE ISSUE OF THE TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED IS RESOLVED; THEY USED THIS PRECONDITION, ALONG WITH THEIR INSISTENCE ON DISCUSSING THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION IN THE INFORMATION WORKING GROUP, TO BLOCK PROGRESS ON OTHER ISSUES.**

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- **THE APRIL 25 PLENARY OFFERED FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT THE EAST HAS ADOPTED A STALLING TACTIC AND IS PREPARING THE GROUND FOR BLAMING THE WEST IF STOCKHOLM FAILS. CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE SOVIET UNION (GENERAL TATARNIKOV) SHARPLY CRITICIZED THE WEST AND PARTICULARLY THE U.S. FOR BLOCKING PROGRESS BY REFUSING TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT THE TYPES OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED. TATARNIKOV STATED THAT THE WEST MUST AGREE TO NEGOTIATE ON "INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES," NOT JUST AIR AS PART OF A COMBINED ARMS EXERCISE. HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THAT**

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MEASURES MUST COVER F-111 AND BACKFIRE AIRCRAFT. FOR THE FIRST TIME TATARNIKOV TALKED ABOUT SEPARATE PARAMETERS FOR "INDEPENDENT" AMPHIBIOUS AND "INDEPENDENT" AIRBORNE ACTIVITIES. (BEGIN COMMENT: FOLLOWING THE U.S. ACTION AGAINST LIBYA, AMBASSADOR BARRY HAD TOLD SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY THAT THE U.S. HAD NOT BEEN PREPARED TO NOTIFY SUCH INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES BEFORE AND WERE EVEN LESS INCLINED TO DO SO NOW. IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION SOVIET DELEGATE YEROFEYEV IMPLIED THAT FUNCTIONALLY RELATED AIR WOULD BE ENOUGH. END COMMENT.) IN REPLY TO THE CZECH AND SOVIET STATEMENTS, BARRY SAID THAT THE U.S. WAS INDEED PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE COVERED BUT THAT THAT DISCUSSION SHOULD NOT HOLD UP NEGOTIATIONS ON OTHER ISSUES. (FULL TEXT SEPTEL.) WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO "WALK AND CHEW GUM AT THE SAME TIME," HE ADDED. IN ANY CASE, ANYONE WHO HAD ATTENDED WORKING GROUP MEETINGS DURING THE PAST WEEK SHOULD BE WELL AWARE OF WHO WAS BLOCKING PROGRESS IN STOCKHOLM.

5. NOTIFICATION: WHATEVER MOVEMENT THERE WAS ON NOTIFICATION WAS BACKWARD, NOT FORWARD. DISCUSSION HIT AN ALL-TIME LOW IN THE NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP AS THE EAST RETURNED TO SHOPWORN POSITIONS NOT HEARD SINCE LAST YEAR. IN HIS DEFINITION OF THE TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED, SOVIET GENERAL TATARNIKOV INCLUDED GROUND, AMPHIBIOUS, AIRBORNE AND AIR FORCES, NAVAL COMPONENTS AND ALL OTHER TYPES OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THE WEST FOCUSED ON GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS ON THE BASIS OF THE COORDINATOR'S ORAL PROPOSAL OF THE PREVIOUS WEEK SEEKING A DEFINITION OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES. NATO'S ABILITY TO SUPERIMPOSE ITS CONCEPTS ON THE COORDINATOR'S PROPOSAL WAS HAMSTRUNG BY THE UK AMBASSADOR'S INSISTENCE THAT NATO NOT SUGGEST CHANGES TO THE COORDINATOR'S LANGUAGE. NNA EFFORTS TO BUILD COMMON GROUND AROUND THE COORDINATOR'S PROPOSAL FELL ON DEAF EARS.

6. NON-USE OF FORCE: THE WEST MOVED CLOSER TO A CONSENSUS TEXT ON NON-USE OF FORCE -- AT LEAST IN STOCKHOLM. MOST OF OUR ALLIES NOW ACKNOWLEDGE, SOMEWHAT BEGRUDGINGLY, THAT ANY NATO TEXT MUST CONTAIN LANGUAGE REFLECTING THE LARGER WESTERN CONCEPT OF SECURITY, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS. THIS CONCEPT IS NOW EMBRACED IN AN AD REFERENDUM NATO TEXT WHICH INCLUDES ALL MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE U.S. ILLUSTRATIVE TEXT: HUMAN RIGHTS, TERRORISM, VERIFICATION/COMPLIANCE, EQUAL RIGHTS/EQUAL DUTIES OF STATES, AS WELL AS ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE LANGUAGE AND THE NUF PRINCIPLE ITSELF AS CONTAINED IN THE UN CHARTER. (SEE SEPTEL FOR TEXT AND ANALYSIS.) THE FRENCH REMAINED STRANGELY SILENT THROUGHOUT THE PROCESS OF DRAFTING THIS TEXT BUT THEIR PREFERRED ROLE AS NATO'S GADFLY WAS ENTHUSIASTICALLY ASSUMED BY THE ITALIANS. IN THE END, THE ITALIAN DELEGATION ABSENTED

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THEMSELVES AT A CRUCIAL MOMENT SO THAT A WESTERN CONSENSUS COULD BE REACHED ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OTHER CONTENTIOUS ISSUES. THUS, IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER ALL EC-12 CAPITALS, PARTICULARLY ROME AND PARIS, WILL BE ABLE TO ACCEPT THE WESTERN TEXT DRAFTED IN STOCKHOLM. MEANWHILE, THE NUF WORKING GROUP, AT WESTERN INSISTENCE, FOCUSED ON THE FIRST ELEMENT OF THE NATO TEXT, I.E., CSBM'S-NUF LINK, TABLED LAST ROUND. NO DRAFT LANGUAGE WAS REGISTERED, HOWEVER. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO THE EVER ANXIOUS NNA COORDINATOR (LOIBL - AUSTRIA) THAT ANY FURTHER DRAFTING PROGRESS IS CONTINGENT ON AT LEAST COMPARABLE SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS IN THE OTHER WORKING GROUPS.

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7. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION/COMMUNICATIONS: INFORMAL CORRIDOR CONTACTS CONTINUED THIS WEEK IN AN EFFORT TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE INFORMATION IMPASSE (NATO IS CURRENTLY PROMOTING THE IDEA OF A B-1 CLUSTER SUBGROUP TO DEAL EXCLUSIVELY WITH INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN THE CONTENTS OF NOTIFICATION; A-2 "STATIC" INFORMATION WOULD STAY WHERE IT IS.). HOWEVER, IN GRINEVSKY'S ABSENCE, THE SOVIETS HAVE BLOCKED ANY FORWARD MOVEMENT. BOTH EAST AND WEST AGAIN STAKED OUT WELL-KNOWN POSITIONS IN THE WORKING GROUP ON WHAT TYPE OF INFORMATION SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN THIS CLUSTER, I.E., STATIC OR DYNAMIC. THE EAST PRESSED ITS POSITION BY TABLING PROPOSALS ON THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION FOR AIR MANEUVERS AND TROOP TRANSFERS BY AIR FORCES. THEY ALSO LABELED STATIC INFORMATION AS INAPPROPRIATE FOR THIS PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE, ALTHOUGH A POSSIBLE TOPIC FOR INCLUSION IN A DISARMAMENT PHASE. NATO WAS JOINED BY SWEDEN IN COUNTERING THIS ARGUMENT.

- THE VERIFICATION DISCUSSION AGAIN FOCUSED ON THE COORDINATOR'S (SCHENK-SWITZERLAND) SUGGESTED LANGUAGE. THROUGH PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS OF TEXTS, THE EAST CONTINUED TO PRESS ITS CASE FOR ALTERNATIVES TO INSPECTION OR OBSERVATION ON REQUEST. THE RIGHT TO PURSUE A CERTAIN COURSE OF ACTION SHOULD THERE BE DOUBTS CONCERNING COMPLIANCE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN BEGRUDGINGLY ACCEPTED, BUT THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO ARGUE THAT SUCH DOUBTS MUST BE WELL FOUNDED. WHILE THE WEST AND THE NNA HAVE OBJECTED, ARGUING THAT ANY REQUIREMENT THAT DOUBTS BE "PROVED" WOULD INFRINGE ON A STATE'S RIGHT TO CONDUCT VERIFICATION AND WOULD UNNECESSARILY DELAY VERIFICATION MEANS. SOVIET OBJECTIVES ARE CLEAR -- TO ENSURE THAT TIMELY VERIFICATION IS VIRTUALLY AN IMPOSSIBILITY. THEY ARE SEEKING FORMULATIONS WHICH COULD ALLOW THEM TO DELAY OR DENY A REQUEST FOR VERIFICATION IF THEY FIND THE REQUESTING STATE'S "DOUBTS" OR REASONS FOR THE REQUEST NOT TO BE "WELL FOUNDED." THEY ARE ALSO SEEKING TO ENSURE THAT CONSULTATIONS AS A VERIFICATION METHOD ARE

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NOT SQUEEZED OUT IN THE DRAFTING PROCESS. WHILE THE SOVIETS HAVE BECOME MORE WILLING 'O DISCUSS VERIFICATION THIS ROUND, THEIR FLEXIBILITY HAS PROVEN TO BE MORE COSMETIC THAN REAL. THE WEST, GENERALLY WITH GOOD SUPPORT FROM THE NNA, CONTINUES TO RESIST SOVIET AMENDMENTS.

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8. OBSERVATION: DRAFTING PROGRESS CONTINUES ON ADMINISTRATIVE, I.E., NONSUBSTANTIVE, ISSUES. LANGUAGE WAS NOTED ON THE HOST STATE'S RESPONSIBILITY TO PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION BOTH TO AND WITHIN THE OBSERVATION AREA AND ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO GUIDE OBSERVERS IN THE AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY. FURTHER PROGRESS IS ANTICIPATED IN THESE NONCONTENTIOUS AREAS, WHILE THE CORE QUESTIONS OF THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF OBSERVATION REMAIN ON THE BACK BURNER. (BEGIN COMMENT: WE EXPECT THE EAST TO CONTINUE TO ALLOW LANGUAGE TO BE NOTED IN B-2. THEIR "FLEXIBILITY" AND "WILLINGNESS TO SHOW PROGRESS" IN THIS GROUP ALLOWS THEM TO CLAIM THAT THEY ARE NOT STANDING IN THE WAY OF PROGRESS. END COMMENT.) THE SOVIETS, HOWEVER, PROVIDED A SIGN OF THEIR UNWILLINGNESS TO FACILITATE EFFECTIVE OBSERVATION WHEN, IN AN INFORMAL COFFEE GROUP, THEY JOINED WITH THE YUGOSLAVS IN REJECTING A PROPOSAL THAT OBSERVERS BE ALLOWED TO USE THEIR PERSONAL BINOCULARS. CLEARLY, THE EAST PREFERS THAT OBSERVERS SEE AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE FROM AS FAR AWAY AS POSSIBLE. (BEGIN COMMENT: THE YUGOSLAV OBJECTION TOOK OTHERS, INCLUDING THE FINNISH COORDINATOR, BY SURPRISE. THE LATTER EXPRESSED HIS ANNOYANCE PRIVATELY TO U.K. AMBASSADOR EDES AS WELL AS HIS CONCERN ABOUT POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THIS YUGOSLAV POSITION FOR THE NNA POSITION OVERALL. END COMMENT.)

9. CONSTRAINTS/ANNUAL FORECASTS: THE WORKING GROUP WAS PARALYZED AS THE EAST REFUSED TO ENGAGE IN SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF TWO NATO TEXTS ENDORSING THE NNA CONCEPT OF A STANDARDIZED FORMAT FOR THE ANNUAL FORECAST. EASTERN FOOTDRAGGING BECAME EVEN MORE APPARENT WHEN AN IRISH ATTEMPT AT COMPROMISE WAS MET BY SILENCE. THE SOVIETS ALSO STALLED ON CONSTRAINTS, ACCUSING THE WEST OF NOT NEGOTIATING SERIOUSLY. IN WHAT MAY BE EVIDENCE BOTH OF THE LACK OF SOVIET SERIOUSNESS REGARDING CONSTRAINTS AND OF A SOVIET REFUSAL TO DISCUSS SUBSTANCE IN OTHER CSBM'S WORKING GROUPS UNTIL THEIR PRECONDITION FOR DRAFTING IS MET, I.E., THE ISSUE OF TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED IS RESOLVED, GENERAL TATARNIKOV NO LONGER REPRESENTS THE SOVIET UNION IN THIS WORKING GROUP. INSTEAD, THE SOVIET BENCH IS NOW BEING WARMED BY TWO SOVIET SECOND-STRINGERS.

BARRY  
END OF MESSAGE

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S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 03397

SUBJECT: CDE: APRIL 29 MEETING WITH GRINEVSKY

1. SUMMARY: SOVIET CDE NEGOTIATOR GRINEVSKY SEEMS EAGER TO REACH AN AGREEMENT, BUT THE KEY ISSUE FOR HIM IS AN AIR PARAMETER OF SOME SORT. HE SOUNDED FLEXIBLE ON OTHER ISSUES SUCH AS GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS, BUT WE HAVE NOT HAD A CHANCE TO PROBE THE NEW SOVIET INSTRUCTIONS. MEANWHILE THE SOVIETS HAVE BROKEN THE LOGJAM ON INFORMATION BY AGREEING TO DISCUSS INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION IN WORKING GROUP B-1, A MOVE WHICH OUR ALLIES ARE MAKING TOO MUCH OF. MEANWHILE, THE BRITISH AND GERMANS ARE HAVING PROBLEMS WITH OUR EFFORTS TO REACH A COMMON POSITION ON VARIOUS ISSUES. END SUMMARY.
2. GRINEVSKY, ACCOMPANIED BY TATARNIKOV, INVITED BARRY AND HANSEN TO LUNCH APRIL 29, FOLLOWING HIS APRIL 27 RETURN FROM MOSCOW. JUDGING BY HIS MOOD AND ACTIONS, HE SEEMS TO BE UNDER NEW INSTRUCTIONS TO TRY TO MOVE AHEAD. HIS CENTRAL PRIORITY IS AN AIR CSBM; HE IS INSTRUCTED TO GET A SEPARATE THRESHOLD FOR REPORTING AIR ACTIVITIES, BUT HE MAY SETTLE FOR LESS. JUDGING BY WHAT HE AND TATARNIKOV SAID, THEIR THINKING ON THE CONTENT OF AN AIR MEASURE IS NOT TOO FAR FROM OURS:
  - NUMBER (OR RANGE) OF SORTIES OR NUMBER OF PARTICIPATING AIRCRAFT FOR THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF AN EXERCISE
  - TYPES OF AIRCRAFT INVOLVED
  - AREA AND DURATION OF ACTIVITY
  - PURPOSE OF EXERCISE
3. WHILE THEY WANT AN INDEPENDENT THRESHOLD FOR AIR, THEY CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THAT WE ARE NOT GOING TO DEPART FROM THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. IT IS ALSO OBVIOUS THAT THEY ARE THINKING OF A HIGH THRESHOLD, EXPRESSED IN NUMBERS OF SORTIES OVER THE DURATION OF AN EXERCISE WHICH WOULD CAPTURE THE AIR COMPONENT OF MAJOR GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES AND LARGE INDEPENDENT AIR EXERCISES - E.G. AIR DEFENSE EXERCISES SUCH AS THE SOVIET GRANITE 86 AND WESTERN EXERCISES SUCH AS EMERALD FOREST OR CENTRAL ENTERPRISE. WE MAY NOT HAVE HEARD THE LAST WORD ON THIS; THEY HAVE HINTED THAT THEY MIGHT SETTLE FOR A SUB-THRESHOLD WITHIN COMBINED ARMS ACTIVITIES - I.E. ONE WHERE THE AIR COMPONENT OF A GROUND FORCE EXERCISE WOULD BE NOTIFIED ONLY IF IT EXCEEDED A CERTAIN LEVEL. MEANWHILE THE ALLIES AND THE NNA PRESS US TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE ON INDEPENDENT AIR; WE HAVE BEEN VERY DIRECT IN WARNING THEM THAT THEY WILL SABOTAGE THE CONFERENCE IF THEY PERSUADE THE SOVIETS THAT WE ARE AT ALL FLEXIBLE ON THIS POINT.
4. GRINEVSKY SOUNDED FLEXIBLE ABOUT THE "SECONDARY" ISSUES SUCH AS GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS, MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS AND DEFERRAL OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES. HE IMPLIED

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THAT EVEN VERIFICATION WOULD FALL INTO PLACE EVENTUALLY. MORE INTERESTING WAS HIS TREATMENT OF HIS GENERAL STAFF COLLEAGUE, GENERAL TATARNIKOV; GRINEVSKY NOW EVIDENTLY HAS AUTHORITY TO DISCUSS MILITARY ISSUES AND IS PREPARED TO DO SO WITH OR WITHOUT TATARNIKOV AT HIS SIDE.

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5. GRINEVSKY'S FIRST ACT ON RETURNING WAS TO BREAK THE PROCEDURAL LOGJAM (OF THEIR OWN MAKING) BY AGREEING TO DISCUSS INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION IN WORKING GROUP B-1, RATHER THAN INSISTING THAT IT COULD ONLY BE DISCUSSED IN A-2. WE DON'T THINK THE SOVIETS DESERVE MUCH CREDIT FOR THIS, SINCE THAT WAS THE ORIGINAL PROCEDURAL AGREEMENT OF OCTOBER 14, BUT OUR ALLIES ARE TAKING THIS AS A MAJOR SIGN OF SOVIET GOOD WILL.

6. WHILE URGING US TO BE FLEXIBLE ON TOPICS WHERE WE HAVE SAID WE WILL NOT BE, OUR ALLIES CONTINUE TO BE TOUGH WHERE WE ARE PREPARED TO BE FLEXIBLE. DESK OFFICERS IN BOTH BONN AND LONDON, OF ALL PLACES, VETOED A TACTICAL MOVE AIMED AT SEIZING THE INITIATIVE IN THE NOTIFICATION GROUP; THE FRG MOD IS HAVING TROUBLE WITH THE CONCEPT OF NOTIFYING NUMBERS OF SORTIES. AND THE UK CONTINUES TO OPPOSE ALMOST ANY DEPARTURE FROM SC.1 AT THIS STAGE ON THE GROUND THAT IT WOULD BE PREMATURE; PARADOXICALLY THEY ARE LETTING IT BE KNOWN THAT THEY ARE NOT BOTHERED BY SUCH CONCEPTS AS INDEPENDENT AIR OR NOTIFYING MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS.

BARRY  
END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03410

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR

SUBJECT: NOTING OF VERIFICATION LANGUAGE

1. THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE WAS NOTED IN COORDINATOR'S  
NOTEBOOK IN THE VERIFICATION WORKING GROUP ON 30 APRIL:

- BEGIN TEXT: ANY PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH HAS
- DOUBTS AS TO ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE'S
- COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREED CSBM'S WILL BE ALLOWED
- TO . . . . THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH REQUESTS
- . . . WILL STATE THE REASONS FOR SUCH A REQUEST.
- END TEXT.

2. IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT THE SAME CONCEPT, IN OUR  
VIEW INSPECTION, WOULD EVENTUALLY REPLACE BOTH SETS OF  
ELLIPSES.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03458  
 SUBJECT: GRINEVSKY FORMULA FOR DEFERRAL OF NAVAL  
 - ACTIVITIES  
 REF: STOCKHOLM 1953  
 1. CDC X - 034  
 2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.  
 3. BEGIN SUMMARY: ON MAY 1 AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY  
 RETURNED TO THE JANUARY 15 GORBACHEV PROPOSAL TO DEFER  
 NAVAL ACTIVITIES TO A FUTURE STAGE OF THE CDE. HE  
 INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD BE SATISFIED WITH A  
 CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT AND SUGGESTED A FORMULATION.  
 REACTING TO BARRY'S INITIAL CRITICAL REACTION, GRINEVSKY  
 INDICATED THAT WHAT HE WANTED WAS A CONFERENCE  
 UNDERSTANDING ON THE ISSUE AND THAT HE WAS FLEXIBLE ON  
 THE WORDING OF A CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT. WASHINGTON  
 INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED PARA 11. END SUMMARY.  
 -  
 4. IN THE COURSE OF A MAY 1 DISCUSSION OF CDE ISSUES,  
 AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY RETURNED TO THE JANUARY 15  
 GORBACHEV PROPOSAL TO DEFER NAVAL ACTIVITIES TO A FUTURE  
 STAGE OF THE CDE. HE INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD  
 BE SATISFIED WITH A CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT AND SUGGESTED  
 THE FOLLOWING FORMULATION.  
 BEGIN TEXT:  
 PARTICIPATING STATES CAN RAISE IN FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS  
 SUBJECTS RELEVANT TO THE MANDATE OF THE CONFERENCE,  
 INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES.  
 (DESCRIPTION OF THE ZONE ACCORDING TO THE MADRID  
 MANDATE.) ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY OF RIGHTS, BALANCE  
 AND RECIPROCITY, EQUAL RESPECT FOR THE SECURITY  
 INTERESTS OF ALL CSCE PARTICIPATING STATES, AND OF THEIR  
 RESPECTIVE OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING CONFIDENCE- AND  
 SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE,  
 THESE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WILL  
 COVER THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AS WELL AS THE ADJOINING SEA  
 AREA (ASTERISK) AND AIR SPACE. THEY WILL BE OF MILITARY  
 SIGNIFICANCE AND POLITICALLY BINDING AND WILL BE  
 PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION WHICH  
 CORRESPOND TO THEIR CONTENT.  
 AS FAR AS THE ADJOINING SEA AREA (ASTERISK) AND AIR  
 SPACE IS CONCERNED, THE MEASURES WILL BE APPLICABLE TO  
 THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF ALL THE PARTICIPATING STATES  
 TAKING PLACE THERE WHENEVER THESE ACTIVITIES AFFECT  
 SECURITY IN EUROPE AS WELL AS CONSTITUTE A PART OF  
 ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE WITHIN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AS  
 REFERRED TO ABOVE, WHICH THEY WILL AGREE TO NOTIFY.  
 NECESSARY SPECIFICATIONS WILL BE MADE THROUGH THE  
 NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING  
 MEASURES AT THE CONFERENCE.  
 NOTHING IN THE DEFINITION OF THE ZONE GIVEN ABOVE WILL  
 DIMINISH OBLIGATIONS ALREADY UNDERTAKEN UNDER THE FINAL

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ACT. THE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES TO BE AGREED UPON AT THE CONFERENCE WILL ALSO BE APPLICABLE IN ALL AREAS COVERED BY ANY OF THE PROVISIONS IN THE FINAL ACT RELATING TO CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND CERTAIN ASPECTS OF SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT. (END OF DESCRIPTION OF THE ZONE ACCORDING TO THE MADRID MANDATE.) SUCH QUESTIONS WILL BE SUBJECT TO DISCUSSION.

FOOTNOTE: (ASTERISK) IN THIS CONTEXT, THE NOTION OF ADJOINING SEA AREA IS UNDERSTOOD TO REFER ALSO TO OCEAN AREAS ADJOINING EUROPE.  
END TEXT.

5. NOTING THAT HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO GIVE A DEFINITIVE VIEW, BARRY SAID THAT HE SAW SEVERAL POTENTIAL PROBLEMS: FIRST, THE SOVIET FORMULA, BY SINGLING OUT NAVAL ACTIVITIES, WOULD SET A PRECEDENT AND WOULD INVITE OTHERS TO ADD OTHER ISSUES. SECOND, BY INCLUDING THE MADRID MANDATE LANGUAGE, THE SOVIET FORMULA RAISED A JURIDICAL PROBLEM: IT EXCLUDED THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOMC OTHER MANDATE FORMULA MIGHT BE DECIDED IN VIENNA; WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO SAY WHAT A POST-VIENNA MANDATE MIGHT LOOK LIKE. THIRD, HE DID NOT LIKE THE FINAL SENTENCE; IT WENT TOO FAR IN TELLING PARTICIPANTS IN A POSSIBLE FUTURE CONFERENCE WHAT THEY COULD OR COULDN'T DISCUSS.

6. BARRY INDICATED THAT HE HAD ANOTHER MORE GENERAL FORMULA IN MIND, BASED ON HIS MARCH 14 STATEMENT IN PLENARY (REF), WHICH WOULD NOT SINGLE OUT INDIVIDUAL ISSUES, BUT WOULD ENABLE A PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH WAS NOT SATISFIED WITH THE WAY AN ISSUE HAD BEEN DECIDED (IN STOCKHOLM) TO RAISE IT IN ANY FUTURE STAGE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE "AGREED MANDATE." THIS, BARRY POINTED, OUT WOULD LEAVE THE ISSUE OF WHICH MANDATE -- MADRID'S OR VIENNA'S -- OPEN.

7. GRINEVSKY CALLED BARRY'S IDEA "INTERESTING" AND SAID THAT HE NEEDED TO THINK IT OVER. HE THEN RETURNED TO HIS OWN FORMULA, ARGUING THAT OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD RAISE OTHER ISSUES ANYWAY, BUT THAT FOR THE MOMENT NAVAL ACTIVITY WAS THE ONLY ISSUE RIPE FOR SUCH A LIST. HE SAID THAT HIS CITATION OF MANDATE LANGUAGE WAS DESIGNED TO AVOID DISPUTES ABOUT WHAT TYPES OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES WERE BEING DEFERRED, I.E., FUNCTIONALLY-RELATED ONLY, OR ALL NAVAL ACTIVITIES. AT ONE POINT HE SAID THAT IN HIS VIEW THE ONLY ISSUE WHICH SHOULD BE SPECIFICALLY POSTPONED WAS NAVAL ACTIVITIES.

8. BARRY RESPONDED THAT IT WOULD BE EVEN HARDER FOR THE U.S. TO AGREE TO THE POSTPONEMENT OF NAVAL ISSUES ALONE AND REITERATED HIS VIEW THAT WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS A GENERAL FORMULA ALONG THE LINES OF HIS PLENARY STATEMENT. GRINEVSKY CONCEDED THAT BARRY MIGHT BE RIGHT AND SAID

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THAT HE WOULD THINK IT OVER.

9. BEGIN COMMENT: POSTPONEMENT OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES WAS NOT REPEAT NOT HIGH ON GRINEVSKY'S PRIORITY LIST OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES HE WANTED TO ADDRESS. HIS LOW KEY, FLEXIBLE APPROACH INDICATED THAT HE WAS LOOKING FOR A FACE-SAVING WAY TO SATISFY THE SOVIET REQUIREMENT FOR A PUBLIC RESPONSE TO THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL AND THAT HE WOULD NOT INSIST ON HIS FORMULA. FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, A VERY GENERAL CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT, WHICH IN NO WAY WOULD PREJUDGE WHAT VIENNA COULD DISCUSS OR WHAT IT COULD MANDATE FOR A POSSIBLE FUTURE STAGE OF THE CDE, MIGHT RESOLVE THIS CONTINUING SOURCE OF FRICTION, THUS PERMITTING US TO FOCUS ON THE REAL SUBSTANCE OF THE CONFERENCE, I.E., GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES.

10. A FORMULA WHICH MIGHT MEET OUR REQUIREMENTS WOULD READ AS FOLLOWS.

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BEGIN TEXT:

PROPOSALS NOT RESOLVED IN NEGOTIATIONS PRIOR TO THE VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING, AS WELL AS ANY NEW ISSUES, MAY BE INTRODUCED IN ANY POSSIBLE POST-VIENNA CONTINUATION OR NEXT STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE, PROVIDED THEY ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE AGREED MANDATE.

END TEXT.

11. REQUEST WASHINGTON'S COMMENTS ON FORMULA AND INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT HOW TO PROCEED.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03496  
SUBJECT: AGREED TEXT IN WORKING GROUP B-2 (OBSERVATION)  
1. CDE X - 036  
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.  
3. WORKING GROUP B-2 (OBSERVATION) AGREED TO NOTE THE  
FOLLOWING TEXT IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK ON MAY 1.  
BEGIN TEXT:  
THE INVITED STATE WILL COVER THE TRAVEL EXPENSES FOR ITS  
OBSERVERS TO THE CAPITAL, OR ANOTHER SUITABLE LOCATION  
SPECIFIED IN THE INVITATION, OF THE HOST STATE, AND BACK.  
END TEXT.  
BARRY  
END OF MESSAGE  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03515

SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, APRIL 28 -

- MAY 2, 1986

1. CDE X - 037

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. BEGIN SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT: THE RETURN OF SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY HAS CREATED A MOOD OF OPTIMISM IN THE CONFERENCE. THE SOVIETS SAY HE HAS COME BACK BEARING "NEW, MORE FLEXIBLE" INSTRUCTIONS. IN FACT, THE TONE OF WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS HAS BEEN MORE CIVIL AND THE EAST HAS BEEN MORE FORTHCOMING ON MARGINAL ISSUES. ON THE KEY ISSUE OF INFORMATION THE SOVIETS ACKNOWLEDGED -- AND OTHERS EAGERLY ACCEPTED -- THAT THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED IN THE NOTIFICATION (B-1) WORKING GROUP. THE FOCUS OF CONFERENCE ATTENTION IS NOW SOVIET INSISTENCE ON THE NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THERE IS NO GIVE IN OUR POSITION BUT MOST OF OUR ALLIES SEEM PREPARED TO ACCEPT THESE ACTIVITIES IN AN EXPANDED NOTIFICATION REGIME AND MAY HAVE SO HINTED TO THE EAST. IN THE NON-USE OF FORCE WORKING GROUP, THE "ENEMY" IS NOT IN THE EAST BUT WITHIN. ITALY CONTINUES ITS STUBBORN REFUSAL TO AGREE TO ANY HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE IN A WESTERN TEXT, THEREBY EFFECTIVELY FREEZING THE SUBMISSION OF ANY FURTHER WESTERN LANGUAGE ON NUF. THE "NEW" SOVIET STANCE IS MAINLY COSMETIC: AGREEMENT TO DISCUSS CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION IN B-1, INTRODUCTION OF A "NEW" CONSTRAINT TO ADDRESS WESTERN CONCERNS ABOUT EQUAL IMPACT AND ANOTHER POLITICAL SPEECH IN PLENARY PRAISING THE "NEW PERSPECTIVE" GORBACHEV'S APRIL 18 SPEECH GAVE TO CDE. IN THE SAME PLENARY (MAY 2) THE GDR LAID DOWN THE EAST'S DREAM PACKAGE: NUF, NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION AND LIMITATIONS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THIS, THE EAST CONTENDS, WOULD NOT BE A MINI-PACKAGE BUT A SUBSTANTIVE RESULT (COMMENT: THIS MAY PRESAGE EASTERN ATTEMPTS TO ENGINEER AN EVENTUAL TRADE-OFF BETWEEN CONSTRAINTS AND INSPECTION. END COMMENT). IN THE PROCESS THE SOVIETS HAVE REGAINED SOME OF THE GROUND THEY LOST LAST WEEK WHILE THE CONFERENCE WAS WAITING FOR GRINEVSKY'S RETURN FROM MOSCOW. END SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT.

4. NOTIFICATION: FOLLOWING GRINEVSKY'S RETURN THE EAST AGREED TO DISCUSS INFORMATION CONTAINED IN A NOTIFICATION IN WORKING GROUP B-1 ON NOTIFICATION INSTEAD OF IN WORKING GROUP A-2 ON INFORMATION. WHILE THERE WAS NO INDICATION OF ANY EASTERN UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING OUR CONCEPT OF "STATIC" (MEASURE 1) INFORMATION, MANY, INCLUDING MOST OF OUR ALLIES, GREETED THIS MOVE AS AN IMPORTANT SIGNAL. IN FACT THE SOVIETS ARE CLAIMING CREDIT FOR REMOVING AN OBSTACLE WHICH THEY CREATED. IN

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THE MEETING ITSELF NO DRAFTING PROGRESS WAS MADE. AFTER THE "DRAMATIC" EASTERN MOVE, DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON THE COORDINATOR'S "FOOD FOR THOUGHT", I.E., A DEFINITION OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THIS HAS BEEN BOGGED DOWN FOR SEVERAL WEEKS BY THE EAST'S (AND MALTA'S) INSISTENCE THAT THE DEFINITION INCLUDE INDEPENDENT AIR (AND NAVAL, IN MALTA'S CASE) ACTIVITIES AS WELL AS MOVEMENTS (TRANSFERS); THE WEST HAS PRESSED THE GROUP TO FOCUS ON AREAS WHERE THERE IS SOME COMMON GROUND, I.E., ON GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES AND RELATED PARAMETERS. IN A PRIVATE CONVERSATION THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR HAS EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS, IN THE INTEREST OF MAKING PROGRESS ON NOTIFICATION, TO DRAFT ON THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION IN THE WORKING GROUP AND TO ADDRESS THE MORE CONTENTIOUS ISSUES OF TYPES OF ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION AND RELATED PARAMETERS MORE INFORMALLY IN COFFEE GROUPS.

5. NON-USE OF FORCE: WHILE THE WEST FIDDLED, ROME BURNED: DURING THE WEEK NATO DELEGATIONS TRIED OUT VARIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS FORMULATIONS TO GET ROME TO GO ALONG WITH A FULL WESTERN NUF TEXT. NEVERTHELESS, ROME CONTINUED ITS "PRINCIPLED" (READ STUBBORN) REFUSAL TO CONSIDER ANY HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE. WHEN THE ITALIANS WERE REMINDED THAT THEIR OWN NUF DRAFT SUBMITTED FOR NATO CONSIDERATION LAST YEAR INCLUDED STRONG HUMAN RIGHTS

LANGUAGE, THEY WERE SOMEWHAT TAKEN ABACK AND FINALLY AGREED TO PROPOSE TO ROME A MARRIAGE OF THE EARLIER ITALIAN LANGUAGE TO THE PROVISIONAL NATO TEXT. THE REST OF THE WESTERN NUF TEXT CONTAINING ALL KEY U.S. ELEMENTS HAS BEEN AGREED TO WITH SOME AMENDMENTS (INCLUDING U.S.). IF NATO CAN AGREE ON HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE, THE REST OF THE NUF TEXT SHOULD FALL INTO PLACE, THEREBY ALLOWING THE WEST TO PLAY ITS NUF CARDS IN THE WORKING GROUP.

WHILE THE WEST FIDDLED, RAKHMANINOV BURNED: IN A STUDIED DISPLAY OF INDIGNATION, THE SOVIET NUF REPRESENTATIVE ACCUSED THE WEST IN PLENARY OF FOOTDRAGGING ON NUF, THEREBY IMPEDING PROGRESS IN THE CONFERENCE. THE TESTY NNA COORDINATOR (LOIBL-AUSTRIA) IS ALSO IRRITATED BY NATO'S INABILITY TO INTRODUCE AND, THEREFORE, DRAFT LANGUAGE IN THE WORKING GROUP.

6. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION/COMMUNICATIONS: THE EAST DEMONSTRATED NEW BUT NONSUBSTANTIVE "FLEXIBILITY" BY AGREEING TO A NONPREJUDICIAL PARAGRAPH ON VERIFICATION INDICATING THAT STATES WITH DOUBTS ABOUT COMPLIANCE HAVE CERTAIN RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES (REPORTED SEPTEL). THE QUESTION OF WHAT THESE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES ARE (I.E, WHAT FORMS OF VERIFICATION WILL BE AVAILABLE) WAS DEFERRED. THE SOVIETS DROPPED THEIR EARLIER REQUIREMENT THAT A STATE MUST HAVE "GROUNDS" FOR DOUBTS, ALTHOUGH THE TEXT ALSO NOTES THAT THE "REASONS" FOR A

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VERIFICATION REQUEST MUST BE STATED VICE THE REQUIREMENT TO STATE THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN SC.1. THE GENERAL VIEW IN STOCKHOLM IS THAT THE FORMS OF VERIFICATION TO BE AGREED WILL CONTINUE TO BE A CONTENTIOUS ISSUE AND IS LIKELY TO BE ONE OF THE LAST RESOLVED. THE EAST, HOWEVER, NOW SEEMS PREPARED TO JOIN NATO AND THE NNA IN DRAFTING A FRAMEWORK" TEXT FOR VERIFICATION.

NATO ALSO REEMPHASIZED ITS COMMITMENT TO MEASURE 1 THIS WEEK BUT THE EAST REFUSED TO ENGAGE IN THE DISCUSSION. NATO WILL NONETHELESS CONTINUE TO PROMOTE MEASURE 1 IN THE A-2 GROUP BUT WE FEAR IT WILL CONTINUE TO BE A MONOLOGUE. THE EAST IS CLEARLY NOT GOING TO DISCUSS STATIC INFORMATION IN ANY VENUE AND THE NNA, WHICH DOES NOT HAVE A SEPARATE INFORMATION MEASURE, SEEMS PREPARED TO SHIFT DISCUSSION OF THE "STATIC" INFORMATION ELEMENTS OF ITS PACKAGE TO OTHER GROUPS.

7. OBSERVATION: MAINTAINING A STEADY DRAFTING PACE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS, THE WORKING GROUP AGREED TO NOTE A SENTENCE IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK THAT THE INVITED STATE WILL PAY THE COST OF ITS OBSERVERS' TRANSPORTATION TO AND FROM THE HOST STATE. MORE SUBSTANTIVELY, THE SOVIETS REJECTED NATO, NNA AND IRISH ARGUMENTS THAT OBSERVERS NEED TO BE PROVIDED WITH DETAILED ANNOTATED MAPS. ONCE AGAIN, THE SOVIETS DEMONSTRATED THEIR RELUCTANCE TO AGREE TO ANY MEASURES WHICH COULD ACTUALLY ENHANCE AN OBSERVER'S ABILITY TO ASSESS AN ACTIVITY ACCURATELY.

8. CONSTRAINTS/ANNUAL FORECASTS: THE ATMOSPHERE WAS BETTER IN THIS GROUP; EASTERN AND NNA CRITICISM OF THE WEST'S REJECTION OF CEILINGS WAS SURPRISINGLY MUTED. THE EAST (BULGARIA) INTRODUCED A PAPER LIMITING GROUND FORCE MANEUVERS WHICH ARE TWO TIMES LARGER THAN THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL TO A TOTAL OF SIX PER YEAR. WHILE THIS REPRESENTS THE FIRST EASTERN CONSTRAINT TEXT WHICH IS NOT A STRAIGHT CEILING, IT IS CLEARLY PATTERNED ON THE NNA CONSTRAINT AND DOES NOT MOVE IN THE WEST'S DIRECTION, I.E., THE CONSTRAINING EFFECTS OF THE ANNUAL FORECAST. IN A DISCUSSION OF THE IRISH TIME CONSTRAINT, THE SOVIET GENERAL -- BACK IN THE SADDLE AFTER A WEEK'S ABSENCE (WHICH HAD FUELED SPECULATION ABOUT A SHIFT IN THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARDS CONSTRAINTS/FORECASTS) -- APPEARED NOT TO REJECT OUT OF HAND THE IDEA OF A TIME CONSTRAINT. THE UK ELABORATED ON ITS REASONS FOR REJECTING A CEILING ON ALERTS.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03622

SUBJECT: SOVIET DEMARCHE TO NATO ALLIES ON CURRENT  
- STATUS OF CDE NEGOTIATIONS

1. CDE X - 040
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE SOVIETS HAVE APPROACHED NORWAY, THE UK, CANADA, THE NETHERLANDS, AND TURKEY TO EXPRESS THEIR CONCERN OVER THE LACK OF PROGRESS IN STOCKHOLM. THE SOVIET DEMARCHE, IN CAPITALS, STRESSED THAT A MEANINGFUL CDE OUTCOME COULD LEAD TO A PHASE II CDE. THE SOVIETS CONTINUED TO TOUT THE JANUARY 15 GORBACHEV OFFER TO AGREE TO NOTIFY GROUND AND AIR ACTIVITIES NOW, WHILE EXPLICITLY POSTPONING NAVAL ACTIVITIES TO THE NEXT PHASE AS THE KEY TO A SOLUTION. (COMMENT: WE ASSUME SIMILAR DEMARCHES WERE MADE IN NNA CAPITALS. WASHINGTON MAY WISH TO CONSIDER A U.S. APPROACH IN NNA AND WARSAW PACT CAPITALS, OUTLINING THE U.S. VIEWS ON THE CDE AND THE CDE'S FUTURE IN THE CSCE PROCESS. AT THE SAME TIME WASHINGTON SHOULD, AT THE MINIMUM, TOUCH BASE WITH NATO ALLIES ON CDE ISSUES PRIOR TO THE NATO MINISTERIAL IN HALIFAX.) END SUMMARY.

4. AT THE CDE NATO CAUCUS MAY 7, AMBASSADOR MEVIK (NORWAY) REPORTED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD RECENTLY APPROACHED THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT TO EXPRESS THEIR CONCERN ABOUT THE SLOW PACE OF NEGOTIATIONS IN STOCKHOLM. THE NETHERLANDS, TURKEY, CANADA AND THE UK REPORTED THAT THEY HAD SIMILARLY BEEN APPROACHED IN CAPITALS. MEVIK OUTLINED THE DEMARCHE MADE BY SOVIET MINISTER COUNSELOR SMIRNOV ON APRIL 29. IN ADDITION TO VOICING GENERAL CONCERN ABOUT THE CONFERENCE, SMIRNOV'S MAIN POINTS WERE THAT:

-- A MEANINGFUL RESULT IN STOCKHOLM WOULD CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR AN "EXTRA MANDATE" TO BE ADOPTED AT THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING FOR A PHASE II CDE NEGOTIATION WHERE DISARMAMENT ISSUES WOULD BE IN THE FOREGROUND.

-- THE MAIN PROBLEM IN CDE REMAINS THE ISSUE OF NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THE JANUARY 15 GORBACHEV OFFER SHOWED THE WAY TO A SOLUTION -- AGREEMENT ON NOTIFICATION OF LAND FORCES AND "AIR" ACTIVITIES NOW AND POSTPONEMENT OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNTIL THE NEXT PHASE. (NOTE: MEVIK POINTED OUT THAT SMIRNOV HAD SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO "AIR" ACTIVITIES, NOT "INDEPENDENT" AIR ACTIVITIES.)

-- THE SOVIETS REGRET THAT THE WEST HAS MADE NO CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE TO THIS PROPOSAL.

-- THE POSTPONEMENT OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES TO THE NEXT PHASE COULD ONLY TAKE PLACE IF THERE IS SPECIFIC AGREEMENT TO DO SO IN STOCKHOLM.

-- THE INCLUSION OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE IS

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ESSENTIAL TO A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME IN STOCKHOLM,  
PARTICULARLY THE ELABORATION OF ITS MILITARY ASPECTS.  
-- CONSTRAINTS WERE MENTIONED IN THE DEMARCHE, BUT ONLY  
IN PASSING.

5. DEMARCHES MADE IN LONDON, OTTAWA, ANKARA AND THE  
HAGUE WERE SIMILAR, ALTHOUGH BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) DID  
NOTE THAT THE SOVIETS HAD EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR AN  
AGREEMENT ON "INDEPENDENT" AIR ACTIVITIES IN THE HAGUE.

6. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO FIRM KNOWLEDGE, WE  
ASSUME THAT THE SOVIETS LIKELY HAVE MADE SIMILAR  
APPROACHES IN NNA CAPITALS. SUCH A STEP WOULD BE  
CONSISTENT WITH AN EMERGING EASTERN CAMPAIGN TO TRY TO  
PLACE THE BLAME FOR SLOW PROGRESS IN STOCKHOLM ON THE  
WEST AND MORE SPECIFICALLY ON THE U.S. USDEL BELIEVES  
WASHINGTON SHOULD CONSIDER AN APPROACH TO NNA AND WARSAW  
FACT CAPITALS EXPRESSING OUR OWN VIEWS BOTH ON THE  
CURRENT STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND CDE'S FUTURE  
WITHIN THE CSCE PROCESS MORE GENERALLY. SUCH AN  
APPROACH IN NATO CAPITALS MIGHT ALSO BE CONSIDERED IN  
ORDER TO AVOID ANY ALLIANCE MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT U.S.  
POSITIONS ON KEY CDE ISSUES. AT A MINIMUM, WE BELIEVE  
THAT GENERAL SOUNDINGS ON CDE SHOULD BE TAKEN IN NATO  
PRIOR TO THE NATO MINISTERIAL IN HALIFAX SO THAT WE ARE  
NOT BLIND-SIDED BY ANY SUDDEN SHIFTS IN ALLIED POSITIONS  
ON SUCH ISSUES AS THE NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR  
ACTIVITIES. END COMMENT.

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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03626

SUBJECT: CDE: LANGUAGE "NOTED" IN VERIFICATION  
WORKING GROUP, MAY 7, 1986

REF: STOCKHOLM 03410

1. CDE XI - 41.

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. AGREEMENT WAS REACHED DURING THE MAY 7, 1986 MEETING OF WORKING GROUP A ON "INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, AND COMMUNICATION" TO "NOTE" A FURTHER TEXT IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK. THIS SENTENCE FOLLOWS ON THE TWO SENTENCES PROVISIONALLY NOTED AT THE APRIL 30 WORKING GROUP MEETING. TEXT IS:  
BEGIN TEXT.

"THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH HAS RECEIVED SUCH A REQUEST WILL . . . WITHIN THE AGREED PERIOD OF TIME. (FULL STOP) . . . " END TEXT.

IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE USE OF ELLIPSES IN MID-SENTENCE DID NOT PREJUDICE THE POSITION OF ANY DELEGATION CONCERNING WHAT SHOULD BE INSERTED IN LIEU OF ELLIPSES.

4. COMMENT. THIS SENTENCE IS THE THIRD IN A SERIES OF SENTENCES ORIGINALLY OFFERED BY COORDINATOR SCHENK AS "FOOD FOR THOUGHT" AND ONE OF THE KEY SENTENCES IN THE WESTERN APPROACH TO VERIFICATION (REFTEL). THE FIRST OF THESE SENTENCES, PROVISIONALLY NOTED ON APRIL 30, CONFIRMS THE RIGHT TO CONDUCT SPECIFIC VERIFICATION -- THAT IS, IN OUR VIEW, INSPECTION. THE SECOND SENTENCE ADDRESSES THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE EXERCISING THAT RIGHT. THIS THIRD SENTENCE IS A LOGICAL FOLLOW-ON, AND KEY, TO THE FIRST TWO SENTENCES INASMUCH AS IT STATES THAT THE STATE RECEIVING A REQUEST HAS A RESPONSIBILITY TO ACT, AND IN SHORT ORDER. IN OUR VIEW, THAT ACTION IS TO ACCEDE TO THE REQUEST WITH NO RIGHT OF REFUSAL. DURING DISCUSSION OF WHAT MIGHT FIT INTO THE MID-SENTENCE ELLIPSES WEST AND NNA BOTH ARGUED THAT IT HAD TO BE ACCEPTANCE OF THE REQUEST. NOT SURPRISINGLY, THE EAST ARGUED FOR A LESS PRECISE TERM: "RESPOND," AND THE COMPROMISE WAS TO SUBSTITUTE ELLIPSES FOR NOW. ELLIPSES AT THE END OF THE SENTENCE INDICATE THAT MORE TEXT IS TO FOLLOW. END COMMENT.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03682

SUBJECT: NON-USE OF FORCE UPDATE

REF: STATE 137812

1. CDE X - 046
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. BEGIN SUMMARY: NATO HAS AGREED ON A FULL WESTERN TEXT WHICH, IN USDEL'S VIEW, REFLECTS ALL KEY U.S. CONCEPTS AND MODIFICATIONS; ITALY IS STILL A HOLDOUT ON HUMAN RIGHTS BUT HAS ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF A HUMAN RIGHTS PASSAGE IN THE TEXT (SEE PARA 7 FOR FULL TEXT EXCEPT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS). ACCORDINGLY, ON MAY 6, NATO TABLED ITS SECOND "COHERENT" BLOCK -- A TEXT ON THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE AND COLLATERAL CONSIDERATIONS. THE NATO TEXT WAS WELCOMED BY MOST DELEGATIONS AND HAS CLEARED THE WAY FOR FURTHER DRAFTING IN THIS WORKING GROUP. THE U.S. HAS LAID DOWN A MARKER THAT WITHOUT AGREEMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE, WE WILL NOT AGREE TO ANY FURTHER TABLING OF TEXTS. END SUMMARY.
  4. BACKGROUND. BASED ON REFTTEL, USDEL PRESSED NATO TO ACCEPT REMAINING U.S. MODIFICATIONS TO AD REFERENDUM WESTERN NUF TEXT, PARTICULARLY THE KEY CHANGE NOTED IN PARA 3 REFTTEL (I.E., ELIMINATING THE WORDS "WHETHER POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY OR OTHERWISE" AND RETURNING TO HFA LANGUAGE). THE 16 ACCEPTED THIS CHANGE BUT NOT ALL OTHER U.S. MODIFICATIONS. NEVERTHELESS, USDEL BELIEVES THAT THE WESTERN TEXT, PENDING SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE, NOW REFLECTS ALL VITAL U.S. CONCEPTS AND MODIFICATIONS. THEREFORE, BASED ON SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS IN OTHER WORKING GROUPS, THE TEXT IS READY FOR TABLING (SEE PARA 7 FOR FULL TEXT). NATO IS WELL AWARE THAT WITHOUT HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE, WHICH MUST GO BEYOND THE NNA LANGUAGE, THE U.S. (AS WELL AS FRANCE, UK, CANADA) WILL NOT ACCEPT THE TABLING OF ANY MORE WESTERN LANGUAGE IN THE A-1 (NUF) WORKING GROUP. IN ADDITION, SINCE THE REMAINDER OF THE TEXT CONTAINS ELEMENTS WHICH ARE KEY TO VARIOUS ALLIES, E.G., PEACEFUL SETTLEMENTS (CANADA), TERRORISM (TURKEY), THE PRESSURE WILL REMAIN ON ITALY TO RESOLVE THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE SO WE CAN TABLE THE REST OF THE TEXT.
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5. NUF DEVELOPMENTS (MAY 5-9): NATO REACHED AGREEMENT ON MAY 5 ON A FULL NUF TEXT WITH THE EXCEPTION OF INCLUSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE. ON TUESDAY (MAY 6), AFTER PRESSURE FROM ALL OTHER NATO DELEGATIONS, INCLUDING DEMARCHES BY THE EC-12 AND THE FRG IN ROME, ITALY AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO THE INCLUSION OF A HUMAN RIGHTS REFERENCE IN THE WEST'S NUF TEXT. (WE ARE STILL HAMMERING OUT LANGUAGE ON SUCH A HUMAN RIGHTS PASSAGE, WHICH MUST GO BEYOND THE NNA LANGUAGE; SEPTTEL FOLLOWS ON THIS SUBJECT.) HAVING ACHIEVED ITALIAN AGREEMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS

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LANGUAGE IN PRINCIPLE, AT THE TUESDAY A-1 WORKING GROUP MEETING THE U.S., SUPPORTED BY ITALY AND DENMARK, TABLED NATO'S SECOND ELEMENT, NOW CHARACTERIZED AS ITS SECOND "COHERENT BLOCK," THAT IS, THE NUF REAFFIRMATION ITSELF AND COLLATERAL CONSIDERATIONS (SELF-DEFENSE, ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE PROVISIONS, I.E., THE FIRST FIVE PARAGRAPHS OF THE TEXT IN PARA 7). INTRODUCTION OF THIS BLOCK OF LANGUAGE WAS WELCOMED IN THE WORKING GROUP BY ALMOST ALL PARTICIPANTS, EVEN IN A MUTED FASHION, BY THE SOVIET REP, WITH THE ONLY DISCORDANT NOTE STRUCK BY POLISH AMBASSADOR KONARSKI.

6. THE NNA COORDINATOR IS NOW TAKING INFORMAL SOUNDINGS AS TO THE NEXT LIKELY CANDIDATE FOR DRAFTING. NATO IS EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF DRAFTING IN THE AREAS OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE ITSELF AND THE LINK BETWEEN THE PRINCIPLE AND CSBM'S. A CONTACT GROUP OF ALL INTERESTED PARTIES WILL BE HELD ON MONDAY, MAY 12, TO IDENTIFY APPROPRIATE SUBJECT(S). OF COURSE, DRAFTING IN THIS WORKING GROUP CONTINUES TO BE PREDICATED UPON COMMENSURATE PROGRESS IN THE OTHER (CSBM'S) WORKING GROUPS.

7. BEGIN WESTERN NUF TEXT (EXCEPT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS): CONSEQUENTLY THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECALLED THEIR OBLIGATION TO REFRAIN IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS, AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL, FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE OR IN ANY MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS. ACCORDINGLY THE PARTICIPATING STATES REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO RESPECT AND PUT INTO PRACTICE THIS PRINCIPLE AS LAID DOWN IN PRINCIPLE II OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

NO CONSIDERATION MAY BE INVOKED TO SERVE TO WARRANT RESORT TO THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THIS PRINCIPLE. THEY RECALLED THAT AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, NOTHING SHALL IMPAIR THE INHERENT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE IF AN ARMED ATTACK OCCURS.

THEY WILL LIKEWISE REFRAIN FROM ANY MANIFESTATION OF FORCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE OR ANY OTHER STATE TO RENOUNCE THE FULL EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND, IN PARTICULAR, OF ITS FREEDOM AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND ITS RIGHT FREELY TO CHOOSE AND DEVELOP ITS OWN POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL SYSTEM.

THEY WILL LIKEWISE REFRAIN FROM MAKING EACH OTHER'S TERRITORY THE OBJECT OF MILITARY OCCUPATION OR OTHER DIRECT OR INDIRECT MEASURES OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, OR THE OBJECT OF ACQUISITION BY MEANS OF SUCH MEASURES OR THE THREAT OF THEM. NO SUCH OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS LEGAL.

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THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESSED THEIR COMMITMENT TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS WITH EACH OF THE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER OR NOT THEY MAINTAIN WITH EACH OTHER RELATIONS OF ALLIANCE, AS WELL AS IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH ALL OTHER STATES.

THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IS A COMPLEMENT TO REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, BOTH BEING ESSENTIAL THOUGH NOT EXCLUSIVE FACTORS FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY.

THE PARTICIPATING STATES CONFIRMED THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 103 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, IN THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ANY TREATY OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER WILL PREVAIL.

THEY RECONFIRMED THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF ALL STATES AND NOTE THAT ALL SOVEREIGN STATES HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS AND EQUAL DUTIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

THEY ARE FURTHER CONVINCED THAT STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS IS INDISPENSABLE FOR BUILDING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY.

THE PARTICIPATING STATES ONCE AGAIN EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN AT CONTINUING ACTS OF TERRORISM. THEY CONDEMNED TERRORISM AND EMPHASIZED THE NECESSITY TO TAKE RESOLUTE MEASURES TO COMBAT IT. REAFFIRMING THEIR COMMITMENTS UNDER THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT, THEY EXPRESSED THEIR DETERMINATION TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM, BOTH AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL AND THROUGH INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. IN THE CONTEXT OF THE COMBAT AGAINST ACTS OF TERRORISM, THEY WILL TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN PREVENTING THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES FROM BEING USED FOR THE PREPARATION, ORGANIZATION OR COMMISSION OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING THOSE DIRECTED AGAINST OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES AND THEIR CITIZENS.

THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO ALL TEN PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT, WHICH ARE ALL OF PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE AND ACCORDINGLY WILL BE EQUALLY AND UNRESERVEDLY APPLIED, EACH OF THEM BEING INTERPRETED TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE OTHERS.

END TEXT.

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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03710

SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS -

- MAY 5-9, 1986

REF: STOCKHOLM 3626

1. CDE X - 048

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. BEGIN SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT: THERE IS GROWING DISENCHANTMENT WITH THE WAY THE WORKING GROUPS ARE WORKING -- OR, MORE PROPERLY, NOT WORKING. IN PARTICULAR, THE NNA COORDINATORS AND THE NNA THEMSELVES ARE COMING UNDER INCREASING CRITICISM FROM EAST AND WEST. ACCORDINGLY, MUCH OF THE ACTION HAS BEGUN TO SHIFT TO BEHIND-THE-SCENES CONTACTS, E.G., U.S.-SOVIET, EAST-WEST. FOR EXAMPLE, BECAUSE THE SWEDISH "NOTIFICATION" COORDINATOR FUMLED THE CONTENTIOUS SUBJECT OF TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED IN THE WORKING GROUP, EASTERN AND WESTERN DELEGATIONS MET WITHOUT A COORDINATOR TO ATTEMPT TO DRAFT. VERIFICATION DRAFTING HAS BEEN POSSIBLE THROUGH THE COORDINATOR BUT REAL PROGRESS REMAINS ELUSIVE. NO PROGRESS WAS REGISTERED ON OBSERVATION FOR THE FIRST TIME IN SEVERAL WEEKS AS THE GROUP BEGINS TO CONFRONT THE MORE CONTENTIOUS ISSUES. THE ANNUAL FORECASTS/CONSTRAINTS WORKING GROUP IS DEADLOCKED AS THE EAST REFUSED TO ADDRESS ANNUAL FORECASTS AND THE WEST REMAINS FIRM IN OPPOSING CONSTRAINING MEASURES. END SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT.

4. NOTIFICATION: PROGRESS ON DRAFTING IN THE WORKING GROUPS CONTINUES TO BE BLOCKED BY THE IMPASSE ON TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED AND HAS NOT BEEN HELPED BY THE CLUMSY COORDINATOR. WHENEVER THE WEST TRIES TO FOCUS DISCUSSION ON GROUND FORCE AND COMBINED ARMS ACTIVITIES, THE EAST INSISTS ON TURNING TO THE NOTIFICATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES; AND MALTA, AS REGULAR AS CLOCKWORK, CHIMES IN, INSISTING THAT NAVAL ACTIVITIES BE GIVEN EQUAL TIME. THE SWEDISH COORDINATOR HAS INSISTED ON TRYING TO DRAFT ON THIS IMPOSSIBLE TOPIC. MOREOVER, HE UNILATERALLY PROPOSED A COUNTERTEXT TO AN NNA/WESTERN PROPOSAL WHICH STYMIED A GROWING MOVE TOWARD ACCEPTANCE OF A COMPROMISE TEXT. THE COORDINATOR'S PRELIMINARY PAPER ON THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION INCLUDED PROVISIONS FOR DETAILED INFORMATION ON AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES WHICH WOULD PLACE THE ONUS ON THOSE WHO WISH TO DELETE RATHER THAN ADD ITEMS -- READ THE WEST. WE HAVE TOLD LIDGARD THAT HIS PAPER WON'T FLY. ALL OF THIS LED THE WESTERN NEGOTIATING TEAM TO REQUEST A MEETING WITH EASTERN REPS TO NEGOTIATE WITHOUT THE COORDINATOR. THE FIRST OF SUCH MEETINGS SEEMED TO INDICATE AN EVOLUTION OF THE SOVIET POSITION TOWARD ACCEPTANCE OF THE BASIC WESTERN APPROACH THAT ONLY FUNCTIONALLY RELATED AIR

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ACTIVITY IS TO BE NOTIFIED.

5. NON-USE OF FORCE: NATO HAS REACHED AGREEMENT ON A FULL NUF TEXT WITH THE EXCEPTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE. HOWEVER, AFTER PRESSURE FROM ALL OTHER NATO DELEGATIONS, INCLUDING DEMARCHES BY THE EC-12 AND THE FRG IN ROME, ITALY AT LEAST AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO A HUMAN RIGHTS REFERENCE IN THE WEST'S NUF TEXT. WE ARE STILL HAMMERING OUT LANGUAGE ON SUCH A PASSAGE WHICH GOES BEYOND NNA HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE (OUR MINIMUM DEMAND). BASED ON THIS TENTATIVE AGREEMENT ON A FULL TEXT (AND THE KNOWLEDGE THAT THE REST OF THE TEXT WILL NOT BE TABLED UNTIL THE HUMAN RIGHTS IMBROGLIO IS RESOLVED), THE WEST INTRODUCED ITS SECOND "COHERENT BLOCK" -- THE NUF REAFFIRMATION AND COLLATERAL CONSIDERATIONS SUCH AS THE INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE AND ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE LANGUAGE. INTRODUCTION OF THIS BLOCK WAS WELCOMED IN THE WORKING GROUP BY ALMOST ALL CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS. WHILE THE SOVIETS ARE SURE TO HAVE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE REFERENCES, THEY WERE STUDIOUSLY NONCONFRONTATIONAL IN THE WORKING GROUP. BASED ON THE "POSITIVE VIBRATIONS" IN THE WORKING GROUP, THE NNA COORDINATOR (LOIBL - AUSTRIA) IS NOW TAKING INFORMAL SOUNDINGS AS TO THE NEXT LIKELY CANDIDATE FOR DRAFTING. THE WEST WILL PROPOSE THE CSBM'S-NUF LINK AS THE LOGICAL CANDIDATE, SINCE BOTH NATO AND THE NNA SHARE THE SAME APPROACH ON THE ISSUE, I.E., CSBM'S BY THEIR VERY SCOPE AND NATURE GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE. THE EAST, ON THE OTHER HAND, MAINTAINS THAT AGREEING TO A NUF COMMITMENT IN STOCKHOLM JUSTIFIES INCLUDING CONCRETE CSBM'S AS PART OF A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT.

6. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION/COMMUNICATIONS: THE WEST SUCCEEDED IN ACHIEVING ITS TACTICAL OBJECTIVE OF DEMONSTRATING THAT MEASURE 1 WAS ALIVE AND KICKING BY DRAWING THE NNA AND A VERY RELUCTANT EAST BACK INTO THE DISCUSSION. THE NNA (SWITZERLAND, SWEDEN, MALTA), WHICH HAD BEEN SILENT ON INFORMATION IN THIS GROUP LAST WEEK, ENERGETICALLY ENGAGED ON THE ISSUE. SWITZERLAND, WHICH REITERATED ITS SUPPORT FOR ELEMENTS OF MEASURE 1, AND SWEDEN, WHICH INDICATED IT HAD "NO PROBLEMS WITH MEASURE 1," WERE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL. PROVOKED BY AMBASSADOR HANSEN, THE EAST FELT COMPELLED TO ENGAGE EVEN THOUGH THEY MADE NO POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION. ON VERIFICATION, THE THIRD IN A SERIES OF SENTENCES PROPOSED BY THE COORDINATOR (SCHENK-SWITZERLAND) WAS AGREED FOR NOTATION, I.E., "THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH HAS RECEIVED SUCH A REQUEST WILL . . . WITHIN THE AGREED PERIOD OF TIME. . . ." (REFTEL). AS DID THE FIRST TWO SENTENCES IN THE SERIES, THIS ONE PUTS ANOTHER BONE ON

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THE VERIFICATION SKELETON. IN OUR VIEW THE FIRST SET OF ELLIPSES SHOULD BE REPLACED WITH THE WORDS "ACCEDE TO THE REQUEST" TO REFLECT THAT THERE MUST BE UNEQUIVOCAL ACCEPTANCE OF A REQUEST. THE NNA JOINED IN SUPPORTING THIS FORMULATION BECAUSE IT BELIEVES ACCEPTANCE SHOULD BE THE NORM. THE EAST, HOWEVER, WOULD USE THE VAGUE TERM "RESPOND," LEAVING OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF A RESPONSE THAT IS LESS THAN AN ACCEPTANCE. THE SECOND SET OF ELLIPSES SIMPLY MEANS THAT MORE TEXT IS TO COME. THE EMERGING SKELETON SHOULD AID IN SPEEDING WORK WHEN, AND IF, THE EAST SHOWS FLEXIBILITY ON INSPECTION.

7. OBSERVATION: FOR THE FIRST TIME IN SEVERAL WEEKS NO DRAFTING PROGRESS WAS MADE. THE EAST TABLED THREE PROPOSALS DESIGNED MORE TO SLOW PROGRESS THAN TO IDENTIFY COMMON GROUND. THE EAST LAID DOWN A FURTHER MARKER THAT INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES MUST BE INCLUDED IN CSEM'S, BY INTRODUCING A TEXT ON THE MODALITIES OF OBSERVATION OF BOTH INDEPENDENT AND COMBINED AIR ACTIVITIES. WHILE THE SPECIFIC MODALITIES OFFERED FOR OBSERVATION OF AIR IN

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JOINT ACTIVITIES MIGHT PROVIDE SOME ROOM FOR LATER DISCUSSION, NATO BASICALLY REJECTED THE PROPOSAL AS AN EFFORT TO PREEMPT A DECISION IN B-1 ON THE TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED. THE EAST ALSO PROPOSED THAT THE INVITING STATE DETERMINE THE DURATION AND MODALITIES OF OBSERVATION FOR EACH ACTIVITY, THUS PROVIDING ANOTHER INDICATION OF ITS INTENTION TO CONTROL TIGHTLY OBSERVERS ACTIVITIES AND, THEREBY, THEIR PERCEPTIONS. FOR THE THIRD WEEK IN A ROW THE EAST AGAIN BLOCKED PROGRESS IN AN INFORMAL COFFEE GROUP, THIS TIME ON THE PROVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES TO OBSERVERS.

8. ANNUAL FORECASTS: IT IS CLEAR TO ALL THAT THE EAST IS BLOCKING PROGRESS ON DRAFTING ON ANNUAL FORECASTS. THIS WEEK THE EAST REFUSED TO TRY TO REGISTER TEXT ON THE CONTENT OF SUCH A FORECAST, SPECIFICALLY ON THE DURATION OF A FORECAST ACTIVITY. WHILE SOME OF OUR ALLIES SEE IN THIS FOOTDRAGGING LINKAGE WITH THE WEST'S REJECTION OF EXISTING CONSTRAINTS PROPOSALS, IN OUR VIEW IT REFLECTS EASTERN CONCERN THAT NOTHING PREJUDICE THEIR POSITION ON THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION (B-1).

9. CONSTRAINTS: THERE WAS NO REAL PRESSURE ON THE WEST FOR MOVEMENT ON CONSTRAINTS THIS WEEK. THE NNA WERE CONSPICUOUS BY THEIR SILENCE -- EVEN THE YUGOSLAV GODFATHER OF CONSTRAINTS DID NOT JOIN THE DISCUSSION. SOVIET REPS GAVE TWO INTERESTING STATEMENTS: ONE DISPARAGING IRISH IDEAS FOR CONSTRAINING THE CALENDAR, AND THE OTHER BLAMING THE WEST FOR LACK OF PROGRESS ON CONSTRAINTS AND PROVIDING DETAILED STATISTICS ON NATO ACTIVITIES TO BOLSTER THEIR ARGUMENT ON THE NEED FOR A CEILING ON THE SCALE OF SUCH ACTIVITIES. IN FRIDAY'S PLENARY (MAY 9) THE SOVIETS ACCUSED THE U.S., UK, AND

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OTHERS OF BEING UNWILLING EVEN TO CONSIDER CONSTRAINTS.  
SOME DELEGATIONS INTERPRETED THIS STATEMENT AS PREPARING  
THE WAY FOR THE EAST EITHER TO DROP CONSTRAINTS OR, MORE  
PROBABLY, TO TRY TO TRADE THEM FOR SOMETHING ELSE.  
(BEGIN COMMENT: THE SOVIETS OFTEN SEEM TO USE THE  
PLENARY TO MAKE POINTS TO REPORT TO MOSCOW THAT THEY  
HAVE MADE THE GOOD EFFORT. END COMMENT.)  
BARRY  
END OF MESSAGE  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03816  
 SUBJECT: NATO AGREES ON HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE (ALMOST)  
 REF: STOCKHOLM 3259

. CDE X - 049

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. BEGIN SUMMARY: ON MAY 12, ROME RELUCTANTLY AGREED TO HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE TO BE INCLUDED IN A WESTERN NON-USE OF FORCE TEXT. THIS LANGUAGE GOES BEYOND THE NNA HUMAN RIGHTS PASSAGE. ACCORDINGLY, ALL NATO DELEGATIONS SEEMED TO HAVE REACHED CONSENSUS ON A FULL NUF TEXT. HOWEVER, AT THE LAST POSSIBLE MOMENT FRANCE SAID THAT IT "MIGHT" HAVE SOME MINOR MODIFICATIONS TO SUGGEST ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM. STAY TUNED. END SUMMARY.

4. AFTER PERSISTENT PRESSURE FROM ALL NATO DELEGATIONS, INCLUDING DEMARCHES IN ROME BY THE EC-12 AND THE FRG, ON MAY 6 ITALY AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO THE INCLUSION OF A HUMAN RIGHTS PASSAGE IN THE NATO NUF TEXT. THE ITALIANS STILL ARGUED, HOWEVER, FOR A MINIMALIST TEXT WHICH PUT HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE OBJECTIVES OF PRINCIPLE 7 (ON HUMAN RIGHTS) OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT; MOREOVER, THEY MAINTAIN THAT THIS TEXT COULD NOT DEPART SUBSTANTIALLY FROM THE NNA LANGUAGE OF SC.7. WHILE A NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS QUESTIONED THE WISDOM OF THE ITALIAN APPROACH, THEY TRIED NEVERTHELESS TO FIND A WAY TO ACCOMMODATE ROME. THE U.S. STATED THAT WE HAD NO OBJECTION TO DISCUSSING HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE FINAL ACT; HOWEVER, WE LAID DOWN A MARKER THAT ANY WESTERN TEXT, AT A MINIMUM, MUST GO BEYOND THE NNA TEXT.

5. ON MAY 7, ITALY SUGGESTED THE FOLLOWING TEXT:

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 "THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESSED THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL PROVISIONS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO ALL TEN PRINCIPLES OF THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES. THESE PRINCIPLES ARE ALL OF PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE AND ACCORDINGLY WILL BE EQUALLY AND UNRESERVEDLY APPLIED, EACH OF THEM BEING INTERPRETED TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE OTHERS.

"THEY RECALLED THAT THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE, SECURITY AND JUSTICE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF THE FINAL ACT, WOULD BE ENHANCED BY THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS AMONG THEMSELVES, AS AMONG ALL STATES, OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION AS WELL AS OF COOPERATION IN HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER FIELDS.

IN THIS CONTEXT THEY REAFFIRMED THE UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM THE RESPECT FOR WHICH IS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR FOR THE CSCE

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PROCESS AND FOR PEACE, JUSTICE AND SECURITY."  
END TEXT.

6. WHILE SOME DELEGATIONS SAID THEY COULD GO ALONG WITH THIS TEXT, THE U.S. AND OTHERS (E.G., UK, CANADA, TURKEY) STRENUOUSLY OBJECTED, NOTING THAT THE THIRD PARAGRAPH, THE CORE OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS SECTION, WAS A RETREAT FROM THE NNA POSITION. IT SOON BECAME CLEAR THAT FURTHER PROGRESS ON NON-USE OF FORCE, E.G., TABLING OF MORE NATO LANGUAGE AND DRAFTING IN THE NUF WORKING GROUP, WAS DEPENDENT ON ROME'S ACCEPTANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE. CONSEQUENTLY, ON MAY 12, PAOLO PUCCI DI BENISICHI, HEAD OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY CSCE DEPARTMENT, TRAVELED TO STOCKHOLM TO DELIVER ROME'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE WORKED OUT BY THE NATO NUF EXPERTS IN STOCKHOLM. HE TERMED ITALY'S ACQUIESCENCE AS A "MAJOR CONCESSION" IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN ALLIED SOLIDARITY IN STOCKHOLM.

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7. CONSENSUS TEXT FOLLOWS:

"THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESSED THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL PROVISIONS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO ALL TEN PRINCIPLES OF THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES, AND DECLARED THEIR DETERMINATION TO RESPECT THESE PRINCIPLES AND TO PUT THEM INTO PRACTICE, IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS. THESE PRINCIPLES ARE ALL OF PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE AND ACCORDINGLY WILL BE EQUALLY AND UNRESERVEDLY APPLIED, EACH OF THEM BEING INTERPRETED TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE OTHERS.

"THEY RECALLED THAT THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE, SECURITY AND JUSTICE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE FINAL ACT, WOULD BE ENHANCED BY THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AMONG THEMSELVES, AS AMONG ALL STATES, OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION AS WELL AS OF COOPERATION IN HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER FIELDS.

"IN THIS CONTEXT THEY REAFFIRMED THE UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, THE RESPECT FOR WHICH IS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR FOR PEACE AND JUSTICE. THEY THUS STRESSED THE NECESSITY TO PROMOTE AND ENCOURAGE THE EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF THESE RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS, AS AN INDISPENSABLE COMPONENT OF THE CSCE PROCESS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY."  
END TEXT.

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8. THIS LANGUAGE CONTAINS ALL THE CONCEPTS CONTAINED IN THE ORIGINALLY ADOPTED FORMULA (REFTEL): 1) THE UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS; 2) THE LINK BETWEEN RESPECT FOR THESE RIGHTS AND THE CSCE PROCESS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY; 3) THE NECESSITY TO PROMOTE AND ENCOURAGE THE EFFECTIVE

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EXERCISE OF THESE RIGHTS; AND 4) THE COMMITMENT TO RESPECT THESE PRINCIPLES, IRRESPECTIVE OF A STATE'S POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SYSTEM (SEE FIRST PARAGRAPH ABOVE. FURTHERMORE, THE TEXT ADDS THE COMMITMENT TO IMPLEMENT ALL PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT, INCLUDING COOPERATION IN "HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER FIELDS." THIS PASSAGE IS marginally STRONGER THAN THE TEXT APPROVED BY WASHINGTON. IT INCLUDES ALL ELEMENTS CONTAINED IN THE NNA TEXT (SC.7) PLUS POINTS 3 AND 4 ABOVE.

9. THEREFORE, DELEGATION JOINED CONSENSUS ON THE TEXT CONTAINED IN PARA 7 ABOVE ON MAY 12. AT THAT POINT, IT SEEMED THAT THE LAST PIECE OF THE WESTERN NUF PUZZLE HAD FALLEN INTO PLACE. SADLY, THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. FRANCE INTERJECTED THAT IT "MIGHT" HAVE SOME "MINOR" MODIFICATIONS TO OFFER ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM BEFORE MAY 15. (BEGIN COMMENT. FRENCH DELEGATION HAS TOLD US PRIVATELY THAT THEY ARE TRYING TO DISSUADE PARIS -- READ D'ABOVILLE - FROM INSISTING ON FURTHER CHANGES IN THE TEXT. STAY TUNED. END COMMENT.)

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03838  
 SUBJECT: POSTPONEMENT OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES  
 REF: A) STATE 146054, B) STOCKHOLM 3458

1. CDE X - 051
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. BEGIN SUMMARY: PROCEEDING ON THE BASIS OF INSTRUCTIONS, U.S. CDE AMBASSADOR BARRY CONVEYED U.S. FORMULA FOR A POSSIBLE CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT TO RESOLVE THE IMPASSE RESULTING FROM THE SOVIET DELEGATION'S INSISTENCE THAT THE CONFERENCE FORMALLY ACKNOWLEDGE GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 PROPOSAL TO POSTPONE NAVAL ACTIVITIES. SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY REACTED BY PROPOSING A NEW SOVIET FORMULA WHICH WAS A STEP BACKWARD FROM EARLIER SOVIET LANGUAGE. BARRY SAID HE WOULD REPORT THE NEW SOVIET LANGUAGE (SEE PARA 6), BUT DOUBTED IT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO WASHINGTON OR TO OUR ALLIES. HE ALSO SUGGESTED TWO OTHER WAYS OF SOLVING THE PROBLEM: THE "FRENCH SOLUTION" LISTING UNRESOLVED ISSUES, AND THE "SWISS SOLUTION" -- A PRENEGOTIATED UNILATERAL STATEMENT. SEE REQUEST FOR ACTION IN PARA 8. END SUMMARY.

4. ON THE BASIS OF INSTRUCTIONS (REF A), U.S. CDE AMBASSADOR BARRY ON MAY 13 SUGGESTED THE FOLLOWING FORMULATION TO SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY TO RESOLVE THE IMPASSE RESULTING FROM THE SOVIET DELEGATION'S INSISTENCE THAT THE CONFERENCE FORMALLY ACKNOWLEDGE GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 PROPOSAL TO POSTPONE NAVAL ACTIVITIES:

BEGIN TEXT:

PROPOSALS NOT RESOLVED IN NEGOTIATIONS PRIOR TO THE VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING, AS WELL AS ANY NEW ISSUES, MAY BE INTRODUCED IN ANY POSSIBLE POST-VIENNA CONTINUATION OR NEXT STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE, PROVIDED THEY ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE AGREED MANDATE.

END TEXT.

5. BARRY CHARACTERIZED THIS LANGUAGE AS A FORMULA FOR ACKNOWLEDGING GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 PROPOSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ANYONE'S POSITION ON THE MANDATE. HE INDICATED THAT WHILE THE U.S. COULD ACCEPT THIS FORMULATION, IT HAD NOT BEEN CLEARED WITH OUR ALLIES.

HE ALSO SAID THAT THE U.S. COULD BUY THE FRENCH FORMULA (WHICH STATES THAT THE "FOLLOWING PROPOSALS" WERE NOT RESOLVED AT THE CONFERENCE AND THEN LISTS THEM BUT SAYS NOTHING ABOUT HOW THEY MIGHT BE HANDLED IN THE FUTURE). FINALLY, HE SAID THAT THERE WAS A THIRD ALTERNATIVE, A PRENEGOTIATED UNILATERAL SOVIET STATEMENT RESERVING THE RIGHT TO BRING UP THE QUESTION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES AT ANY TIME. THIS WOULD BE SOMETHING LIKE THE SWISS "RESERVATION" ON THE WORKING STRUCTURE.

6. GRINEVSKY RECOGNIZED THE U.S.' DESIRE TO TAKE THE

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SOVIET POSITION INTO CONSIDERATION AND SAID THAT HE WOULD EXAMINE THE U.S. FORMULA. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE U.S. FORMULATION SIMPLY STATED REALITY: EACH PARTICIPATING STATE HAS THE RIGHT DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS TO RAISE ANY QUESTION WHICH CORRESPONDS TO THE MANDATE. HE PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT INSTEAD:

BEGIN TEXT:

THE CHAIRMAN NOTED THE COMMON UNDERSTANDING THAT ANY DELEGATION MAY RAISE IN THE FUTURE ANY QUESTION CONSISTENT WITH THE MANDATE, INCLUDING QUESTIONS OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES OF PARTICIPATING STATES TAKING PLACE IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AS WELL AS IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE WHENEVER THESE ACTIVITIES AFFECT SECURITY IN EUROPE AS WELL AS CONSTITUTE A PART OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE WITHIN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE.

END TEXT.

7. BARRY SAID THAT HE WOULD SEND THIS FORMULA BACK TO WASHINGTON BUT DOUBTED THAT IT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. HE NOTED 1) IT SINGLES OUT NAVAL ACTIVITIES AND, BY PUTTING THEM IN A CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT, WOULD GIVE A NEW FORMAL CHARACTER TO THEIR POSTPONEMENT; 2) IT INFRINGES ON OUR INTERPRETATION OF THE MANDATE BY JUXTAPOSING THE WORDS "NAVAL ACTIVITIES" AND THE SELECTIVE EXCERPT FROM THE MANDATE. BARRY EVEN CHARACTERIZED THE NEW SOVIET

FORMULA AS A STEP BACK FROM THE PREVIOUS GRINEVSKY PROPOSAL (REF B) AND FROM THE WAY IN WHICH THE ZONE WAS DEFINED IN WORKING GROUP B-1. GRINEVSKY AGREED TO THINK MORE ABOUT THIS SUBJECT.

8. BEGIN COMMENT: WE VIEW THE NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL MORE AS AN EFFORT TO PROBE OUR RESOLVE THAN AS A SERIOUS BARGAINING EFFORT AND WILL CONTINUE TO PUSH OUR APPROACH. REQUEST WASHINGTON CONFIRMATION THAT THE NEW GRINEVSKY FORMULA IS NOT ACCEPTABLE AND THAT WASHINGTON COULD ACCEPT THE "FRENCH SOLUTION" OR A UNILATERAL STATEMENT WHICH DID NOT DAMAGE OUR VIEW OF THE MANDATE.

BARRY  
END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03810

SUBJECT: CDE: LANGUAGE PROVISIONALLY NOTED IN  
WORKING GROUP ON NOTIFICATION

1. CDE X - 50.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE, TO SERVE AS CHAPEAU LANGUAGE FOR THE SECTION IN WHICH MILITARY ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED WILL BE DEFINED, WAS PROVISIONALLY NOTED DURING THE MAY 13 MEETING OF WORKING GROUP B ON NOTIFICATION:  
BEGIN TEXT.

"MILITARY ACTIVITIES . . . CONDUCTED IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS AT OR ABOVE THE LEVELS DEFINED BELOW, WILL BE NOTIFIED." END TEXT.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE  
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SECRET STOCKHOLM 03910

SUBJECT: CDE: SOVIET GLACIER BEGINS TO MOVE

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN INTENSIVE BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH THE US, FRANCE AND THE FRG OVER THE PAST TEN DAYS THE SOVIETS HAVE BEGUN TO EXPLORE SOLUTIONS TO THE GROUND FORCE/AIR FORCE "NOTIFICATION" ISSUE. THE ISSUE OF AIR ACTIVITIES CAN BE RESOLVED ON THE BASIS OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, ALTHOUGH IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO EXEMPT AIR ACTIVITIES BELOW A CERTAIN LEVEL FROM INCLUSION IN THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION GIVEN FOR GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES. ON THE GROUND FORCE THRESHOLD, MOSCOW APPEARS RECEPTIVE TO THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH BUT THEY STRONGLY INSIST ON A NUMERICAL PARAMETER AND RESIST INCLUSION OF EQUIPMENT IN A NOTIFICATION. THEY CONTINUE TO REJECT THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT. THEY SAY THEIR BOTTOM LINE ON THE NUMERICAL GROUND FORCE PARAMETER IS 15,000, WHICH COULD REDUCE THE LIKELIHOOD OF OBSERVATIONS OF EXERCISES IN THE INTERIOR OF THE USSR. THE SOVIETS MAY RECOGNIZE THAT TIME IS RUNNING OUT AND ARE BEGINNING TO CALCULATE THE PRICE OF AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD ASSURE THE CONTINUITY OF THE CDE AFTER VIENNA. END SUMMARY.

2. RIGHT AFTER HIS RETURN FROM "PRIVATE BUSINESS" IN MOSCOW AT THE BEGINNING OF MAY, SOVIET CDE NEGOTIATOR GRINEVSKY AND HIS GENERAL STAFF REPRESENTATIVE GENERAL TATARNIKOV BEGAN SEEKING OUT US, THE GERMANS AND THE FRENCH FOR INTENSIVE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS FOCUSING ON THE PLACE OF AIR ACTIVITIES IN A CSBM REGIME. GRINEVSKY HAS ALSO DISCUSSED THE QUESTION OF FINDING A FORMULA FOR "DEFERRING" NAVAL ACTIVITIES TO A CONTINUATION OF THE CDE, BUT HE SEEMS TO BE UNDER NO PRESSURE FROM MOSCOW TO FIND A SOLUTION. THE SOVIET POSITION ON AIR AND GROUND FORCE ISSUES HAS EMERGED SLOWLY, BUT NOW WE THINK WE HAVE A PRETTY GOOD PICTURE OF IT.

AIR ACTIVITIES

3. THE SOVIETS APPEAR WILLING TO ACCEPT THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH EVENTUALLY WITHOUT IDENTIFYING IT AS SUCH; IN FACT, THEY WANT TO MINIMIZE THE ACTUAL AMOUNT OF INFORMATION GIVEN ON AIR ACTIVITIES.

-- THEY WANT AN AIR THRESHOLD OF 700 SORTIES OVER THE DURATION OF AN EXERCISE, BUT THEY ARE AMBIGUOUS AS TO WHAT SUCH A THRESHOLD WOULD MEAN. AT A MINIMUM, THEY WANT TO EXEMPT ALL FUNCTIONALLY RELATED AIR BELOW A CERTAIN LEVEL FROM INCLUSION IN A NOTIFICATION. THEIR IDEAL WOULD BE A VERY HIGH AIR THRESHOLD AS A COMPLETELY INDEPENDENT PARAMETER, BUT THEY PROBABLY WOULD ACCEPT A SEPARATE THRESHOLD FOR

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INCLUSION OF AIR IN A GROUND FORCE NOTIFICATION.

-- THEIR APPARENT WILLINGNESS TO ADOPT THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO AIR ACTIVITIES IS CONDITIONED BY THE FACT THAT THEY DON'T WANT THEIR EXERCISES INVOLVING STRATEGIC AVIATION INCLUDED IN NOTIFICATION. THEY CLAIM THEY CHOSE THE HIGH FIGURE OF 700 BECAUSE IT WOULD NOT CATCH EXERCISES OF THIS SORT OR "ROUTINE" AIR TRAINING EXERCISES. ON BEING TOLD THAT THIS WAS NOT CORRECT, THEY HAVE ALSO CONSIDERED THE POSSIBILITY OF EXEMPTIONS FOR AIR DEFENSE AND STRATEGIC EXERCISES. BUT THEY CONTINUE TO INSIST ON AN AIR PARAMETER.

4. WE HAVE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS, WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE SAID THEY WILL STUDY:

-- WE WON'T CONSIDER AN INDEPENDENT AIR PARAMETER AS A TRIGGER FOR NOTIFICATION.

-- WE DON'T CONSIDER A THRESHOLD BELOW WHICH FUNCTIONALLY RELATED AIR WOULD BE EXEMPTED FROM INCLUSION IN A NOTIFICATION NECESSARY; NEARLY ALL MAJOR GROUND FORCE EXERCISES ABOVE THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL WILL HAVE SIGNIFICANT AIR COMPONENTS.

-- THEIR FIGURE OF 700 IS TOO HIGH IN ANY CASE BECAUSE IT WOULD EXEMPT MOST AIR ACTIVITIES FROM INCLUSION IN NOTIFICATION; WE DON'T WANT SYMBOLIC ARMS CONTROL.

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5. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT THE SOVIETS WILL SETTLE FOR FUNCTIONALLY RELATED AIR (WITHOUT CALLING IT THAT) WHERE INFORMATION ON AIR WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE PROVIDED BELOW A CERTAIN THRESHOLD; WE UNDERSTAND WASHINGTON IS ANALYZING THE EFFECTS OF SUCH A CONCEPT. GROUND FORCES

6. AS DISCUSSIONS HAVE PROCEEDED ON THE AIR ISSUE, THE SOVIETS HAVE BECOME MORE WILLING TO DISCUSS THE GROUND FORCE THRESHOLD.

-- THEY PREFER A SIMPLE NUMERICAL THRESHOLD AS A TRIGGER FOR NOTIFICATION, INCLUDING THE "STRUCTURAL" ELEMENT AS PART OF THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE CONTEXT OF NOTIFICATION; HOWEVER KNOWING A SIMPLE NUMERICAL THRESHOLD IS UNACCEPTABLE TO US, THEY ARE PROBABLY PREPARED TO INCLUDE A STRUCTURAL ELEMENT IN THE TRIGGER FORMULATION.

-- THEIR "BOTTOM LINE" NUMERICAL THRESHOLD IS 15,000, THEY SAY. WE THINK THEIR INSTRUCTIONS WOULD LET THEM GO LOWER.

-- THEY ARE TRYING DESPERATELY TO AVOID OBSERVATION OF SOVIET "NATIONAL" (NON-PACT) EXERCISES IN THE SOVIET HEARTLAND, I.E., ONE OF NATO'S OWN BOTTOM LINE OBJECTIVES; THEY MAY EVENTUALLY TRY TO PUSH A SPLIT-LEVEL NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION THRESHOLD.

-- THEY ARE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO A SEPARATE EQUIPMENT

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THRESHOLD, CLAIMING THAT ITS EFFECT WOULD BE INEQUITABLE.

-- THEY ARE VERY SUSPICIOUS OF THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT AND ITS FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT, THE NNA FORMULA ON BEING AWAY FROM NORMAL LOCATIONS. THEY ARE WILLING TO ADD OTHER ACTIVITIES TO THEIR LIST OF "MANEUVERS AND MOVEMENTS" BUT WILL "NEVER" ACCEPT THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT BECAUSE THEY WILL NOT PROVIDE INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION OF GARRISONS OR DESIGNATION OF UNITS IN THEM.

7. WE REMAIN HOPEFUL THAT OUR "DIVISION EQUIVALENT" FORMULATION MIGHT HELP SOLVE SOME OF THE ABOVE PROBLEMS. THE SUSPICIOUS SOVIETS ARE UNLIKELY TO SEE ITS MERITS IN THE NEAR FUTURE, HOWEVER, EVEN IF A NEUTRAL "PARENT" CAN BE FOUND TO SPONSOR IT.

DRAFTING

8. WITH EFFORTS UNDERWAY BEHIND THE SCENES, THE SOVIETS SEEM READY TO EASE THEIR BRAKES ON THE DRAFTING PROCESS ON CSBMS. SINCE THEY SHARE OUR DESPAIR OVER THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF MOST COORDINATORS, THEY HAVE AGREED TO HELP PREPARE THE WAY FOR DRAFTING BY PRIVATE CONTACTS WITHOUT NEUTRAL "HELP". EVEN IF THIS TACTIC WORKS, THERE ISN'T ENOUGH TIME TO PRODUCE MUCH BEFORE THE ROUND ENDS MAY 23.

9. WE CONTINUE TO PRESS THE SOVIETS TO DISCUSS VERIFICATION MODALITIES; THEY CONTINUE TO FOCUS ON NTMS, "CONSULTATIONS" AND "OBSERVATION ON REQUEST". WE OFFER NO GIVE: WE ARE SERIOUS IN THREATENING TO WALK AWAY FROM AN AGREEMENT WITHOUT A SOLID INSPECTION PROVISION. FURTHER, WE NOTE THAT, TO BE MEANINGFUL, THE INSPECTION PROVISION MUST BE TIED TO THE PROPER NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD.

COMMENT

10. WHAT IS SIGNIFICANT IN ALL THIS IS THAT THE SOVIETS APPEAR TO HAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO FIND OUT WHAT THE PRICE OF AN AGREEMENT HERE IS, AND THEY SEEM READY TO PAY SOMETHING FOR CDE CONTINUITY. THIS MAY RELATE TO THEIR NEW INTEREST IN CDE PHASE II DISARMAMENT. IF SO, THERE IS NO REASON NOT TO POCKET WHAT WE CAN WHILE MAKING NO COMMITMENT ABOUT THE FUTURE.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03961  
SUBJECT: EASTERN LANGUAGE IN WORKING GROUP A-3  
- (ANNUAL FORECASTS/CONSTRAINTS)

1. CDE X - 059
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. BULGARIA TABLED THE FOLLOWING LONG-AWAITED EASTERN LANGUAGE ON THE CONTENT OF ANNUAL PLANS IN THE MEETING OF WORKING GROUP A-3 ON MAY 15.

BEGIN TEXT:

IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR, EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL LIST ITS NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES CHRONOLOGICALLY AND WILL PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON EACH ACTIVITY:

- TYPE OF MILITARY ACTIVITY, INCLUDING ITS DESIGNATION, IF ANY;
- GENERAL PURPOSE OF THE ACTIVITY;
- THE PERIOD OF TIME WITHIN WHICH THE MILITARY ACTIVITY IS ENVISAGED TO TAKE PLACE;
- APPROXIMATE DURATION OF THE PLANNED ACTIVITY;
- NAMES OF THE STATES INVOLVED IN THE ACTIVITY;
- THE TENTATIVE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF TROOPS OR THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MILITARY AIRCRAFT AS WELL AS INFORMATION ON POSSIBLE COMPONENTS OF OTHER TYPES OF ARMED FORCES;
- AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY;
- INITIAL AND TERMINAL POINTS OF MOVEMENTS (TRANSFERS) WHEN THEY ARE EFFECTED IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S, AS WELL AS THE TERMINAL POINT WHEN THE MOVEMENT (TRANSFER) IS EFFECTED INTO THE ZONE AND THE INITIAL POINT WHEN THE MOVEMENT (TRANSFER) IS EFFECTED OUT OF IT.

END TEXT.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 04017

SUBJ: CDE: EASTERN TRIAL BALLOON ON DROPPING STATIC INFORMATION AND CONSTRAINTS

1. CDE X - 61
2. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT
3. SUMMARY. THE EAST GERMANS, BULGARIANS AND HUNGARIANS ARE QUIETLY SUGGESTING A "DEAL" WHEREBY THE EAST WOULD DROP ITS SUPPORT FOR CONSTRAINTS IF THE WEST WOULD DROP STATIC INFORMATION (MEASURE I). MOST NATO DELEGATIONS LIKE THE IDEA, BUT THE BRITISH ARE ADAMANTLY OPPOSED AND WANT US TO HOLD ON TO MEASURE I UNTIL THE LAST MINUTE; ALTHOUGH THIS "DEAL" DOES NOT HAVE MUCH FOR US, HOLDING OUT FOR A LAST MINUTE TRADE MAY MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO GET THE INFORMATION WE NEED IN THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION OR FORECASTING. END SUMMARY.
4. MANY WESTERN OBSERVERS ASSUMED THAT THE MAY 9 SOVIET PLENARY STATEMENT ON CONSTRAINTS SPELLED THE END OF SOVIET SUPPORT FOR SUCH MEASURES. SINCE THEN, A NUMBER OF WARSAW PACT DELEGATIONS (NOT THE SOVIETS) HAVE SUGGESTED A "DEAL" WHEREBY THE WEST WOULD ABANDON STATIC INFORMATION (SC-1 MEASURE I) AND THE EAST WOULD DROP ITS SUPPORT FOR CONSTRAINTS. THE EASTERNERS HAVE CLAIMED UNCERTAINTY AS TO WHETHER THEY COULD PRODUCE THE SOVIET UNION FOR SUCH A "DEAL," BUT WHAT WE ARE HEARING IS CLEARLY AN AUTHORIZED TRIAL BALLOON.
5. IN THE NATO CAUCUS, THE FRENCH, BELIEVING MEASURE I IS LOSING VALIDITY AS A BARGAINING CHIP, HAVE ALREADY PROPOSED TRADING IT OFF, A PROPOSAL WHICH NO ONE SUPPORTED AT THE TIME. THE IDEA HAS GAINED GROUND RECENTLY, HOWEVER; THE FRG, FRANCE, ITALY AND OTHERS HAVE ALREADY BEEN APPROACHED BY THE EAST AND PROBABLY SOUNDED INTERESTED. THE UK DELEGATION IS ADAMANTLY OPPOSED; ALTHOUGH THEY PRIVATELY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT MEASURE I IS UNATTAINABLE, THEY SAY THAT "LONDON" WOULD NEVER DO A DEAL UNTIL THE LAST ROUND. IN FACT, WE THINK THIS STEMS MORE FROM UK HEAD OF DELEGATION EDES' SENSE OF TACTICS THAN FROM LONDON'S INSTRUCTIONS.
6. WE ARE NO MORE WORRIED THAT CONSTRAINTS WILL BE DRAFTED OVER OUR OPPOSITION THAN THE EAST IS WORRIED THAT STATIC INFORMATION WILL SNEAK INTO A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT WITHOUT THEIR AGREEMENT. NEVERTHELESS, THERE ARE A FEW VALID REASONS FOR DISPOSING OF BOTH ISSUES EARLY NEXT ROUND RATHER THAN LATER:
  - "PROTECTING" MEASURE I MEANS THAT WE CANNOT TRY TO INCORPORATE CERTAIN KINDS OF INFORMATION IN TEXTS ON NOTIFICATION AND CALENDARS; WE CANNOT EVEN PROBE WHAT THE EAST MIGHT BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE ON SUBORDINATION AND LOCATION OF UNITS. IF WE LET THIS GO UNTIL THE LAST MINUTE, THE ENTIRE ISSUE OF STATIC INFORMATION WILL GO UNRESOLVED FOR LACK OF TIME.

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-- KEEPING CONSTRAINTS IN PLAY UNTIL THE END USES UP SCARCE CONFERENCE TIME WHICH COULD BE DEVOTED TO OTHER ISSUES SUCH AS INSPECTION OR NOTIFICATION.

-- WHILE WE SEE NO POSSIBILITY THAT CONSTRAINTS WILL CREEP INTO LANGUAGE BEING DRAFTED IN THE WORK GROUPS, THE DANGER WILL ALWAYS EXIST THAT, UNLESS CONSTRAINTS ARE PUT OUT OF THE WAY BEFORE THEN, THE NNA WILL ATTEMPT TO SNEAK THEM INTO ANY LAST MINUTE DEAL THEY MAY TRY TO MAKE.

-- THE UK DELEGATION'S LAST-MINUTE STRATEGY, ON THIS ISSUE AS ON OTHERS, IGNORES THE FACT THAT AT THE TIME OF THE LAST ROUND THEY WILL BE IN THE EC PRESIDENCY, WHICH WILL EFFECTIVELY EMASCULATE THEM AS NEGOTIATORS; BY AUGUST 19 WE WILL BE LEFT ALONE HOLDING THE BAG, AND THE BRITS IN THEIR COMMUNITY HAT WILL LIKELY BE URGING US TO LET GO OF IT.

6. IN SPITE OF THE ADVANTAGES NOTED ABOVE, AN INFORMATION-CONSTRAINTS "DEAL" IS NOT WITHOUT COSTS:

-- WE ARE NOT IN THE POSITION OF NEEDING TO TRADE ANYTHING TO THE EAST IN EXCHANGE FOR CONSTRAINTS; THEY SEEM TO HAVE ABANDONED THAT SHIP ALREADY AS AN ACHIEVABLE OBJECTIVE AND ARE STAYING WITH IT ONLY TO HAVE ANOTHER STICK TO USE AGAINST NATO;

-- THE REAL SUPPORTERS OF CONSTRAINTS ARE THE NNA, WHO WILL TRY TO GET US TO PAY SOMETHING FOR GIVING THEM UP REGARDLESS OF PREVIOUS EAST-WEST DEALS. MEASURE I COULD, THEREFORE, BE USEFUL WITH THE NNA, IF NOT THE EAST, LATER ON IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

-- FINALLY, IF OUR GOAL IS TO GET AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE OUT OF MEASURE I INTO MEASURES II AND III, OUR TACTIC MAY BE LESS TRANSPARENT, AND PERHAPS THEREFORE MORE SUCCESSFUL, IF MEASURE I REMAINS ON THE TABLE EVEN AS WE TRY TO INSERT VARIOUS PROVISIONS FROM IT INTO THE OTHER TWO MEASURES. THE UK DELEGATION WOULD PROBABLY OPPOSE THIS TACK, TOO, BUT PERHAPS NOT AS VIGOROUSLY.

7. WASHINGTON AGENCIES WILL WANT TO CONSIDER THE INFORMATION-CONSTRAINTS ISSUE, AS WELL AS THE UK TACTIC, DURING THE BREAK BETWEEN ROUNDS.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 03928

SUBJECT: TEXT OF AMB. BARRY SPEECH IN CDE, 5/16/86

1. CDE IX - 055

2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE SPEECH WHICH AMBASSADOR ROBERT L. BARRY, HEAD OF THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE, GAVE IN PLENARY ON FRIDAY, MAY 16.

BEGIN TEXT: AT THE END OF THE LAST ROUND AND THE BEGINNING OF THIS ONE, THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT ON AT LEAST ONE THEME: SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN DRAFTING WAS ESSENTIAL IN THIS CRITICAL ROUND. WE HAVE NOT MADE SUCH PROGRESS; INDEED, VERY LITTLE OF SIGNIFICANCE HAS BEEN DRAFTED. THE POSSIBILITY OF FAILURE LOOMS LARGER OVER THE CONFERENCE DESPITE INTENSIVE EFFORTS TO SOLVE PROBLEMS, BEHIND THE SCENES AS WELL AS IN WORKING GROUPS THEMSELVES. IT IS OPEN TO QUESTION WHETHER THERE REMAINS ENOUGH TIME TO DRAFT AN AGREEMENT EVEN IF ALL THE MAJOR ISSUES ARE SUCCESSFULLY RESOLVED SOON. AS WE KNOW ALL TOO WELL, DRAFTING IS A SLOW PROCESS. -- THE REASON WE HAVE DRAFTED SO LITTLE DURING THIS ROUND IS THAT SEQUENTIALISM HAS BEEN IMPOSED ON THE CONFERENCE BY THE EAST. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD, IN EFFECT, THAT UNLESS WE ACCEPT THEIR VERSION OF THE TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED, NOTHING ELSE OF SUBSTANCE CAN BE DRAFTED ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES. THIS HAS BEEN EVIDENT IN EACH OF THE RELEVANT WORKING GROUPS IN THE PAST FEW WEEKS. THIS IS WHY WE WILL RECESS IN A WEEK WITH SO LITTLE ACCOMPLISHED.

-- BEHIND THE ISSUE OF TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED LURKS THE ISSUE OF WHAT WOULD CONSTITUTE A MINIMALIST OUTCOME FOR THIS CONFERENCE -- A SO-CALLED "MINI-PACKAGE" -- AND THE ISSUE OF WHO WANTS ONE. EAST AND WEST SAY THEY DO NOT; LET US EXAMINE THE PROPOSALS EACH HAS MADE TO SEE WHOSE ARGUMENTS THE FACTS SUPPORT.

-- WE OBVIOUSLY SHOULD TAKE AS A BASELINE FOR OUR MEASUREMENT THE MADRID MANDATE, WHICH TELLS US TO NEGOTIATE A SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH ARE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT, POLITICALLY BINDING AND PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION. IN OTHER WORDS, WE ARE EXPECTED TO HAVE SOME REAL BEEF BETWEEN OUR HAMBURGER ROLLS.

-- WHERE'S THE BEEF IN THE PROPOSALS BEFORE THIS CONFERENCE? LET'S HAVE A LOOK.

-- IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT THE MORE YOU KNOW ABOUT THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF OTHERS ON A ROUTINE BASIS, THE GREATER IS THE POSSIBILITY FOR ENHANCING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY. INFORMATION ABOUT FORCE STRUCTURES PROVIDES A GOOD YARDSTICK AGAINST WHICH TO MEASURE ANY

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DEVIATIONS FROM THE NORM. THE SAME APPLIES TO MILITARY ACTIVITIES OR POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE. IF YOU KNOW WHAT THE GENERAL PICTURE IS, WHAT THE STATUS QUO IS AT ANY GIVEN TIME, YOU WILL BE BETTER ABLE TO PUT ANY SUCH ACTIVITIES IN PROPER PERSPECTIVE. WESTERN PROPOSALS PROVIDE FOR AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ABOUT MILITARY UNITS -- INFORMATION THAT IS CRUCIAL IF FORECASTING, NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION, AND VERIFICATION ARE TO BE MEANINGFUL. SUCH INFORMATION WOULD NOT ONLY ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE OTHER MEASURES WE WILL AGREE UPON, BUT WOULD ALSO ENHANCE CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BY PROVIDING A MORE COMPREHENSIVE PICTURE OF MILITARY STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITY IN EUROPE. BUT WHERE'S THE BEEF IN THE EASTERN PROPOSALS? WHILE WILLING TO PROVIDE CERTAIN INFORMATION IN THE CONTENTS OF NOTIFICATION, THE WARSAW PACT REMAINS UNWILLING TO PROVIDE INFORMATION OF A MORE GENERAL NATURE THAT WOULD MAKE THE "DYNAMIC" INFORMATION TRULY MEANINGFUL. SOME HAVE EVEN GONE SO FAR AS TO ARGUE, ON OCCASION, THAT THE KIND OF INFORMATION WE ARE SEEKING WOULD AMOUNT TO "LEGALIZED ESPIONAGE." THIS APPROACH, MR. CHAIRMAN, DESTROYS CONFIDENCE AND ENSURES THAT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE OTHER IMPORTANT MEASURES UNDER NEGOTIATION HERE WILL BE MINIMAL.

-- CONCERNING THE NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES, MR. CHAIRMAN, OUR APPROACH IS DESIGNED TO CAPTURE A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF MILITARY ACTIVITY IN EUROPE -- FOCUSING, AS MANDATED, ON THOSE ACTIVITIES THAT POSE THE GREATEST THREAT TO SECURITY IN EUROPE -- GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES AND COMBINED ARMS ACTIVITIES, THAT IS GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES IN COMBINATION WITH AIR OR NAVAL COMPONENTS. WE HAVE ALSO PROPOSED THAT AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES AND MOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES BE NOTIFIED. AND THE THRESHOLDS WE HAVE PROPOSED WOULD, IN FACT, CAPTURE RELEVANT MILITARY ACTIVITY AND REPRESENT A QUANTUM LEAP OVER THE THRESHOLDS PROVIDED FOR IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. BUT, MR. CHAIRMAN, THE THRESHOLDS PROPOSED BY THE WARSAW PACT FOR LAND ACTIVITIES WOULD NOT RESULT IN ANY MORE NOTIFICATIONS AT ALL. WHAT KIND OF AN IMPROVEMENT WOULD THIS REPRESENT? HOW MUCH MORE WILL WE LEARN ABOUT MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE? AND HOW MUCH WOULD THIS CONTRIBUTE TO ENHANCING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY? ZERO. NO BEEF AT ALL.

-- WE HAVE HEARD A LOT ABOUT THE WESTERN POSITION ON MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS OF LATE. UNDER OUR APPROACH, WE WOULD NOTIFY THE PARTICIPATION OF US-BASED UNITS IN A NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY 45 DAYS IN ADVANCE OF THEIR DEPARTURE FROM THEIR ARRIVAL POINT IF THEY MEET THE CRITERION OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE; THAT MEANS,

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WHEN THEY REACH NOTIFIABLE LEVEL AND WHEN THEY PICK UP THEIR EQUIPMENT. REMEMBER, NO MILITARY FORCE CAN HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON THE SECURITY OF EUROPE UNLESS IT HAS ITS EQUIPMENT.

-- LET'S DISCUSS AIR ACTIVITIES. WHERE AIR FORCES OPERATE IN COMBINATION WITH GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY, OUR APPROACH WOULD PROVIDE FOR INFORMATION ON SUCH AIR SUPPORT. WE HAVE INDICATED OUR READINESS TO PROVIDE VERY DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE RANGE OF SORTIES TO BE FLOWN, THE CATEGORIES OF AIRCRAFT, NATURE OF MISSION AND GEOGRAPHICAL AREA OF OPERATION.

-- WE CONTINUE TO REJECT COVERAGE OF AIR ACTIVITY WHICH IS NOT IN CONJUNCTION WITH GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY, AS THE TYPES OF ACTIVITY AND THE ALTITUDES AT WHICH SUCH ACTIVITY IS CONDUCTED MAKE VERIFICATION UNMANAGEABLE. BUT SINCE 90 OF MILITARY AIR ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE IS IN COMBINATION WITH GROUND ACTIVITIES, THERE IS A LOT OF BEEF IN OUR APPROACH. IN CONTRAST, THE WARSAW PACT HAS PROPOSED NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES WITH SUCH HIGH THRESHOLDS THAT, IN PRACTICE, HARDLY ANY USEFUL AND VERIFIABLE INFORMATION WOULD BE PROVIDED ABOUT AIR ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE -- WHETHER COMBINED OR, AS THE EAST SEEKS, INDEPENDENT. WHERE'S THE BEEF? I CAN'T FIND IT. IT APPEARS, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS IS ACTUALLY TO AVOID PROVIDING INFORMATION ON AIR ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE. WE WOULD NOT HAVE A BETTER PICTURE ABOUT MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE; CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY WOULD NOT BE ENHANCED. ANOTHER ZERO FOR SUBSTANCE.

-- ON OBSERVATION, MR. CHAIRMAN, WE HAVE AGREED THAT ALL PARTICIPATING STATES WILL BE INVITED TO OBSERVE NOTIFIED MILITARY ACTIVITIES. IN OUR APPROACH, A LARGE NUMBER OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES WILL BE OBSERVED. THIS ENHANCES CONFIDENCE. BUT WHAT IS THE POSITION OF THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES ON OBSERVATION? THEY HAVE COUNTERED WITH A SUGGESTION THAT WOULD SEVERELY RESTRICT THE NUMBER OF NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES TO BE OBSERVED AND, IN ADDITION, SEEK TO LIMIT THE OBSERVATION OF SUCH ACTIVITIES TO A SMALL PORTION OF THE OVERALL ACTIVITY. CONTRIBUTION TO CONFIDENCE -- MINIMAL AT BEST. NO BEEF HERE.

-- AND, MR. CHAIRMAN, OUR MANDATE REQUIRES THAT ANY AGREEMENT HERE BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIABLE. I ASK YOU -- CAN MEASURES BE VERIFIED THROUGH CONSULTATIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS? WESTERN PROPOSALS PROVIDE EVERY PARTICIPATING STATE WITH THE RIGHT TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE, AND PROVIDE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO THROUGH ON-SITE INSPECTION. AT THE SAME TIME, IT PROTECTS AGAINST ABUSE. THE PROPOSAL OFFERED BY THE WARSAW PACT DOES NOT EVEN COME CLOSE TO MEETING THE MANDATE CRITERIA OF ADEQUATE VERIFIABILITY. BEEF

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FACTOR - ZERO.

-- FINALLY, LET ME MENTION THE TOPIC OF CONSTRAINTS, OR MORE PRECISELY LIMITATIONS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES. I ADMIT THAT THERE'S NO WESTERN BEEF HERE. WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO IDENTIFY ANY LIMITATION WHICH WOULD NOT HAVE A DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT ON US, GIVEN THE GEOGRAPHIC AND PRACTICAL REALITIES OF THE WESTERN SECURITY POSITION. WHAT I WOULD LIKE YOU TO REALIZE IS THAT THERE IS NO BEEF IN THE EASTERN POSITION, EITHER; A LITTLE CAREFUL MULTIPLICATION INDICATES THAT THEY ARE SUPPORTING CONSTRAINTS THAT DON'T CONSTRAIN, LIMITATIONS WHICH DO NOT LIMIT. IN FACT, WHEN THE SUBJECT TURNS TO PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD REALLY CONSTRAIN ALL EQUALLY, SUCH AS STRENGTHENING THE ANNUAL FORECAST MEASURE, THE EAST IS CURIOUSLY RETICENT.

-- MR. CHAIRMAN, I HAVE TRIED TO ESTABLISH WHERE THE BEEFLESS MINI-PACKAGE REALLY IS IN THE CONFERENCE. LET ME SUGGEST WHY. DURING OUR MAY 2 PLENARY I WAS SURPRISED TO HEAR THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC CRITICIZE A PASSAGE FROM A SPEECH WHICH I HAD MADE IN ROME TO THE EFFECT THAT THIS CONFERENCE OUGHT TO CONTRIBUTE TO INCREASED OPENNESS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AND THE BREAKING DOWN OF THE ARTIFICIAL BARRIERS WHICH DIVIDE EUROPE. THE IMPLICATION OF HIS WORDS WAS THAT THE EAST IS OPPOSED TO OPENNESS AND WANTS TO KEEP THE BARRIERS IN PLACE. IF SO, WE PROBABLY AREN'T GOING TO GET AN AGREEMENT HERE. FURTHERMORE, THE BASIC PREMISES OF THE ENTIRE CSCE PROCESS, OF WHICH THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IS AN INTEGRAL PART, ARE OPEN TO SERIOUS QUESTION.

-- MR. CHAIRMAN, MY DELEGATION HAS NOT WRITTEN OFF THE CHANCES FOR SUCCESS HERE EVEN THOUGH WE RECOGNIZE THEY ARE SERIOUSLY DIMINISHED. THERE IS MORE AT STAKE HERE THAN CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES THEMSELVES AND THE RELUCTANCE WE WOULD ALL HAVE TO WASTE THE MANY MONTHS OF INTENSIVE EFFORT WE HAVE ALREADY INVESTED IN A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. FAILURE TO REACH AGREEMENT WOULD CAST A SHADOW OVER THE VIENNA CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE AND THE CSCE PROCESS, AS WELL AS THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS IN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS ELSEWHERE. THERE IS SEEMING AGREEMENT ABOUT THE PRINCIPLES WHICH WE ARE SUPPOSED TO TRANSLATE INTO REALITY, EVEN THAT CONCERNING ON-SITE INSPECTION. I IS THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE, IF VERY DIFFICULT, TO CODIFY A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT REFLECTING THESE PRINCIPLES IN THE VERY FEW WEEKS WHICH REMAIN TO US. BUT IT SHOULD BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT FOR THE U.S., A PURELY SYMBOLIC BEEFLESS MINI-PACKAGE IS OUT OF THE QUESTION, AND LAST-MINUTE MINI-PROPOSALS DESIGNED TO PRODUCE SUCH A RESULT WILL NOT BE ACCEPTABLE.

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**C O N F I D E N T I A L** STOCKHOLM 03962  
**SUBJECT:** WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS - MAY 12-16, 1986  
**REF:** A) STOCKHOLM 3947, B) STOCKHOLM 3928

1. CDE X - 058
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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 3. **BEGIN SUMMARY:** WHILE DRAFTING WENT SOMEWHAT BETTER IN THE KEY NOTIFICATION GROUP THIS WEEK, THE EAST APPEARS TO BE CONTINUING ITS TACTIC OF DELAYING SIGNIFICANT DRAFTING PROGRESS. MOSCOW'S OBJECTIVE APPEARS TO BE TO DELAY SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS UNTIL THE END GAME WHEN OUR ALLIES WILL BE UNDER PRESSURE TO AGREE TO A MINI-PACKAGE. WE INTENTIONALLY CLOSED THE WEEK ON A DOWNBEAT NOTE, REJECTING ANY MINI-PACKAGE AND EXPRESSING PESSIMISM OVER CONFERENCE PROSPECTS IN ORDER TO EXERT PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS TO SPEED UP THE DRAFTING OF CSBM'S. WE PUSHED THIS APPROACH EARLIER IN NATO CAUCUSES AND FOR THE TIME BEING, IT APPEARS TO ENJOY SOME SUPPORT. AFTER A WEEK OF INTENSIVE BEHIND-THE-SCENES NEGOTIATIONS, NATO DELEGATIONS HAVE DRAFTED A NEW COMPROMISE FORMULATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS. **END SUMMARY.**

4. **ASSESSMENT:** THE EAST APPEARS TO BE CONTINUING ITS TACTIC OF DELAYING DRAFTING PROGRESS IN THE KEY NOTIFICATION GROUP ON THE MOST IMPORTANT, AND, THEREFORE, MOST CONTROVERSIAL, ISSUES, I.E., TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED AND PARAMETERS. THE SOVIET OBJECTIVE (SEE REF A FOR A MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS) APPEARS TO BE TO DELAY SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS UNTIL THE END GAME WHEN OUR ALLIES WILL BE UNDER PRESSURE TO AGREE TO A MINI-PACKAGE. IN THIS WAY THE SOVIETS WILL KILL TWO BIRDS WITH ONE STONE: THEY WILL AVOID HAVING TO ACCEPT UNPALATABLE WESTERN MEASURES, SUCH AS ON-SITE INSPECTION AND STATIC INFORMATION AS AN INDEPENDENT MEASURE, AND WILL HAVE WON THE (MINIMALIST) AGREEMENT NEEDED TO JUSTIFY CONTINUATION OF THE CDE PROCESS (AND POSSIBLY INTEGRATION OF THE APRIL 18 GORBACHEV CONVENTIONAL ARMS PROPOSAL INTO A CDE PHASE II).

IN HIS PLENARY STATEMENT ON MAY 16 (REF B), AMBASSADOR BARRY INTENTIONALLY CLOSED THE WEEK ON A DOWNBEAT NOTE, REJECTING SUCH A MINI-PACKAGE AND EXPRESSING PESSIMISM OVER CONFERENCE PROSPECTS. WE PUSHED THIS APPROACH EARLIER IN NATO CAUCUSES AND FOR THE TIME BEING, IT APPEARS TO ENJOY SOME SUPPORT. FOR THEIR PART, THE

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 SOVIETS, WHILE DELAYING ON DRAFTING, HAVE CAST ABOUT IN THEIR PRIVATE CONTACTS FOR WAYS TO RESOLVE THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AT NOT TOO HIGH A COST TO THEM. WHILE THE ALLIES PRESENT A UNIFIED FACE TO THE OUTSIDE, THEY REMAIN INTERNALLY DIVIDED ON TACTICS.

5. **NOTIFICATION:** DRAFTING WENT SOMEWHAT BETTER THIS WEEK. CHAPEAU LANGUAGE INTRODUCING A DEFINITION OF

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MILITARY ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED, WHICH HAD BEEN PRECOOKED IN A SERIES OF PRIVATE MEETINGS AND IN COFFEE GROUP MEETINGS WAS NOTED: "MILITARY ACTIVITIES . . . CONDUCTED IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S AT OR ABOVE THE LEVELS DEFINED BELOW, WILL BE NOTIFIED." THE WORKING GROUP -- AT THE WEST'S INSISTENCE -- CONTINUED TO FOCUS ITS DISCUSSION ON GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES UNDER THE GUISE OF A DISCUSSION OF COMBINED ARMS ACTIVITIES. THE EAST TRIED TO SHIFT ATTENTION TO AIR ACTIVITIES AND TRANSFERS; MALTA TRIED TO REDEFINE COMBINED ARMS ACTIVITIES AS ANY COMBINATION OF GROUND, NAVAL, AND/OR AIR FORCES.

AFTER THE EAST TABLED DRAFT LANGUAGE ON THE NOTIFICATION OF LAND FORCES, AIR FORCES AND TRANSFERS IN THREE SEPARATE PARAGRAPHS, THE WEST OUTMANEUVERED THEM BY REDRAFTING THE FIRST EASTERN PARAGRAPH ON THE SPOT TO MOVE CLOSER TO THE DESIRED DEFINITION AND THRESHOLD. THE REDRAFTED LANGUAGE READ: THE ENGAGEMENT OF LAND FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN A MILITARY ACTIVITY OUTSIDE THEIR NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATIONS CONDUCTED ACCORDING TO A COMMON PLAN UNDER A SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH ANY POSSIBLE AIR, NAVAL, AMPHIBIOUS OR AIRBORNE COMPONENTS. IN THIS CONTEXT THE PARTICIPATION OF AIR AND/OR NAVAL COMPONENTS WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE NOTIFICATION."

BEGIN COMMENT: THE ADDITION OF "SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND" HAS BEEN THE PRICE DEMANDED BY THE UK, FRG AND FRANCE FOR ACCEPTING THE U.S. APPROACH TO THRESHOLDS.

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THE UK AND THE FRG ARE CONCERNED BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR FORCES EXERCISING SIMULTANEOUSLY, BUT INDEPENDENTLY OF EACH OTHER, IN THE TRAINING AREAS CONTAINED IN THE LUNEBURGER HEIDE. THE FRENCH HAD WANTED TO GO EVEN FURTHER AND INSIST THAT HEADQUARTERS HAD TO BE IN THE FIELD. END COMMENT.

DISCUSSION OF THE ABOVE LANGUAGE WAS FRUITFUL AND, EVEN THOUGH AGREEMENT WAS NOT REACHED, IT HAS BECOME THE BASIS FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATION. HOWEVER, WE ARE STILL A LONG WAY FROM AGREEMENT, SINCE WE MUST GET RID OF "COMMON PLAN" AND THE EAST STILL INSISTS THAT WE CONCURRENTLY SEPARATE LANGUAGE ON AIR FORCE EXERCISES. 6. NON-USE OF FORCE: ON MAY 12, THE NATO ALLIES APPROACHED CONSENSUS ON A WESTERN NUF TEXT; ON MAY 13, THEY ACHIEVED IT; ON MAY 14 THEY LOST IT; ON MAY 15 THEY QUARRELED; AND ON MAY 16 THEY ACHIEVED IT AGAIN. MERCIFULLY, THE WEEK ENDED ON THIS UPBEAT NOTE. WHEN ROME RELUCTANTLY AGREED EARLY IN THE WEEK ON A STRONG REFERENCE TO HUMAN RIGHTS, IT SEEMED THE WEST WAS WELL POSITIONED, BOTH SUBSTANTIVELY AND TACTICALLY, TO DRAFT ON NON-USE OF FORCE. HOWEVER, AFTER A CONSENSUS SEEMED

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TO HAVE BEEN REACHED, PARIS INTRODUCED "MINOR MODIFICATIONS" TO THE TEXT; THE CHANGES WERE, IN FACT, MAJOR AND SUBSTANTIVE AND WATERED DOWN THE HUMAN RIGHTS TEXT. ALL THE ALLIES REJECTED THESE AMENDMENTS AS HAVING COME TOO LATE AND AS HAVING DESTROYED A CAREFULLY CRAFTED NATO COMPROMISE. ON FRIDAY, PARIS INDICATED THAT IT COULD -- ON SECOND THOUGHT -- ACCEPT THE ORIGINAL HUMAN RIGHTS TEXT -- WITH MINOR AND NONSUBSTANTIVE MODIFICATIONS. ONCE AGAIN, NATO SEEMS TO HAVE A CONSENSUS NUF TEXT. STAY TUNED. MEANWHILE, BASED ON WHAT PROVED TO BE A MOMENTARILY FAULTY ASSUMPTION OF AGREEMENT ON A FULL WESTERN TEXT, NATO ENTERED INTO COFFEE GROUP NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CSBM'S-NUF LINK AND THE NUF REAFFIRMATION ITSELF. THE GROUP IS APPROACHING AGREEMENT ON LINKAGE LANGUAGE

WHICH REFLECTS THE WESTERN APPROACH: THE ADOPTED CSBM'S (AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION) GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE NUF PRINCIPLE. PENDING FINAL RESOLUTION OF WESTERN INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES ON A NUF TEXT, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO NOTE THE SENTENCE IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK ON TUESDAY. THE NUF REAFFIRMATION IS SOMEWHAT MORE PROBLEMATIC. UNTIL LAST WEEK, WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS WERE BUSINESSLIKE -- ALMOST CORDIAL.

7. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION: NATO AND THE NNA CONTINUED EFFORTS TO DEVELOP A VERIFICATION SKELETON IN THE WORKING GROUP WITH THE NNA'S INTRODUCTION OF A FIRST SENTENCE ON VERIFICATION MODALITIES: "THE REQUEST WILL BE ADDRESSED TO THE STATE ON WHOSE TERRITORY THE ACTIVITIES OR PRESUMED ACTIVITIES ARE CARRIED OUT". THIS FORMULATION MAKES A USEFUL REFERENCE TO "TERRITORY" AND ALSO TO NON-NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES. IT ALSO RECOGNIZES THE PRINCIPLE OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER ONE'S OWN TERRITORY AND OBIVIATES THE NEED TO DETERMINE THE NATIONALITIES OF FORCES ENGAGED IN AN ACTIVITY. PERHAPS FOR THESE REASONS THE EAST RESISTED THE WORD "TERRITORY," INSISTING THAT THE REQUEST BE ADDRESSED ONLY TO THE STATE CONDUCTING THE ACTIVITIES IN QUESTION. MALTA, SUPPORTED BY THE EAST, ALSO ARGUED AGAINST TERRITORY BECAUSE ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE DO NOT TAKE PLACE ON ANYONE'S TERRITORY. WE SURMISE THAT THE EAST'S REAL PROBLEM IS THAT THEY PERCEIVE THE REFERENCE TO "TERRITORY" TO BE A LEAD INTO ON-SITE INSPECTION. THOUGH THE DISCUSSION WAS USEFUL, SPONTANEOUS CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE NNA AND IRISH WERE UNHELPFUL AND NO TEXT WAS AGREED. AS WE MOVE INTO THE SUBJECT OF MODALITIES, DRAFTING WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT; THE EAST WILL RESIST DRAFTING ON MODALITIES FOR INSPECTION, INSISTING INSTEAD THAT THEIR CONCEPT OF VERIFICATION, I.E., NTM'S, CONSULTATIONS, OBSERVATION ON REQUEST, BE EXPLORED.

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 IN ORDER TO ALLOW MORE TIME FOR THE VERIFICATION DISCUSSION, THE WEST AGREED TO DROP INFORMATION FROM THIS WEEK'S AGENDA. NEXT WEEK WE WILL RETURN TO INFORMATION AS WELL AS CONTINUE THE VERIFICATION DISCUSSION.

8. OBSERVATION: ALTHOUGH NO TEXT WAS NOTED THIS WEEK, THE EAST MADE A POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT MOVE TOWARD THE NNA POSITION ON DURATION OF OBSERVATION BY TABLING A TEXT STATING THAT OBSERVATION OF "THE NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY" WOULD BEGIN "WHENEVER IT REACHES THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL" (AN APPROACH WHICH ALSO HAS CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT WITHIN THE NATO CLUSTER CAUCUS). PLAYING OFF THE SAME TEXT, THE WEST PRESSED FOR OUR INTERPRETATION THAT THE PHRASE "THE NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY" MEANT OBSERVATION OF ALL NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES. ALTHOUGH TATARNIKOV (USSR) REFUSED TO ACCEPT OUR INTERPRETATION, HE ALSO AVOIDED DIMISSING THIS CONCEPT OUT OF HAND -- A POSSIBLE SHIFT FROM THE EAST'S EARLIER POSITION THAT ONLY A CERTAIN NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS SHOULD BE MANDATORY EACH YEAR. THE EAST ALSO TABLED A TEXT ON OBSERVATION OF TRANSFERS OF TROOPS AND COMBAT AIRCRAFT "IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S." WHILE THE TEXT IS FOR THE MOST PART UNACCEPTABLE AS IT NOW STANDS, THE EAST MAY HAVE BEEN HINTING AT A WILLINGNESS TO EXEMPT TRANSFERS "INTO" THE ZONE. ON A MORE NEGATIVE NOTE, THE EAST TORPEDOED ANOTHER COFFEE GROUP, THIS TIME ON THE MODALITIES FOR THE OBSERVATION OF AIR ACTIVITY, BY INSISTING ON SPECIFICALLY DISCUSSING INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES RATHER THAN AIR ACTIVITIES IN GENERAL.

9. ANNUAL FORECASTS: AMID MUCH FANFARE, BULGARIA TABLED THE EAST'S LONG-AWAITED PROPOSAL ON ANNUAL PLANS (BEING SENT SEPTEL). THE CONTENT SECTION INCLUDES MOST OF THE GENERAL ELEMENTS IN THE WESTERN AND NNA PROPOSALS AS WELL AS AN UNDESIRABLE ITEM ON TRANSFERS. SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON THE INTRODUCTORY PHRASE, WHERE THE WEST AND SWITZERLAND FOCUSED ON WHAT IS MISSING: CALENDAR YEAR QUARTERS AND STANDARDIZED FORMAT. IN

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 FACT, ON THE LATTER POINT THE BULGARIAN FORMULA IS A STEP BACKWARD FROM THE ANALAGOUS EASTERN FORMULATION IN THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION: THE CHAPEAU FOR THE FORECAST MERELY CALLS ON STATES TO "PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON EACH ACTIVITY."

10. CONSTRAINTS: IN A STERILE EAST-WEST EXCHANGE, THE EAST EN MASSE ATTACKED THE WEST FOR ITS "STEREOTYPICAL, CONSERVATIVE" THINKING ON CONSTRAINTS. THE U.S. COUNTERED BY ASKING HOW MANY EXERCISES IN THE MADRID ZONE (I.E., BEYOND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT 250-KILOMETER LIMIT IN THE THE USSR) WOULD BE REPORTED GIVEN THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEWEST EASTERN CONSTRAINT. THE EAST

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**NOTICEABLY QUIET THROUGHOUT THE EXCHANGE.**

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 04124

SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY

1. CDE - 072.

2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE MAY 23 PLENARY ENDING THE 10TH SESSION OF CDE, WESTERN (U.S., ITALY, FRANCE), NNA (YUGOSLAVIA) AND SOVIET STATEMENTS FOCUSED ON THE LACK OF PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS FOR AGREEMENT. (FULL TEXT OF STATEMENTS BY REPRESENTATIVE STENY HOYER AND GRINEVSKY (USSR) SENT SEPTEL.) U.S. DEPUTY HANSEN ACCUSED THE SOVIETS OF BLOCKING DRAFTING IN HIS REPLY TO THE SOVIET STATEMENT. CIARRAPICO (ITALY) AND GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) OFFERED VIEWPOINTS ON WHAT MUST BE DONE TO REACH AGREEMENT BY SEPTEMBER 19. ON BEHALF OF THE NNA, BOZOVIC (YUGOSLAVIA) STATED THAT A MINI-PACKAGE WAS AN UNACCEPTABLE OUTCOME FOR THE CONFERENCE; HE WARNED THAT WE ARE HEADED FOR SUCH AN OUTCOME UNLESS MORE FLEXIBILITY IS DISPLAYED. END SUMMARY.

4. AMBASSADOR HANSEN MADE FOLLOWING POINTS IN HIS REPLY TO SOVIET ACCUSATIONS THAT THE U.S. IS RESPONSIBLE FOR LACK OF PROGRESS IN CDE:

-- AS THE MANDATE STIPULATES, THE CDE IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE OVERALL CSCE PROCESS WHICH INCLUDES OTTAWA, BUDAPEST AND BERN; REPRESENTATIVE HOYER MADE THIS POINT AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

-- WHEREAS NATO INTRODUCED A COMPREHENSIVE SET OF CSBM'S EARLY IN THE CONFERENCE, TODAY FOR THE FIRST TIME THE EAST HAS PROPOSED PARAMETERS FOR "CONCRETE CSBMS."

-- DRAFTING HAS ALSO BEEN DELAYED BY THE EAST'S INSISTENCE ON PRECONDITIONS FOR DRAFTING. FIRST, THE EAST INSISTED ON PARALLELISM, I.E., CONCRETE MEASURES MUST BE DRAFTED PARALLEL TO PROGRESS IN NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF). THEN, THE EAST ADOPTED A "SEQUENTIAL" APPROACH VIS-A-VIS DRAFTING; I.E., THE WEST MUST AGREE TO THE EASTERN POSITION ON AIR ACTIVITIES BEFORE DRAFTING CAN PROCEED. THIS, HANSEN SAID, WAS NOT, TO USE GRINEVSKY'S WORDS, "THE LANGUAGE OF NEGOTIATION."

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-- THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR NOTIFICATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES EXCLUDES 90 PERCENT OF AIR ACTIVITIES AND IS NOT COMPREHENSIVE. THE 10 PERCENT THE SOVIETS ARE WILLING TO NOTIFY INCLUDES INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES, PRIMARILY NON-THREATENING AIR DEFENSE EXERCISES. MOREOVER, THESE ACTIVITIES ARE UNVERIFIABLE WITHOUT AN UNACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF INTRUSIVENESS. THE WEST, IN CONTRAST, PROPOSED THAT AIR ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT COMBINED WITH LAND

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ACTIVITIES BE COVERED BY AN AGREEMENT. THIS IS A MUCH MORE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH.

-- THE "NEW" SOVIET THRESHOLD OF 18,000 TROOPS FOR LAND ACTIVITIES "IGNORES" NATO AND NNA PROPOSALS FOR LOWER, MORE SIGNIFICANT THRESHOLDS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE SOVIET PROPOSAL IS THREE TIMES THE NATO THRESHOLD.

-- IN THE LAST THREE DAYS OF DRAFTING THIS SESSION, THE WEST EXTENDED ITS HAND TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF WHAT ACTIVITIES ARE TO BE NOTIFIED (IN B-1). THE EAST REJECTED THE HAND, DEMANDING THE WHOLE ARM.

-- SOVIET EFFORTS TO SEPARATE THE U.S. AND CANADA FROM THEIR EUROPEAN FRIENDS AND ALLIES "WILL NOT WORK."

5. ON BEHALF OF THE NNA, AMBASSADOR BOZOVIC (YUGOSLAVIA) STRESSED THAT A MINI-PACKAGE WOULD NOT BE AN ACCEPTABLE OUTCOME TO CDE. HE URGED ALL (IMPLYING EAST AND WEST) TO "LEAVE ENTRENCHED POSITIONS" AND NOT TO WAIT UNTIL THE END TO MAKE NECESSARY CONCESSIONS. HE WARNED AGAINST "PLAYING THE TIME FACTOR," CALLING IT A "DANGEROUS ILLUSION" WHICH WOULD INEVITABLE LEAD TO FAILURE.

6. IN A CONCILIATORY SPEECH, AMBASSADOR GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) ARGUED THAT "EVERYONE MADE SIGNIFICANT GESTURES" TO SOLVE THE ISSUE OF AIR ACTIVITIES. ALTHOUGH HE "WELCOMED" SOVIET ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT NOTIFICATION IS THE "CENTRAL ISSUE," HE REJECTED SOVIET ACCUSATIONS OF WESTERN "IMMOBILITY" ON THAT ISSUE.

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7. AMBASSADOR CIARRAPICO (ITALY) REVIEWED PROGRESS IN EACH WORKING GROUP AND WHAT MUST YET BE ACCOMPLISHED. HE STRESSED NEED FOR AGREEMENT ON ON-SITE INSPECTION IN PARTICULAR. HE IMPLIED CDE WILL HAVE WORK TO DO AFTER VIENNA REGARDLESS OF RESULTS ACHIEVED BEFORE THE REVIEW.

HANSEN

END OF MESSAGE

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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 04121

SUBJECT: TEXT OF CSCE CO-CHAIRMAN STENY H. HOYER'S  
SPEECH TO CDE, 5/23/86

1. CDE IX - 65

2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE SPEECH THE HONORABLE  
STENY H. HOYER, CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON  
SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, GAVE TO CDE IN  
STOCKHOLM TODAY, FRIDAY, MAY 23.

BEGIN TEXT:

MR. CHAIRMAN, IT IS BOTH AN HONOR AND A PLEASURE TO  
ADDRESS THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. AS CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE  
UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN  
EUROPE, I AM ON MY WAY TO BERN, SWITZERLAND, TO ATTEND  
THE CLOSING OF ANOTHER FORUM IN THE CSCE PROCESS -- THE  
EXPERTS' MEETING ON HUMAN CONTACTS. STOCKHOLM AND BERN  
ARE REMINDERS OF THE DIVERSITY OF THE CSCE PROCESS,  
ENCOMPASSING SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, CULTURAL,  
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, AS WELL AS THE FREE FLOW  
OF PEOPLE, INFORMATION AND IDEAS. THIS DIVERSITY IS  
FOUNDED ON A DELICATE BALANCE ESTABLISHED BY THE  
HELSINKI FINAL ACT, A BALANCE WHICH IS ESSENTIAL TO THE  
INTEGRITY AND VITALITY OF THE PROCESS AS A WHOLE.  
THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, THE CONGRESS, AS WELL  
AS THE ADMINISTRATION, ARE COMMITTED TO THE CSCE PROCESS  
BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THAT IT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO FURTHER  
THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES ON WHICH OUR OWN NATION WAS  
FOUNDED: FREEDOM AND SECURITY, PROSPERITY -- MATERIAL  
AND SPIRITUAL -- AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF EACH  
INDIVIDUAL. WE INHERITED THESE PRINCIPLES FROM EUROPE  
MORE THAN TWO HUNDRED YEARS AGO. TWICE IN THIS CENTURY  
AMERICANS HAVE SHED THEIR BLOOD TO DEFEND THEM IN  
EUROPE. WE CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE IN EFFORTS TO  
MAINTAIN AND ADVANCE THIS SHARED HERITAGE. PROMINENT  
AMONG THESE EFFORTS IS THE CSCE. AND WE ARE VERY  
CONCERNED ABOUT ITS HEALTH AND FUTURE. RECENT  
DEVELOPMENTS MAKE US QUESTION WHETHER THE FORMAL  
MECHANISMS OF THE PROCESS ARE WORKING. WE ARE CONCERNED  
BY THE APPARENT UNWILLINGNESS OR INABILITY OF SOME  
STATES TO PARTICIPATE CONSTRUCTIVELY AND MAKE THE  
PROCESS WORK. OUR EXPERIENCE IN OTTAWA, BUDAPEST, AND  
SO FAR IN BERN LEADS US TO QUESTION WHETHER THE EAST IS  
SERIOUSLY COMMITTED TO COOPERATION AND A BETTER, MORE  
OPEN, RELATIONSHIP WITH THE WEST.  
IT IS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT MUTUAL TRUST TO DEVELOP  
WHILE IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL PROVISIONS OF THE HELSINKI  
FINAL ACT AND THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT REMAINS  
SELECTIVE AND UNEVEN. CONFIDENCE IS THREATENED WHEN  
SIGNATORIES DISREGARD THEIR COMMITMENTS. WHEN  
CONFRONTED WITH THE CURRENT RECORD OF OFTEN BLATANT  
DISREGARD FOR HELSINKI PLEDGES IN MANY AREAS OF THE  
FINAL ACT, THE U.S. PUBLIC AND ITS CONGRESS REBARD THE

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CONTINUED VIABILITY OF THE FINAL ACT AS BEING SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZED. TRUST CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED ON THE BASIS OF CONCRETE, BALANCED PROGRESS IN ALL SECTIONS OF THE FINAL ACT, WHICH MEANS IN REALITY CONCRETE ACTIONS BY ALL PARTICIPATING STATES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR COMMITMENTS.

TO THIS END, DR. ANDREI SAKHAROV, WHO EMBODIES BOTH THE TECHNOLOGICAL GENIUS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND THE HIGHEST EXPRESSION OF MORAL CONSCIENCE, ONCE WROTE:

-- "IT IS WRONG TO ACCEPT THE CONTENTION... THAT THE PURSUIT OF PEACE AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT ARE MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY. NO MATTER HOW IMPORTANT ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS ARE, THEY CAN PRODUCE DECISIVE RESULTS ONLY WHEN THEY ARE JOINED TO THE RESOLUTION OF BROADER AND MORE COMPLICATED PROBLEMS OF MILITARY-POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CONFRONTATIONS INCLUDING QUESTIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS. THE FREEDOM TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION AT HOME AND ACROSS INTERNATIONAL BORDERS, THE FREEDOM TO MOVE AT HOME AND TO TRAVEL OR EMIGRATE ABROAD, ALL RANK AS PREREQUISITES OF INTERNATIONAL TRUST, BASIC TO THE PROCESS OF DIMINISHING HOSTILITY."

ALTHOUGH AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE CSCE PROCESS, THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE HAS ITS OWN UNIQUE AND IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE, ADOPTING CONCRETE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH WILL HELP REDUCE THE RISK OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE. THE COURSE OF MORE THAN TWO YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD THAT OBJECTIVE SET AT MADRID HAS NOT BEEN ENCOURAGING. MANY MONTHS WERE LOST BEFORE THE EAST DECIDED TO JOIN THE OTHERS IN DISCUSSING CONCRETE MILITARY MEASURES, THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THIS CONFERENCE WAS ESTABLISHED. WE CANNOT FORGET THAT THREE YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS PRECEDED THIS CONFERENCE. THEY ESTABLISHED ITS TERMS OF REFERENCE TO WHICH WE RIGOROUSLY ADHERE AND EXPECT NO LESS OF OTHERS.

BY JANUARY OF THIS YEAR, ALL SEEMED TO HAVE ACCEPTED THE NEED FOR INTENSE AND ACCELERATED NEGOTIATION ON MEASURES FOR EXCHANGING MILITARY INFORMATION, FORECASTING, NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES, AND VERIFICATION. BUT DRAFTING ON REAL SUBSTANCE STILL HAS NOT BEGUN. IF THE EAST WERE TRULY SERIOUS ABOUT THIS CONFERENCE, IT WOULD JOIN THE WEST AND THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES IN DRAFTING MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT MEASURES WHICH WOULD HAVE A REAL IMPACT ON THE MILITARY SITUATION IN EUROPE. THE EAST HAS REFUSED TO TAKE THIS NECESSARY STEP. THE UNITED STATES, INCLUDING THE CONGRESS, IS CONCERNED BY THE RESULTANT STAGNATION OF THE CONFERENCE.

YET, THE BASIS FOR AGREEMENT EXISTS. DETAILS FOR CONCRETE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES HAVE EMERGED FROM DISCUSSIONS OVER THE MONTHS, AND A GOOD

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SENSE OF THE FINAL COMPLEX OF MEASURES HAS BEEN APPARENT FOR SOME TIME. THE BASIC REQUIREMENTS FOR ANY ACCEPTABLE MEASURES HAVE BEEN CRYSTAL CLEAR ALL ALONG BECAUSE THEY ARE SPELLED OUT IN THE FOUR CRITERIA OF THE MADRID MANDATE.

FIRST, ALL MEASURES MUST BE POLITICALLY BINDING; WE MUST OVERCOME THE GAPING LOOPHOLE IN COMPLIANCE FOUND IN THE VOLUNTARY NATURE OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. SECOND, THE MEASURES MUST BE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT; THEY MUST AVOID COSMETIC POLITICAL GESTURES AND GENUINELY CONTRIBUTE TO GREATER STABILITY IN THE EUROPEAN MILITARY SITUATION.

THIRD, THEY MUST APPLY TO THE WHOLE OF EUROPE.

FINALLY, ALL MEASURES MUST BE VERIFIABLE AND ACCOMPANIED BY MEANS OF VERIFICATION. THE TASK OF THIS CONFERENCE IS TO BUILD CONFIDENCE AS WELL AS ENHANCE SECURITY.

IDEALLY, CONFIDENCE COULD DEPEND ON TRUST, AND SEPARATE, ADEQUATE MEANS OF VERIFICATION WOULD NOT BE NEEDED. BUT WE DO NOT LIVE IN AN IDEAL WORLD. NOT ALL STATES ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF OPENNESS; NOT ALL READILY SHARE INFORMATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ABOUT ACTIVITIES AND EVENTS WHICH MAY AFFECT THEM AND THEIR PEOPLE. VERIFICATION, THUS, BECOMES NECESSARY TO ASSURE THAT THE COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN WILL BE IMPLEMENTED.

ON ISSUES OF NATIONAL SECURITY, WHERE THE WELL-BEING OF OUR PEOPLE IS DIRECTLY AT STAKE, WE CANNOT DEPEND ON THE GOOD WILL OF OTHERS TO PROVIDE INFORMATION NEEDED TO CLEAR UP DOUBTS AND AMBIGUITIES AND VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN. PRACTICAL, MANDATORY MECHANISMS SUCH AS ON-SITE GROUND INSPECTION ARE REQUIRED. ADOPTING MEASURES IN STOCKHOLM WITHOUT THIS VERIFICATION PROVISION WOULD NOT FULFILL THE TERMS OF THE MADRID MANDATE AND WOULD BE WORSE THAN ADOPTING NO MEASURES AT ALL.

THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR A POSITIVE RESULT HERE BEFORE SEPTEMBER 19. BUT WORK CANNOT PROGRESS WITHOUT THE COOPERATION OF ALL PARTICIPANTS. IF, AFTER NEARLY THREE YEARS OF MEETINGS, THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE FAILS TO PRODUCE A SUBSTANTIAL SET OF CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES, THE LESSONS THE UNITED STATES WILL DRAW ARE SERIOUS AND VERY SOBERING. WE COULD ONLY CONCLUDE THAT THE EAST, REGARDLESS OF ITS PUBLIC STATEMENTS, SUGGESTIONS AND HINTS, IS NOT PREPARED TO ENTER INTO ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE WEST WHICH REQUIRE EVEN THE MOST MODEST DEGREE OF OPENNESS AND COOPERATION. CONTRARY TO PUBLIC STATEMENTS, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT IT WAS NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT ON-SITE INSPECTION AS A MEANS OF VERIFICATION. WE WOULD ALSO CONCLUDE THAT CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES ARE TOO DEMANDING FROM THE EASTERN PERSPECTIVE TO BE SERIOUSLY DISCUSSED AND NEGOTIATED.

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THE SUCCESS OF THIS CONFERENCE IS IMPORTANT, BUT THAT WILL NOT BE ACHIEVED IF WE ACCEPT ONLY COSMETIC AGREEMENTS. THE SUCCESS OF THIS CONFERENCE DEPENDS FIRST OF ALL ON ENACTING SOUND MEASURES AND THEN THE REAL TEST WOULD COME WITH THEIR IMPLEMENTATION AND THEIR SUBSEQUENT EFFECTIVENESS AS INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS FOR REDUCING MILITARY CONFRONTATION.

MR. CHAIRMAN, WITH STOCKHOLM, BERN, BUDAPEST, OTTAWA AND OTHERS, WE MAY HAVE A TENDENCY TO THINK OF THE CSCE PROCESS AS A SERIES OF MEETINGS. WE MUST AVOID SUCH A LIMITED VIEW. THE CSCE PROCESS IS NOT A STRING OF NEGOTIATING TABLES -- BUT A UNIQUE CONTEXT WITHIN WHICH THE COMPLEX WEB OF OUR RELATIONSHIPS MAY BE DISCUSSED AND FURTHERED. THE GOAL OF STOCKHOLM FINALLY IS TO REDUCE THE PROBABILITIES OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION ARISING THROUGH MISUNDERSTANDING OR MISCALCULATION. THAT CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED THROUGH CONCRETE MEASURES -- THROUGH ACTIONS. SUCH ACTIONS TAKEN TOGETHER WITH THE ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS OF RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, CAN LEAD TO LASTING PEACE ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT. A HUNDRED FINAL DOCUMENTS WILL MEAN NOTHING IF INDIVIDUALS STILL CANNOT EXERCISE THEIR FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE, EXPRESSION AND MOVEMENT. THAT IS THE ESSENCE OF HELSINKI. THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, IF FULLY IMPLEMENTED, WILL BE JUDGED AS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT MILESTONES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THE UNITED STATES WANTS TO SEE THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE SUCCEED. WE ALSO WANT TO SEE THE CSCE PROCESS CONTINUE, REVITALIZED, AFTER THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING. THAT MEETING WILL EVALUATE THE CSCE PROCESS NOT IN TERMS OF MEETINGS CONCLUDED BUT IN TERMS OF THE ACTIONS THOSE MEETINGS WERE HELD TO ADDRESS AND OF THE TEN PRINCIPLES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT WHICH THOSE ACTIONS WERE MEANT TO ADVANCE. THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.

HANSEN

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 04122

SUBJECT: TEXT OF SOVIET CDE PLENARY SPEECH 5/23/86

1. CDE IX - 66
2. (C) FOLLOWING IS THE PREPARED TEXT OF THE SPEECH BY SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR OLEG GRINEVSKY TO CDE PLENARY TODAY, FRIDAY, MAY 23. BEFORE BEGINNING THE PREPARED REMARKS, GRINEVSKY ATTACKED REPRESENTATIVE STENY HOYER, CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, WHO HAD SPOKEN EARLIER (TEXT SENT SEPTEL), FOR INTRODUCING HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES INTO CDE, WHERE, GRINEVSKY CONTENDED, THEY DO NOT BELONG. AFTER GRINEVSKY SPOKE, U.S. DEPUTY AMBASSADOR LYNN HANSEN EXERCISED THE RIGHT OF REPLY TO REFUTE THE MAIN POINTS IN THE SOVIET STATEMENT (SEE SEPTEL).

## 3. U - BEGIN TEXT:

MR. CHAIRMAN, THE CONFERENCE IS MOVING NOW INTO THE CONCLUDING PHASE OF ITS WORK. NATURALLY, THIS PLACES ALL ITS PARTICIPANTS UNDER SERIOUS RESPONSIBILITY. WE HAVE LITTLE TIME LEFT AND MUCH, EVEN VERY MUCH, REMAINS TO BE DONE. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE OUGHT TO ACT MORE ENERGETICALLY WITHOUT LOSING TIME AND PRESS FORWARD PERSISTENTLY.

I BELIEVE THAT A DISSERVICE IS DONE TO THE CONFERENCE BY THOSE WHO ATTEMPT TO CALL INTO QUESTION THE VERY POSSIBILITY OF ACHIEVING POSITIVE RESULTS IN STOCKHOLM, WHO ATTEMPT TO STEER MATTERS TO CONFRONTATION RATHER THAN TO COOPERATION IN NEGOTIATING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS. ISN'T IT LIKE TOLLING THE KNELL FOR THE CONFERENCE?

OBVIOUSLY, WE ARE FAR FROM LOOKING AT THE AFFAIRS IN STOCKHOLM THROUGH PINK GLASSES OR CLOSING OUR EYES TO THE DIFFICULTIES AND OBSTACLES THAT WE ARE YET TO OVERCOME ON OUR WAY TO COMPLETING THE CONFERENCE. THOSE WHO HAVE FOLLOWED CLOSELY THIS SESSION CANNOT FAIL TO SEE THAT INTENSIVE WORK HAS BEEN GOING ON IN DRAFTING GROUPS. COORDINATORS AND NEGOTIATORS HAVE TOILED RELENTLESSLY WITHOUT COUNTING TIME TO ACHIEVE RESULTS. IN OUR VIEW, INTERESTING AND USEFUL WORK HAS BEEN DONE IN THE GROUP DEALING WITH NOTIFICATION WHICH HAS MANAGED, SEEMINGLY, TO ADDRESS THE VERY CRUX OF THE MATTER. WE, ON OUR PART, WISH THIS GROUP AND ITS COORDINATOR, DISTINGUISHED AMBASSADOR LIDGARD, SUCCESS IN MOVING FORWARD. USEFUL WORK HAS ALSO BEEN DONE IN THE GROUP ON OBSERVATION; SOME MOVEMENT, ALBEIT TIMID, HAS BEGUN IN THE NON-USE OF FORCE GROUP.

HOWEVER, WE SHOULD STATE WITH ALL FRANKNESS THAT DRAFTING HAS BEEN EXTREMELY SLOW. LANGUAGE AGREED SO FAR CONCERNS ONLY PERIPHERAL, SECONDARY QUESTIONS. WHAT IS REQUIRED THEN TO ACCELERATE PROGRESS AT THE CONFERENCE, TO IMPART IT A MORE BUSINESS-LIKE PACE? IT WOULD SEEM THAT THE REQUIREMENT HERE IS THAT ALL

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PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE PURSUE MORE ENERGETICALLY AND BOLDLY SOLUTIONS TO UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS AND SEEK APPROACHES TO MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS.

WE NOTE WITH SATISFACTION THAT THIS VERY ATTITUDE TO OUR BUSINESS PREVAILS AMONG MANY WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. LIKE IN OTHER CSCE FORA, THE NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN PLAYING A POSITIVE ROLE. THERE IS A FEELING THAT FRANCE, ITALY, SPAIN AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES ARE IN FAVOUR OF A POSITIVE CONCLUSION OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE.

THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN CONSISTENT IN PURSUING THEIR FIRM LINE OF ACHIEVING SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO NAME A SINGLE THEME DEFINED IN THE AGREEMENT OF OCTOBER 14, 1985, WHERE THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE NOT MADE CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS. EVERYONE HAS STILL FRESH MEMORIES OF THE MAJOR INITIATIVES SET FORTH BY THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, WHICH ENABLED THE CONFERENCE TO GAIN MOMENTUM.

WHILE ON HIS VISIT TO PARIS EARLY IN OCTOBER, 1985, MIKHAIL GORBACHEV EXPRESSED READINESS OF THE SOVIET UNION TO ACCEPT THE IDEA OF A NUMBER OF STATES, NEUTRAL IN THE FIRST PLACE, REGARDING MUTUAL EXCHANGES OF ANNUAL PLANS OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THIS STEP MADE IT POSSIBLE TO START A BUSINESS-LIKE CONSIDERATION OF THIS IMPORTANT MEASURE WHICH CAN BECOME A SERIOUS SAFETY FUSE AGAINST A MILITARY CONFLICT IN EUROPE.

ON JANUARY 15, THE SOVIET UNION MADE A PROPOSAL TO AGREE NOW ON NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MANOEUVRES OF LAND AND AIR FORCES AND TO POSTPONE THE ISSUE OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNTIL THE NEXT STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE. THAT PROPOSAL PAVED THE WAY TO SOLVING THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF THE CONFERENCE.

THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE INTRODUCED FAR-REACHING AND SPECIFIC PROPOSALS DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENTS IN SUCH AREAS AS NON-USE OF FORCE, INVITATION OF OBSERVERS, AND LIMITATION OF THE SCALE OF MILITARY MANOEUVRES. WE, ON OUR PART, ARE PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO FOLLOW THIS WAY IN THE BELIEF THAT OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES WILL ACT LIKEWISE.

MR. CHAIRMAN, IF WE ANALYZE THE STATUS AT THE CONFERENCE WE COULD MAKE A CONCLUSION THAT TODAY A LOT HINGES ON THE PROBLEM OF NOTIFICATION. TIME HAS COME FINALLY TO IDENTIFY SERIOUSLY TYPES OF NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES, ADDRESS NOTIFICATION OF MANOEUVRES OF LAND AND AIR FORCES, MOVEMENTS (TRANSFERS) OF FORCES, START NEGOTIATING SPECIFIC PARAMETERS FOR THEM, AND WORK ON INFORMATION IN THE CONTEXT OF NOTIFICATION.

IN ORDER TO GIVE AN IMPETUS TO SUCH BUSINESS-LIKE DISCUSSIONS AND PROGRESS AT THE CONFERENCE WE WOULD LIKE TODAY TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING PROPOSALS:

FIRST. TO NOTIFY MAJOR MANOEUVRES OF LAND FORCES

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CONDUCTED INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH ANY POSSIBLE AIR, NAVAL, AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE COMPONENTS, IF THEY INVOLVE 18,000 TROOPS AND MORE. IN SO DOING, THE NUMBER OF DIVISIONS ENGAGED IN THE MANOEUVRES WOULD BE REPORTED.

SECOND. TO NOTIFY MANOEUVRES OF AIR FORCES, WHENEVER DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF THE MANOEUVRES 700 OR MORE SORTIES ARE FLOWN OR MORE THAN 350 COMBAT AIRCRAFT ARE ENGAGED IN THE MANOEUVRES.

THIS IS THE WAY -- THROUGH MAKING CONCRETE PROPOSALS AND SEEKING SOLUTIONS TO UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS -- THAT SHOULD GUIDE, IN OUR VIEW, ALL THOSE WHO SINCERELY WISH TO CONCLUDE THE FIRST STAGE OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE WITH POSITIVE AND SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS.

UNFORTUNATELY, THERE HAVE BEEN, SO FAR, NO STEPS ON THE PART OF THE U.S. AND ITS CLOSEST ALLIES TO MEET COMPROMISE PROPOSALS ADVANCED BY OTHER PARTICIPANTS. THEY AVOID SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS FACING THE CONFERENCE AND PREFER TO STAY ENTRENCHED IN THEIR OLD, MOSS-COVERED POSITIONS. WHAT IS MORE, THEY TORPEDOED ANY MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING THAT SEEMED TO HAVE TAKEN SHAPE MORE THAN ONCE. AND THE U.S. DELEGATION MADE A STEP BACKWARDS AND REFUSED TO ACCEPT PROPOSALS WHICH IT HAD AGREED TO EARLIER AND EVEN MADE ITSELF. THIS FRIVOLOUS PLAYING AT NEGOTIATIONS WAS PLAYED VIRTUALLY IN ALL WORKING GROUPS. IN ESSENCE, THIS IS NOTHING ELSE BUT A CREATION OF ARTIFICIAL DEADLOCKS AT THE CONFERENCE, A DESIRE TO TIGHTEN STILL MORE THE KNOT OF DIFFERENCES RATHER THAN A SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS TO UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS. IT IS THIS APPROACH THAT CREATES DIFFICULTIES, SLOWS DOWN WORK, AND LEADS TO FOOT DRAGGING. AS A RESULT, A TRULY COMPLEX SITUATION HAS EVOLVED AT THE CONFERENCE.

MR. CHAIRMAN, I BELIEVE THAT IT IS CLEAR TO EVERYONE THAT THERE CAN BE NO FINAL AGREEMENT BASED ON ONE SCENARIO ONLY AND PROPOSED BY ONE COUNTRY ONLY. WE NEED A COMMON PLATFORM GEARED TO A CONCRETE RESULT.

THE EUROPEANS MASTERED ENOUGH POLITICAL REALISM AND WISDOM TO CONCLUDE THE MADRID MEETING BY A SUBSTANTIVE RESULT. THEY WERE ABLE TO OVERCOME DIFFICULTIES AND DIFFERENCES FOR THE SAKE OF ONE FUNDAMENTAL THING - THE PRESERVATION AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS OF SECURITY AND COOPERATION WHICH MEETS THEIR VITAL LONG-TERM INTERESTS.

EUROPE, WHICH POSSESSES THE NECESSARY HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE, CAN SAY ITS WORD THAT WILL CARRY WEIGHT IN STOCKHOLM, TOO, AND SHOW AN EXAMPLE OF SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING. BY MENTIONING EUROPE WE DO NOT INTEND IN ANY WAY TO DOWNPLAY THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTION IN THIS REGARD OF THE U.S. AND CANADA WHICH SIGNED THE HELSINKI ACT.

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PROCEEDING FROM SUCH HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES STAND FOR CONSISTENT COMPLIANCE WITH ALL PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT IN ORDER TO IMPROVE ONCE AGAIN THE CLIMATE IN EUROPE, TO ESTABLISH CONFIDENCE AS AN INTEGRAL COMPONENT OF RELATIONS AMONG STATES, AND TO BUILD DEPENDABLE SECURITY ON THE CONTINENT.

BASED ON THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE PRESSING TASKS OF EUROPEAN POLITICS IT IS PARAMOUNT TO CONCLUDE THE FIRST STAGE OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE WITH POSITIVE RESULTS. POSSIBILITIES EXIST FOR IT AND THEY ARE QUITE REAL, GIVEN THE MUTUAL DESIRE TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, BY ALL APPEARANCES, THIS IS WHAT SOME OF OUR WESTERN COUNTERPARTS ARE LACKING YET. OTHERWISE IT IS DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN SKIDDING IN THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE. BUT SUCCESS OR FAILURE IN STOCKHOLM CONSTITUTES IN THE CURRENT SITUATION A TOUCHSTONE OF THE READINESS TO SEEK IN DEEDS RATHER THAN IN WORDS THE REDUCTION OF MILITARY DANGER ON OUR CONTINENT, TO ACTUALLY BUILD CONFIDENCE. THIS IS NECESSARY BOTH BY ITSELF AND FOR THE NEXT CSCE MEETING IN VIENNA SO AS TO ENABLE IT TO TAKE A DECISION ON THE SECOND PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE. ACCORDINGLY, A FRESH IMPETUS WOULD BE GIVEN TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS IN ALL ITS DIMENSIONS.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 04127  
 SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, MAY 19-23, 1986

1. CDE X - 067
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT: AT THE END OF LAST ROUND AND THE BEGINNING OF THIS, THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT ON AT LEAST ONE THEME: SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN DRAFTING WAS ESSENTIAL DURING THIS ROUND. WE HAVE NOT MADE SUCH PROGRESS; INDEED, VERY LITTLE OF SIGNIFICANCE HAS BEEN DRAFTED. WITH ONLY TEN NEGOTIATING WEEKS LEFT, THE POSSIBILITY OF FAILURE LOOMS LARGE OVER THE CONFERENCE.  
 WHO IS TO BLAME? AT THE MOMENT, THE SOVIETS ARE THE CULPRITS. THEY HAVE CLEARLY DELAYED DRAFTING PROGRESS ON THE KEY ISSUES, PARTICULARLY ON THE TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED. BUT CHANCES ARE THAT THE DESIRE FOR AGREEMENT WILL CAUSE EVEN OUR CLOSE ALLIES TO BLAME US FOR OUR "TOUGH" POSITION AS THE NEXT ROUND MOVES ON. FOR EXAMPLE, IN INTERNAL NATO DISCUSSIONS ONLY THE U.S., ALONG WITH THE UK, REMAINS INSISTENT THAT ON-SITE INSPECTION QUA VERIFICATION MUST BE INCLUDED IN ANY CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. FRANCE, IN FACT, CANNOT EVEN ACCEPT NATO'S VERIFICATION MEASURE AS IT NOW STANDS. ACCORDINGLY, THERE IS A DANGER THAT MANY OF OUR ALLIES WILL BE PREPARED TO JOIN THEIR ALREADY ANXIOUS NNA COLLEAGUES IN ACCEPTING SOME FORM OF FACE-SAVING "MINI-PACKAGE" IN SEPTEMBER. THE EAST EUROPEANS ARE ALSO GETTING NERVOUS BUT FOR DIFFERENT REASONS. SOVIET LACK OF FLEXIBILITY THIS ROUND COMBINED WITH OUR REPEATED INSISTENCE THAT WE WILL NOT ACCEPT A LAST-MINUTE "MINI-PACKAGE" HAS MADE THEM REALIZE THAT THERE JUST MIGHT NOT BE A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. END SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT.
4. NOTIFICATION: INASMUCH AS NOTIFICATION IS THE KEY ISSUE IN DEVELOPING A FINAL DOCUMENT IN CDE, THIS SESSION WITNESSED AN UNUSUAL AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY IN THE DESIGNATED WORKING GROUP, ITS SUBORDINATE CONTACT GROUP, ON THE MARGINS AND IN BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS. THE CONFERENCE AT LARGE FOCUSED ON ESTABLISHING A DEFINITION FOR NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES WHILE THE USDEL ALSO WORKED BEHIND THE SCENES TO DEVELOP CONSENSUS ON THE APPROPRIATE THRESHOLD. NONE OF THESE EFFORTS HAS BEEN AN UNQUALIFIED SUCCESS. WE CONSIDER THAT SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT FOR A COMMON APPROACH TO THRESHOLDS HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED WITH KEY DELEGATIONS ALTHOUGH AN ALLIED CONSENSUS DOES NOT EXIST ON THE ISSUE OF "SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND". ON THE OTHER HAND, DRAFTING IN THE WORKING GROUPS HAS GENERALLY BEEN THWARTED THROUGH A COMBINATION OF FACTORS, E.G., EASTERN INSISTENCE ON THE NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITY, MALTESE INTERFERENCE (WHICH AT THIS STAGE

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IS MORE OF AN ANNOYANCE THAN A MAJOR STUMBLING BLOCK) IN THE FLOW OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BY ITS INSISTENCE ON HAVING ITS MEDITERRANEAN CONCERNS REFLECTED, AND THE CLUMSINESS OF THE COORDINATOR WHICH ENCUMBERS RATHER THAN FACILITATES THE DRAFTING PROCESS.

THE ENHANCED FOCUS ON DRAFTING ON NOTIFICATION RAISED EXPECTATIONS BY MID-ROUND WHEN DRAFTING ON THE NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES GOT UNDERWAY. AT THE SAME TIME, BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET DELEGATION AND DIFFERENT WESTERN DELEGATIONS RAISED HOPES THAT A SOLUTION COULD BE FOUND TO THE PROBLEM CAUSED BY SOVIET PROCCUPATION WITH THE NOTIFICATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES. LIKE A CRESCENDO IN A SOUSA MARCH, HOPES INTENSIFIED THAT A NOTIFICATION TEXT COULD BE NOTED WHICH PRESERVED THE SUBORDINATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES TO THE NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY. THESE HOPES WERE SHATTERED IN THE LAST WEEK OF THE SESSION AS THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE, GENERAL TATARNIKOV, CONTINUED BANGING THE INDEPENDENT AIR DRUM, EVEN REJECTING THE POSSIBILITY OF WORKING ON THE BASIS OF AN EASTERN PROPOSAL. THIS DISCORDANT NOTE RESULTED IN A CACOPHONY OF SOUNDS FROM ALL DIRECTIONS, EFFECTIVELY CANCELING THE WHOLE SHOW UNTIL THE CONFERENCE RESUMES IN JUNE. THE ONLY TEXT NOTED THIS ROUND WAS A "CHAPEAU" LER HN NCE TO THE SECTION CONTAINING DEFINITIONS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED.

5. NON-USE OF FORCE: ONLY ONE PASSAGE WAS REGISTERED THIS ROUND: THE LINK BETWEEN CONCRETE CSBM'S AND THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE. THIS LANGUAGE WHICH STATES THAT THE "ADOPTION" AND "IMPLEMENTATION" OF CSBM'S "IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MADRID MANDATE" GIVES "EFFECT AND EXPRESSION" TO THE NUF PRINCIPLE REFLECTS THE WESTERN APPROACH. WHILE DRAFTING PROGRESS WAS MINIMAL IN THE TENTH SESSION (AS IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN, GIVEN THE SLOW PACE IN MOST OTHER GROUPS), THIS WAS DUE MORE TO DEBILITATING DISUNITY THAN TO DELIBERATE DECISIONS ON THE PART OF NATO. THE ALLIANCE WAS OFTEN ITS OWN WORST ENEMY

AS IT WRESTLED WITH THE VEXING PROBLEMS OF HOW TO REAFFIRM THE NUF PRINCIPLE AND WHETHER TO INCLUDE HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE IN THE WESTERN NUF TEXT. WITHOUT INTERNAL AGREEMENT ON THESE SUBJECTS, THE WEST WAS UNABLE TO INTRODUCE ANY OF THE REMAINDER OF ITS NUF LANGUAGE OR TO ENGAGE IN ANY SERIOUS DRAFTING. BY MID-ROUND, HOWEVER, WE WERE ABLE TO PERSUADE EC-12 DELEGATIONS TO DROP THEIR INSISTENCE ON A NUF REAFFIRMATION WHICH INCLUDED REFERENCES TO PROHIBITIONS ON "RIGHTS OF REPRISAL" AND OTHER "MANIFESTATIONS" OF FORCE. IRONICALLY, HUMAN RIGHTS BECAME THE FINAL BETE NOIRE OF THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES AS FIRST ROME AND THEN PARIS OBJECTED TO STRONG HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE IN A WESTERN

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TEXT. ONLY AFTER MUCH INTERNAL AGONIZING -- AND STRATEGIC DEMARCHES -- DID THE ALLIANCE FINALLY AGREE TO A HUMAN RIGHTS PASSAGE WHICH GOES BEYOND THE NNA TEXT. NATO THEN TABLED ITS SECOND "COHERENT BLOCK" WHICH CONTAINED THE NUF REAFFIRMATION AND COLLATERAL CONSIDERATIONS INCLUDING ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE LANGUAGE. THE WEST NOW PLANS TO INTRODUCE THE REST OF THE WESTERN TEXT, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE, EARLY NEXT ROUND. THUS, AN UNCHARACTERISTICALLY UNITED WEST IS NOW COMFORTABLY POISED TO DRAFT AT WHATEVER PACE DEEMED TACTICALLY AND SUBSTANTIVELY APPROPRIATE NEXT ROUND.

6. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION: THE ALLIANCE CONTINUED TO PROMOTE MEASURE 1 ENERGETICALLY THROUGHOUT THE ROUND WITH GENERALLY SOLID SUPPORT ON THE NEED FOR "STATIC" INFORMATION FROM THE NNA (PARTICULARLY SWITZERLAND, SWEDEN, AND MALTA). THE EAST, HOWEVER, REFUSED TO BITE, AND AFTER THEIR SO-CALLED CONCESSION TO DISCUSS THE INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED IN THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION IN WORKING GROUP B-1 (NOTIFICATION), WOULDN'T ENGAGE ON INFORMATION AT ALL UNLESS SPECIFICALLY PROVOKED. WHEN PROVOKED THEY INSISTED THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO PROVIDE INFORMATION -- INCLUDING STATIC INFORMATION -- AND POINTED, WITH NO COMMITMENTS, TO SC.7'S HANDLING OF INFORMATION. THE RESULT -- NO SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS ON

STATIC INFORMATION THIS ROUND. WHAT THIS MEANS FOR THE FUTURE NEEDS TO BE CONSIDERED CAREFULLY: THE FRENCH HAVE ALREADY PROPOSED IN CAUCUS THAT NATO CONSIDER TRADING OFF MEASURE 1 FOR AN APPROPRIATE EASTERN CONCESSION; GDR AMBASSADOR BUHRING HAS FLOATED A TRIAL BALLOON OF A MEASURE 1/CONSTRAINTS TRADE-OFF; AND CAUCUS SENTIMENT IS GROWING FOR SOME ACTION ALONG THESE LINES SO AS TO ALLOW SUFFICIENT TIME TO NEGOTIATE SOME STATIC INFORMATION EXCHANGE INTO OTHER MEASURES AS ENVISAGED BY THE NNA. WHATEVER THE FUTURE OF MEASURE 1, HOWEVER, SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS ON INFORMATION IN THIS WORKING GROUP WILL BE AN UPHILL BATTLE AT BEST, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE.

ON VERIFICATION, EASTERN NONSUBSTANTIVE FLEXIBILITY CONTRIBUTED TO SOME DRAFTING PROGRESS ON A VERIFICATION "SKELETON" WHICH TREATS THE KEY ISSUES (E.G., FORM OF VERIFICATION, TIMELINESS OF RESPONSE ETC.) BY USE OF ELLIPSES, LEAVING SUBSTANTIVE DECISIONS FOR LATER. THREE SENTENCES WERE NOTED DEALING WITH IMPORTANT ELEMENTS FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE: THE RIGHTS OF STATES TO BE ALLOWED TO CONDUCT SOME FORM OF VERIFICATION (INSPECTION, IN OUR VIEW); THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE STATE RECEIVING SUCH A REQUEST; AND TIMELINESS. THE EAST WAS LESS WILLING TO DRAFT ON THE MODALITIES OF VERIFICATION, APPARENTLY FEARING THAT SUCH MODALITIES WOULD BE TAILORED TO INSPECTION AND NOT TO THEIR CONCEPT OF VERIFICATION, I.E., NTM'S, CONSULTATIONS AND, PERHAPS, SOME FORM OF

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OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST. WHILE PROGRESS ON KEY VERIFICATION ISSUES REMAINED ELUSIVE, THE DEVELOPING SKELETON DOES MARK SOME MEASURE OF SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS, INASMUCH AS IT CONFIRMS RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF STATES CONCERNING VERIFICATION AND SHOULD FACILITATE WORK WHEN, AND IF, THE SOVIETS SHOW FLEXIBILITY ON INSPECTION. FOR THE NEAR TERM, HOWEVER, THE MOST PRESSING ISSUE MAY BE ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT. THE FRENCH, IN PARTICULAR, BROADLY HINTED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS IN THE WORKING GROUP THAT SOMETHING ALONG THE LINES OF OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST MAY BE A POSSIBLE SOLUTION. (THEY HAVE

REITERATED TO US BILATERALLY THEIR POSITION THAT 72 HOURS MUST ELAPSE BETWEEN AN INSPECTION REQUEST AND THE ARRIVAL OF A TEAM; THIS TAKES MUCH VALUE OUT OF THE MEASURE.) IN INTERNAL NATO DISCUSSIONS THE DUTCH HAVE NOT HESITATED TO VOICE SIMILAR VIEWS. BY SEPTEMBER SEVERAL OTHERS MAY NOT BE WITH US ON THE INSPECTION ISSUE. IN AN EFFORT TO REMOVE ANY DOUBT ABOUT THE SERIOUSNESS OF OUR POSITION AND TO BOLSTER ALLIANCE RESOLVE WE ARE NOW REEMPHASIZING TO THE ALLIES, AS WELL AS THE EAST AND NNA, THAT INSPECTION WILL REMAIN THE SINE QUA NON FOR THE UNITED STATES IN STOCKHOLM.

7. OBSERVATION: DRAFTING PROGRESS CONTINUED ON THE "HOUSEKEEPING" ISSUES OF OBSERVATION (E.G., TRANSPORTATION OF OBSERVERS) DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THE ROUND, BUT LATER BOGGED DOWN AS A RESULT OF MORE COMPLEX ISSUES BEING DISCUSSED AND THE GENERAL SOVIET TACTIC OF DELAYING SUBSTANTIVE DRAFTING. THE EAST TORPEDOED A SERIES OF INFORMAL COFFEE GROUP ON MAPS AND BINOCULARS AND COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES FOR OBSERVERS, CLEARLY DEMONSTRATING THAT THEY HAVE NO INTENTION OF ACTUALLY HELPING OBSERVERS MAKE AN ACCURATE ASSESSMENT OF AN ACTIVITY. NEAR THE ROUND'S END, HOWEVER, THE EAST DID SHOW SOME APPARENT FLEXIBILITY ON THE QUESTION OF DURATION OF OBSERVATION BY ADOPTING THE NNA'S POSITION THAT OBSERVATION SHOULD BEGIN ONCE THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD IS REACHED. ALSO, WHEN NATO PRESSED THE CASE THAT ALL NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE OBSERVED, THE EAST, UNLIKE IN THE PAST, STUDIOUSLY AVOIDED REJECTING THAT POSITION OUT OF HAND. OVERALL, WHILE PROGRESS HAS SLOWED IN B-2, THERE REMAIN SEVERAL AREAS RIPE FOR DRAFTING NEXT ROUND AND THE EAST IS SHOWING LESS RIGIDITY IN THIS GROUP THAN ELSEWHERE. HOWEVER, THERE ARE DEFINITE LIMITS PLACED ON SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS PENDING RESOLUTION OF THE THRESHOLD QUESTION IN B-1. NATO CONTINUES TO WORK WELL TOGETHER, ALTHOUGH THE RELUCTANCE OF SOME ALLIES TO DEPART FROM THE LETTER OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED COULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO FIND ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS AS DRAFTING PROGRESSES.

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8. ANNUAL FORECASTS: THE EAST BLOCKED DRAFTING ON ANNUAL FORECASTS UNTIL THE FINAL WEEK OF THE ROUND. WHILE SOME CDE PARTICIPANTS LINKED SOVIET OBSTRUCTIVE BEHAVIOR ON FORECASTS TO WESTERN TOUGHNESS ON CONSTRAINTS, IN OUR VIEW, THE MORE LIKELY LINKAGE WAS BETWEEN FORECASTS AND NOTIFICATION. AS LONG AS THE CORE ISSUE OF TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED REMAINED UNRESOLVED, THE SOVIETS DID NOT WANT TO AGREE TO ANYTHING ANYWHERE ELSE WHICH MIGHT PREJUDICE THEIR POSITION. FIRST, THEY REJECTED A STANDARDIZED FORMAT FOR FORECASTS; THEN THEY REFUSED TO TRY TO DRAFT TEXT ON THE CONTENT OF THE FORECAST, SPECIFICALLY, ON THE DURATION OF A FORECAST ACTIVITY. HOWEVER, DURING THE FINAL TWO WEEKS OF THE ROUND -- FOLLOWING GRINEVSKY'S RETURN TO STOCKHOLM FROM MOSCOW REPORTEDLY WITH NEW, MORE FLEXIBLE INSTRUCTIONS -- THE EASTERN POSITION LOOSENED UP SOMEWHAT. BULGARIA TABLED THE LONG-AWAITED EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR AN "ANNUAL PLAN," THE CONTENT OF WHICH INCLUDED MOST OF THE ELEMENTS OF WESTERN AND NNA PROPOSALS, ALTHOUGH IN MORE GENERAL TERMS. FURTHERMORE, THE BULGARIAN PROPOSAL INCLUDED A PROVISION ON TRANSFERS. IN BEHIND THE SCENES MEETINGS DURING THE FINAL WEEK, THE EAST WAS EAGER TO NOTE SOMETHING ON ANNUAL FORECASTS AND THE INTRODUCTORY SENTENCE TO THE CONTENT OF THE CALENDAR WAS NEGOTIATED: EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL LIST THE ABOVE-MENTIONED ACTIVITIES CHRONOLOGICALLY AND WILL PROVIDE INFORMATION ON EACH ACTIVITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING MODEL:." THE LATTER PHRASE, ALTHOUGH NOT OUR PREFERRED STANDARDIZED FORMAT," IS A SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT OVER THE PARALLEL LANGUAGE IN B-1 (NOTIFICATION), "AGREED FORM OF CONTENT." THIS WAS THE ONLY LANGUAGE NOTED IN THIS GROUP THIS ROUND, ALTHOUGH WE ARE NARROWING THE GAPS REGARDING THE FIRST TWO ELEMENTS OF THE CONTENT OF THE ANNUAL CALENDAR.

9. CONSTRAINTS: THERE WAS NO REAL PRESSURE ON THE WEST THIS ROUND TO DRAFT ON CONSTRAINTS ALTHOUGH THE EAST DID USE THEIR LATE "FORTHCOMINGNESS" ON THE CALENDAR TO TRY TO TURN UP THE HEAT ON CONSTRAINTS. THROUGHOUT THE ROUND

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THE SOVIETS EXPLOITED CONSTRAINTS TACTICALLY RATHER THAN SERIOUSLY TRYING TO DRAFT LANGUAGE. DURING THE FIRST WEEK, THEY USED THE CONSTRAINTS MEETING TO DELIVER A POLEMICAL ATTACK ON THE U.S. FOR ITS ATTACK ON LIBYA. LATER, THEY FOCUSED THEIR EFFORTS ON BLAMING THE WEST FOR BLOCKING PROGRESS ON CONSTRAINTS, REPEATEDLY ACCUSING THE U.S. AND THE U.K. OF BEING UNWILLING SERIOUSLY TO CONSIDER CONSTRAINTS. MANY INTERPRETED THESE ATTACKS AS THE SOVIET DELEGATION'S LAST-DITCH EFFORT TO PUSH CONSTRAINTS BEFORE DROPPING THEM. AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME THE GDR AMBASSADOR (BUHRING) INFORMALLY SOUNDED NATO DELEGATES' REACTIONS TO THE IDEA OF A TRADE OFF:

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CONSTRAINTS FOR MEASURE ONE.  
AT THE SAME TIME, THE EAST CONTINUED TO COURT THE NNA, TABLING AN NNA-INSPIRED CONSTRAINTS PROPOSAL LIMITING GROUND FORCE MANEUVERS WHICH ARE TWO TIMES GREATER THAN THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL TO A TOTAL OF SIX PER YEAR. THE NNA, INTERNALLY SPLIT ON HOW TO APPROACH CONSTRAINTS, WERE SURPRISINGLY PASSIVE THIS ROUND. EARLY IN THE ROUND SOME (E.G., THE SWEDES) WANTED TO EXPLORE THE CONSTRAINING EFFECTS OF THE CALENDAR AND THEY CONTINUE TO PURSUE THIS APPROACH PRIVATELY; HOWEVER, OTHERS (YUGOSLAVIA) FEEL STRONGLY ABOUT NNA LOYALTY TO "TRUE" CONSTRAINTS. THE RESULT WAS LITTLE NNA AGITATION ON THE ISSUE AND NO NNA PRESSURE ON NATO. THE IRISH "TIME CONSTRAINT" (ONE EXAMPLE OF THE CONSTRAINING EFFECT OF THE FORECAST) APPEARS TO BE GAINING SUPPORT AMONG THE NNA, WHILE THE SOVIETS, ALTHOUGH CRITICAL, HAVE NOT REJECTED IT OUT OF HAND. SOME WITHIN NATO INCREASINGLY VIEW "TIME CONSTRAINTS" AS PROVIDING US A WAY OUT OF THE CONSTRAINTS "DILEMMA." OTHERS BELIEVE THAT THERE IS AS YET NO TACTICAL BENEFIT TO BE DERIVED FROM NATO SUPPORT FOR SUCH AN IDEA. ALL AGREE THAT, SUBSTANTIVELY SPEAKING, AS LONG AS OUR ALERT LOOPHOLE REMAINS LARGE ENOUGH TO DRIVE SOVIET TANKS THROUGH, THE IRISH IDEAS WILL NOT INHIBIT THE SOVIET USE OF FORCE FOR INTIMIDATION.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STOCKHOLM 04133

SUBJECT: CDE: USSR NOTIFICATION PROPOSAL, MAY 23, 1986

1. CDE X - 69.  
 2. LOU - ENTIRE TEXT.  
 3. DURING PLENARY ON MAY 23 (REPORTED SEPTEL), USSR AMB. GRINEVSKY (FULL TEXT SEPTEL) NOTED THAT "A LOT HINGES ON NOTIFICATION," AND THAT THE TIME HAS COME TO ADDRESS THESE ISSUES SERIOUSLY. IN THAT CONTEXT, HE MADE A NEW PROPOSAL, AS FOLLOWS: BEGIN TEXT.

"FIRST. TO NOTIFY MAJOR MANOEUVRES OF LAND FORCES CONDUCTED INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH ANY POSSIBLE AIR, NAVAL, AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE COMPONENTS, IF THEY INVOLVE 18,000 TROOPS AND MORE. IN SO DOING THE NUMBER OF DIVISIONS ENGAGED IN THE MANOEUVRES WOULD BE REPORTED.

SECOND. TO NOTIFY MANOEUVRES OF AIR FORCES, WHENEVER DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF THE MANOEUVRES 700 AND MORE SORTIES ARE FLOWN OR MORE THAN 350 COMBAT AIRCRAFT ARE ENGAGED IN THE MANOEUVRES."  
 END TEXT.

4. IN RESPONDING TO THE USSR STATEMENT, U.S. AMBASSADOR HANSEN SAID, INTER ALIA, THE U.S. WOULD STUDY THIS PROPOSAL. NONETHELESS, HANSEN NOTED THAT THE NUMERICAL THRESHOLD PROPOSED BY THE USSR WAS NOT ONLY THREE TIMES THE LEVEL PROPOSED IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED, BUT THAT THE USSR PROPOSAL ALSO IGNORED NNA PROPOSALS. FURTHER, IT STICKS TO A CONCEPT (NUMERICAL PARAMETERS TO TRIGGER NOTIFICATION) WHICH IS CLEARLY OUTMODED AND UNACCEPTABLE TO MOST DELEGATIONS. AS FOR THE PROPOSED PARAMETERS FOR NOTIFICATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES, HANSEN OBSERVED THAT THE ONLY TYPE OF ACTIVITY THAT WOULD BE CAPTURED WOULD BE THE TEN PERCENT OF AIR ACTIVITY IN EUROPE NOT COMBINED WITH GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY, I.E. INDEPENDENT AIR. IT WOULD NOT CAPTURE ANY OF THE REMAINING 90 PERCENT OF AIR ACTIVITY IN THE ZONE -- ACTIVITY THAT IS COMBINED WITH GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY, WHEREAS OTHER APPROACHES (SC.1) WOULD PROVIDE FOR SUCH INFORMATION.

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 END OF MESSAGE  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 04126

SUBJECT: CDE: CODEL HOYER MEETING WITH SOVIET CDE  
- AMBASSADOR, MAY 23, 1986

1. CDE X - 070
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN THE COURSE OF A ONE-AND-A-HALF HOUR PRIVATE MEETING WITH CONGRESSMEN STENY HOYER AND JOHN PORTER ON MAY 23, 1986, SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY GAVE A SURPRISINGLY UPBEAT ASSESSMENT OF THE CHANCES FOR A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME AT STOCKHOLM. THIS CABLE REPORTS SEVERAL POINTS OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO THE CDE. END SUMMARY.
4. IN THE COURSE OF A ONE-AND-A-HALF HOUR PRIVATE MEETING WITH CONGRESSMEN STENY HOYER AND JOHN PORTER ON MAY 23, 1986, SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY GAVE A SURPRISINGLY UPBEAT ASSESSMENT OF THE CHANCES FOR A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME AT STOCKHOLM. HE SAID THAT HE SAW NO GREAT DIVERGENCIES ON SUBSTANCE. HOWEVER, HE COULD NOT REPORT TO MOSCOW THAT THERE WAS A "REAL DESIRE" ON THE PART OF ALL PARTICIPANTS TO HAVE AN AGREEMENT BECAUSE OF THE GENERAL APPROACH OF SOME TO WORLD AFFAIRS AND THE CSCE PROCESS AS A WHOLE. HE FURTHER DEFINED THIS APPROACH BY SOME AS INVOLVING THE LINKAGE OF THE DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF THE CSCE PROCESS SO THAT IF ONE FAILED, E.G., THE OTTAWA HUMAN RIGHTS MEETING, THEN PROGRESS IN ANOTHER, E.G., AT STOCKHOLM, WOULD LEAD TO AN IMBALANCE IN THE PROCESS.
5. CONGRESSMAN HOYER SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN GREAT OPTIMISM IN THE U.S. REGARDING U.S.-USSR RELATIONS DUE TO THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT BEFORE THE SUMMIT AND POSITIVE SUMMIT ATMOSPHERICS. HOWEVER, HE HAD BEEN DISCOURAGED IN HIS MEETING WITH THE SOVIET DELEGATE IN OTTAWA AND ASKED GRINEVSKY WHY THE TWO SIDES ARE SO FAR APART ON THE "SMALL ISSUE" OF FAMILY REUNIFICATION. HOYER NOTED THAT IN HELSINKI ALL SIGNATORY STATES HAD SIGNED A DOCUMENT CONTAINING PROVISIONS ACCORDING TO WHICH THEY WOULD ACCORD MINIMUM RIGHTS TO THEIR CITIZENS, BUT THAT THE U.S. STILL FOUND GREAT RESTRICTION IN THE SOVIET IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE PROVISIONS.
6. TURNING TO ANOTHER SUBJECT, GRINEVSKY SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD ACCEPT VERIFICATION IN PRINCIPLE, BUT SAID THAT THOSE WHO FOLLOWED THE ISSUE ALWAYS REFERRED TO "ADEQUATE VERIFICATION -- IT IS OUR BIBLE." HE SAID THAT STOCKHOLM CSBM'S ARE STILL BEING NEGOTIATED AND THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE NATURE OF THESE CSBM'S REQUIRED INSPECTION. THE KIND OF ACTIVITY BEING NEGOTIATED IN STOCKHOLM, I.E., NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCES, ACCORDING TO THE NATO APPROACH, DOES NOT CALL FOR INSPECTION BECAUSE THE U.S. ALREADY KNOWS EVERYTHING

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FROM ITS NTM'S. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT EXCLUDE THE  
POSSIBILITY OF "INSPECTION FOR THE SAKE OF INSPECTION,"  
BUT THAT HE DOUBTED IT WAS POSSIBLE AT THE PRESENT TIME;  
MORE CONFIDENCE WAS NEEDED FIRST.

7. THIS CABLE WAS NOT CLEARED WITH CONGRESSMEN HOYER  
AND PORTER.

HANSEN

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03947

SUBJECT: WESTERN STRATEGY AND TACTICS FOR THE CLOSING  
- PHASE OF CDE

1. CDE X - 054

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. BEGIN SUMMARY: USDEL BELIEVES THAT, TO ACHIEVE THE MINIMALIST AGREEMENT NEEDED FOR CONTINUITY IN CDE, SOVIET CDE STRATEGY WILL BE TO CONTINUE DELAYING SUBSTANTIVE DRAFTING WHILE BUILDING POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE WEST TO ACCEPT AN ELEVENTH-HOUR MINI-PACKAGE. TO COUNTER THIS, THE U.S. MUST TOUGHEN NATO TO IMPRESS UPON BOTH THE EAST AND NNA THAT WE WILL NEVER ACCEPT A PACKAGE WHICH DOES NOT INCLUDE, INTER ALIA, INSPECTION WITH NO RIGHT OF REFUSAL, AND TO PRESSURE THE EAST TO BRING THEIR APPARENT FLEXIBILITY BEHIND THE SCENES TO THE FORE IN THE CONFERENCE. WE ARE ASSUMING A POSTURE OF PESSIMISM OVER CONFERENCE PROSPECTS AND INDICATING THAT IF SUBSTANTIVE DRAFTING IN ALL AREAS IS NOT ACCELERATED EARLY IN ROUND XI AN ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE ACHIEVABLE. WHILE NOT ALL ALLIED DELEGATIONS ARE LIKELY TO JOIN US IN PROCLAIMING THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF A "SYMBOLIC" AGREEMENT, WE CAN EXPECT GOOD NEAR-TERM SUPPORT FOR A FIRM LINE AGAINST A MINI-PACKAGE AND FOR THE NECESSITY OF INSPECTION. WHETHER THE CENTER WILL HOLD THROUGH THE FINAL HOUR IS MORE QUESTIONABLE. OUR TACTICAL PROBLEM IS COMPOUNDED BY THE UK, WHICH (WHILE AGREEING WITH OUR SHORT-RANGE TACTICS) MAY BE PLAYING INTO EASTERN HANDS BY HOLDING TO THE VIEW THAT SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS NEED NOT START UNTIL THE LAST ROUND. SEE PARA 6 FOR ACTION REQUESTED. END SUMMARY.

4. EASTERN STRATEGY: AS CDE ROUND X ENDS, THE EAST IS CARRYING ITS TACTIC OF DELAY INTO THE END GAME. CLEARLY, THE EASTERN OBJECTIVE IN STOCKHOLM IS TO ACHIEVE A "MODEST" AGREEMENT (READ A "MINI-PACKAGE" CONTAINING NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION, AN ANNUAL CALENDAR, AND NON-USE OF FORCE, BUT WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT STATIC INFORMATION AND WITHOUT ON-SITE INSPECTION) WHICH WOULD ENSURE CONTINUITY OF THE CDE PROCESS AFTER VIENNA, IDEALLY IN THE FORM OF A CDE PHASE II MANDATE LINKED TO THE APRIL 18 GORBACHEV INITIATIVE. TO ACHIEVE THIS, IN ROUND XI THEY PROBABLY WILL CONTINUE TO DELAY SUBSTANTIVE DRAFTING FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE WHILE BLAMING THE WEST FOR "FOOT-DRAGGING." THUS, THEY SEEK TO BUILD POLITICAL PRESSURE ON NATO STATES TO ACCEPT A MINIMAL OUTCOME IN SEPTEMBER.

SIMPLY PUT, THE EAST IS ATTEMPTING TO SET UP THE WEST FOR A MINI-PACKAGE OR, AT THE MINIMUM, TO TAKE THE RAP FOR A FAILURE. THIS ROUND, THE SOVIETS DEADLOCKED THE CONFERENCE ON THE NOTIFICATION ISSUE BY INSISTING THAT, AS A PRECONDITION TO DRAFTING ON GROUND FORCE PARAMETERS,

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PARAMETERS BE IDENTIFIED WHICH WOULD CAPTURE INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES, ALBEIT AT A VERY HIGH LEVEL. COMPLEMENTING THIS EFFORT, THEY HAVE BEGUN A CONCERTED CAMPAIGN BOTH WITHIN THE CONFERENCE AND IN THE PRESS OF BLAMING THE WEST FOR LACK OF PROGRESS IN ALL WORKING GROUPS. IN RECENT DAYS THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNS THAT THE SOVIETS MAY BE PREPARED TO RESOLVE THE AIR QUESTION IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH AND ALSO TO ACCEPT A NONPREJUDICIAL FORMULATION ON THE DEFERMENT OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES. THIS "FORTHCOMINGNESS" IS ONLY PART OF A SLIDING DEFENSE, HOWEVER, AND WE FULLY EXPECT THAT NEW BARRIERS WILL EMERGE IN THE NEXT ROUND AS THEIR MINIMALIST STRATEGY CONTINUES.

5. THE U.S. RESPONSE: IN OUR VIEW, THE RECENT GORBACHEV INITIATIVE AND EARLIER SIGNS OF RENEWED SOVIET INTEREST IN A PHASE II CDE OFFER US POTENTIAL LEVERAGE TO COUNTER THIS SOVIET STRATEGY AS WELL AS TO PRESS OUR CASE WITH THE NNA AND OUR ALLIES. WE ARE ASKING HOW ONE CAN EXPECT TO GO INTO A MUCH MORE COMPREHENSIVE NEGOTIATION INVOLVING GENUINE ARMS REDUCTION WHEN WE ARE APPARENTLY UNABLE TO REACH FAR LESS AMBITIOUS GOALS HERE; WE ARE PRESSING THE CASE THAT THE SOVIETS NOW BELIEVE THEY NEED AN AGREEMENT; AND WE ARE DOWNPLAYING THE CHANCES FOR A SUBSTANTIVE RESULT IN STOCKHOLM AND MAKING ABUNDANTLY CLEAR TO ALL THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES AGREE TO A MINI-PACKAGE, I.E., ANY PACKAGE WHICH DOES NOT CONTAIN, INTER ALIA, ON-SITE INSPECTION AS A RIGHT. WE STRESS THAT ROUND X WAS A "CRITICAL" SESSION, BUT THAT NO SUBSTANTIVE DRAFTING WAS ACCOMPLISHED BECAUSE OF EASTERN INTRANSIGENCE. FOR THERE TO BE ANY POSSIBILITY OF ACHIEVING AN ACCEPTABLE RESULT, SUBSTANTIVE DRAFTING MUST PROGRESS RAPIDLY IN ALL GROUPS EARLY IN ROUND XI. IN USDEL'S VIEW, THIS APPROACH CARRIED OUT WITHIN THE CONFERENCE, IN BILATERAL CONTACTS, AND IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS EFFORTS OFFERS THE BEST CHANCE TO BUILD PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS TO SERIOUSLY

DRAFT IN THE NEXT ROUND. WE SHOULD ALSO PRESS THE SOVIETS BILATERALLY TO TRANSLATE THEIR APPARENT FLEXIBILITY IN PRIVATE INTO GENUINE FLEXIBILITY WHERE IT COUNTS, I.E., DRAFTING IN THE WORKING GROUPS. ALTHOUGH WE ARE NOT SANGUINE ABOUT FORCING AN EARLY SHOW OF THE EASTERN HAND, WE BELIEVE SUCH A COURSE WOULD AT LEAST ALLOW THE WEST TO BUILD ITS CASE THAT THE EAST IS AT FAULT FOR THE FAILURE OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE.

6. ALLIANCE CONSIDERATIONS: FOR THE NEAR TERM (THROUGH THE END OF THE ROUND) THERE IS GENERAL CAUCUS SUPPORT FOR OUR SUGGESTED TACTICS AND AT LEAST THE FRG AND UK WILL BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT OUR VIEW IN THE FINAL PLENARY. LONGER TERM SUPPORT FOR OUR STRATEGY INTO ROUND XI, HOWEVER, IS MORE PROBLEMATIC. FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL

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REASONS, MANY ALLIED DELEGATIONS ARE LOATH TO EVEN HINT PUBLICLY THAT WE MIGHT NOT ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT, AND THEY ARE OVERLY ENCOURAGED BY RECENT SOVIET HINTS OF FLEXIBILITY. THE FRENCH, ON THE OTHER HAND, SAY THEY ARE PREPARED TO BRAND THE CONFERENCE A FAILURE IF THE MAJOR ELEMENTS OF AN AGREEMENT ARE NOT DECIDED BY THE END OF ROUND XI. THE UK (STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY CANADA), WHILE SUPPORTIVE OF OUR POSTURE OF PESSIMISM, HAS YET TO AGREE WITH US THAT SUBSTANTIVE DRAFTING MUST ACCELERATE NEXT ROUND, AND THEY CONTINUE TO FEEL THAT THE WEST CAN WREST BIGGER CONCESSIONS FROM THE SOVIETS BY HOLDING RELIGIOUSLY TO SC.1 UNTIL THE FINAL ROUND. THE TROUBLE WITH THIS ARGUMENT IS THAT THE TOUGH GUYS WILL BE LITTLE IN EVIDENCE AT THE END. THE BRITISH, AS HOLDERS OF THE EC PRESIDENCY, WILL BE NEUTRALIZED. THE FRENCH, WHO HAVE ALWAYS BEEN "WET" ON KEY QUESTIONS SUCH AS INSPECTION, WILL BE PREPARED FOR A MINI-PACKAGE AS A GESTURE TO KOHL. THE CANADIANS ARE CONFIDENT ABOUT THE END GAME BECAUSE THEY HAVE NO REAL SUBSTANTIVE CONCERNS. AS A RESULT WE WILL BE LEFT HOLDING THE BAG ALONE -- A NO-WIN SITUATION FOR US. ALSO, THE LONGER SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS IS BLOCKED, THE MORE THE SWEDES (AS HOSTS) WILL BE TEMPTED TO TRY TO "RESCUE" THE CONFERENCE WITH A PRE-FINAL ROUND BRIDGING PROPOSAL WHICH THEY MAY, IN FACT, ALL READY BE DRAFTING.

7. WE HAVE FOUR TASKS BEFORE US: 1) ALTHOUGH THERE MAY BE SOME MOVEMENT DEVELOPING IN THE BRITISH POSITION, WE MUST CONTINUE TO PRESS THE UK AND CANADA TO SUPPORT SUBSTANTIVE DRAFTING NOW AS THE ONLY POSSIBLE ROUTE TO A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME; 2) WE MUST BEGIN TO EXPRESS IN THE CONFERENCE, BILATERALLY AND IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE POOR PROSPECTS FOR THE CONFERENCE'S SUCCESS AND THE REASONS FOR THEM, AND TO STRESS THAT FOR THERE TO BE ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS, SUBSTANTIVE DRAFTING MUST ACCELERATE SHARPLY; 3) WE MUST CONTINUE TO IMPRESS UPON ALLIES AND THE EAST ALIKE THAT WE WILL NOT AGREE TO A MINI-PACKAGE, THAT INSPECTION IS AND WILL REMAIN OUR SINE QUA NON AND THAT SUBSTANTIVE DRAFTING MUST BEGIN NOW; AND 4) WHILE AVOIDING ANY IMPLIED COMMITMENT TO CONTINUITY IN CDE, WE NEED TO STRESS THAT CONTINUATION OF THE CONFERENCE AFTER VIENNA SEEMS TO US IMPOSSIBLE IF STOCKHOLM FAILS.

8. WE PROVIDE THESE THOUGHTS FOR POSSIBLE USE IN THE RUNUP TO THE HALIFAX NATO MINISTERIAL AND THE WARSAW PACT PCC SUMMIT WHICH WILL FORM THE BACKDROP FOR THE BEGINNING OF THE NEXT CDE ROUND ON JUNE 10.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03259  
 SUBJECT: WESTERN NON-USE OF FORCE TEXT  
 REF: A) STOCKHOLM 3094, B) S'OCKHOLM 1911,  
 - C) STATE 31397  
 1. CDE X - 030  
 2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS CABLE CONTAINS THE REMAINDER OF THE WESTERN NON-USE OF FORCE TEXT (THE FIRST ELEMENT, THE CSBM'S-NUF LINK, HAS ALREADY BEEN TABLED) AS DRAFTED BY NATO DELEGATIONS IN STOCKHOLM. THE DRAFT CONTAINS ALL THE KEY ELEMENTS OF THE U.S. ILLUSTRATIVE TEXT, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS, ANTI-TERRORISM, ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE, AND VERIFICATION/COMPLIANCE LANGUAGE. THE REFERENCE TO THE NUF PRINCIPLE, MOREOVER, IS CLOSER TO THE U.S. (UN CHARTER) THAN THE EC-12 APPROACH (HELSINKI FINAL ACT). ACTION REQUESTED IN PARA 7. END SUMMARY.

4. NATO DELEGATIONS IN STOCKHOLM HAVE REACHED AD REFERENDUM AGREEMENT ON A WESTERN TEXT ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE (SEE PARA 8 FOR FULL TEXT). USDEL BELIEVES THE DRAFT REFLECTS ALL KEY ELEMEN'S IN THE U.S. NUF TEXT CONTAINED IN REF B, E.G., LANGUAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ANTI-TERRORISM, VERIFICATION/COMPLIANCE AND EQUAL RIGH'S/EQUAL DUTIES OF STATES. THESE CONCEPTS WERE NOT INCLUDED IN THE EC-12 NUF TEXT (REF B): IN ADDITION, THIS NATO DRAFT CONTAINS LANGUAGE ON THE NUF PRINCIPLE 'SELF (TAKEN FROM THE UN CHARTER) AND ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE LANGUAGE CLOSER TO 'HE U.S. THAN THE EC-12 APPROACH. IN SHORT, THE DRAFT REFLECTS THE BROADER WESTERN CONCEPT OF SECURITY, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS.

5. AS WITH ANY DOCUMENT DESIGNED BY A COMMITTEE, THIS NUF TEXT IS FAR FROM PERFECT. FOR EXAMPLE, DELEGATION PRESSED FOR A MORE EXTENSIVE HUMAN RIGHTS SECTION. HOWEVER, GIVEN THE FACT THAT EC-12 TEXT DID NOT CONTAIN WHAT WOULD BE TERMED HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE, EVEN GETTING AGREEMENT TO INCLUDE HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE WAS EXCEPTION-ALLY DIFFICULT. EVEN AFTER AMBASSADOR BARRY'S LOBBYING IN ROME, THE ITALIANS WERE UNBENDING. HOWEVER, AT THE LAST MOMENT, THEY ABSENTED THEMSELVES FROM THE DRAFTING EXERCISE, SO A CONSENSUS COULD BE REACHED ON HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE. AS AGREED, THE HUMAN RIGHTS PARAGRAPH INCLUDES, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE CSCE CONTEXT, THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. WHILE THE HUMAN RIGHTS TEXT FALLS FAR SHORT OF WHAT DELEGATION WOULD LIKE TO HAVE SEEN, IT GOES BEYOND THE NNA TEXT. MOREOVER, NATO DELEGATIONS HAVE ACCEPTED THE IDEA OF INTRODUCING MORE WESTERN HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE IF THE TACTICAL SITUATION SHOULD WARRANT, E.G., AS A COUNTER-POINT IF THE EAST PUSHES ITS NO-FIRST-USE LANGUAGE. WHILE THE ORDERING OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE TEXT IS

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SOMEWHAT HAPHAZARD, SINCE THE TEXT WILL BE INTRODUCED IN A PIECEMEAL (OR BLOCK) FASHION, THE ORDER CAN BE CORRECTED DURING NEGOTIATIONS DEPENDING ON THE FORM OF A NUF SECTION IN A STOCKHOLM CONCLUDING DOCUMENT.

6. ALL NATO DELEGATIONS AGREED TO REPORT THIS UNBRACKETED TEXT TO THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPITALS FOR COMMENT BY APRIL 30. THE TEXT REPRESENTS A FRAGILE COMPROMISE, PARTICULARLY FOR EC-12 MEMBERS, SINCE IT GOES WELL BEYOND THEIR COMMON TEXT Tabled IN THE NATO CAUCUS ON FEBRUARY 26. NEVERTHELESS, ALL DELEGATIONS, EXCEPT ITALY, SAID THEY WOULD RECOMMEND TO THEIR CAPITALS THAT THE TEXT BE ACCEPTED AS DRAFTED. (THEREFORE, FOR THE TIME BEING, DEPARTMENT SHOULD HOLD OFF ON DEMARCHES REQUESTED IN REF A). WHETHER THE TEXT COMES THROUGH UNSCATHED IS DIFFICULT TO PREDICT. THE NORMALLY OBSTREPEROUS FRENCH, THE MAIN AUTHORS OF THE EC-12 TEXT, WERE STRANGELY SILENT DURING THE DRAFTING OF THIS TEXT. THE ITALIANS WILL ONLY SAY THEY WILL REPORT TO ROME THAT THIS TEXT RECEIVED THE SUPPORT OF ALL DELEGATIONS, INCLUDING THEIR COMMUNITY PARTNERS. WESTERN DELEGATIONS IN STOCKHOLM, MOREOVER, SEEM MORE INCLINED TO ACCEPT THE BROADER U.S. APPROACH TO NUF THAN THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPITALS. WHEN AND IF THIS LANGUAGE IS ADOPTED AS THE FORMAL WESTERN NUF TEXT, NATO WILL DETERMINE HOW BEST TO USE IT IN STOCKHOLM, I.E., TO BE INTRODUCED IN A PIECEMEAL (OR BLOCK) APPROACH CONTINGENT UPON PROGRESS IN CSBM'S WORKING GROUPS.

7. ACTION REQUESTED: DELEGATION BELIEVES TEXT IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN REF C. WE HAVE DISCOURAGED OTHERS FROM FIDDLING WITH THE TEXT. ANY COMMENTS SHOULD BE RECEIVED BY WEDNESDAY, APRIL 30.

8. BEGIN TEXT:

-- CONSEQUENTLY THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECALL THEIR OBLIGATION TO REFRAIN IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS, AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNA'IONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL, FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE OR IN ANY MANNER INCONSIS'ENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS. ACCORDINGLY THE PARTICIPATING STATES REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO RESPECT AND PUT INTO PRACTICE THIS PRINCIPLE AS LAID DOWN IN PRINCIPLE 2 OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

(N.B. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE U.S. POSITION IN FAVOR OF USING MINIMALIST UN CHARTER LANGUAGE TO REAFFIRM THE NUF PRINCIPLE, THE FIRST SENTENCE IS BASED ON ARTICLE 2(4) OF THE UN CHARTER (UNC) WITH THE ADDITION OF "IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS" TO PUT IT IN THE CSCE CONTEXT. THE SECOND SENTENCE WAS ADDED IN PLACE OF A VERBATIM QUOTE OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT'S (HFA) PRINCIPLE 2, P.78, PR POSED IN THE EC-12 TEXT).

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-- NO CONSIDERATION WHATSOEVER WHETHER OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY OR ANY OTHER NATURE CAN BE INVOKED TO JUSTIFY THE THREAT OF FORCE OR THE DIRECT OR INDIRECT USE OF FORCE.

THEY RECALL THAT AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, NOTHING SHALL IMPAIR THE INHERENT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE IF AN ARMED ATTACK OCCURS.

(N.B. THE FIRST SENTENCE IS BASED ON U.S. LANGUAGE ELABORATING THE HFA'S PRINCIPLE 2, PARA 1, P.78. THE SECOND SENTENCE IS BASED ON ARTICLE 51 OF THE UNC. THE TEXT ENSURES THAT THESE TWO ELEMENTS ARE LINKED)

-- THEY WILL LIKEWISE REFRAIN FROM ANY MANIFESTATION OF FORCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE OR ANY OTHER STATE TO RENOUNCE THE FULL EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND, IN PARTICULAR, OF ITS FREEDOM AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND ITS RIGHT FREELY TO CHOOSE AND DEVELOP ITS OWN POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL SYSTEM.

(N.B. THE FIRST PART OF THE SENTENCE IS BASED ON HFA'S PRINCIPLE 2, PARA 3, P.79; THE SECOND PART IS BASED ON HFA'S PRINCIPLE 1, PARA 1, P.78.)

-- THEY WILL LIKEWISE REFRAIN FROM MAKING EACH OTHER'S TERRITORY THE OBJECT OF MILITARY OCCUPATION OR OTHER DIRECT OR INDIRECT MEASURES OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, OR THE OBJECT OF ACQUISITION BY MEANS OF SUCH MEASURES OR THE THREAT OF THEM. NO SUCH OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS LEGAL.

(N.B. BASED ON HFA'S PRINCIPLE 4, PARA 3, P.79. THE TURKS SAY THEY ACCEPT THIS LANGUAGE, WHICH COULD BE USED AGAINST THEM BY CYPRUS AND GREECE.)

-- THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESSED THEIR COMMITMENT TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS WITH EACH OF THE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER OR NOT THEY MAINTAIN WITH EACH OTHER RELATIONS OF ALLIANCE, AS WELL AS IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH ALL OTHER STATES.

(N.B. NEW ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE LANGUAGE; SAME IDEA IS CONTAINED IN NNA PROPOSAL (SC.7), EC-12, AND U.S. TEXTS.)

-- THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IS A COMPLEMENT TO REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, BOTH BEING ESSENTIAL, THOUGH NOT EXCLUSIVE, FACTORS FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY.

(N.B. THE ORIGINAL EC-12 TEXT ON PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES (PSD) IS STRENGTHENED WITH THE ADDITION OF AN AMENDMENT ("BOTH . . . SECURITY."); THE SECOND PART IS TAKEN FROM HFA SECTION ENTITLED "MATTERS RELATED TO GIVING EFFECT TO CERTAIN OF THE ABOVE PRINCIPLES, P.84.)

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-- IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 103 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE PARTICIPATING STATES CONFIRM THAT IN THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ANY TREATY OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER WILL PREVAIL.

(N.B. BASED ON ARTICLE 103 OF THE UNC.)

-- THEY CONFIRM THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF ALL STATES AND NOTE THAT ALL SOVEREIGN STATES HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS AND EQUAL DUTIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

(N.B. U.S. LANGUAGE BASED ON THE HFA'S PRINCIPLE 1, PARA 2, P.78.)

-- THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT EFFECTIVE FORMS OF VERIFICATION ENSURING STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS ARE INDISPENSABLE FOR BUILDING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY.

(N.B. BASED ON U.S. LANGUAGE ON VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE.)

THEY STRESSED THE NECESSITY TO PROMOTE AND ENCOURAGE THE EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS. THEY FURTHER REAFFIRMED THE UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS, THE RESPECT FOR WHICH IS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR FOR PEACE, JUSTICE AND

WELL-BEING NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AMONG THEMSELVES AS AMONG ALL STATES. IT IS THUS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR FOR THE CSCE PROCESS AND FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.

(N.B. THE FIRST SENTENCE IS BASED ON U.S. LANGUAGE; THE SECOND SENTENCE IS BASED ON THE HFA'S PRINCIPLE 7, PARA 5 (P.80); AND THE THIRD SENTENCE IS TAKEN FROM THE NNA PROPOSAL (SC.7).)

(N.B. THE TEXT WHICH FOLLOWS IS EC-12 HUMAN RIGHTS TEXT. IT IS WEAKER THAN NNA LANGUAGE IN SC.7.)

-- THEY RECOGNIZED THE CLOSE LINK BETWEEN PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THE WORLD AS A WHOLE AND ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED FOR EACH OF THEM TO MAKE ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRENGTHENING OF WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY AND TO THE PROMOTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS AND WELL-BEING FOR ALL PEOPLES.

-- THE PARTICIPATING STATES ONCE AGAIN EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN AT THE CONTINUING ACTS OF TERRORISM. THEY CONDEMN TERRORISM, INCLUDING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND EMPHASIZE THE NECESSITY TO TAKE RESOLUTE MEASURES TO COMBAT IT. THEY EXPRESS THEIR DETERMINATION TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM, BOTH AT THE NATIONAL

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LEVEL AND THROUGH INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. IN THE  
CONTEXT OF THE COMBAT AGAINST ACTS OF TERRORISM, THEY  
WILL TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN PREVENTING THEIR  
RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES FROM BEING USED FOR THE  
PREPARATION, ORGANIZATION OR COMMISSION OF TERRORIST  
ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING THOSE DIRECTED AGAINST OTHER  
PARTICIPATING STATES AND THEIR CITIZENS.

(N.B. FIRST SENTENCE IS NEW; THE SECOND AND THIRD  
SENTENCES ARE SOMEWHAT ABBREVIATED VERSIONS OF THE  
MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT'S (MCD) PRINCIPLES SECTION,  
PARAS 4 AND 5.)

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-- THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO ALL TEN  
PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT, WHICH ARE ALL OF PRIMARY  
SIGNIFICANCE AND ACCORDINGLY WILL BE EQUALLY AND  
UNRESERVEDLY APPLIED, EACH OF THEM BEING INTERPRETED  
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE OTHERS.

(N.B. BASED ON THE HFA, THE FIRST PARAGRAPH FOLLOWING  
THE TEN PRINCIPLES, P.82.)

END TEXT.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03905

SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO THE FRENCH ON WESTERN NON-USE OF  
- FORCE TEXT

REF: A) STOCKHOLM 3816, B) STOCKHOLM 3094

1. CDE X - 053

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AS ANTICIPATED IN REF A, THE FRENCH SUBMITTED "MODIFICATIONS" TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS PORTION OF THE WESTERN NON-USE OF FORCE TEXT. THE FRENCH MAINTAIN THESE MODIFICATIONS ARE MERELY DRAFTING CHANGES. THEY ARE NOT; THE CHANGES ARE MAJOR AND THEY ARE SUBSTANTIVE. THEREFORE, IN DELEGATION'S VIEW, OUR DIFFERENCES ARE IRRECONCILABLE. ALL OTHER NATO DELEGATIONS ALSO SHARE THIS VIEW. THESE LAST-MINUTE CHANGES HAVE RESULTED IN A MAJOR IMPASSE WITHIN NATO AND POTENTIALLY AT THE CONFERENCE, WHICH COULD REDOUND TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE ONLY SOLUTION IS FOR THE FRENCH TO BACK DOWN FROM THEIR SUGGESTED CHANGES IMMEDIATELY. ACCORDINGLY, DELEGATION REQUESTS THAT DEPARTMENT USE THE VISIT OF FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER RAIMOND, POLITICAL DIRECTOR MOREL, AND HIS MAIN DISARMAMENT ADVISORS TO WASHINGTON TODAY, MAY 16 OR OVER THE WEEKEND, TO DELIVER A DEMARCHE CONTAINING THE POINTS IN PARA 7 BELOW. END SUMMARY.

4. BACKGROUND. ON MAY 12, ROME RELUCTANTLY AGREED ON HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE TO BE INCLUDED IN A WESTERN NUF TEXT. ACCORDINGLY ALL NATO DELEGATIONS SEEMED TO HAVE REACHED CONSENSUS ON A FULL NUF TEXT. HOWEVER, AT THE LAST POSSIBLE MOMENT FRANCE SAID IT MIGHT HAVE SOME MINOR DRAFTING MODIFICATIONS TO SUGGEST ON HUMAN RIGHTS. ON MAY 13, THE FRENCH DELEGATION TOLD US PRIVATELY THAT IT WAS DISCUSSING THESE MODIFICATIONS WITH PARIS, IMPLYING THAT THE DELEGATION WASN'T HAPPY WITH THE CHANGES AND WAS TRYING TO PERSUADE PARIS TO DROP THEM. ON MAY 14, THE FRENCH DELEGATION TOLD US THEY HAD BEEN OVERRULED AND THAT PARIS, AT THE POLITICAL DIRECTOR LEVEL OF THE QUAI D'ORSAY, HAD DECIDED TO GO FORWARD WITH ITS SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS. ON MAY 15, FRANCE SUBMITTED THESE CHANGES; THEY ARE MAJOR AND THEY ARE SUBSTANTIVE. IN SHORT, THEY WEAKEN THE HUMAN RIGHTS TEXT AND THUS MAKE IT UNACCEPTABLE TO US. THE FRENCH WOULD SUBSTITUTE THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS FOR PARAS 2 AND 3 OF THE AD REF NATO TEXT (SEE REF A).

-- FOR PARA 2 REF A SUBSTITUTE:

EITHER:

"THE PARTICIPATING STATES EXPRESS THE CONVICTION THAT RESPECT FOR THESE PRINCIPLES WILL ENCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF NORMAL AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND THE PROGRESS OF COOPERATION AMONG THEM IN ALL FIELDS."

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OR:

"THEY RECOGNIZED THE CLOSE LINK BETWEEN PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE AND ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED FOR EACH OF THEM TO MAKE ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRENGTHENING OF WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY AND TO THE PROMOTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS AND WELL-BEING FOR ALL PEOPLES."

-- FOR PARA 3 REF A SUBSTITUTE:

THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZE THE UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, RESPECT FOR WHICH IS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR FOR THE PEACE, JUSTICE AND WELL-BEING NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AMONG THEMSELVES AS AMONG ALL STATES."

5. THE FRENCH USED THE FOLLOWING ARGUMENTS TO JUSTIFY THEIR POSITION:

-- ON PARA 2, THE AD REF NATO TEXT COULD MAKE IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEPENDENT ON IMPLEMENTATION IN OTHER FIELDS, ESPECIALLY ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION.

-- ON PARA 3, IT IS DANGEROUS TO LINK HUMAN RIGHTS TO THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SITUATION BECAUSE THE LINKAGE COULD BE REVERSED BY THE SOVIET UNION, I.E., IN THE CASE OF THE WORSENING OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SITUATION THE SOVIETS COULD USE THIS AS A JUSTIFICATION TO REPRESS HUMAN RIGHTS.

-- THE FRENCH WOULD PREFER TO RETURN TO AND NOT GO BEYOND THE AGREED LANGUAGE OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. (BOTH TEXTS THE FRENCH HAVE INTRODUCED COME FROM THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.) FURTHERMORE, THE FRENCH ARGUED THAT STOCKHOLM IS NOT THE BEST PLACE TO DEVELOP THE HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLE.

6. WHILE SOME DELEGATIONS HAD SYMPATHY IN SUBSTANCE WITH THE FRENCH MINIMALIST POSITION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, E.G., ITALY, THERE WAS A STRONG AND UNANIMOUS SENSE THAT IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS TO TAMPER WITH THE CAREFULLY CRAFTED COMPROMISE HUMAN RIGHTS TEXT AT THIS LATE DATE. FURTHERMORE, THIS UNEXPECTED IMPASSE HAS MAJOR IMPLICATIONS FOR ALLIED SOLIDARITY AND DRAFTING PROGRESS IN THE CONFERENCE ITSELF. WITHOUT FULL AGREEMENT ON A NATO NUF TEXT THERE CAN BE NO MORE DRAFTING PROGRESS IN THE NUF WORKING GROUP EVEN IF WE CAN AGREE TO LANGUAGE WHICH SERVES OUR INTERESTS. (THE NUF WORKING GROUP MEETS FOR THE LAST TIME THIS ROUND ON TUESDAY, MAY 20.) THE EAST IS SURE TO -- AND HAS ALREADY BEGUN TO -- USE THIS IMPASSE TO BLAME THE WEST FOR THE LACK OF PROGRESS IN THE CONFERENCE AS A WHOLE. IN ADDITION, THESE LAST-MINUTE FRENCH OBJECTIONS FIT INTO A DISTURBING AND RECURRING PATTERN. EVEN PARIS'S CLOSEST EC-12 ALLIES

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ARE RUNNING OUT OF PATIENCE WITH FRENCH OB DURACY.  
 7. THEREFORE DELEGATION RECOMMENDS THAT WASHINGTON USE THE OCCASION OF THE VISIT OF FRENCH POLITICAL DIRECTOR MOREL AND HIS CLOSEST DISARMAMENT ADVISORS (E.G., D'ABOVILLE) TODAY, MAY 16 AND OVER THE WEEKEND, TO IMPRESS UPON THE FRENCH THAT THEY MUST DROP THESE MODIFICATIONS IMMEDIATELY. DELEGATION SUGGESTS THAT DEPARTMENT USE THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS (SEE REF B IF MORE TALKING POINTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS ARE NEEDED):  
 -- THE WESTERN NUF TEXT WAS ONLY AGREED UPON AFTER THE MOST DELICATE AND ARDUOUS NEGOTIATIONS. AS PARIS IS PROBABLY AWARE, WE WOULD HAVE LIKED TO HAVE SEEN STRONGER HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE. HOWEVER, WE AGREED TO ACCEPT THE FULL WESTERN NUF TEXT IN THE INTERESTS OF MAINTAINING WESTERN SOLIDARITY AND OF ADVANCING DRAFTING IN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE.

-- ALL NATO DELEGATIONS BELIEVED WE HAD FULL AGREEMENT ON THIS TEXT ON MONDAY, MAY 12. PARIS HAD BEEN FULLY AWARE OF THE BASIC CONTENTS OF THE TEXT FOR MANY WEEKS. THEREFORE THERE CAN BE NO EXCUSE FOR THE LATE SERIES OF MAJOR AND SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIONS AFTER ALL OTHER NATO MEMBERS THOUGHT THAT WE HAD CONSENSUS ON THE TEXT.

-- PARIS, IN THE GUISE OF INTRODUCING AMENDMENTS, IN FACT, HAS RETURNED TO ITS EARLIER HUMAN RIGHTS TEXT, A TEXT WHICH WAS REJECTED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS BY ALL OTHER ALLIES. THIS ATTEMPT BY PARIS TO HAVE ITS CAKE AND EAT IT TOO IS UNACCEPTABLE. (A NUMBER OF ALLIES HAVE ACCUSED THE FRENCH OF REINTRODUCING THEIR TEXT AT THIS JUNCTURE FOR TACTICAL, NOT SUBSTANTIVE, REASONS.)

-- IN ADDITION TO THESE PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS WE ALSO HAVE MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS WITH THE FRENCH SUGGESTIONS:

- 1) PARIS'S SUGGESTION ON THE SECOND PARAGRAPH ELIMINATES REFERENCES TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THESE REFERENCES WERE NEEDED TO GET ROME'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE TEXT. THE TEXT DOES NOT, CONTRARY TO PARIS'S ASSERTION, LINK PROGRESS IN HUMAN RIGHTS TO PROGRESS IN OTHER FIELDS.

- 2) PARIS'S SUGGESTION TO ELIMINATE THE FINAL SENTENCE CONTAINED IN THE NNA DRAFT AND IS THE MOST IMPORTANT STEP BEYOND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT LANGUAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS FOR US. IF WE ELIMINATE THIS SENTENCE WE WILL NOT ONLY HAVE A TEXT WHICH IS POLITICALLY UNSUSTAINABLE, I.E., IT IS WEAKER THAN THE NNA TEXT, WE WILL ALSO HAVE, IN EFFECT, SOLD OUT THOSE NNA SUCH AS THE SWISS WHO HAD FOUGHT SO STRENUOUSLY TO HAVE HUMAN RIGHTS REFLECTED IN THE NNA NUF TEXT.

- 3) PARIS'S ARGUMENT THAT LINKING HUMAN RIGHTS TO THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SITUATION MIGHT GIVE THE SOVIETS

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A JUSTIFICATION FOR REPRESSING HUMAN RIGHTS INTERNALLY IS IRRELEVANT. THE FRENCH, AS MUCH AS ANYONE, KNOW THAT THE STATE IS A COLD-HEARTED BEAST," AS DE GAULLE ONCE SAID. IN OTHER WORDS, THE SOVIETS HAVE AND WILL REPRESS HUMAN RIGHTS REGARDLESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SITUATION AND REGARDLESS OF CDE AGREED LANGUAGE.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03683

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD

REF: STATE 115080

1. CDE X - 43
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT
3. SUMMARY. PER REFERENCED GUIDANCE, USDEL HAS BEEN CONDUCTING NON-STOP CONSULTATIONS WITH THE FRG, U.K. AND FRENCH DELEGATIONS ON THE ISSUE OF NOTIFICATION THRESHOLDS. AS A RESULT OF THE CONTACTS WE HAVE AN AMENDED VERSION THAT IS PROVISIONALLY ACCEPTABLE TO ALL. CHANGES ARE REFLECTED PARENTHETICALLY IN THE AMENDED VERSION OF THE THRESHOLD PAPER AND ARE EXPLAINED IN PARA 5. GUIDANCE REQUESTED, PARA 6. END SUMMARY.

4. BEGIN TEXT.

STRUCTURAL PARAMETER AT THE DIVISION LEVEL  
(AMALGAMATION OF SC. 1/A AND SC.7)

A MILITARY LAND ACTIVITY, THAT IS,

- ALL MILITARY ACTIVITY (1) INVOLVING ONE OR MORE GROUND FORCE DIVISION EQUIVALENT FORMATIONS, CARRYING OUT A COMMON MILITARY ACTIVITY UNDER A SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND, (2) AWAY FROM THEIR NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATIONS, IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS,

WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION.

A DIVISION EQUIVALENT FORMATION, FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS AGREEMENT, IS DEFINED AS A MILITARY GROUND FORCE COMPOSED OF

- MAJOR COMBAT UNITS ON THE BRIGADE/REGIMENT LEVEL, THAT IS, TANK, INFANTRY, MOTORIZED RIFLE, AIRMOBILE (3) OR AIRBORNE BRIGADES/REGIMENTS, OR EQUIVALENT SIZE FORMATIONS (4) WITH
- AN AGGREGATE TOTAL OF AT LEAST...COMBAT, COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT TROOPS; OR
- A TOTAL OF AT LEAST . . . MAIN BATTLE (5) TANKS.

THE PARTICIPATION OF A GROUND FORCE DIVISION EQUIVALENT FORMATION THAT IS NORMALLY STATIONED OUTSIDE THE ZONE, IN A MILITARY LAND ACTIVITY CONDUCTED WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION WHEN PERSONNEL DEPART THEIR ARRIVAL BASE WITHIN THE ZONE.

MILITARY ACTIVITY (6) IS DEFINED AS:

- (7) ANY ACTIVITY OF GROUND FORCES IN TRAINING AREAS, OR ON ANY TERRAIN OUTSIDE NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATIONS, WITH THE EXCEPTIONS OF DISASTER RELIEF, AGRICULTURAL WORK, AND SPORTING ACTIVITIES. END TEXT.

5. CHANGES MADE TO THE ORIGINAL FORMULATION TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE CONCERNS OF OUR ALLIES. PROVIDED BELOW IS AN EXPLANATION OF THE CHANGES KEYED TO THE ITEM LOCATION IN THE TEXT IN PARA 4, ABOVE.

- A. (1) THE U.K. AND THE FRG WANTED TO DROP THE

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FORMULATION OF "MILITARY EXERCISE ACTIVITY." THEY FELT THAT THE "MILITARY EXERCISE ACTIVITY" FORMULATION WAS TOO RESTRICTIVE. THE CONSENSUS WAS THAT THE FORMULATION CURRENTLY REFLECTED, "MILITARY ACTIVITY," CAPTURED EVERYTHING THAT THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT WOULD CAPTURE.

-- B. (2) BECAUSE OF U.K., FRG AND FRENCH CONCERNS, WE REINTRODUCED THE "SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND" FORMULATION.

-- C. (4) THE U.K. BELIEVED THAT THE FORMULATION CALLING FOR THE SUPPORTING ELEMENT WAS NOT NECESSARY AND COULD BE A KEY CIRCUMVENTION POINT FOR THE EAST TO USE WHEN FORMATIONS ARE NOT ORGANIZED INTO DIVISIONS. ALTHOUGH THE "EQUIVALENT FORMATION" CONCEPT WAS INCLUDED THE U.K. INSISTED THAT WE DROP THE SUPPORT ELEMENT SO THAT IT COULD NOT BE USED FOR CIRCUMVENTION. WE AGREE WITH THIS CONCERN ABOUT CIRCUMVENTION AND BELIEVE THE CHANGE IN THE NUMERICAL FORMULATIONS WILL ENSURE NOTIFICATION AT THE PROPER LEVEL. WE DO NOT REQUIRE THE INCLUSION OF THE SUPPORT ELEMENT TO TRIGGER NOTIFICATION.

-- E. (3) AIRMOBILE WAS ADDED TO REFLECT THAT IT IS NOT TO BE TREATED IN THE SAME WAY AS AMPHIBIOUS. THE NNA WOULD LIKE SPECIAL PARAMETERS, SIMILAR TO AMPHIBIOUS PARAMETERS, FOR BOTH AIRMOBILE AND AIRBORNE DIVISIONS.

-- D. (5) ALL DELEGATIONS ASKED THAT WE REINTRODUCE, FROM SCI/A, THE TERMINOLOGY "MAIN BATTLE TANKS."

-- E. (6) SAME AS IN (1).

-- F. (7) THIS FORMULATION IS A U.K. AND FRG AMALGAMATION. THIS LANGUAGE TAKES INTO ACCOUNT 2 YEARS OF COMMENTS BY THE NNAS AND THE EAST ON THE ISSUE OF EXCEPTIONS TO THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT. THE GENERAL FEELING IS THAT THIS FORMULATION IS IN FACT A FAIRLY CLOSE RESTATEMENT OF OUT-OF-GARRISON. THERE IS A DANGER IN THAT ONCE YOU START ENUMERATING EXCEPTIONS YOU OPEN THE DOOR FOR MORE TO BE PRESENTED, BUT THE U.K. DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT THE WORDING PROVIDED WILL ADEQUATELY TAKE CARE OF ALL OBJECTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN RAISED THUS FAR.

6. WE ARE GOING TO CONTINUE OUR CONSULTATIONS HERE AS WE WORK TO GAIN ACCEPTANCE OF THESE IDEAS IN THE CONFERENCE. REQUEST THAT WASHINGTON DETERMINE THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THE CHANGES INTRODUCED BY COB 15 MAY 86. DELEGATION MEMBERS BELIEVE THAT THIS FORMULATION IS ACCEPTABLE.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03163

SUBJECT: GORBACHEV CONVENTIONAL ARMS INITIATIVE AND THE  
- CDE -- A PR POSAL FOR CDE PHASE II?

REF: STOCKHOLM 3114

1. CDE X - 020

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE SOVIETS ARE ALREADY ENGAGED IN A FULL COURT PRESS TO PROMOTE THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL AMONG CDE DELEGATES (REFTEL). INITIAL INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE PROPOSAL IS LIKELY TO MANIFEST ITSELF IN A CONCERTED SOVIET EFFORT AT THE VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING TO RENEGOTIATE THE MANDATE FOR A SUBSEQUENT PHASE OF THE CDE TO INCLUDE DISARMAMENT ISSUES. FROM STOCKHOLM IT ALSO APPEARS THAT A SOVIET CAMPAIGN TO MERGE MBFR INTO CDE MAY BE IN THE WIND. WHILE USDEL CDE WILL REACT CAUTIOUSLY TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, THERE MAY BE SOME POSSIBILITY FOR INCREASED WESTERN NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE HERE, SINCE MANY VIEW A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME IN STOCKHOLM AS BEING ESSENTIAL TO EASTERN EFFORTS TO EXPAND THE CONFERENCE'S MANDATE AT VIENNA. END SUMMARY.

4. IN USDEL'S VIEW THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL HAS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STOCKHOLM NEGOTIATION AND POTENTIAL LONG-TERM EFFECTS ON U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS IN EUROPE. OUR ATTENTION HAS BEEN DRAWN PARTICULARLY TO THE CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS IN "THE ENTIRE EUROPEAN TERRITORY FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS," WHICH IS THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AS AGREED UPON IN MADRID, ALBEIT NOT AS CONCISELY DEFINED AS IN THE MADRID MANDATE. WE ALSO FOUND THE REFERENCE TO THIS PROPOSAL AS A MEANS OF "CUTTING THE KNOT WHICH HAS BEEN GROWING TIGHTER AT THE VIENNA TALKS" OF CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN LIGHT OF EARLIER SOUNDINGS THE SOVIETS HAVE TAKEN WITH THE FRENCH, IN PARTICULAR, ABOUT THE POSSIBLE MERGING OF MBFR INTO CDE. THUS IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THE SOVIETS MAY WELL PURSUE A BROADER FORUM (I.E., THE CDE) TO DISCUSS CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT BY SEEKING AN EXPANDED MANDATE FOR A RESUMED CDE CONFERENCE TO INCLUDE DISARMAMENT ISSUES. WE NOTE THAT THE SOVIETS, AFTER THEIR INTERVENTION IN WORKING GROUP AB ON APRIL 21, BEGAN CANVASSING THE NNA TO ASSESS THEIR ATTITUDES ABOUT THE GORBACHEV CONVENTIONAL ARMS INITIATIVE. GIVEN THE CLOSE CONNECTION GORBACHEV MADE BETWEEN THIS NEW INITIATIVE AND THE DEADLOCK AT MBFR, WE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED TO FIND THE SOVIETS TESTING THE WATERS IN THE COMING MONTHS FOR A POSSIBLE MERGER OF MBFR INTO CDE.

5. IN OUR VIEW, THE LATEST GORBACHEV PROPAGANDA INITIATIVE IS A NO-COST PROPOSAL FOR THE SOVIETS. IT ENABLES THEM TO SCORE PROPAGANDA POINTS IN THE BROADER ARMS CONTROL SCENE, WHILE SACRIFICING NOTHING OF

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SUBSTANCE. IN FACT, THE HINT OF MOVING CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT ISSUES INTO THE BROADER CSCE ENVIRONMENT CONFIRMS THE LACK OF SOVIET SERIOUSNESS ABOUT THIS ISSUE. IF THEY WERE SERIOUS THEY WOULD, OF COURSE, SEE THE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES OF NEGOTIATING A DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT IN THE LARGER FORUM. IN TERMS OF THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE, THEY OBVIOUSLY STAND TO BENEFIT FROM EXTENDING THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FROM THE MBFR GUIDELINES AREA -- WHERE THEY MAINTAIN A SIGNIFICANT CONVENTIONAL ARMS ADVANTAGE -- TO THE CDE ZONE, WHERE THAT DISPARITY IS NEGLIGIBLE.

6. THE GORBACHEV OFFER WAS FORESHADOWED TO US DURING A UK-USSR SECURITY SEMINAR IN EDINBURGH APRIL 14-15, WHERE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER VIKTOR LYNNIK WENT OUT OF HIS WAY TO CONVEY TO U.S. CDE DEPREP, AMBASSADOR HANSEN, SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO ADDRESS THE CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS QUESTION AS WELL AS TO DISCUSS WESTERN PERCEPTIONS OF A CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE IN EUROPE. WE HAVE ALSO BEEN GIVEN SOME INDICATION OF THE POSSIBLE SOVIET COURSE OF ACTION IN RECENT BILATERAL CONTACTS. MOST NOTABLY, SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY, AFTER A LONG PERIOD OF SEEMING TO ACCEPT THAT THE CDE WOULD NOT BE READY TO MOVE DIRECTLY TO A DISARMAMENT PHASE, EXPRESSED TO AMBASSADOR BARRY HIS RENEWED INTEREST IN WORKING TO EXPAND ANY NEW MANDATE NEGOTIATED AT THE VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING TO ENCOMPASS DISARMAMENT ISSUES.

7. USDEL WILL TAKE A CAUTIOUS APPROACH TO THE NEW GORBACHEV INITIATIVE AND TO RENEWED SOVIET INTEREST IN A PHASE II CDE CONFERENCE DEALING WITH DISARMAMENT. IT CONTINUES TO BE OUR POSITION THAT EVEN A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION FOR THE FIRST PHASE OF CDE WOULD NOT WARRANT A MOVE TO A DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATION AND THAT, IN ANY EVENT, CDE IS NOT THE PROPER FORUM TO ADDRESS DISARMAMENT IN THE

PRESENT SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN EUROPE. WE WILL ALSO REMAIN ALERT TO ANY CONCERTED SOVIET CAMPAIGN TO MERGE MBFR INTO CDE AS WE WILL WANT TO KEEP THE SOVIETS' FEET TO THE FIRE IN MBFR WHERE THE LATEST WESTERN PROPOSAL HAS CLEARLY PUT THEM ON THE DEFENSIVE. HOWEVER, IF THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL IS DESIGNED TO MOVE CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT INTO THE BROADER FORUM OF CDE IT COULD RESULT IN INCREASED SOVIET INTEREST IN A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME IN STOCKHOLM, SINCE THERE IS CURRENTLY A WIDELY HELD VIEW THAT WITHOUT SUCCESS HERE THERE WOULD BE NO CHANCE OF BROADENING THE MANDATE TO INCLUDE DISARMAMENT AT VIENNA. THIS COULD PROVIDE THE U.S. AND NATO WITH INCREASED NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE AS WE MOVE INTO THE END GAME IN STOCKHOLM. IN PREPARING ANY SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSES IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT THE PROPOSAL MAY BE DIFFICULT FOR SOME TO REJECT CATEGORICALLY. WE NOTE A LUKEWARM RESPONSE ON THE PART OF THE FRG. AND THE

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**POSSIBILITY OF ADDRESSING DISARMAMENT ISSUES IN THE CDE  
IS ALREADY ENSHRINED IN THE MADRID MANDATE.**

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**END OF MESSAGE**

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03316

SUBJECT: HANDLING THE GORBACHEV CONVENTIONAL ARMS  
- REDUCTION INITIATIVEREF: (A) STATE 131155, (B) MOSCOW 7144 (C) STATE  
131553

1. CDE X-031 - CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. GORBACHEV'S APRIL 18 CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTION INITIATIVE IS PURE PROPAGANDA, BUT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE IN TERMS OF ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT TO DISMISS IT AS SUCH. ITS LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES ARE POLITICAL RATHER THAN MILITARY: TO APPEAR FORTHCOMING AND CONSTRUCTIVE ON ARMS CONTROL/SECURITY ISSUES OF IMMEDIATE CONCERN TO WESTERN EUROPEANS AND TO FURTHER THE SOVIET OBJECTIVE OF ESTABLISHING A PAN-EUROPEAN SECURITY FORUM INDEPENDENT FROM CSCE. WHAT IS NEEDED IS A U.S. PUBLIC RESPONSE WHICH ALLOWS US TO GAIN THE HIGH GROUND WITH THE WESTERN EUROPEANS. AT THE SAME TIME WE SEE ADVANTAGES IN TAKING UP THE SOVIET OFFER OF A BILATERAL DIALOGUE IN PART BECAUSE IT CAN HELP US IN MBFR AND CDE.
3. DEPARTMENT'S INSTRUCTIONS ON THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL (REF C) PROVIDE FOR AN INTERIM POSTURE OF NEITHER REJECTING NOR ACCEPTING IT. OVER THE LONGER TERM, WE FAVOR A MAJOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY RESPONSE WITH THE FOLLOWING OBJECTIVES:
  - STRENGTHEN ALLIED UNITY ON ARMS CONTROL/SECURITY ISSUES BY SEIZING THE PUBLIC INITIATIVE;
  - USE THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL TO GAIN INCREASED LEVERAGE IN CDE AND MBFR WHILE GUARDING AGAINST A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY FORUM - CDE II - SEPARATE FROM CSCE;
  - UNDERLINE THE VALUE OF FUTURE CSBMS AS MEANS OF PREVENTING SURPRISE/CONVENTIONAL ATTACK WHILE REDUCTIONS PROGRESS;
  - FOCUS ATTENTION ON THOSE ELEMENTS OF SOVIET FORCE STRUCTURE WHICH WOULD MAKE A CONVENTIONAL ATTACK ON THE WEST POSSIBLE;
  - TO SET THE GOAL OF REMOVING SOVIET TROOPS FROM EASTERN EUROPE AND THINNING THEM OUT IN THE WESTERN USSR.
4. IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH THOSE OBJECTIVES, WE SHOULD RESPOND IN GENERAL TERMS TO WHAT IS A VERY GENERAL PROPOSAL AND NOT GET BOGGED DOWN IN DETAILS. SUCH A RESPONSE WOULD STRESS THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
  - A. WE WELCOME THE FACT THAT GORBACHEV RECOGNIZES THAT CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS MUST ACCOMPANY NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES ARE A NECESSARY PART OF THE PROCESS, AS SOVIET SPOKESMEN HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED.
  - B. IN MBFR AND CDE, THE EAST HAS A CHANCE TO JOIN

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HE WEST IN FIRST STEPS IN WHAT WILL HAVE TO BE A GRADUAL PROCESS. IN VIENNA, WE HAVE A CHANCE TO BEGIN BALANCED REDUCTIONS AND START THE PROCESS OF VERIFYING NO-INCREASE COMMITMENTS. IN STOCKHOLM, WE HAVE A CHANCE TO ESTABLISH NEW MANDATORY CSBMS TO MAKE THE EUROPEAN MILITARY SITUATION MORE PREDICTABLE AND STABLE. MBFR AND CDE ARE TESTS OF SOVIET INTENTIONS; CDE WILL ADJOURN SEPTEMBER 19.

C. GORBACHEV'S PROPOSALS LOOK BEYOND THESE IMMEDIATE TASKS, AND WE ARE WILLING TO EXPLORE MORE AMBITIOUS CONCEPTS. CHANGING THE STRUCTURE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE SO THAT CONVENTIONAL ATTACK IS NO LONGER AN OPTION IS VERY MUCH IN WESTERN INTEREST. THIS WOULD REQUIRE ACHIEVING BALANCE IN FORCES ON THE CENTRAL FRONT AND MORE DEMANDING VERIFICATION MEASURES AND OTHER CSBMS TO SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF CONVENTIONAL SURPRISE ATTACK.

D. WE AGREE THAT SUCH MEASURES SHOULD COVER ALL OF EUROPE FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS. BUT OUR IMMEDIATE CONCERN MUST BE WITH THE CENTRAL FRONT WHERE THE CURRENT IMBALANCE IS GREATEST AND INHERENTLY DESTABILIZING.

E. WE FAVOR SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN FORCE LEVELS IN EUROPE. TO THAT END, THE U.S. WOULD BE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW ITS GROUND TROOPS TO THE CONTINENTAL U.S. IF THE SOVIETS WITHDREW THEIR TROOPS FROM EASTERN EUROPE. THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE CONCOMITANT LIMITATIONS AND CSBMS AFFECTING SOVIET TROOPS IN THE ZONE TO THE URALS. (U.S. ARMAMENTS WOULD REMAIN IN EUROPE AS A FORM OF COMPENSATION FOR NATO'S GEOGRAPHICAL DISADVANTAGE.)

F. JUST AS THE U.S. SEEKS BALANCE IN NUCLEAR FORCES ON A GLOBAL BASIS, WE BELIEVE CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS ULTIMATELY MUST BE ACHIEVED ON A GLOBAL RATHER THAN REGIONAL BASIS.

5. AT THIS STAGE IN THE PUBLIC DISCUSSION, WE DON'T THINK WE SHOULD BE ANY MORE SPECIFIC THAN THE SOVIETS IN DISCUSSING WHERE SUCH NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE. WE SHOULD STRESS THAT WE HAVE TWO PERFECTLY GOOD FORUMS IN EXISTENCE - CDE AND MBFR - AND THE SOVIETS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO USE THEIR PROPOSALS TO ESCAPE FROM THOSE.

6. IN PARALLEL WITH OUR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, WE THINK THAT THERE ARE ADVANTAGES IN TAKING UP THE SOVIET SUGGESTION OF BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS OF THE GORBACHEV INITIATIVE (REF B.). A CENTRAL PURPOSE WOULD BE TO GAIN MORE LEVERAGE OVER MBFR AND CDE, CONVINCING MOSCOW THAT THERE IS A CHANCE FOR THE GORBACHEV INITIATIVE ONLY IF AGREEMENT IS REACHED IN BOTH THESE FORUMS. IN PARTICULAR, THE SOVIETS NEED TO UNDERSTAND

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THAT WE WILL NOT JOIN A MINI-PACKAGE IN STOCKHOLM AND  
THAT FAILURE IN STAGE I OF A CDE WOULD NOT ONLY  
PREVENT VIENNA FROM AGREEING ON A DISARMAMENT PHASE  
BUT ALSO MAKE THE CONTINUATION OF THE CSBM STAGE  
PROBLEMATIC. WE ARE PLEASED TO SEE THAT THIS  
MESSAGE IS GETTING THROUGH (REF B, PARA 8).

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03684  
 SUBJECT: THE GORBACHEV INITIATIVE AND CDE -  
 - THREE WEEKS LATER

REF: STATE 145765

1. CDE X - 047
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. BEGIN SUMMARY: EASTERN HANDLING OF THE GORBACHEV CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL HAS BEEN SURPRISINGLY LOW-KEY AT CDE. SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR (GRINEVSKY) HAS PROVIDED NO ELABORATION OF THE PROPOSAL'S INTENDED FORUM (CDE, MBFR, OR A NEW FORUM), WHILE OTHER EASTERN CONTACTS HAVE VARIOUSLY SUPPORTED JUST ABOUT ANY INTERPRETATION, MOST RECENTLY SUBSUMING MBFR INTO A CDE PHASE II. WE ANTICIPATE THE INITIATIVE WILL BE USED TO BOLSTER THE NEW SOVIET CAMPAIGN FOR A PHASE II CDE AT THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME HERE. IN OUR VIEW THE CURRENT LOW-KEY APPROACH IS BEING TAKEN DUE BOTH TO INTERNAL CONFUSION AND TO AVOID ATTRACTING ATTENTION TO THE LEVERAGE WE COULD EXERT ON THE EAST FOR A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME HERE. END SUMMARY.

4. USDEL BELIEVES THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS OF SOVIET HANDLING OF THE GORBACHEV INITIATIVE SHOULD COMPLEMENT RESPONSES TO REFTEL RECEIVED FROM NATO CAPITALS. IN THIS MESSAGE AND PREVIOUS WE HAVE ANALYZED THE PROPOSAL PRIMARILY FROM THE CDE PERSPECTIVE AND HAVE LEFT BROADER VIEWS OF ALLIED GOVERNMENT REACTIONS FOR EMBASSIES TO ASSESS IN CAPITALS. WE CAN NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT TO DATE, THE PROPOSAL HAS HAD LITTLE EFFECT ON ALLIED DELEGATIONS' THINKING ABOUT WESTERN CDE PROPOSALS CURRENTLY ON THE TABLE.

5. FOLLOWING INITIAL, ALBEIT VAGUE, EASTERN BALLYHOING, GORBACHEV'S APRIL 18 CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT INITIATIVE HAS BEEN GIVEN A SURPRISINGLY LOW PROFILE BY EASTERN DELEGATES IN STOCKHOLM. PREVIOUS GORBACHEV ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES, PARTICULARLY HIS JANUARY 15 PROPOSALS, WERE AGGRESSIVELY TOUTED BY THE EAST BOTH IN FORMAL WORKING GROUPS AND IN INFORMAL CONTACTS. BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO FIND ANY EASTERNERS HERE WHO ARE PREPARED TO VOLUNTEER SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS ON THIS LATEST OFFERING. IN CONVERSATIONS WITH AMBASSADOR BARRY (U.S.), SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY HAS MADE NO EFFORT TO TALK UP THE APRIL 18 INITIATIVE IN THE CDE CONTEXT AND HAS DESCRIBED

IT AS AN "IDEA," NOT A PROPOSAL. SOVIET EMBASSIES IN CAPITALS, NOT THE SOVIET CDE DELEGATION, HE SAID, WOULD BE CONSULTING ON HOW THE "IDEA" COULD BE DEVELOPED. GRINEVSKY TOLD AMBASSADOR CITRON (FRG) THAT MOSCOW HAS NOT DECIDED WHAT FORUM (CDE, MBFR, OR A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY BODY) THE PROPOSAL WOULD BE TARGETED AT, ALTHOUGH HE MUSED THAT IT IS PERHAPS BETTER SUITED FOR

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NATO/WARSAW PACT DISCUSSIONS IN THE FIRST STAGE. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, HE HAS BEGUN TALKING UP THE NEED FOR A CDE STAGE II WITH AN EXPANDED MANDATE PROVIDING FOR DISARMAMENT TO BE ADDED TO CSBM'S AFTER VIENNA.

6. OTHER EASTERN STATEMENTS AND CONTACTS HAVE BEEN CONTRADICTIONARY. FOR INSTANCE, IN A RECENT PLENARY STATEMENT, GDR AMBASSADOR BUHRING OBSERVED THAT THE PROPOSAL GAVE A "NEW PERSPECTIVE" TO CDE, WHILE A MEMBER OF THE BULGARIAN CDE SAID THAT THE PROPOSAL WAS CLEARLY AIMED AT AN EXPANDED MBFR NEGOTIATION. OVER THE PAST TWO DAYS, TWO NON-SOVIET EASTERN DELEGATES HAVE SPECULATED ON A FOUR-STEP SCENARIO FOR THE INITIATIVE WHICH THEY CLAIMED TO HAVE DEDUCED FROM THE LIMITED INFORMATION THE SOVIETS HAVE VOLUNTEERED: 1) A "SYMBOLIC" AGREEMENT AT MBFR WHICH WOULD OPEN THE DOOR TO PHASE OUT THAT NEGOTIATION; 2) A "MODEST" RESULT IN STOCKHOLM; 3) MERGER OF MBFR ISSUES INTO CDE PHASE II; 4) CDE PHASE II TO BE A TWO-TIERED PROCESS -- BLOC-TO-BLOC AND ALL CSCE PARTICIPATING STATES. ONE CONTACT EVEN MUSED THAT THE OPENING EASTERN OFFER IN PHASE II COULD BE A 30 TO 50 PER CENT BLOC-TO-BLOC CUT IN CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS.

7. THERE IS A DEGREE OF GENUINE EASTERN UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE INTENT OF THE PROPOSAL WHICH CONFIRMS GRINEVSKY'S EARLIER OBSERVATION TO BARRY THAT GORBACHEV WAS "OUT IN FRONT" OF THE SOVIET BUREACRACY ON THIS. WE ANTICIPATE THAT, REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME IN STOCKHOLM, THE SOVIETS WILL PUSH FOR A PHASE II CDE, I.E., DISARMAMENT PHASE, AT VIENNA AND THAT THE GORBACHEV INITIATIVE WILL BE A CENTRAL PART OF THEIR CAMPAIGN. WE

SUSPECT THAT THEIR CURRENT TACK IN STOCKHOLM IS PRIMARILY DESIGNED TO AVOID THE APPEARANCE THAT GORBACHEV'S INITIATIVE HAS PUT THE SOVIETS UNDER PRESSURE FOR A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME HERE AS A NECESSARY PRELUDE TO CDE PHASE II, PRESSURE WHICH THEY FEAR THE WEST MIGHT TRY TO EXPLOIT TO GAIN ADDITIONAL NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE ON SUCH ISSUES AS INSPECTION. THUS EASTERN STRATEGY IN STOCKHOLM WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO DOWNPLAY THE CDE DIMENSION OF THE INITIATIVE WHILE SEEKING TO MANEUVER THE WEST INTO A MINI-PACKAGE THAT WOULD PROVIDE SOMETHING THE SOVIETS COULD SELL AS A "POSITIVE" OUTCOME IN STOCKHOLM. PERHAPS SIGNALING EASTERN STRATEGY, GDR AMBASSADOR BUHRING HAS ALREADY PROVIDED IN PLENARY AN INDICATION OF THE TYPE OF MINI-PACKAGE THE EAST WOULD TRY TO BILL IN VIENNA AS A "SUBSTANTIVE" CDE RESULT -- NON-USE OF FORCE, NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION, AND LIMITATIONS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES.

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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03063

SUBJECT: SOVIET VIEWS, EDINBURGH CONVERSATIONS

1. CONFIDENTIAL, ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: BY VIRTUE OF HIS AFFILIATION WITH THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH AS A POST-DOCTORAL FELLOW, CDE DEPUTY, AMBASSADOR HANSEN, PARTICIPATED FOR THE FOURTH STRAIGHT YEAR IN UK-USSR DISCUSSIONS ON SECURITY ISSUES NOMINALLY TITLED "SURVIVAL IN THE NUCLEAR AGE." THE AGENDA FOR THE DISCUSSIONS WAS TAKEN FROM THE GENEVA SUMMIT JOINT DECLARATION. RISK REDUCTION CENTERS WERE DISCUSSED WITH SOVIETS EXPRESSING WILLINGNESS TO EXPLORE THE BASIC IDEA BUT BEING SKEPTICAL REGARDING THE PRACTICAL UTILITY OF THE CONCEPT AS THEY UNDERSTAND IT. SDI DISCUSSIONS FROM THE SOVIET SIDE CONCENTRATED ON THE PREVENTION OF "SPACE STRIKE WEAPONS" RATHER THAN ON STOPPING RESEARCH. ZERO-INF OPTION FOR EUROPE, SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME AT STOCKHOLM AND NEED TO ADDRESS CONVENTIONAL FORCE ARMS CONTROL WERE OTHER ISSUES STRESSED BY THE SOVIET SIDE. END SUMMARY

3. SOVIET PARTICIPANTS:

- VIKTOR LYNNIK (CENTRAL COMMITTEE, INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT) GENERAL-LIEUTENANT MILSHTeyN (USA AND CANADA INSTITUTE) GENERAL-LIEUTENANT MIKHAYLOV (CHEROV'S DEPUTY IN GENERAL STAFF DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS)
- G. YANAYEV, (USSR-GREAT BRITAIN FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY)
- A. MASKO, (USSR-GREAT BRITAIN FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY)
- G. FEDOSOV, (SOVIET EMBASSY, LONDON)
- A. LIKHOTAL, (DIPLOMATIC ACADEMY, MOSCOW)

4. GENERAL SOVIET THEMES

- THE SPIRIT OF GENEVA MUST BE RECREATED; THIS IS ONLY POSSIBLE THROUGH AGREEMENTS WHICH WOULD CONTROL AND REDUCE ARMS. REGIONAL ISSUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS ARE PERIPHERAL ISSUES WHICH MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO IMPINGE UPON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ARMS CONTROL. A MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR TESTING COULD HAVE BEEN THE FIRST STEP IN HALTING THE ARMS RACE; THE FAILURE TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT ON A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN GOES AGAINST THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. IT WOULD BE FOOLISH AND ILLOGICAL TO SEND SOVIET SCIENTISTS TO MONITOR U.S. NUCLEAR TESTS ON SITE SINCE SUCH AN ACT WOULD MAKE TESTING A LEGITIMATE ACT. TIME IS A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR, SOON IT WILL BE TOO LATE TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL SINCE THE ARMS RACE HAS ITS OWN LOGIC. SOLUTIONS TO CURRENT DIFFICULTIES DO NOT LIE IN THE MILITARY SPHERE BUT IN NEW POLITICAL THINKING. THIS NEW POLITICAL THINKING RECOGNIZES THE LINKS BETWEEN THE MILITARY, THE ECONOMIC AND THE HUMANITARIAN FACTORS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA. THERE WILL BE NO ARMS CONTROL WITHOUT VERIFICATION (PROVERKA) BUT NO VERIFICATION WITHOUT ARMS CONTROL. THE LEVELS OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION,

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BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL, MUST BE REDUCED. DETERRENCE REMAINS AN UNACCEPTABLE DOCTRINE TO THE SOVIET MILITARY; IT IS LIKE WEARING A BULLET-PROOF VEST FILLED WITH DYNAMITE.

#### 5. RISK REDUCTION CENTERS

LYNNIK (WHO IS SAID TO BE A PROTEGE OF PRAVDA'S VIKTOR AFANASIYEV AND WHO CLAIMED TO HAVE DRAFTED GORBACHEV'S LATEST SPEECH TO THE SUPREME SOVIET) SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION BELIEVED THE GENERAL IDEA TO BE "VERY WORTH WHILE". IT MIGHT HAVE SOME VALUE IN DEALING WITH SUCH ISSUES AS NUCLEAR TERRORISM, BUT IT CANNOT BECOME A SUBSTITUTE FOR DEALING WITH BASIC ISSUES, I.E., ARMS CONTROL. INDICATING "SOME UNDERSTANDING OF THE U.S. POLITICAL SYSTEM", HE SAID THAT THE GENERAL IDEA WAS HARMLESS FROM THE POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW AND EVEN MORE HARMLESS TO THE MILITARY BECAUSE IT WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON U.S. MILITARY PROGRAMS.

MILSHEYN CONCLUDED THAT RISK REDUCTION MIGHT BE OKAY BUT EXPRESSED GREAT DOUBT ABOUT THEIR REAL IMPACT NOTING THAT ALL U.S. SUGGESTIONS FALL SHORT OF PRACTICAL STEPS TO LIMIT ARMS. HE INDICATED THAT U.S. AND SOVIET EXPERTS WOULD BE MEETING TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE BUT THAT BEFORE PROGRESS ON RISK REDUCTION WOULD BE POSSIBLE, THERE MUST BE CONCRETE RESULTS IN THE AREA OF ARMS CONTROL.

MIKHAYLOV SAID THAT RISK REDUCTION IS A PERIPHERAL ISSUE WITH WHICH WOULD YIELD NO PRACTICAL RESULTS AND NO REAL ADVANTAGES. NEVERTHELESS, THE SOVIETS ARE GIVING IT CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. PRIVATELY, MIKHAYLOV INDICATED THAT THE GENERAL STAFF VIEWS RISK REDUCTION CENTERS AS ALLOWING CERTAIN ELEMENTS IN THE U.S. TO BE UTILIZED FOR DISINFORMATION.

#### 6. SDI

SOVIETS EXPECTED TO TAKE THE OFFENSIVE ON THIS ISSUE BUT WERE FRUSTRATED WHEN PROFESSOR RICHARD THOMAS OF TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY BROKE HIS PREVIOUS SILENCE AND LAUNCHED HIS OWN OFFENSIVE BY PROVIDING A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAMS VIEWED THROUGH THE EYES OF AN AMERICAN SCIENTIST. HE OUTLINED THE SOVIET MILITARY'S VIEWS ON THE CREATION OF A SPACE THEATER OF MILITARY OPERATIONS (STVD), THE DIVISION OF AIR DEFENSE FORCES INTO ANTI-AIR, ANTI-SATELLITE, AND ANTI-SPACE FORCES. HE THEN CITED SOVIET SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH INCLUDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF INFRARED SENSOR SYSTEMS WHICH WOULD NEED TO DETECT INFRA-RED WAVE OUT TO 500 MICRONS WHICH CLEARLY INDICATED A REQUIREMENT TO SENSE BODIES IN SPACE. HANSEN FOLLOWED WITH SOVIET ARGUMENTS CONDEMNING DETERRENCE AS A PRINCIPLE AND SOVIET FOCUS ON DEFENSE AS THE EMBODIMENT OF DETERRENCE CONTRASTING SOVIET VIEWS WITH U.S. THEORIES ON MUTUAL VULNERABILITY.

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MILSHEYN COUNTERED BY SAYING THAT THE STARTING POINT FOR SDI WAS PRESIDENT REAGAN'S 23 MARCH 1983 STATEMENT. ANY OTHER APPROACH WOULD LEAD TO MUTUAL RECRIMINATIONS. WHAT IS AT STAKE IS THE PREVENTION OF SPACE STRIKE WEAPONS. (COMMENT: AT NO TIME DID MILSHEYN SPEAK OF PREVENTING SDI, THE FOCUS WAS ON PREVENTING "SPACE STRIKE WEAPONS". END COMMENT) WHEN PRESSED FOR A DEFINITION OF SPACE STRIKE WEAPONS, MILSHEYN HEDGED BUT NOTED IT WAS IT PERSONAL OPINION THAT IT ANY NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL MEANS USED TO STRIKE TARGETS EITHER IN SPACE OR ON THE GROUND FROM SPACE; THIS INCLUDED ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS. THE QUESTION OF DETERMINING THE RELATION OF OFFENSE TO DEFENSE HAS A HISTORY REACHING BACK TO 1972 AND THE GLASBORO MEETINGS BETWEEN PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND KOSYGIN AND THE SIGNING OF THE ABM TREATY. REFUSING TO ADDRESS THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR, MILSHEYN ARGUED THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. STRATEGIC DEFENSE WOULD VIOLATE THE ABM TREATY. MOREOVER, THE WHOLE IDEA OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE WAS A DANGEROUS ILLUSION. NO SYSTEM, INCLUDING THE MOSCOW ABM SYSTEM, COULD PROVIDE ANY REAL PROTECTION. PRESSED ON THE QUESTION OF RESEARCH, MILSHEYN STATED THAT FIELD TESTING OF SDI COMPONENTS WENT BEYOND WHAT WAS ALLOWED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ABM TREATY. FINALLY, RESIGNED TO THE FACT THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT GOING TO STOP ITS SDI PROGRAM, MILSHEYN TOOK A SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT VIEW THAN THAT OF GENERAL MIKHAYLOV IN STATING THAT ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS MUST CONTINUE IRRESPECTIVE OF THE SDI.

MIKHAYLOV STATED CATEGORICALLY THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS NO SDI-TYPE PROGRAM AND HAS NO PLANS FOR DEVELOPING SPACE STRIKE WEAPONS. HE NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE CONDUCTING RESEARCH INTO NEW TECHNOLOGIES AS AN EXAMPLE HE LISTED THE USE OF LASERS IN MEDICINE, LASER-LOCATION DEVICES, AND FOR THE INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY. SOVIET LABORATORIES, HE CLAIMED, WERE OPEN TO INSPECTION. THE DEPLOYMENT OF SPACE STRIKE WEAPONS, MIKHAYLOV CLAIMED, WOULD MAKE THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IMPOSSIBLE SINCE THE USSR MUST ENSURE ITS CAPABILITY FOR AN ANSWERING STRIKE. RESPONDING TO A THOMAS QUESTION, MIKHAYLOV IDENTIFIED THE FACILITY AT SARY SHAGAN AS AN EXPERIMENTAL STATION EXPLORING THE POSSIBLE USE OF LASERS TO LOCATE OBJECTS IN SPACE.

#### 7. OTHER ISSUES

- INF. SOVIETS CLEARLY WANTED A STATEMENT IN THE COMMUNIQUE WHICH STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF ZERO-INF IN EUROPE. THE FINAL LANGUAGE READ "A VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT ON AMERICAN AND SOVIET INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES COULD BE AN IMPORTANT STEP AS WOULD A SIMILAR AGREEMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS."
- CDE. GREAT STRESS WAS PLACED ON OBTAINING AGREEMENT TO THE IDEA THAT "THE ADOPTION OF A SUBSTANTIAL CONCLUDING

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DOCUMENT AT STOCKHOLM WAS VIEWED BY THE PARTICIPANTS AS A NECESSARY PRELIMINARY FOR TAKING ADDITIONAL DECISIONS RELATING TO CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AT THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE."

- CONVENTIONAL ARMS. THE INITIAL SOVIET DRAFT COMMUNIQUE, BROUGHT FROM MOSCOW, CONTAINED A LONG AND RAMBLING SECTION ON THE NEED TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS WHICH WAS PERCEIVED BY MANY TO BE A ROADBLOCK TO REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR ARMS. IT MADE SO LITTLE SENSE TO THE PARTICIPANTS IN ITS ORIGINAL FORM THAT IT WAS PARED DOWN ONLY TO SAY: "IT WAS RECOGNIZED THAT IT IS IMPORTANT IN THE VIENNA TALKS TO REACH EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS CONCERNING THE LEVELS OF MILITARY FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, WITHOUT ENDANGERING ANY STATE'S SECURITY." (COMMENT: LYNNIK, IN PARTICULAR APPEARED ANXIOUS TO CONVEY TO HANSEN SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO ADDRESS THE CONVENTIONAL QUESTION AND PERCEPTIONS OF CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE. END COMMENT)

- NEW POLITICAL THINKING. MILSTEYN AND MIKHAYLOV DID NOT ENGAGE MUCH ON THIS QUESTION, BUT LYNNIK AND OTHERS SOUGHT TO PROMOTE THIS IDEA AS THE BASIS FOR DEALING WITH ALL ARMS CONTROL ISSUES.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03062

SUBJECT: CDE: USDEPUTY BILATERALS

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: ON THE MARGINS OF THE EDINBURGH CONVERSATIONS (SEPTEL) AMBASSADOR HANSEN DISCUSSED CDE WITH GENERAL-LIEUTENANT KONSTANTIN MIKHAYLOV, WHO WAS THE SOVIET MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE AT THE MADRID CSCE REVIEW MEETING AND IS CURRENTLY A DEPUTY TO GENERAL COLONEL CHERVOV IN THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF. MIKHAYLOV APPEARED TO INDICATE A GENERAL SOVIET DESIRE TO REACH AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM, SLIGHT IRRITATION AT THE 15 JANUARY 86 CORBACHEV STATEMENT AS IT PERTAINED TO CDE, AND SOVIET MILITARY INTEREST IN LIMITATIONS IN THE CDE. IN STOCKHOLM, HANSEN ALSO MET WITH HUNGARIAN DEPUTY WHO WAS SENT ON A FISHING MISSION BY "BIG BROTHER" AND REPORTED MOVE OF HUNGARIAN VICE-MINISTER TO NEW YORK AND HIS RESPONSIBILITIES. END SUMMARY  
GENERAL MIKHAYLOV:
3. GENERAL MIKHAYLOV SOUGHT OUT DISCUSSION WITH US CDE DEPUTY HANSEN ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF CDE NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID THAT SITUATION IN STOCKHOLM WAS NOT VERY CLEAR AND THE SOVIETS HAD DIFFICULTY IN UNDERSTANDING WHY PROGRESS WAS SO DIFFICULT. AT MADRID, HE NOTED, DRAFTING APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN EASIER. TWICE, MIKHAYLOV SAID THAT "MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH" GORBACHEV HAD TAKEN A BROAD STEP IN SHOWING WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS NAVAL ISSUES IN THE FUTURE SESSION OF THE CDE. THIS CONSTITUTED A "CRUCIAL ISSUE TO US" WHICH MUST FIND A SOLUTION IN THE FUTURE. (COMMENT: MIKHAYLOV DID NOT INDICATE ANY REQUIREMENT TO RECORD AGREEMENT TO DISCUSS NAVAL ISSUES IN A FUTURE ITERATION OF CDE. END COMMENT)
4. IT WAS IMPORTANT, ESPECIALLY IN RESPECT TO RECENT EVENTS (READ LIBYA), TO DEAL WITH INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE. BUT IN THAT REGARD, THE SOVIETS RECOGNIZED THAT THEY ARE SPEAKING OF AIR FORCES BASED IN EUROPE AND THAT SUCH FORCES FUNCTION ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY IN SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY. THIS SHOULD CAUSE NO PROBLEM, HE CONCLUDED.
5. MIKHAYLOV INQUIRED WHAT WERE THE U.S. REQUIREMENTS IN THE AREA OF INFORMATION, WERE WE AFTER MORE INFORMATION OR NEW FORMS OF INFORMATION? HANSEN REPLIED THAT WE WERE AFTER MORE INFORMATION THAN HAD HITHERTOFORE BEEN EXCHANGED UNDER THE TERMS OF FINAL ACT NOTIFICATION AS WELL AS A NEW FORM, I.E., THE EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION AS OUTLINED IN OUR MEASURE ONE. THE GENERAL REPLIED THAT MEASURE ONE WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO THEM, BUT THAT MEASURE TWO, THE EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL CALENDARS, DID REPRESENT A NEW FORM OF INFORMATION.
6. SOLUTION OF THE THRESHOLD FOR THE NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE THRESHOLDS SHOULD NOT POSE GREAT PROBLEMS, MIKHAYLOV ASSERTED, THIS COULD BE FOUND ON THE BASIS OF

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THE SOVIET PROPOSAL 20,000 TROOPS AND THE U.S. IDEA OF A DIVISION. THE WESTERN POSITION ON VERIFICATION CAUSED HIM TO BREATHE UNEVENLY, MIKHAYLOV SAID. WHAT DID THE WEST WANT, THE ABILITY TO CHECK ON UNNOTIFIED ACTIVITIES OR ON INCORRECT INFORMATION? HANSEN REPLIED THAT THE RIGHT TO INSPECT QUESTIONABLE ACTIVITIES WAS AN ABSOLUTE NECESSITY FOR U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF AN OUTCOME IN STOCKHOLM. AT THIS POINT MIKHAYLOV ONLY TOOK NOTES. HE POINTED TO THE CONFIDENCE BUILDING ASPECTS OF INVITING OBSERVERS "IN THE FORMS OF HELSINKI" AND DOING THIS AT LOWER THRESHOLDS AS A SIGNIFICANT MOVE FORWARD BY THE SOVIET UNION. HE INSISTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION SCRUPULOUSLY ADHERS TO ANY AGREEMENT IT MAKES. MIKHAYLOV SHOOK HIS HEAD WHEN INFORMED THAT NATO WILL NOT ACCEPT CONSTRAINTS/LIMITATIONS AS PART OF AN OUTCOME AT STOCKHOLM. HE SAID THIS ISSUE IS OF GREAT INTEREST TO THE SOVIET UNION.

7. HE NOTED THAT WE WOULD UNDERSTAND WHY AMBASSADOR GRINIEVSKY DID NOT COME TO WASHINGTON AFTER THE NEXT SESSION IN STOCKHOLM BEGINS. HE IMPLIED THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION NOW HAS ITS INSTRUCTIONS AND WILL DO EVERYTHING TO MAKE AN AGREEMENT POSSIBLE. SEVERAL TIMES DURING THE DISCUSSION, MIKHAYLOV NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NNA'S IN MAKING AN AGREEMENT POSSIBLE AND URGED HANSEN TO PLACE PRESSURE ON THE NNA GROUP TO BECOME MORE ACTIVE.  
HUNGARIAN CDE DEPUTY

8. DR. ISTVAN KORMENDY, THE ACTIVIST HUNGARIAN DEPUTY, TOLD HANSEN HE HAD BEEN DISPATCHED, TO HIS SURPRISE, BY "BIG BROTHER" TO ASK A BASIC QUESTION OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION, SPECIFICALLY OF AMB. HANSEN. (COMMENT: BIG BROTHER TURNED OUT TO BE ROZANOV, THE SENIOR KGB MAN ON THE SOVIET DELEGATION. WHILE THIS ACCOUNTS FOR THE APPROACH TO HANSEN, IT IS ALSO CURIOUS SINCE BEFORE THE LAST BREAK, ROZANOV'S STAR HAD BEEN SINKING AND HE HAD STRUGGLED TO KEEP ANY PROFILE AT ALL. END COMMENT) THE QUESTION WAS: DOES THE AMERICAN DELEGATION WANT AN AGREEMENT AT STOCKHOLM? IF SO, A MINI-PACKAGE OR A SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT. HANSEN EXPRESSED SURPRISE AT THE QUESTION SINCE WE HAD MADE IT ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT WE HAD NO INTEREST IN A MINI-PACKAGE AND INSISTED THAT AN AGREEMENT MUST BE SIGNIFICANT IN MILITARY TERMS AS WELL AS INCLUDE INSPECTION.

9. KORMENDY THEN REPORTED THAT DURING THE LAST BREAK FOREIGN MINISTER SCHEVARDNADZE HAD CALLED "SENIOR MEMBERS" OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION INTO HIS OFFICE AND HAD EACH, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF AMB. GRINIEVSKY (WHO WAS NONETHELESS PRESENT), GIVE HIS EVALUATION OF THE STATE OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. KORMENDY REFUSED TO INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT THE "SENIOR MEMBERS" INCLUDED THE KGB AND MILITARY ELEMENTS. (COMMENT: ALMOST

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CERTAINLY, AMBASSADORS RACHMANINOV AND YEREFYEV WERE INCLUDED. END COMMENT) KORMENDY DID CONFIRM THAT FROM THE VANTAGE POINT OF THE NON-SOVIET WTO DELEGATIONS, THE SOVIET DELEGATION DID NOT SEEM TO RECEIVE ITS INSTRUCTIONS FROM A SINGLE SOURCE. BUT, HE EMPHASIZED, THE WEST OUGHT TO PAY MOST ATTENTION TO THE POLITICAL SIDE OF THE HOUSE.

10. FINALLY, KORMENDY WAS EAGER THAT IT BE KNOWN IN WASHINGTON THAT VICE-MINISTER F. ESZTERGALYOS WAS BEING TRANSFERRED TO NEW YORK TO MAKE WAY FOR A MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO HAVE A JOB IN BUDAPEST. THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT IS NOT PLEASED WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF THE HUNGARIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON AND THEREFORE, ACCORDING TO KORMENDY, ESZTERGALYOS WILL TURN OVER HIS N.Y. DUTIES TO A DEPUTY AND WILL FOCUS HIS EFFORTS ON U.S./HUNGARIAN RELATIONS. KORMENDY TOOK PAINS TO EXPLAIN THE INTIMATE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ESZTERGALYOS AND DOBRYININ WHICH CAN BE TRACED BACK TO THEIR JOINT TIME IN WASHINGTON.

HANSEN

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03681

SUBJECT: RUSSIAN LANGUAGE IN CSCE FORA

REF: A) 85 STOCKHOLM 9697, B) 85 STOCKHOLM 870

1. CDE X - 045
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: SWEDISH CDE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY HIRED AN INDEPENDENT, I.E., NON-SOVIET, RUSSIAN LANGUAGE EXPERT FOR A LIMITED PERIOD OF TIME THIS ROUND. DELEGATION BELIEVES WE SHOULD USE THIS PRECEDENT TO BREAK THE SOVIET STRANGLE HOLD ON THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE BOOTH IN OTHER MULTILATERAL FORA, INCLUDING THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE. ACTION REQUESTED PARA 8. END SUMMARY.
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4. AS NOTED IN REFTELS, RUSSIAN LANGUAGE TRANSLATORS AND INTERPRETERS HAVE CAUSED RECURRING PROBLEMS AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. INDEPENDENT LANGUAGE-QUALIFIED CIVIL SERVANTS ARE HIRED BY THE SWEDISH SECRETARIAT FOR ALL CSCE LANGUAGES, EXCEPT RUSSIAN. THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY INSISTS THAT IT PROVIDE THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE EXPERTS TO THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE (AS WELL AS TO MOST OTHER INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES). IN THE PAST THE SWEDISH SECRETARIAT HAS ACQUIESCED TO SOVIET DEMANDS.
5. THIS SESSION, AFTER NUMEROUS COMPLAINTS BY THE U.S. AND OTHER DELEGATIONS, AND OVER THE STRONG PROTESTS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION, THE SECRETARIAT HIRED FOR TWO WEEKS AN INDEPENDENT RUSSIAN LANGUAGE EXPERT, SERGE SAMARINE, A VIENNA-BASED CIVIL SERVANT WHO HOLDS AN IRISH PASSPORT. SAMARINE WORKED THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE BOOTH AT THE CONFERENCE FOR ONE WEEK.
6. AFTER THE SOVIETS THREATENED THE SWEDISH SECRETARIAT WITH A FORMAL DEMARCHE, THE CONFERENCE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (AF SILLEN) DECIDED NOT TO FIGHT THE MATTER AND TOOK SAMARINE OUT OF THE LANGUAGE BOOTH. THE SOVIETS USED THEIR USUAL LITANY OF ARGUMENTS, INCLUDING THAT SAMARINE SPOKE "ARCHAIC" RUSSIAN. (COMMENT: THE SOVIETS HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED PRIVATELY THAT SAMARIN IS A FAR BETTER INTERPRETER/TRANSLATOR THAN THE TWO YOUNG SOVIET-SUPPLIED LANGUAGE EXPERTS CURRENTLY IN STOCKHOLM. END COMMENT.) AF SILLEN SAYS THAT SINCE HE HAD ALREADY ESTABLISHED THE PRECEDENT OF HIRING INDEPENDENT RUSSIAN LANGUAGE EXPERTS, HE DECIDED NOT TO PRESS THE ISSUE FURTHER WITH THE SOVIETS.
7. BEGIN COMMENT. WE WISH AF SILLEN HAD NOT YIELDED TO SOVIET PRESSURE. NEVERTHELESS, WE GIVE HIM CREDIT FOR BREACHING AN IMPORTANT BARRIER. THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE CSCE PROCESS, HAS HIRED AND USED A NON-SOVIET RUSSIAN LANGUAGE EXPERT. END COMMENT.
- 
8. ACTION REQUESTED BY DEPARTMENT.

SECRET

406

SECRET

25X1

-- ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE SECRETARIAT OF THE BERN HUMAN CONTACTS EXPERT MEETING IS USING, AS PROMISED, NON-SOVIET RUSSIAN LANGUAGE EXPERTS.

-- FOLLOW UP WITH THE SECRETARIAT OF THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE, CITING THE STOCKHOLM (AND PERHAPS BERN) PRECEDENT TO DEMONSTRATE OUR CONTINUED INTEREST IN HAVING NON-SOVIET RUSSIAN LANGUAGE INTERPRETERS AT THE VIENNA REVCON.

BARRY  
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL  
NNNN

SECRET

407



SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 03950  
 SUBJECT: PROPOSED WESTERN HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE

1. CDE X - 057
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

-

3. THE FOLLOWING HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE WAS WORKED OUT BY THE NATO NUF EXPERTS AFTER LONG AND PAINSTAKING NEGOTIATIONS. ALL STOCKHOLM NATO DELEGATIONS HAVE RECOMMENDED THAT THIS TEXT BE ACCEPTED BY THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPITALS. THE SILENCE PROCEDURE WILL EXPIRE OOB TUESDAY, MAY 20.

4. BEGIN TEXT:  
 THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESSED THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL PROVISIONS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO ALL TEN PRINCIPLES OF THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTICIPATING STATES, AND DECLARED THEIR DETERMINATION TO RESPECT THESE PRINCIPLES AND TO PUT THEM INTO PRACTICE, IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS. THESE PRINCIPLES ARE ALL OF PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE AND ACCORDINGLY WILL BE EQUALLY AND UNRESERVEDLY APPLIED, EACH OF THEM BEING INTERPRETED TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE OTHERS.

THEY RECALLED THAT THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE, SECURITY AND JUSTICE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, WOULD BE ENHANCED BY COOPERATION IN ALL FIELDS COVERED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT. IN THIS CONTEXT THEY REAFFIRMED THE UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, THE RESPECT FOR WHICH IS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR FOR PEACE AND JUSTICE. THEY THUS STRESSED THEIR DETERMINATION TO RESPECT AND TO PUT INTO PRACTICE THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF THESE RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS, WHICH IS AN INDISPENSABLE COMPONENT OF THE CSCE PROCESS, AND OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, AS WELL AS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AMONG THEMSELVES AS AMONG ALL STATES.

END TEXT.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

**C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 04048**

**SUBJ: GONZALEZ VISIT TO MOSCOW**

**REFS: A. MOSCOW 08550; B. FBIS LD191714 MOSCOW TASS ENGLISH  
1642; C. FBIS LD191814 MOSCOW TASS ENGLISH 1714**

**1. CDE X - 64**

**2. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.**

**3. ADDING TO MOSCOW'S ANALYSIS OF RYZHKOV'S DINNER SPEECH FOR GONZALEZ (REF A), WE NOTE THAT TASS ISSUED A CORRECTION WHICH BLURS THE CONNECTION BETWEEN GORBACHEV'S APRIL 15 PROPOSAL ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS AND A POSSIBLE CDE STAGE II. THE ORIGINAL, IN USING GORBACHEV'S FORMULATION "THE REDUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS" TO DEFINE THE OBJECTIVE OF A CDE II COMING OUT OF VIENNA, CLEARLY IMPLIES THAT GORBACHEV WAS REFERRING TO CDE AS THE ARENA FOR APPLICATION OF HIS PROPOSAL. IN DROPPING THE EXACT GEOGRAPHICAL FORMULATION, THE REVISION WEAKENS THE LINK BETWEEN CDE AND THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL.**

**4. IN OUR VIEW, TASS'S REVISION OF RYZHKOV'S SPEECH REVEALS SOVIET UNCERTAINTY ABOUT HOW TO HANDLE THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL AND HOW TO PLAY ITS RELATIONSHIP TO CDE. THE PASSAGE IN EITHER VERSION DOES, HOWEVER, STRONGLY REINFORCE THE VIEW THAT THE SOVIETS ARE LOOKING FOR A CDE II AND WILL MAKE IT THEIR MAIN ORDER OF BUSINESS IN VIENNA. THIS IS THE MESSAGE WE HAVE BEEN RECEIVING FROM THE EAST IN THE CORRIDORS HERE. WE AGREE WITH MOSCOW THAT WE WILL BE HEARING INCREASINGLY MORE ABOUT CDE II AS THE ENDGAME HERE IN STOCKHOLM PROGRESSES. BARRY**

**END OF MESSAGE**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**NNNN**

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 04040  
SUBJ: PROPOSED WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT ON CDE

1. CDE X - 62

2. CONFIDENTIAL-ENTIRE TEXT

3. FOLLOWING IS DRAFT TEXT FOR SUGGESTED WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT TO BE ISSUED AT START OF NEXT CDE ROUND, JUNE 10. REQUEST TEXT BE CLEARED WITH WASHINGTON AGENCIES AS APPROPRIATE.

BEGIN TEXT: THE ADMINISTRATION IS INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE LACK OF PROGRESS IN THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE (CDE), WHICH RESUMES JUNE 10. THE CONFERENCE, WHICH HAS BEEN MEETING IN STOCKHOLM SINCE JANUARY 1984, IS CHARGED WITH ENACTING CONCRETE, VERIFIABLE MEASURES DESIGNED TO INCREASE STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THEREBY REDUCE THE RISK OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION.

AS PART OF THE BROADER CSCE PROCESS, SUCCESS IN CDE SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO AN IMPROVED EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP AND HELP TO LOWER THE ARTIFICIAL BARRIERS WHICH DIVIDE EAST FROM WEST IN EUROPE. THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED TO THIS OBJECTIVE.

THE PRESIDENT HAS ALWAYS ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE CDE; HE IS CONCERNED THAT, WITH ONLY TEN NEGOTIATING WEEKS REMAINING BEFORE THE CONFERENCE ADJOURNS, THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS ARE DIMINISHING RAPIDLY AND THE OPPORTUNITY OFFERED BY CDE MAY BE LOST. THE PREVIOUS ROUND, WHICH WE AND OUR ALLIES, AS WELL AS NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES, BELIEVED WAS CRITICAL, WAS WASTED BECAUSE OF EASTERN RELUCTANCE TO ENGAGE IN THE DRAFTING PROCESS. UPON RESUMPTION OF THE TALKS, THE FIRST TASK OF AN INTENSIFIED DRAFTING EFFORT MUST BE TO DECIDE ON THE LEVEL OF GROUND FORCE AND COMBINED ARMS EXERCISES TO BE NOTIFIED. WESTERN PROPOSALS PROVIDE EXTENSIVE INFORMATION ON THE LAND AND AIR COMPONENTS OF SUCH EXERCISES, AND IT IS TIME TO END THIS IMPASSE NOW.

THE UNITED STATES SEEKS SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS AS WELL AS ESTABLISHMENT OF REAL CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES IN EUROPE. THESE OBJECTIVES CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED IN EXISTING NEGOTIATIONS: MBFR IN VIENNA AND CDE IN STOCKHOLM, WHERE REALISTIC WESTERN PROPOSALS ARE NOW ON THE TABLE. THE INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD BE JUDGED BY ITS ACTIONS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS RATHER THAN BY GENERALITIES CONTAINED IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS. THE PRESIDENT HAS INSTRUCTED AMBASSADOR ROBERT L. BARRY, HEAD OF THE U.S. DELEGATION IN STOCKHOLM, TO PRESS FOR MEANINGFUL PROGRESS IN THE CONFERENCE DURING THE NEXT ROUND AND TO REPORT BACK WHEN THE ROUND ENDS IN JULY. END TEXT.

SECRET

410

Unofficial translation

S T A T E M E N T

by Oleg A. GRINEVSKY,  
Ambassador at Large,  
Head of the USSR Delegation  
to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-  
Building Measures and Disarmament in  
Europe

Stockholm, April 21, 1986

Mr. Chairman,

The 11th Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED)<sup>is</sup> concluding its work. This significant event put Berlin in the focus of attention of the numerous friends of the GDR, of the broad European and world public. Problems of war and peace occupied a great place at the Congress.

The report of the SED Central Committee delivered by Erich Honecker and the statement by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev provide important assessments of the current international situation and real ways out of the existing acute situation.

Disregarding the pressing interests and aspirations of all <sup>peoples,</sup> certain quarters have taken to the road of actually undermining the Geneva accords, the road of actions that only further complicate the already tense situation in the world.

It concerns first of all the sinister nuclear explosions in Nevada which destroyed a unique chance to give the process of disarmament a real start. It also concerns the impudent action taken by the United States against Libya that is fraught with the danger of a serious worsening of the situation in the world. Such actions damage directly the dialogue between both the USSR and the USA and between East and West in general.

Set against a broad international context, such steps, which are contrary to the tasks of strengthening confidence and serutiny, cannot be viewed as isolated developments. They all are manifestations of the general policy of solving international problems by force, of stepping up the arms race.

At this moment of responsibility no one may dodge discharging one's duty to the present and succeeding generations. As far as the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community are concerned, they have acted and will continue to act being fully aware of their responsibility. In Berlin the Soviet leader stated with utter certainty that our proposals for eliminating nuclear weapons and bridling the arms race hold good, and if the governments of Western countries are really concerned about the fate of peace, it is high time they began matching their words with deeds.

We would like specifically to draw the attention of the participants in the Stockholm Conference to the statement by the General Secretary, particularly to its section concerning Europe, as it has direct relevance to the task of strengthening confidence, security and to disarmament on our continent.

Two groupings of forces, stressed M.Gorbachev, each three million strong and possessing the most advanced tanks, missiles and planes, let alone small arms of all types, face each other in Europe. Moreover, what is called conventional weapons are constantly being improved and made more sophisticated and powerful, their effects becoming more and more like those of weapons of mass destruction.

There is another aspect to this problem. We are told that Western Europe cannot give up nuclear weapons, including American ones, because in this case it would allegedly feel less secure in the face of the conventional armed forces and armaments of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

What do we think necessary to say in this context?

3.

To begin with, the elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe would create a new situation not only for the West but also for ourselves. We should not forget that invasions of our territory in the pre-nuclear age were mounted from the West, and more than once.

From the capital of the GDR the Soviet Union appeals to all the West Europeans and declares: our country will never and under no circumstances begin armed operations against Western Europe unless we and our allies become targets of a NATO attack.

Our country backs this position with a new initiative now applying to the conventional armaments and armed forces. The USSR suggests that agreement be reached on substantial reductions in all the components of the land forces and tactical air forces of the European states and the relevant forces of the USA and Canada deployed in Europe. The formations and units to be reduced should be disbanded and their weaponry either destroyed or stored in national territories. Geographically, reductions, obviously, should cover the entire European territory from the Atlantic to the Urals. Longer-range and battle-field nuclear weapons could be reduced simultaneously with conventional weapons.

The question of dependable verification at every stage of this process offers itself. Both national technical means and international forms of verification, including, if need be, on-site inspection, are possible.

In short, this is a subject for serious negotiations. We believe that the formulation of the question in a broader context will make it possible to cut the knot which has been growing tighter at the Vienna talks over so many years now.

There are no traps in the policy of the Soviet Union. It extends an open hand, not a fist, to the West. We are looking for ways to mutual understanding and to the limitation of the arms race, to overcoming the negative trends of confrontation and to creating confidence as an inherent component of relations among states, including those in Europe.

The Soviet leadership considers that in the present situation fraught with dangers to the cause of peace it is important to make use of every possibility to correct and normalize the international situation. In this context the entire potential of the Stockholm Conference should naturally be utilized.

Mr. Chairman,

This session of the Conference is of special importance. And not only because time, as they say it, is running out on it. The tense and acute international situation makes it imperative that measures be taken which would help restore confidence and strengthen security on our continent. Therefore it is incumbent on this stage of the Stockholm negotiations to seek energetically solutions to the main outstanding problems of the Conference, to move steadily along the road of negotiating a concluding document which would both give concrete expression and effect to the non-use-of-force principle and include confidence-building measures in the military field.

The Soviet Union and socialist countries have made important steps to remove the pile-ups that have grown at the Conference and make headway in its work. Neutral and nonaligned countries make a substantial contribution to this end. Unfortunately, we are yet to see any accomodating moves on the part of some other



negotiators, although we hear sometimes pronouncements on the need to break the impasse at the Conference. Fossilized proposals and reluctance to budge in years-long positions form the main obstacles to negotiation of mutually acceptable agreements. I think that this round of negotiations will reveal whether words about the desire to move ahead are backed up by practical actions.

The question of non-use of force occupies an important place at the Stockholm negotiations. Giving concrete expression and effect to this principle provides in effect a base for and fill with substance all military measures we are negotiating, consolidates them and makes them confidence- and security-oriented.

It is time to address seriously one of the central issues of the Conference - notification of major military manoeuvres. In order to move ahead in it, it is essential to identify types of military activities that will be subject to notification. The key to solution of the problem is given in the January 15 Soviet proposal. Our proposal is to agree now on notification of major manoeuvres of ground and air forces, movements and transfers of troops and postpone the question of naval activities until the next stage of the Conference.

It is also necessary to focus on such an important question as the limitation of the scale of military manoeuvres. We expect that a realistic approach will be demonstrated to the consideration of this issue with account taken of its significance for reducing the risk of military confrontation in Europe.

Certainly, there<sup>are</sup>/other questions at the Conference that await solution, e.g. exchanges of annual plans of notifiable military activities, invitation of observers, etc. Obviously,

all confidence-building measures must be provided with adequate forms of verification.

We are in favour of the most effective methods of drafting on the entire range of questions as defined in the Agreement of October 14, 1985. We need to seek concrete results at each and every working group meeting. It would be the greatest prodigality to waste our time on academic discussion leading away from drafting. One should value one's own time and one's co-negotiators' time.

Mr. Chairman,

Success in Stockholm, conclusion of the Conference by adopting a substantive concluding document could give a fresh impetus to the further development of the CSCE process and improvement of international relations in general. It would also ensure favourable prerequisites for the Vienna follow-up meeting to contribute significantly to the improvement of the political climate and revival of detente in Europe and the world over.



**DELEGATION OF THE S. F. R. OF YUGOSLAVIA  
TO  
THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE — AND SECURITY — BUILDING MEASURES  
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE**

**CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY**

**Statement**

**by Mr. Aleksandar Bozović, Head of the Delegation of  
Yugoslavia, on terrorism, April 28, 1986, in the work-  
ing group A+B**

Speaking in this working group on two earlier occasions - on December 16 last year and last week - I have stated that our stand on terrorism is crystal-clear and consistent: Yugoslavia condemns without any reservations all - and I repeat all - forms of terrorism and fully respects and implements its international obligations in preventing and combating acts of terrorism. Our territory has never been used for the preparation of subversive and terrorist acts and has never been a sanctuary for terrorists. I leave it to my colleagues to assess their own country's role and actions or lack of actions in this respect. But let me, Mr. Chairman, acknowledge with appreciation the courage with which the United States Vice-President's Task Force on Combating Terrorism recognized that "the United States itself is sometimes used as a safe-heaven for terrorists".

Our resolute stand against terrorism stems also from the fact that our country - its citizens, property and interests - were so frequently in the past the object of terrorist and subversive activities, in most cases organized on and executed from the territories of a number of Participating States. Post-war history offers numerous examples of ruthless and internationally conspired attacks on our diplomatic and other missions, assaults on our Ambassadors and other official representatives, incursions of armed terrorist groups into our territory, planting of bombs in check-rooms at railway stations and other public places, and so on. Physical assaults and beatings of Yugoslav workers employed abroad, threats and blackmail for the purpose of extorting money, are frequently practised. Resistance to such acts are labelled and punished as disruption of public order, but acts that are opposed are neither proven nor punished. Countries whose hospitality these conspiratorial elements enjoyed and still enjoy, have frequently failed to take effective action to prevent anti-Yugoslav subversive and terrorist activities and to have the perpetrators of subversive and terrorist acting against Yugoslavia and its citizens duly punished.

Subversive and terrorism oriented groups and organizations are still active, and they are in some countries even patronized by

some members of Parliaments who, in their turn, are rewarded for services rendered with the titles of "honorary Croats". Aspects of private life of terrorists recruited from within those organizations have been given on television and in mass media, a publicity that intends to make heroes out of them and that amounts to an open invitation to all those who wish to come into the limelight to commit terrorist crimes. Furthermore, mass media are placed at the disposal of subversive and terrorist organizations and widely used for recruiting followers.

Some of the subversive and terrorist oriented groups and organizations in different Participating States may lately have changed their names with a view to make themselves more acceptable or at least less subject to criticism or actions by the competent authorities of the host countries and to fit within the wide and wild interpretations of democracy and its functioning. Be that as it may, the fact remains that they all stem from the Nazi-Fascist organizations that during the last war fought together with the occupiers of their own countries against their own peoples, or from those that had later been created in order to continue, on the same basis, their criminal activities. In 1956 Ante Pavelić, former Ustashi leader and head of the so-called "Independent State of Croatia", created the "Croatian Liberation Movement". One of the offsprings of that organization is the "Croatian Peoples Resistance", whose newspaper "Resistance", published in some of the Participating States, openly made appeals for terrorism in the following terms: "Our platform is clear: Yugoslavia in any form must be destroyed. Destroy it by working with Russians and the Americans, with the Communists, with the non-Communists and the anti-Communists, destroy it together with anyone destroying it. Destroy it with the dialectics of words and dynamite but destroy it unconditionally ...". As I said, this appeal has been printed and reprinted, published and republished in some of the Participating States. The only change that was brought into this text, in order to appease the conscience of legally minded legislations, was to omit the word "dynamite", the rest, however, remained the same.

Mr. Chairman,

Terrorism is not a "matter of taste". It cannot one day be called "senseless acts of violence" and the other "disagreement with the order and state of affairs" in the countries of the origin of terrorists. Terrorism cannot be condemned in one region and be treated as potential strategic reserve in the other. There is no difference, consequence-wise, between state sponsored and semi-officially or privately sponsored terrorism or actions that are taken under the benevolent attitude towards activities that are only half a step apart from terrorism and easily transformed into criminal acts.

Terrorism must never be ideologized along the lines of the main political divisions of the post-war world. Such an ideologization has been used and misused for destructive political ends. Revanchist, fascist, neo-Nazi and anti-Communist terrorism have nothing to do with the democratic organization and ideals of Western democratic societies. On the other hand, the so-called radical, revolutionary terrorism has nothing to do with the aspirations and ideas of the socialist world, just as so-called anti-colonial, emancipatory terrorism has nothing to do with the strivings and goals of peoples fighting for national and social liberation.

Recent events have reminded us all that, taking different forms and inspired by different motives, terrorism does not spare any country, any social political system or any region of the world. Nobody is any more immune to subversion and terrorism. It is highly regrettable that some of the Participating States had to learn that the hard way and at the cost of tremendous sometimes irreplaceable losses. We do hope that we all have drawn appropriate lessons and that now, that the increased awareness on the need to take joint actions to prevent terrorism is evident, we will finally all be ready to come to grips with the problem itself as well as with the generators of terrorism and with its underlying causes. President Reagan has rightly stated in a report to the US Congress on April 26, 1984, that we should treat terrorism as a crime against the international community but also endeavour to eliminate the causes of frustration and despair that nurtures and steers up terrorism.

This Delegation shares the opinion that the Stockholm Conference has to single out terrorism as a threat to cooperation, peace and security in Europe and to focus on effective measures to preventing it. Within our efforts to elaborate on the principle of the non-use of force or threat of force, we should undertake to take all necessary measures to prevent preparations being carried out on our respective territories for the execution of acts of subversion and terrorism, including measures banning the conduct on our respective territories of unlawful activity by persons, groups or organizations which advocate, call for, encourage, instigate, organize or engage in subversive and terrorist activities endangering human lives and sovereignty and territorial integrity of other countries. Let me, in this context, draw your attention to the dangers inherent in an interpretation of democracy and democratic institutions such as freedom of organization, freedom of expression and freedom of the press in a way that amounts to invitation and that is understood by those who engage in subversive and terrorist activities as a green light to carry on with their criminal acts. "Terrorists deliberately manufacture sensations to capture maximum media attention - a ploy that often takes advantage of press freedom. Such activity, it is stated in the report of the US Vice-President's Task Force on Combating Terrorism, "can be offset by close communication between media and government".

The joint proposal of the neutral and non-aligned countries submitted under SC.7 contains some provisions on preventing subversive activities and terrorism. At the time of the elaboration of those provisions they were considered as being the best basis for adopting a text that would command the consensus of all of us. However, in the light of recent events those provisions, I believe, clearly need further elaboration.

I also agree that the Stockholm decisions focusing on effective means of preventing terrorism would not, of course, resolve the problem and that a broader approach is needed. With this in mind we have very carefully studied the recommendations of the United States Vice-President's Task Force on Combating Terrorism, some of which in our opinion merit further consideration. The Task Force

considers that international cooperation is crucial to long-term deterrence of terrorism and that it can be achieved through multilateral and bilateral agreements. While progress in achieving multilateral agreements has been slow, efforts should, in the opinion of the Task Force, continue to reach an agreement to show that many nations are committed to fighting terrorism as an international crime against society. To this I would like to add that each Participating State should, within their own legal system, take effective steps to prevent subversive and terrorist activities on their territories first. We should, in other words, start by cleaning our own back-yards first, or at least along with our efforts to prevent terrorism in other countries and regions.

As I have earlier stated the Task Force recognizes that the United States itself is sometimes used as a safe-heaven for terrorists and finds that "present extradition treaties with other countries preclude the turning-over of fugitives wanted for "political offences" which is an obvious loophole for terrorists". The Task Force also recommends that the information on terrorist activities between governments should be exchanged as such exchanges "with like-minded nations" and international law enforcement organizations have been highly useful and should therefore be expanded. The only comment I have with regard to this recommendation is to ask why such an exchange of information should be limited to like-minded nations alone.

Mr. Chairman,

The Follow-up Meeting in Vienna, in November this year, should in our view provide for an elaborated consideration of the problem of terrorism by convening a special meeting of all Participating States that should, among other, elaborate a regional agreement on prevention of subversive and terrorist activities. That agreement should in our view include the obligation of the Participating States to respect and fulfil their international obligations and to bring their national legislations in accordance with the provisions of international legal and political instruments to which they are or may become parties. The Follow-up Meeting in Vienna should also call on Participating States to revise the existing or conclude new bilateral



agreements that would provide for the punishment and extradition of persons found guilty to have committed subversive or terrorist activity. Such efforts have of course to be translated into a broader international action and agreements to combat and prevent terrorism.

Mr. Chairman,

At our last meeting of this group, the representative of the United States, Ambassador Lynn Hansen, asked what have the non-aligned countries done to prevent terrorism. A fair question merits an honest answer. The non-aligned countries have in the past taken a number of actions and made a number of proposals within the United Nations organization to prevent and combat subversive and terrorist activities. A number of international instruments, recommendations and resolutions on terrorism have been adopted, but unfortunately not respected and implemented by all member states. The non-aligned countries have also taken a number of actions with a view to eradicate the underlying causes of terrorism, but their efforts met with opposition, and were not successful. So, the question is not only what have they done but why have they not succeeded.

At the Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement, that was recently held in New Delhi, the following text on international terrorism was adopted:

"The Ministers expressed their deep concern at the world-wide escalation of acts of terrorism, including state terrorism in all its forms, which endanger or take innocent human lives, jeopardize fundamental freedoms and have an increasingly deleterious effect on international relations and may jeopardize the very territorial integrity and security of states. They condemned all terrorist activities, whether perpetrated by individuals, groups or states, and resolved to counter them by every legal means possible. They called upon all states to fulfil their obligations under international law to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in other states or acquiescing in activities within their territories directed towards the commission of such acts."

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Next 6 Page(s) In Document Denied

Unofficial translation

S T A T E M E N T

by Oleg A. GRINEVSKY,  
Ambassador at Large,  
Head of the USSR Delegation  
to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-  
Building Measures and Disarmament in  
Europe

Stockholm, May 23, 1986

Mr. Chairman,

The Conference is moving now into the concluding phase of its work. Naturally, this places all its participants under serious responsibility. We have little time left and much, even very much, remains to be done. Under these circumstances we ought to act more energetically without losing time and press forward persistently.

I believe that a disservice is done to the Conference by those who attempt to call into question the very possibility of achieving positive results in Stockholm, who attempt to steer matters to confrontation rather than to cooperation in negotiating mutually acceptable agreements. Isn't it like tolling the knell for the Conference?

Obviously, we are far from looking at the affairs in Stockholm through pink glasses or closing our eyes to the difficulties and obstacles that we are yet to overcome on our way to completing the Conference.

Those who have followed closely this session cannot fail to see that intensive work has been going on in drafting groups. Coordinators and negotiators have toiled relentlessly without counting time to achieve results. In our view, interesting and useful work has been done in the group dealing with notification which has managed, seemingly, to address the very crux of the matter. We, on our part, wish this group and its coordinator, distinguished Ambassador Lidgard, success in moving forward. Useful work has also been done in the group

on observation; some movement, albeit timid, has begun in the non-use of force group.

However we should state with all frankness that drafting has been extremely slow. Language agreed so far concerns only peripheral, secondary questions.

What is required then to accelerate progress at the Conference, to impart it a more business-like pace? It would seem that the requirement here is that all participants in the Conference pursue more energetically and boldly solutions to unresolved problems and seek approaches to mutually acceptable agreements.

We note with satisfaction that this very attitude to our business prevails among many West-European countries. Like in other CSCE fora the neutral and nonaligned countries have been playing a positive role. There is a feeling that France, Italy, Spain and other Western countries are in favour of a positive conclusion of the Stockholm Conference.

The socialist countries have been consistent in pursuing their firm line of achieving substantive results. It is impossible to name a single theme defined in the Agreement of October 14, 1985, where the Soviet Union and the socialist countries have not made constructive proposals. Everyone has still fresh memories of the major initiatives set forth by the Soviet leadership, which enabled the Conference to gain momentum.

3.

While on his visit to Paris early in October, 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev expressed the readiness of the Soviet Union to accept the idea of a number of states, neutral in the first place, regarding mutual exchanges of annual plans of notifiable military activities. This step made it possible to start a business-like consideration of this important measure which can become a serious safety fuse against a military conflict in Europe.

On January 15, the Soviet Union made a proposal to agree now on notification of major manoeuvres of land and air forces and to postpone the issue of naval activities until the next stage of the Conference. That proposal paved the way to solving the basic problems of the Conference.

The socialist countries have introduced far-reaching and specific proposals designed to achieve agreements in such areas as non-use of force, invitation of observers, and limitation of the scale of military manoeuvres. We, on our part, are prepared to continue to follow this way in the belief that other participating States will act likewise.

Mr. Chairman,

If we analyze the status at the Conference we could make a conclusion that today a lot hinges on the problem of notification. Time has come finally to identify seriously types of notifiable activities, address notification of manoeuvres of land and air forces, movements (transfers)

of forces, start negotiating specific parameters for them, and work on information in the context of notification.

In order to give an impetus to such business-like discussions and progress at the Conference we would like today to make the following proposals.

First. To notify major manoeuvres of land forces conducted independently or in combination with any possible air, naval, amphibious and airborne components, if they involve 18,000 troops and more. In so doing the number of divisions engaged in the manoeuvres would be reported.

Second. To notify manoeuvres of air forces, whenever during the entire period of the manoeuvres 700 and more sorties are flown or more than 350 combat aircraft are engaged in the manoeuvres.

This is the way - through making concrete proposals and seeking solutions to unresolved problems - that should guide, in our view, all those who sincerely wish to conclude the first stage of the Stockholm Conference with positive and substantive results.

Unfortunately, there have been, so far, no steps on the part of the US and its closest allies to meet compromise proposals advanced by other participants. They avoid solutions to problems facing the Conference and prefer to stay entrenched in their old, moss-covered positions. What is more, they torpedoed any mutual understanding that seemed to have taken shape more than once. And the US delegation made a step backwards and refused to accept proposals which

it had agreed to earlier and even made itself. This frivolous playing at negotiations was played virtually in all working groups.

In essence, this is nothing else but a creation of artificial deadlocks at the Conference, a desire to tighten still more the knot of differences rather than a search for solutions to unresolved problems. It is this approach that creates difficulties, slows down work, and leads to foot dragging. As a result, a truly complex situation has evolved at the Conference.

Mr. Chairman,

I believe that it is clear to everyone that there can be no final agreement based on one scenario only and proposed by one country only. We need a common platform geared to a concrete result.

The Europeans mastered enough political realism and wisdom to conclude the Madrid Meeting by a substantive result. They were able to overcome difficulties and differences for the sake of one fundamental thing - the preservation and further development of the Helsinki process of security and cooperation which meets their vital long-term interests.

Europe which possesses the necessary historical experience can say its word that will carry weight in Stockholm too, show an example of solving the problem of



b.

confidence and security building. By mentioning Europe we do not intend in any way to downplay the significance of a possible contribution in this regard of the US and Canada which signed the Helsinki Act.

Proceeding from such historical perspective, the Soviet Union and the socialist countries stand for consistent compliance with all provisions of the Final Act in order to improve once again the climate in Europe, to establish confidence as an integral component of relations among states, and to build dependable security on the continent.

Based on the requirements of the pressing tasks of European politics it is paramount to conclude the first stage of the Stockholm Conference with positive results. Possibilities exist for it and they are quite real, given the mutual desire to achieve agreement. However, by all appearances, this is what some of our Western counterparts are lacking yet. Otherwise it is difficult to explain skidding in the work of the Conference. But success or failure in Stockholm constitute in the current situation a touchstone of the readiness to seek in deeds rather than in words the reduction of military danger on our continent, to actually build confidence. This is necessary both by itself and for the next CSCE meeting in Vienna so as to enable it to take a decision on the second phase of the Conference devoted to disarmament in Europe. Accordingly, a fresh impetus would be given to the development of the Helsinki process in all its dimensions.

