



**Directorate of  
Intelligence**

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25X1

**Soviet Bloc and Neutral/Nonaligned  
Country Statements at the  
CSCE Stockholm Conference on  
Confidence- and Security-Building  
Measures and Disarmament  
in Europe (CDE)  
(CDE-IX & CDE-X)**

**28 January – 14 March 1986  
15 April – 23 May 1986**

**Volume I**

25X1

**A Reference Aid**

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*CR 86-11187  
June 1986*

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
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**FOREWORD**



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FOREWORD

This reference aid contains a chronological history and index of topics discussed during the Ninth and Tenth Rounds of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) which commenced in Stockholm on 28 January and recessed on 23 May 1986. It is indexed according to subjects and countries. In the case of the Soviet Union the individual delegate speaking, if identified, is also specified. Furthermore, the forum in which the statement(s) occurred is noted.

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The conference record has been retained in straight chronological order. The index, located at the beginning, is designed to guide the user to pages for specific topics, countries, and in the case of the Soviet Union, personalities. By using the type of entry key located at the front of the index, users can determine whether the references are from cables reporting on plenary, post-plenary, or working group meetings and limit their searches by these types of references when desired. Users interested in statements by a particular country are directed to the country index where each country has its own subject index. In the case of the Soviet Union, an additional letter code will identify the individual delegate who made the statement, if noted in the text. Each Soviet delegate who spoke is also included in the main subject index.

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Statements by the following countries are indexed: Bulgaria, German Democratic Republic (GDR), Hungary, Malta, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and Yugoslavia. Several countries that were indexed in previous reference aids were not included in this edition, since they were not mentioned in the negotiating record. Please note that there is also a separate entry for the "East". In this section are found statements which were attributed to the East in general but to no one country in particular.

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All statements made by participating countries during plenary and working group AB meetings are summarized in the "Statement Summaries" section of this reference aid. [REDACTED]

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Two items of note which might otherwise be overlooked are brought to the user's attention: "weekly wrap-up" cables summarizing developments in all CDE forums are included chronologically and can be located by referring to the subject index; a group of miscellaneous cables are referenced in the subject index as "miscellaneous cables" and cover such topics as delegation personnel changes, analyses of delegation and group positions or motives at CDE, and procedural issues and similar subjects. [REDACTED]

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CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE-  
AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES  
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE  
STOCKHOLM 1984

31 January 1986 \*/

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS  
(as communicated by Delegations)

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\*/ The previous edition was printed  
on 8 November 1985

A U S T R I A

|                   |   |
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| Dr Wolfgang LOIBL | Ambassador, Head of Delegation                |
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| Dr Thomas NADER   | Delegate                                      |

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|--------------------|-----------------------------|
| Mr Karl LIKO       | General, Military Adviser   |
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|---------------------|------------------------|
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B E L G I U M

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Mr Demetrio ORTIGUEIRA



B U L G A R I A

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| Mr Oliver NOWAK         | Attaché (Communication Officer)       |
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in Stockholm

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| Mr Slawomir PETELICKI     | First Secretary at the<br>Embassy of the Polish People's<br>Republic in Stockholm |

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P O R T U G A L

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| Dr João de MATOS SEQUEIRA   | Second Secretary               |

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R O M A N I A

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| Mr Marin BUHOARA      | Counsellor, Member of Delegation      |
| Mr Nicolae IORDACHE   | Counsellor, Member of Delegation      |
| Mr Dumitru CEAUȘU     | Counsellor, Member of Delegation      |
| Mr Nicolae CORDUNEANU | Colonel, Member of Delegation         |

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| Mr Petru-Dumitru BORDEA | Counsellor, Embassy of the Socialist Republic of Romania       |
| Mr Mihai ALBU           | Second Secretary, Embassy of the Socialist Republic of Romania |

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| Mrs Floarea STOENICA      | Secretary of the Delegation |
| Mrs Ana-Mariana MOGOSEANU | Secretary of the Delegation |

S A N M A R I N O

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| Mr Giordano Bruno REFFI                 | Minister of Foreign Affairs                              |
| Mr Oscar PASQUINI                       | Minister   |
| Mrs Maria Antonietta BONELLI            | Director, Office for Political<br>and Diplomatic Affairs |
| Mr José Manuel de MOLLINEDO<br>MARTINEZ | Member of Delegation                                     |
| Mr Fredrik W. LETTSTRÖM                 | Consul General of San Marino,<br>Stockholm               |

S P A I N

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Mr Joaquin PÉREZ-VILLANUEVA                      Deputy Head of Delegation

Captain José Luis RIPOLL                      Defence International Affairs  
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Mr José TOLEDANO                      Administrative Officer

Mr Francisco REVUELTA                      Administrative Officer

Mr Mats ERIKSSON

## S W E D E N

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|---------------------|--|
| Mr Sten ANDERSSON   | Minister for Foreign Affairs<br>- Head of Delegation -<br><u>ex officio</u> when in attendance |
| Mr Pierre SCHORI    | Permanent Under-Secretary of<br>State for Foreign Affairs,<br>Delegate                         |
| Mr Curt LIDGARD     | Ambassador, Head of Delegation   |
| Mr Björn ELMER      | Minister Plenipotentiary,<br>Deputy Head of Delegation   |
| Mr Gustav EKHOLM    | Minister Plenipotentiary, Delegate   |
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| Mr Arne KALLIN      | First Secretary, Delegate  |

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| Mr Sture ERICSON          | Member of Parliament, Delegate   |
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| Mr Stig ALEMYR            | Member of Parliament, Delegate   |
| Mrs Anita BRÅKENHIELM     | Member of Parliament, Delegate   |
| Mr Jan ELIASSON           | Ambassador, Under-Secretary<br>for Political Affairs,<br>Ministry for Foreign Affairs,<br>Delegate |
| Mr Carl-Magnus HYLTIENIUS | Assistant Under-Secretary,<br>Ministry for Foreign Affairs,<br>Delegate                            |

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| Mr Jan PRAWITZ     | Special Adviser on Disarmament,<br>Ministry of Defence, Expert |

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| Colonel Bertil JOHANSSON           | Ministry of Defence, Expert   |
| Captain (Navy) Jan ÅKERHIELM       | Defence Staff, Expert   |
| Lieutenant Colonel<br>Vulf HESSULF | Ministry of Defence,<br>Expert  |
| Mr Johan TUNBERGER                 | Senior Security Policy Analyst,<br>National Defence Research<br>Institute, Expert   |
| Mr Lars LÖNNBACK                   | Ambassador, Assistant Under-<br>Secretary, Head of Press and<br>Information Department, Ministry<br>for Foreign Affairs, Expert |
| Mr Bertil JOBEUS                   | Head of Press Division, Ministry<br>for Foreign Affairs, Expert   |
| Mr Herman GYLLENHAAL               | Press Officer, Head of Section,<br>Ministry for Foreign Affairs   |
| Mr Ove BRING                       | Doctor of Laws, Ministry for<br>Foreign Affairs, Expert   |
| Mr Bo ERIKSSON                     | Head of Section, Ministry for<br>Foreign Affairs  |
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| Ms Ingrid REHN-BUKAI               | Senior Administrative Officer   |

S W I T Z E R L A N D

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| Miss Susanna JUTZI | Secretary of the Delegation           |

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| Colonel Hans STÖSSEL | Defence Attaché                     |

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Ambassador, Head of Delegation

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Mrs Güner ERCETİN

Mr Mustafa TÜRKKAN



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| I.S. ROZANOV     | Member of Delegation        |
| Y.N. RAHMANINOV  | Member of Delegation        |
| V.I. EROFEEV     | Member of Delegation        |
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| V.A. VOLOSSATOV  | Counsellor                  |
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| A.N. GROCHEV     | Expert                      |
| A.V. PIROGOV     | Expert                      |
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| N.S. SELIVERSTOV | Counsellor                  |
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V.S. ZAKHARIKOV

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E.P. FROLOVA

M.V. CHALNEV

V.V. ANDREEVA

## U N I T E D K I N G D O M

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| Miss K.E. GILLMORE  | Administrative and Technical Assistant |
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| Dr Lynn HANSEN                   | Ambassador, Deputy Head<br>of Delegation               |
| Mr Gregory J. NEWELL             | Ambassador of the United<br>States to Sweden, Delegate |
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| Mr Jeremy F. CURTIN              | Delegate   |
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| Mr Jon GUNDERSEN                 | Delegate   |
| Mr Kenneth HUCK                  | Delegate   |
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| Major Evan C. MACGIBBON          | Delegate   |
| Mr Rolf MOWATT-LARSEN            | Delegate   |
| Mr Edwin NOLAN                   | Delegate   |
| Ms Suzanne PARRY                 | Delegate   |
| Dr Harlan STRAUSS                | Delegate   |
| Lieutenant Colonel<br>Joseph TYO | Delegate   |

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 Ms Donna PETRICH  
 Ms Nancy WALKER  
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| Mr Sherrod McCALL    | Counsellor, American Embassy,<br>Stockholm                               |
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| Mr Allen F. SCHEEL   | Attaché (Security)   |

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Mr Guy ROSENQVIST  
Mr Åke BLIXT  
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Mr David L. BLEYLE  
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Y U G O S L A V I A

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| Mr Aleksandar BOZOVIC        | Ambassador, Head of Delegation |
| Colonel Branislav MIHAILOVIC | Deputy Head of Delegation      |
| Dr Ljubivoje ACIMOVIC        | Special Adviser                |
| Dr Vladimir BILANDZIC        | Member of Delegation           |

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|----------------------|--|
| Mr Marjan OSOLNIK    | Ambassador to Sweden                         |
| Mr Dobrosav VEIZOVIC | Counsellor of the Embassy,<br>Stockholm      |
| Mr Nedzad HADZIMUSIC | First Secretary of the<br>Embassy, Stockholm |

Administrative and Technical Staff

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|--------------------------|---|
| Mr Miodrag MARKUS        | Administrative Secretary to<br>the Delegation |
| Mrs Ratomirka DJORDJEVIC | Secretary                                     |
| Mr Vojislav DJORDJEVIC   |   |

**STATEMENT SUMMARIES**

SECRET

25X1

SUMMARY OF  
PLENARY STATEMENTS

28 January 1986

MALTA

- Claims US sanctions against Libya, naval presence in Mediterranean are destabilizing factors.
- Reviews Malta's efforts to "stall instability."
- Urges conference to consider independent air and naval activities.

UNITED STATES

- Replies to Malta's remarks.
- Defends US actions on terrorism - Libya issue.

FRG

- Presents FRG and France's joint ideas on the CDE.
- Urges conference to consider all parts of the final act.
- Reminds delegations that CDE is the responsibility of all participants, not just the superpowers.
- Emphasizes the need to devote as much attention to conventional stability as the nuclear balance of power.
- Assesses recent Soviet proposals (January 15).
- Contends that reliable verification is a crucial element of CDE.
- Reviews non-use of force (NUF) principle.
- Urges conference to reach a substantive agreement before Vienna review.
- Argues that a community of equals is necessary for confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) to become reality.

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FRANCE

- Notes time remaining before follow-up meeting is short.
- Discusses proposals made by Gorbachev on 15 January.
- Argues that conventional armaments need to be discussed along with nuclear arsenals.
- Reviews conditions necessary for France to participate usefully in an effective and verifiable process of nuclear disarmament.
- Outlines conditions which must be satisfied if conference is to succeed.
- Reaffirms French support for the functional approach to independent air and naval activities.
- Reviews French policy on NUF.
- Urges conference to consider all aspects of the final act equally.
- Thanks Swedish Government for hospitality.

USSR

- Reviews Gorbachev's 15 January proposal.
- Recognizes the need for Europe to be an active participant in CDE.
- Criticizes the West for limiting notification to ground force activities.
- Reaffirms desire for limitation of the scale of military maneuvers.
- Urges intensification of CDE's work on NUF principle.
- States that a substantive concluding document is possible.

28 February 1986

UNITED STATES

- Reaffirms US commitment to begin drafting stage.
- Urges delegations to keep focus of conference on CSBMs.
- Confirms US desire to seek better US/Soviet working relationship.

14 March 1986

USSR

- Claims that recent Party Congress demonstrates USSR foreign policy aims to preserve and strengthen universal peace.
- Reviews progress made by conference.
- Outlines measures undertaken by Soviet Union to give a "fresh impetus" to the negotiations.

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SECRET

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USSR

- Criticizes NATO for not being responsive to recent Soviet proposals.
- Argues that the drafting process needs to speed up.
- Concludes that a substantive and meaningful document is possible before Vienna.

UNITED STATES

- Reflects upon the accomplishments of the conference.
- Provides "evidence" that world political leaders want conference to reach an agreement.
- Suggests that the drafting process has gained momentum during the session.
- Outlines those areas where delegations are in agreement.
- Proposes the conference begin drafting on issues where there is considerable common ground.
- Emphasizes that the concluding document will not accommodate all of the proposals before CDE.
- Urges the conference to honor Olaf Palme's memory by seeking consensus on measures to reduce suspicion and increase confidence and cooperation.

15 April 1986

NETHERLANDS

- Presents the positions of EC-12 on NUF, verification, notification.
- Criticizes US military actions against Libya.
- Calls upon all parties to use restraint.

POLAND

- Alleges that US is pursuing a policy of military conflict in Mediterranean.
- Condemns US act of state terrorism against Libya.
- Endorses Warsaw Pact proposal call for a nuclear weapons free zone.
- Praises Gorbachev's January 15 proposal.
- Outlines conditions which must be met if negotiations are to succeed.

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BULGARIA

- Argues that US action in Libya is a violation of the NUF principle.
- Claims that Ambassador Barry has been hostile to Bulgaria since his tour of duty there.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GDR, HUNGARY

- Condemn US military action.

USSR

- Asserts that US justification to the act is "weak indeed."
- Argues that action is latest in trend of US interference.
- Suggests that "military aggression" disrupts atmosphere of confidence.

MALTA

- Accuses the US of violating the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, NUF and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes.
- Offers GOM assistance in improving relations between Libya, US.
- Insists that US actions have demonstrated the need for naval activities in the Mediterranean to be included in any CDE agreement.

UNITED STATES

- Defends US military actions against Libya.
- Presents evidence US has linking Libya with recent terrorist attacks.
- Reaffirms US commitment to CDE.
- Urges the conference to speed up the drafting process.

UNITED KINGDOM

- Stresses that the US has the right of self-defense.

FRG

- Notes his surprise at the number of hypocritical statements made by various delegates.
- Declares that US had reasons for military action.

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23 May 1986

USSR

- Looks at the progress made by the working groups during CDE X.
- Claims that it is impossible to name a single area in which the Soviet Union and the socialist countries have not made constructive proposals.
- Stresses that little progress has been made on notification.
- Outlines the latest Soviet proposal on notification.
- Criticizes the US and its allies for not meeting compromise proposals advanced by other participants.
- Argues that US actions have tightened the knot of differences rather than help solve unresolved problems.
- Concludes that positive results can be reached by the end of the first stage in Stockholm.

UNITED STATES (Hansen)

- Asserts that East is to blame for the delay in drafting.
- Emphasizes that the Soviet proposal for notification of air activities is not comprehensive.
- Declares that the new Soviet threshold for land activities ignores NATO and NNA proposals for lower, more significant thresholds.

YUGOSLAVIA

- Stresses that a mini-package would not be an acceptable outcome to CDE.

FRANCE

- Welcomes Soviet acknowledgement that notification is the central issue.

ITALY

- Reviews progress in each working group and what still needs to be accomplished.
- Implies that the conference will have work to do after Vienna, regardless of results achieved before the review.

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Working Group AB

10 February 1986

POLAND

- Distributes a 10-point text for the invitation of observers.

USSR

- Cites the "sinister" nuclear explosion and US action against Libya as evidence of worsening US-Soviet relations.

YUGOSLAVIA

- Condemns US action against Libya; all forms of terrorism.

MALTA

- Alludes to its efforts to mediate between Libya and the US.

CYPRUS

- Promises to press the Euro-Mediterranean security link in the non-use of force working group.

ROMANIA

- Stresses it would accept no excuses for the use of force.

TURKEY

- Notes the special importance it attaches to combating terrorism.

PORTUGAL

- Deplores the hypocritical propaganda introduced by those praising Libya in CDE and stressed that terrorism is the primary issue.

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FRG

- Chastises the Soviets for praising Libya while noting UN condemnation of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

POLAND

- Outlines three aspects of the Gorbachev proposal on conventional weapons which have relevance for CDE.

UNITED STATES

- Responds to nonaligned and Soviet criticism of US actions against Libya.

28 April 1986

YUGOSLAVIA

- Reaffirms Yugoslavia's commitment to the prevention of terrorism.
- Stresses that terrorism cannot be condemned in one region and be treated as potential strategic reserve in another.
- Shares the opinion that Stockholm conference has to single out terrorism as a threat to cooperation, peace and security in Europe.
- Suggests that each participating state should take effective steps to prevent subversive and terrorist activities on their territories first.
- Proposes a special meeting of all participating states that should elaborate a regional agreement on prevention of subversive and terrorist activities.
- Recalls previous efforts by the nonaligned countries to prevent terrorism.
- Reads the text on international terrorism adopted at the Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Nonaligned Movement.

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SUBJECT INDEX

**SECRET**

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**MAIN SUBJECT INDEX**

**Type Key**

- p - plenary meeting
- a - working group A
- b - working group B
- c - working group AB
- d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
- e - NATO caucus

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**CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES:** 1d, 36d, 207p, 327d, 347, 404d

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Handling the Gorbachev conventional arms initiative: pp. 394-396

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Names of participating states: 346a

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BULGARIA SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

- p - plenary meeting
- a - working group A
- b - working group B
- c - working group AB
- d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
- e - NATO caucus

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EAST SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

p - plenary meeting

a - working group A

b - working group B

c - working group AB

d - post-plenary or other informal conversations

e - NATO caucus

ADJOINING SEA AND AIRSPACE: 127a

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Duration of the activity: 346a

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Geographic coordinates of the location of the activity: 346a

Names of participating states: 346a

Number of troops participating 127a, 346a

Number of naval vessels involved: 127a

Number of military aircraft involved: 127a, 346a

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OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

Host country responsibilities: 156b

Invitation of observers: 156b

PRIOR NOTIFICATION: 128a

SC.1 (also SC.1/Amplified): 347

SC.7: 38d, 228

TRANSFER/MOVEMENT OF TROOPS: 127a

VERIFICATION:

General references to: 38d, 227

Verification by cadres: 38d

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**GDR SUBJECT INDEX**

**Type Key**

- p - plenary meeting**
- a - working group A**
- b - working group B**
- c - working group AB**
- d - post-plenary or other informal conversations**
- e - NATO caucus**

**INSPECTIONS:**

General references to: 38a

**VERIFICATION:**

General references to: 38a

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HUNGARY SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

- p - plenary meeting
- a - working group A
- b - working group B
- c - working group AB
- d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
- e - NATO caucus

OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

Scope of observation: 40d

SC.7: 40d

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MALTA SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

- p - plenary meeting
- a - working group A
- b - working group B
- c - working group AB
- d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
- e - NATO caucus

CDE IX:

General references to: 15p

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 282p

CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES

FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 282p

HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: 2p, 15p

MALTESE MEDITERRANEAN ZONE OF PEACE: 15p, 23d

NON-USE-OF-FORCE:

General references to: 282p

NOTIFICATIONS: see also PRENOTIFICATION; PRIOR NOTIFICATION

General references to: 2p

Type of forces involved: 2p

Number of troops participating: 2p

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Number of naval vessels involved: 2p

NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE

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POLAND SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

p - plenary meeting

a - working group A

b - working group B

c - working group AB

d - post-plenary or other informal conversations

e - NATO caucus

CDE ZONE: 278p, 304c

DISARMAMENT: 304c

FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 278p, 281p

HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

JANUARY 15 PROPOSAL: 278p

NOTIFICATIONS: see also PRIOR NOTIFICATION

General references to: 278p

NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE: 277p

OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

Coordination of observation with other states: 81c

Host country responsibilities: 81c

Invitations of observers: 81c

Scope of observation: 81c

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## USSR SUBJECT INDEX

| Type Key  | Speaker Key     |
|---|-----------------|
| p - plenary meeting                                 | A - Grinevskiy  |
| a - working group A                                 | B - Rakhmaninov |
| b - working group B                                 | C - Rozanov     |
| c - working group AB                                | D - Solomenko   |
| d - post-plenary or other<br>informal conversations | E - Tatarnikov  |
| e - NATO caucus                                     | F - Mikhaylov   |

ADJOINING SEA AND AIRSPACE: 19p/A, 75d/E, 144p/A, 178d/A, 320d/A

AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES: 145p/A, 204p/A, 221p/A, 366p/A, 374p/A

## CDE-IX:

General references to: 18p/A, 21p/A, 36d/A, 204p/A, 210p/A

Structural issues: 104d

## CDE-X:

General references to: 364p/A

CDE ZONE: see also ZONAL CONSTRAINTS; 19p/A, 178d/A, 320d/A

COMPLIANCE: see also MEASURE 5; 39d/C, 367p/A

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 17p/A, 19p/A, 21p/A, 29p/A,  
39d/E, 39d/C, 204p/A, 212p/A, 299p/A, 317d/A, 320d/A, 367p/A, 375d/A,  
404d/F

CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 1d, 36d/A, 207p/A, 327d/D, 404d/F

CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES

DISARMAMENT: 17p/A, 28p/A, 129d/E, 141p/A, 299p/A, 320d/A

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EQUALITY OF RIGHTS: 320d/A

EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS (of Activities Notifiable in Advance): see also MEASURE 2;

Military calendars: 403d/F

Annual forecasts of military activities: 203p/A, 211p/A, 365p/A

EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION: see also MEASURE 1;

General references to: 75d/E, 403d/F

FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

FINAL DOCUMENT: 18p/A, 21p/A, 28p/A, 203p/A, 216p/A

GRINEVSKIY, O.A.: 17p, 28p, 36d, 104d, 172d, 176d, 203p, 209p, 282p, 299p, 303c, 317d, 320d, 364p, 374p, 375d

HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 18p/A, 75d/B, 146p/A, 320d/A, 367p/A

HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: 19p/A, 28p/A, 73d, 74d/C, 145p/A, 172d/A, 176d/A, 178d/A, 205p/A, 211p/A, 302p/A, 317d/A, 320d/A, 343, 304d/F

INSPECTIONS:

General references to: 300p/A, 375d/A

Areas of inspection: 129d/E

Methods: 38a/E

JANUARY 15 PROPOSAL: 17p/A, 28p/A, 36d/A, 73d, 140p/A, 176d/A, 204p/A, 211p/A, 327d/D, 365p/A

MADRID MANDATE: 19p/A, 28p/A, 74d/C, 144p/A, 178d/A, 180d/A, 205p/A, 213p/A, 320d/A

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General references to: 18p/A, 19p/A, 29p/A, 204p/A

Of ground forces: 179d/A, 302p/A, 365p/A

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MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 18p/A, 36d/A, 39d/E, 74d, 173d/A,  
204p/A, 343, 366p/A, 374p/A, 403d/F

MEASURE 1: see also EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION

MEASURE 2: see also EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS .

MEASURE 3: see also NOTIFICATIONS

MEASURE 5: see also COMPLIANCE; VERIFICATION

MIKHAYLOV: 403d

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MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR TESTING: 17p/A, 140p/A

NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS: see also VERIFICATION; 38a, 39d, 129d/E, 300p/A

NFU: see NON FIRST USE (OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS)

NON-FIRST-USE (OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS): 29p/A, 75d/B

NON-USE-OF-FORCE:

General references to: 2p/A, 20p/A, 29p/A, 203p/A, 206p/A, 214p/A,  
301p/A, 327d/D, 365p/A

NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY: 29p/A

NOTIFICATIONS: see also MEASURE 3; PRIOR NOTIFICATION

General references to: 19p/A, 36d/A, 143p/A, 177d/A, 203d/A, 214p/A,  
327d/D

Type of forces involved: 19p/A

Number of troops participating: 19p/A, 39d/E, 144p/A, 173d/A, 178d/A,  
204p/A, 302p/A, 327d/D, 365p/A, 374p/A, 375d/A

Number of naval vessels involved: 19p/A, 28p/A, 144p/A, 177d/A, 204p/A,  
327d/D

Number of military aircraft involved: 19p/A, 28p/A, 144p/A, 173d/A, 178d/A  
204p/A, 302p/A, 327d/D, 365p/A, 374p/A

Transfer/movement of troops, naval vessels or aircraft: 19p/A, 173d/A,  
178d/A, 365p/A

Information to be included: 177d/A, 206p/A

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NTM: see NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS

NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE: 17p/A

NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE

NUF TREATY: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY

NWFZ: see NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE

OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

General references to: 36d/A

Invitations of observers: 203p/A, 204p/A, 212p/A, 365p/A, 404d/F

RAKHMANINOV, Yu.N.: 75d

ROZANOV, I.S.: 39d, 74d, 227d

SC.1 (also SC.1/Amplified): 39d/E

SC.6: 29p/A

SC.7: 39d/E, 39d/C, 205p/A, 212p/A

SMIRNOV: 327d

TATARNIKOV, V.M.: 38a, 75d, 129d

THRESHOLDS: see MANPOWER THRESHOLDS

TRANSFER/MOVEMENT OF TROOPS: 19p/A, 39p/E, 144p/A, 302p/A, 317d/A

UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES: 21p/A, 207p/A

VERIFICATION: see also MEASURE 5; NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS

General references to: 38a/E, 39d/C, 129d/E, 227d/C, 300p/A, 302p/A,  
320d/A, 375d/A, 404d/F

Verification by cadres: 39d/c

ZONAL CONSTRAINTS: see CDE ZONE

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YUGOSLAVIA SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

- p - plenary meeting
- a - working group A
- b - working group B
- c - working group AB
- d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
- e - NATO caucus

CDE X:

General references to: 359p

INSPECTIONS:

General references to: 40d

OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

General references to: 40d

SC.1: 40d

SC.7: 40d

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- "CONSTRAINTS"  
 REF: 85 STOCKHOLM 9814  
 1. CDE IX - 016  
 2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.  
 -  
 3. U.S. (GUNDERSEN, GALASSI) AND SOVIET DELOFFS  
 (YEREFYEV, SOLOMENKO, GROSHEV) MET JANUARY 27 TO

RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF HOW TO TRANSLATE THE WORD "CONSTRAINTS" INTO RUSSIAN (SEE REF FOR BACKGROUND). USDEL STRESSED THAT THE WESTERN CONCEPT AT CDE IS DIFFERENT FROM WHAT HAS BEEN USED IN PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT, AS A RESULT, THE U.S. AND NATO CONTINUED TO PREFER THE TERM "SDERZHIVAYUSHCHIYE MERY" (RESTRAINING MEASURES). AS SUGGESTED BY AMBASSADOR BARRY TO SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY AT THE END OF THE LAST ROUND, USDELOFFS PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING TEMPORARY SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM: WHEN WE (NATO) OR THE EAST DISCUSS THE EASTERN PROPOSAL, THE WORD "OGRANICHENIYA" (TRANSLATED "LIMITATIONS" INTO ENGLISH) WOULD BE USED; WHEN WE (NATO) OR THE EAST DISCUSS THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF CONSTRAINTS, IT WOULD BE TRANSLATED BY THE INTERPRETERS INTO RUSSIAN AS "SDERZHIVAYUSHCHIYE MERY." THE SOVIETS AGREED TO THIS APPROACH. WE BOTH AGREED THAT THIS WOULD BE A TEMPORARY SOLUTION TO EXPEDITE THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE AND WOULD NOT PREJUDICE FUTURE DOCUMENTS. SOVIETS SUGGESTED THAT INTERPRETERS USE "OGRANICHENIYA" WHEN REFERRING TO THE NNA PROPOSALS ON CONSTRAINTS, BUT USDELOFF NOTED THAT THIS WAS AN NNA DECISION THAT COULD NOT BE ADDRESSED IN THIS UNDERSTANDING. SOVDELOFFS DID NOT CHALLENGE THIS ASSESSMENT. USDELOFFS THEN REPORTED THIS U.S.-SOVIET UNDERSTANDING TO NATO COLLEAGUES, WHO SUPPORTED IT. U.S. AND SOVIET DELEGATES CONVEYED THIS SOLUTION ON JANUARY 28 TO THE CDE SECRETARIAT BEFORE THE OPENING PLENARY SESSION. THE SECRETARIAT, NOT DISGUIISING ITS RELIEF, READILY AGREED TO IMPLEMENT THIS TEMPORARY SOLUTION.

BARRY  
 END OF MESSAGE

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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 00645

SUJJECT: CDE PLENARY, JANUARY 28, 1986

1. CDE IX - 009

2. FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER AND FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER DUMAS ACCENTED FRANCO-GERMAN COOPERATION IN THEIR JOINT APPEARANCE AT JANUARY 28 PLENARY OPENING 9TH SESSION OF CDE (SEE SEPTELS FOR FULL TEXT AND ANALYSES OF STATEMENTS). MALTESE FOREIGN MINISTER SCEBERRAS TRIGONA INSISTED ON NOTIFICATION OF AIR, LAND AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES; HE ALSO ATTACKED U.S. ACTIONS ON TERRORISM/LIBYA ISSUE, PROMPTING RIGHT OF REPLY BY AMBASSADOR BARRY (ALSO REPORTED IN A SEPTEL). STRESSING GORBACHEV'S

-  
JANUARY 15 PROPOSAL, GRINEVSKY (USSR) CITED NEED TO PROGRESS ON NUF AND LIMITATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES (TEXT OF SPEECH SENT SEPTEL). ON BEHALF OF THE EC-12 BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) WELCOMED SPAIN AND PORTUGAL INTO THE EC, AND NOTED EC-12 READINESS TO DRAFT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO REACH A POSITIVE RESULT BEFORE VIENNA REVIEW.  
BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 00651

SUBJECT: FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT AT CDE

L. CDE IX - OLO

2. FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER M. ROLAND DUMAS DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT AT THE OPENING PLENARY SESSION OF THE NINTH ROUND OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON JANUARY 28TH.

3. BEGIN TEXT: MY STATEMENT TO YOU ON BEHALF OF FRANCE IS AN IMPORTANT MOMENT FOR MY COUNTRY'S DIPLOMACY AND FOR ME PERSONALLY, AS WELL AS FOR THE FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. I WAS ANXIOUS TO BE HERE, TOGETHER WITH MY FRIEND HANS DIETRICH GENSCHER, TO BEAR WITNESS JOINTLY TO THE IMPORTANCE OUR TWO COUNTRIES ATTACH TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE, AND THUS TO GIVE AN EXAMPLE OF WHAT SHOULD BE HENCEFORTH THE FRENCH-GERMAN COOPERATION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE. THIS IS WHY I ASSOCIATE MYSELF FULLY WITH HIS STATEMENT AND THE VIEWS HE HAS JUST EXPRESSED.

I ALSO ASSOCIATE MYSELF WITH THE REMARKS OF M. BUWALDA WHO, ON BEHALF OF THE CURRENT PRESIDING COUNTRY OF THE EEC, HAS WELCOMED HIS SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE COLLEAGUES WHO CONTRIBUTE TODAY FOR THE FIRST TIME TO THE ACTION OF THE EEC COUNTRIES IN THIS CONFERENCE.

THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE HAS A MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE SECURITY OF OUR CONTINENT AS WELL AS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THE SIGNIFICANCE FOR EUROPE OF AN AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM NEXT SUMMER IS CLEAR. ON ONE POINT EVERYBODY IS AGREED; NO ONE SET OF NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING EUROPEAN SECURITY IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN, OR HAS PRIORITY OVER, ANOTHER SET. THEREFORE, I WISH TO RECALL OUR COMMITMENT TO THE DIALOGUE ON SECURITY ISSUES BETWEEN THE PARTICIPATING STATES FROM THE EAST AND THE WEST AND THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CSCE, OF WHICH OUR CONFERENCE IS AN INTEGRAL PART.

OUR CONFERENCE IS TODAY EMBARKING ON ITS FIRST SESSION OF 1986. WE JOINTLY AGREED TO BRING ITS WORK TO A CONCLUSION ON THE 19TH OF SEPTEMBER NEXT, AT THE LATEST, IN ORDER TO ENABLE THE CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING IN VIENNA TO ASSESS ITS RESULTS. TIME IS RUNNING SHORT AND THE ADOPTED WORK PROGRAM ENCOURAGES US TO INTENSIFY OUR EFFORTS: THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IS THUS ENTERING ITS DECISIVE PHASE. OUR OBJECTIVE REMAINS TO ARRIVE, WITHIN THAT TIME-FRAME, AT A SUBSTANTIAL RESULT THAT WOULD FULFILL THE MANDATE WE ADOPTED IN MADRID IN 1983. THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AGREED ON BY THE 35 COUNTRIES SHOULD REPRESENT A CONCRETE CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRENGTHENING OF SECURITY AND CONFIDENCE IN EUROPE AND BE APPLICABLE TO THE WHOLE OF

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THE ZONE CONCERNED, INCLUDING THAT PORTION OF SOVIET TERRITORY THAT IS SITUATED WEST OF THE URALS. IT WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH TO EFFECT A MARGINAL IMPROVEMENT IN THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES OF HELSINKI. INDEED, WHAT IS REQUIRED, BY COMPARISON WITH THOSE MEASURES, IS IN THE NATURE OF A QUALITATIVE LEAP. BUT BEFORE SETTING OUT THE POSITION OF MY COUNTRY ON THE PROCEEDING OF THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE, I WISH TO RECALL THE IMPROVEMENT, THE RESUMPTION OF THE EAST/WEST DIALOGUE WHICH IS ALREADY STARTING TO EMERGE IN THE LAST FEW WEEKS BUT WHICH MUST NOW BE CONSOLIDATED. FRANCE FAVOURED SUCH A DEVELOPMENT AND CONTRIBUTED TO IT WHEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, M. FRANCOIS MITTERRAND, WELCOMED THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE USSR, M. GORBACHEV, TO PARIS. IT IS NOT MY INTENTION TO RECALL THE DETAILS OF THE PARIS AND GENEVA SUMMITS. BUT I SHOULD BE DOING LESS THAN YOU EXPECTED IF I DID NOT MENTION IN THIS CONTEXT THE PROPOSAL MADE BY M. GORBACHEV ON 15 JANUARY LAST. SUBJECT: FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT AT CDE THE SCOPE OF THIS PROPOSAL AROUSES INTEREST. IT CALLS FOR REFLEXION AND REQUIRED THAT IT BE ANALYSED IN DEPTH. WE ARE DOING THIS MOST CAREFULLY AND IN A MOST OPEN-MINDED SPIRIT. AT THIS STAGE, HOWEVER, I WOULD RATHER CONFINE MYSELF TO ONE OR TWO POINTS THAT ARE LINKED WITH THE VERY PURPOSE OF OUR CONFERENCE.

(L) MR. GORBACHEV'S PROPOSED REDUCTIONS IN THE NUCLEAR ARSENALS OF THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES ARE A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, AND ONE THAT WE OURSELVES HAVE ADVOCATED. BUT ONE CANNOT FORGET AT THE SAME TIME CONVENTIONAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS EXISTING IN EUROPE WHICH ALSO THREATEN OUR COUNTRIES. FOR US, EUROPEANS, THEN, THE LIMITATION OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS CANNOT BE PUT FORWARD AS SUFFICIENT IN ITSELF. SECURITY, IN ALL ITS CONSTITUENT PARTS, MUST BE OUR CRITERION. FOR US, THE PROBLEM OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS CANNOT RECEIVE ONLY SECONDARY PRIORITY AS COMPARED WITH NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS.

(2) MR. GORBACHEV STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES THAT OUR CONFERENCE IS EXPECTED TO ADOPT. WE ARE INDEED CONVINCED THAT IT WOULD BE A STEP TOWARD GREATER TRANSPARENCY IN MILITARY MATTERS, AND WOULD CONSTITUTE A POSITIVE ELEMENT FOR MORE CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AMONG ALL OUR COUNTRIES AND THE PREREQUISITE FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE 35 NATIONS CONCERNING THE LIMITATIONS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS IN EUROPE. THE SAME JUDGMENT APPLIES TO THE REFERENCE IN THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO THE PRESENT-DAY IMPORTANCE OF VERIFICATION IN ARMS CONTROL. THIS TOO, IN OUR VIEW, IS VERY MUCH IN THE SPIRIT OF THE CDE.

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(3) NOR WOULD I WISH TO OVERLOOK THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH, IN THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, MORE PARTICULARLY CONCERN FRANCE, NAMELY THOSE AFFECTING THE NUCLEAR POWERS OTHER THAN THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S.S.R. AS REGARDS FRANCE, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC SET OUR AS LONG AGO AS 1983 THE CONDITIONS WHICH, IN THE FRENCH VIEW, WOULD HAVE TO BE SATISFIED TO ENABLE FRANCE TO PARTICIPATE USEFULLY IN AN EFFECTIVE AND VERIFIABLE PROCESS OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT:

--FIRSTLY, THE REDUCTIONS IN THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN ARSENALS WOULD HAVE TO HAVE REACHED A POINT WHERE THE QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE DISPARITY BETWEEN THOSE ARSENALS AND THE ARSENALS OF THE OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS HAD BEEN FUNDAMENTALLY ALTERED.

--NEXT, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS NOT TO BE STRENGTHENED. WE MADE PROPOSALS ALONG THESE LINES AT THE GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE IN 1984.

--FINALLY, ELIMINATION OF THE EXISTING IMBALANCES IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND THE SUPPRESSION OF THE CHEMICAL THREAT.

FRANCE THUS FAVOURS DISARMAMENT. WE SUBSCRIBE TO THE VIEW THAT IT CANNOT, IN THE LONG-TERM, BE AN EXCLUSIVELY BILATERAL UNDERTAKING. WHEN THE TIME COMES, AND IF THE APPROPRIATE CONDITIONS THEN OBTAIN, FRANCE WILL NOT BE FOUND WANTING.

THIS IS ALSO WHY FRANCE WAS THE FIRST TO ADVOCATE THE CDE AS EARLY AS THE END OF THE 1970'S. WE STILL THINK, AS WE DID THEN, THAT THE QUESTION OF REDUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES SHOULD BE TACKLED AMONG ALL THE COUNTRIES HAVING FORCES ON THIS CONTINENT AND NOT IN CENTRAL EUROPE ALONE. THIS JUDGMENT HAS BEEN ENDORSED BY THE 35 PARTICIPANTS IN THE CSCE PROCESS. FULL RECOGNITION HAS THEREBY BEEN GIVEN TO THE CONTRIBUTION THAT CAN BE MADE BY OUR CONFERENCE ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE, SIDE BY SIDE WITH THE AMERICAN-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SPACE SUBJECT: FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT AT CDE ARMAMENTS.

WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO SET OUT ARE THE PRECISE CONDITIONS WHICH MUST BE SATISFIED IF THIS CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE IS TO SUCCEED.

L) IN MY OPINION REALISM AND PRAGMATISM CONSTITUTE THE FIRST CONDITION. IT WOULD BE PREMATURE AT THIS STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE TO SEEK A LIMITATION ON THE SIZE OF THE MILITARY FORCES OR ACTIVITIES ON OUR CONTINENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE DEEM IT POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE BETTER PREDICTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY OF LARGE-SCALE MILITARY ACTIVITIES. FOR THIS REASON, FRANCE IN CONJUNCTION WITH ITS ALLIES HAS PROPOSED SIX MEASURES PROVIDING FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION OF LAND OR COMBINED MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE. MUCH

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HAS ALREADY BEEN DONE TO IDENTIFY THE ELEMENTS OF CONVERGENCE BETWEEN THESE PROPOSALS AND THOSE MADE BY OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE, PARTICULARLY BY THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES. IN THIS REGARD I WELCOME THIS INITIATIVE WHICH IS IN ITSELF AN EXAMPLE OF WHAT CAN BE ACHIEVED OUTSIDE THE TRADITIONAL CLEAVAGES OF MILITARY ALLIANCES. WE ARE WELL AWARE OF THE SPECIFIC SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES.

2) HOWEVER, WE FIND IT DIFFICULT TO ENVISAGE SPECIFIC MEASURES WHICH WOULD BE APPLIED TO LARGE-SCALE ACTIVITIES ONLY AND NOT TO ACTIVITIES SMALLER IN SCALE. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT THE DEGREE OF NOTIFICATION, OF OBSERVATION AND OF VERIFICATION SHOULD GROW TOGETHER WITH THE SCALE OF AN ACTIVITY. BUT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ONE SET AND THE OTHER IS ONE OF DEGREE NOT KIND.

3) FINALLY, I WISH TO MENTION THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH HAVE ARISEN CONCERNING NOTIFICATION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THAT WE OUGHT TO ADHERE STRICTLY TO THE APPROACH AGREED ON AT MADRID, KNOWN AS THE "FUNCTIONAL" APPROACH. TO CALL IT INTO QUESTION MIGHT, IN OUR OPINION, JEOPARDIZE THE OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCE.

HERE ARE, MR. CHAIRMAN, THE THREE CONDITIONS WE CONSIDER ESSENTIAL FOR THE CONFERENCE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT ON A FINAL DOCUMENT. WHAT STATUS THEN SHOULD THE IMPORTANT PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE BE GRANTED IN SUCH A DOCUMENT? THIS PRINCIPLE APPEARS ALREADY IN THE HELSINKI DECALOGUE. HAVE NOT ALL OUR STATES AFFIRMED THAT THIS PRINCIPLE ALREADY GOVERNED THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS, INCLUDING THOSE WITHIN A GIVEN POLITICAL OR MILITARY ALLIANCE, AS WELL AS THEIR RELATIONS WITH THIRD COUNTRIES? REAFFIRMATION OF THIS PRINCIPLE CANNOT THEREFORE BE TAKEN TO IMPLY THAT THE PRINCIPLE HAS LOST ITS FORCE, BUT TO THE CONTRARY THAT IT MUST BE STRENGTHENED, THAT IT SHOULD BE GIVEN "EFFECT AND EXPRESSION" AS WE AGREED IN MADRID WHEN WE ADOPTED THE MANDATE OF THE CONFERENCE. OUR INTENTION IS INDEED TO GIVE THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE A CONCRETE CONTENT THROUGH SIGNIFICANT MEASURES AND PRECISE CRITERIA. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE SHALL HAVE TO PREFACE THESE CONCRETE MEASURES BY A POLITICAL "STATEMENT OF GROUNDS". IN SHORT, THIS WOULD BE DESIGNED TO CLARIFY THE LINK BETWEEN SUCH PROVISIONS AND THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE.

MR. CHAIRMAN, OUR CONFERENCE HAS THE UNIQUE ATTRIBUTE OF BELONGING TO THE CSCE PROCESS. ABOVE AND BEYOND ITS OWN IMMEDIATE OBJECT, IT IS THE EXPRESSION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A GRAND POLITICAL DESIGN WHICH TRANSCENDS IT. THE FUNDAMENTAL RAISON D'ETRE OF THAT

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PROCESS IS THE SEARCH FOR WAYS OF OVERCOMING THE STATE OF AFFAIRS THAT CURRENTLY EXISTS IN EUROPE THROUGH COOPERATION, EXCHANGE AND DIALOGUE. THAT IS AN AMBITION WHICH MY COUNTRY PROCLAIMS AS RESOLUTELY TODAY AS IT DID TEN YEARS AGO. THE SITUATION OF OUR SUBJECT: FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT AT CDE CONTINENT MUST NOT AND WILL NOT BE CHANGED BY WEAPONS OR MISTRUST. BUT THE HISTORY OF EUROPE DID NOT STOP 40 YEARS AGO. OUR PEOPLES HAVE A GREAT DEAL TO DO TOGETHER IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS, FREE CIRCULATION OF PERSONS AND IDEAS. THEY HAVE A GREAT DEAL TO SAY TO ONE ANOTHER. CAN A STATE WHICH IS NOT AT PEACE WITH ITS OWN CITIZENS REALLY GAIN CONFIDENCE OF ITS NEIGHBORS?

IT IS BECAUSE A SINGLE POLITICAL DESIGN UNDERLIES THE VARIOUS MEETINGS AND CONFERENCES GENERATED BY THE CSCE THAT MY COUNTRY IS DETERMINED THAT THE BALANCE BETWEEN ALL THE ASPECTS OF THE FINAL ACT SHALL BE RESPECTED. ANY PRIORITY GIVEN TO ONE OF THOSE ASPECTS WOULD BE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE OTHERS, AND OF THE PROCESS AS A WHOLE. LET US NOT FORGET IN PARTICULAR THE HUMAN CONTACTS: IN THIS REPECT I WISH THE FORTHCOMING BERN MEETING TO BE SUCCESSFUL.

IT IS THEN, LATER, THAT THE RESULTS WE HOPE TO ACHIEVE IN STOCKHOLM WILL BE PLACED IN THEIR OVERALL CONTEXT, SIDE BY SIDE WITH THE OTHER 35-NATION MEETINGS THAT HAVE BEEN HELD SINCE MADRID. THIS WILL BE DONE IN VIENNA THIS FALL, AT THE FOLLOW-UP CSCE MEETING. IT IS IN THE LIGHT OF THIS COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT THAT IT WILL THEN BE POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH THE CDE COULD CONTINUE.

MR. CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, IN CONCLUDING MY REMARKS, I MUST NOT FORGET ALL THAT HAS BEEN DONE TO PROMOTE THE SUCCESS OF THIS CONFERENCE BY THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT, WHICH I TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY OF THANKING FOR ITS HOSPITALITY.

DESPITE DIFFICULTIES AND SHORTCOMINGS, THE SPIRIT OF HELSINKI MUST CONTINUE TO GUIDE OUR 35 STATES. IT IS MY HOPE THAT WE SHALL BE ABLE NEXT AUTUMN TO SAY THAT STOCKHOLM FULFILLED THE HOPES RAISED IN HELSINKI.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 00664

SUBJECT: STATEMENT OF FRG FOREIGN MINISTER  
- HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER, JANUARY 28, 1986

1. CDE IX - 012

2. THERE FOLLOWS THE FULL TEXT OF THE SPEECH DELIVERED  
BY FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER AT THE STOCKHOLM  
CONFERENCE ON JANUARY 28, 1986.-  
BEGIN TEXT:

MR CHAIRMAN,

- EXACTLY TWO YEARS AGO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF EUROPE, THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA INAUGURATED THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE. THE COMMON GOAL IS TO ACHIEVE MORE CONFIDENCE AND MORE SECURITY IN EUROPE. MORE CONFIDENCE AND MORE SECURITY -- THAT IS THE GREAT HOPE OF OUR NATIONS. IT IMPOSES ON US A HISTORICAL RESPONSIBILITY THAT WE MUST LIVE UP TO.

- I AM PLEASED TO HAVE THIS OPPORTUNITY TODAY TO PRESENT TOGETHER WITH MY FRIEND AND COLLEAGE, MONSIEUR ROLAND DUMAS, FOREIGN MINISTER OF FRANCE, OUR JOINT IDEAS ON THE CDE. WE SEEK A SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOME TO THIS CONFERENCE THIS YEAR STILL, BEFORE THE START OF THE CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING IN VIENNA.

- OUR JOINT APPEARANCE AT THE CONFERENCE REFLECTS THE CLOSE FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION LINKING OUR TWO PEOPLES AND STATES. IT ALSO REFLECTS OUR FULL AGREEMENT ON THE GOALS OF THE CSCE PROCESS, OF WHICH THE CDE IS AN INTEGRAL PART. WE REGARD THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES AS AN EXAMPLE FOR THE WHOLE OF EUROPE: THE GERMANS AND THE FRENCH HAVE SHOWN THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO REPLACE ANIMOSITY AND RIVALRY WITH LASTING FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION. THE SAME HOLDS TRUE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WHICH -- NEWLY STRENGTHENED BY THE DEMOCRACIES OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL -- HAS BECOME A FORCE FOR STABILITY, RECONCILIATION AND PEACE IN EUROPE. THE COMMUNITY, WHICH IS INCREASINGLY FORMULATING AND PURSUING ITS INTERESTS, NOT LEAST IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY, IS TO A GROWING EXTENT ABLE AND WILLING TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR SHAPING EUROPE'S DESTINY. IT IS A MODEL OF SUCCESSFUL COOPERATION AMONG EQUAL AND INDEPENDENT STATES. IT IS AND REMAINS A MOTOR IN THE CSCE PROCESS.

- EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND INCORPORATION INTO THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE ARE CORNERSTONES OF OUR POLICY. WE REALIZE THAT EUROPE DOES NOT END AT THE RIVER ELBE. PERHAPS EVEN MORE THAN TO OTHERS, THIS APPLIES TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, WHICH IS CONSCIOUS OF ITS HISTORICAL RESPONSIBILITY AS A COUNTRY IN THE HEART OF EUROPE AND WHOSE CITIZENS WILL NEVER FORGET THAT GERMANS

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ALSO LIVE ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE DIVIDING LINE.

- WITH THE CSCE, EUROPE HAS RETURNED TO THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA. THE CSCE IS THE INSTRUMENT THAT EUROPE HAS GIVEN ITSELF TO LAY THE FOUNDATIONS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LASTING PEACE ON OUR CONTINENT. THE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE UNDER OBLIGATION TO MAKE FULL USE OF THIS INSTRUMENT. THE CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING IN VIENNA AT THE END OF THIS YEAR WILL PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO ASSESS THE PROGRESS MADE IN THE CSCE PROCESS. THIS ASSESSMENT MUST INCLUDE THE WORK OF THE NUMEROUS CONFERENCES AND MEETINGS OF EXPERTS THAT WERE AGREED UPON IN MADRID AND HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY TAKEN PLACE.

- ALL PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES MUST STRIVE TO GIVE EFFECT TO ALL PARTS OF THE FINAL ACT IN A BALANCED FASHION IN THE AWARENESS OF THEIR INNER COHERENCE. EVERYONE WILL THEN BENEFIT FROM THE FRUITS OF THE FINAL ACT. IT MUST NOT BE TORN APART IN DISPUTES OVER PROMOTION OF CERTAIN ELEMENTS AND ABANDONMENT OF OTHERS. THIS WOULD DEPRIVE IT OF ITS EFFECT AS A MAGNA CHARTA OF COOPERATION, THEREBY CAUSING EVERYONE TO LOSE OUT.

- IN TAKING STOCK IN VIENNA AND PREPARING FURTHER PROGRAMS, WE SHALL HAVE TO TAKE HUMAN RIGHTS JUST AS SERIOUSLY AS SECURITY, POLITICAL COOPERATION JUST AS SERIOUSLY AS ECONOMIC COOPERATION. WE SEEK COOPERATION AND EXCHANGES IN ALL SPHERES -- IN THE SPHERES OF HUMANITARIAN IMPROVEMENTS, TECHNOLOGY, SCIENCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, INFORMATION AND CULTURE. WE WELCOME THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ALSO ACKNOWLEDGES THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF THE EUROPEAN

- COMMUNITY. REGARDING THE EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES AS A FACTOR IN THEIR OWN RIGHT WITH AN EQUAL CLAIM TO SECURITY IS JUST AS IMPORTANT AS RECOGNIZING THE ESSENTIAL ROLE PLAYED BY THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA AS CSCE PARTICIPANTS IN THE SECURITY FRAMEWORK AFFORDED BY THE CSCE. IN THE CSCE PROCESS, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SUPERPOWERS FOR IMPROVING THE OVERALL SECURITY CONDITIONS MUST INTERACT WITH THE CONTRIBUTION MADE BY SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, A CONTRIBUTION WHICH FILLS OUT THE FRAMEWORK THROUGH DIVERSE FORMS OF COOPERATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CLOSE RELATIONS. NOBODY MAY RULE HIMSELF OUT OR BE EXCLUDED HERE. THE CDE IS PROOF THAT SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT ARE NO BILATERAL MATTERS, BUT ARE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF ALL PARTICIPANTS. THE CDE MUST DEMONSTRATE THAT ALL NEGOTIATIONS THAT DEAL WITH EUROPEAN SECURITY ARE OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE AND EQUAL URGENCY.

MR CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

- IN JANUARY 1984 I REMARKED IN THIS FORUM THAT THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION GAVE REASON FOR CONCERN. TODAY WE CAN STATE QUITE CLEARLY THAT THE APPREHENSIONS HAVE

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NOT MATERIALIZED. THE CSCE NET HAS STOOD THE STRAIN. THE SITUATION HAS CHANGED FOR THE BETTER. EAST AND WEST HAVE EMBARKED ON AN ATTEMPT TO MAKE GENUINE PROGRESS IN THE SPHERE OF DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL WHICH IS SO VITAL TO THE FUTURE OF MANKIND. IN GENEVA AND IN THE MULTILATERAL FORA FAR-REACHING WESTERN PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED. THEY REPRESENT A SOLID BASIS FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SUBSTANTIAL RESULTS.

- MY GOVERNMENT SUBSCRIBES TO AN ACTIVE POLICY OF SAFEGUARDING PEACE. OUR GOAL IS A STATE OF LASTING STABILITY WHICH WILL RELIABLY EXCLUDE ANY KIND OF WAR.

- IN THE FINAL DECLARATION ISSUED AFTER THE GENEVA SUMMIT, ALL PARTS OF WHICH MEET WITH OUR APPROVAL, IT SAYS: "RECOGNIZING THAT ANY CONFLICT BETWEEN THE USSR

- AND THE U.S. COULD HAVE CATASTROPHIC CONSEQUENCES, THEY EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF PREVENTING ANY WAR BETWEEN THEM, WHETHER NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL. THEY WILL NOT SEEK TO ACHIEVE MILITARY SUPERIORITY."

- THIS IMPORTANT STATEMENT APPLIES NOT ONLY TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS. IT MUST APPLY TO ALL COUNTRIES. INDIVIDUAL DEFENSIVE EFFORTS ALONE WILL NOT ENSURE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS OBJECTIVE. THUS ALL EFFORTS MUST BE DIRECTED TO COOPERATIVE SOLUTIONS LEADING TO LASTING STABILITY AND THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL OF ARMS AND FORCES.

- EVERY ATTEMPT TO REVERSE THE SPIRALING ARMS BUILD-UP MUST PROVE ITS WORTH HERE IN EUROPE. THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY IN EUROPE CANNOT BE SEEN MERELY IN ITS SEPARATE ELEMENTS. ITS ROOTS AND ITS INTERRELATIONSHIPS HAVE TO BE IDENTIFIED: THE POLITICAL CAUSES OF TENSION, THE CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY OF THE CONTINENTAL SUPERPOWER, THE RESPONSE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE.

- WE LIVE IN A COMPLEX SYSTEM OF SECURITY IN WHICH THE DESTRUCTIVE POWER OF NUCLEAR ARMS RULES OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF USING WAR AS A MEANS OF GAINING POLITICAL POWER. THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN THE MILITARY EQUATION IS A HIGH PRICE FOR THE BANNING OF WAR. IN THE COMPETITION TO CONSTANTLY INCREASE AND PERFECT SUCH SYSTEMS THAT PRICE REACHES SENSELESS PROPORTIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, THE EFFORTS TO STOP AND REVERSE THIS PROCESS HAVE THE SUPPORT OF ALL NATIONS.

- THESE EFFORTS MUST LEAD TO AN INCREASE IN STABILITY. THEY MUST NOT SERVE TO HEIGHTEN THE RISKS OF DANGERS FROM OTHER SOURCES THAT HAVE BEEN OFFSET BY NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. WE MUST NOT REACH A SITUATION WHERE IT APPEARS A WAR IN EUROPE CAN AGAIN BE WON.

- IF WE IN EUROPE WANT TO BRING ABOUT A RADICAL CHANGE FOR THE BETTER THEN WE SHALL HAVE TO DEVOTE AS MUCH ATTENTION TO CONVENTIONAL STABILITY AS TO THE NUCLEAR BALANCE OF POWER.

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- HERE THERE EXISTS AN INNER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE MILITARY BALANCE OF POWER. OUR AIM MUST BE TO PREVENT ANY WAR IN EUROPE, EVEN A CONVENTIONAL ONE, WHICH, GIVEN MODERN WEAPONS SYSTEMS, WOULD EXCEED THE HORRORS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR TO AN UNIMAGINABLE DEGREE. THE CREATION OF LASTING PEACE IN EUROPE DEMANDS MORE THAN THE REMOVAL OF MILITARY IMBALANCES.
- WE DO NOT WANT TO REVERT TO THE TIMES WHEN MILITARY ALLIANCES WITH HEAVILY ARMED CONVENTIONAL FORCES CONFRONTED ONE ANOTHER, EVER READY FOR COMBAT. THUS IN THE LONG TERM WE MUST DISCUSS NOT ONLY NUMBERS BUT ALSO ARMAMENTS, MILITARY DOCTRINES, ENEMY IMAGES. THE CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH ARE THE SUBJECT OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS HERE IN STOCKHOLM SHOULD NOT MERELY BE THE PRELIMINARY STAGE OF DISARMAMENT MEASURES IN THE CONVENTIONAL SPHERE. THEY SHOULD ALSO LAY THE FOUNDATIONS FOR COOPERATIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WHICH REMOVE THE INCENTIVE FOR THE USE OF FORCE AS WELL AS THE FEAR OF SUCH FORCE. THAT IS WHY OUR READINESS TO CARRY OUT SUCH MEASURES IS A TEST OF OUR WILL TO BAN WAR FROM EUROPE FOREVER AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING POLITICAL AIMS.
- THE NEW PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY GENERAL SECRETARY GORUACHEV ON 15 JANUARY 1986 CAN GIVE THE NEGOTIATIONS MAJOR IMPULSES AND OPEN UP POSSIBILITIES FOR MOVEMENT.
- FOR THIS IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE NEW ELEMENTS OF THESE PROPOSALS PROVE USEFUL IN BOTH THE BILATERAL AND THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. WE ARE STUDYING THESE PROPOSALS WITH OUR ALLIES AND CONSTRUCTIVE NEW ELEMENTS WILL BE MET WITH CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSES.
- THE PROPOSALS FOR THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR POTENTIALS AGAIN SHOW HOW IMPORTANT IT IS TO SEEK ALSO CONVENTIONAL STABILITY IN EUROPE. THIS IS WHERE EUROPE'S FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY INTERESTS BECOME APPARENT WHICH HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL AND CONVENTIONAL THREATS. EACH OF THESE AREAS HAS ITS IMPORTANCE FOR OVERALL STABILITY.
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- OF COURSE THE SOVIET IDEAS ON INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES ARE OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO US BECAUSE HERE TOO WE ARE DIRECTLY AFFECTED. WE ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE OPINIONS OF OUR FRENCH AND BRITISH FRIENDS ON THESE MATTERS.
- MR. GORBACHEV'S STATEMENT WITH REGARD TO VERIFICATION DESERVES SPECIAL ATTENTION. THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS NOW PREPARED TO ACCEPT STRICT CONTROLS INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE INSPECTIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A UNIVERSAL CONVENTION BANNING THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IS ALSO OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE FOR THE MULTI-LATERAL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, WHERE A BREAKTHROUGH CAN BE ACHIEVED IF EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS

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NOW PROVE POSSIBLE.

- AS REGARDS CHEMICAL WEAPONS, IT WILL BE CRUCIAL TO AGREE ON EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION WHICH WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO CLARIFY CASES OF SUSPICION AS WELL AND TO ENSURE THAT NO PRODUCTS INTENDED FOR CIVILIAN PURPOSES CAN BE DIVERTED TO THE MANUFACTURE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

- IN THE CASE OF MBFR IT IS A QUESTION OF AGREEING ON A SYSTEM OF VERIFICATION AND INSPECTION MEASURES TO PROVIDE THE DATA BASE FOR THE OBLIGATION OF BOTH SIDES NOT TO INCREASE THEIR FORCE LEVELS, AND FOR SUBSEQUENT REDUCTIONS.

- SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS AT THE CDE ALSO ASSUME GREATER IMPORTANCE BECAUSE THE AREA OF MBFR REDUCTIONS COMPRISES ONLY CENTRAL EUROPE.

- MR. CHAIRMAN, THE NINTH ROUND OF THE CDE MARKS THE BEGINNING TODAY OF THE DECISIVE THIRD YEAR OF NEGOTIATIONS. THE AIM IS TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BY MEANS OF A SET OF POLITICALLY BINDING, MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT AND VERIFIABLE MEASURES WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE APPLIED THROUGHOUT EUROPE. ALL INVOLVED HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY AWARE THAT CONFIDENCE-BUILDING

- IS AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT OF A POLICY AIMED AT DETENTE AND COOPERATION. ONLY ON THE BASIS OF GROWING CONFIDENCE FOUNDED ON CONCRETE MEASURES WILL IT BE POSSIBLE TO MAKE PROGRESS IN MUTUAL COOPERATION AND TOWARDS AN ACCOMMODATION IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY AMONG THE PARTICIPATING STATES.

- OUR AIM IS TO EFFECTIVELY AND VISIBLY REDUCE THE DANGER OF THE USE OF MILITARY POWER BY MEANS OF COOPERATIVE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. WE SHARE MR. GORBACHEV'S VIEW THAT THE ROAD LEADING TO THE USE OF FORCE AND TO COVERT PREPARATIONS FOR WAR MUST BE BLOCKED. ACTUAL OR SUPPOSED THREATS CAN BE REDUCED BY MEASURES WHICH SUBJECT THE MILITARY CONDUCT OF PARTICIPATING STATES TO SPECIFIC RULES, THUS MAKING IT CALCULABLE. RELIABLE VERIFICATION IS A CRUCIAL ELEMENT OF SUCH MEASURES.

- CONFIDENCE SHOULD NOT BE "BLIND." THE ONE SHOWING CONFIDENCE MUST HIMSELF BE ABLE TO SEE THAT THE MILITARY EFFORTS OF THE OTHER SIDE EXCLUSIVELY SERVE TO MAINTAIN ITS OWN DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY. AFFORDING PROOF OF ONE'S GOOD INTENTIONS IN A MILITARILY RELEVANT MANNER MEANS CONVINCING OTHERS OF ONE'S OWN PEACEFUL AIMS.

- THE DETAILED PROPOSALS SUBMITTED BY THE WEST CORRESPOND WITH THIS CONCEPT OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING. THE PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY OTHER DELEGATIONS CONCUR WITH THAT CONCEPT IN MANY RESPECTS. WE NEED CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WILL PROVE CAPABLE OF DISPELLING MISTRUST IN THEIR AREA OF APPLICATION IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE -- FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS -- AND OF

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ENHANCING MILITARY STABILITY. THIS AIM IS OF CONSIDERABLE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE TODAY. THAT SIGNIFICANCE WILL INCREASE FURTHER STILL IF IT PROVES POSSIBLE BOTH TO REDUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS DRASTICALLY AND WHERE POSSIBLE ELIMINATE THEM ALTOGETHER, AND TO ESTABLISH A BALANCED RELATIONSHIP OF POWER IN THE CONVENTIONAL SPHERE AND DO AWAY WITH CHEMICAL WEAPONS COMPLETELY.

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- AS YOU ALL KNOW, THE U.S.-SOVIET DECLARATION OF 8 JANUARY 1986 MEETS WITH OUR FULL APPROVAL, ALSO WHERE IT CALLS FOR THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE AND ITS TERMINATION ON EARTH.
- THE MANDATE OF THIS CONVERENCE ESTABLISHED A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SPECIFIC MEASURES AND THE PRINCIPLE OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE. ITS TASK IS TO LEND EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE EXISTING PROHIBITION OF FORCE BY MEANS OF EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO REDUCE THE DANGER OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION.
- THE STATES PARTICIPATING IN THIS CONFERENCE COMMITTED THEMSELVES IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT TO THE NON-USE OF FORCE, ONE OF TEN PRINCIPLES OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE. TO RENOUNCE FORCE DOES NOT MEAN RENOUNCING CONVICTIONS, VALUES AND POSITIONS ON CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES. RATHER, IT LIMITS THE MEANS BY WHICH STATES MAY RESOLVE THEIR DIFFERING AND OFTEN OPPOSING INTERESTS. THE NON-USE OF FORCE IS INDIVISIBLE. IT MUST APPLY WORLDWIDE AND BETWEEN ANY STATES. THAT ALSO MEANS THAT A STOP MUST BE PUT TO FORCE WHEREVER IT IS BEING APPLIED.
- BY REAFFIRMING THEIR RENUNCIATION OF FORCE IN CONNECTION WITH AGREEMENT ON NEW CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES IN STOCKHOLM, THE PARTICIPATING STATES WOULD TRANSLATE THE PRINCIPLE OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE EMBODIED IN THE UN CHARTS INTO REALITY. THEY WOULD THEREBY LEND CONVINCING EXPRESSION AND EFFECT TO THEIR DETERMINATION TO OBSERVE STRICTLY THE PROHIBITION OF THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. IN THIS WAY, A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION COULD BE MADE TO PREVENTING WAR.
- TIME IS NOW SHORT FOR THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, AND THE NEGOTIATING AGENDA IS EXTENSIVE AND DIFFICULT. IT CAN BE MASTERED ONLY IF ALL SIDES DEMONSTRATE GOOD FAITH AND WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE. THIS IMPLIES THAT THE MADRID MANDATE MUST NOT BE PUT INTO QUESTION.
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- WE MUST MAKE USE OF THE AVAILABLE TIME TO REACH A RESULT THAT CONSTITUTES A "LEAP FORWARD" FROM THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. AN AGREEMENT MUST HAVE TAKEN CLEAR SHAPE BY THIS SUMMER. A SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT STEP IN THE CSCE PROCESS AND A GOOD BASIS FOR PROGRESS IN OTHER SPHERES OF THE CSCE AT THE FOLLOW-UP

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## MEETING IN VIENNA.

- 1986 WILL BE A YEAR OF DECISION AS FAR AS LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENTS ARE CONCERNED. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE OPTIONS FOR THESE DEVELOPMENTS ARE SEEN CLEARLY AND THAT THE INTENTIONS OF THE AFFECTED PARTIES ARE KNOWN. BOLD NEW PLANS STILL AROUSE GREAT SCEPTICISM. HOWEVER, THE NATIONS MUST SEEK FIRMER FOUNDATIONS ON WHICH TO BUILD LASTING PEACE. EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE THAT GOAL MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF EVERY FACTOR THAT GOES TO MAKE UP STABILITY. THE MEASURES AIMED AT CONFIDENCE-BUILDING THAT WE ARE ABLE TO AGREE ON HERE WILL ALSO SERVE AS A TEST WHEN IT COMES TO EVALUATING THE CHANCES OF MORE EXTENSIVE PROGRESS IN THE ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS. PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, WHOSE REALIZATION OR PROSPECTS WE SHALL REVIEW IN BERNE AND VIENNA, WILL BE AN IMPORTANT YARDSTICK OF THIS CONFIDENCE-BUILDING.

- WHAT IS NECESSARY IS THAT CONFIDENCE BE CREATED AMONG STATES AND PEOPLE IN THE SERIOUS COMMITMENT OF ALL CSCE PARTICIPATING STATES TO THE AIM OF CREATING A LASTING PEACE IN EUROPE IN WHICH THE PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT AND OF THE OTHER DOCUMENTS OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS HAVE BECOME REALITY. THIS REALITY MEANS A PEACEFUL COMMUNITY OF EQUALS WHOSE LARGER MEMBERS ENJOY NO GREATER DEGREE OF SECURITY THAN THEIR SMALLER PARTNERS.

- IT MUST BE A COMMUNITY OF STATES WITHIN WHICH THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION HAS BECOME REALITY, WHERE NATIONS DEVELOP THEIR CULTURAL IDENTITY AND INDIVIDUALS ENJOY THEIR RIGHTS AND ENGAGE IN INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGES.

- THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, WHICH IN THE PAST HAS CONTRIBUTED TO REDUCING TENSION IN EUROPE, WILL DO ITS BEST TO HELP ENSURE THAT USE IS MADE OF TODAY'S OPPORTUNITIES TO BRING ABOUT A FAR-REACHING TRANSFORMATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.  
END TEXT.

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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 00638

SUBJECT: LIBYA-TERRORISM ISSUE RAISED IN CDE

1. CDE IX - 008
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY. IN HIS STATEMENT AT THE OPENING PLENARY (SEE SEPTTEL), MALTESE FOREIGN MINISTER SCEBERRAS TRIGONA ATTACKED U.S. ACTIONS ON LIBYA-TERRORISM ISSUE, PROMPTING RIGHT OF REPLY BY U.S. END SUMMARY.

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4. AT JANUARY 28 PLENARY, MALTESE FOREIGN MINISTER SCEBERRAS TRIGONA ATTACKED U.S. ACTIONS ON TERRORISM-LIBYA ISSUE. SCEBERRAS TRIGONA CONTENDED THAT THE MEDITERRANEAN HAS BEEN DESTABILIZED BY A "SPIRAL OF ACTIONS" IN RECENT MONTHS. HE CONDEMNED TERRORIST ACTS SUCH AS THE ROME AND VIENNA AIRPORT BOMBINGS, BUT ALSO ATTACKED U.S. (AND ISRAELI) RESPONSE TO TERRORISM, CITING U.S. SANCTIONS ON LIBYA AND U.S. NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AS DESTABILIZING FACTORS. HE THEN REVIEWED AT LENGTH GOM ACTIONS TAKEN TO "STALL INSTABILITY," I.E., USE OF DIPLOMATIC APPROACHES TO VARIOUS GOVERNMENTS. IN THIS RESPECT, HE CITED GOM OFFER TO U.S. TO ACT AS INTERMEDIARY WITH LIBYA WHICH, HE NOTED, WAS REFUSED BY THE U.S. (BEGIN COMMENT: SCEBERRAS TRIGONA NEVER ACKNOWLEDGED THAT TERRORISM ITSELF IS THE ISSUE; NOR DID HE TAKE NOTE OF THE U.S. CONTENTION THAT LIBYA SUPPORTS TERRORISM. END COMMENT.) WITH REGARD TO THE "MEDITERRANEAN DIMENSION" OF THE CDE, SCEBERRAS TRIGONA STATED THAT RECENT EVENTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN UNDERSCORE THE NECESSITY OF APPLYING THE SAME CONCRETE MEASURES TO AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES AS TO GROUND ACTIVITIES. HE STOPPED JUST SHORT OF THREATENING TO SABOTAGE AN AGREEMENT WITHOUT SUCH MEASURES WHEN HE NOTED THAT IF "THIS DIMENSION (AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES) IS NEGLECTED IT WILL DISRUPT" THE WHOLE CDE PROCESS.

5. IN RIGHT OF REPLY TO SCEBERRAS TRIGONA'S REMARKS, AMBASSADOR BARRY (U.S.) MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
  - JANUARY 21 STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT REAGAN ON CDE REFLECTS U.S. DETERMINATION TO CONCENTRATE ON ISSUES BEFORE US WITHOUT UNNECESSARY DETOURS INTO ISSUES WHICH ARE NOT PART OF OUR WORK HERE. REGRETTABLY, SUCH AN ISSUE -- TERRORISM AND LIBYA -- HAS BEEN RAISED AT THE CONFERENCE. IT REQUIRES A RESPONSE.
  - COMMENTS EQUATING COWARDLY, SENSELESS TERRORIST ACTS IN ROME AND VIENNA WITH U.S. ACTIONS TO DETER AND PREVENT TERRORISM ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE U.S.

- 
- LIBYA'S ROLE IN TERRORISM HAS BEEN ADEQUATELY PROVEN BY INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WE HAVE SHARED WITH OUR ALLIES AND BY COLONEL KADAFI'S PERSONAL ADMISSION.
  - ATTEMPTS TO USE THIS CONFERENCE TO DEVISE MEASURES

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TO INTERFERE WITH THE LEGITIMATE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE  
OR FREEDOM OF THE SEAS OR INTERNATIONAL AIR SPACE WILL  
FAIL.

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END OF MESSAGE

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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 00690

USIA FOR IP/PFE

GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL

SUBJECT: STATEMENT OF USSR REPRESENTATIVE,

- JANUARY 28, 1986

1. CDE IX - 013

2. THE FULL TEXT OF THE STATEMENT MADE BY USSR AMBASSADOR OLEG A. GRINEVSKY, AT THE PLENARY OF JANUARY 28, FOLLOWS.

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BEGIN TEXT:

MR. CHAIRMAN,

- THIS SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE IS RESUMED AFTER A RECESS THAT WAS FILLED WITH IMPORTANT POLITICAL EVENTS CONDUCIVE TO ITS WORK.

- AN ACT OF HISTORIC SIGNIFICANCE WAS THE STATEMENT BY GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE MIKHAIL GORBACHEV OF JANUARY 15, 1986, WHICH SET FORTH A PROGRAM FOR DURABLE PEACE, ELIMINATION OF THE MOST SERIOUS THREAT LOOMING LARGE OVER MANKIND -- THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR. THE NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS COVER ALL CRUCIAL AREAS OF ACTIVE ACTIONS FOR DISARMAMENT, CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND ASSURED INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.

- IT IS FOR THE FIRST TIME IN ITS HISTORY THAT MANKIND HAS A PLAN, FEASIBLE IN AN HISTORICALLY BRIEF TIME-SPAN, FOR A STAGE-BY-STAGE ELIMINATION, BY THE YEAR 2000, OF THE MOST DESTRUCTIVE WEAPONS OF WAR THAT CREATE A DEADLY THREAT TO LIFE ITSELF ON EARTH -- NUCLEAR ARMS. OBVIOUSLY, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH DISARMAMENT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE UNLESS THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING OR DEPLOYMENT OF SPACE STRIKE ARMS IS BANNED.

- AS A PRACTICAL STEP IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT PROGRAM, THE SOVIET UNION ANNOUNCED THE EXTENSION, TILL MARCH 31, 1986, OF THE UNILATERAL MORATORIUM ON ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSION WHICH WAS PUT INTO ACTION ON AUGUST 6, LAST, ON THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE HIROSHIMA TRAGEDY. THE DECISION OF THE USSR TO EXTEND ITS MORATORIUM PROVIDES THE UNITED STATES WITH ADDITIONAL TIME TO CONSIDER OUR PROPOSALS ON THE CESSATION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS AND TO SET OFF ALONG THE ROAD OF REALISM AND RESPONSIBILITY.

- THE SET OF NEW SOVIET INITIATIVES PROVIDES ALSO FOR ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, RIDDING EUROPE OF NUCLEAR ARMS, BOTH INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND TACTICAL,

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REDUCTION OF THE ARMED FORCES AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS IN EUROPE, AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. IN ORDER TO IMPLEMENT THE PROGRAM, THE ENTIRE EXISTING SYSTEM OF NEGOTIATIONS HAS TO BE SET IN MOTION AND THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE EFFICIENCY OF DISARMAMENT MACHINERY ENSURED. IT IS THE ONLY WAY FOR MANKIND TO ENTER INTO THE NEW

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MILLENNIA UNDER PEACEFUL SKIES AND SPACE, FOR THE PRESENT AND SUBSEQUENT GENERATIONS TO LOOK INTO THE FUTURE WITH HOPE AND CONFIDENCE.

- IT IS NOT AN ACCIDENT THAT THE NEW SOVIET INITIATIVES IN THEIR CONSIDERABLE PART ARE DIRECTLY ADDRESSED TO EUROPE. IN ACHIEVING A RADICAL TURN TOWARDS THE POLICY OF PEACE, EUROPE COULD HAVE A SPECIAL MISSION. THAT MISSION IS ERECTING A NEW EDIFICE OF DETENTE.

- FOR THIS EUROPE HAS THE NECESSARY HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE, WHICH IS OFTEN UNIQUE. SUFFICE IT TO RECALL THAT THE JOINT EFFORTS OF THE EUROPEANS, THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA PRODUCED THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. IF THERE IS A NEED FOR A SPECIFIC AND VIVID EXAMPLE OF NEW THINKING AND POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY IN APPROACHING THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE, COOPERATION AND INTERNATIONAL TRUST, USIA FOR IP/PFE

GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL

THAT HISTORIC DOCUMENT COULD IN MANY WAYS SERVE AS SUCH AN EXAMPLE.

- THE STOCKHOLM FORUM IS THE CHILD OF THE CSCE PROCESS INITIATED IN HELSINKI, IT'S PART AND PARCEL. IT IS CALLED UPON TO PLACE BARRIERS AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE OR COVERT PREPARATIONS FOR WAR, WHETHER ON LAND, AT SEA OR IN THE AIR. THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF MANY STATES, PARTICULARLY AS THE RESULT OF THE SUMMIT MEETINGS IN PARIS AND GENEVA, THE POSSIBILITIES FOR THIS HAVE NOW BECOME EVIDENT. IT HAS BEEN POSSIBLE TO AGREE ON THE TRANSITION TO CONCRETE NEGOTIATIONS ON A RANGE OF QUESTIONS WHICH COULD FORM THE SHAPE OF A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM. AGREEMENT WAS ALSO ACHIEVED ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WORKING MECHANISM TO NEGOTIATE AGREEMENT ON THOSE QUESTIONS. ON THE WHOLE THE CONFERENCE HAS COME CLOSE TO ELABORATION OF THE TEXT OF THE DOCUMENT WHICH WOULD COMPLETE THE PRESENT STAGE OF ITS WORK.

- HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE A GROSS MISTAKE, AND IT HAS BEEN RIGHTLY NOTED HERE BY MANY DELEGATIONS, TO CLOSE ONE'S EYES TO OR UNDERESTIMATE THE DIFFICULTIES OR DIFFERENCES OF OPINION, SOMETIMES PROFOUND, WHICH ARE YET TO BE OVERCOME IN ORDER TO ATTAIN SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS AT THE STOCKHOLM NEGOTIATIONS. THE PROPOSALS AND IDEAS RELEVANT TO THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND VOICED BY GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV ARE DESIGNED PRECISELY TO HELP OVERCOME THOSE DIFFERENCES AND FIND SOLUTIONS TO OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS.

- ENHANCED CONFIDENCE WOULD BE PROMOTED, IN OUR VIEW, PARTICULARLY IN THE CURRENT SITUATION, BY REDUCTIONS IN THE NUMERICAL LEVEL OF TROOPS ENGAGED IN MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS THAT SHOULD BE NOTIFIED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

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- THE SOVIET UNION PROPOSES TO NOTIFY MAJOR MANEUVERS OF GROUND TROOPS, MOVEMENTS (TRANSFERS) OF FORCES, AS WELL AS MAJOR MANEUVERS OF AIR AND NAVAL FORCES. IT IS ONLY NATURAL AS THESE SERVICES OF THE ARMED FORCES ARE CAPABLE OF THREATENING EUROPEAN SECURITY. THE LAST WAR AS WELL AS CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS DEMONSTRATE THE IMPORTANT, AND OFTEN DECISIVE, SIGNIFICANCE OF AIR AND NAVAL FORCES IN CONDUCTING COMBAT ACTIVITIES AND THEIR GREAT DESTRUCTIVE EFFECT WITH THE USE OF ONLY CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS.
- THESE PROPOSALS OF OURS ARE IN FULL CONFORMITY WITH THE MANDATE OF THE CONFERENCE PRODUCED BY THE CSCE MEETING IN MADRID. IT STATES CLEARLY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY THAT "MEASURES WILL COVER THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AS WELL AS THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE." THE SOVIET UNION HAS STRICTLY ADHERED AND WILL CONTINUE TO ADHERE TO THESE PROVISIONS OF THE MANDATE.
- UNFORTUNATELY, CERTAIN WESTERN COUNTRIES STICK TO A DIFFERENT POSITION. THEY ATTEMPT TO REDUCE NOTIFICATION ONLY TO GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES AND DO NOT WISH TO
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- CONSIDER NOTIFICATION REGARDING AIR AND NAVAL FORCES IN ITS ENTIRETY. I DO NOT THINK THERE IS NEED TO ELABORATE ON THE SUBJECT NOW. NO DOUBT THAT ALL DELEGATIONS STILL HAVE FRESH MEMORIES OF THE ACUTE DEBATE ON THE ENTIRE RANGE OF THESE ISSUES THAT TOOK PLACE AT THE PREVIOUS SESSION. AS A RESULT, NOTIFICATION REGARDING GROUND TROOPS, AIR AND NAVAL FORCES BECAME THE BOTTLENECK AT THE CONFERENCE.
- THE CLUE TO THE SOLUTION OF THE NOTIFICATION PROBLEMS THAT HAVE ARISEN IS GIVEN IN THE STATEMENT BY GENERAL USIA FOR IP/PFE
- GENEVA FOR U.S. CD DEL
- SECRETARY GORBACHEV. HE SAID, "OF COURSE, THOSE ARE SERIOUS PROBLEMS AND THEY MUST BE ADDRESSED IN A SERIOUS MANNER IN THE INTERESTS OF BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN EUROPE. HOWEVER, IF THEIR COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION CANNOT BE ACHIEVED AT THIS TIME, WHY NOT EXPLORE WAYS OF THEIR PARTIAL SOLUTION, FOR INSTANCE REACH AGREEMENT NOW ABOUT NOTIFICATIONS OF MAJOR GROUND FORCE AND AIR FORCE EXERCISES, POSTPONING THE QUESTION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNTIL THE NEXT STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE." SUCH SOLUTION WOULD TAKE ACCOUNT NOT ONLY OF THE SITUATION AT THE CONFERENCE BUT OF THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL ITS PARTICIPANTS AS WELL. CERTAINLY, THIS IS NOT A SIMPLE MATTER; IT REQUIRES JOINT EFFORTS OF ALL PARTICIPANTS, PROVIDED, OF COURSE, THEY ARE SO DESIROUS.
- ANOTHER SERIOUS OUTSTANDING QUESTION IS LIMITATION OF THE SCALE OF MILITARY MANEUVERS. THIS IS A MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM IN THE SYSTEM OF CSBM'S. AND DIVERGENCIES HERE ARE FAR FROM BEING SEMANTIC AS REPRESENTA-

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TIVES OF CERTAIN DELEGATIONS TRY TO PORTRAY THEM. IT IS NOT WORDS THAT MATTER BUT THE REAL SITUATION WHERE MANEUVERS CONDUCTED, FOR EXAMPLE, BY NATO COUNTRIES ACQUIRE SUCH PROPORTIONS THAT THEY ARE USED, IN FACT, AS A MEANS OF POLITICAL PRESSURE, AS THE THREAT OF FORCE. FURTHERMORE, LARGE-SCALE MANEUVERS ARE DIFFICULT SOMETIMES TO DISTINGUISH FROM TROOPS DEPLOYMENTS FOR ACTUAL COMBAT. IS IT NOT A SERIOUS SOURCE OF MISTRUST AND SUSPICION IN RELATIONS AMONG STATES?

- THE SOVIET UNION, THE SOCIALIST STATES HAVE FAVORED AND WILL CONTINUE TO FAVOR A SIGNIFICANT LIMITATION OF THE SCALE OF MILITARY MANEUVERS. THE RELEVANT PROPOSALS OF THE NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED COUNTRIES PURSUE THE SAME OBJECTIVE.

- IT IS ALSO NECESSARY TO INTENSIFY WORK ON GIVING CONCRETE EXPRESSION AND EFFECT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE. A NUMBER OF BASIC PROVISIONS ON THE MATTER WAS SUBMITTED IN A PROPOSED TREATY ON THE MUTUAL RENUNCIATION OF MILITARY FORCE AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACEFUL RELATIONS. ALTHOUGH THERE IS CERTAIN MOVEMENT IN THE QUESTION OF NON-USE OF FORCE, IT LAGS BEHIND THE GENERAL PROGRESS OF WORK. UNLESS THE TEMPO OF WORK IN THIS AREA IS ACCELERATED, IT COULD BECOME AN IMPEDIMENT. OBVIOUSLY, THIS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO HAPPEN.

- AGREEMENT ON THIS QUESTION SHOULD SATISFY THE OBJECTIVES OF THE CONFERENCE AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, AND ABOVE ALL PREVENTION OF ANY WAR, WHETHER NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL. NATURALLY, THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE CANNOT BUT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THIS FUNDAMENTAL PROVISION IN ELABORATING FORMULAS REGARDING NON-USE OF FORCE. SO MUCH SO THAT IT FOUND ITS EXPRESSION IN A NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, INCLUDING THE JOINT SOVIET-U.S. STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 21, 1985.

- SUCH ARE SOME OF OUR VIEWS THAT WE WISHED TO EXPRESS TODAY IN ORDER TO FACILITATE A DECISIVE TURN TOWARDS ELABORATION OF CONCRETE AGREEMENTS AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. THE SOVIET DELEGATION STANDS READY TO CLARIFY ITS PROPOSALS ON AND SEEK MUTUAL SOLUTIONS TO ALL THESE AS WELL AS OTHER QUESTIONS THAT ARE ON THE AGENDA OF THE CONFERENCE.

- WE ARE PREPARED TO GO OUR PART OF THE ROAD FOR A SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE CURRENT STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE. NATURALLY, IF WE ARE TO GO ALL THE WAY DOWN

- THE ROAD, ALL DELEGATIONS WILL HAVE TO MAKE THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS. WE CAN NOTE WITH SATISFACTION THAT  
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NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED COUNTRIES HAVE ALREADY SPECIFIED

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THEIR POSITIONS IN FAVOR OF THE SEARCH FOR AGREEMENT. WE COUNT ON OTHER PARTICIPANTS TO INTENSIFY THEIR EFFORTS, TOO, TO ACHIEVE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. THE CONFERENCE HAS A RIGHT TO EXPECT ACCOMMODATING STEPS OF THEM.

- WE BELIEVE THAT CONCRETE RESULTS IN STOCKHOLM ARE QUITE POSSIBLE, PROVIDED FUTILE SCHEMES TO SECURE UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES ARE ABANDONED AND THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY AND RECIPROCITY AND OF EQUAL RESPECT FOR THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL PARTICIPATING STATES ARE ABIDED BY.

MR. CHAIRMAN,

- MOST PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE BELIEVE, AND WE SHARE THEIR OPINION, THAT POSSIBILITIES HAVE BECOME EVIDENT IN STOCKHOLM TO COMPLETE ITS CURRENT STAGE THIS AUTUMN BY ADOPTING A SUBSTANTIVE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE BOTH CONCRETE OBLIGATIONS REGARDING NON-USE OF FORCE AND SIGNIFICANT CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE MILITARY FIELD. THE CONFERENCE ENTERS A NEW PHASE, I.E., DRAFTING A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. HOW SHOULD IT START?

- MANY HAVE REFERRED HERE TO, AND RIGHTLY SO, THE NEED FOR A SMOOTH ENTERING INTO DRAFTING. NOW, AT THE INITIAL STAGE OF WORK, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO RECORD THOSE ELEMENTS AND FORMULAS WHERE THE SIDES' POSITIONS ARE CLOSE OR CONVERGING. OBVIOUSLY, WHEN THIS WORK IS UNDER WAY WE SHALL ALSO HAVE TO KEEP IN MIND MORE COMPLEX QUESTIONS WHERE DIFFERENCES IN APPROACHES PERSIST. PROCEEDING FROM THE SIMPLE TO THE COMPLEX WE SHOULD NOT FORGET THAT SOLUTION OF THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEMS WOULD ACCELERATE ADVANCEMENT IN GENERAL.

- WE CONCUR THAT DRAFTING SHOULD BE DONE IN STAGES AND THROUGH COORDINATORS WHO, HAVING IDENTIFIED WORKING METHODS IN GROUPS, WOULD FOCUS DISCUSSIONS ON THOSE ISSUES WHICH WOULD HAVE BETTER CHANCES OF REACHING CONSENSUS. WITH THIS ORGANIZATION OF WORK MAIN ELEMENTS OR IMPORTANT COMPONENTS ON WHICH AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE WOULD GET IDENTIFIED IN THE PROCESS.

- NATURALLY, THESE WORKING METHODS MUST BE APPLIED TO ALL WORKING GROUPS, TO ALL AREAS PROVIDED FOR IN THE AGREEMENT OF OCTOBER 14, 1985.

- CONCLUDING MY STATEMENT, I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT A SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE WOULD FACILITATE A TURN FROM CONFRONTATION TO PEACEFUL COOPERATION OF STATES. A PRODUCTIVE OUTCOME OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE WOULD CONTRIBUTE ALSO TO THE SOLUTION OF AN HISTORIC OBJECTIVE OF OUR TIME -- TO DO THE UTMOST SO THAT 1986 WILL BECOME NOT JUST A YEAR OF PEACE BUT WOULD HELP END THE XXTH CENTURY UNDER THE SIGN OF LASTING PEACE AND CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 00637  
ON TERRORISM, LIBYA AND CDE

1. CDE IX-006. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AS REPORTED SEPTEL, I FELT COMPELLED TO REPLY TO MALTESE FOREIGN MINISTER TRIGONA'S SPEECH TO THE CDE PLENARY BECAUSE OF HIS CRITICISM OF US POLICY TOWARD LIBYA. FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER AND DUMAS WERE PRESENT FOR TRIGONA'S SPEECH BUT NOT FOR MY REPLY.
3. DURING THE RECEPTION FOLLOWING THE PLENARY I APPROACHED TRIGONA AND SAID I WAS SORRY I HAD TO TAKE HIM ON PUBLICLY BUT THAT I FOUND HIS EQUATION OF LIBYAN TERRORISM AND THE US RESPONSE TO IT UNACCEPTABLE. WE HAD HARD EVIDENCE LINKING LIBYA TO TERRORISM IN GENERAL AND THE ROME AND VIENNA AIRPORT MURDERS SPECIFICALLY AND HAD SHARED THIS EVIDENCE WITH OUR ALLIES. THE MALTESE DEFENSE OF LIBYA WAS UNCONVINCING, AND MALTA SHOULD HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE US WOULD NOT ALLOW ANY MEASURES TO BE APPROVED AT THIS CONFERENCE WHICH WOULD LIMIT OUR ABILITY TO RESPOND TO TERRORISM OR EXERCISE FREEDOM OF THE HIGH SEAS AND INTERNATIONAL AIR SPACE.
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4. TRIGONA RESPONDED BY DENYING THAT HE HAD EQUATED TERRORISM AND THE US RESPONSE, POINTING OUT PLACES IN HIS SPEECH WHERE HE HAD CONDEMNED TERROR. HE UNDERLINED MALTESE CONCERN ABOUT F-14 INTERCEPTS OF ALGERIAN AND KUWAITI AIRCRAFT ENROUTE TO MALTA AND THE DAMAGE WHICH TENSION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN WAS DOING TO THE MALTESE ECONOMY. HE PUT IN A PLUG FOR THE MALTESE IDEA OF A REGIONAL MEETING OF MEDITERRANEAN STATES AND AGAIN EXPRESSED HIS "AMAZEMENT" AT US OPPOSITION TO THE IDEA OF A DIALOGUE WITH QADHAFI.
5. ON CDE, TRIGONA EXPRESSED SOME BITTERNESS AT BEING "ABANDONED" BY THE SOVIETS, REFERRING TO GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 STATEMENT OFFERING TO DEFER NAVAL ISSUES UNTIL A FUTURE STAGE OF CDE. TRIGONA SAID MALTA DID NOT EXPECT TO GET ALL IT WAS ASKING FOR IN STOCKHOLM, BUT DID EXPECT SOME ACCOMMODATION TO MALTESE NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THIS CONNECTION HE MENTIONED HOW MUCH MALTA DEPENDED ON EMPLOYMENT IN LIBYA AND LIBYAN TRADE AND INVESTMENT.
6. I RESPONDED THAT NATIONS MUST HAVE A MORAL SCALE OF VALUES WHICH RANKED CONCERN FOR HUMAN LIFE AND DETERRENCE OF TERRORISM AHEAD OF TRADE. IT SOUNDED TO ME AS IF LIBYA WAS TRYING TO BLACKMAIL MALTA AND MALTA WAS RESPONDING. AS TO CDE I SAID WE HOPED TO BE ABLE TO ACCOMMODATE MALTESE NATIONAL INTERESTS BUT NOT AT THE EXPENSE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF THE SEAS OR VITAL US DEFENSE INTERESTS. WE WOULD ACCEPT NO OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCE WHICH IN ANY WAY INFRINGED ON OUR ABILITY TO DO JUST WHAT WE ARE DOING NOW; ASSERTING OUR RIGHT TO USE INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND THE AIR SPACE OVER THEM FREELY.
7. IN CONCLUSION TRIGONA EXPRESSED HIS HIGH REGARD FOR

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AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS AND SAID HE WANTED TO WORK WITH US  
TO FIND A COMMON GROUND ON CDE. I SAID WE WOULD BE GLAD  
TO DISCUSS THE CDE ISSUES.

8. COMMENT: WE IN STOCKHOLM WOULD APPRECIATE EMBASSY  
VALLETTA'S BEST JUDGMENT ON HOW FAR THE MALTESE WILL  
PUSH THEIR ISSUES HERE. CLEARLY THEY HAVE THE CAPACITY  
TO WRECK THE CONFERENCE; THE QUESTION IS DO THEY HAVE THE  
WILL. NO ONE HERE PRETENDS TO HAVE THE ANSWER OR A PRES-  
CRIPTION ON HOW BEST TO MINIMIZE THE RISK.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 00681

SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF STATEMENTS OF FRENCH AND FRG  
- FOREIGN MINISTERS AT CDE

REF: A) PARIS 3646, B) STOCKHOLM 651, C) STOCKHOLM 664

1. CDE IX - 015

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. BEGIN SUMMARY: FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER AND FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER DUMAS ACCENTED FRANCO-GERMAN COOPERATION IN THEIR JOINT APPEARANCE AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON JANUARY 28. THEY BOTH STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING A STABLE CONVENTIONAL FORCE RELATIONSHIP, OF ENSURING ADEQUATE VERIFICATION IN ALL MULTILATERAL SECURITY AGREEMENTS AND OF MAINTAINING THE BALANCE WITHIN THE CSCE PROCESS. GENSCHER ALSO DESCRIBED THE GROWING ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN EUROPEAN SECURITY DECISIONS. WHILE GENSCHER AND DUMAS WERE AT PAINS TO ACCENTUATE THE POSITIVE IN THEIR STOCKHOLM VISIT, CERTAIN DIFFERENCES WERE EVIDENT. IN GENERAL, THE FRENCH TOOK A MORE CAUTIOUS APPROACH TO THE CDE, E.G., ON CONSTRAINTS, WHILE THE GERMANS WERE MORE FORTHCOMING ON SUCH SUBJECTS AS NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF). END SUMMARY.

4. AS NOTED IN REFTEL A, FRENCH AND FRG OFFICIALS CLOSELY COORDINATED THE STATEMENTS OF FOREIGN MINISTERS DUMAS AND GENSCHER AT THE CDE ON JANUARY 28. THESE EFFORTS WERE OBVIOUS IN STOCKHOLM. BOTH FOREIGN MINISTERS STRESSED FRANCO-GERMAN COOPERATION IN THEIR STATEMENTS AND JOINT APPEARANCES. THEY BOTH UNDERScoreD THE NEED TO GIVE THE CONVENTIONAL FORCE RELATIONSHIP IN EUROPE EQUAL ATTENTION TO THE NUCLEAR RELATIONSHIP, TO REDUCE THE RISK OF CONVENTIONAL WAR, TO ELIMINATE CHEMICAL WEAPONS, TO ENSURE ADEQUATE VERIFICATION IN ALL MULTILATERAL SECURITY AGREEMENTS AND TO MAINTAIN THE BALANCE OF THE CSCE PROCESS. IN ADDITION, THEY BOTH WELCOMED SPAIN AND PORTUGAL TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OF "DEMOCRATIC" NATIONS. THIS MUCH OF FRANCO-GERMAN COOPERATION ALSO REFLECTED THE U.S. APPROACH TO THE CDE AND EUROPEAN SECURITY. HOWEVER, FRANCO-GERMAN "PARALLELISM" ON OTHER SUBJECTS DIVERGED FROM U.S. THINKING. FOR EXAMPLE, GENSCHER'S STATEMENT, WHILE EMPLOYING THE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY IN REFERRING TO THE IMPORTANCE OF "PREVENTING AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE," COULD NONETHELESS BE READ AS AN IMPLICIT REFERENCE TO SDI.

5. WHILE DUMAS AND GENSCHER WERE AT PAINS TO ACCENTUATE THE POSITIVE, CERTAIN DIFFERENCES IN THE FRENCH AND GERMAN APPROACH TO THE CDE COULD NOT BE HIDDEN. IN GENERAL, THE FRENCH TAKE A MORE CAUTIOUS CYNICAL APPROACH TO THE CONFERENCE. THE FRG, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS EAGER FOR AN AGREEMENT -- SOME WOULD SAY ANY AGREEMENT -- IN

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STOCKHOLM. THESE DIFFERENCES EMERGED MOST CLEARLY ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE SUBJECT WITH DUMAS ARGUING FOR WHAT IS IN EFFECT A MINIMALIST POSITION, I.E., THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE SHOULD BE GIVEN CONCRETE CONTENT THROUGH CSBM'S. GENSCHER IMPLICITLY TOOK THE NUF REAFFIRMATION OUT OF THE CSBM'S CONTEXT BY DEALING WITH NUF AND CSBM AS SEPARATE ISSUES. GENSCHER ALSO EMPHASIZED THE GROWING ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN DEFINING AND REPRESENTING ITS OWN SECURITY INTERESTS.

6. IN HIS PLENARY STATEMENT(REF B), THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER ALSO STRESSED:

-- THE NEED TO AGREE ON A "QUALITATIVE LEAP" OVER THE LIMITED MEASURES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE "SOVIET TERRITORY . . . WEST OF THE URALS."

-- THE "AMBITIOUS" NATURE OF GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 PROPOSAL. REGARDING NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT HE REITERATED TRADITIONAL FRENCH PRECONDITIONS, TO ENABLE FRANCE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROCESS (READ: IT AIN'T GONNA HAPPEN). ON THE CDE/CONVENTIONAL SIDE, DUMAS SUGGESTED THAT THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL SHOULD BE JUDGED IN THE LIGHT OF THE NEED FOR GREATER VERIFICATION AND TRANSPARENCY.

-- THE "CONDITIONS" NECESSARY FOR SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM:  
- 1) REALISM AND PRAGMATISM; E.G., IT IS PREMATURE TO SEEK "TO LIMIT THE SIZE OF MILITARY FORCES OR ACTIVITIES," I.E., ON CONSTRAINTS.

- 2) ALL MEASURES MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH THE "FUNCTIONAL APPROACH," I.E., NO NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. (COMMENT: WE COULDN'T HAVE SAID IT BETTER OURSELVES. END COMMENT.)  
-- THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE FREE CIRCULATION OF PEOPLE AND IDEAS. "CAN A STATE WHICH IS NOT AT PEACE WITH ITS OWN CITIZENS," DUMAS QUERIED, "REALLY GAIN THE CONFIDENCE OF ITS NEIGHBORS?" (COMMENT: AGAIN, OUR SENTIMENTS EXACTLY. WE MIGHT ALSO FRUITFULLY USE THESE IDEAS IN OUR NUF DISCUSSIONS. END COMMENT.)

7. IN HIS UPBEAT PRO-DETENTE ADDRESS, FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER EMPHASIZED:

-- THE INTRA GERMAN ANGLE. WE WILL "NEVER FORGET THAT GERMANS ALSO LIVE ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE DIVIDING LINE."

-- THE GOAL OF ACHIEVING LASTING STABILITY AND ELIMINATING "ANY KIND OF WAR." GENSCHER QUOTED THE GENEVA SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE ABOUT "PREVENTING ANY WAR . . . , WHETHER NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL." (COMMENT: IN THE CDE CONTEXT THIS STATEMENT MAY PLAY INTO EASTERN HANDS BY LENDING LEGITIMACY TO SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE THE NUCLEAR ANGLE INTO THE NUF WORKING GROUP. END COMMENT.)

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-- THE NEED FOR COOPERATIVE SOLUTIONS TO SECURITY QUESTIONS; "INDIVIDUAL DEFENSIVE EFFORTS ALONE WILL NOT ENSURE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS (PREVENTING WAR) OBJECTIVE."

-- GORBACHEV'S PROPOSALS "CAN GIVE THE NEGOTIATIONS MAJOR IMPULSES AND OPEN UP POSSIBILITIES FOR MOVEMENT." (COMMENT: GENSCHER DID NOT ELABORATE IN THE CDE CONTEXT, PERHAPS BECAUSE FRG ANALYSIS IS NOT COMPLETE OR IS DIFFERENT, AT THIS STAGE, THAN THE FRENCH VIEW. THE LATTER REASON WAS SUGGESTED TO US BY A FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL WITH THE DUMAS PARTY. END COMMENT.)

-- PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENT AT THE OPENING OF THE NINTH ROUND OF THE CDE, I.E., THE CDE HAS IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS FOR EAST-WEST SECURITY. GENSCHER CONCLUDED BY PLEDGING THE FRG TO "BRING ABOUT A FAR-REACHING TRANSFORMATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WEST AND EAST."

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 00755

SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF JANUARY 28 CDE PLENARY ADDRESS BY

- SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY

1. CDE IX - 018

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. BEGIN SUMMARY: SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY'S JANUARY 28 CDE PLENARY ADDRESS WAS UPBEAT AND OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR THE CONFERENCE BUT OFFERED LITTLE THAT WAS NEW. SURPRISINGLY, GRINEVSKY OFFERED NO ELABORATION OF GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 CDE PROPOSALS, CONFINING HIMSELF TO A MERE REITERATION. HE DID MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS WILL PACKAGE THE DEFERMENT OF NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES AS A SIGNIFICANT CONCESSION FOR WHICH THEY WILL EXPECT A CORRESPONDING WESTERN MOVE. THE SOVIET STATEMENT ALSO EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO LIMIT THE SIZE OF MILITARY MANEUVERS. GRINEVSKY APPEARED TO SHARE OUR POSITION THAT DRAFTING, AT LEAST INITIALLY, SHOULD FOCUS ON AREAS OF CONVERGING VIEWS. HE ALSO TOOK THE OCCASION TO LAY DOWN AN ADDITIONAL MARKER THAT THE EAST WILL INSIST ON PARALLEL DRAFTING OF NUF AND CSBM'S. END SUMMARY.

4. SOVIET CDE AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY'S PLENARY STATEMENT OF JANUARY 28 WAS UPBEAT IN TONE, BUT CONTAINED NO MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE SURPRISES. GRINEVSKY FOCUSED ON THE JANUARY 15 GORBACHEV STATEMENT WHICH HE SAID COVERED ALL CRUCIAL AREAS OF DISARMAMENT, AND WAS "AN ACT OF HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE." HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT IT COULD ONLY BE IMPLEMENTED IF "THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING OR DEPLOYMENT OF SPACE STRIKE ARMS IS BANNED." TURNING TO CDE, GRINEVSKY DID NOTE, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN USDEL'S RECOLLECTION, THAT "THE STOCKHOLM FORUM IS THE CHILD OF THE CSCE PROCESS," THUS, IMPLICITLY ACKNOWLEDGING THE SUBORDINATE RELATIONSHIP OF STOCKHOLM TO THE FULL VIENNA CSCE REVIEW MEETING. WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT SERIOUS SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES REMAIN TO BE RESOLVED AT THE CONFERENCE, HE WAS SURPRISINGLY POSITIVE ABOUT THE CONFERENCE TO DATE WHICH HE SAID, LARGELY AS A RESULT OF THE POLITICAL IMPETUS PROVIDED BY THE GENEVA AND PARIS SUMMITS, "HAS COME CLOSE TO ELABORATION OF THE TEXT OF

- THE DOCUMENT WHICH WOULD COMPLETE THE PRESENT STAGE OF ITS WORK." GRINEVSKY SAID THAT GORBACHEV'S PROPOSALS ON CDE WERE DESIGNED TO OVERCOME THE REMAINING DIFFICULTIES AND FIND SOLUTIONS, PARTICULARLY TO THE CONFERENCE'S "BOTTLENECK," THE NOTIFICATION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. HE, HOWEVER, OFFERED NO AMPLIFICATION OF THOSE PROPOSALS BUT SIMPLY REITERATED GORBACHEV'S STATEMENTS ON LOWER THRESHOLDS FOR NOTIFICATION AND ON DEFERRMENT OF THE NAVAL ISSUE. GRINEVSKY GAVE NO GROUND ON THE SOVIET INTERPRETATION OF THE MANDATE, CONTINUING TO CONTEND

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THAT THE NOTIFICATION OF BOTH AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES WAS IN FULL CONFORMITY WITH IT. GRINEVSKY CHARACTERIZED GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL ON NAVAL ACTIVITIES AS A SIGNIFICANT SOVIET CONCESSION FOR WHICH THEY WILL EXPECT SOMETHING IN RETURN ("WE ARE PREPARED TO GO OUR PART OF THE ROAD . . . IF WE ARE TO GO ALL THE WAY DOWN THE ROAD OTHER DELEGATIONS WILL HAVE TO MAKE THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS").

5. GRINEVSKY MADE A MAJOR PITCH FOR A "SIGNIFICANT LIMITATION ON THE SCALE OF MILITARY MANEUVERS," WHICH HE CALLED A MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM TO BE ADDRESSED IN THE SYSTEM OF CSBM'S. EMPLOYING SOME UNIQUE MIRROR IMAGING, HE ALSO CONTENDED THAT LARGE-SCALE NATO MANEUVERS ARE USED AS A MEANS OF POLITICAL PRESSURE AND "AS THE THREAT OF FORCE." TURNING TO THE NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF) GRINEVSKY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT "CERTAIN MOVEMENT HAD OCCURRED" ON THIS ISSUE BUT THAT NUF DISCUSSIONS LAGGED BEHIND THE GENERAL PROGRESS AT THE CONFERENCE, HINTING THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD IMPEDE PROGRESS ON CSBM'S IF THE PACE OF WORK ON NUF IS NOT ACCELERATED. THIS WAS ANOTHER IN A SERIES OF SOVIET MARKERS THAT THEY WILL NOT ACCEPT A SEQUENTIAL APPROACH TO DRAFTING REQUIRING SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ON CSBM'S PRIOR TO ANY NUF PROGRESS. GRINEVSKY AGAIN PLUGGED THE SUBSTANCE OF SC.6 BUT DID NOT MENTION THE TREATY IDEA. HE NOTED THAT THE GENEVA SUMMIT HAD CALLED FOR THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WAR AND THAT THE CDE COULD NOT "IGNORE" THIS ISSUE. (BEGIN COMMENT: IT IS CLEAR THAT THE IDEA OF A "NUF TREATY" IS A DEAD ISSUE; HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS REMAIN ADAMANT ABOUT INTRODUCING THE "NO FIRST USE" CONCEPT INTO THE CDE CONTEXT. END COMMENT.)

6. GRINEVSKY CLOSED WITH SOME REMARKS ABOUT THE MODALITIES FOR DRAFTING WHICH TO A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE PARALLELED OUR VIEW THAT DRAFTING INITIALLY SHOULD FOCUS ON AREAS OF CONVERGENCE. AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING, THIS SOVIET POSITION SHOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR US TO AVOID DEMANDS FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF BRACKETED LANGUAGE INTO COORDINATOR'S TEXTS.

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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 00680

SUBJECT: GUIDELINES FOR DRAFTING

1. CDE IX - 014
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THE FOLLOWING GUIDELINES FOR DRAFTING WERE AGREED TO BY THE CDE NATO CAUCUS ON JANUARY 29. GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE), MELLBIN (DENMARK), AND CITRON (FRG) WERE SELECTED AS CAUCUS REPRESENTATIVES TO MAKE AN APPROPRIATE APPROACH TO THE WORKING GROUP COORDINATORS ON THE BASIS OF THIS DOCUMENT AND WILL BE MEETING WITH THEM ON JANUARY 30. THE CAUCUS ALSO DECIDED THAT THE TEXT ITSELF WOULD REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL, FOR INTERNAL NATO USE ONLY.

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BEGIN TEXT.

- DRAFTING
- THE PRESENT PAPER IS INTENDED TO REFLECT THE DISCUSSION ON THE ABOVE SUBJECT WHICH TOOK PLACE IN THE MEETING ON JANUARY 23, 1986, AT THE PALAIS D'EGMONT.
  - THE WELL ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLE THAT NOTHING IS DEFINITELY AGREED UNTIL EVERYTHING IS AGREED WILL APPLY.
  - DRAFTING SHOULD PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF A PRINCIPLE OF "FLEXIBLE PARALLELISM." THIS MEANS THAT DRAFTING WOULD NOT HAVE TO START AT EXACTLY THE SAME TIME OR PROCEED AT THE SAME PACE IN ALL CLUSTER GROUPS. HOWEVER, THE PRINCIPLE OF DRAFTING IS ACCEPTED AB INITIO FOR ALL CLUSTER GROUPS AND NO MAJOR DELAY IS FORESEEN IN INITIATING THE DRAFTING IN ANY GROUP. THERE ARE SUFFICIENT MEANS TO ENSURE THAT DRAFTING ON ANY SUBJECT DOES NOT GAIN AN UNACCEPTABLE LEAD IN RELATION TO DRAFTING ON OTHER SUBJECT.
  - DRAFTING WILL TAKE PLACE IN ENGLISH ONLY.
  - INITIALLY, CONTRIBUTIONS FROM ALLIED DELEGATIONS TO DRAFTING SHOULD BE BASED ON QUOTATIONS FROM SC.1/AMPLIFIED.
  - THE COORDINATORS MUST BE EXPECTED TO PRESENT DRAFT TEXTS ELABORATED ON THEIR OWN RESPONSIBILITY AND INTENDED TO ESTABLISH COMPROMISE LANGUAGE. WITH REGARD TO SUBJECTS ON WHICH THERE ARE NO OTHER PROPOSALS THAN THOSE IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED COORDINATORS WILL NOT HAVE THE USUAL BASIS FOR ELABORATING COMPROMISE LANGUAGE. ALLIED COUNTRIES WILL MAINTAIN SUCH PROPOSALS AND DECIDE IN DUE COURSE HOW THEY BEST CAN ENSURE THAT THEY ARE INCLUDED IN THE DRAFTING PROCESS.
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  - IN ALL PROBABILITY, COORDINATORS IN THEIR EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH AGREED TEXTS WILL HAVE TO APPLY A "BITS AND PIECES APPROACH," I.E., TO NAIL DOWN AGREEMENT ON WHATEVER SENTENCES OR OTHER PARTS OF TEXTS LEND THEMSELVES THERETO AT THE ACTUAL MOMENT. IN GENERAL A DEDUCTIVE APPROACH CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO YIELD THE

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DESIRED RESULTS.

- COORDINATORS SHOULD NOT INTRODUCE TEXTS WHICH COMPARE POSITIONS TAKEN IN THE VARIOUS PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE.
  - TEXTS SHOULD BE ENTERED INTO THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK WHEN THEY ARE AGREED BY CONSENSUS AND SHOULD CONTAIN NO BRACKETS TO INDICATE DISAGREEMENT. THE USE OF DOTS ( . . . ) WILL BE INHERENT IN THE "BITS AND PIECES APPROACH," INDICATING THAT AGREEMENT ON PART OF A TEXT, INCLUDING SPECIFIC FIGURES, IS STILL OUTSTANDING.
  - IN RESPECT TO POSSIBLE DRAFT TEXTS WHICH ARE NOT READY TO BE ENTERED INTO THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK DISAGREEMENT CAN BE ESTABLISHED BY ORAL DECLARATIONS.
  - IT IS TO BE FORESEEN THAT AS DRAFTING PROCEEDS A CERTAIN INDIVIDUALIZATION OF THE WORKING MODALITIES IN THE VARIOUS CLUSTER GROUPS WILL DEVELOP.
  - A DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY SHOULD BE EXERCISED IN THE APPLICATION OF THE ABOVE GUIDELINES; BUT MAJOR CHANGES SHOULD BE DECIDED BY THE HEADS OF DELEGATIONS.
- END TEXT.  
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END OF MESSAGE  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 00693  
 SUBJECT: NATO AMBASSADORS DISCUSS CDE WITH LORD CARRINGTON

1. CDE IX-017. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. THE CDE NATO AMBASSADORS HAD A GOOD SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION ON THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS WITH CARRINGTON DURING HIS STOCKHOLM VISIT JANUARY 29. KEY ISSUES WERE WHETHER CDE WAS LIKELY TO BE THE ONLY SECURITY-RELATED AGREEMENT TO BE CONCLUDED IN 1986, WHETHER EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION WOULD BE SATISFIED BY SUCCESS IN CDE, IN THE ABSENCE OF AGREEMENT ON NUCLEAR ISSUES AND WHETHER WE COULD GET ON-SITE INSPECTION IN A CDE AGREEMENT. THE ROLE OF A US-SOVIET SUMMIT IN THE CDE CONTEXT WAS ALSO DISCUSSED. CARRINGTON EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION WITH PAST NAC DISCUSSIONS OF CDE AND SUGGESTED THAT A FREE-WHEELING LUNCHEON DISCUSSION INCLUDING PERMREPS AND CDE AMBASSADORS WAS HIS PREFERRED FORMAT FOR THE NEXT NATO CDE CONSULTATION. END SUMMARY.
3. DURING HIS BILATERAL VISIT TO STOCKHOLM ON JANUARY 29, LORD CARRINGTON MET WITH THE NATO AMBASSADORS AT THE HOME OF DANISH AMBASSADOR MELLBIN WHO HAD BEEN THE SPOKESMAN FOR THE STOCKHOLM CAUCUS AT THE JANUARY 24 NAC. HIS INTENTION WAS TO HAVE THE KIND OF FREE-WHEELING DISCUSSION WHICH HE FELT HAD BEEN SO LACKING IN PREVIOUS NAC MEETINGS ON CDE, AND HE LED THE WAY.

4. IN DISCUSSING THE PROSPECTS FOR A CDE AGREEMENT THIS YEAR, BARRY (US) SAID THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD CONFIRMED THAT THE US BOTTOM LINE WAS VERIFIABILITY - I.E. SOME ON-SITE INSPECTION. ABSENT THAT, WE WOULD NOT APPROVE A MINI-PACKAGE. WE THOUGHT ON-SITE INSPECTION WAS ATTAINABLE, IF ONLY IN THE END-GAME. THIS WAS THE PRICE THE USSR WOULD HAVE TO PAY FOR CONTINUING THE CDE PROCESS. ALSO, CDE IS THE LEADING CANDIDATE FOR A SECURITY-RELATED AGREEMENT IN 1986, AND THIS SHOULD AFFECT THE SOVIET POSITION ON INSPECTIONS.
5. CARRINGTON WONDERED IF CW WAS NOT A BETTER CANDIDATE. CITRON (FRG) SAID THAT HE DOUBTED THIS; CW INSPECTIONS WOULD BE FAR MORE INTRUSIVE THAN CDE INSPECTIONS. SEVERAL NATO WETS (NORWAY, DENMARK, SPAIN, CANADA) DOUBTED THAT THE USSR WOULD EVER AGREE TO INSPECTIONS IN THE CDE CONTEXT, ALTHOUGH THEY SEEMED TO ACCEPT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THIS MIGHT MEAN NO AGREEMENT BEFORE THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE.
6. CARRINGTON WAS SKEPTICAL THAT CDE (IN WHICH NO FOREIGN OFFICE IS REALLY INTERESTED) WOULD SATISFY NORTHERN EUROPEAN APPETITES FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. CITRON OPINED THAT A SUCCESSFUL CDE WOULD BE A BIG HELP IN THE FRG; THE SITUATION WAS FAR EASIER THAN AT THE HEIGHT OF THE INF CONTROVERSY. MODEST STEPS IN STOCKHOLM WHICH PROMISED A CONTINUATION OF THE CSCE PROCESS AND COULD STIMULATE PROGRESS IN OTHER FORA COULD HAVE A

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MAJOR IMPACT ON PUBLIC OPINION. OTHERS (PERHAPS REFLECTING THEIR FOCUS ON CDE) GENERALLY AGREED.

7. CARRINGTON ASKED HOW CDE COULD FIT INTO A JULY REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT. BARRY SAID THAT MULTILATERAL CDE ISSUES COULD NOT BE NEGOTIATED BILATERALLY, BUT THE SUMMIT PROCESS COULD BE USED TO RESOLVE CRUCIAL OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS - E.G. ON-SITE INSPECTION. MEVIK (NORWAY) OBJECTED TO THE IDEA OF SUPERPOWER NEGOTIATION OF CDE, BUT OTHERS SAID THAT THE MORE ISSUES THAT CAN BE RESOLVED IN BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE USSR, THE BETTER - E.G. SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF FORECASTS DURING GORBACHEV'S VISIT TO PARIS.

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8. CARRINGTON DOUBTED THAT THE US OR EUROPEAN PUBLICS WOULD BE CONTENT WITH A SECOND US-SOVIET SUMMIT AT WHICH NOTHING WAS DECIDED. BARRY SAID THAT THE US HAD LONG SAID THAT THE PROCESS WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE RESULTS; SUMMITS SHOULD NOT BE PLACES TO SIGN AGREEMENTS BUT TO SEEK PROGRESS ON ISSUES WHICH ARE STALLED. CARRINGTON DOUBTED THAT SUCH AN APPROACH COULD BE SOLD TO THE MEDIA.

9. IN CONCLUSION CARRINGTON REITERATED HIS FRUSTRATION WITH PREVIOUS NAC CONSULTATIONS ON CDE AND URGED BRIAN FALL TO ORGANIZE A FREE-WHEELING CDE LUNCHEON MEETING FOR THE NEXT CDE EVENT. FALL SAID THAT THE PROBLEM WAS TO ACCOMMODATE 36 BUT HE THOUGHT IT COULD BE DONE. MANY OF THE CDE AMBASSADORS AGREED THAT A GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THIS SORT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO THE USUAL TOUR DE TABLE.

BARRY  
END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 00751  
SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS DISCUSSION OF GORBACHEV'S  
JANUARY 15 CDE PROPOSAL

1. CDE IX - 023
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. THE CDE NATO CAUCUS BRIEFLY DISCUSSED JANUARY 31 HOW THE ALLIANCE SHOULD HANDLE GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 PROPOSAL TO DEFER THE ISSUE OF NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNTIL THE NEXT PHASE OF CDE. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT THE WEST SHOULD MAKE NO FORMAL REFERENCES TO THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL. MOST SHARED THE VIEW EXPRESSED BY CIARRAPICCO (ITALY) THAT NATO SHOULD NOT SEEK INFORMAL CLARIFICATION FROM THE SOVIETS BUT POCKET THE SOVIET OFFER. EDES (UK) NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE TO OFFER SOME ELABORATION IN THE PROCESS OF DRAFTING A NOTIFICATION MEASURE. THERE WAS ALSO GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH EDES' OBSERVATION THAT THE GORBACHEV OFFER WAS IN NO WAY A CONCESSION" AND THAT NATO DELEGATIONS SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO CHARACTERIZE IT AS SUCH.
4. WE HAVE BEEN MAKING THE POINT IN THE NATO CAUCUS AND AMONG MANY OTHER DELEGATIONS THAT IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE NAVAL ISSUE HAS REALLY GONE AWAY OR WILL SIMPLY REAPPEAR UNDER THE GUISE OF "FUNCTIONALLY RELATED" NAVAL ACTIVITIES. WE HAVE ALSO STRESSED OUR POSITION SO THAT INDEPENDENT AIR IS EXCLUDED ALSO. SO FAR, THIS SEEMS TO BE ACCEPTED BY ALL.

BARRY  
END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 00750  
SUBJECT: CDE ISSUES AT EVERE  
REFS: A) USNATO 543, B) USNATO 485, C) USNATO 429  
1. CDE IX - 019.  
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.  
3. USDEL HAS TAKEN NOTE OF UK PERMREP'S EFFORTS TO ENGAGE THE NATO MACHINERY TO WORK ON CDE ISSUES (REF A). DELEGATION VIEWS ARE FORWARDED BELOW FOR WASHINGTON CONSIDERATION.  
4. FOR OUR PART, WE SEE NO OBJECTION TO CONSIDERATION OF THE MNA CONSTRAINT PROPOSAL AT EVERE. WE WOULD POINT OUT, HOWEVER, THAT THE CONCLUSIONS REACHED IN THE JUST COMPLETED CONSTRAINTS STUDY APPLY ALSO TO SC-7; FURTHER, WE REMAIN UNCONVINCED THAT THERE IS A REQUIREMENT FOR NATO TO IDENTIFY A MEASURE OF CONSTRAINT FOR USE IN STOCKHOLM.  
5. AS NOTED IN REF C, USDEL DID NOT OBJECT TO AN EXAMINATION AT EVERE OF SC-7 TO DETERMINE OTHER ASPECTS WITH NEGOTIATING RELEVANCE FOR STOCKHOLM. THIS IS MOST LIKELY A REFERENCE TO THE SC-7 LANGUAGE ON NUF. DESPITE OUR WILLINGNESS TO AGREE TO THE SUGGESTED WORK IN NATO, WE BELIEVE SUCH AN EXAMINATION IS PART OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND CAN BE MOST SATISFACTORILY CARRIED OUT IN STOCKHOLM ON THE BASIS OF INSTRUCTIONS FROM CAPITALS.  
6. WE ARE PUZZLED BY THE UK ATTEMPT TO FORCE RESOLUTION OF THE ANOMALIES IN THE WESTERN CSBM PACKAGE AT EVERE. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT IN THE PRE-NAC HEADS CAUCUS THAT THESE ISSUES -- WITH THE EXCEPTION OF RESTRICTED AREAS -- COULD BEST BE RESOLVED DURING NEGOTIATIONS IN STOCKHOLM. USDEL SUPPORTS THAT VIEW.  
BARRY  
END OF MESSAGE  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 00789

SUBJECT: SOVIET NEGOTIATOR GRINEVSKY ON CDE

1. CDE IX-027. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SOVIET CDE NEGOTIATOR GRINEVSKY RETURNED TO STOCKHOLM IN A POSITIVE FRAME OF MIND AFTER HIS MEETING (TOGETHER WITH OTHER NEGOTIATORS) WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV IN THE COURSE OF PREPARING HIS JANUARY 15 STATEMENT. HE SEEMS TO BE INSTRUCTED TO GET ON WITH AN AGREEMENT.
3. HE DID NOT OBJECT WHEN I SAID THAT THE BOTTOM LINE FOR THE US WAS ON-SITE INSPECTION. THE ISSUE COULD BE DEFERRED BUT NOT AVOIDED. WE WOULD NOT BE SATISFIED WITH OBSERVATION ON REQUEST AS IN THE NNA PROPOSAL; WHAT WAS REQUIRED WAS A FORM OF INSPECTION WHICH COULD NOT BE DENIED.
4. GRINEVSKY SAID WE WERE CORRECT IN INTERPRETING THE CDE SEGMENT OF GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 SPEECH AS REFERRING TO LOWERING THE HELSINKI NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION THRESHOLDS AND NOT TO NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS ON EXERCISES (CONSTRAINTS). HE INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE THRESHOLD ISSUE BILATERALLY IN AN EFFORT TO NARROW THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US.
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5. I SAID IT REMAINED OUR VIEW THAT INDEPENDENT AIR AS WELL AS NAVAL ACTIVITIES COULD NOT BE PART OF A STOCKHOLM AGREEMENT; WE WERE STICKING TO THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. GRINEVSKY SAID THE SOVIETS HAD NOT CHANGED THIS POSITION IN THE MEANING OF THE MANDATE, BUT THAT THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT WAS AN EFFORT TO FIND A PRACTICAL WAY OUT OF THE BLIND ALLEY WE WERE IN. (COMMENT: THE IMPLICATION OF GRINEVSKY'S COMMENT WAS THAT THEY WOULD NOT MAKE TOO MUCH OF A FUSS ABOUT INDEPENDENT AIR EITHER, BUT WE SUSPECT THE MILITARY MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION WILL NOT BE SO PHILOSOPHICAL.)
6. ON PROCEDURAL MATTERS SUCH AS DRAFTING MODALITIES AND LANGUAGE, GRINEVSKY SOUNDED RELAXED AND FLEXIBLE. HE PROMISED TO CONSIDER OUR NO-BRACKETS DRAFTING MODEL, SAYING THAT HE SAW NO PROBLEMS OF PRINCIPLE WITH IT. HE SEEMED READY TO ACCEPT A LOOSE AND INFORMAL STRUCTURING OF DRAFTING IN THE WORKING GROUPS FOLLOWING THE MODEL DEVELOPED BY COORDINATOR KAHILUOTO RATHER THAN MORE DETAILED AND UNFLEXIBLE MODELS SUGGESTED BY EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES. AND HE AGREED THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION THAT ENGLISH WAS THE ONLY LANGUAGE IN WHICH DRAFTING WOULD PROCEED, ALTHOUGH HE INSISTED ON THE EAST'S RIGHT TO SUBMIT TEXTS IN RUSSIAN AS WELL AS ENGLISH.
7. COMMENT: GRINEVSKY HAS BEEN QUITE ILL FOR SEVERAL DAYS, AND THIS IS THE FIRST MEETING WE COULD ARRANGE SINCE THE SESSION BEGAN. FOR THE FIRST TIME HE HAD A NOTETAKER, INDICATING THAT THERE IS A SENSITIVITY IN HIS DELEGATION ABOUT THE CONTEXT OF OUR BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS. FOR THE FIRST TIME, HE DID NOT RAISE THE

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ARGUMENT THAT WE WERE DRAGGING OUR FEET ON NON-USE OF  
FORCE. JUDGING BY HIS DEMEANOR, GRINEVSKY IS EAGER TO  
MOVE AHEAD. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN IF THE GENERAL STAFF  
OR THE KGB WILL FOLLOW.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 00844

SUBJECT: CDE DEVELOPMENTS ON VERIFICATION ISSUE,  
WEEK OF JANUARY 27-31, 1986

1. CDE XI -30. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. BEGIN SUMMARY. DURING FIRST WEEK OF CDE ROUND NINE THE EAST SIGNALLED POTENTIAL ACCEPTANCE OF A CSBM VERIFICATION REGIME ALONG THE LINES PROPOSED BY THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED (SC.7, "OBSERVATION BY REQUEST"). SOME NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED SEEMED TO BE EXCITED BY SUCH SIGNALS, WHILE NATO IS FIRMLY MAINTAINING ITS INSISTENCE THAT NOTHING SHORT OF MANDATORY ON-SITE INSPECTION IS ACCEPTABLE. END SUMMARY.
3. DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF CDE ROUND NINE THE EAST WAS BUSY SENDING SIGNALS THAT IT WAS NOT ONLY OPEN-MINDED ON HOW TO RESOLVE THE VERIFICATION PROBLEM BUT MAY WELL BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT A VERIFICATION MEASURE ALONG THE LINES SET OUT IN THE NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED (NNA) PROPOSAL (SC.7, "OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST"). THESE MOVES REFLECT, NO DOUBT, A FOLLOW-UP ON THE JANUARY 15 GORBACHEV PROPOSAL AS WELL AS A GRUDGING REALIZATION THAT THE EAST'S SPLENDID ISOLATION ON THIS ISSUE DOES NOT SERVE IT IN GOOD STEAD -- BOTH NATO AND THE THE NNA HAVE PROPOSED PROVISIONS FOR ON-SITE INVESTIGATION OF QUESTIONABLE ACTIVITIES, ALBEIT THE NNA PROPOSAL IS BY A JUSTIFIABLE REQUEST WITH RIGHT OF REFUSAL AND, THEREFORE, IS NOT MANDATORY. THE EAST HAS APPARENTLY DECIDED TO PROMOTE THE SC.7 APPROACH AS OSTENSIBLY MEETING NATO'S REQUIREMENT FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION.
4. WORKING GROUP A (INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, COMMUNICATION) -- JANUARY 29, 1986. DURING THE WEDNESDAY WORKING GROUP A DISCUSSION JANUARY 29 ON VERIFICATION BOTH THE GDR AND USSR SENT SUCH SIGNALS. IN RESPONSE TO PROBING BY NATO ON HOW THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL, WHICH MENTIONS BOTH NTM'S AND ON-SITE INSPECTION AS VERIFICATION METHODS, WOULD BE APPLIED IN THE CDE CONTEXT, THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS WERE MADE:
  - GDR AMBASSADOR BUEHRING REGRETTED NATO STATEMENTS WHICH, IN HIS VIEW, INDICATED THAT NATO IS STILL NOT PREPARED TO MAKE A QUALITATIVE MOVE ON INSPECTION. HE THUS IMPLIED THAT THE EAST IS READY TO MAKE SUCH A MOVE. HE SAID THAT THE GDR HAD AN "OPEN-MINDED ATTITUDE" CONCERNING VERIFICATION.
  - USSR GENERAL TATARNIKOV REITERATED THE WTO'S INTEREST IN EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION OF MILITARY MANEUVERS WHICH REQUIRED ADEQUATE (A WORD REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED) FORMS OF VERIFICATION CORRESPONDING TO THEIR CONTENTS. WE ARE WILLING, HE SAID, TO GO IN FOR ANY FORM OF VERIFICATION REQUIRED. GORBACHEV, HE NOTED, HAD SPOKEN OF BOTH NTMS AND ON-SITE INSPECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF MONITORING (KONTROL) OVER WEAPONS WHICH LEND THEMSELVES TO MONITORING. IT IS ONE MATTER TO VERIFY WHETHER NUCLEAR WEAPONS

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HAVE BEEN DESTROYED OR NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS ELIMINATED, HE NOTED, AND ANOTHER TO COUNT TROOPS IN MANEUVERS -- ONE, TWO, OR ONE AND ONE-HALF DIVISIONS (BEGIN COMMENT: TARTARNIKOV MAY HAVE BEEN SIGNALLING WHAT THRESHOLDS WOULD BE SUITABLE TO THE SOVIETS FOR NOTIFICATION. END COMMENT.) AND, HE ADDED, IT WAS ONE MATTER TO CHECK ON NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY ARE 50 OR 150 KT AND ANOTHER TO VERIFY HOW MANY AIRCRAFT SET OUT TO TAKE PART IN A MANEUVER. THE USSR IS FOR "REASONABLE" VERIFICATION, AND, IN THE CONTEXT OF CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING ISSUES, SUCH A REASONABLE APPROACH MIGHT BE TACKLED BY NTM'S, MULTILATERAL OR BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS, OR CONSULTATIVE COMMISSIONS IF THERE ARE DOUBTS ABOUT IMPLEMENTATION. SC.7 (NNA PROPOSAL) SETS OUT "REASONABLE" VERIFICATION MEASURES FOR THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES WE ARE TO ELABORATE AND, TARTARNIKOV SAID, WE ARE STUDYING THESE PROPOSALS AND WILL LOOK AT THEM ALONG WITH OTHERS INsofar AS THEY ARE EFFECTIVE MEASURES. IN THE CONTEXT OF NOTIFICATION MEASURES, HE SAID, INSPECTIONS (AS SET OUT BY NATO IN SC.1) ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE. VERIFICATION MEASURES, HE NOTED, CAN BE OF A VARIED SORT AND WOULD INCLUDE NOT SIMPLY INSPECTIONS ALONE. IT (VERIFICATION) MUST COVER ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES -- LAND, AIR AND NAVAL. THESE FORMS CAN BE VARIED CASE-TO-CASE, I.E. VERIFICATION OF CONFIDENCE MEASURES FOR MAJOR NAVAL MANEUVERS MIGHT INVOLVE USE OF TECHNICAL MEANS AVAILABLE TO EVERY STATE. TROOP TRANSFERS MUST ALSO BE VERIFIED AND FORMS OF INSPECTION VERIFICATION ARE AVAILABLE AND HAVE BEEN ENUMERATED (BEGIN COMMENT: HE MAY WELL BE TALKING ABOUT OBSERVATION METHODS RATHER THAN VERIFICATION TECHNIQUES THAT WOULD APPLY IN THE CASE OF DOUBTS CONCERNING COMPLIANCE. END COMMENT.)

-- USSR REP ROZANOV TOOK ISSUE WITH NATO'S INSPECTION MEASURE AS A "ROUTINE" AND AUTONOMOUS MEASURE, ASSERTING THAT VERIFICATION MUST BE LINKED WITH SPECIFIC MEASURES. YOU CAN'T, FOR EXAMPLE, AGREE TO SEND IN INSPECTION TEAMS TO VERIFY CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION BEFORE YOU REACH AGREEMENT ON A REGIME BANNING CHEMICAL WEAPONS. ALTHOUGH NATO REPS ADROITLY REFER TO THE NNA PROPOSAL AS AN "INSPECTION" MEASURE, ROZANOV SAID, HE "CAN'T FIND THE WORD INSPECTION IN SC.7." SEEMING TO DRAW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN "ROUTINE" VERIFICATION AND SITUATIONS THAT RAISE QUESTIONS OF COMPLIANCE, ROZANOV SAID THAT ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION ARE INCLUDED IN THE CONTEXT OF EACH AGREED CSBM; WHETHER OR NOT WE OBSERVE OR COMPLY IS ANSWERED BY ANOTHER QUESTION. HE ASKED NATO WHAT WAS WRONG WITH THE APPROACH REFLECTED IN SC.7, NOTING THAT SC.7 ALLOWS THE RIGHT OF REFUSAL FOR "OBSERVATION" REQUESTS GENERATED BY DOUBTS CONCERNING COMPLIANCE.

5. CORRIDOR CONVERSATIONS. FOLLOWING THE WORKING

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GROUP MEETING REPS FROM AT LEAST THREE NATO COUNTRIES WERE SEPARATELY TOLD BY INDIVIDUAL WTO REPS (OVER LUNCHES) THAT THE WTO WAS LOOKING FAVORABLY AT SC.7'S "OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST" PROPOSAL. A DAY LATER, USDEPREP HANSEN WAS TOLD THE SAME THING BY HUNGARIAN DEPREP KORMENDY. LATER KORMENDY ALSO TOLD USDELOFF (HUCK) THAT SC.7'S "OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST" IS THE WTO RESPONSE TO NATO'S GOAL OF ON-SITE INSPECTION.

6. NNA ATTITUDE. THE AFOREMENTIONED SIGNALS HAVE NOT GONE UNNOTICED BY THE NNA. AWARE THAT NATO'S APPROACH IS ANATHEMA TO THE WTO, SOME OF THE NNA HAVE MADE EFFORTS TO DISTANCE THEIR APPROACH FROM NATO'S. FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE AFOREMENTIONED WORKING GROUP MEETING YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR BOZOVIC WAS QUICK TO CAUTION AGAINST DRAWING PARALLELS BETWEEN THE TWO APPROACHES, STRESSING THAT THEY ARE NOT THE SAME. SC.7, HE NOTED, TALKS OF "OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST," WHILE SC.1 TALKS OF "ON-SITE INSPECTION." SOME OTHER NNA HAVE ENGAGED MORE ACTIVELY BEHIND THE SCENES WITH NATO REPS IN PUSHING THEIR OWN APPROACH ARGUING THAT IT MIGHT BE THE MOST THAT CAN BE OBTAINED OUT OF THE CONFERENCE.

7. NATO REACTIONS. MEANWHILE, NATO REPS HAVE NOT TAKEN THE BAIT. THEY HAVE CONTINUED TO INSIST STRONGLY THAT NOTHING SHORT OF MANDATORY ON-SITE INSPECTION MEASURE WILL BE ACCEPTABLE IN AN AGREEMENT EMERGING FROM STOCKHOLM. THIS POINT HAS BEEN MADE ACROSS THE BOARD WITH INTERLOCUTORS FROM BOTH WTO AND NNA AND AT A VARIETY OF LEVELS.

8. WHY SC.7? WHY MIGHT SC.7 PROVE TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE WTO? THERE ARE SEVERAL POSSIBLE REASONS:  
 -- IT COULD PROVIDE THE SEMBLANCE OF ACCEDING TO THE U.S. AND NATO REQUIREMENT FOR VERIFICATION THROUGH ON-SITE INSPECTION.

-- THE SC.7 ESCAPE CLAUSE, OR RIGHT OF REFUSAL, WOULD ALLOW WTO TO DENY REQUESTS (IN ORDER TO PROTECT NATIONAL SECURITY).

9. IMPLICATIONS.  
 -- USSR/WTO NOW SEEM TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE NECESSITY OF ADDRESSING NON-COMPLIANCE. HERETOFORE, SOVIETS ARGUED THAT NON-COMPLIANCE WAS NOT A PROBLEM INASMUCH AS EVERYTHING NOTIFIABLE WOULD BE NOTIFIED AND OBSERVED; OBSERVATION WOULD THUS SERVE THE ROLE OF VERIFICATION. ROZANOV HIMSELF, HOWEVER, ACKNOWLEDGED THAT QUESTIONS OF NON-COMPLIANCE COULD ARISE AND BOTH TARTARNIKOV AND ROZANOV IMPLIED THAT THE SOLUTION MAY LIE WITH SC.7'S "OBSERVATION BY REQUEST" PROPOSAL. THIS LOGICALLY LEADS TO AN IMPLICIT ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT NOT ONLY NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES REQUIRE VERIFICATION, BUT THAT MEANS MUST EXIST TO DEAL WITH QUESTIONS RAISED CONCERNING A NON-NOTIFIED ACTIVITY THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED.  
 -- ANOTHER KEY IMPLICATION LIES IN THE NATURE OF SC.7

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ITSELF. SC.7 PROVIDES LOOPHOLES -- A REQUEST MUST BE JUSTIFIED ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE REQUESTER BELIEVES HIS NATIONAL SECURITY IS THREATENED OR THAT THE AGREEMENT ITSELF IS JEOPARDIZED, AND MAY BE DENIED ON GROUNDS OF "SUPREME NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS." NATO WOULD THUS HAVE TO JUSTIFY ANY REQUEST AND MIGHT, FOR EXAMPLE, HAVE DIFFICULTY JUSTIFYING A REQUEST TO OBSERVE A SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITY INTENDED TO INTIMIDATE A NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT STATE. THE REQUEST COULD BE DENIED ON GROUNDS THAT THE ACTIVITY POSED NO THREAT TO NATO, OR THAT AN INSPECTION WOULD HAVE A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON "SUPREME NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS." ADDITIONALLY, EVEN EGREGIOUS BREACHES OF THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLDS WE ARE PROPOSING COULD HARDLY BE JUSTIFIED AS THREATENING THE SECURITY OF MOST PARTICIPANTS. -- "OBSERVATION ON REQUEST" COULD UNDERCUT THE POSSIBILITY OF USING INSPECTIONS AS PENALTIES FOR FAILURE TO FORECAST.

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END OF MESSAGE  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 00810  
 SUBJECT: CDE WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS,  
 JANUARY 27-31, 1986

REF: STATE 31397

1. CDE IX - 028
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ENJOYED A BRIEF MOMENT IN THE SUN AS THE WORLD PRESS FOCUSED ON THE COORDINATED APPEARANCES OF THE FRENCH AND FRG FOREIGN MINISTERS AT THE OPENING OF THE NINTH SESSION. THE INTERNATIONAL SPOTLIGHT DISAPPEARED AS QUICKLY AS THE SCANDINVAIAN MID-WINTER SUN, HOWEVER, LEAVING THE CDE TROOPS TO BEGIN DRAFTING AN AGREEMENT. MOST DELEGATIONS EXPRESSED QUALIFIED OPTIMISM THAT THIS TASK COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY SEPTEMBER 1986. HOW TO GET THERE, HOWEVER, REMAINS AN OPEN QUESTION. FOR EXAMPLE, DESPITE HINTS AT FLEXIBILITY IN GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 STATEMENT, THE SOVIET POSITION ON NAVAL ACTIVITIES REMAINS OPAQUE. THE ACTUAL DRAFTING OF AN AGREEMENT GOT OFF TO AN UNEASY, BUT NOT INAUSPICIOUS, START. DRAFTING LANGUAGE WAS INTRODUCED IN THE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION WORKING GROUPS, AREAS WHERE WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE RAPID PROGRESS, BUT NOT IN THE CONSTRAINTS OR NON-USE OF FORCE WORKING GROUPS, WHERE WE WILL HAVE MORE DIFFICULTY CONTROLLING THE DISCUSSION. END SUMMARY.

4. THE NINTH ROUND OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE OPENED IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF OPTIMISM. AFTER TWO YEARS OF LABORING QUIETLY IN THE TRENCHES, CDE DELEGATIONS FOUND THE INTERNATIONAL SPOTLIGHT FOCUSED ON STOCKHOLM FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE OFFICIAL OPENING IN JANUARY 1984. IN CLOSELY COORDINATED STATEMENTS, FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER DUMAS AND FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GEMSCHER ACCENTED FRANCO-GERMAN COOPERATION AND THE KEY ROLE OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IN MAINTAINING EUROPEAN STABILITY IN THEIR JOINT APPEARANCE AT THE CONFERENCE. SOVIET GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV INCLUDED THE CDE IN HIS JANUARY 15 PROPOSALS INDICATING SOME GIVE ON THE SOVIET NEGOTIATING STANCE (WE WILL, OF COURSE, HAVE TO READ THE FINE PRINT OF HIS PROPOSAL -- YET TO BE PROVIDED -- DURING THIS ROUND). SO FAR, FOR EXAMPLE, THE SOVIET POSITION ON NAVAL ACTIVITIES REMAINS OPAQUE. PRESIDENT REAGAN ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO THE GENERAL FEELING OF OPTIMISM WHEN HE EXPRESSED IN A JANUARY 21 STATEMENT HIS BELIEF THAT "AN ACCORD WITH IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS

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 FOR THE OVERALL EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP CAN BE ACHIEVED IN STOCKHOLM THIS YEAR." THE MALTESE FOREIGN MINISTER USED THE OPENING PLENARY AS A FORUM FOR FLOGGING HIS COUNTRY'S MEDITERRANEAN PROPOSALS. WHILE THE HONCHOS SPOKE OF AN AGREEMENT BY SEPTEMBER OF THIS YEAR, THE

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TROOPS SORTED OUT HOW TO GET THERE FROM HERE.

5. SOME CONFUSION EMERGED ON JUST HOW TO BEGIN DRAFTING. THE EAST ARGUED FOR A STRUCTURED AND EXTENSIVE DRAFTING AGENDA IN MOST WORKING GROUPS, WHILE NATO FAVORED A MORE UNSTRUCTURED APPROACH IN ORDER TO RETAIN WESTERN FLEXIBILITY IN EACH WORKING GROUP. THE NNA COORDINATORS CONSULTED ANXIOUSLY IN THE CORRIDORS, EAGER TO MOVE THEIR RESPECTIVE WORKING GROUPS IN A STRUCTURED WAY BUT WARY OF ALIENATING EITHER EAST OR WEST.

6. NON-USE OF FORCE: WHILE THE WEST CAME UNDER SOME PRESSURE FROM THE EAST TO MOVE TO DRAFTING, THE EAST AND THE NNA SEEMED TO ACCEPT, RELUCTANTLY, THAT THE EXPLORATORY PHASE WAS NOT YET EXHAUSTED. HUNGARY CALLED ON THE WORKING GROUP TO RECORD ELEMENTS WHERE POSITIONS ARE CLOSE OR CONVERGING AND TO CONDUCT DRAFTING IN STAGES. (THE NNA COORDINATOR IS SYMPATHETIC TO THIS APPROACH.) THE SOVIETS, MEANWHILE, WARNED THAT A LACK OF PROGRESS ON NUF WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO MOVE FORWARD IN OTHER AREAS, I.E., CSBM'S. THE WEST, HOWEVER, HAS YET TO GET ITS COLLECTIVE NUF ACT TOGETHER. NEVERTHELESS, WITHIN NATO DELEGATIONS THERE SEEMS TO BE A CERTAIN EVOLUTION AWAY FROM THE MOST CONTENTIOUS LANGUAGE CONTAINED IN EARLIER ALLIED DRAFTS, E.G., ON THE BONN DECLARATION AND THE MANIFESTATION OF FORCE, AND TOWARDS A COMMON LINE EMPHASIZING THE NUF-CSBM'S LINKAGE, UN CHARTER TYPE LANGUAGE, AND THE BALANCE OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT PRINCIPLES. IN ADDITION, WESTERN DELEGATIONS APPEAR READY, AT LEAST FOR TACTICAL PURPOSES, TO CONSIDER ELEMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE LANGUAGE. TO KEEP THE EAST -- AND SOME OF OUR ALLIES -- OFF-BALANCE, THE U.S. (GUNDERSEN) BEGAN TO INTRODUCE NEW ELEMENTS FOR WORKING GROUP CONSIDERATION -- THIS WEEK

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COMPLIANCE WITH TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS AND THE UNDENIABLE RELATIONSHIP" BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS AND NON-USE OF FORCE. OVER THE NEXT WEEKS, WE HOPE AT LEAST TO IDENTIFY COMMON ELEMENTS/CONCEPTS BASED ON REFTTEL TO INTRODUCE INTO WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS. TO START WITH, WE WILL DISCUSS THE NUF CSBM'S LINKAGE, PUTTING THE NUF REAFFIRMATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONCRETE MEASURES TO BE AGREED TO IN STOCKHOLM.

7. INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, COMMUNICATION: IN CONCERTED AND COORDINATED CONTACTS THE EAST PUT OUT THE WORD TO WESTERN DELEGATES THAT IT WAS OPEN TO THE NNA CONCEPT OF "OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST" AS A FORM OF ON-SITE VERIFICATION. KORMENDY (HUNGARY) PRIVATELY INDICATED TO US THAT THE EAST COULD, IN FACT, ACCEPT SC.7'S OBSERVATION ON REQUEST APPROACH, WHICH INCLUDES THE RIGHT OF REFUSAL CLAUSE. NATO DELEGATIONS, INCLUDING THE OFTEN NON-CONFRONTATIONAL ITALIANS AND NORWEGIANS, HAVE INFORMED THE EAST IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS THAT ON-SITE

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INSPECTION (OSI) IS A SINE QUA NON TO AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM AND THAT THE SC.7 APPROACH DOES NOT MEET NATO'S REQUIREMENTS. AT THE SAME TIME, NATO TRIED TO POCKET GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 STATEMENT IN THE CDE CONTEXT, ACCEPTING THE OSI CONCEPT IN PRINCIPLE, WHILE THE SOVIETS AWKWARDLY TRIED TO DISTANCE THEMSELVES FROM THEIR LEADER. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS THE ISSUE. NEXT WEEK, THE WEST INTENDS TO HIGHLIGHT "INFORMATION," PERHAPS INTRODUCING DRAFTING LANGUAGE FROM SC.1 INTO THE RELEVANT WORKING GROUP. ON PROCEDURE, THE NATO MINI-CLUSTER AGREED ON THE NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY IN WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS, SO AS NOT TO GET LOCKED INTO STRUCTURED OR AD SERIATIM DISCUSSIONS THAT WOULD INEVITABLY LEAD TO ENTIRE MEETINGS DEVOTED TO DISCUSSION OF COMMUNICATIONS/CONSULTATIONS.

8. CONSTRAINTS: LITTLE OR NO PROGRESS WAS MADE ON CONSTRAINTS, PERHAPS REFLECTING REAL-LIFE SOVIET DISLIKE FOR ANYTHING THAT CONSTRAINS ITS MILITARY ACTIVITIES. NEVERTHELESS, THE EAST CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO DROP THIS

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ISSUE AS LONG AS IT BELIEVES IT CAN PIN THE BLAME FOR FAILURE TO COME UP WITH A CONSTRAINTS MEASURE ON THE WEST. (ALONG THESE LINES, THE SOVIETS -- AND THE CONFERENCE -- HAVE TEMPORARILY AGREED TO USE THE U.S.- SUPPLIED WORD -- "SDERZHIVAYUSHCHIYE MERY" -- TO CONVEY OUR CONCEPT OF CONSTRAINTS, THEREBY PROVIDING THE SOVIETS A CONVENIENT OUT IF THEY SHOULD DECIDE TO DROP THIS ISSUE.) MEANWHILE, THE YUGOSLAVS PUBLICLY AND EVEN SOME CLOSET CONSTRAINT PROPONENTS (E.G., THE NETHERLANDS) PRIVATELY CONTINUE TO AGITATE FOR SOME KIND OF CONSTRAINTS MEASURE. WHILE THE COORDINATOR (JUNOD OF SWITZERLAND) HELD FRENETIC MEETINGS BEHIND THE SCENES TO WORK OUT A WORKABLE STRUCTURE FOR DISCUSSION AND DRAFTING ON FORECASTS AND CONSTRAINTS, THE NNA AND THE EAST ACCEPTED THE WESTERN FOCUS ON ANNUAL FORECASTS -- AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT.

9. ANNUAL FORECASTS: MALTA, APPARENTLY PICKING UP WHERE THE SOVIETS LEFT OFF LAST ROUND, FOCUSED ON AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES AS A WAY TO CAPTURE NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN AN ANNUAL FORECAST. MALTA'S GAUCI ASKED WHETHER NATO'S FORECAST OF AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES WOULD INCLUDE BOTH MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT. HIS EMPHASIS ON "EQUIPMENT" SUGGESTS THAT MALTA IS HOPING TO CAPTURE IN A CSBM'S REGIME NOT ONLY THE TROOPS CARRYING OUT AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS, BUT THE NAVAL VESSELS INVOLVED IN SUCH AN OPERATION AS WELL. THE EAST NEITHER FORGED AHEAD WITH THE BULGARIAN LANGUAGE ON FORECASTS TABLED AT THE END OF LAST ROUND NOR INSISTED THAT THE MEETING ADDRESS CONSTRAINTS. INSTEAD THE BULGARIANS CALLED FOR A STRUCTURING OF THE GROUP'S WORK WITH THE AGENDA AGREED ON IN ADVANCE. TURKEY PLANS NEXT WEEK TO INTRODUCE

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LANGUAGE ON ANNUAL FORECASTS FROM SC.1/AMPLIFIED.

10. NOTIFICATION: THE WEST MADE NOTIFICATION THE LEADING CANDIDATE FOR DRAFTING WHEN THE U.S. (HANSEN) INTRODUCED THE FIRST TWO PARAGRAPHS OF MEASURE 3 ALMOST VERBATIM AND PROPOSED THAT TENTATIVE AGREEMENT BE RECORDED ON A PHRASE THAT PREJUDICED NO POSITION, I.E.,

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"WILL GIVE NOTIFICATION . . . DAYS BEFORE SUCH ACTIVITY BEGINS." CAUGHT OFF GUARD, THE EAST AND THE NNA DID NOT RESPOND TO THIS INITIATIVE. MOREOVER, THE SOVIETS DID NOT INDICATE EITHER PRIVATELY OR PUBLICLY HOW THEY PLAN TO IMPLEMENT GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 STATEMENT IN STOCKHOLM. THE EAST CONTINUED TO PUSH FOR DRAFTING IN BOTH RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH BY TABLING NOTIFICATION LANGUAGE IN RUSSIAN -- CLEARLY VIOLATING THE INFORMAL AGREEMENT SETTING UP THE DRAFTING STAGE. (UNFORTUNATELY, THE EAST CLAIMS NOT TO RECOLLECT THE INFORMAL AGREEMENT REACHED LAST ROUND THAT ENGLISH WOULD BE THE ONLY DRAFTING LANGUAGE AND THE NNA ARE RELUCTANT TO GET INVOLVED). AT THIS POINT, WE INTEND TO WORK THIS OUT WITH THE SOVIETS ON THE SIDELINES. THE MALTESE AMBASSADOR, BITTER AT HAVING BEEN ABANDONED BY GORBACHEV'S DEFERRAL OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNTIL A SECOND STAGE OF THE CDE, LAID DOWN A MARKER: MALTA WOULD GO ALONG WITH WESTERN NOTIFICATION LANGUAGE (SEE ABOVE) PROVIDED THAT THE QUESTION OF THE TYPE OF ACTIVITY (LAND, AIR, NAVAL) WOULD NOT BE PREJUDICED BY THIS STATEMENT. AFTER WINNING PUBLIC POINTS FOR GORBACHEV'S FORTHCOMINGNESS ON THE ISSUE OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES, SOVIET RETICENCE SO FAR IN STOCKHOLM ON THIS ISSUE MAY INDICATE RELUCTANCE ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO LET THE WEST POCKET GORBACHEV'S CONCESSION WITHOUT HAVING TO PAY ANYTHING FOR IT.

10. OBSERVATION: THE FINNISH COORDINATOR (KAHILUOTO) OF THE WORKING GROUP OPENED THE FIRST OBSERVATION MEETING WITH SOME DISQUIETING REMARKS ABOUT THE NEED FOR A MORE FORMAL STRUCTURE FOR DISCUSSIONS, BUT BACKED OFF A BIT WHEN CAUTIONED ABOUT THIS APPROACH BY WESTERN DELEGATES IN THE CORRIDORS. THE STRUCTURED APPROACH SUGGESTED BY KAHILUOTO IN THIS PARTICULAR WORKING GROUP MAY, IN FACT, WORK TO NATO'S ADVANTAGE; HOWEVER, IT MIGHT ALSO CREATE DANGEROUS PRECEDENTS IN OTHER WORKING GROUPS. THE WORKING GROUP ITSELF QUICKLY MOVED INTO DRAFTING WHEN THE EAST, SOMEWHAT SURPRISINGLY, INTRODUCED A TEXT ON THE PURPOSES OF OBSERVATION. THE

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EASTERN LANGUAGE, PARTICULARLY THE REFERENCE TO THE OBSERVERS' CONFIRMING THE "PEACEFUL INTENTIONS" OF THE INVITING COUNTRY, IS CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST. NEXT WEEK, THE WEST WILL STRESS THIS POINT WHILE UNDERSCORING THE OBLIGATORY NATURE OF INVITATIONS TO

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OBSERVERS. THE NNA, LED BY AUSTRIA, CLAIMED THAT BOTH  
THE EASTERN AND WESTERN APPROACHES IN THE OBSERVATION  
ISSUE ARE ACCOMMODATED IN SC.7.

HANSEN

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S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 00819

SUBJECT: MEASURE ONE AND THE TURKISH PROBLEM

1. CDE IX - 029.

2. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. SUMMARY: USDEL OFFICERS MET WITH THE TURKISH DCM TO DISCUSS THE LONG-STANDING MEASURE ONE INFORMATION PROBLEM VIS-A-VIS RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON THE OSD STUDY. REPS WERE ENCOURAGED BY THE INITIAL TURKISH RESPONSE. HOWEVER, WE MAY NEED TO HAVE OUR IDEAS REINFORCED, POSSIBLY DURING ASD PERLE'S TURKISH HLG LATER THIS MONTH (SEE PARA 7). END SUMMARY

4. ON SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1986, DCD AMBASSADOR LYNN HANSEN TOGETHER WITH SECDEFREP HARLAN STRAUSS, AND ASG DEL MEMBER KEN HUCK MET WITH THE TURKISH DEPUTY DENIZ BOLUKBASI. AMBASSADOR HANSEN BEGAN THE DISCUSSION BY TELLING BOLUKBASI THAT IF THERE IS TO BE A SUCCESS ON NATO'S TERMS AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE PRIOR TO THE MID-SEPTEMBER ADJOURNMENT, OUR TACTICS MUST BE ADJUSTED, WHICH MEANS WE MUST FIND BETTER WAYS OF DEALING WITH SOME OF OUR KEY CONCEPTS. IN THIS REGARD, WE NEED TO CONSIDER AGAIN AND TRY TO RESOLVE THE MEASURE ONE PROBLEM, WHICH HANSEN DESCRIBED AS PIVOTAL.

5. USING THE IG "BLESSED" OSD "THOUGHT PAPER" AS HIS GUIDE, HANSEN DESCRIBED ITS CONCEPTS FOR DEALING WITH MEASURE ONE, EMPHASIZING THE FACT THAT BOLUKBASI IS THE FIRST NON-USG OFFICIAL TO BE BRIEFED ON THE SUBJECT:

- A. IN THE FINAL END GAME, MEASURE ONE INFORMATION EXCHANGE MIGHT BE REMOVED AS A SEPARATE MEASURE WITH ITS REQUIREMENTS INTEGRATED INTO THE ANNUAL EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS AND NOTIFICATION. WE WOULD, HOWEVER, CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR MEASURE ONE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AT LEAST DOWN TO DIVISION LEVEL.

- B. A NEW INFORMATION REQUIREMENT MAY CONSIST OF A LIST OF UNITS WITH SUBORDINATION DOWN TO BRIGADE/REGIMENT LEVEL FOR FORCES WITHIN THE ZONE; UNIT LOCATIONS NEED NOT BE CORRELATED WITH UNIT.

- C. PARTICIPATING STATES WILL DESIGNATE THE LOCATIONS OF ITS RESTRICTED AREAS AS DEFINED IN PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE VERIFICATION MEASURE AS GARRISONS.

- D. IF ITEM C IS UNACCEPTABLE, AT THE TIME OF THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR THE ANNUAL CALENDAR A LIST OF TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS AS PROVIDED UNDER MEASURE V WILL BE PROVIDED, AND,

- E. EACH PARTICIPATING STATE SHALL SPECIFY THE COMPOSITION OF A DIVISION EQUIVALENT FORMATION BY MAJOR COMBAT ELEMENTS.

6. BOLUKBASI THANKED AMBASSADOR HANSEN FOR THE CLOSE CONSULTATIONS AND SAID HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY REPORT THE AFOREMENTIONED TO ANKARA. HE INDICATED THAT ITEM 5B (ABOVE) WOULD BE PATENTLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF AS WOULD ANY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WHICH

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GAVE SUBORDINATION DOWN TO BRIGADE/REGIMENT LEVEL. BOLUKBASI PERSISTENTLY RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE DELINKAGE OF UNIT WITH LOCATION, NOTING THAT EVERY TURKISH BRIGADE/REGIMENT LOCATION CAN SIMPLY BE IDENTIFIED BY GOING TO THE TELEPHONE DIRECTORIES. HE ASKED IF A RESTRICTED AREA CAN BE A CITY, SINCE NEARLY EVERY TURKISH CITY IS HEADQUARTERS FOR AT LEAST ONE REGIMENT. THUS, TURKISH CITIES/TOWNS ARE "GARRISON CITIES" WITH TRAINING AREAS LOCATED OUTSIDE CITY LIMITS. IN BOLUKBASI'S OPINION, AN EXCHANGE OF RESTRICTED AREAS WOULD BE QUITE SIMPLE, SINCE HE COULD EASILY PROVIDE A MAP OF TURKEY WITH BLACK DOTS OVER ALL CITIES TO INDICATE RESTRICTED AREAS. LIKEWISE, BOLUKBASI BELIEVED A STATEMENT OF DIVISION EQUIVALENCY CAN BE READILY PROVIDED. NEVERTHELESS, CONSIDERING HOW SLOWLY TGS WORKS AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THAT ALL ACTION OFFICERS ARE FULLY ENGAGED IN WORKING ON THE U.S.-TURKISH BILATERAL DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT A TGS ANSWER CAN BE OBTAINED BEFORE MID-SEPTEMBER. HANSEN EMPHASIZED THAT SUCH A DELAY IS UNACCEPTABLE, SINCE OUR CDE TACTICS MAY BE HINGED TO THIS PROPOSAL. BOLUKBASI SAID HE WOULD EMPHASIZE URGENCY, BUT HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC. ON THE OTHER HAND, BOLUKBASI SAID HE WOULD NOT PERSONALLY OPPOSE INTER-ALLIANCE DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT.

7. BOLUKBASI INDICATED A PROBABLE TGS WILLINGNESS TO IDENTIFY BY LOCATION ANY TURKISH BRIGADE/REGIMENT PARTICIPATION IN A NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY. THIS INFORMATION, HE OPINED, COULD BE PROVIDED IN BOTH THE ANNUAL CALENDAR AND THE NOTIFICATION.

8. COMMENT: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED U.S. DEL REPS WERE ENCOURAGED BY THE COMPARATIVELY POSITIVE NATURE OF BOLUKBASI'S REMARKS, CONSIDERING HIS PAST OBJECTIONS TO MEASURE ONE. HE APPRECIATED THE FULL PRESENTATION AND THE CONSIDERATION BY THE USG OF TURKISH INTERESTS. STILL, IF NO SATISFACTORY RESPONSE IS RECEIVED FROM THE TGS BY MID-FEBRUARY, U.S. DEL SUGGESTS THAT ASSISTANT SECRETARY PERLE RAISE AND TRY TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE DURING THE LATE FEBRUARY U.S.-TURKISH HLG IN ANKARA. WE WOULD APPRECIATE EMBASSY ANKARA'S VIEWS ON THE USEFULNESS OF RAISING THIS ISSUE THROUGH NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS IN ANKARA. END COMMENT.  
HANSEN

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 00752

SUBJECT: NATO CLUSTER CAUCUS ANALYSIS OF NON-USE OF

- FORCE SECTION ON SC.7 DRAFT

REF: 85 STOCKHOLM 8885

1. CDE IX - 019

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE END OF LAST ROUND THE NATO CAUCUS REQUESTED THE A-1 CLUSTER CAUCUS (NON-USE OF FORCE) TO ANALYSE THE NON-USE OF FORCE SECTION OF THE NNA WORKING DOCUMENT SC.7. THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS WAS COMPILED BY THE DANISH DEPUTY AFTER INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND OTHER INTERESTED DELEGATIONS (U.S. ANALYSIS CONTAINED IN REFTEL). THE PAPER IS MERELY INTENDED FOR BACKGROUND USE FOR NATO DELEGATIONS IN THE A-1 WORKING GROUP. THE CLUSTER CAUCUS IS MEETING ON MONDAY, FEBRUARY 3 TO CONCLUDE ITS WORK ON THE DOCUMENT. SECTIONS I AND II (GENERAL AND SPECIFIC REMARKS) ARE LARGELY DESCRIPTIVE AND REQUIRE NO SPECIFIC ACTION. SECTION III (PARTICULAR PROBLEMS) HIGHLIGHTS THE ISSUE OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. THE "ONE DELEGATION" IN QUESTION REFERS TO CANADA. SECTION IV (TACTICS) IS MORE PRESCRIPTIVE. GIVEN DISCUSSIONS AMONG INTERESTED NATO DELEGATIONS WITH A VIEW TOWARD FORMULATING A COMMON NATO APPROACH ON THE SUBJECT, USDEL BELIEVES THE APPROACHES SUGGESTED IN THE "TACTICS" SECTION IS PREMATURE AND WILL SUGGEST AT MONDAY'S MEETING THAT IT BE DROPPED. END SUMMARY.

4. BEGIN TEXT.

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SC.7: SECTION ON NON-USE OF FORCE

OBSERVATIONS BASED ON DISCUSSIONS IN CLUSTER CAUCUS A.1.

I. GENERAL REMARKS

- 1) IT IS DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE EXACTLY TO WHAT EXTENT THERE IS COMMON GROUND BETWEEN THE VIEWS OF THE NNA COUNTRIES AND THE NATO COUNTRIES SINCE THE ALLIES HAVE NOT YET AGREED ON A POSITION CONCERNING NON-USE OF FORCE OTHER THAN ACCEPTING THE PRINCIPLE OF A REAFFIRMATION OF THE PRINCIPLE IN THE CONTEXT OF AN AGREEMENT ON CONCRETE AND MEANINGFUL CSBM'S.

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- 2) IT IS THE OVERALL ASSESSMENT THAT THE NNA TEXT IS CLOSER TO THE GENERAL APPROACH OF THE NATO COUNTRIES THAN TO THE GENERAL APPROACH OF THE WTO COUNTRIES.

- A NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS FEEL THAT MOST OF ITS ELEMENTS ARE UNEXCEPTIONABLE AND THEY BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR THE ALLIES TO ADOPT A POSITION ON THE NNA TEXT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AS A FIRST IMPORTANT STEP IN DEVELOPING WESTERN STRATEGY AND TACTICS ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE ISSUE.

- 3) THE NNA COUNTRIES ARE GENERALLY THOUGHT TO ACCEPT

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THE IDEA THAT THE FORMULATIONS THEY HAVE PROPOSED MAY BE USED IN VARIOUS WAYS, PROBABLY AS PART OF A FUTURE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT, BUT POSSIBLY ALSO AS A SEPARATE TEXT. A DISTINCTION BETWEEN A PREAMBULAR SECTION AND AN OPERATIVE SECTION IS NOT FORESEEN, BUT MAY NOT BE EXCLUDED. THE QUALIFICATION OF THE TEXT AS A "SOLEMN DECLARATION" IS FAVORED IN PARTICULAR BY CYPRUS AND YUGOSLAVIA. NONE OF THE NNA COUNTRIES SEEM TO ADVOCATE THE IDEA OF A TREATY.

- 4) THE TEXT IS IN ITS NEAR TOTALITY A COMPILATION OF SENTENCES DRAWN FROM THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT ("DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES . . . ," "MATTERS RELATED TO GIVING EFFECT . . . ," "QUESTIONS RELATING TO . . . THE GENEVA FOR CD DEL MEDITERRANEAN," ETC.) AND FROM THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT ("PRINCIPLES," CDE SECTION, ETC.) IN SPITE OF THEIR DIFFERENT ORIGINS THESE VARIOUS SENTENCES ARE ALL PUT ON THE SAME LEVEL. FURTHERMORE, MANY OF THESE SENTENCES HAVE BEEN TRUNCATED OR SLIGHTLY MODIFIED AND THEY ARE OFTEN REPRODUCED IN A SOMEWHAT MODIFIED CONTEXT. THIS MAY OF COURSE HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR THEIR SIGNIFICANCE AND THIS IS ALSO -- PERHAPS IN PARTICULAR -- TRUE WITH RESPECT TO SENTENCES DRAWN FROM THE UN CHARTER OR REFLECTING GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, BUT WHICH IN THE TEXT AT HAND ARE QUOTED WITHOUT DIRECT REFERENCES EITHER TO THE CHARTER OR TO INTERNATIONAL LAW (PAGE 17 SECTION 6; PAGE 18 SECTION 3).

- IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT THE NNA TEXT IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER REFERS TO, OR DRAWS ITS SUBSTANCE FROM, SIX OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, NAMELY THE PRINCIPLES ON REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, ON TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF STATES, ON PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES, ON NONINTERVENTION IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS, ON RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AND ON FULFILLMENT IN GOOD FAITH OF OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. IT THUS LEAVES FOUR PRINCIPLES ASIDE AND IT MAY THEREFORE BE ARGUED THAT IT DOES NOT RESPECT IN AN ENTIRELY SATISFACTORY WAY THE BALANCE ACHIEVED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

5) THE PRECISE ORDERING OF THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE TEXT DOES NOT SEEM TO REFLECT ANY PARTICULAR LOGIC. THE TEXT IS INDEED A COMPROMISE WHICH TO A CERTAIN DEGREE SIMPLY JUXTAPOSES SECTIONS WHICH REFLECT DIFFERENT NATIONAL CONCERNS: A SWISS CONCERN WITH HUMAN RIGHTS, A YUGOSLAV CONCERN WITH TERRORISM AND AN AUSTRIAN CONCERN WITH PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. A NUMBER OF MORE DETAILED PROVISIONS IN THE TEXT ALSO REVEAL PARTICULAR NATIONAL INTERESTS: THE INTEREST OF MALTA IN "SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA" AND THE INTEREST OF CYPRUS IN -- INTER ALIA -- THE CONCEPT OF

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"DIRECT OR INDIRECT MANIFESTATION OF FORCE."

- MORE FUNDAMENTALLY THE TEXT IS A COMPROMISE BETWEEN DELEGATIONS DESIRING AN AMBITIOUS RECONFIRMATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE (IN PARTICULAR CYPRUS AND YUGOSLAVIA) AND DELEGATIONS HAVING A MORE CONSERVATIVE ATTITUDE (IN PARTICULAR SWITZERLAND AND AUSTRIA).

6) WHEREAS THE TEXT OF COURSE UNEQUIVOCALLY PRESENTS ITSELF AS A POLITICAL STATEMENT IT IS NEVERTHELESS THE FEELING THAT THERE ARE SOME INSTANCES WHERE THE WORDING -- FOR VARIOUS REASONS -- MAY BE SAID TO TEND TOWARDS BLURRING THE CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PURELY POLITICAL PRONOUNCEMENT AND THE LEGAL -- OR QUASI-LEGAL -- REASONING (PAGE 17 SECTION 4; PAGE 19 SECTION 1).

II. SPECIFIC REMARKS

- ADD PAGE 17 PARA 1 LINE 2:

IT HAS BEEN EXPLAINED BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF CYPRUS THAT THE REFERENCE TO AN "IMPROVED AND CONSISTENT IMPLEMENTATION" OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT IS DUE TO THE VARIOUS VIOLATIONS OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE.

- ADD PAGE 17 PARA 1 LINES 5-6:

A PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA IN THE VERY FIRST PARAGRAPH OF THE TEXT DOES NOT SEEM PARTICULARLY DESIRABLE AND IT COULD POSSIBLY LEAD THINKING IN THE DIRECTION OF SPECIAL CSBM'S FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA. REFERENCES IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND IN THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECURITY IN EUROPE AND SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA ARE LINKED BY A REFERENCE TO "THE BROADER CONTEXT OF WORLD SECURITY." IT HAS, HOWEVER, BEEN EXPLAINED BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF MALTA THAT THE LAST SENTENCE OF THE PARAGRAPH SHOULD BE READ IN THE LIGHT OF THE PARAGRAPH AS A WHOLE -- WHERE ONE DOES FIND THE WORDS "PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE."

- ADD PAGE 17 PARA 2:

THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE EQUAL STATUS OF ALL THE PRINCIPLES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THEIR EQUAL IMPLEMENTATION REFLECT A WESTERN POSITION.

- ADD PAGE 17 PARA 3:

THIS SENTENCE IS A DIRECT QUOTE FROM THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT EXCEPT THE LAST THREE WORDS "WITHIN THE CSCE."

THESE WORDS HAVE BEEN ADDED (ACCORDING TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF CYPRUS) IN ORDER TO GIVE THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE A PARTICULAR CSCE DIMENSION OR (ACCORDING TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF AUSTRIA) IN ORDER TO UNDERLINE THAT THE CDE PROCESS IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE CSCE PROCESS

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-- SINCE ONE MIGHT IN THE ABSENCE OF THESE THREE WORDS HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE COMPLEMENTARITY TO WHICH THE SENTENCE REFERS IS ONLY RELEVANT IN A CDE CONTEXT. IT MUST, HOWEVER, BE NOTED THAT THE CONCEPT OF COMPLEMENTARITY AS USED BY WESTERN COUNTRIES WHEN REFERRING TO THE CSCE PROCESS NORMALLY REFERS TO THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE THREE "BASKETS."

- ADD PAGE 17 PARA 4:

THIS PARAGRAPH SEEMS TO ILLUSTRATE A TENDENCY TOWARDS CONFUSING POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS SINCE IT REALLY APPEARS AS AN EMBRYONIC LEGAL REASONING. THIS REASONING, HOWEVER, IS PURELY TAUTOLOGICAL, FOR IF NON-USE OF FORCE IS AN OBLIGATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW THIS OBVIOUSLY IMPLIES THAT ITS NONOBSERVANCE CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

- ADD PAGE 17 PARA 4 LINE 3:

THE REFERENCE TO "NONCOMPLIANCE" IS UNCLEAR. IT COULD POSSIBLY BE THOUGHT THAT DECISIONS ON WHAT CONSTITUTES "NONCOMPLIANCE" WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN BY OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, BUT THIS WOULD SUGGEST A SECURITY RELATIONSHIP OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED NATIONS. THE REFERENCE TO NONCOMPLIANCE SHOULD THEREFORE EITHER BE CLARIFIED, THAT IS, CLEARLY LINKED TO THE UNITED NATIONS, OR IT SHOULD BE DROPPED.

- ADD PAGE 17 PARA 5 LINE 3:

THE ADVERB "EFFECTIVELY" SHOULD BE REMOVED BECAUSE A SIMPLE OBSERVANCE OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE RENDERS IT EFFECTIVE.

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- ADD PAGE 17 PARA 5 LINES 3-5:

THE SENTENCE "NO CONSIDERATION . . . THIS PRINCIPLE" MIGHT BE BETTER PLACED IN THE CONTEXT OF A REFERENCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS AS IT APPEARS IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

- ADD PAGE 17 PARA 6:

IT IS THE FIRST TIME THAT THE RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE IS EXPLICITLY STATED IN A CSCE TEXT, BUT THE IDEA IS ALREADY IMPLICITLY CONTAINED IN VARIOUS PROVISIONS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.. IT HAS BEEN EXPLAINED BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF SWEDEN THAT THE TEXT IN QUESTION, ALTHOUGH IT DIRECTLY REPEATS THE WORDING OF ARTICLE 51 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, IS NOT SUPPOSED STRICTLY SPEAKING TO BE A QUOTE FROM THE CHARTER, BUT RATHER A RESTATEMENT OF A PRINCIPLE OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW.

- ADD PAGE 17 PARA 8:

A QUESTION FROM AN EASTERN REPRESENTATIVE CONCERNING THE ABSENCE OF ANY MENTIONING OF "ARMED FORCE" AND HAS BEEN ANSWERED BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF SWEDEN TO THE EFFECT THAT ARTICLE 2.4 OF THE UN CHARTER WAS A COMPLETE AND ALL-ENCOMPASSING PROVISION AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE AND

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THAT ONE THEREFORE HAD TO BE CAUTIOUS NOT TO SPECIFY PARTICULAR KINDS OF "FORCE" IN ORDER NOT TO CREATE UNCERTAINTY WITH RESPECT TO A POSSIBLY "LESS PROHIBITED" NATURE OF THE USE OF SUCH OTHER KINDS OF FORCE WHICH WERE NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED.

- ADD PAGE 18 PARA 1 LINE 1:

THE CONCEPT OF "DIRECT OR INDIRECT USE OF FORCE" AND THE CONCEPT OF "MANIFESTATION OF FORCE" BOTH EXIST IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, BUT THE LINKAGE OF "DIRECT AND

INDIRECT" WITH "MANIFESTATION OF FORCE" IS NEW. FROM A CONCEPTUAL POINT OF VIEW IT IS PRESUMABLY THE MOST IMPORTANT INNOVATION IN THE NNA TEXT. THE INNOVATION IS DUE TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF CYPRUS WHO IN VARIOUS INTERVENTIONS HAS EXPLAINED THAT THE EXPRESSION "MANIFESTATION OF FORCE" REFERS TO TYPES OF ACTION WHICH HAVE A MORE CONCRETE CHARACTER THAN TYPES OF ACTION WHICH CAN BE QUALIFIED AS THREATS. IT IS, HOWEVER, UNCLEAR WHETHER THE SUGGESTED IMAGINARY ESCALATION IS TO BE CONSTRUED AS A) THREATS (DIRECT MANIFESTATIONS OF FORCE); 2) DIRECT MANIFESTATIONS OF FORCE; 3) INDIRECT USE OF FORCE; 4) DIRECT USE OF FORCE OR AS 1) THREATS (COVERING BOTH INDIRECT AND DIRECT MANIFESTATIONS OF FORCE) 2) INDIRECT USE OF FORCE 3) DIRECT USE OF FORCE OR POSSIBLY IN ANY OTHER WAY.

IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF THE CONCEPT OF "DIRECT AND INDIRECT MANIFESTATION OF FORCE" MAY POSSIBLY OPEN UP FOR DISCUSSIONS ABOUT VARIOUS TYPES OF MANIFESTION OF FORCE.

-- ADD PAGE 18 PARA 2:

THIS PARAGRAPH CONSTITUTES A STRONG ARGUMENT AGAINST THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE. IT MIGHT BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND WHY THE WORD "CULTURAL" -- RATHER THAN FOR INSTANCE THE WORD "IDEOLOGICAL" -- HAS BEEN INCLUDED.

-- ADD PAGE 18 PARA 3:

THIS PARAGRAPH SEEMS TO NEED A REFERENCE WHICH CLEARLY LINKS IT EITHER TO INTERNATIONAL LAW (AS IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT) OR TO THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER SINCE IT MIGHT OTHERWISE BE UNDERSTOOD TO IMPLY THAT -- FOR INSTANCE -- A TEMPORARY OCCUPATION OF TERRITORY IN CONFORMITY WITH ACTIONS UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER WOULD BE ILLEGAL.

-- ADD PAGE 18 PARA 4 LINE 3:

ACCORDING TO THE TEXT OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IS A "COMPLEMENT" TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE USE OF FORCE; IN THE TEXT AT HAND IT IS QUALIFIED AS BEING "AN ESSENTIAL COMPLEMENT."

-- ADD PAGE 18 PARA 5 LINES 2-3:

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ACCORDING TO THE TEXT OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT THE RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR FOR "PEACE, JUSTICE AND WELL-BEING;" IN THE TEXT AT HAND IT IS SAID TO BE "AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR FOR THE CSCE PROCESS AND FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY." THERE IS THUS ESTABLISHED A PARTICULARLY CLOSE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY WITHIN THE CSCE PROCESS WHICH MAY PROVE USEFUL IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE WTO COUNTRIES.

-- ADD PAGE 19 PARA 1 LINES 2-3:

THE SENTENCE: "THEY DECLARE . . . PRESENT DOCUMENT" IS UNCLEAR AND ADMITS OF SEVERAL DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS. IN THE FIRST PLACE IT MAY BE USED TO SUBSTANTIATE A CLAIM TO THE EFFECT THAT THE DOCUMENT AT HAND HAS A PARTICULARLY ELEVATED STATUS AND IT MAY EVEN BE ARGUED THAT IT TENDS TO EQUATE IT WITH A LEGALLY BINDING TEXT. FURTHERMORE, IF THE SENTENCE IS SEEN AS TURNED TOWARDS THE PAST, IT MAY BE UNDERSTOOD TO "WHITEWASH" AND CONFIRM PRIOR COMMITMENTS SINCE THEY ARE ALLEGEDLY NOT IN CONFLICT WITH THE DOCUMENT AT HAND. IT WOULD THUS MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO CRITICIZE THE PROVISIONS OF EXISTING BILATERAL TREATIES WHICH REFLECT THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE.

ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THE SENTENCE IS SEEN AS TURNED TOWARDS THE FUTURE, IT MAY BE UNDERSTOOD TO EFFACE THOSE

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ASPECTS OF PREVIOUS COMMITMENTS WHICH REFLECT THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE SINCE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL HAVE TO INTERPRET PREVIOUS COMMITMENTS IN THE LIGHT OF THE DOCUMENT AT HAND. THIS LAST UNDERSTANDING SEEMS TO BE SUPPORTED BY STATEMENTS BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF SWEDEN AND AUSTRIA TO THE EFFECT THAT THE PARTICIPATING STATES WERE TO CONSIDER THAT NONE OF THE OBLIGATIONS THEY HAD ENTERED INTO PREVIOUSLY WERE IN CONTRADICTION WITH THE DOCUMENT AT HAND.

-- PAGE 19 PARA 2:

THE REFERENCE TO THE PRIMACY OF OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER IS WELCOME BUT THIS REFERENCE OUGHT TO HAVE A MORE PROMINENT PLACE WITHIN THE TEXT.

-- PAGE 19 PARA 3 LINES 1-2:

IT HAS BEEN QUESTIONED WHETHER "THE SITUATION IN EUROPE" AND "THE EQUAL RESPECT FOR . . ." CAN LOGICALLY BE PUT ON THE SAME FOOTING.

-- PAGE 19 PARA 3 LINES 3-5:

IT HAS BEEN QUESTIONED WHETHER THE IDEAS OF "BUILDING MUTUAL CONFIDENCE," "LESSENING MILITARY CONFRONTATION," "STRENGTHENING SECURITY" AND "PROMOTING DISARMAMENT" CAN LOGICALLY BE PUT ON THE SAME FOOTING. IT MAY FOR INSTANCE BE ARGUED THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN "PROMOTING DISARMAMENT" AND "STRENGTHENING SECURITY" IS THAT OF A MEANS TO AN END.

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-- PAGE 19 PARA 4:  
THE REFERENCE TO CSBM'S IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO THE TEXT BUT IT OUGHT TO BE STRENGTHENED TO A VERY CONSIDERABLE DEGREE.

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THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE WORDS "GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION" MAY POSSIBLY GIVE RISE TO DIFFICULTIES SINCE IT HAS BEEN ARGUED BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF CYPRUS (AS WELL AS BY EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES) THAT THE WORD "EXPRESSION" REFERS TO A REAFFIRMATION OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE AND THE WORD "EFFECT" TO THE ADOPTION OF CSBM'S -- WHEREAS THE NATO COUNTRIES TAKE THE EXPRESSION AS A UNITY AND UNDERSTAND IT AS REFERRING IN ITS ENTIRETY TO THE ADOPTION OF CSBM'S.

IT CAN BE NOTED THAT THE REPRESENTATIVE OF AUSTRIA HAS EXPLAINED THAT THE EXPRESSION "SERVE" (TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION) HAS THE SAME MEANING AS THE USUAL EXPRESSION "SO AS" (TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION) AND THAT IT HAS SIMPLY BEEN CHOSEN BECUASE IT ALREADY WAS TO BE FOUND IN SC...3 (SECTION 1).

-- IT COULD FINALLY BE NOTED THAT A QUESTION CONCERNING THE REASONS FOR THE PARTICULAR ORDERING OF THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE TEXT ON NON-USE OF FORCE HAS BEEN ANSWERED BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF AUSTRIA TO THE EFFECT THAT THE TEXT FIRST STRESSES THE COMMITMENT TO THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, THAT IT SECONDLY STRESSES THE COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT AND THAT IT THIRDLY ELABORATES ON A NUMBER OF THESE PRINCIPLES. IT WAS, HOWEVER, AT THE SAME OCCASION ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE PRESENT ORDERING OF THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE TEXT COULD OF COURSE BE MODIFIED.

-- THE PRECEDING COMMENTS ARE OF COURSE NOT EXHAUSTIVE AND A NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS ARE STILL WAITING FOR COMMENTS FROM THEIR AUTHORITIES; THIS IS TRUE IN PARTICULAR WITH RESPECT TO THE SECTION ON TERRORISM (PAGE 18 SECTION 6).

### III. PARTICULAR PROBLEMS

- ONE DELEGATION HAS SUGGESTED THE INCLUSION OF THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS WITH RESPECT TO THE QUESTION OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES:

- "IN THE VIEW OF ONE DELEGATION THE EMPHASIS PLACED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN THE NNA DOCUMENT IS A POSITIVE FEATURE. IN FACT, THE TREATMENT OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE IN ISOLATION FROM OTHER RELEVANT PRINCIPLES, PARTICULARLY THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES, WOULD BE INCOHERENT WITH THE GENERAL WESTERN POSITION, ESPECIALLY AS EXPRESSED IN THE SIXTH COMMITTEE OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY. IT SHOULD BE RECALLED THAT ARTICLE 1 OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY STATES: 'THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE, AS SET FORTH IN

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THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, TO SETTLE ANY INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE IN WHICH THEY MAY BE INVOLVED BY PEACEFUL MEANS IN SUCH A MANNER THAT INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND JUSTICE ARE NOT ENDANGERED, AND TO REFRAIN IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN ANY MANNER INCONCISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS.' REFERENCE TO THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES TAKEN TOGETHER WITH THE FULFILLMENT OF OBLIGATIONS FLOWING FROM THE OTHER PRINCIPLES MENTIONED IN THE NNA DRAFT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONDITIONS THAT WOULD ENHANCE SECURITY AND MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND MAKE RECOURSE TO FORCE LESS LIKELY. THIS IS NOT ONLY A MORE REALISTIC APPROACH THAN THAT ADOPTED BY THE SOVIET UNION; IT IS MORE COMPATIBLE WITH WESTERN VIEWS OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE IN THE CONTEXT OF ITS INTERRELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER PRINCIPLES. IN OTHER WORDS, A GREAT ADVANTAGE OF THE NNA APPROACH IS THAT IT EXTENDS THE PARAMETERS OF THE DISCUSSION OF THE STOCKHOLM MEETING BY BRINGING IN OTHER RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS SO AS TO REMOVE THE NARROW FOCUS ON THE ELEMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION'S OWN CHOOSING, NAMELY, THE NON-USE OF FORCE. IT IS BELIEVED THAT TO TREAT THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE IN ISOLATION FROM ITS NATURAL LINKAGE WITH OTHER RELEVANT PRINCIPLES IS ARTIFICIAL AND POSSIBLY DAMAGING TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PRINCIPLE IN QUESTION."

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- IT SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE RECALLED THAT OTHER DELEGATIONS ARE OF THE VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE TACTICALLY UNWISE TO ENGAGE IN ANY MORE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS ON THE ISSUE OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN STOCKHOLM SINCE THIS MIGHT POSSIBLY RESUSCITATE -- WITHOUT ANY PROSPECT FOR AGREEMENT -- ALL THE PROBLEMS ALREADY THOROUGHLY DISCUSSED IN MONTREUX AND ATHENS, AND THUS IN THE END BE DAMAGING TO THE WESTERN EFFORTS TO CONCENTRATE THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CSBM'S.

#### IV. TACTICS

- THE COORDINATOR OF CLUSTER GROUP A.1 HAS (IN THE BEGINNING OF JANUARY) SUGGESTED TO STRUCTURE THE WORK OF THIS GROUP BY CONCENTRATING -- FOR THE TIME BEING -- THE DISCUSSIONS ON THE NNA PROPOSAL. THIS MAY BE AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION SEEN FROM A WESTERN POINT OF VIEW SINCE IT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO PUSH THE SOVIET AND ROMANIAN PROPOSALS INTO THE BACKGROUND.

- FURTHERMORE, THIS WAY OF PROCEEDING MIGHT BE A FIRST STEP TOWARDS ENGAGING CLUSTER CAUCUS A.1 IN A DRAFTING PROCESS ON THE BASIS OF THE NNA TEXT. THIS MIGHT ALSO BE CONSIDERED AS ACCEPTABLE FROM A WESTERN POINT OF VIEW SINCE IT IS THE OVERALL ASSESSMENT THAT THE NNA TEXT IS CLOSER TO THE GENERAL APPROACH OF THE NATO COUNTRIES

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THAN TO THE GENERAL APPROACH OF THE WTO COUNTRIES. IT IS, HOWEVER, OBVIOUS THAT IF THE NNA TEXT BECOMES THE BASIS FOR DRAFTING, WESTERN DELEGATIONS WILL AS AN URGENT MATTER HAVE TO DEFINE DETAILED POSITIONS WITH RESPECT TO THIS PROPOSAL.

- IT SHOULD IN THIS CONTEXT BE RECALLED THAT AN ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE TO TABLE A WESTERN DRAFT ON NON-USE OF FORCE.

- IN AWAITING A DECISION ON THIS MATTER, OR IN AWAITING THE DEVELOPMENT OF DETAILED WESTERN POSITIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE NNA PROPOSAL, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT

- THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS DURING THE FIRST WEEKS OF THE NINTH SESSION FOLLOW THE SAME TACTICS AS IN THE EIGHTH SESSION, THAT IS, TRYING TO MAINTAIN A GENERALLY CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE VIS-A-VIS THIS PROPOSAL WHILE ASKING QUESTIONS OF CLARIFICATION -- OF A RATHER CRITICAL CHARACTER -- ON VARIOUS POINTS OF DETAIL. GENERALLY SPEAKING THE PROBLEM WITH RESPECT TO THE NNA TEXT WAS, AND STILL IS, TO STRIKE A BALANCE BETWEEN THE PITFALLS OF ADOPTING ON THE ONE HAND AN EXCESSIVELY POSITIVE ATTITUDE, WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO AN INCREASE IN THE AMBITIONS OF THE WTO COUNTRIES, AND ON THE OTHER HAND AN EXCESSIVELY NEGATIVE ATTITUDE, SINCE IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE BAD TACTICS FOR THE NATO COUNTRIES TO ENGAGE IN AN ALL-OUT CRITICISM OF A TEXT WHICH THEY CAN PRESUMABLY MAKE GOOD USE OF LATER ON.

STOCKHOLM, 13TH JANUARY, 1986

END TEXT.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 00811

SUBJECT: US STATEMENT IN CDE, 2/4/86

L. CDE VII - 024

2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY OF REMARKS AMBASSADOR ROBERT L. BARRY, HEAD, USDEL CDE, WILL MAKE TO THE ROYAL INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AT CHATHAM HOUSE, LONDON, TOMORROW, FEBRUARY 4, 1986.

3. BEGIN TEXT: TITLE: THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE.

THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE RESUMED WORK ONE WEEK AGO WITH A MEETING ATTENDED BY FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND FOREIGN MINISTER DUMAS OF FRANCE. THE REMARKS OF THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE THEIR COUNTRIES ATTACH TO THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AS A KEY INSTRUMENT FOR ENHANCING EUROPEAN STABILITY AND SECURITY. THEY SPOKE AS EUROPEANS AND DESCRIBED STOCKHOLM AS A DIMENSION OF A EUROPEAN PROCESS, THE HELSINKI CSCE PROCESS OF COOPERATION AND SECURITY-BUILDING. THE UNITED STATES ATTACHES EQUALLY GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, AND WE SHARE WITH OUR ALLIES THE VISION OF A EUROPE OF INDEPENDENT STATES JOINED IN COOPERATION RATHER THAN SEPARATED BY MISTRUST AND CONFRONTATION. WE ARE NOT GEOGRAPHICALLY A EUROPEAN NATION, BUT WE ARE TIED TO EUROPE: MILITARILY TO THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE; POLITICALLY TO THE COMPLEMENTARY GOALS OF INCREASED WESTERN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE LOWERING OF THE BARRIERS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. OUR PARTICIPATION IN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IS A DEMONSTRATION OF THIS COMMITMENT TO EUROPE.

JUST BEFORE LEAVING WASHINGTON FOR STOCKHOLM, I MET WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN. HE ISSUED A STATEMENT STRESSING THE TWO DIMENSIONS OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, MILITARY AND POLITICAL, AND THE IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS SUCCESS THERE WOULD HAVE FOR THE OVERALL EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP. THE PRESIDENT UNDERLINED THE CONTRIBUTION STOCKHOLM COULD MAKE TO EUROPEAN SECURITY IN THE LARGER SENSE, THAT WHICH ENCOMPASSES POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND HUMANITARIAN -- HUMAN RIGHTS -- AS WELL AS STRICTLY MILITARY MATTERS. "THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS BROADER CONCEPT OF SECURITY," THE PRESIDENT SAID, "IS THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE OF THE UNITED STATES."

THE PRESIDENT ALSO EXPRESSED HIS BELIEF THAT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE COULD SUCCEED IN REACHING AN ACCORD THIS YEAR, A BELIEF ECHOED BY MINISTER GENSCHER AND MINISTER DUMAS LAST WEEK. THERE IS, IN FACT, A VERY GOOD CHANCE THE CONFERENCE WILL ACHIEVE WHAT IT

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WAS SET UP TO DO: ESTABLISH A MILITARY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME WHICH WOULD REDUCE THE RISK OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE. IN DOING SO, IT WOULD INCREASE STABILITY IN THE EUROPEAN MILITARY SITUATION IN THE NEAR TERM AND GIVE A POLITICAL IMPULSE TO GREATER OPENNESS AND COOPERATION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

IF AN AGREEMENT IS REACHED IN STOCKHOLM, IT WILL BE SIMILAR IN OUTLINE TO THE PROPOSALS NATO TABLED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFERENCE IN JANUARY, 1984. IT WILL ESTABLISH A MANDATORY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME CONSISTING OF MEASURES REQUIRING EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ABOUT MILITARY FORCES IN EUROPE AND REQUIRING THAT SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENTS FROM NORMAL LOCATIONS BE FORECAST A YEAR IN ADVANCE, DESCRIBED IN MORE DETAIL SEVERAL WEEKS IN ADVANCE, AND OBSERVED BY TEAMS FROM OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES. THERE WILL BE ADEQUATE VERIFICATION MEASURES, INCLUDING ON-SITE INSPECTION. THERE WILL BE LANGUAGE REAFFIRMING, BUT NOT REDEFINING, THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE. IN CONTRAST TO THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE 1975 HELSINKI FINAL ACT, WHICH WERE LARGELY POLITICAL IN SIGNIFICANCE BECAUSE THEY WERE VOLUNTARY AND LACKED ANY PROVISION FOR VERIFICATION, THESE MEASURES WOULD HAVE A REAL IMPACT ON THE CONDUCT OF MILITARY AFFAIRS.

SUBJECT: US STATEMENT IN CDE, 2/4/86

INDEED, THE BROADER POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF A STOCKHOLM AGREEMENT WOULD FLOW FROM THE PRACTICAL MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MEASURES WE AGREED ON. IN THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES AND OUR ALLIES, THIS CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME COMING OUT OF STOCKHOLM SHOULD ACCOMPLISH SEVERAL ENDS:

RISK REDUCTION:

AN AGREEMENT WOULD REDUCE THE RISK OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION ARISING FROM AMBIGUITY ABOUT THE NATURE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND THE INTENTIONS BEHIND THEM. IT WOULD DO THIS BY REQUIRING A ROUTINE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION CONCERNING MILITARY FORCES AND THEIR NORMAL EXERCISE PRACTICES WHICH WOULD, OVER TIME, DEVELOP A PATTERN OF NORMAL MILITARY ACTIVITY IN EUROPE. ESTABLISHING THE DATA BASE WHICH DEFINED THIS PATTERN MAY TAKE A FEW YEARS, BUT ONCE ESTABLISHED, IT COULD BECOME THE NORM AGAINST WHICH ALL MILITARY ACTIVITY ON THE CONTINENT WAS JUDGED. CONFORMITY WITH SUCH A NORM COULD CONTRIBUTE TO INCREASED STABILITY AS WELL AS GREATER PREDICTABILITY IN THE OVERALL MILITARY SITUATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, EXTRAORDINARY MILITARY ACTIVITY, DETERMINED BY REFERENCE TO THE ESTABLISHED NORM, WOULD BECOME READILY IDENTIFIABLE WITH THE RESULT THAT APPROPRIATE POLITICAL AND, IF REQUIRED, MILITARY COUNTERMEASURES COULD BE

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TAKEN. CONFORMITY WITH A PATTERN WOULD SERVE THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING ASPECT OF A CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING REGIME, WHILE IDENTIFYING DEVIATIONS FROM THE NORM WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE SECURITY-BUILDING ASPECT.

USE OF MILITARY FORCE FOR POLITICAL INTIMIDATION: BY CREATING A SCHEDULE OF ACTIVITIES FAR IN ADVANCE TO WHICH ALL STATES WOULD HAVE TO ADHERE, THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME WE ARE DISCUSSING WOULD INHIBIT THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES. EUROPE HAS SEEN TOO MANY EXAMPLES OF THE USE OF SO-CALLED MILITARY EXERCISES FOR THE PURPOSE OF POLITICAL INTIMIDATION, FOR EXAMPLE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN 1968 AND POLAND IN 1981. A MANDATORY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME PROVIDING FOR FORECASTING, NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION AND INSPECTION WOULD NOT PREVENT SUCH EVENTS IN THE FUTURE. BUT IT WOULD RAISE THE POLITICAL PRICE TO A THREATENING STATE AND THUS HELP TO DETER THE THREAT. AND INSPECTION AND OBSERVATION WOULD PROVIDE A CLEARER INDICATION OF THE INTENT BEHIND SUCH SUDDEN, LARGE-SCALE ACTIVITIES. SINCE UNCERTAINTY ABOUT INTENT IS A MAJOR FACTOR IN INTIMIDATION, AN EFFECTIVE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME WOULD HELP COUNTER INTIMIDATION.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND OPENNESS: REQUIRING STATES TO ANNOUNCE IN ADVANCE A SCHEDULE FOR THE ACTIVITIES OF THEIR FORCES WOULD CONTRIBUTE GREATLY TO PREDICTABILITY AND STABILITY. CONSIDER THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIRTY-FIVE COUNTRIES WITH VERY DIFFERENT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND POLITICAL TIES AGREEING THAT THEY WOULD INITIATE NO SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ACTIVITIES WITHOUT FIRST ANNOUNCING AND EXPLAINING THEM FORMALLY AND IN DETAIL IN ADVANCE. BOTH MILITARILY AND POLITICALLY, ESTABLISHING THE PRINCIPLE OF OPENNESS AND THE RIGHT OF STATES TO KNOW ABOUT THE MILITARY INTENTIONS AND ACTIVITIES OF OTHERS, EAST, WEST AND NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED, WOULD BE OF PRECEDENT-SETTING IMPORTANCE.

MILITARY COMMANDERS UNDERSTAND, I BELIEVE, THE STABILIZING EFFECT THAT THE CORRECT DEGREE OF OPENNESS IN MILITARY AFFAIRS AFFORDS. THEY ACCEPT THE IDEA THAT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CAN INDICATE, WITH A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE OF ASSURANCE, WHETHER THEIR MILITARY ACTIVITIES ARE ROUTINE AND NON-THREATENING IN CHARACTER. THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME WHICH WE ENVISION WOULD EXPAND OPENNESS AND THUS INCREASE THIS ASSURANCE ABOUT THE NATURE OF ACTIVITIES THROUGH OVERT MUTUAL COOPERATION. EXAGGERATED CLAIMS FOR MILITARY SECRECY BELONG TO THE PAST; REAL CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING REQUIRES THAT WE PUT OUT-MODED PRACTICES BEHIND US.

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WHEN WE DISCUSS OPENNESS AMONG STATES, WE TOUCH UPON THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE OF UNITED STATES POLICY WHICH PRESIDENT REAGAN EMPHASIZED, A EUROPE WITHOUT BARRIERS, WHERE PEOPLE OF ALL COUNTRIES CAN COMMUNICATE WITH ONE ANOTHER, TRAVEL FREELY, EXCHANGE IDEAS OF ALL KINDS, FOR THE ENRICHMENT OF ALL. IN STOCKHOLM, WE DEAL WITH MILITARY EXCHANGE, AND THE NEED TO FIND AN ALTERNATIVE TO SECRETIVENESS AND CONFRONTATION IN THE MILITARY FIELD IS PERHAPS PARTICULARLY EVIDENT. BUT RELATIONS AT THE MILITARY LEVEL ARE A REFLECTION OF RELATIONSHIPS ON MORE BASIC POLITICAL, CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC LEVELS. STOCKHOLM CAN EASE SUSPICION AND INCREASE OPENNESS AND UNDERSTANDING THROUGH A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME IN THE MILITARY FIELD, BUT SUCCESS THERE WILL ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO IMPROVEMENT BETWEEN EAST AND WEST ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF THE RELATIONSHIP.

THE CONCEPT OF OPENNESS, WHETHER IN MILITARY AFFAIRS OR IN OTHER FIELDS, IS AN ISSUE OF GREAT SENSITIVITY TO SOME OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, ESPECIALLY TO THE SOVIET UNION. BUT MY IMPRESSION IS THAT THIS SENSITIVITY IS LESSENING AS A NEW GENERATION COMES TO POWER IN THE SOVIET UNION. I AM PARTICULARLY ENCOURAGED THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP SEEMS TO HAVE ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF ON-SITE INSPECTION AS A NECESSARY ELEMENT OF VERIFIABILITY, AS EVIDENCED BY A NUMBER OF RECENT STATEMENTS, INCLUDING GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 PROPOSALS. ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN NO INDICATION YET THAT THE PRINCIPLE HAS BEEN ACCEPTED FOR RISK REDUCTION ACTIVITIES AS OPPOSED TO ARMS REDUCTIONS ACTIVITIES, I SEE NO REASON WHY IT SHOULD NOT BE; WESTERN INSPECTION AND OBSERVATION PROPOSALS IN THE STOCKHOLM CONTEXT ARE LESS INTRUSIVE THAN ELSEWHERE BECAUSE THEY INVOLVE DYNAMIC ACTIVITIES WHICH, UNLIKE STATIC ONES, DO NOT REQUIRE ENTRY INTO SENSITIVE INSTALLATIONS.

THE SOVIET ATTITUDE IS EVOLVING POSITIVELY IN OTHER AREAS AS WELL. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFERENCE, THE EAST TOOK A VERY POLEMICAL APPROACH AND ADVANCED PROPOSALS NOT FOR PRACTICAL, CONCRETE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES BUT RATHER FOR DECLARATORY MEASURES ON NO-FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONES, REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS AND THE LIKE, WHICH REPRESENTED THEIR POLITICAL AGENDA FOR WESTERN EUROPE. IN THE PAST YEAR, THE EAST HAS GRADUALLY ADOPTED A MORE PRACTICAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH. THEY HAVE BEEN MORE FORTHCOMING ON IMPORTANT PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. IN OCTOBER, THEY JOINED WITH THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN ACCEPTING AN INFORMAL WORKING ARRANGEMENT WHICH FOCUSED THE ATTENTION OF THE CONFERENCE ON SPECIFIC MEASURES WITH REAL MILITARY CONTENT.

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ALSO IN OCTOBER, DURING HIS VISIT TO PARIS, SOVIET GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV ACCEPTED THE IDEA OF AN EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL SCHEDULES FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES, A MEASURE WHICH BOTH NATO AND THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED HAD PROPOSED. IN GENEVA LAST NOVEMBER, MR. GORBACHEV JOINED PRESIDENT REAGAN IN ASKING FOR AN EARLY AND SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. LAST MONTH, IN HIS STATEMENT OF JANUARY 15, MR. GORBACHEV REAFFIRMED THE COMMITMENT TO PROGRESS, AS PRESIDENT REAGAN DID ON JANUARY 21.

IN SUM, THE EAST HAS MOVED CLOSER TO THE APPROACH LAID OUT IN THE CONFERENCE MANDATE, ON WHICH THE WEST BASED ITS PACKAGE OF PROPOSALS. ONE REASON FOR THE CHANGE IS THAT NATO WAS WELL PREPARED FOR THIS CONFERENCE AND HAS BEEN PATIENT AND FIRM IN THE FACE OF EFFORTS TO DIVERT THE AGENDA FROM MILITARY SECURITY TO POLITICAL ISSUES. THE EAST DOES WANT AN AGREEMENT WHICH WILL ALLOW CONTINUATION OF SOME KIND OF EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE, AND THEY MUST REALIZE THAT THE ONLY AGREEMENT WITHIN REACH IS ONE WHICH FULFILLS THE MANDATE CRITERIA, IS CONCRETE, PRACTICAL, MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT AND VERIFIABLE.

I HAVE ALREADY IDENTIFIED VERIFIABILITY AS THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF AN AGREEMENT AND AN AREA WHERE EAST AND WEST HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH COMMON GROUND. A SECOND AREA OF DIFFERENCE RELATES TO INFORMATION EXCHANGE. THE EAST CONTINUES TO OBJECT TO A COMPREHENSIVE EXCHANGE, DESCRIBING IT AS AN ATTEMPT TO LEGALIZE ESPIONAGE. THE FINAL EASTERN POSITION ON INFORMATION, AS ON INSPECTION, WILL BE A GOOD INDICATOR OF JUST HOW FAR THEY ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF OPENNESS WHICH IS THE UNDERLYING PREMISE OF ANY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME.

A THIRD PROBLEM AREA HAS BEEN THE QUESTION OF WHAT TYPES OF MILITARY ACTIVITY ARE TO BE COVERED. IN OUR VIEW, THE MADRID MANDATE ESTABLISHED WHAT WE CALL THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. THAT IS, AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES ARE COVERED WHEN THEY ARE FUNCTIONALLY RELATED TO GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES; INDEED, SUCH COMBINED ARMS ACTIVITIES ARE THE ONLY KIND WHICH HAVE REAL MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT. THE EAST HAS TRIED TO INCLUDE SO-CALLED INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN THE MEASURES UNDER DISCUSSION, AN ATTEMPT WHICH THE WEST HAS REJECTED. NOW IT APPEARS THAT THE EAST IS WILLING TO HAVE AN AGREEMENT WHICH DOES NOT INCLUDE INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES. THAT REMOVES A MAJOR OBSTACLE IN THE TALKS. INHERENTLY UNVERIFIABLE INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES SHOULD ALSO BE SET ASIDE. I BELIEVE THAT THE WILL EXISTS TO OVERCOME THESE OBSTACLES. SO LET ME TRY TO RELATE SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM TO THE LARGER PICTURE OF ARMS CONTROL AND

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THE TWO TRACKS OF ARMS REDUCTION, ON THE ONE HAND, AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING LEADING TO RISK REDUCTION, ON THE OTHER, ARE MUTUALLY REINFORCING. WE HOPE FOR SUCCESS IN GENEVA AND IN VIENNA -- SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS. IF WE CAN ACCOMPLISH THESE REDUCTIONS, THEY WILL IN THEMSELVES BUILD CONFIDENCE AND THUS RESULT IN A MORE STABLE WORLD. IN THE MEANTIME, SUCCESSFUL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING CAN HELP TO PAVE THE WAY FOR ARMS REDUCTIONS. THE KIND OF REGIME WE ARE TRYING TO CREATE IN STOCKHOLM WOULD, IF COMPLIED WITH, GIVE A POLITICAL IMPULSE TO OTHER NEGOTIATIONS. STOCKHOLM IS ALSO BREAKING NEW GROUND IN ANOTHER AREA. IT IS THE ONLY SECURITY FORUM WHICH INCLUDES ALL THE EUROPEAN STATES, EXCEPT FOR ALBANIA. IT HAS STIMULATED THE FIRST SERIOUS FORMAL EXCHANGE AMONG THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES ON SECURITY-RELATED ISSUES, RESULTING IN THE EMERGENCE OF A COMMON POSITION ON THE ISSUES BEFORE THE CONFERENCE. THIS, IN TURN, HAS MADE THEM SEE MORE CLEARLY SOME OF THE COMPLEXITIES AND DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED WITH THE ARMS REDUCTION EFFORTS, WHICH ARE ALSO IMPORTANT TO THEM.

SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM COULD HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT ON THE ENTIRE RANGE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, AS BOTH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV HAVE INDEPENDENTLY RECOGNIZED. TO CITE JUST ONE EXAMPLE, IT COULD MOVE THE ENTIRE HELSINKI CSCE PROCESS AHEAD. THE CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING, WHICH OPENS IN VIENNA IN NOVEMBER OF THIS YEAR, WILL EVALUATE PROGRESS IN ALL ASPECTS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THAT MEANS EXAMINING DEVELOPMENTS IN HUMAN RIGHTS AS WELL AS PROGRESS IN THE SECURITY FIELD. FOR THE UNITED STATES AND ITS NATO ALLIES, BALANCE AMONG ALL TEN PRINCIPLES OF THE CSCE IS ESSENTIAL TO THE CONTINUATION OF THE PROCESS.

DEVELOPMENTS ON HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN THE EAST SINCE THE MADRID REVIEW MEETING OF 1980-1983 HAVE NOT BEEN ENCOURAGING. NOR CAN WE POINT TO NOTABLE SUCCESSES AT THE POST-MADRID MEETINGS SUCH AS THE OTTAWA HUMAN RIGHTS FORUM OR THE BUDAPEST CULTURAL FORUM. WE CAN HOPE FOR SUCCESS AT THE BERN HUMAN CONTACTS MEETING LATER THIS YEAR, BUT IN ANY CASE THE VIENNA CONFEREES WILL NOT HAVE A VERY BRIGHT PICTURE TO CONTEMPLATE. A MEANINGFUL AND POLITICALLY BINDING STOCKHOLM AGREEMENT, STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH BY ALL PARTICIPATING STATES, WILL MAKE IT EASIER FOR VIENNA TO DECIDE ON CONTINUING THE STOCKHOLM SECURITY FORUM IN SOME FORM AFTER THE CSCE REVIEW CONCLUDES ITS WORK.

IN CONCLUSION, LET ME NOTE THAT OUR WORK IN STOCKHOLM LACKS THE DRAMA OF DEALING WITH VITAL NUCLEAR ISSUES, AS THE GENEVA NEGOTIATORS DO. AS LORD CARRINGTON POINTED OUT IN A SPEECH TO THE SWEDISH INSTITUTE OF

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LAST WEEK, THE PACE OF OUR WORK HAS BEEN SOMETHING LESS THAN ELECTRIC, ALTHOUGH HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT COMPARED TO OUR MBFR COLLEAGUES IN VIENNA WE HAVE BEEN ALMOST RECKLESS IN OUR HASTE. SO IT IS LITTLE WONDER THAT OUR EFFORTS HAVE GONE LARGELY UNNOTICED, BOTH IN THE MEDIA AND IN OUR FOREIGN OFFICES. BUT AS THE CLOCK RUNS OUT ON OUR DELIBERATIONS, THINGS ARE BEGINNING TO HAPPEN. KEEP YOUR EYE ON US FOR THE TWENTY-THREE NEGOTIATING WEEKS REMAINING TO US, AND YOU MAY SEE SOMETHING INTERESTING -- AND IMPORTANT -- BEGIN TO EMERGE.

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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 00975  
SUBJECT: CDE AMB. BARRY'S CONSULTATIONS AT UK FCO

1. CDE IX-033 - CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.
2. BEGIN SUMMARY: CDE AMBASSADOR BARRY MET ON FEBRUARY 5 WITH ASSISTANT UNDERSECRETARY TIMOTHY DAUNT, FCO, AND A GROUP MADE UP OF MOD AND FCO CDE/MBFR SPECIALISTS. UK OFFICIALS PROBED US THINKING ON STATIC INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, CONSTRAINTS, INDEPENDENT AIR AND NUF. BARRY REFERRED BRIEFLY TO "INFORMAL THINKING AMONG US DEL AND WASHINGTON COMMUNITY" ON DIRECTIONS IN WHICH THE US POSITION MIGHT EVOLVE DURING THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. DAUNT WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN CDE/MBFR LINKS. END SUMMARY.
3. BARRY RAISED STATIC INFORMATION, POINTING OUT THAT NATO CAUCUS HAD DECIDED ON TWO-TRACK APPROACH; WE WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS INFORMATION AS AN INDEPENDENT MEASURE BUT WOULD ALSO ACCEPT SOUND DRAFT LANGUAGE ON INFORMATION UNDER FORECASTING AND NOTIFICATION. WE FORESAW CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY IN GETTING MEASURE 1 ADOPTED AS SUCH, GIVEN TURKISH, YUGOSLAV, SWISS, SWEDISH AS WELL AS WTO OPPOSITION. THIS DID NOT MEAN BACKING AWAY FROM IT BUT TRYING TO GET REAL CONTENT THROUGH OTHER MEASURES AS WELL.
4. FOR THE US, BARRY SAID, VERIFICATION (INSPECTION) IS THE KEY ISSUE. WE SEE INFORMATION AS A NECESSARY ADJUNCT OF VERIFICATION, BUT HAVE CHOSEN TO PUT OUR EMPHASIS ON THE LATTER. DAUNT RUEFULLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THAT WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE US POSITION ON MBFR AS WELL. HE CONFESSED TO "SOME SURPRISE" AT OUR POSITION ON INFORMATION, BUT COLONEL HALL OF MOD INDICATED THAT IT DID NOT CREATE GREAT PROBLEMS FOR THEM.
5. NOTING THAT CONSTRAINTS WAS ON THE UK AGENDA, BARRY SAID THAT WE DID NOT THINK A CONSTRAINT MEASURE WAS REQUIRED AT STOCKHOLM. WE HAD BEEN GIVING SOME THOUGHT TO A PROVISION REQUIRING FORECASTS 2 YEARS IN ADVANCE FOR ESPECIALLY LARGE EXERCISES AND/OR A "FREE" INSPECTION FOR LARGE-SCALE UNFORECAST ACTIVITIES. DAUNT ASKED IF WE HAD THOUGHT ABOUT THE UK PROPOSAL ON MORE DEMANDING OBSERVATION/INSPECTION FOR LARGE SCALE ACTIVITIES; WE SAID WE TENDED TO PREFER A SIMPLE APPROACH.
6. THE BRITISH HAD ASKED THAT INDEPENDENT AIR BE ON OUR AGENDA: BARRY SAID WE WERE FIRM ON EXCLUDING THIS, AND WOULD STICK WITH THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. DAUNT ASKED ABOUT OUR POSITION ON TRANSFERS; WE SAID THAT IF POSSIBLE WE WERE EVEN FIRMER. DAUNT EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN OUR POSITION ON REINFORCEMENTS INTO THE ZONE IN MBFR AND OUR EXCLUDING TRANSFERS IN CDE.
7. ON NUF, BARRY CONFIRMED THAT THE NATO CAUCUS IN STOCKHOLM WAS THINKING OF PUTTING TOGETHER PARAGRAPHS WHICH COULD BE TABLED IN THE COURSE OF NUF NEGOTIATIONS, NOT A FULL-SCALE DRAFT. THE BRITISH SAID THEY HAD BEEN

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THINKING OF DEVISING NEW LANGUAGE TO EXPAND THEORETICALLY ON THE NUF/CSBM LINK. BARRY CAUTIONED THAT INVENTING NEW TEXTS COULD CREATE A BAD PRECEDENT WHEN IT CAME TO SOVIET EFFORTS TO "ELABORATE" ON THE NUF PRINCIPLE.

8. BARRY SAID THAT USDEL WAS GIVING SOME THOUGHT TO THE THRESHOLD ISSUE; WE MIGHT WANT TO SETTLE ON A NOTIFICATION AND/OR OBSERVATION THRESHOLD OF ONE-HALF OR MORE OF TWO DIVISIONS, 12,000 MEN AND X/Y EQUIPMENT; THIS WOULD FILTER OUT INSIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES AND MAKE OBSERVATION EASIER. MOD REPS SAID THEIR THINKING HAD BEEN ALONG SIMILAR LINES -- 1 DIVISION, 10,000 MEN (WHICH WOULD ALLOW FOR A DIVISION LEAVING SOME ELEMENTS IN GARRISON). BUT THEY WEREN'T TOO WORRIED ABOUT THE BURDENS OF OBSERVATION AS LONG AS HOSPITALITY WAS ELIMINATED.

9. DAUNT RAISED THE FUTURE OF MBFR AND CDE, SUGGESTING THAT IF THE EAST REJECTED THE WESTERN INITIATIVE WE MIGHT WANT TO RECESS MBFR. BARRY SAID HE SAW REAL DANGERS IN HAVING MBFR ISSUES SUBSUMED INTO CDE.

10. ON THE QUESTION OF POST-VIENNA CDE, BARRY SAID NO ONE REALLY EXPECTED TO MOVE INTO STAGE II EVEN GIVEN A SUCCESSFUL CDE OUTCOME. HE ALSO SAID WE WANTED TO GET THE MESSAGE ACROSS THAT THERE WAS NO GUARANTEE THAT VIENNA WOULD AGREE THAT THERE SHOULD BE A STAGE IB, THOUGH THE SOVIETS NO DOUBT REALIZED THAT MANY IN NATO WOULD FAVOR IT. DAUNT WONDERED IF FOCUS OF DISCUSSIONS DURING A POSSIBLE STAGE IB MIGHT NOT SHIFT TO "CRISIS MANAGEMENT" CSBMS. BARRY SAID THIS SHOULD BE AVOIDED AT ALL COSTS SINCE THIS WOULD MEAN MULTILATERAL CRISIS MECHANISM OUTSIDE NATO. DAUNT AND BARRY AGREED THAT US AND UK SHOULD THINK ABOUT NEW PRE-CRISIS CSBMS WHICH COULD BE UNVEILED AS EXAMPLE OF WHAT A STAGE IB STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE COULD DEAL WITH; LEFTOVER MEASURES FROM THIS STAGE WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE SUFFICIENT. (DELEGATION WILL TRY TO COME UP WITH SUGGESTIONS FOR WASHINGTON CONSIDERATION.)

11. DAUNT WONDERED HOW WE WOULD GET ALLIANCE AGREEMENT ON NEW ELEMENTS IN WESTERN POSITION. BARRY SAID WE WERE NOT THINKING OF REVISING SC.1; THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH TIME, AND POSITIONS DISCUSSED IN EVERE WOULD LEAK. WE WERE SIMPLY TRYING TO LOOK FOR AREAS WHERE WE COULD BE FLEXIBLE AS THE NEGOTIATIONS MOVED AHEAD. CHANGES COULD EMERGE NOT AS NEW NATO SUGGESTIONS BUT RATHER AS SUGGESTIONS FROM THE NNA (PERHAPS INSPIRED BY THE WEST).

12. COMMENT: WE CAUTIONED DAUNT THAT WE HAD NOT SHARED THESE INFORMAL IDEAS WITH OTHERS AND DID NOT INTEND TO. HE PROMISED TO HOLD OUR THINKING CLOSELY, BUT WELCOMED LEARNING WHAT WE WERE THINKING OF ON THE EVE OF HIS WASHINGTON TRIP.

BARRY  
END OF MESSAGE

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I N T E R V E N T I O N

en séance plénière

de l'Ambassadeur Stephan Todorov,  
chef de la délégation de la RP de Bulgarie  
à la Conférence de Stockholm

le 7 février 1986

Monsieur le Président,

Un travail considérable a été accompli par la Conférence pendant les dernières deux années, qui a préparé le passage vers la rédaction d'un document. Le progrès a été marqué par l'adoption des thèmes sur lesquels notre attention devrait se concentrer, et qui pourraient devenir éléments d'un document. Une structure organisationnelle, qui garantirait l'examen des propositions sous tous leurs aspects a été créée. Avec la nouvelle année, la Conférence est entrée dans une période décisive de son travail avant l'ouverture de la réunion de Vientiane.

Le développement inhérent de la Conférence coïncide avec des développements positifs importants dans les relations internationales. Le rétablissement du dialogue politique au plus haut niveau entre l'Union des Républiques Socialistes Soviétiques et les Etats-Unis d'Amérique, ainsi que les accords adoptés à la rencontre à Genève en novembre dernier, ont créé des conditions qui contribueraient à imprimer une dynamique aux négociations en cours aux différents forums internationaux sur les questions de la sécurité et du désarmement.

Le plan de perspective riche d'initiatives concrètes proposé par le Secrétaire général du CC du PCUS Mikhaïl Gorbatchev indique la bonne direction pour la libération de l'humanité jusqu'à la fin du siècle des armes nucléaires, chimiques et autres armes de destruction massive. Ce plan est tout aussi ambitieux que réaliste.

"Cet objectif est réalisable, parce qu'il répond aux intérêts fondamentaux de tous les hommes, sans aucune distin-



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ction de classe, de race, de nationalité, de différences de foi ou d'idéologie" - a dit le Secrétaire général du CC du PCC et Président du Conseil d'Etat de la RPB Todor Jivkov.

Aujourd'hui, monsieur le Président, pour avancer vers cet objectif sont nécessaires une nouvelle façon de penser une restrainte dans le domaine militaire, une preuve de haute responsabilité de la part de tous les gouvernements pour la sécurité des peuples, pour les intérêts de l'humanité et de sa civilisation.

Ces dans ces circonstances internationales et dans le contexte d'un travail préparatoire pour la rédaction achevé que la Conférence poursuit son travail cette année. Aussi, la Conférence a devant soi des problèmes complexes et difficile cela exige, comme il nous semble, que toutes les délégations adoptent une nouvelle approche, qu'elles manifestent un esprit ouvert face aux problèmes en discussion.

Un exemple d'une telle approche de flexibilité et d'efforts pour avancer dans les domaines où il est possible de rassembler l'accord des participants est la proposition de Mikhaïl Gorbatchev pour le possible solutionnement des difficultés survenues en relation avec la notification des manoeuvres, mouvements et transfers de troupes, proposition qui ouvrirait la voie pour obtenir le consensus sur une si importante question qu'est la notification des manoeuvres militaires et du transfer/mouvement de troupes des pays participants à la CSCE.

Personne ne saurait nier que depuis le début de la Conférence jusqu'à ce jour certaines délégations ont fait une série de pas pour rapprocher les positions, tout en démontrant

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d'une façon tangible leur volonté d'arriver à des accords acceptables pour tous. En même temps, il y a des délégations qui n'ont pas encore bougé de leurs anciennes positions, définies au début même de la Conférence. L'absence de volonté de faire preuve d'une flexibilité, le refus de tenir compte des intérêts égaux de la sécurité de tous les participants ne manquerait pas de créer des difficultés, d'autant plus à l'étape de rédaction. Nous sommes déjà, pendant cette session, face à de telles difficultés. Et ce n'est pas en clamant une disposition de commencer tout de suite, sans plus tarder la rédaction, que sera neutralisée l'influence néfaste d'une telle approche de notre travail.

Dans ce contexte, je voudrais prévenir contre l'interprétation erronée des signes constructifs faits par un groupe de pays, exprimant leur disponibilité à rédiger des accords mutuellement acceptables. Pour le succès de notre travail, il faut interpréter ces signes dans la lumière de la volonté de contribuer à effectuer un tournant vers un meilleur état de choses dans les relations Est-Ouest, dans les relations entre les pays participants. Leur interprétation à la lumière des stéréotypes et façons de penser anciens, propres à certains depuis des périodes plus "difficiles" de ces relations, ne pourrait qu'entraîner les négociations dans une impasse, d'où il serait difficile de s'en sortir.

La délégation bulgare continue à espérer que preuve sera faite par tous à la Conférence de réalisme et de volonté de coopérer, ce qui permettrait, en conformité avec le mandat d'adopter des mesures de confiance et de sécurité qui seraient à même de marquer un développement substantiel du régime de

confiance de l'Acte final.

Monsieur le Président,

L'un des domaines décisifs dans lesquels il est nécessaire d'arriver à des accords mutuellement acceptables pour réaliser le développement qualitatif mentionné est le domaine des mesures de limitation.

L'adoption de telles mesures serait à même de réduire le sentiment d'insécurité généré par les manoeuvres de particulièrement grande envergure, manoeuvres qu'il est difficile de distinguer dans des termes appropriés de la préparation réelle d'agression. Nous pensons qu'il ne serait pas exagéré d'affirmer que le danger d'un conflit militaire résultant d'erreur ou de malentendu augmente dans une progression géométrique avec l'augmentation du nombre des participants dans les activités militaires.

Du point de vue politique, l'introduction de mesures de limitation serait une preuve du refus de la politique d'intimidation par démonstration de force militaire et par conséquent - une expression du principe de non-recours à la force ou à la menace de la force. Ceci serait une preuve de la volonté de développer les relations entre les pays-membres à la base de la coopération, dans l'esprit du processus de la CSCE.

Comme la discussion l'a démontré, toutes les délégations sont d'accord que l'élaboration de mesures de contrainte, en conformité avec le principe du respect égal des intérêts de la sécurité de tous les Etats participants, contribuerait d'une manière directe à réduire le danger de la confrontation militaire et par celà, à atteindre les objectifs fixés par

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le mandat de l'étape actuelle de la Conférence sur les mesures de confiance et de sécurité et sur le désarmement en Europe.

Nous avons étudié avec attention les idées, exprimées par toutes les délégations au sujet des mesures de contrainte ainsi que le document SC-7, présenté par les Etats neutres et non-alignés. Il nous semble que pour l'avancement des négociations il est nécessaire de prendre pour point de départ l'idée contenue dans la proposition SC-7 de lier le nombre maximum ~~des participants~~ aux activités militaires avec le niveau de notification de ces activités, ainsi que d'introduire des limitations de la durée des exercices militaires. Je voudrais aujourd'hui, au nom des co-auteurs du document WGA-1 - les délégations de la RDA, de l'URSS et de la RF de Bulgarie, soumettre à l'attention des participants un texte qui, selon pourrait devenir le pas suivant pour parvenir à des accords mutuellement acceptables:

Les pays participants ne conduiront pas, indépendamment ou conjointement avec d'autres pays participants, des manoeuvres militaires dont le niveau n'excéderait pas plus de cinq fois le niveau de notification. Aussi, la durée de toute manoeuvre militaire notifiable n'excèdera-t-elle pas 15 jours.

Nous espérons, monsieur le Président, que cette proposition sera examinée au cours du travail dans un cadre non-formel, en conformité avec notre accord du 14 octobre 1955.

Je voudrais faire appel à tous les participants de considérer cette proposition avec un esprit ouvert, dans le contexte de la coopération et de la compréhension réciproque.

L'esprit même de notre temps exige une restrainte des activités militaires des Etats.

Merci pour votre attention. 72

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01002  
 C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARAGRAPHS MIS-NUMBERED)  
 ORIGINAL CDS NUMBER UNKNOWN  
 SUBJECT: U.S./SOVIET CONTACTS, FEBRUARY 3-7, 1986

1. CDE IX - 039
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: INTENSIVE CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET DELEGATION DURING THE PAST WEEK SUGGEST THAT THEIR PRIMARY GOAL IS TO RETRIEVE AS MUCH AS THEY CAN OF GORBACHEV'S "DEFERRAL" OF THE NAVAL ISSUE BY INSISTING THAT WE AGREE HERE AT STOCKHOLM THAT INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES BE ON THE AGENDA IN THE POST-VIENNA CONTINUATION OF CDE. THEY ARE READY TO EXPLORE THRESHOLDS AND THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT BILATERALLY BUT SO FAR SHOW NO FLEXIBILITY . THEY HAVE RECEIVED OUR MESSAGE ON THE NEED FOR INSPECTIONS WITH RESIGNATION AND MILD PROTEST. END SUMMARY.
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4. USDEL HAD INTENSIVE CONTACTS WITH SOVIET DELEGATION DURING THE WEEK OF FEBRUARY 3-7. ALL SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION ATTENDED A BUFFET DINNER AT AMBASSADOR BARRY'S RESIDENCE FEBRUARY 6; IN ADDITION THERE WAS A GRINEVSKY-BARRY BILATERAL FEBRUARY 3 AND A BARRY-HANSEN/GRINEVSKY-TATARNIKOV WORKING LUNCH FEBRUARY 7, BOTH LAST-MINUTE SOVIET INITIATIVES. THE SOVIETS HAVE PROPOSED CONTINUING THE WEEKLY WORKING LUNCH AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING. BECAUSE MOST OF THE ISSUES WERE DISCUSSED REPEATEDLY, THIS REPORT COVERS TOPICS WITHOUT REGARD TO WHERE THEY WERE BROUGHT UP.
5. GORBACHEV STATEMENT: THE MAIN POINT WHICH THE SOVIETS WISHED TO DISCUSS WAS THE "U.S. RESPONSE" TO THE GORBACHEV JANUARY 15 STATEMENT WITH ITS PROPOSAL TO DEFER NOTIFICATION OF NAVAL EXERCISES UNTIL THE SECOND STAGE OF THE CDE. WHAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION WANTS IS AGREEMENT BY THE STOCKHOLM CONFEREES TO HAVE INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES ON THE AGENDA OF THE POST-VIENNA PHASE OF CDE. SOME IMPLIED THAT UNLESS THE WEST AGREED TO THIS, THE GORBACHEV OFFER WOULD BE WITHDRAWN AND THERE COULD BE NO DRAFTING ON NOTIFICATION, FORECASTING, OR OBSERVATION. (BEGIN COMMENT: WE THINK THIS IS A BLUFF. END COMMENT.) OUR REACTION WAS THAT IT WAS NOT IN THE CONFERENCE'S POWER TO DECIDE WHAT WOULD BE DISCUSSED DURING THE NEXT PHASE. THIS WOULD BE THE TASK OF THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE. IN ANY CASE, WE HAD NOT CHANGED OUR MINDS ABOUT THE MEANING OF THE MADRID MANDATE. INTERESTINGLY, THE SOVIETS CONFIRMED THAT THEY THOUGHT THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF VIENNA DECIDING ON A NEW STAGE OF CDE.
6. THRESHOLDS: WE EXPLORED SOVIET FLEXIBILITY ON THRESHOLDS BY ASKING FOR SOVIET THOUGHTS ON THE NNA PROPOSAL WITH ITS THREE CATEGORIES OF PARAMETERS

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(STRUCTURAL, NUMERICAL AND EQUIPMENT). ALTHOUGH WE HAD RAISED THIS QUESTION PUBLICLY IN THE WORKING GROUP, THE SOVIETS SAID THEY WERE TAKEN BY SURPRISE AND NEEDED TIME TO THINK THE QUESTION OVER. THEY TRIED -- WITHOUT SUCCESS -- TO STEER CONVERSATION TOWARD A DISCUSSION OF SPECIFIC NUMERICAL PARAMETERS. GENERAL TATARNIKOV DID NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PARAMETERS OTHER THAN NUMERICAL PARAMETERS BUT HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE IN DETAIL. HOWEVER, THEY DID EXPRESS INTEREST IN PURSUING THE ISSUE AT FUTURE LUNCHES.

7. PROCEDURAL ISSUES: MUCH OF OUR BILATERAL DISCUSSION, AS USUAL, INVOLVED PROCEDURE. THE SOVIETS HAVE RELUCTANTLY ACCEPTED THE IDEA OF BRACKETLESS DRAFTING AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING. BUT THEY ARE STILL SMARTING OVER WESTERN REQUESTS FOR IMMEDIATE SOVIET RESPONSES TO NATO COMPROMISE TEXTS IN ENGLISH. IT WAS CLEAR THAT ONE OF THE MAIN REASONS FOR SOVIET INSISTENCE ON TIME TO REACT IS TATARNIKOV'S INABILITY TO DIGEST ENGLISH TEXTS ON THE SPOT AND UNWILLINGNESS TO RESPOND IMMEDIATELY TO THEM. TATARNIKOV DESCRIBED TWO POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES: 1) TO INTRODUCE TEXTS THROUGH THE COORDINATOR OR 2) TO HAVE CONTACT GROUP MEETINGS TO INFORM OTHERS OF WHAT WOULD BE DISCUSSED OR TABLED.

8. WE URGED FLEXIBILITY ON PROCEDURAL MATTERS, I.E., THAT WE NOT INSIST ON A GIVEN METHODOLOGY FOR DRAFTING BUT USE DIFFERENT METHODS IN DIFFERENT SITUATIONS. WE SAID THAT IT WAS TOO EARLY TO MEET IN CONTACT GROUPS AND THE COORDINATORS ARE NOT READY TO DRAFT TEXTS. BUT WE AGREE THAT IN THE FUTURE IT WOULD BE MORE USEFUL TO GIVE TEXTS TO THE COORDINATOR SHORTLY BEFORE A GIVEN MEETING SO THAT HE COULD STUDY, BUT NOT MODIFY, THEM. HANSEN SUGGESTED THAT ONE METHOD WHICH THE WEST MIGHT TRY WOULD BE TO EXAMINE TABLED PROPOSALS, EXPRESS WESTERN VIEWS IN THE APPROPRIATE WORKING GROUPS REGARDING POSSIBLE AREAS FOR CONSENSUS, GIVE THE EAST AND THE MNA THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS, THEN ALLOW ANY PARTICIPANT, INCLUDING THE COORDINATOR, TO DRAFT A TEXT.

9. GORBACHEV ON CONSTRAINTS/THRESHOLDS. IN RESPONSE TO OUR REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION AS TO WHETHER THE CDE SECTION OF GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 PROPOSAL REFERRED TO CONSTRAINTS (LIMITATIONS ON THE SIZE OF EXERCISES) OR THRESHOLDS (LOWERING THE HELSINKI PARAMETERS ON NOTIFICATION/OBSERVATION), GRINEVSKY UNHESITATINGLY SAID THAT THRESHOLDS WERE WHAT WAS MEANT.

10. INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES: ROZANOV OBSERVED THAT INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES OVER THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT WERE WITHIN THE MADRID MANDATE. WHEN QUERIED AS TO HOW SUCH AIR ACTIVITIES COULD BE VERIFIED, ROZANOV STATED THAT A SWISS STUDY SHOWED HOW AN AWAC'S PLANE COULD BE

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USED, I.E., AWAC'S AIRCRAFT COULD BE RENTED AND OPERATED ON A MULTINATIONAL BASIS. AT THE SAME TIME, NONE OF THE SOVIETS GAVE ANY INDICATION THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO DROP NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES OVER THE ADJOINING SEA AREA. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE INCLUDED.

11. INFORMATION: TATARNIKOV INDICATED THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE WILLING TO GIVE SOME "STATIC" INFORMATION IF WE WOULD PROVIDE "STATIC" INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE OF OUR GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL FORCES IN THE ZONE. (BEGIN COMMENT: WHILE IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THE SOVIETS ARE COMING AROUND TO ACCEPTING THE SUBSTANCE OF OUR MEASURE 1, THIS MAY INDICATE A WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION AND IDENTITY OF UNITS PARTICIPATING IN NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES. END COMMENT.)

12. INSPECTION: WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT FOR US INSPECTION IS A SINE QUA NON. THE SOVIETS HAVE LISTENED RESIGNEDLY AND OCCASIONALLY PROTESTED, BUT THE MESSAGE HAS GOTTEN THROUGH.


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13. NUF: RAKHMANINOV EXPRESSED SOME STUDIED FRUSTRATION AT THE "SLOW PACE" OF THE NUF DISCUSSIONS. HOWEVER, HE ALLOWED THAT IT WAS PROBABLY NOT POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE CONSENSUS AGREEMENT TO A FULL STRUCTURE FOR NUF WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS. HE AGREED TO CONSIDER AN APPROACH BASED ON THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS FOR THE NEXT FEW WEEKS OF NUF DISCUSSION: THE LINKAGE BETWEEN NUF AND CONCRETE CSBM'S, THE COMMITMENT TO THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, AND THE NUF PRINCIPLE ITSELF. (BEGIN COMMENT: IF THE WEST IS ABLE TO GET EASTERN CONCURRENCE TO A WORKING GROUP DISCUSSION BASED ON SOMETHING RESEMBLING THE ABOVE FORMULA, WE WILL HAVE BOUGHT SOME MUCH-NEEDED TIME TO DEVELOP A COMMON NATO LINE ON NUF. FURTHERMORE, THE THREE ELEMENTS MENTIONED ABOVE ARE ABOUT AS CLOSE AS WE CAN GET TO A CORE POSITION ALL NATO DELEGATIONS CAN ACCEPT. WE CANNOT GUARANTEE, HOWEVER, THAT THE EAST -- OR SOME OF THE NNA -- WILL ACCEPT THIS APPROACH OR WILL DELAY INTRODUCING NUF DRAFTING TEXTS IN THE COMING WEEKS. END COMMENT.)

14. OVERALL ASSESSMENT: THE SOVIETS ARE REACTING WITH SOME CONFUSION AND UNCERTAINTY TO THE NEW PROCEDURAL SITUATION (I.E., DRAFTING) AND THEY ALSO SEEM CONFUSED ABOUT HOW TO HANDLE THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT. THE GENERAL STAFF SEEMS TO BE LEADING THE (HOPELESS) EFFORT TO FIX INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES ON THE POST-STOCKHOLM CDE AGENDA. BUT ON THE WHOLE THE SOVIET APPROACH IS NON-POLEMICAL AND GENERALLY FLEXIBLE ON PROCEDURAL ISSUES. HOWEVER, THEY ARE INSISTENT THAT THEY HAVE MADE THEIR LAST "UNILATERAL CONCESSION" AND ARE DISAPPOINTED THAT NOBODY RECOGNIZES IT AS SUCH. WE

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DOUBT THAT MUCH OF SUBSTANCE WILL COME FROM WEEKLY  
MEETINGS BUT CONTINUING THE EXPLORATION IS CLEARLY IN  
OUR INTEREST. END COMMENT.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01034  
 SUBJECT: CDE WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS,  
 - FEBRUARY 3-7, 1986

1. CDE IX - 044
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. BEGIN SUMMARY: LITTLE SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS WAS MADE LAST WEEK AS THE CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS, AS IS THEIR WONT, CONCENTRATED ON PROCEDURAL ISSUES -- IN THIS CASE, HOW TO FACILITATE THE DRAFTING PROCESS. THE SOVIETS ARE CLEARLY UNCOMFORTABLE DRAFTING IN THE MORE FLUID ATMOSPHERE OF THE WORKING GROUPS AND PREFER SMALL COFFEE GROUPS WHERE THEY HAVE A VIRTUAL VETO OVER THE TEXTS EMERGING INTO THE LARGER GROUP. IN THE NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUPS, THE WEST SEIZED THE INITIATIVE BY TABLING A COMPROMISE TEXT BASED ON SWISS AND IRISH PROPOSALS. IN OTHER WORKING GROUPS THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE MEETING OF THE MINDS. ON NON-USE OF FORCE, THE EAST BEGRUDGINGLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT LINKAGE BETWEEN THE NUF PRINCIPLE AND CONCRETE CSBM'S MUST BE REFLECTED IN A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. ON THE SIDELINES, SOVIET DELEGATES HAVE SAID THEY WANT THE CONFERENCE TO AGREE THAT INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES WILL BE ON THE AGENDA OF CDE AFTER VIENNA. OUR RESPONSE HAS BEEN THAT ONLY THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE CAN DECIDE WHAT CDE WILL DISCUSS AFTER VIENNA. END SUMMARY.

4. OVERVIEW: LITTLE FORWARD PROGRESS WAS REGISTERED THIS WEEK AS THE CDE SHIP ENTERED THE UNCHARTED WATERS OF DRAFTING A EUROPEAN SECURITY ACCORD. THE 35 PASSENGERS ON THE STOCKHOLM SHAKEDOWN CRUISE STILL DISPLAY MORE SUSPICION THAN CONFIDENCE REGARDING EACH OTHER'S METHODS AND MOTIVATIONS. AS HAS ALL TOO OFTEN BEEN THE CASE WHEN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE FOCUSED ON PROCEDURE (IN THIS CASE HOW TO DRAFT), IT IS SUBSTANCE THAT SUFFERS. AS USUAL, IT IS SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS THAT ARE AT THE ROOT OF THE PROCEDURAL WRANGLING. THE SOVIETS, UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE FLUIDITY AND UNPREDICTABILITY OF THE WORKING GROUPS, PREFER TO MOVE THE REAL NEGOTIATIONS TO THE BACK ROOM WHERE A FEW SELECT DELEGATIONS MIGHT ENGAGE THE COORDINATORS IN SOME REAL GIVE-AND-TAKE. WE BELIEVE SUCH A MOVE WOULD BE PREMATURE, AND WOULD HARM OUR ABILITY TO DRAFT IN THE LARGER WORKING GROUPS. ODDLY, THE NEUTRALS SEEM EVEN MORE HESITANT ABOUT MOVING TO DRAFTING THAN THE EAST, PERHAPS BECAUSE THEY FEAR THEIR OWN PROPOSALS WILL BE IGNORED BY EAST AND WEST.

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5. NOTIFICATION: THE WEST SEIZED THE INITIATIVE IN THE WORKING GROUP ON FEBRUARY 4 BY TABLING A COMPROMISE TEXT BASED ON A SWISS TEXT TABLED THE PREVIOUS WEEK AND AN IRISH PROPOSAL TABLED THIS WEEK. THE SOVIET GENERAL

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(TATARNIKOV), CAUGHT OFF GUARD, REACTED NEGATIVELY, IN PART BECAUSE HE DOES NOT SPEAK ENGLISH. WE HAVE AGREED TO PROVIDE THE COORDINATOR WITH TEXTS SHORTLY BEFORE TABLING THEM FOR HIS INFORMATION BUT NOT FOR MODIFICATION.

6. OUTSIDE THE WORKING GROUP THE MAIN SOVIET PREOCCUPATION HAS BEEN THE U.S. RESPONSE -- OR LACK THEREOF -- TO GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL TO DEFER NOTIFICATION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNTIL THE NEXT STAGE OF THE CDE. THEY WANT THE CONFERENCE TO AGREE THAT INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES WILL BE ON THE POST-VIENNA CDE AGENDA. THEY WARN DARKLY THAT WITHOUT SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING THERE WILL BE NO AGREEMENT ON NOTIFICATION BEFORE SEPTEMBER 19 (THE CDE ADJOURNMENT DATE). OUR RESPONSE HAS BEEN THAT ONLY THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING (NOT THE CDE) CAN DECIDE WHAT A FUTURE STAGE OF THE CDE WILL DISCUSS. WE THINK THE SOVIETS ARE BLUFFING ON THIS.

7. OBSERVATION: REPRESENTATIVES OF THE THREE GROUPS INTRODUCED TEXTS ON OBSERVATION IN THE WORKING GROUP ON FEBRUARY 6. NATO ONCE AGAIN SUBMITTED SC.1/AMPLIFIED LANGUAGE, THIS TIME ON THE MANDATORY INVITATION OF OBSERVERS FROM ALL STATES AND ON THE NUMBER OF OBSERVERS (MAXIMUM OF TWO PER STATE) TO BE INVITED. POLAND (STANIEWSKI) INTRODUCED LANGUAGE WHICH FUZZED THE ISSUE OF WHETHER STATES WOULD BE REQUIRED TO SEND INVITATIONS TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES (ON BEHALF OF THE EAST, POLAND HAS LONG ADVOCATED SENDING INVITATIONS ONLY TO STATES WHOSE SECURITY IS AFFECTED BY EXERCISES, I.E., NEIGHBORING STATES) AND ON WHETHER ALL NOTIFIED MILITARY ACTIVITIES WOULD BE SUBJECT TO OBSERVATION. SWITZERLAND (SCHARLI) TOOK ISSUE WITH LANGUAGE IN THE POLISH TEXT TABLED THE PREVIOUS WEEK WHICH DESCRIBED THE PURPOSE OF OBSERVATION AS BEING THE CONFIRMATION OF "PEACEFUL

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INTENTIONS." NOTING THAT INTENTIONS ARE NOT VERIFIABLE, THE SWISS MILREP TABLED LANGUAGE WHICH EMPHASIZED CONFIRMATION OF THE "ROUTINE" AND "NON-THREATENING" CHARACTER OF AN ACTIVITY AS THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF OBSERVATION. HE ALSO NOTED THAT OBSERVERS WOULD BE ABLE TO CONFIRM THAT THE ACTIVITY ITSELF CORRESPONDED TO THE NOTIFICATION. AUSTRIA AND SWEDEN OUTLINED POSSIBLE COMMON GROUND BETWEEN THE NNA (SC.7) AND NATO (SC.1 AMPLIFIED) PROPOSALS, DROPPING REFERENCES IN SC.7 TO MANEUVERS AND PRIOR NOTIFICATION. HOWEVER, FINLAND REINSERTED THE CONTROVERSIAL LANGUAGE FROM THE NNA PROPOSAL IN ITS INTERVENTION.

8. NON-USE OF FORCE: FOR THE FIRST TIME THE EAST PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE NUF PRINCIPLE AND CONCRETE CSBM'S HAS TO BE INCLUDED IN A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. AS COULD BE EXPECTED, EASTERN AND WESTERN CONCEPTS OF THIS LINKAGE DIFFERED SOMEWHAT. THE

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WEST, WITH THE U.S. (GUNDERSEN) AS THE LEAD SPEAKER, ARGUED THAT THE LINKAGE BETWEEN CSBM'S AND THE NUF PRINCIPLE IS CENTRAL TO THE DISCUSSION OF NUF, THAT CSBM'S CREATE OPERATIONAL BARRIERS WHICH MAKE THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE LESS LIKELY AND THAT THE FINAL ACT AND THE MADRID MANDATE CONTAIN ELEMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DRAFTING LANGUAGE TO DESCRIBE THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE TWO. USSR (RAKHMANINOV) TRIED TO PLAY DOWN THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF THE NUF/CSBM'S LINKAGE BY ARGUING THAT IT IS ONLY ONE OF THREE LINKAGES BETWEEN NUF AND THE PURPOSES OF THE CONFERENCE, PRIDE OF PLACE BEING ACCORDED EXPRESSION OF THE PRINCIPLE ITSELF. THE USSR AND YUGOSLAVIA (BOZOVIC) PRESSED FOR AN "ELABORATION" OF NUF WHICH WOULD ENCOMPASS THE "MULTIPLE PURPOSES" OF THE CONFERENCE, I.E., CONFIDENCE-BUILDING, SECURITY-BUILDING AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE. CYPRUS (PAPADAPOULOS), EVER EAGER FOR PROGRESS ON NUF, TRIED -- WITHOUT NOTICEABLE SUCCESS -- TO SERVE AS GO-BETWEEN BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

9. THE GENERAL EASTERN APPROACH TO THE NUF WORKING GROUP IS AIMED AT ASSURING A LEADING POSITION FOR NUF IN ANY AGREEMENT EMERGING OUT OF STOCKHOLM BY NEGOTIATING AN EXTENSIVE AGENDA FOR WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS ON NUF. HUNGARY (KORMENDY) TRIED TO PURSUE THIS TACK BY PRESENTING A NUMBER OF ELEMENTS WHICH COULD FIGURE IN A PREAMBLE TO A NUF SECTION -- OR, CONCEIVABLY COULD MAKE UP A SEPARATE DECLARATION IF THE EAST DECIDES TO PUSH FOR SEPARATE NUF AND CSBM'S AGREEMENTS. SO FAR, EXCEPT FOR IMPLICITLY ABANDONING THE UNSALEABLE IDEA OF A TREATY ON NUF, THE EAST HAS NOT INDICATED WHAT FORM IT WOULD LIKE A REAFFIRMATION OF THE PRINCIPLE TO TAKE, ALTHOUGH IT HAS IMPLICITLY ACCEPTED THE IDEA THAT SUCH A REAFFIRMATION WOULD BE CONTAINED IN A SINGLE DOCUMENT. ALLIED DELEGATIONS ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY IMPATIENT FOR NATO TO HAMMER OUT A COMMON POSITION AND LANGUAGE ON NUF. AN AUGMENTED HEADS-ONLY NATO CAUCUS DEDICATED TO NUF HAS BEEN CALLED FOR FEBRUARY 19.

10. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION: NATO TABLED LANGUAGE FROM SC.1/AMPLIFIED. IN THIS WORKING GROUP, WHERE THE WEST TABLED MEASURE 1 LANGUAGE, THE SOVIET UNION REFUSED TO "CONSIDER" IT OR EVEN TO "NOTE IT DOWN" BECAUSE IT ADDRESSED "INDEPENDENT" INFORMATION AND, IN THEIR VIEW, INFORMATION ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF NOTIFICATION SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN THIS GROUP. THEY RAISED HACKNEYED ARGUMENTS THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSAL AMOUNTED TO "LEGITIMIZED ESPIONAGE." THE EAST SUBSEQUENTLY SUBMITTED A TEXT PROPOSING THAT INFORMATION BE EXCHANGED IN THE CONTEXT OF A NOTIFICATION, AN ISSUE WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE WORKING GROUP DEALING WITH NOTIFICATION. THIS TRIGGERED A DEBATE BOTH ON WHERE SUCH A PROPOSAL SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AS WELL AS ON THE

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SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL. SWEDEN SUPPORTED THE NEED FOR STATIC INFORMATION WHICH, IN ITS VIEW, DID NOT "NECESSARILY" HAVE TO BE INCLUDED IN A SEPARATE CHAPTER (LIKE SC.1'S MEASURE 1). SOME ALLIES APPEAR READY TO EMPHASIZE THE SUBSTANCE OF STATIC INFORMATION WHICH IN OUR VIEW COULD MISTAKENLY SIGNAL A WILLINGNESS TO FALL OFF OF MEASURE 1. WE HAVE SO FAR HELD THEM AT BAY.

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11. CONSTRAINTS/ANNUAL FORECASTS: THE EAST TRIED TO STEAL THE SHOW IN THE PLENARY ON FEBRUARY 7 WHEN BULGARIA (TODOROV) INTRODUCED AN EASTERN PROPOSAL ON CONSTRAINTS WHICH CRIBBED HEAVILY FROM THE NNA PROPOSAL. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL CALLED FOR A CEILING ON EXERCISES FIVE TIMES THE NOTIFICATION LEVEL AND LIMITED THE DURATION OF EXERCISES TO 15 DAYS (VICE 17 IN SC.7). THE EAST THUS WAS ABLE TO WIN POINTS FROM THE NNA BY BUYING ON TO SEVERAL ASPECTS OF THEIR CONCEPT OF CONSTRAINTS; AT THE SAME TIME, IT TRIED FURTHER TO ISOLATE AND PRESSURE THE WEST ON THE CONSTRAINTS ISSUE. (IN A PRIVATE CONVERSATION SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY HINTED THAT HE EXPECTED A THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION WHICH WOULD RESULT IN AN 80,000 CONSTRAINT CEILING. HOW MUCH OF THE EAST'S MUCH PROFESSED AFFINITY FOR CONSTRAINTS IS REAL AND HOW MUCH TACTICAL IS ANOTHER QUESTION, HOWEVER.  
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END OF MESSAGE  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01046

SUBJECT: POLAND OBSERVATION TEXT

L. CDE IX - 037

2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT

3. AT THE FEBRUARY LO WORKING GROUP A B MEETING, AMBASSADOR KONARSKI (POLAND) DISTRIBUTED A LO-POINT TEXT FOR THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS. TEXT IS AS FOLLOWS:

ON THE QUESTION OF THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS (AS REFERRED TO IN THE INTERVENTION OF AMBASSADOR WLODZIMIERZ KONARSKI, HEAD OF THE POLISH DELEGATION):

(1) THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL INVITE OBSERVERS FROM ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES TO NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES (TO BE DEFINED).

(2) INVITATIONS WILL BE EXTENDED TO PARTICIPATING STATES THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

(3) INVITATIONS WILL BE TRANSMITTED TO PARTICIPATING STATES AT THE TIME OF NOTIFICATION.

(4) A REPLY TO THE INVITATION WILL BE GIVEN NOT LATER THAN 15 DAYS BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THE OBSERVATION.

(5) A PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH HAS RECEIVED AN INVITATION MAY SEND NO MORE THAN TWO OBSERVERS TO A MILITARY ACTIVITY.

(6) THE PRINCIPAL AIMS OF OBSERVATION ARE TO PROMOTE CONTACTS AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING, AND TO ESTABLISH THE PEACEFUL INTENTIONS OF THE HOST STATE AND TO ASCERTAIN THE CONFORMITY OF THE OBSERVED ACTIVITY WITH THE PRIOR NOTIFICATION.

(7) TOGETHER WITH THE INVITATION, PARTICIPATING STATES WILL RECEIVE GENERAL INFORMATION ON THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME, ITS ORGANIZATION, AND ON THE MEANS OF OBSERVATION, PRINTED MATERIALS, INCLUDING THE DESCRIPTION OF THE NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY.

(8) EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL DECIDE FOR ITSELF WHETHER TO SEND MILITARY OR CIVILIAN OBSERVERS.

(9) THE OBSERVERS WILL RECEIVE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE AIMS, OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY TO BE OBSERVED.

(10) WHENEVER POSSIBLE, THE OBSERVERS WILL BE ENTITLED TO OBSERVE THE ACTIVITIES OF COMMANDING STAFF, MILITARY UNITS AND SUB-UNITS, AND TO ENTER INTO DIRECT CONTACT WITH ALL RANKS OF THE FORCES ENGAGED.

4. THE ABOVE-MENTIONED POINTS ARE INTENDED TO BE OF HELP IN THE DISCUSSION AND MAY BE DEVELOPED OR SUPPLEMENTED ACCORDING TO THE PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATIONS.

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END OF MESSAGE

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*Anibazudan*  
*Ceterchi*

prononcée par le  
Chef de la Délégation de  
Roumanie *[Signature]*

le 14 février 1986

Monsieur le Président,

La Conférence sur les mesures de confiance et de sécurité et sur le désarmement en Europe est entrée dans sa phase décisive- la phase de la rédaction du document final. Les travaux de la Conférence sont d'ores et déjà orientés dans la bonne direction, comme il a été- à juste titre- souligné dans cette enceinte.

Les trente cinq Etats participants à la Conférence ont exprimé, tous, leur volonté d'utiliser les prémisses créées par les deux ans de travail et de recherches afin de parvenir à un accord sur un ensemble de mesures qui puissent contribuer effectivement à l'accroissement de la confiance et de la sécurité et ouvrir ainsi la voie au désarmement en Europe.

Les travaux de la Conférence se déroulent actuellement dans un contexte international qui réclame et en même temps fait possible la conclusion d'un accord.

En effet, la situation internationale continue à rester grave et complexe. Le danger que représente pour tous les Etats participants à la Conférence l'accélération de la course aux armements, notamment nucléaires, n'est pas écarté. C'est pourquoi il est nécessaire de tout mettre en oeuvre, de n'épargner aucun effort pour arrêter le cours dangereux des événements, pour que tous les Etats s'engagent résolument dans une politique de désarmement, de détente, de compréhension et de coopération.

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Il est vrai que ce dernier temps des rayons encourageants sont parus à l'horizon ce qui pourraient annoncer le rassérénement de la vie internationale. Pourtant, les lourds nouages de la course aux armements, de la politique de force, de tension et de menaces continuent à assombrir les rapports internationaux.

L'intensification des contacts entre les facteurs responsables des différents pays peuvent-nous en sommes persuadés- contribuer à dissiper la méfiance, les malentendus, à augmenter la confiance et la coopération. Les résultats enregistrés au sommet soviéto-américain de Genève en témoignent. Les faits, la vie même devront nous montrer la vraie signification de cette rencontre. Après le sommet de Genève il faut passer à des actions concrètes, effectives, dans l'esprit des engagements assumés et des déclarations faites sur la liquidation des missiles nucléaires à portée moyenne déployés en Europe, de toutes les armes nucléaires, sur l'arrêt de toute action visant la militarisation du Cosmos.

Dans ce contexte, la délégation roumaine voudrait souligner l'importance que revêt le complexe de propositions présentées récemment par l'Union Soviétique, destinées à contribuer à l'arrêt de la course aux armements nucléaires, de la militarisation du Cosmos, à l'élimination totale des armes nucléaires, à la diminution générale du danger de guerre, à l'accroissement de la confiance et au renforcement de la sécurité.

La Roumanie est profondément préoccupée par l'état actuel de la situation internationale et agit par tous les moyens dont elle dispose pour le dialogue, la détente, la confiance et le rapprochement entre les nations, pour le désarmement, la sécurité et la coopération en Europe et dans le monde. L'une des préoccupations constantes de mon pays est l'élimination de la menace nucléaire sur

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notre continent, de toute menace de destruction massive, au niveau sous-régional, régional et global. Je ne voudrais pas m'arrêter sur les initiatives prises par la Roumanie dans ce domaine dans différents fora internationales. Je voudrait simplement informer la Conférence sur une initiative commune récente roumano-bulgare visant l'élimination des armes chimiques de la zone des Balkans.

Comme il a été mentionné au début même des travaux de la présente session de la Conférence, à côté des armes nucléaires, les armes chimiques représentent un réel danger pour la sécurité et la paix européenne.

Pour que l'élimination de la menace chimique soit devenue réalité, le président de la République Socialiste de Roumanie, Nicolae Ceaușescu et le président du Conseil d'Etat de la République Populaire de Bulgarie, Todor Jivkov ont signé à Bucarest, le 22 décembre dernier, une Déclaration-appel sur la création d'une zone libre d'armes chimiques dans les Balkans.

Examinant l'évolution de la situation internationale et notamment les problèmes concernant la consolidation de la paix et de la sécurité en Europe et constatant les graves dangers que comporte la poursuite de la course aux armements, de l'expérimentation, de la production et du déploiement de nouvelles armes nucléaires et d'autres moyens de destruction massive, les deux présidents ont lancé un appel solennel aux chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement des pays balkaniques, pour unir et conjuguer les efforts de tous les Etats de cette région en vue de transformer les Balkans en une zone libre d'armes chimiques.

Les deux pays voisins et amis sont persuadés que la proclamation des Balkans comme zone libre d'armes chimiques serait un pas important vers la libération complète de l'Europe d'une catégorie d'armes extrêmement dangereuses et contribuerait au raffermissement de la confiance et de la co-opération entre les pays et les peuples de cette région.



La mise en oeuvre de cette initiative serait de nature à contribuer effectivement aux efforts déployés pour l'interdiction générale et complète des armes chimiques et la destruction des stocks existants, et à stimuler les négociations qui ont lieu à cet effet.

L'évolution de la situation internationale actuelle impose, d'autre part, une intensification des efforts de tous les Etats dans les organismes de négociations multilatérales sur le désarmement, tels que la Conférence de Genève, les traitatives de Vienne, ainsi que la Conférence de Stockholm.

Monsieur le Président,

La Conférence de Stockholm a un rôle important à jouer dans la consolidation de la paix et de la sécurité en Europe, dans le développement de la confiance et de la coopération entre les pays européens, dans les efforts qui ont pour but la réalisation d'une Europe unie, fondée sur le respect de la diversité des systèmes sociaux, du droit qu'a chaque peuple de choisir le système qu'il desire, sans ingérence étrangère aucune.

La place et le rôle de la Conférence de Stockholm dans le processus de la CSC n'est mis en doute par aucun Etat participant. La volonté commune de parvenir à un accord a trouvé son expression concrète aussi bien dans les structures de travail actuelles, que dans la mise en évidence des domaines d'un consensus potentiel. Comme nous l'avons dit avant la fin de l'année passée, nous sommes persuadés que, dans les circonstances actuelles, on peut parvenir à un accord dont les composantes principales seraient les suivantes:

a) Le développement et l'amélioration des mesures de confiance prévues par l'Acte final de Helsinki.

À notre avis, les efforts devraient être concentrés

dans ce domaine dans la direction de l'adoption de mesures de confiance et de sécurité qui aient pour but:

-la notification préalable obligatoire des manoeuvres militaires, des mouvements de troupes et d'autres activités militaires qui par leur ampleur mettent en danger la sécurité d'autres Etats (il est à noter, dans ce contexte, que les progrès enregistrés ce dernier temps par des approches nouvelles pourraient faciliter dans une large mesure le consensus);

-la diminution du niveau des effectifs des troupes et des armements engagés dans les manoeuvres militaires ou dans les mouvements de troupes qui doivent être notifiés et l'extension du délai d'annonce préalable de ces activités;

-l'extension de la notification préalable à d'autres activités militaires comme, par exemple, aux manoeuvres auxquelles participent également des unités aéroportées et amphibies;

-l'information mutuelle sur les plans annuels de manoeuvres, de mouvements de troupes et d'autres activités militaires notifiables (la délégation roumaine voit le calendrier annuel comme une première étape du régime de notification ayant un certain potentiel de contrainte);

-un échange accru de données et d'informations sur les activités militaires notifiables, leur but, l'endroit où elles se déroulent et les forces armées qui y prennent part;

-l'invitation des observateurs des autres Etats participants à la Conférence pour assister aux manoeuvres militaires, aux mouvements de troupes et à d'autres activités militaires qui pourraient mettre en danger la sécurité d'autres Etats.

b) La limitation des activités militaires qui suscitent des suspicions particulières, ainsi que des effectifs qui participent aux manoeuvres militaires, du nombre et de la durée de telles

manoeuvres, notamment quand elles sont organisées de sorte qu'elles puissent servir de démonstration de force ou de moyens de pression sur d'autres Etats.

Je voudrais évoquer à ce propos l'importance que ma délégation attache aux idées contenues dans le projet présenté par les pays neutres et non-alignés (SC-7), ainsi que la similitude d'approches et de solutions préconisées par ce groupe de pays et par la Roumanie. Nous sommes heureux de constater qu'il y a des mouvements dans ce domaine et que d'autres pays se sont ralliés aux points de vue que nous avons soutenu à la session précédente.

Nous ne considérons nullement qu'il est vain de rechercher à ce stade de la Conférence une limitation des activités et des forces militaires sur notre continent. Nous estimons au contraire qu'il est de notre devoir de le faire et de le faire le plus vite possible si nous voulons réaliser - comme nous nous sommes proposé - plus de confiance et plus de sécurité, car la grande espérance de nos nations est justement - comme il a été dit dans cette salle - de bénéficier de plus de confiance et de plus de sécurité.

c) la création d'un cadre pour l'échange d'informations, pour les communications et les consultations entre les 35 Etats participants sur les problèmes relatifs à la confiance et à la sécurité et pour prévenir et trouver des solutions aux situations de crise. Un pareil cadre pourrait être créé, dans une première étape - comme nous l'avons déjà précisé - par l'établissement des liaisons téléphoniques ou par telex entre les 35 Etats participants, ainsi que par l'organisation des réunions des représentants de ces pays appelées à examiner la mise en oeuvre des mesures de confiance et de sécurité qui seront adoptées par la Conférence.

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d) L'adoption d'une Déclaration sur le non-recours à la menace ou à l'emploi de la force.

Dans ce domaine il y a également un certain progrès, mais nous sommes encore loin de ce que devrait contenir le futur accord. Ma délégation voudrait préciser qu'une simple réaffirmation du principe du non-recours à la menace ou à l'emploi de la force ne nous satisfera pas. Les débats ont montré qu'un nombre croissant d'Etats participants sont du même avis.

La Roumanie a présenté déjà à la Conférence les considérations qui l'ont déterminé à juger que l'adoption d'une Déclaration sur le non-recours à la menace ou à l'emploi de la force est plus que nécessaire dans les circonstances internationales actuelles et qu'elle est en même temps conforme aux dispositions de l'Acte final de Helsinki et du Document de clôture de la Réunion de Madrid. Je n'ai pas l'intention d'y revenir. Je voudrais seulement souligner qu'une pareille Déclaration, qui marquerait un pas vers un éventuel traité européen en la matière, devrait non seulement réaffirmer mais également indiquer les voies et les moyens par lesquels les Etats participants s'engagent à respecter l'obligation de s'abstenir dans leurs relations mutuelles, ainsi que dans leurs relations internationales en général, de recourir à la menace ou à l'emploi de la force, soit contre l'intégrité territoriale ou l'indépendance politique d'un Etat, soit de toute autre manière incompatible avec les buts des Nations Unies et les principes inscrits dans l'Acte final de Helsinki.

Pour ce qui est de la vérification, ma délégation s'en tient toujours aux considérations qu'elle a déjà présentés devant la Conférence, son option étant conforme au mandat qui indique que les mesures de confiance et de sécurité soient assorties de formes adéquates de vérification correspondant à leur contenu.

Monsieur le Président,

La Conférence dispose actuellement du cadre officiel et non-officiel de travail. En définissant la structure de travail de la Conférence, nous avons établi, en principe, la structure même du futur accord et, à notre connaissance, aucun pays participant n'a pas retiré son accord sur le compromis réalisé à la session précédente. Il faut donc poursuivre le chemin sur lequel nous nous sommes engagés et parvenir à un accord acceptable pour tous, à un accord qui puisse permettre à la Réunion de Vienne d'élaborer le mandat pour la deuxième phase de la Conférence appelée à développer le processus entamé à Stockholm et à convenir des mesures de désarmement.

Nous sommes du même avis exprimé par d'autres délégations, qu'il faut progresser en allant du simple au complexe et qu'il ne faut pas attendre la solution des problèmes controversés. Nous pouvons avancer parallèlement: résoudre d'abord les questions plus simples où l'accord est possible et chercher en même temps, dans un esprit de bonne volonté et de coopération, des solutions aux problèmes plus difficiles. Il ne faut pas perdre de vue non plus que le temps dont nous disposons est limité et qu'il passe très vite.

Nous avons l'avantage, Monsieur le Président, d'être secourus dans cette entreprise, par des coordinateurs dont la bonne foi, la compétence et la gentillesse sont au-dessus de tout soupçon. Il est donc de notre devoir de leur donner tout notre appui et de leur faire confiance.

Monsieur le Président,

J'ai commencé mon intervention en disant que la Conférence de Stockholm est entrée dans sa phase décisive- la phase de la rédaction du document final. Le temps pour les dissertations, la philosophie et les débats théoriques est déjà révolu. Les organes

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de travail ont été créés pour y négocier et rédiger les textes du document final de la Conférence. Nos délégations se sont engagés à respecter aussi bien les structures de négociation que les fonctions qui leur ont été attribuées. Malheureusement pas toujours et pas par tout cet engagement est respecté .

La délégation roumaine a fait preuve, comme d'autres délégations l'ont fait aussi, d'esprit de compromis et de coopération en revenant sur certaines de ses positions ou en laissant pour une étape ultérieure quelques unes des propositions qu'elle a présenté à la Conférence. Nous attendons et nous espérons que tous nos partenaires de négociations fassent leur bout de chemin, car c'est la seule voie qui pourrait nous amener à un accord.

La délégation de mon pays est prête à oeuvrer aussi dans les semaines à venir , de concert avec les autres délégations, à la recherche des solutions de compromis qui tiennent compte des intérêts de sécurité de tous les Etats participants.

Telles sont, Monsieur le Président, les considérations que la délégation de Roumanie voudrait partager, à ce stade- là des travaux de la Conférence aux distingués représentants d'autres pays participants.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01191  
 SUBJECT: CDE WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS,  
 FEBRUARY 10-14, 1986

1. CDE IX - 051
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. BEGIN SUMMARY AND OVERALL ASSESSMENT: THE CONFERENCE CONTINUED TO MOVE IN FITS AND STARTS TOWARDS DRAFTING. THE EAST HAS CLEARLY BEEN THROWN OFF BALANCE BY NATO'S ACTIVISM ON DRAFTING; EASTERN DELEGATES ARGUE, UNCONVINCINGLY, THAT WESTERN "COUNTERCONCESSIONS" TO THE JANUARY 15 GORBACHEV STATEMENT ARE NEEDED BEFORE SERIOUS DRAFTING CAN BEGIN. HOWEVER, THEY APPEARED TO BE READY TO DRAFT ON UNCONTENTIOUS ISSUES. THIS TIME IT WAS THE NNA WHO INDICATED THAT THEY WERE NOT READY TO DRAFT. THE SWEDES AND OTHER NNA WANTED TO DELAY DRAFTING TO BE SURE THAT SC.7 POSITIONS DID NOT GET LOST AS EAST AND WEST AGREED ON COMPROMISE LANGUAGE. THIS APPROACH IS BOTH DILATORY AND DANGEROUS AND WE HAVE TOLD THE NNA SO IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS. (A WORLDNET INTERVIEW BY AMBASSADOR BARRY LAMENTING NNA "HESITANCY" ALSO HAD AN IMPACT IN NNA CAPITALS.) BY THE END OF THE WEEK THE NNA WERE BACK ON TRACK EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR DRAFTING. NATO CONTINUED TO TABLE TEXTS BASED ON SC.1/AMPLIFIED IN ALL OF THE GROUPS WHERE WE HAVE PROPOSALS. SOME FORWARD MOVEMENT WAS REGISTERED ON THE OBSERVATION ISSUE WHEN THE EAST, FOR THE FIRST TIME, PROPOSED THAT OBSERVERS MUST BE INVITED FROM ALL PARTICIPATING STATES; THE EAST ALSO IMPLICITLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT VERIFICATION MAY BE CONSIDERED BEFORE OTHER MEASURES ARE AGREED AND SOMETHING BEYOND NTM'S AND "GOOD WILL" MAY BE REQUIRED TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE. FOR PRIMARILY TACTICAL REASONS, THE EAST CONTINUED TO COURT THE NNA BY INCORPORATING SOME OF THE NNA APPROACH TO CONSTRAINTS IN THEIR OWN PROPOSAL. IN THE ABSENCE OF A WESTERN POSITION ON NUF, THE U.S. CONTINUED TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE ELEMENTS FOR A NUF SECTION, E.G., EQUAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS. ON THE MARGINS OF THE CONFERENCE THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY ARE EAGER TO PIN DOWN A CONFERENCE AGREEMENT THAT NAVAL ACTIVITIES WOULD BE INCLUDED ON THE AGENDA OF A RESUMED STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. THE EAST IS BEGINNING TO ACKNOWLEDGE, IF NOT ACCEPT, OUR MESSAGE THAT ON-SITE INSPECTION IS THE BOTTOM LINE FOR THE U.S. TO ACCEPT A CDE AGREEMENT. END SUMMARY AND GENERAL ASSESSMENT.

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4. NOTIFICATION: ON FEBRUARY 11 THE GDR TABLED LANGUAGE ON THE METHOD OF NOTIFICATION OF MULTINATIONAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED "IN THE SEA (OCEAN) AREA AND AIR SPACE ADJOINING EUROPE." TAKEN AT FACE VALUE, THE TEXT AGAIN REGISTERS EASTERN REJECTION OF THE FUNCTIONAL

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APPROACH IN THE ADJOINING AREAS. ANOTHER INDICATION OF THE SOVIET PREOCCUPATION WITH NAVAL ACTIVITIES IS REFLECTED IN EASTERN RELUCTANCE TO DISCUSS PARAMETERS FOR NOTIFICATION OR TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED. THE ISSUE OF WHERE TO NEGOTIATE THE CONTENTS OF A NOTIFICATION CONTINUES TO BE CONTENTIOUS. SINCE THE EAST INSISTS ON DISCUSSING SUCH INFORMATION IN THE INFORMATION/VERIFICATION GROUP (SEE PARA 7), IT FINDS ITSELF IN THE UNCOMFORTABLE POSITION OF HAVING NOTHING TO SAY WHEN, AS OCCURRED THIS WEEK, THE NNA (SWITZERLAND) AND NATO (U.K.) TABLED TEXTS DESCRIBING THE CONTENTS OF NOTIFICATION. IT APPEARS THAT, FOR THE TIME BEING, THE SOVIETS HAVE ISOLATED THEMSELVES FROM BOTH THE WEST AND THE NNA ON THIS ISSUE. THEY PRESUMABLY WILL CONTINUE TO ADDRESS NOTIFICATION CONTENTS IN THE INFORMATION/VERIFICATION GROUP AS A COUNTERBALANCE TO NATO'S MEASURE 1. DISCUSSION IN THE WORKING GROUP INDICATES THAT THE NNA AND NATO SHARE SIMILAR CONCEPTIONS OF THE KIND OF INFORMATION A NOTIFICATION SHOULD CONTAIN. HOWEVER, THE NNA, CONCERNED WITH FIREPOWER AND MOBILITY AS INDICATORS OF MILITARY POTENTIAL WHICH COULD PROVE THREATENING, REQUIRE A MUCH MORE DETAILED ACCOUNTING OF EQUIPMENT INVOLVED IN NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES.

5. NUF: ALL SIDES STUDIOUSLY AVOIDED COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO ACTUAL DRAFTING: THE WEST BECAUSE IT HAS YET TO GET ITS COLLECTIVE ACT TOGETHER ON NUF; THE NNA BECAUSE THEY BOTH ANTICIPATE AND FEAR EAST-WEST COLLUSION ON THE SUBJECT; AND MOST SURPRISINGLY THE EAST, THE ORIGINAL DEMANDEUR OF NUF, PARTIALLY BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN THROWN OFF-BALANCE BY WESTERN ATTEMPTS TO EXPAND THE NUF AGENDA THIS ROUND. IN FACT, WHEN THE EASTERN NUF SPOKESMAN (KORMENDY - HUNGARY) WAS ASKED ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE THREE EASTERN TEXTS INTRODUCED THAT WEEK,

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HE REPLIED THAT THEY MERELY REPRESENT "ELEMENTS WHICH COULD FIGURE IN A NUF ACCORD" RATHER THAN ACTUAL DRAFT TEXTS. THE NNA COORDINATOR (LOIBL - AUSTRIA) HAS REGISTERED SOME COMMON GROUND IN THE WORKING GROUP BY NOTING THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS HAVE AGREED THAT THERE MUST BE A NUF-CSBM'S LINK AND SOME REFERENCE TO COMMITMENT TO THE HELSINKI FINAL DOCUMENT IN ANY STOCKHOLM ACCORD. THE U.S. STRESSED THAT THIS COMMITMENT MUST REFLECT ALL THE PRINCIPLES AND PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE NEED FOR IMPROVED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACT. THE MERE MENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, AN UNDERSTANDABLY NEURALGIC POINT FOR THE EAST, PROMPTED THE (USSR) AND (YUGOSLAVIA) TO ACCUSE THE U.S. OF INTRODUCING INAPPROPRIATE SUBJECTS INTO THE NUF DEBATE. DESPITE THE LACK OF AN AGREED ALLIED NUF TEXT, WE HAVE MADE SOME PROGRESS BOTH WITH OUR ALLIES AND IN THE RELEVANT WORKING GROUP IN DEFINING THE AGENDA. MOST OF

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OUR ALLIES NOW SEEM TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT NON-FIRST-USE LANGUAGE FROM THE BONN DECLARATION AND LANGUAGE DELIMITING AND DEFINING THE NUF PRINCIPLE DOES NOT BELONG IN THE NUF SECTION OF ANY FINAL DOCUMENT. IN THE WORKING GROUPS WE ARE GRADUALLY INTRODUCING WESTERN CONCEPTS SUCH AS HUMAN RIGHTS AND TREATY COMPLIANCE INTO THE NUF DIALOGUE, MUCH TO THE CONSTERNATION OF THE EAST. OUR EFFORT TO REDEFINE THE NUF AGENDA HAS MET WITH PREDICTABLE EASTERN OPPOSITION, BUT ALSO WITH A DISTURBING LACK OF SYMPATHY BY SOME OF THE NNA. UNFORTUNATELY, THE LEAST SYMPATHETIC OF THE NNA (CYPRUS, YUGOSLAVIA, AND MALTA) SEEM TO BE ON THE ASCENDANCY IN THE WORKING GROUP AS THE MORE PRO-WESTERN DELEGATIONS (AUSTRIA, SWITZERLAND, AND SWEDEN) ARE CONCENTRATING THEIR EFFORTS IN OTHER AREAS.

6. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION/COMMUNICATIONS: THIS WEEK'S DEVELOPMENTS CENTERED ON VERIFICATION BOTH IN AND OUTSIDE OF THE WORKING GROUP. THE MAJOR DEVELOPMENT IN WORKING GROUP A-2 ITSELF WAS TABLING OF EASTERN DRAFT LANGUAGE ON VERIFICATION WHICH EMPHASIZED NTM'S AS THE

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PRIMARY INSTRUMENT OF VERIFICATION AND PROPOSED THAT ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT NONCOMPLIANCE WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY PROOF AND RESOLVED THROUGH A CONSULTATIVE PROCEDURE. THE EAST PROBABLY WOULD INSIST ON A CONSULTATIVE PROCESS -- WITH THE BURDEN ON THE PARTY QUESTIONING COMPLIANCE TO SUBSTANTIATE ITS DOUBTS -- BEFORE AGREEING EVEN TO AN NNA-STYLE OBSERVATION ON REQUEST. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EASTERN TEXT IS THAT IT REPRESENTS THE FIRST WTO ACKNOWLEDGMENT THAT 1) DRAFTING ON VERIFICATION CAN BEGIN BEFORE AGREEMENT ON SPECIFIC MEASURES IS REACHED, AND 2) SOMETHING BEYOND NTM'S AND "GOODWILL" MAY BE REQUIRED TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE. THE U.S. POCKETED THE TWO TACIT ACKNOWLEDGMENTS AND SUGGESTED THAT WE NOW BEGIN DRAFTING A VERIFICATION MEASURE. THE EAST FINALLY SEEMS TO HAVE GOTTEN THE MESSAGE THAT WE ARE SERIOUS ABOUT THIS ISSUE. THE SOVIETS ALSO APPEAR TO VIEW THE NNA'S "OBSERVATION ON REQUEST" PROPOSAL AS POINTING THE WAY TO A POSSIBLE VERIFICATION COMPROMISE (POSSIBLY TIED TO DROPPING CONSTRAINTS), ALTHOUGH THEY PUBLICLY LINE UP BEHIND THE YUGOSLAV POSITION THAT SUCH A MEASURE IS TIED TO CONFERENCE ACCEPTANCE OF CONSTRAINTS. WE ARE MAKING IT PLAIN THAT OBSERVATION ON REQUEST IS UNACCEPTABLE TO US. THERE WERE NO SUBSTANTIVE DEVELOPMENTS ON INFORMATION, BUT THE USSR CONTINUED ITS UNSUCCESSFUL EFFORTS TO PREVENT DISCUSSION OF INDEPENDENT INFORMATION IN THE INFORMATION/VERIFICATION GROUP. NATO HAS BEEN FIRM IN RESISTING THIS SOVIET PLOY.

7. OBSERVATION: THERE WAS MOVEMENT IN OBSERVATION THIS WEEK ON THE ISSUE OF INVITATION OF OBSERVERS FROM ALL

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PARTICIPATING STATES. POLISH AMBASSADOR KONARSKI'S TABLING OF TEN IDEAS FOR OBSERVATION IN WORKING GROUP AB REPRESENTS THE EAST'S FIRST CONCRETE OBSERVATION PROPOSAL. WHILE SOME OF KONARSKI'S IDEAS ARE UNACCEPTABLE, HE DID OFFER THE FIRST EXPLICIT RECOGNITION THAT THE EAST ACCEPTS THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS FROM ALL PARTICIPATING STATES; THIS WAS CONFIRMED IN DRAFTING

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LANGUAGE TABLED BY POLAND IN THE WORKING GROUP MEETING. THE EAST HAS YET TO ACKNOWLEDGE, HOWEVER, THAT OBSERVERS FROM ALL STATES WILL BE INVITED TO ALL NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES. THIS POSITION, AS WELL AS THEIR REFUSAL TO SERIOUSLY DISCUSS THE DURATION OF OBSERVATION, IS CLEARLY TIED TO THE EASTERN VIEW THAT THE TYPE OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED AND OBSERVED MUST BE DECIDED FIRST. THE NNA MADE AN EFFORT TO DOWNPLAY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEIR POSITION ON DURATION OF OBSERVATION (ONCE THE NOTIFIABLE THRESHOLD IS REACHED) AND NATO'S (FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACTIVITY); SOME SENTIMENT IS BEING EXPRESSED THAT THIS COULD BE A RIPE AREA FOR AN ACCOMMODATION AT THE RIGHT MOMENT. THE WEST CONTINUED TO TABLE SC.1 TEXT BUT SUPPORTED EFFORTS TO REACH CONSENSUS ON ISSUES RIPE FOR DRAFTING (E.G., INVITATION). IN THIS REGARD THE FINNISH COORDINATOR HAS DISCREETLY OFFERED A COMPROMISE TEXT TO REPRESENTATIVES ON BOTH SIDES ON THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS WHICH MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE.

8. ANNUAL FORECASTS/CONSTRAINTS: AS IN PREVIOUS WEEKS, THE WEST FOCUSED ON FORECASTS; THE EAST AND NNA PREFERRED TO DISCUSS CONSTRAINTS -- THE EAST FOR TACTICAL REASONS (TO ISOLATE THE WEST AT NO RISK TO WARSAW PACT SECURITY INTERESTS), THE NNA BECAUSE IT IS THEIR "BABY," BUT ALSO BECAUSE MOST OF THEM BELIEVE THAT SUCH A MEASURE WOULD BEST PROTECT THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS.

FORECASTS: THE WEST TABLED MORE LANGUAGE FROM SC.1/AMPLIFIED. BULGARIA AND TURKEY CONTINUED THEIR EXCHANGE FROM LAST WEEK ON HOW THE CDE ZONE SHOULD BE REFERRED TO IN THE ANNUAL FORECAST TEXTS. THE NNA, FOR THE FIRST TIME, TOOK UP DISCUSSION OF DRAFT FORECAST LANGUAGE IN THIS WORKING GROUP (RATHER THAN INSISTING ON DISCUSSING THEIR FORECAST MEASURE WITH NOTIFICATION). WHILE THE NNA WELCOMED THE WESTERN FORECASTS TEXT, THEY DID CRITICIZE THE PROVISION IN THE NATO MEASURE WHICH WOULD ALLOW A STATE TO CHANGE INFORMATION IN THE FORECAST, OR TO ADD NEW INFORMATION, AT THE TIME OF NOTIFICATION, SEEING IN IT A POTENTIAL LOOPHOLE.

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CONSTRAINTS: IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WE HAVE BLUNTLY TOLD THE SWEDS AND OTHERS THAT WE WILL NOT ACCEPT CONSTRAINTS SUCH AS THE NNA/EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR A LIMIT ON THE SIZE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES; WE HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE NNA FOCUS ON THE CONSTRAINING EFFECT OF

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FORECASTS INSTEAD. BULGARIA INTRODUCED A TEXT DRAWN FROM ITS NNA-INSPIRED PROPOSAL OF FEBRUARY 7 CALLING FOR A CEILING FIVE TIMES THE NOTIFICATION LEVEL AND A LIMIT OF 15 DAYS ON THE DURATION OF NOTIFIABLE MANEUVERS. THE WTO HOPES TO COURT FAVOR WITH THE NNA BY ADOPTING ELEMENTS OF THEIR APPROACH ON CONSTRAINTS, BUT THE NEUTRALS ARE SUSPICIOUS; THEY DO NOT BELIEVE SOVIET SUPPORT FOR CONSTRAINTS IS SINCERE AND FEAR THAT THE EAST WILL USE THE ISSUE AS TRADING MATERIAL WITH THE WEST.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01149

SUBJECT: WHITHER CDE?

1. CDE IX-048. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE TEETERS ON THE BRINK OF DRAFTING. NATO SOUNDS EAGER TO START; THE WARSAW PACT ARGUES UNCONVINCINGLY THAT WESTERN "COUNTER-CONCESSIONS" ARE NEEDED FIRST. THE NNA ARE MOST HESITANT OF ALL, FEARING AN EAST-WEST DEAL OVER THEIR HEADS. US "OPTIMISM" IS DRIVING THE RUSSIANS WILD, AND EVIDENT GAPS ARE APPEARING BETWEEN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY MEMBERS OF THEIR DELEGATION. WE EXPECT PRESSURE TO BUILD ON US TO INCLUDE INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES IN NOTIFICATIONS BUT ARE SIGNALING THAT THIS IS OUT OF THE QUESTION. THRESHOLDS AND NUF ARE THE TWO KEY ISSUES FOR NATO AT PRESENT; A FIRM IDEA OF WHERE WE WANT TO GO WILL BE NEEDED BY THE BEGINNING OF THE NEXT ROUND. END SUMMARY
3. AS I HAVE DONE PERIODICALLY I'D LIKE TO GIVE MY PERSONAL OVERVIEW OF HOW CDE IS DEVELOPING. IT CONTINUES TO BE A MADDENINGLY SLOW PROCESS. NOW THAT WE HAVE DECIDED WE WANT TO DRAFT, THE EAST AND THE NNA THINK IT IS A TRICK AND ARE RUNNING THE OTHER WAY. WITH LUCK, WE'LL CATCH UP WITH THEM IN A COUPLE OF WEEKS AND MADRID-STYLE UNBRACKETED DRAFTING WILL BEGIN. BUT IT WON'T BE EASY.
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4. THE EAST ARE TAKING THE LINE THAT BEFORE PRODUCTIVE DRAFTING CAN BEGIN, THE WEST MUST ANNOUNCE SOME "COUNTER-CONCESSIONS" TO RECIPROCATE FOR GORBACHEV'S "DEFERRAL" OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES. THEY ARE ALSO THREATENING TO REOPEN PROCEDURAL DISPUTES ABOUT INTERPRETATION OF THE OCTOBER 14 AGREEMENT CONSIGNING SUBJECTS TO WORKING GROUPS. ON THE WHOLE THEY ARE LOOKING CLUMSY AND DISORGANIZED; THEY KNOW IT AND THIS MAKES THEM ANGRY AND NERVOUS.
5. THE NNA, IRONICALLY, ARE LOOKING EVEN WORSE. THEY FEAR THAT EAST AND WEST WILL STRIKE A DEAL WHICH LEAVES THEM AND THEIR PROPOSALS OUT. THEY ARE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT THE EAST WILL DROP ITS SUPPORT FOR CONSTRAINTS IF THE WEST STOPS INSISTING ON INSPECTIONS (IN FACT THE SOVIETS ARE DROPPING SUCH HINTS). THE SWEDES IN PARTICULAR HAVE BEEN SAYING IT'S TOO EARLY TO DRAFT, THAT THERE NEEDS TO BE AN "OVERVIEW" FIRST. (THIS LED AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY AND ME TO MARCH UP TO THE HEAD OF THE SWEDISH DELEGATION AT A FEBRUARY 12 RECEPTION BY THE SWEDISH FOREIGN MINISTER AND TELL HIM THAT EAST AND WEST AGREED THAT IT WAS TIME TO QUIT STALLING AND DRAFT.) MY COMMENTS ABOUT NNA "HESITANCY" IN A FEBRUARY 11 WORLDNET INTERVIEW HAVE ALSO REVERBERATED IN NNA CAPITALS, WITH THE RESULT THAT MOST NNA DELEGATIONS ARE BEING FORCED TO PROCLAIM THEIR INNOCENCE TO THEIR MINISTRIES.
6. THE SOVIETS ARE BEING DRIVEN WILD BY OUR LINE -

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USED OUTSIDE THE CONFERENCE WHERE THEY CAN'T RESPOND - THAT THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT OF JANUARY 15 MAKES US OPTIMISTIC THAT THEY WILL ACCEPT ON-SITE INSPECTION IN STOCKHOLM. IN THE CORRIDORS, NATO IS ECHOING OUR VIEWS THAT THERE WILL BE NO AGREEMENT WITHOUT INSPECTION, FORCING THE SOVIETS TO PROTEST DEFENSIVELY THAT ARMS REDUCTIONS WARRANT INSPECTION BUT CSBMS DO NOT. MOST ALLIES ARE STICKING WITH THIS POSITION BUT SOME (FRANCE, IN PARTICULAR) ARE PRIVATELY PERSUADED THAT THE MOST WE CAN GET IS THE LEAKY NNA CONCEPT OF "OBSERVATION ON REQUEST."

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7. IF WE ARE ABLE TO GET SOME NON-CONTROVERSIAL LANGUAGE DRAFTED THIS ROUND IN SEVERAL, IF NOT ALL WORKING GROUPS, WE WILL HAVE ACHIEVED OUR OWN GOAL AND KEPT THE TACTICAL ADVANTAGE. BUT IN THE APRIL-MAY ROUND PRESSURE WILL BUILD FROM THE NNA AND OUR OWN ALLIES TO AGREE TO THE SOVIET POSITION ON INCLUDING INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES. OUR ANSWER WILL OF COURSE BE NO. BUT I AM HOPEFUL THAT A NEW POSITION ON THRESHOLDS FOR NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION AND FORECASTING WILL TAKE THE PRESSURE OFF AND PERMIT DRAFTING TO GO FORWARD ON GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES. THE DELEGATION RECOMMENDATION ON THRESHOLDS IS BEING SENT BY SEPTEL; I SIMPLY WANT TO FLAG THE ISSUE AS BEING CRITICAL TO PROGRESS ON ALL OF OUR CSBMS.

8. BY SPRING WE WILL ALSO NEED TO HAVE OUR NATO DUCKS IN LINE ON NUF SO THAT WE CAN TABLE PARAGRAPHS PIECEMEAL AS THE NUF DISCUSSION PROGRESSES. GIVEN THE VARIETY OF VIEWS ON NUF WITHIN NATO AND THE FACT THAT THE ISSUE IS BEING DEALT WITH IN THE EC AS WELL, GETTING OUR ACT TOGETHER WILL NOT BE EASY. AT THE SAME TIME, WE CAN EXPECT INCREASING PRESSURE FROM THE EAST TO BEGIN DRAFTING ON NUF TO MAINTAIN "PARALLEL" PROGRESS ON ALL PARTS OF A FINAL AGREEMENT.

9. IN MY VIEW WE WILL ONLY GET WHAT WE NEED ON INSPECTIONS IF THERE IS BROAD AGREEMENT ON OTHER AREAS BY JULY AND IT IS PLAIN TO THE SOVIETS THAT A FINAL CONCESSION ON INSPECTIONS WILL GUARANTEE SUCCESS HERE. I AM NOT NEARLY SO OPTIMISTIC AS I SOUND PUBLICLY THAT THIS CAN BE DONE IN THE TIME REMAINING, BUT IT IS POSSIBLE.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01257  
SUBJECT: DATES FOR NEXT PRE-ROUND CDE-NAC MEETING  
1. CDE IX - 056  
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.  
3. ON FEBRUARY 19 THE CDE NATO CAUCUS AGREED  
AD REFERENDUM TO SYG CARRINGTON'S PROPOSAL FOR A  
PRE-ROUND X REINFORCED NAC ON MONDAY MORNING APRIL 14,  
TO BE FOLLOWED BY A WORKING LUNCHEON HOSTED BY SYG FOR  
HEADS OF DELEGATION AND PERMREPS. THE CAUCUS ALSO  
AGREED TO HOLD ITS PRE-NAC MEETING IN BRUSSELS ON  
SUNDAY, APRIL 13. HEADS OF DELEGATION WOULD PLAN TO  
RETURN TO STOCKHOLM ON THE EVENING OF APRIL 14.  
BARRY  
END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01296

SUBJECT: NUF: RECOMMENDED APPROACH TO THE EC-12 AND

- U.S. TEXTS AND FUTURE DRAFTING

REF: STOCKHOLM 1259

1. CDE IX - 062

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. BEGIN SUMMARY: ON FEBRUARY 20 NATO CAUCUS AMBASSADORS FOCUSED ON THE EC-12 NUF TEXT AND WHAT TO DO WITH IT. U.S. REGISTERED ITS STRONG OBJECTIONS TO COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT IN "SECURITY" MATTERS. NEVERTHELESS, IN THE INTERESTS OF DRAFTING A COMMON NUF TEXT FOR THE 16 SOONEST, WE ARE PREPARED TO USE THE COMMUNITY'S DRAFT AS A BASIS FOR DRAFTING A COMMON NATO POSITION ON THE SUBJECT. DELEGATION INTENDS TO INTRODUCE ELEMENTS OF THE U.S. DRAFT INTO THE EC-12 DRAFT TO MAKE IT MORE COMPATIBLE WITH THE BROADER U.S. APPROACH TO NON-USE OF FORCE. WE ALSO PREFER TO INTRODUCE THE EVENTUAL NATO DRAFT IN A PIECEMEAL FASHION IN ORDER TO BETTER CONTROL THE PACE AND THE SUBSTANCE OF DRAFTING IN THE NUF WORKING GROUP. THE FRENCH HAVE PLAYED A PARTICULARLY MISCHIEVOUS AND TROUBLING ROLE IN THIS WHOLE QUESTION. ACTION REQUESTED PARA 9. END SUMMARY.

4. THE NATO CAUCUS CONVENED A SPECIAL HEADS-PLUS-ONE MEETING TO DISCUSS NON-USE OF FORCE ON WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 20. THE MAIN TOPIC ON THE AGENDA WAS THE EC-12 NUF DRAFT, WHICH HAS BEEN TABLED IN THE HAGUE (SEE REFTTEL). THE AD REFERENDUM TEXT IS SUBJECT TO THE SILENCE PROCEDURE UNTIL MONDAY, FEBRUARY 24. IF THERE ARE NO NATIONAL COMMENTS BY THAT TIME THE TEXT WILL BE INTRODUCED INTO THE CAUCUS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE 16 ON TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 25.

5. AMBASSADOR BARRY LED OFF CAUCUS DISCUSSION BY REACTING STRONGLY AND NEGATIVELY BOTH TO THE MEDIUM AND THE MESSAGE OF THE EC-12 DRAFT. ON THE MEDIUM (THE COMMUNITY'S SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE) BARRY STRESSED THAT NATO -- NOT THE EC-12 -- WAS THE PROPER VENUE TO DISCUSS SECURITY ISSUES; ONLY IN ALLIANCE COUNCILS AND CAUCUSES CAN THE INTERESTS OF ALL ALLIES BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. NOT SURPRISINGLY, TURKEY, CANADA, AND NORWAY SUPPORTED THE U.S. POSITION. BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS), SPEAKING IN THE CAPACITY OF THE DUTCH EC-12 PRESIDENCY, MAINTAINED THAT COMMUNITY EFFORTS WERE INTENDED TO

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CONTRIBUTE TO NATO'S DECISION-MAKING PROCESS ON NUF; I.E., THERE WAS NO INTENTION TO INTRODUCE AN EC-12 TEXT INTO THE CONFERENCE IN GENERAL. BUWALDA DEFENDED THE RIGHT OF THE COMMUNITY TO TAKE UP "POLITICAL" MATTERS AND NOTED, SOMEWHAT SARCASTICALLY, THAT THE 12 HAD TAKEN UP NUF BECAUSE NATO EFFORTS ON THE SUBJECT HAD BEEN

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"BLOCKED" BY "CERTAIN" COUNTRIES, I.E., THE U.S. A LENGTHY EXCHANGE FOLLOWED BUWALDA'S INTERVENTION WITH OTHER COMMUNITY MEMBERS FEELING COMPELLED TO DEFEND, ALBEIT TEPIDLY. THE COMMUNITY'S PREROGATIVES ON "POLITICAL" MATTERS. WE SEE THE NOT-SO-INVISIBLE HAND OF PARIS IN BOTH THE SUBSTANCE AND THE TACTICS OF THE COMMUNITY NUF EFFORTS. ON THE SUBSTANTIVE MESSAGE OF THE EC-12 TEXT WE ALSO HAVE PROBLEMS, I.E., IT GOES TOO FAR ON DELIMITING THE NUF PRINCIPLE AND NOT FAR ENOUGH IN DETAILING COLLATERAL ELEMENTS SUCH AS HUMAN RIGHTS. NEVERTHELESS, THE CAUCUS AGREED THAT IT WAS A MATTER OF SOME URGENCY THAT THE WEST FORMULATE A COMMON NUF TEXT

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01293

SUBJECT: NUF UPDATE

REF: STATE 31397

1. CDE IX - 063
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. BEGIN SUMMARY: WORKING GROUP DISCUSSION ON NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF) HAS LARGELY CONCENTRATED ON NONCONTENTIOUS ELEMENTS GENERALLY CONSISTENT WITH WESTERN CONCEPTS. THIS HAS BEEN DUE TO A SOMEWHAT FORTUITOUS COMBINATION OF WESTERN SOLIDARITY, EASTERN INEPTNESS, AND A CAREFUL NNA COORDINATOR. FURTHERMORE, THE U.S. HAS BEGUN TO INTRODUCE ELEMENTS OF THE WEST'S BROADER CONCEPT OF SECURITY INTO THE NUF DIALOGUE. NEVERTHELESS, WE WILL BE UNABLE TO TRANSLATE THESE IDEAS INTO A CONCRETE TEXT UNTIL THE ALLIANCE CAN AGREE ON COMMON NUF LANGUAGE. END SUMMARY.

4. DURING THE NINTH ROUND USDEL HAS FOCUSED ITS EFFORTS ON MAINTAINING ALLIED UNITY, PREVENTING THE SOVIET NUF PROPOSAL (SC.7) FROM GAINING ANY CREDENCE, AND IN REDEFINING THE NUF AGENDA IN WORKING GROUP A. WE HAVE BEEN LARGELY SUCCESSFUL IN THESE TACTICAL GOALS SO FAR. HOWEVER, WHILE WE HAVE BEGUN TO INTRODUCE, BASED ON REFTEL INSTRUCTIONS, ELEMENTS OF THE WEST'S BROADER CONCEPT OF SECURITY INTO THE NUF DIALOGUE, WE WILL BE UNABLE TO TRANSLATE THESE IDEAS INTO A CONCRETE DRAFT TEXT UNTIL THE ALLIANCE CAN AGREE TO NUF LANGUAGE. THIS THEN IS OUR PRIMARY SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIVE DURING THIS ROUND; THE SOONER WE AGREE TO SUCH A DRAFT THE MORE WE CAN CONTROL AND REDEFINE THE NUF AGENDA IN STOCKHOLM.

5. NATO: THE SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND. OUR INITIAL SUCCESS HAS BEEN IN REACHING A TACIT UNDERSTANDING AS TO WHAT SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN NATO CONSENSUS LANGUAGE. CONTRARY TO THE PAPERS CIRCULATED BY THEIR CAPITALS LAST FALL, THE ITALIAN, CANADIAN, AND FRG DELEGATIONS HERE NOW ACKNOWLEDGE THAT LANGUAGE TAKEN FROM THE BONN DECLARATION AND ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE AND DELIMIT THE UNIVERSAL NUF PRINCIPLE SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN A WESTERN TEXT. FURTHERMORE, THESE AND OTHER INDIVIDUAL DELEGATIONS HAVE DECIDED AGAINST ADDING MORE INDIGESTIBLE INGREDIENTS INTO THE NATO NUF STEW FOR THE TIME BEING. HAVING DEFINED AND NARROWED THE NUF AGENDA TO A MANAGEABLE SIZE, WE SHOULD NOW BE ABLE TO WORK ON

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DRAFTING A COMMON NUF TEXT PREFERABLY USING ONE TEXT AS A BASIS. WE WILL WANT TO AVOID THE INTRODUCTION OR REINTRODUCTION OF A PLETHORA OF WESTERN TEXTS; SUCH A PROLIFERATION OF TEXTS COULD ONLY SLOW DOWN THE EXERCISE. (SEPTEL DISCUSSES AN EC-12 NUF TEXT, DELEGATION'S REACTION TO IT, AND SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS.) WHATEVER TEXT WE WORK FROM WE WILL WANT TO ENSURE THAT THE

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FOLLOWING POINTS ARE COVERED:

- THE CSBM-NUF LINK; I.E., CONCRETE CSBM'S GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE;
- THE UNIVERSAL NUF COMMITMENT AS SET FORTH IN THE UN CHARTER;
- PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE AND INTERDEPENDENCE OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT PRINCIPLES;
- ELEMENTS CLEARLY AIMED AT SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE NUF PRINCIPLE SUCH AS ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE AND AFGHANISTAN REFERENCES.
- FINALLY, THE TEXT SHOULD CONVEY THE OVERALL WESTERN CONCEPT OF SECURITY, WHICH INCLUDES SUCH PRINCIPLES AS GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION HUMAN RIGHTS.

6. WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS. UNDERSTANDABLY FROM ITS PERSPECTIVE, THE EAST HAS BEGUN TO PRESS THE WEST TO JOIN THE EAST AND THE NNA IN INTRODUCING NUF TEXTS FOR WORKING GROUP CONSIDERATION. THE SOVIET AND HUNGARIAN (THE EASTERN SPOKESPERSON) REPS WARN DARKLY THAT IF THERE IS NO PROGRESS DRAFTING ON NUF THERE CAN BE NO PROGRESS ON DRAFTING CONCRETE CSBM'S. SINCE NATO HAS INTRODUCED VIRTUALLY THE WHOLE OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED VERBATIM, THE EAST NOW THREATENS TO FOLLOW A SIMILAR PROCEDURE WITH THE SOVIET DRAFT NUF TREATY (SC.6). HUNGARY HAS ALREADY INTRODUCED THE EAST'S NO-FIRST-USE LANGUAGE FROM SC.6. NEVERTHELESS, DESPITE EASTERN

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HUFFING AND PUFFING, WORKING GROUP DISCUSSION, UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF THE NNA COORDINATOR (LOIBL - AUSTRIA) HAS FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON CORE NUF ELEMENTS: NUF-CSBM'S LINK, THE COMMITMENT TO THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT; AND THE UNIVERSAL CHARACTER OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE. THIS HAS BEEN DUE, IN NO SMALL MEASURE, TO ALLIED SOLIDARITY IN THE WORKING GROUP. THE U.S. DELEGATION, MOREOVER, HAS BEGUN TO INTRODUCE GRADUALLY NEW ELEMENTS INTO THE NUF DIALOGUE, MUCH TO THE CONSTERNATION OF THE EAST AND TO THE INITIAL CONFUSION OF THE NNA AND EVEN SOME OF OUR ALLIES. OVER THE PAST WEEKS WE HAVE DISCUSSED, FOR EXAMPLE, THE RELATIONSHIP OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND TREATY COMPLIANCE TO THE NUF PRINCIPLE. IN THE WORKING GROUP WE HAVE ALSO BROACHED THE TOPIC OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS AND EQUAL DUTIES OF ALL PARTICIPATING STATES. IT IS OUR INTENTION TO MAKE SURE THAT THESE, AS WELL AS OTHER WESTERN CONCEPTS, BECOME A LEGITIMATE AND ACCEPTED PART OF THE NUF AGENDA IN STOCKHOLM.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01648

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION:  
AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN, AMBASSADOR BARRY,  
WARREN ZIMMERMANN; WITH HEAD OF SOVIET CDE DELEGATION,  
AMBASSADOR O.A. GRINEVSKY, FEBRUARY 21, 1986

1. CDE IX - 088
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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## 3. BEGIN TEXT:

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN AND AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY BRIEFLY DISCUSSED THEIR PERSONAL VIEWS OF EACH OTHER'S NEGOTIATION. KAMPELMAN SAID THAT WHILE HE HAD BEEN READING AMBASSADOR BARRY'S REPORTING CABLES, HE WAS COMPELLED TO RATION HIS READING TIME AND THEREFORE WAS NOT TOO FAMILIAR WITH THE DETAILS OF THE STOCKHOLM NEGOTIATIONS. IN GENEVA HE HAD JUST HAD OCCASION TO MEET WITH FIRST DEPUTY SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIYENKO AND HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE THOUGHT THE SOVIET NEGOTIATING TEAM IN GENEVA HAD VERY CAPABLE PEOPLE IN IT WITH MANY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE IN ARMS CONTROL MATTERS.

GRINEVSKY THOUGHT THAT THE TEAMS IN GENEVA ON BOTH SIDES WERE VERY CAPABLE.

KAMPELMAN NOTED THAT HE WAS THE LEAST EXPERIENCED AMONG OUR PEOPLE IN GENEVA.

GRINEVSKY SAID THAT PERHAPS IT WAS BETTER TO HAVE SOMEONE LIKE THAT BRING A FRESH VIEWPOINT TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.

KAMPELMAN SAID THAT IN OUR SYSTEM WHEN ANYONE WAS APPOINTED AMBASSADOR, THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE HOLDS CONFIRMATION HEARINGS. WHEN HE WAS APPOINTED, A SENATOR WHO WAS A GOOD FRIEND OF HIS AND THUS NOT AT ALL OPPOSED TO THE NOMINATION, HAD ASKED HIM IF HE WOULD NOT FEEL AT A DISADVANTAGE IN GENEVA WHEN HE COUNTED THE TOTAL YEARS OF EXPERIENCE OF PEOPLE LIKE KARPOV, OBUKHOV, AND KVITSINKY, WITH WHOM HE WOULD HAVE TO DEAL. AT THAT POINT ANOTHER SENATOR MADE THE POINT GRINEVSKY HAD JUST EXPRESSED -- THAT SOMETIMES IT IS DESIRABLE TO BRING IN SOMEONE WITH A NEW PERSPECTIVE. HE ASKED GRINEVSKY WHAT HE HEARD FROM GENEVA.

GRINEVSKY SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE TEAMS THERE WERE HARD AT WORK, YET SO FAR THERE WERE NO VISIBLE RESULTS HE COULD DISCERN.

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KAMPELMAN REPEATED WHAT HE HAD SAID TO THE PRESS HERE IN STOCKHOLM TODAY. HE THOUGHT THAT THERE HAD BEEN MORE MOVEMENT IN GENEVA THAN HE HAD EXPECTED TO SEE AT THIS STAGE. IN REALITY, ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES THE TWO SIDES WERE STILL VERY FAR APART BUT IT SHOULD BE REALIZED THAT THOSE TALKS WERE VERY COMPLEX, THAT THE SIDES HAD VERY DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE NATIONAL INTERESTS AND DIFFERENT VALUES, AND THAT THERE WAS STILL

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A GREAT DEAL OF MISTRUST BETWEEN THEM. IT TAKES TIME TO ADDRESS THESE ISSUES. THE FACT THAT BOTH SIDES HAD MADE SOME MOVEMENT WAS IN HIS VIEW USEFUL. HE COULD VERY WELL UNDERSTAND THE FEELING OF IMPATIENCE BUT HE THOUGHT THAT ALL HAVE TO UNDERSTAND THAT THERE WAS NO ADVANTAGE IN DELAY. HE APPRECIATED THAT AND DID NOT BELIEVE THAT WE WERE LOOKING FOR DELAY. IT WAS SIMPLY THAT THE PROCESS INVOLVED TOOK TIME; WE THEREFORE HAD TO BE PATIENT WITH EACH OTHER.

BARRY NOTED THAT UNLIKE THE STOCKHOLM NEGOTIATIONS, THE GENEVA TALKS WERE NOT COVERED BY AN ESTABLISHED ADJOURNMENT DATE.

KAMPELMAN THOUGHT IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN USEFUL TO HAVE A CERTAIN ADJOURNMENT DATE FOR THE GENEVA TALKS AS WELL. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS THE SOVIET SIDE HAD SUGGESTED SETTING SUCH A DATE BUT THE U.S. HAD OBJECTED. TOWARD THE END OF THE MADRID ROUND HE HAD CONSULTED WITH KOVALEV AND KONDRASHEV AND TOLD THEM THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO RECOMMEND THAT A FINAL DATE BE SET. BOTH HAD SAID THAT IT WOULD NOT BE DESIRABLE TO RAISE NEW ISSUES IN MOSCOW.

GRINEVSKY POINTED OUT THAT IN SOME WAY KAMPELMAN'S TALKS WERE IN ANY EVENT GOVERNED BY A TARGET DATE. HE RECALLED THE SITUATION AT THE SALT I NEGOTIATIONS WHEN THE STAFFS HAD TO WORK DAY AND NIGHT IN ORDER TO MEET THE PRACTICAL DEADLINE OF THE 1972 MOSCOW SUMMIT.

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KAMPELMANN POINTED OUT HE WAS NOT SUGGESTING A FIRM DATE BE SET FOR COMPLETION OF THE GENEVA TALKS, FOR EVENTS ELSEWHERE WOULD PROBABLY OVERTAKE A FIRM DATE IN ANY EVENT. HE WAS SUGGESTING THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO HAVE ONE FOR THE VIENNA TALKS.

GRINEVSKY ASKED KAMPELMAN HOW THE STOCKHOLM CDE WORK LOOKED TO HIM FROM GENEVA.

KAMPELMAN SAID HE HAD BEEN ASKED THAT QUESTION AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE TODAY. HE HAD REPLIED THAT THE DETAILS OF CDE WORK HAD NOT BEEN RAISED IN GENEVA IN ANY SUBSTANTIVE DETAIL. HE DID READ BARRY'S CABLES OF COURSE. A COUPLE OF WEEKS AGO SOME IMPORTANT PEOPLE FROM THE SOVIET UNION HAD VISITED GENEVA -- PRIMAKOV, ZHURKIN, AND SHISLIN. HE HAD MET WITH ALL THREE. PRIMAKOV HAD ASKED HIM IF HE DID NOT FEEL LEFT OUT WHEN HE SAW HOW FAST THE WORK WAS PROCEEDING IN STOCKHOLM AND VIENNA. HE HAD REPLIED THAT IT WAS A GOOD RACE. IT WAS CLEAR, OF COURSE, THAT IN THE BROAD PICTURE CDE WAS A VERY IMPORTANT PART OF THE TOTAL PICTURE IN TERMS OF ATTENTION OR DECISION AT A SUMMIT MEETING. IN GENEVA, WHILE START AND INF HAD A FAIRLY LONG HISTORY, THE SPACE TALKS HAD NONE. THIS WAS A TOTALLY BRAND NEW NEGOTIATION. SOME MOVEMENT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED BUT MUCH WORK REMAINED TO BE DONE. FOR THIS REASON HE FELT THAT STOCKHOLM WOULD BE

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READY FOR SUMMIT ATTENTION SOONER THAN THE SPACE TALKS. NONETHELESS HE FELT THAT AGREEMENT HERE WOULD BE A POSITIVE FACTOR FOR THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE OUR RESPECTIVE AUTHORITIES WOULD FEEL ENCOURAGED BY THE ELEMENT OF TRUST THAT IT WOULD MEAN. THIS IS WHAT HE HAD SAID TO THE PRESS THIS MORNING -- THAT THERE WAS A RELATIONSHIP. HE HAD SAID THE SAME THING TO KORNIYENKO AND KVITSINSKY YESTERDAY. RECOGNIZING THAT AS A LAWYER HE HAD ACQUIRED MOST OF HIS NEGOTIATING EXPERIENCE IN NONGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, AS A NEGOTIATOR HE HAD ALWAYS FELT IT USEFUL AFTER INITIAL EXPLORATION TO TRY AND EMPHASIZE THAT WHICH WAS COMMON EVEN IF IT DID NOT APPEAR IMPORTANT; IN THIS WAY THE PARTIES GOT USED TO SAYING "YES" RATHER THAN "NYET."

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BARRY WANTED TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF SUCH A WAY OF PROCEEDING AT THIS STAGE IN THE CDE NEGOTIATIONS, NOT JUST BETWEEN TWO NATIONS BUT 35. AT PRESENT THERE WERE STILL TOO MANY ISSUES TO BE HANDLED OR EVEN JUST NARROWED BY OUR SENIORS. HE FOUND IT VERY DIFFICULT AT THIS SESSION TO GET THROUGH THE BARRIER TO START DRAFTING. THE SITUATION WAS QUITE UNPRECEDENTED.

KAMPELMAN SAID HE HAD NOT TRIED TO APPLY HIS ARGUMENTATION TO THE STOCKHOLM TALKS. TO HIS SATISFACTION THE NOVEMBER 21 AGREEMENT BETWEEN REAGAN AND GORBACHEV WAS CAST IN LANGUAGE THAT FITTED HIS OWN PREJUDICES REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS.

GRINEVSKY REMARKED THAT IT WAS EASIER OF COURSE TO CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH ONE COULD SAY "NYET" RATHER THAN "YES." HE HOPED THAT BY NEXT WEEK SOME PROGRESS MIGHT BE ACHIEVED. IT WILL NOT SOLVE THE MAIN PROBLEM, HOWEVER. THAT WAS WHY HE WANTED TO ASK KAMPELMAN IF HE COULD CLARIFY THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO AN ANSWER TO GORBACHEV'S INITIATIVE.

KAMPELMAN REPLIED THAT THERE WERE NO SECRETS HERE. HE HAD NOTHING TO HIDE. HE EXPECTED THE ANSWER TO BE GIVEN VERY QUICKLY. HE COULD TELL GRINEVSKY WITH COMPLETE HONESTY THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS TAKEN GORBACHEV'S LETTER VERY SERIOUSLY. FROM THIS STANDPOINT THE GENEVA SUMMIT MEETING WAS VERY IMPORTANT. THE PRESIDENT HAD LIKED GORBACHEV; IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO SAY THAT HE RESPECTED HIM BUT HAD LIKED HIM TOO. HE HAD COME AWAY WITH THE FEELING THAT GORBACHEV TRULY WANTED TO DO SOMETHING TO IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THE PRESIDENT WANTED THAT ALSO. OBVIOUSLY IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AS IN OURS THERE ARE PEOPLE WITH DIFFERENT EMPHASES AND DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS. KAMPELMAN HATED TO ADMIT IT BUT SOMETIMES HE HAD AN ARGUMENT WITH HIS WIFE. GRINEVSKY REMARKED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE A GOOD FAMILY THAT DID NOT OCCASIONALLY ENGAGE IN ARGUMENTS.

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KAMPELMAN WENT ON TO SAY THAT A NUMBER OF PEOPLE (THE PRESIDENT WAS NOT AMONG THEM) HAD QUESTIONED THE BONA FIDE NATURE OF GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 LETTER. A NUMBER OF FACTORS HAD CONTRIBUTED TO SUCH QUESTIONING. ONE WAS THE FACT THAT THE ESSENCE OF THE LETTER HAD BEEN PUBLICIZED AT THE SAME TIME THE PRESIDENT RECEIVED IT. IT SO HAPPENED THAT ON THAT SAME DAY HE AND ZIMMERMAN HAD LUNCH WITH KARPOV. IT WAS A NICE LUNCH THAT ENDED AT A QUARTER BEFORE 3:00 P.M. HE LIKED WORKING WITH KARPOV BECAUSE HE WAS STRAIGHT AND SMART AS WELL. TWO OR THREE HOURS LATER HIS PRESS OFFICER TOLD HIM THAT A UPI MESSAGE FROM MOSCOW CONTAINED AN IMPORTANT ANNOUNCEMENT WHICH KARPOV HAD NOT MENTIONED TO HIM AT ALL. KAMPELMAN HAD REPORTED THIS TO WASHINGTON. THAT KIND OF THING COULD BE THE REASON THAT HAD LED SOME PEOPLE TO SAY THAT THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE GORBACHEV INITIATIVE WAS PROPAGANDA. MOREOVER, NAMING THE YEAR 1999 AS A TARGET TO END ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS LED SOME TO SAY THAT THE PROPOSAL WAS NOT REALISTIC. THE WAY THE PRESIDENT FUNCTIONS IS TO HAVE EVERYBODY HAVE THEIR SAY AND EXPRESS THEIR POINT OF VIEW. THEN THE PRESIDENT EXAMINES IT AND REACHES A DECISION. OBVIOUSLY MUCH OF THE JANUARY 15 LETTER DEALT WITH MATTERS AFFECTING OUR ALLIES; THEY LIKE TO BE CONSULTED. THEREFORE THE PRESIDENT CONCLUDED THAT HE WANTED NITZE TO CONSULT WITH OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES AND ROWNY WITH ALLIES IN ASIA, TO TALK TO THEM AND TELL THEM: "THIS IS WHAT I INTEND TO SAY; TELL ME WHAT YOU THINK ABOUT IT, BECAUSE IT AFFECTS YOU." ALL THIS TAKES TIME. HE HAD NOTED THAT SOVIET AUTHORITIES ARE ALSO SLOW TO COMMENT IN SUCH CASES. GORBACHEV'S LETTER HAD NOT INDICATED THAT A QUICK REPLY WAS EXPECTED. THE PRESIDENT LOOKED AT THIS EXCHANGE AS ONLY AN EARLY STAGE OF MANY EXCHANGES. KAMPELMAN HAD ASSURED HIS COLLEAGUES IN GENEVA THAT THIS WAS AN OBVIOUS EXPLANATION. HIS GUESS WAS THAT THE ANSWER WOULD BE FORTHCOMING SOON.

ZIMMERMANN POINTED OUT THAT IF ONE LOOKED AT THE COURSE OF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS, ONE WOULD NOT REGARD THE

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FIVE WEEKS SINCE JANUARY 15 AS VERY MUCH TIME. THE U.S. HAD MADE PROPOSALS IN START AND INF AT THE OUTSET IN MARCH, THEN HAD TO WAIT SIX MONTHS FOR THE SOVIET RESPONSE SEPTEMBER 30-OCTOBER 1. THE U.S. CAME BACK WITH A COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL A MONTH LATER (NOVEMBER 1). THEN TWO AND A HALF MONTHS LATER CAME GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 LETTER. KAMPELMAN, REFERRING TO THE SIX MONTHS' WAIT, SAID WE HAD NOT BEEN CRITICAL, BEARING IN MIND, FIRST, CHERNENKO'S DEATH AND THEN THE APPOINTMENT OF A NEW FOREIGN MINISTER, THEREFORE NOT JUMPING TO ANY CONCLUSIONS. HE BELIEVED IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE IF THE SOVIET SIDE WERE TO JUMP TO CONCLUSIONS IN THIS INSTANCE.

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ON THE OTHER HAND, WE REALIZED THAT THE 27TH CONGRESS WAS IMMINENT, AT WHICH GORBACHEV WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY WANT TO SPEAK ON THE SUBJECT.

GRINEVSKY ASKED IF WE WERE WAITING FOR THAT STATEMENT. ZIMMERMANN AND KAMPELMAN BOTH DENIED THIS EMPHATICALLY. KAMPELMAN SAID WE ASSUMED THAT GORBACHEV WOULD SAY WHAT HE HAD SAID IN HIS LETTER.

ZIMMERMANN ALSO WANTED TO EMPHASIZE THAT BETWEEN JANUARY 15 AND TODAY MOST OF THE TIME HAD BEEN TAKEN UP BY CONSULTATIONS. KAMPELMAN SAID THESE CONSULTATIONS HAD NOT BEEN EASY BUT WERE HEALTHY.

BARRY SAID HE DID NOT KNOW HOW THE EXPECTED RESPONSE WOULD RELATE TO THE NEGOTIATIONS AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. IN HIS VIEW IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY CONCENTRATE ON NUCLEAR ARMS ISSUES SUCH AS INF. HE WOULD DOUBT THAT MBFR, CW, AND CDE WOULD RECEIVE MORE THAN PASSING MENTION. THAT DID NOT MEAN, OF COURSE, THAT WE WOULD NOT HAVE TO PAY ATTENTION TO WHAT THE PRESIDENT SAID IN REPLY TO GORBACHEV'S LETTER.

KAMPELMAN AGREED THAT THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE MORE DECISIONS MADE AS A RESULT OF GORBACHEV'S LETTER DEALING WITH GENEVA THAN WITH CDE. IN THE GENEVA DISCUSSIONS WE

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WERE WITHIN RANGE OF AGREEMENT ON SOME ISSUES BUT FAR APART ON OTHERS. IF KARPOV AND KVITSINSKY WERE HERE THEY WOULD CAUTION NOT TO OVEREMPHASIZE WHAT WAS WITHIN RANGE. WE HAD AGREED ON LOTS OF POINTS AND SHOULD MAKE AN EFFORT TO AGREE ON MORE. AS A MATTER OF FACT THERE WERE SOME SERIOUS DIFFERENCES WHICH AT SOME POINT WOULD REQUIRE HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION.

GRINEVSKY MENTIONED THAT HE HAD KNOWN KARPOV AND KVITSINSKY FOR MANY YEARS AND UNDERSTOOD VERY WELL THAT WHENEVER THE HIGHEST AUTHORITIES MAKE A STATEMENT IT IS UP TO THEM HOW AND WHEN TO PUBLICIZE IT. GORBACHEV'S STATEMENT WAS CERTAINLY NOT MADE FOR PURPOSES OF PROPAGANDA. HE WOULD STRESS ONE POINT: IT WAS, OF COURSE, UP TO THE U.S. SIDE TO DECIDE WHEN AND HOW IT WOULD PROVIDE AN ANSWER. PERSONALLY, HE BELIEVED THAT THE DELAY HERE WAS DELIBERATE; IF ONE FOLLOWED THE CABLE TRAFFIC ONE WOULD SEE THIS CLEARLY. THE CONFERENCE NOW HAD ARRIVED AT A BOTTLE-NECK. WITHOUT KNOWING WHAT GROUND FORCES, NAVAL FORCES AND AIR FORCES WOULD BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO REACH DECISIONS ABOUT OBSERVATION AND ABOUT EXCHANGE OF CALENDARS, AS WELL AS SOME VERIFICATION ISSUES. SOME PROGRESS HAD NOW BEEN MADE BUT TAKING SUBSTANCE AS A WHOLE FOR TWO OR THREE WEEKS THE SUBSTANCE HAD REMAINED UNCHANGED -- WHAT TO NOTIFY, WHAT TO OBSERVE. GORBACHEV'S SUGGESTION PROVIDES A WAY OUT OF THE IMPASSE -- IT MUST BE SUCH THAT NEITHER SIDE LOSE SIGHT OF THE PRINCIPLES AGREED AT MADRID. IT WAS THEREFORE LOGICAL

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TO POSTPONE A DECISION REGARDING NAVAL FORCES UNTIL A LATER STAGE. HE REGARDED THE MERE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO ANSWER TO THIS PROPOSAL AS VERY DISCOURAGING. HE HOPED THAT BARRY WOULD SOON GET INSTRUCTIONS ENABLING HIM TO GO BEYOND JUST GENERALITIES. HE SAW THIS CONFERENCE AS BEING IN REAL DIFFICULTY NOW. KAMPELMAN SAID THAT NEITHER HE NOR BARRY KNEW WHAT WOULD BE IN THE TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY.

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BARRY HATED TO INTERRUPT THE DISCUSSION BUT HAD TO POINT OUT THAT THEY WERE EXPECTED AT A HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING. BESIDES, IF KAMPELMAN AND GRINEVSKY MANAGED TO RESOLVE ALL OUTSTANDING ISSUES HE, BARRY, WOULD NOT BE IN A POSITION TO CLAIM CREDIT.

END TEXT.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01343

SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS,

- FEBRUARY 17-21, 1986

REF: STATE 31397

1. CDE IX - 064

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. BEGIN SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW: THIS WAS ANOTHER WEEK IN WHICH THE DOG DID NOT BARK. IN OTHER WORDS, REAL DRAFTING DID NOT BEGIN. ONLY IN THE ANNUAL FORECAST WORKING GROUP MEETING WAS THERE ANY CLOSE APPROXIMATION OF DRAFTING. THE EVER SUSPICIOUS SOVIETS SUSPECTED WESTERN MOTIVES IN PRESSING FOR DRAFTING; THE NNA FEARED EAST-WEST COLLUSION BEHIND THE SCENES (LAST YEAR THEY WORRIED ABOUT EAST-WEST ENMITY). THE WEST HAS CONTRIBUTED ITS FAIR SHARE TO THE SLOWDOWN. THE 16 VERY INDEPENDENT MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE ARE ILL PREPARED TO DEAL WITH THE NEW AND CUMBERSOME MACHINERY OF THE CONFERENCE (I.E., TEAMS, CLUSTERS, CAUCUSES, WORKING GROUPS, ETC.) WHERE THERE IS A PREMIUM ON DISCIPLINE AND INTERNAL COHESION. ON THIS SCORE, THE EAST HAS NO SUCH PROBLEM. SUBSTANCE IS ANOTHER MATTER, HOWEVER. FOR EXAMPLE, THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO PRESS BEHIND THE SCENES FOR TAKING UP NAVAL ACTIVITIES DURING A CDE FOLLOW-UP PHASE AND IN THE WORKING GROUPS, STRESSED THE NEED TO INCLUDE NOTIFICATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES IN THE CURRENT PHASE, AND HAVE REINTRODUCED THEIR NON-FIRST-USE PROPOSAL INTO THE NUF WORKING GROUP. OUR EASTERN COLLEAGUES TELL US, WITH A WINK AND A NOD, THAT THIS OBDURATE BEHAVIOR IS ONLY A RESPONSE TO OUR TABLING OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED UNCHANGED. MEANWHILE, RESPONDING TO WESTERN PRESSURE, THE NNA HAVE BEGUN TO TABLE SC.7. END SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW.

4. NOTIFICATION: WESTERN WILLINGNESS TO DRAFT CONTINUES TO THROW THE EAST AND NNA OFF BALANCE. BOTH ARE SUSPICIOUS OF OUR MOTIVES: THE EAST BELIEVES THAT WE HAVE SOMETHING MOMENTOUS UP OUR SLEEVE, AND THE NNA FEARS THAT WE WILL CUT A DEAL WITH THE EAST OVER THEIR HEADS. THE SOVIETS ALSO ARE DISPLEASED THAT WE HAVE NOT RESPONDED TO THE CDE SECTION OF GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 STATEMENT. WHILE WE HAVE TOLD THEM PRIVATELY THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL RESPOND TO GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 STATEMENT AFTER CONSULTING WITH OUR ALLIES, THE SOVIETS HERE ARE APPARENTLY (RIGHTLY) READING THE WEST'S ONGOING REFUSAL TO RESPOND, EVEN, PRIVATELY, TO THAT STATEMENT AS A REJECTION OF THE GENEROUS PROPOSAL TO DEFER CONSIDERATION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNTIL THE NEXT PHASE. MOREOVER, THE SOVIETS ARE NOT HAPPY DISCUSSING DRAFT LANGUAGE IN THE WORKING GROUPS WHERE ALL 35 PARTICIPANTS ARE REPRESENTED; THEY ARE PUSHING INSTEAD FOR LANGUAGE PRODUCED BY THE COORDINATOR IN SMALLER COFFEE GROUPS WHERE NNA, WESTERN AND EASTERN REPS COULD NEGOTIATE A

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TEXT WITH THE COORDINATOR BEFORE PRESENTING IT TO THE WORKING GROUP. IN THE WORKING GROUP MEETING ON FEB 18 THE EAST REFUSED TO CONSIDER PARAMETERS UNTIL AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED, IN WHICH THEY INCLUDE NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES, MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS, INCLUDING TRANSFERS ORIGINATING OUTSIDE THE ZONE. IN ADDITION, THEY CONTINUED TO REFUSE TO CONSIDER DRAFT TEXTS ON THE CONTENTS OF NOTIFICATION AS PART OF NOTIFICATION, ARGUING INSTEAD THAT THEY SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE INFORMATION/VERIFICATION MEETING. WHILE THE EAST SULKED, THE WEST AND NNA TABLED DRAFT TEXTS ON PARAMETERS BASED ON THEIR RESPECTIVE PROPOSALS. NOTING THAT BOTH NATO AND NNA PROPOSALS FOCUS ON THE DIVISION AS THE STRUCTURAL ELEMENT FOR NOTIFICATION, AND THAT THE USSR HAS ALSO EXPLAINED THAT THEIR PROPOSED PARAMETER (20,000 TROOPS) REPRESENTS A DIVISION WITH EQUIPMENT AND SUPPORT GROUPS, WE POINTED OUT THAT THERE IS COMMON GROUND ON A PARAMETER BASED ON A DIVISION.

5. NON-USE OF FORCE. PROGRESS OF SORTS WAS MADE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AT ARRIVING AT A COMMON POSITION ON NON-USE OF FORCE. THE EC-12 RECENTLY COMPLETED A NUF DRAFT WHICH THEY PLAN TO INTRODUCE INTO THE NATO CAUCUS IN STOCKHOLM AS EARLY AS TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 25. WHILE THE TEXT IS MARGINALLY BETTER THAN SOME OF THE EARLIER DRAFTS FLOATED BY INDIVIDUAL COMMUNITY MEMBERS, IT IS FAR FROM IDEAL. IN FACT, WE OBJECT TO BOTH THE MESSAGE AND THE MEDIUM OF THE DRAFT. THE TEXT'S SUBSTANTIVE MESSAGE GOES TOO FAR IN DELIMITING THE NUF PRINCIPLE AND NOT FAR ENOUGH IN DETAILING COLLATERAL ELEMENTS SUCH AS HUMAN RIGHTS. ITS MEDIUM (THE COMMUNITY'S SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE) IS EVEN MORE OBJECTIONABLE. WE HAVE TOLD OUR ALLIES IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS THAT NATO -- NOT THE EC-12 -- IS THE PROPER VENUE FOR DISCUSSION OF SECURITY MATTERS. WE SEE PARIS' NOT-SO-INVISIBLE AND MISCHIEVOUS HAND BEHIND THE COMMUNITY'S EFFORTS. NEVERTHELESS, WE ARE STILL FACED WITH THE NECESSITY OF TRANSLATING THE BROADER WESTERN CONCEPT ON NUF INTO A CONCRETE NATO TEXT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FOR BOTH TACTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE REASONS. ACCORDINGLY, IN DRAFTING A COMMON NATO TEXT WE PLAN TO WORK FROM THE COMMUNITY TEXT WHILE INTRODUCING ELEMENTS CONTAINED IN THE U.S. DRAFT (SEE REFTTEL). AT THAT POINT WE WILL MOST LIKELY WANT TO INTRODUCE THE NATO TEXT PIECEMEAL INTO WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS IN ORDER TO BETTER CONTROL THE PACE AND THE SUBSTANCE OF NUF DRAFTING. AGAIN, WE EXPECT THE FRENCH TO BE THE ODD MAN OUT IN THIS ENDEAVOR.

-. IN THE NUF WORKING GROUP, THE EAST INTRODUCED ITS NON-FIRST-USE CONCEPT INTO THE DISCUSSION. NOT SURPRISINGLY, THIS PROMPTED A HEATED EXCHANGE WITH THE WEST ARGUING THAT THE EAST WAS BLOCKING PROGRESS BY

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REINTRODUCING A CLEAR NON-STARTER INTO THE DISCUSSIONS AND THE EAST, SAFE IN THE KNOWLEDGE THAT NATO HAD NO AGREED TEXT, EXHORTING THE WEST TO TABLE ITS OWN LANGUAGE IF IT DIDN'T LIKE THE EASTERN CONTRIBUTION. AT THE SAME TIME, WESTERN EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE THE MORE SOLID NEUTRALS (SWITZERLAND, AUSTRIA, AND SWEDEN) TO TAKE THE PLAY AWAY FROM SOME OF THEIR MORE UNPREDICTABLE NONALIGNED COLLEAGUES (YUGOSLAVIA, MALTA, AND CYPRUS) BORE SOME FRUIT. THE NEUTRALS, FOR EXAMPLE, MADE CONSTRUCTIVE STATEMENTS ON THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE, WHICH WILL MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE EAST TO DEFINE OR DELIMIT THE PRINCIPLE IN THE NUF SECTION OF A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT.

6. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION/COMMUNICATIONS: WHILE NO SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS WAS EVIDENT, THE WORKING GROUP MEETING WAS GENERALLY POSITIVE IN THAT IT FOCUSED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON STATIC/INDEPENDENT INFORMATION. SOME NNA REITERATED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE INCLUSION OF "STATIC" OR "STRUCTURAL" INFORMATION IN A SET OF CSBM'S BUT REFERRED TO SUCH INFORMATION IN THE CONTEXT OF NOTIFICATION AND ANNUAL CALENDARS RATHER THAN AS AN INDEPENDENT MEASURE. THE EAST TRIED, UNSUCCESSFULLY, TO STEER DISCUSSION TO INFORMATION IN THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION. WHEN THIS TACTIC FAILED, THE SOVIETS ATTACKED MEASURE 1 AS "ONE-SIDED, UNBALANCED, AND READY FOR THE TRASH-CAN." BUT WHILE EASTERN DELEGATES STATED SUBSTANTIVE OPPOSITION TO THE MEASURE THE SOVIET MILREP CONFUSED THE ISSUE BY OFFERING TO CONSIDER IT IF IT WERE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE NAVAL FORCES AND BASES. WE CHALLENGED THE SOVIETS TO TABLE SUCH A PROPOSAL FOR CONSIDERATION. SINCE SUCH A PROPOSAL WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO ACCEPTING MEASURE 1, THERE WAS NO RESPONSE. -. THERE WAS SOME MOVEMENT ON THE VERIFICATION ISSUE OUTSIDE THE WORKING GROUP. THE WEST ENCOURAGED THE GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION COORDINATOR (SCHENK - SWITZERLAND) TO DEVELOP MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE BASED ON THAT PART OF THE FEBRUARY 12 HUNGARIAN VERIFICATION TEXT WHICH RECOGNIZED THE NECESSITY FOR ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION FOR AGREED CSBM'S. WHILE AN AGREED TEXT ON THIS SUBJECT WOULD BASICALLY REITERATE MANDATE LANGUAGE AND BE OF LIMITED SUBSTANTIVE SIGNIFICANCE, IT COULD HAVE THE IMPORTANT RESULT OF DRAWING THE EAST INTO DRAFTING ON VERIFICATION. SCHENK IS CONTINUING HIS EFFORTS TO FIND AN ACCEPTABLE FORMULATION. WHILE INITIALLY ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE IDEA, THE EAST HAS HESITATED, APPARENTLY REFLECTING THEIR RECOGNITION OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RECORDING SUCH AN AGREED SENTENCE EVEN IF BASED ON THEIR OWN PROPOSAL.

7. OBSERVATION: LITTLE PROGRESS WAS MADE THIS WEEK, ALTHOUGH NATO HAS ESSENTIALLY FINISHED THE HOUSEKEEPING

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TASK OF GETTING SC.1 LANGUAGE ON THE TABLE. THE NNA REACTED TO NATO'S CRITICISM OF NNA FOOTDRAGGING ON DRAFTING BY TABLING A BARRAGE OF TEXTS; BOTH NATO AND THE NNA MADE CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORTS TO FIND CONSENSUS LANGUAGE ON THE SCOPE OF OBSERVATION AND ON INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED TO OBSERVERS. HOWEVER, IT TAKES THREE NEGOTIATING PARTNERS TO TANGO IN STOCKHOLM AND THE EAST SEEMS PREPARED TO SIT OUT THE DANCE UNTIL THE QUESTION OF WHAT TYPE OF ACTIVITIES WILL BE NOTIFIED HAS BEEN RESOLVED IN THE NOTIFICATION GROUP. THIS WEEK'S EASTERN TACTIC WAS TO PRESS THE WEST FOR MORE ON THE OBSERVATION OF AMPHIBIOUS AND, PARTICULARLY, AIR ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED "IN ASSOCIATION" WITH GROUND ACTIVITIES INCLUDING THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS TO AIR BASES. THIS REFLECTED THE CURRENT SOVIET LINE WHICH, WHILE NOT ABANDONING NAVAL ACTIVITIES, HAS EMPHASIZED THE INCLUSION OF AIR ACTIVITIES -- OBVIOUSLY THE "QUID" THE EAST WANTS IN RETURN FOR GORBACHEV'S OFFER TO DEFER THE CONSIDERATION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES TO THE NEXT PHASE OF CDE. THE CURRENT TIGHT SOVIET LINKAGE OF OBSERVATION TO PROGRESS ON NOTIFICATION COULD MAKE IT PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT TO ENGAGE IN ANY SERIOUS DRAFTING ON OBSERVATION IN THE NEAR FUTURE. ON THE BRIGHT SIDE THE COORDINATOR (KAHILUOTO - FINLAND) IS CONTINUING HIS INFORMAL EFFORTS OUTSIDE THE WORKING GROUP TO FIND CONSENSUS LANGUAGE ON THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS AND HAS PRODUCED A TEXT WHICH WE FIND GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE.

8. ANNUAL FORECASTS: WEST, EAST AND NNA ALL TABLED LANGUAGE IN THE WORKING GROUP ON FEBRUARY 20 AND THEN ENGAGED IN THE CLOSEST APPROXIMATION OF DRAFTING WE HAVE WITNESSED TO DATE. EVER SINCE GORBACHEV'S ACCEPTANCE IN PRINCIPLE OF THE ANNUAL FORECAST (DURING HIS PARIS SUMMIT), IT HAS BEEN CLEAR THAT THIS IS AN UNCONTROVERSIAL AREA WHERE PROGRESS IS POSSIBLE. SINCE THEN, HOWEVER, SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO BROADEN THE ZONE HAVE BEEN PROMINENT IN THE DISCUSSION OF FORECASTS, WITH THE BULGARIANS AND TURKS PERIODICALLY ARGUING OVER EASTERN EFFORTS TO CHANGE THE ZONE AGREED IN MADRID. THE TURKS HAVE BEEN ACTIVE IN CONVINCING THE REST OF NATO BEHIND THE SCENES THAT AGREEMENT ON THE ZONE AS AGREED IN MADRID MUST BE REGISTERED EARLY AND NOT LEFT UNTIL THE LAST MINUTE. THE NNA, FINALLY FELL OFF THEIR INSISTENCE POSITION THAT FORECASTS MUST BE NEGOTIATED TOGETHER WITH NOTIFICATION AND FOR THE FIRST TIME, INTRODUCED A TEXT ON THE SUBJECT. IN THE ENSUING DISCUSSION OF TEXTS, IT WAS CLEAR THAT NONE OF THE OBJECTIONS RAISED WAS INSURMOUNTABLE AND THAT -- BARRING AN UNFORESEEABLE BLOW-UP -- THE FIRST SENTENCES OF A TEXT ON FORECASTS COULD BE AGREED AND THEN REGISTERED BY THE COORDINATOR AS CONSENSUS LANGUAGE.

- CONSTRAINING MEASURES: THERE IS NO PROSPECT FOR

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PROGRESS IN THIS GROUP AS LONG AS THE EAST DEFINES  
CONSTRAINING MEASURES AS CEILINGS ON THE LEVEL OF  
MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THE WEST HAS BEEN EXTREMELY FIRM  
IN ITS PRINCIPLED OPPOSITION TO SUCH CONSTRAINING  
MEASURES BUT, AWARE THAT THE WEST STANDS ALONE IN ITS  
CATEGORICAL REJECTION OF CEILINGS, THE EAST SHOWS NO  
SIGN OF MOVING OFF ITS POSITION. IT CONTINUED IN THE  
WORKING GROUP TO PROMOTE ITS PROPOSAL FOR LIMITATIONS ON  
THE SCALE AND DURATION OF LARGE-SCALE MANEUVERS,  
STRESSING ITS SIMILARITY TO THE NNA PROPOSAL AND TAKING  
UP THE YUGOSLAV ARGUMENT THAT ADOPTION OF CONSTRAINTS IS  
THE KEY TO SUCCESS AT STOCKHOLM. MEANWHILE, THE NNA ARE  
HINTING AT THE POSSIBILITY OF OTHER "CONSTRAINTS", I.E.,  
THEIR VERSION OF AN ANNUAL FORECAST CONSTRAINT WHICH  
WOULD COMBINE THE FORECAST WITH A LIMITATION ON  
UNFORECAST ACTIVITIES. THEY ALSO CONFIRMED EARLIER  
HINTS THAT ALERTS WOULD BE EXEMPT FROM THEIR  
CONSTRAINT. IN PRIVATE THE SWEDES HAVE JUSTIFIED THIS  
POTENTIAL LOOPHOLE BY NOTING THAT UNDER SWEDISH LAW  
ALERTS ARE CLASSIFIED AS SECRET AND PRIOR NOTIFICATION  
OF SUCH ACTIVITIES IS ILLEGAL.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01444  
 SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN'S DISCUSSION WITH CDE  
 - NATO CAUCUS

REF: STOCKHOLM 975 (NOTAL)

1. CDE IX - 071

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. BEGIN SUMMARY: DURING A ONE-DAY VISIT TO STOCKHOLM, HEAD OF USDEL NST AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN MET WITH CDE NATO CAUCUS FEBRUARY 21. HIS PRESENTATION AND ENSUING DISCUSSION HIGHLIGHTED KEY POLICY QUESTIONS WHICH NATO WILL NEED TO ADDRESS AS CDE APPROACHES ADJOURNMENT AND WE PREPARE FOR THE CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING: HOW BEST CAN CDE'S SUBORDINATION TO CSCE BE PROTECTED AND EMPHASIZED? SHOULD CDE IMPLEMENT ANY MEASURES IT ADOPTS, OR SHOULD IMPLEMENTATION BE LEFT TO VIENNA? WE ALSO THINK THAT AT SOME POINT NATO OUGHT TO CONSIDER SUCH ADDITIONAL ISSUES AS: HOW TO RELATE PROGRESS IN THE THE DIFFERENT CSCE BASKETS TO PRESSURES TO MOVE BEYOND THE CURRENT CDE PHASE? SHOULD NATO BE CONSIDERING NEW OPTIONS IN THE CSBM'S FIELD FOR A POSSIBLE PHASE IB AND, IF SO, WHAT MEASURES?. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT IN THE CAUCUS THAT BRUSSELS NEEDS TO CONSIDER THESE QUESTIONS MORE INTENSIVELY THAN IT PRESENTLY SEEMS TO BE DOING. END SUMMARY.

4. IN A BRIEF PRESENTATION TO THE CDE NATO CAUCUS FEBRUARY 21 AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN MADE THE FOLLOWING MAIN POINTS, WHICH HIGHLIGHTED ISSUES THAT SHOULD RECEIVE CAREFUL STUDY IN NATO:

-- THE CDE WOULD PROVIDE THE FIRST TEST OF SOVIET SINCERITY ON THE ISSUE OF VERFICATION IN GENERAL AND ON-SITE INSPECTION IN PARTICULAR AND RESULTS IN STOCKHOLM WILL PROVIDE AN IMPORTANT SIGNAL TO THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS.

-- THE IMPORTANCE OF BALANCE IN THE CSCE IS THE KEY TO MAINTAINING THE FUNDAMENTAL UTILITY OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS FOR THE WEST; HE EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO RESIST LONG-STANDING EASTERN EFFORTS TO TURN HELSINKI INTO A STRICTLY MILITARY-SECURITY PROCESS.

-- THE CDE ITSELF SHOULD NOT IMPLEMENT ANY MEASURES ADOPTED IN STOCKHOLM BUT RATHER REFER THEM TO THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING WHERE THEY CAN BE REVIEWED IN THE

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LIGHT OF PROGRESS MADE IN OTHER AREAS OF CSCE. IN KAMPELMAN'S VIEW, IMPLEMENTATION OF AN AGREEMENT BY STOCKHOLM WOULD GIVE THE CDE A LIFE OF ITS OWN AND REMOVE THE SOVIETS' INCENTIVE TO MAKE PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE OTHER PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT (I.E., HUMAN RIGHTS).

5. IN ENSUING DISCUSSION NATO CDE AMBASSADORS WERE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH KAMPELMAN ON THE IMPORTANCE OF

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BALANCE IN THE CSCE PROCESS, BUT SEVERAL DISAGREED WITH KAMPELMAN'S VIEW THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF A CDE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE LEFT TO VIENNA. SOME ARGUED AS FOLLOWS:

-- IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN TO OUR PUBLICS WITHHOLDING IMPLEMENTATION OF AN AGREEMENT WHICH WE SAY INCREASES EUROPEAN SECURITY; IF THE AGREEMENT IS WORTHWHILE IN ITS OWN RIGHT IT SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED AS SOON AS IS PRACTICAL (NORWAY).

-- WHILE OVERALL CSCE BALANCE IS CENTRAL, WE SHOULD MAKE OUR DECISION ON IMPLEMENTATION OF A CDE AGREEMENT IN LIGHT OF ITS INTRINSIC VALUE AND NOT HAVE IMPLEMENTATION OVERTLY TIED TO BALANCE IN VIENNA (ITALY, NETHERLANDS, CANADA).

-- WE SHOULD WEIGH THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF ALL CSCE MEETINGS (E,G, OTTAWA, BERN, BUDAPEST, STOCKHOLM) PLUS PROGRESS IN HUMAN RIGHTS AGAINST A DECISION TO CONTINUE THE CDE PROCESS, NOT AGAINST IMPLEMENTATION OF A SOLID CDE AGREEMENT.

-- IT WILL BE VALUABLE TO OPEN UP "EUROPE TO THE URALS" FOR OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, WITHOUT WAITING MONTHS FOR RESULTS TO COME OUT OF VIENNA (FRG).

-- HE MADRID MANDATE GIVES CDE THE AUTHORITY TO "ADOPT" CSBM'S AND THE HELSINKI PREPARATORY MEETING AGREED THE CDE WOULD "IMPLEMENT" AGREED MEASURES (FRG AND UK).

6. IN RESPONSE, KAMPELMAN STRESSED AGAIN THAT THE INTEGRITY OF THE ENTIRE HELSINKI PROCESS REQUIRES THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION DECISION BE TAKEN BY THE FULL CSCE. HE CAUTIONED THAT IF THE MILITARY-SECURITY COMPONENT OF HELSINKI IS ALLOWED TO ACQUIRE AN INDEPENDENT LIFE THE REST OF THE CSCE PROCESS WILL DIE. HE SUGGESTED THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF A CDE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT COULD BE DECIDED UPON AT THE OUTSET OF VIENNA, NOT AT ITS CONCLUSION, THUS PRESERVING THE OPTION OF RAPID IMPLEMENTATION OF CSBM'S.

7. THE CAUCUS AGREED THAT THESE QUESTIONS NEED TO BE GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION IN PREPARATION FOR THE END-GAME AT CDE AND THE VIENNA START-UP. BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS), HOWEVER, NOTED THAT THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE AT NATO IS NOT PLANNING TO START DISCUSSIONS FOR THE VIENNA MEETING UNTIL APRIL AND HAS SCHEDULED ONLY ONE MEETING A MONTH THEREAFTER FOR THAT PURPOSE. IN BUWALDA'S VIEW, SHARED BY OTHERS INCLUDING USDEL, THE IMPORTANCE OF VIENNA REQUIRES A MORE INTENSIVE WORK PROGRAM IN BRUSSELS THEN IS PRESENTLY BEING CONTEMPLATED. AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN NOTED THAT A MUCH MORE AMBITIOUS APPROACH HAD BEEN TAKEN PRIOR TO THE MADRID MEETING.

8. COMMENT: WE SHARE THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED DURING THIS DISCUSSION AND FOUND AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN'S PARTICIPATION PARTICULARLY VALUABLE AS IT HIGHLIGHTED

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CENTRAL ISSUES BEYOND DAY-TO-DAY NEGOTIATING CONCERNS. IN PARTICULAR WE STRONGLY SUPPORT HIS VIEW ON THE NECESSITY OF BALANCE AMONG ALL AREAS OF THE FINAL ACT AND, IN LIGHT OF THIS, SUGGEST THAT NATO BEGIN INTENSIFIED CONSIDERATION OF THE FUTURE OF THE SECURITY BASKET SHOULD THERE BE AN AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM (I.E, CAN THERE BE FURTHER PROGRESS IN THE SECURITY AREA UNLESS AND UNTIL THERE IS BALANCED PROGRESS IN HUMAN RIGHTS?). HOWEVER, WE ALSO SUGGEST THAT NATO BEGIN TO CONSIDER ISSUES RELATED TO A POSSIBLE POST-VIENNA PHASE OF CDE, WHICH WERE RECENTLY RAISED IN AMBASSADOR BARRY'S BILATERAL MEETING IN LONDON (REFTEL). AS ONE TACK TO

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PREVENT VIENNA FROM FOCUSING ON DISARMAMENT OR "CRISIS MANAGEMENT" CSBM'S NATO MAY WANT TO BEGIN THE CONSIDERATION OF NEW OPTIONS IN THE CSBM FIELD WHICH COULD BE COMBINED WITH CSBM'S NOT FULLY ADDRESSED IN STOCKHOLM AND WOULD BE HELD FOR CONSIDERATION AT A POSSIBLE "PHASE 1B" CDE. NATO MAY ALSO WISH TO BEGIN CONSIDERATION OF AN ALLIANCE POSITION IN OPPOSITION TO ANTICIPATED SOVIET ATTEMPTS IN VIENNA TO CHANGE THE CDE'S MANDATE. END COMMENT.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01259

SUBJECT: EEC DRAFT TEXT ON NUF

1. CDE IX - 055

2. C NOFORN - ENTIRE TEXT

3. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A NON-USE-OF-FORCE DRAFT WHICH WAS AGREED UPON IN THE EEC WORKING GROUP ON CDE/CSCE. IT HAS BEEN PUT OUT TO EEC CAPITALS UNDER THE SILENCE PROCEDURE, AND, IF NO OBJECTION IS RAISED, IT WILL BE APPROVED MONDAY, FEBRUARY 24. WE HAVE BEEN GIVEN THIS TEXT IN CONFIDENCE BY A MEMBER OF AN EEC DELEGATION HERE; IT SHOULD BE HELD CLOSELY AND NOT SHOWN TO ANYONE IN THE EEC.

4. BEGIN TEXT:

(1.1) THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE THIRTY-FIVE STATES OF THE CSCE MET IN STOCKHOLM FROM 17 JANUARY 1984 TO 19 SEPTEMBER 1986, IN ORDER TO ADOPT A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE AGREED AT THE MADRID FOLLOW-UP MEETING TO CONVENE A CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE, AS A SUBSTANTIAL AND INTEGRAL PART OF THE MULTILATERAL PROCESS INITIATED BY THE CSCE.

(1.2) ACCORDINGLY THEY AGREED ON SUCH A SET OF CSBM'S WHICH ARE OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE, POLITICALLY BINDING, PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION AND WHICH COVER THE WHOLE OF EUROPE, AS LAID DOWN IN THE ABOVE MENTIONED MANDATE.

(L.3) IN DOING SO, THEY RECOGNIZED THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THOSE AGREED CSBM'S WILL, AS STATED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING THE DANGERS OF ARMED CONFLICT AND OF MISUNDERSTANDING OR MISCALCULATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD GIVE RISE TO APPREHENSION, PARTICULARLY IN A SITUATION WHERE THE PARTICIPATING STATES LACK CLEAR AND TIMELY INFORMATION ABOUT THE NATURE OF SUCH ACTIVITIES.

(L.4) THEY FURTHERMORE EXPRESSED THEIR DETERMINATION, BY IMPLEMENTING THESE CSBM'S, TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE AMONG THEM AND THUS O CONTRIBUTE TO INCREASING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND, MORE GENERALLY, TO ELIMINATE THE CAUSES OF TENSION THAT MAY EXIST AMONG THEM AND THEREFORE TO MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE WORLD.

(L.5) THEY RECOGNIZED, MOREOVER, THAT THIS SET OF CSBM'S ADOPTED IN STOCKHOLM, BY THEIR SCOPE AND BY THEIR NATURE, WILL MAKE AN IMPORTANT AND APPROPRIATE CONTRIBUTION TO ACHIEVE THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE WHICH IS TO UNDERTAKE, IN STAGES, NEW, EFFECTIVE AND CONCRETE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO MAKE PROGRESS IN STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND ACHIEVING DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE.

(L.6) IN THIS CONTEXT THEY RECOGNIZED THAT SUCH MEASURES AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION WILL, IN ACCORDANCE

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WITH THE MANDATE LAID DOWN IN THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT, SERVE THE PROCESS OF STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE SO AS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THEIR DUTY TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.

(2.1) CONSEQUENTLY, THE PARTICIPATING STATES REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO RESPECT AND PUT INTO PRACTICE THIS PRINCIPLE LAID DOWN IN THE FINAL ACT AS FOLLOWS:

(2.2) THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL REFRAIN IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL, FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND WITH THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES OF THE FINAL ACT. NO CONSIDERATIONS MAY BE INVOKED TO SERVE TO WARRANT RESORT TO THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THIS PRINCIPLE.

(2.3) ACCORDINGLY, THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY ACT CONSTITUTING A THREAT OF FORCE OR DIRECT OR INDIRECT USE OF FORCE AGAINST ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE. LIKEWISE, THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY MANIFESTATION OF FORCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING

ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE TO RENOUNCE THE FULL EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS. LIKEWISE, THEY WILL ALSO REFRAIN IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS FROM ANY ACT OF REPRISAL BY FORCE.

(2.4) NO SUCH THREAT OR USE OF FORCE WILL BE EMPLOYED AS A MEANS OF SETTling DISPUTES, OR QUESTIONS LIKELY TO GIVE RISE TO DISPUTES, BETWEEN THEM.

(3.1) THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZED THEIR COMMITMENT TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

(3.1.1) NO CONSIDERATION WHATSOEVER WHETHER OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY OR ANY OTHER NATURE CAN BE INVOKED TO JUSTIFY THE THREAT OF FORCE OR THE DIRECT OR INDIRECT USE OF FORCE. THEY RECALL THAT THE USE OF FORCE IS ONLY JUSTIFIED IN THE EXERCISE OF THE INHERENT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENCE IF AN ARMED ATTACK OCCURS, AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

(3.1.2) THEY WILL LIKEWISE REFRAIN FROM ANY MANIFESTATION OF FORCE OR COERCION FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE OR ANY OTHER STATE TO RENOUNCE THE FULL EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND, IN PARTICULAR, OF ITS LIBERTY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND ITS RIGHT FREELY TO CHOOSE AND DEVELOP ITS OWN POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL

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SYSTEM. (NO TERRITORIAL OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION RESULTING FROM THE THREAT OR THE USE OF FORCE WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS LEGAL.)

(3.L.3) THEIR COMMITMENT APPLIES TO THEIR RELATIONS WITH EACH OF THE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PARTY OF AN ALLIANCE OR NEUTRAL, AS WELL AS TO THEIR RELATIONS WITH ALL OTHER STATES.

(3.L.4) THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IS A COMPLEMENT TO REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.

(3.2) THEY RECOGNIZED THE CLOSE LINK BETWEEN PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE AND ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED FOR EACH OF THEM TO MAKE ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRENGTHENING OF WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY AND TO THE PROMOTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS AND WELL-BEING OF ALL PEOPLES.

(3.3) THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO ALL TEN PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT, WHICH ARE ALL OF PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE AND ACCORDINGLY WILL BE EQUALLY AND UNRESERVEDLY APPLIED, EACH OF THEM BEING INTERPRETED TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE OTHERS. END TEXT.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01470

SUBJECT: REVISED EC-12 NUF PAPER

REF: A) STOCKHOLM 1259; B) STATE 31397

1. CDE IX - 074
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. DUTCH AMBASSADOR BUWALDA INTRODUCED THE FOLLOWING TEXT ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE TO THE CAUCUS AS A "CONTRIBUTION" TO THE PROCESS OF ARRIVING AT A COMMON NATO POSITION ON NUF IN STOCKHOLM (SEE PARA 4). THE TEXT, OF COURSE, IS THE SLIGHTLY AMENDED EC-12 TEXT REPORTED IN REF A; HOWEVER, BUWALDA STUDIOUSLY AVOIDED CALLING IT AN EC-12 TEXT. THE COMMUNITY DRAFT WAS FINALLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE TO THE 16 ONLY AFTER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE ON THE OBSTREPEROUS FRENCH IN VARIOUS PLACES, MOST PARTICULARLY IN THE HAGUE, ACCORDING TO OUR SOURCES ON EC-12 DELEGATIONS. THE CAUCUS REMANDED THE TEXT TO THE A-1 CLUSTER FOR STUDY AND COMMENT. MEANWHILE, BEARING IN MIND THE TACTICAL SITUATION IN THE CONFERENCE, THE CLUSTER WAS CHARGED WITH FOCUSING ON ONE OR TWO SECTIONS OF THE TEXT WITH A VIEW TOWARDS RECOMMENDING LANGUAGE TO THE CAUCUS WHICH WOULD BE AGREED BY THE 16. THE CAUCUS WOULD THEN DECIDE HOW AND WHEN TO USE THIS LANGUAGE IN THE CONFERENCE. BASED ON INSTRUCTIONS (REF B) USDEL WILL PRESS TO HAVE THE EVENTUAL NATO TEXT REFLECT AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE OF THE U.S. APPROACH TO NUF AND WILL REPORT THESE DISCUSSIONS TO WASHINGTON AS THE SITUATION DEVELOPS. SEPTEL FOLLOWS WITH DELEGATION'S COMMENTS ON THE EC-12 TEXT WHICH, AT OUR REQUEST, IS NOW REFERRED TO IN OUR DELIBERATIONS AS THE "FEBRUARY 26 TEXT."

4. BEGIN TEXT:

1.1. THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE 35 STATES OF THE CSCE MET IN STOCKHOLM FROM 17 JANUARY 1984 TO 19 SEPTEMBER 1986, IN ORDER TO ADOPT A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE AGREED AT THE MADRID FOLLOW-UP MEETING TO CONVENE A CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE, AS A SUBSTANTIAL AND INTEGRAL PART OF THE MULTILATERAL PROCESS INITIATED BY THE CSCE.

1.2. ACCORDINGLY THEY AGREED ON SUCH A SET OF CSBM'S WHICH ARE OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE, POLITICALLY BINDING PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION AND WHICH COVER THE WHOLE OF EUROPE, AS LAID DOWN IN THE ABOVE-MENTIONED MANDATE.

1.3. IN DOING SO, THEY RECOGNIZED THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THOSE AGREED CSBM'S WILL, AS STATED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING THE DANGERS OF ARMED CONFLICT AND OF MISUNDERSTANDING OR MISCALCULATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD GIVE RISE TO

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## APPREHENSION.

1.4. THEY FURTHERMORE EXPRESSED THEIR DETERMINATION, BY IMPLEMENTING THESE CSBM'S, TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE AMONG THEM AND THUS CONTRIBUTE TO INCREASING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND, MORE GENERALLY, TO ELIMINATE THE CAUSES OF TENSION THAT MAY EXIST AMONG THEM AND THEREFORE TO MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE WORLD.

1.5. THEY RECOGNIZED MOREOVER THAT THIS SET OF CSBM'S ADOPTED IN STOCKHOLM, BY THEIR SCOPE AND BY THEIR NATURE, WILL MAKE AN IMPORTANT AND APPROPRIATE CONTRIBUTION TO ACHIEVING THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE WHICH IS DESIGNED TO UNDERTAKE, IN STAGES, NEW, EFFECTIVE AND CONCRETE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO MAKE PROGRESS IN STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND ACHIEVING DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE.

1.6. IN THIS CONTEXT THEY RECOGNIZED THAT SUCH MEASURES AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION WILL, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE LAID DOWN IN THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT, SERVE THE PROCESS OF STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE SO AS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THEIR DUTY TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.

2.1. CONSEQUENTLY THE PARTICIPATING STATES REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO RESPECT AND PUT INTO PRACTICE THIS PRINCIPLE LAID DOWN IN THE FINAL ACT AS FOLLOWS:

2.2. THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL REFRAIN IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL, FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND WITH THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES OF THE FINAL ACT. NO CONSIDERATIONS MAY BE INVOKED TO SERVE TO WARRANT RESORT TO THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THIS PRINCIPLE.

2.3. ACCORDINGLY, THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTS CONSTITUTING A THREAT OF FORCE OR DIRECT OR INDIRECT USE OF FORCE AGAINST ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE. LIKEWISE THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY MANIFESTATION OF FORCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE TO RENOUNCE THE FULL EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS. LIKEWISE THEY WILL ALSO REFRAIN IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS FROM ANY ACT OF REPRISAL BY FORCE.

2.4. NO SUCH THREAT OR USE OF FORCE WILL BE EMPLOYED AS A MEANS OF SETTLING DISPUTES, OR QUESTIONS LIKELY TO GIVE RISE TO DISPUTES, BETWEEN THEM.

3.1. THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZED THEIR COMMITMENT TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONSHIP AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

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3.1.1. NO CONSIDERATION WHATSOEVER WHETHER OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY OR ANY OTHER NATURE CAN BE INVOKED TO JUSTIFY THE THREAT OF FORCE OR THE DIRECT OR INDIRECT USE OF FORCE.

THEY RECALL THAT AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, NOTHING SHALL IMPAIR THE INHERENT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE SELF DEFENSE IF AN ARMED ATTACK OCCURS.

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3.1.2. THEY WILL LIKEWISE REFRAIN FROM ANY MANIFESTATION OF FORCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE OR ANY OTHER STATE TO RENOUNCE THE FULL EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND, IN PARTICULAR, OF ITS LIBERTY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND ITS RIGHT FREELY TO CHOOSE AND DEVELOP ITS OWN POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL SYSTEM.

3.1.3. THEY WILL LIKEWISE REFRAIN FROM MAKING EACH OTHER'S TERRITORY THE OBJECT OF MILITARY OCCUPATION OR OTHER DIRECT OR INDIRECT MEASURES OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, OR THE OBJECT OF ACQUISITION BY MEANS OF SUCH MEASURES OR THE THREAT OF THEM. NO SUCH OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS LEGAL.

3.1.4. THEIR COMMITMENT APPLIES TO THEIR RELATIONS WITH EACH OF THE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PART OF AN ALLIANCE OR NEUTRAL AS WELL AS TO THEIR RELATIONS WITH ALL OTHER STATES.

3.1.5. THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IS A COMPLEMENT TO REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.

3.2. THEY RECOGNIZED THE CLOSE LINK BETWEEN PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE AND ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED FOR EACH OF THEM TO MAKE ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRENGTHENING OF WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY AND TO THE PROMOTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS AND WELL-BEING FOR ALL PEOPLES.

3.3. THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO ALL TEN PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT, WHICH ARE ALL OF PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE AND ACCORDINGLY WILL BE EQUALLY AND UNRESERVEDLY APPLIED, EACH OF THEM BEING INTERPRETED TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE OTHERS.

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## FOOTNOTE:

AN ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO OBTAIN WORDING SIMILAR TO OR IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FIFTH PARAGRAPH ON HUMAN RIGHTS AS LAID DOWN IN THE SEVENTH PRINCIPLE OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT WHICH IS THE SOURCE OF THE RELEVANT PARAGRAPH IN THE DRAFT NNA PROPOSAL ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE. IN CASE THIS WOULD APPEAR NOT TO BE POSSIBLE DELEGATIONS IN STOCKHOLM COULD MAKE USE OF PARAGRAPH

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3.2. IN THE DRAFT DOCUMENT.

END TEXT.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01633

SUBJECT: NON-USE OF FORCE UPDATE

REF: STOCKHOLM 1584

1. CDE IX - 086

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. THE FOLLOWING AMENDMENTS WERE PROPOSED TO THE TO THE FIRST SIX PARAGRAPHS OF THE FEBRUARY 26 TEXT (REFTEL) WHICH DESCRIBES THE RATIONALE AND BACKGROUND TO THE NUF REAFFIRMATION. AGREEMENT ON ANY OF THE SUGGESTED LANGUAGE, OF COURSE, IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE FINAL FORM OR DISPOSITION OF THE NATO TEXT WE ARE CURRENTLY TRYING TO HAMMER OUT IN THE NUF CLUSTER GROUP. HOWEVER, IF WE ARE ABLE TO AGREE TO LANGUAGE ON THE AIM, I.E., CONCRETE CSBM'S, AND KEY LINK, I.E., CSBM'S JUSTIFY A NUF REAFFIRMATION, WE WILL BE BETTER ABLE TO COUNTER EASTERN THREATS THAT THEY WILL HOLD BACK PROGRESS INCSBM WORKING GROUPS IF THERE IS NO PROGRESS IN THE NUF WORKING GROUP. WITH THIS IN MIND, DELEGATION WELCOMES WASHINGTON COMMENTS ON THESE FIRST SIX PARAGRAPHS AND AMENDMENTS BY COB, MARCH 7.  
BEGIN TEXT WITH AMENDMENTS.

1.1. THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE 35 STATES OF THE CSCE MET IN STOCKHOLM FROM 17 JANUARY 1984 TO 19 SEPTEMBER 1986, IN ORDER TO ADOPT A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE AGREED AT THE MADRID FOLLOW-UP MEETING TO CONVENE A CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE, AS A SUBSTANTIAL AND INTEGRAL PART OF THE MULTILATERAL PROCESS INITIATED BY THE CSCE.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT:

USA: LINE 3 DELETE "TO ADOPT A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S . . ." TO BE REPLACED BY: "TO BEGIN A PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION, AND ADOPTION OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S . . ." LINE 6: DELETE "AS A SUBSTANTIAL . . . CSCE."

1.2. ACCORDINGLY THEY AGREED ON SUCH A SET OF CSBM'S WHICH ARE OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE, POLITICALLY BINDING PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION AND WHICH COVER THE WHOLE OF EUROPE, AS LAID DOWN IN THE ABOVE-MENTIONED MANDATE.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT:

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TURKEY: LINE 3 DELETE "AND WHICH COVER THE WHOLE OF EUROPE, AS LAID DOWN IN THE ABOVE-MENTIONED MANDATE." TO BE REPLACED BY: "WILL BE APPLICABLE IN ALL AREAS AS COVERED BY THE ABOVE-MENTIONED MANDATE."

1.3. IN DOING SO, THEY RECOGNIZED THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THOSE AGREED CSBM'S WILL, AS STATED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING THE DANGERS OF ARMED CONFLICT AND OF MISUNDERSTANDING OR MISCALCULATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD GIVE RISE TO

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APPREHENSION.

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:

USA: LINE 4 DELETE "WHICH COULD GIVE RISE TO APPREHENSION."

NORWAY AND ITALY SUGGESTED THAT THE WHOLE SENTENCE OF THE FINAL ACT COULD BE INTRODUCED: "WHICH COULD GIVE RISE TO APPREHENSION, PARTICULARLY IN A SITUATION WHERE THE PARTICIPATING STATES LACK CLEAR AND TIMELY INFORMATION ABOUT THE NATURE OF SUCH ACTIVITIES."

1.4. THEY FURTHERMORE EXPRESSED THEIR DETERMINATION, BY IMPLEMENTING THESE CSBM'S, TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE AMONG THEM AND THUS CONTRIBUTE TO INCREASING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND, MORE GENERALLY, TO ELIMINATE THE CAUSES OF TENSION THAT MAY EXIST AMONG THEM AND THEREFORE TO MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE WORLD.

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:

UK: LINE 4 DELETE "AND THEREFORE TO MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE WORLD."

USA: LINE 4 DELETE " . . . TO ELIMINATE THE CAUSES OF TENSION . . . " OR DELETE EVERYTHING AFTER THE WORD "EUROPE" IN LINE 4.

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NORWAY: LINE 3: " . . . IN EUROPE AND, MORE GENERALLY, TO ELIMINATING THE CAUSES OF TENSION . . . " INSTEAD OF THE EXISTING " . . . IN EUROPE AND, MORE GENERALLY, TO ELIMINATE . . . ."

CANADA: LINE 3: "IN EUROPE AND TO ELIMINATE THE CAUSES OF . . . ."

1.5. THEY RECOGNIZED MOREOVER THAT THIS SET OF CSBM'S ADOPTED IN STOCKHOLM, BY THEIR SCOPE AND BY THEIR NATURE, WILL MAKE AN IMPORTANT AND APPROPRIATE CONTRIBUTION TO ACHIEVING THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE WHICH IS DESIGNED TO UNDERTAKE, IN STAGES, NEW, EFFECTIVE AND CONCRETE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO MAKE PROGRESS IN STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND ACHIEVING DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE.

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:

UK: LINE 1 AFTER "MOREOVER THAT" ADD "THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS SET OF CSBM'S . . . ."

USA: LINE 2 DELETE "IMPORTANT AND." LINE 4 AFTER THE WORD "IS" ADD "AS A SUBSTANTIAL AND INTEGRAL PART OF THE CSCE PROCESS, . . . ."

FRG: LINE 2 DELETE "IMPORTANT" TO BE REPLACED BY: "ESSENTIAL."

CANADA INTRODUCED THE FOLLOWING TEXT:

"THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZING THAT IN ENHANCING OPENNESS AND PREDICTABILITY IN MILITARY ACTIVITY, CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES CAN, BY THEIR VERY NATURE, CONTRIBUTE TO LESSENING THE RISK OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE AND THUS REINFORCE THE

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PROHIBITION AGAINST THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, HAVE  
CONSEQUENTLY AGREED TO THE FOLLOWING CONCRETE MEASURES:"  
CANADA ASKED THAT SOME OF THE IDEAS CONTAINED IN THIS  
TEXT BE SOMEHOW REFLECTED IN PARA 1.5 AND 1.6, PARTICULARLY  
THE REFERENCE TO "OPENNESS AND PREDICTABILITY."

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1.6. IN THIS CONTEXT THEY RECOGNIZED THAT SUCH MEASURES  
AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION WILL, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE  
MANDATE LAID DOWN IN THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT,  
SERVE THE PROCESS OF STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND  
SECURITY IN EUROPE SO AS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION  
TO THEIR DUTY TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT:

USA: LINE 1 AFTER "THAT" ADD "A SET OF CSBM'S ADOPTED  
AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION . . . ."  
END TEXT AND AMENDMENTS.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01519  
 SUBJECT: EASTERN DRAFT LANGUAGE ON NOTIFICATION

1. CDE IX - 079.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: ON 25 FEB, GDR MILREP TABLED DRAFTING LANGUAGE IN THE NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP. THE FIRST SECTION DEALS WITH NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE MANEUVERS IN A MANNER REMINISCENT OF FINAL ACT LANGUAGE AT A THRESHOLD OF 20,000 TROOPS. THE SECOND SECTION PROPOSES THE NOTIFICATION OF AIR FORCE MANEUVERS, INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH GROUND TROOPS AND/OR NAVAL FORCES, AT A LEVEL OF 200 AIRCRAFT SIMULTANEOUSLY AIRBORNE IN EUROPE AS WELL AS THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE. SECTION THREE COVERS THE MOVEMENT OF GROUND TROOPS WITH A NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD OF 20,000 TROOPS AND/OR AIR FORCE MOVEMENTS OF ONE HUNDRED MILITARY AIRCRAFT. A FOURTH PARAGRAPH CONTAINS ONLY ELIPSES PROVIDING FOR THE NOTIFICATION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES. END SUMMARY.
4. EASTERN PROPOSAL. BEGIN TEXT.

SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION ARE:

- A) MANOEUVRES OF GROUND TROOPS CONDUCTED BY THE PARTICIPATING STATES INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH ANY POSSIBLE AIR, NAVAL, AMPHIBIOUS OR AIRBORNE TROOP COMPONENTS UNDER A COMMON PLAN, IF THEY INVOLVE 20,000 TROOPS OR MORE.  
 NOTIFICATIONS WILL BE GIVEN OF MANOEUVRES OF GROUND TROOPS CONDUCTED IN EUROPE ON THE TERRITORY OF ONE OR MORE PARTICIPATING STATES AS WELL AS, IF APPLICABLE, IN THE ADJOINING SEA (OCEAN) AREA AND AIR SPACE;
- B) MANOEUVRES OF AIR FORCES CONDUCTED UNDER A COMMON PLAN INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH GROUND TROOPS AND/OR NAVAL FORCES, IF IN THE COURSE OF THE MANOEUVRE IT IS FORESEEN THAT TWO HUNDRED MILITARY AIRCRAFT OR MORE WILL BE IN THE AIR SPACE OVER THE NOTIFIED AREA AT THE SAME TIME.  
 NOTIFICATIONS WILL BE GIVEN OF MANOEUVRES OF AIR FORCES CONDUCTED IN EUROPE AS WELL AS IN THE ADJOINING SEA (OCEAN) AREA AND AIR SPACE.
- C) MOVEMENTS (TRANSFERS) OF GROUND TROOPS OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES EFFECTED IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AND IN THE ADJOINING SEA (OCEAN) AREA AND AIR SPACE, AS WELL AS INTO THAT ZONE OR OUT OF IT, WHEN THESE MOVEMENTS (TRANSFERS) INVOLVE 20,000 TROOPS OR MORE AND WHEN THE OVERALL DISTANCE OF THE MOVEMENT (TRANSFERS) IS 250-300 KM OR MORE ALONG A STRAIGHT LINE DRAWN FROM THE INITIAL POINT OF THE MOVEMENT.  
 NOTIFICATIONS WILL BE ALSO GIVEN OF TRANSFERS (FLIGHTS) OF AIR FORCE AVIATION TALLING ONE HUNDRED MILITARY AIRCRAFT OR MORE AND EFFECTED FROM OTHER CONTINENTS OR FROM OTHER REGIONS TO EUROPE AND TO THE ADJOINING SEA

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(OCEAN) AREA AND AIR SPACE, INSIDE THE ZONE AND OUT OF IT.  
D) . . .

END TEXT.

5. IN ADDITION TO SOME WORDING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THIS PROPOSAL AND THE EASTERN WORKING DOCUMENT PRESENTED A YEAR AGO, WGB.1, THE CONCEPT "IF APPLICABLE" IS INTRODUCED IN A MANNER ROUGHLY ANALOGOUS TO ITS USAGE IN THE FINAL ACT. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THIS CONCEPT HAS SURFACED IN PROPOSALS IN THE CDE.

6. IN WGB.2, AIR FORCE MANEUVERS HAD BEEN DEFINED TO INCLUDE AIR FORCES, NAVAL AVIATION AND AVIATION OF AIR DEFENSE FORCES. THE DRAFTING LANGUAGE MENTIONS ONLY "AIR FORCES" INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH GROUND TROOPS AND/OR NAVAL FORCES. IT RETAINS, HOWEVER, THE THRESHOLD OF 200 AIRCRAFT SIMULTANEOUS AIRBORNE.

7. WGB.4, DEALING WITH THE MOVEMENT OF FORCES SPOKE OF FORMATIONS AND UNITS WITH A NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF 20,000 TROOPS IN THE ZONE AS WELL AS IN AND OUT OF IT. THE DRAFTING LANGUAGE MAKES NO REFERENCE TO FORMATIONS AND UNITS BUT RETAINS THE 20,000 TROOP THRESHOLD. INSTEAD OF A REFERENCE TO THE AREA COVERED BY CBMS (SIC), THE NEW LANGUAGE REFERS TO THAT ZONE AS BEING THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AND IN THE ADJOINING SEA (OCEAN) AREA AND AIR SPACE. IT ALSO INTRODUCES FOR THE FIRST TIME IN STOCKHOLM THE CRITERION THAT NOTIFIABLE MOVEMENTS MUST COVER A STRAIGHT LINE DISTANCE OF 250-300 KM.

THE NEW LANGUAGE SPECIFIES AIR FORCE AVIATION (EXCLUDING ARMY, NAVAL AND AIR DEFENSE AVIATION) AND MAKES CLEAR THAT THIS COVERS ONLY MILITARY AIRCRAFT. OTHERWISE, THIS NEW LANGUAGE REPEATS THE BASIC CONCEPT OF NOTIFYING THE MOVEMENT OF 100 AIRCRAFT AS IN WGB.4.

8. WGB-3 WHICH ADDRESSED THE PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MANEUVERS OF NAVAL FORCES DOES NOT APPEAR IN THE LANGUAGE TABLED BY THE GDR. PARA 4, FOLLOWED BY ELLIPSES, WAS EXPLAINED BY THE GDR MILREP AS BEING DESIGNED TO LAY DOWN THE MARKER THAT SPACE IS PROVIDED FOR ADDING NAVAL FORCE MANEUVERS IF THE WEST DOES NOT RESPOND TO THE 15 JAN GORBACHEV IDEA.

HANSEN

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01575  
 SUBJECT: SOVIET STATEMENTS ON INSPECTIONS  
 REF: (A) MBFR VIENNA 157; (B) STOCKHOLM 844

1. CDE IX - 068
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. IN RESPONSE TO REF A, THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT MADE FORMAL CDE STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT INSPECTIONS ARE WARRANTED AS A VERIFICATION MEASURE FOR ARMS REDUCTIONS, BUT HAVE ADDRESSED THIS ISSUE IN INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS AND IN BACKGROUND COMMENTS TO THE PRESS. IN A MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INFORMATION, VERIFICATION AND COMMUNICATIONS FEBRUARY 26, THE DUTCH MILREP (VAN DER GRAAF) PRESSED THE SOVIETS FOR FURTHER ELABORATION OF THEIR POSITION ON ON-SITE INSPECTION. HE CITED GORBACHEV'S FEBRUARY 20 STATEMENT TO THE CD DELIVERED BY SOVIET FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS KORZENKO AND A FEBRUARY 17 TASS REPORT BY VASILY KHARKOV (WHICH MBFR DEL MAY FIND INTERESTING) WHICH SAID IN PART, "THE USSR HOLDS THAT CONCRETE AGREEMENTS ON DISARMAMENT SHOULD BE VERIFIED BOTH BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS AND ON-SITE INSPECTION THROUGH INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURES. . . . BUT THE SOVIET UNION UNDERSCORES THAT THE POINT AT ISSUE SHOULD BE CONTROL OVER DISARMAMENT AND NOT ARMAMENT, WHICH HAWKS IN THE UNITED STATES AND NATO ARE ACTUALLY AFTER." IN RESPONSE, THE SOVIET MILREP (GENERAL TATARNIKOV) ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE FEBRUARY 20 GORBACHEV STATEMENT TO THE CD REFLECTED OFFICIAL POLICY. HE NOTED THAT IF AGREEMENT WERE ACHIEVED ON DISARMAMENT, THEN, AND ONLY IN THAT CASE, WOULD VERIFICATION BY VARIOUS MEASURES, INCLUDING ON-SITE INSPECTION BE APPROPRIATE. VERIFICATION OF CSBM'S AGREED AT CDE, TATARNIKOV ADDED, WOULD HAVE TO BE MORE "ELEGANT AND STREAMLINED" AND HE POINTED TO EASTERN PROPOSALS FOR VERIFICATION BY NTM'S AND CONSULTATIONS AS "WORTHY" METHODS IN THE STOCKHOLM CONTEXT.

4. WE ALSO CALL MBFR DEL'S ATTENTION TO REF B WHICH PROVIDES AN OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS ON THE VERIFICATION ISSUE AT CDE, INCLUDING ANOTHER WORKING GROUP STATEMENT MADE BY THE SOVIET MILREP IN WHICH HE ACKNOWLEDGED GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 OFFER OF ON-SITE INSPECTION "IN THE CONTEXT OF MONITORING OVER WEAPONS WHICH LEND THEMSELVES TO MONITORING." WE WILL PASS ALONG ANY ADDITIONAL RELEVANT STATEMENTS AS THEY BECOME AVAILABLE.

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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01469  
 C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT CHANGED)  
 ORIGINALLY PROCESSED AS CDS #0056828  
 SUBJECT: CDE: FIRST DRAFTING BREAKTHROUGH RECORDED IN  
 VERIFICATION WORKING GROUP

L. CDE IX - 070.

2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. SUMMARY. ON FEBRUARY 26, THE CONFERENCE FINALLY RECORDED ITS FIRST DRAFT TEXT IN THE WORKING GROUP DEALING WITH "INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, AND COMMUNICATION", WHEN NO OBJECTIONS WERE RAISED TO THE COORDINATOR'S (SWITZERLAND-SCHENK) PROPOSAL THAT HE NOTE A SPECIFIC ONE SENTENCE TEXT ON VERIFICATION IN HIS NOTEBOOK. END SUMMARY.

4. INTENSIVE BEHIND THE SCENES DISCUSSIONS LED TO AGREEMENT ON FEBRUARY 26 IN WORKING GROUP A ON INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, AND COMMUNICATION THAT A TEXT ON VERIFICATION BE "NOTED IN THE COORDINATOR'S AND PARTICIPANTS NOTEBOOKS." REFERRED TO AS A "NOTEBOOK TEXT," IT READS AS FOLLOWS: BEGIN TEXT.  
 "THE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES TO BE AGREED UPON WILL BE PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION WHICH CORRESPOND TO THEIR CONTENT. . ." END TEXT.

IN NOTING THIS DRAFTING SUCCESS THE COORDINATOR (SCHENK) RECALLED THAT THE DRAFTING EXERCISE ITSELF TAKES PLACE UNDER THE CONDITIONS AGREED INFORMALLY ON OCTOBER 14 IN THE "GENTLEMAN'S AGREEMENT," I.E. THAT "ALL DRAFT TEXTS WILL BE CONSIDERED PROVISIONAL AND WILL NEITHER IMPLY NOR PREJUDICE FINAL AGREEMENT ON ANY OF THE ELEMENTS DISCUSSED."

5. COMMENT. USDEL AND NATO OBJECTIVES IN AGREEING TO "NOTE" THIS TEXT WERE TWOFOLD: TO ACTUALLY BEGIN THE DRAFTING PROCESS ON THE VERIFICATION MEASURE SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH DRAFTING ON OTHER SUBJECTS AND, BY ENSURING THAT SUCH LANGUAGE HAS BEEN "NOTED" IN THIS WORKING GROUP, TO REINFORCE OUR POSITION THAT VERIFICATION IS A SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT MEASURE. WE JUDGED THAT THE ONLY WAY TO ENGAGE THE EAST IN THE DRAFTING PROCESS WAS TO WORK WITH A TEXT BASED ON THE MANDATE. AS A REITERATION OF MADRID MANDATE LANGUAGE, THE LANGUAGE IN ITSELF IS NOT REVOLUTIONARY. IN GETTING THE LANGUAGE "NOTED" HOWEVER, WE WERE ABLE TO GET A FOOT IN THE DOOR -- VERIFICATION AS A PRINCIPLE, AND AS AN INDEPENDENT AND SEPARATE MEASURE. THE DOTS AT THE END OF THE SENTENCE, INCLUDED AT WESTERN INSISTENCE, INDICATE THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS AGREE THAT MORE TEXT IS TO BE ADDED. WEST WILL WORK CAREFULLY TO ENSURE THAT FUTURE TEXTS TO BE "NOTED" DEVELOP AND PROTECT THE POSITION THAT NTMS ARE NOT ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION. THUS WE ARE NOT INCLINED TO AGREE, FOR EXAMPLE, TO "NOTE" AS A NEXT STEP, ONLY A SENTENCE

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RELATING TO NTMS, BUT RATHER TO ENSURE THAT SOME  
ADDITIONAL ASPECTS OF OUR APPROACH ARE "NOTED" AT THE SAME  
TIME, SINCE, ONCE NTM LANGUAGE IS "NOTED," THE EAST MAY  
WELL REFUSE TO ACCEPT ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE ON THE GROUNDS  
THAT MORE SPECIFIC VERIFICATION MEASURES SHOULD BE  
TAILORED INDIVIDUALLY TO SPECIFIC CSBMS. END COMMENT.  
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END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL  
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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 01421

SUBJECT: TEXT OF AMB BARRY SPEECH IN BERN, 2/27/86

L. CDE IX - 069

2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE SPEECH, ENTITLED "CDE, CSCE AND U.S. SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS EUROPE," WHICH AMBASSADOR ROBERT L. BARRY, HEAD OF THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILD NG MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE, WILL GIVE IN BERN SWITZERLAND THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 27. IF IT IS CARRIED ON THE WIRELESS FILE FOR THURSDAY, IT SHOULD BE EMBARGOED UNTIL 1800 GMT.

BEGIN TEXT: IT IS A PLEASURE FOR ME TO BE HERE TODAY. AS HEAD OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE, THE CDE, I AM VERY MUCH AWARE OF THE CENTRAL ROLE SWITZERLAND PLAYS BOTH IN OUR CONFERENCE AND IN ITS PARENT, THE CSCE PROCESS. THIS WILL BE DEMONSTRATED BY THE CSCE EXPERTS' MEETING ON HUMAN CONTACTS, WHICH OPENS HERE IN BERN IN APRIL. I CAN THINK OF NO MORE APPROPRIATE PLACE THAN THE CAPITAL OF SWITZERLAND TO SPEAK ABOUT EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES AND THEIR RELATION TO THE WIDER CONTEXT OF EAST-WEST AFFAIRS. OF COURSE, I SPEAK NOT AS A EUROPEAN BUT AS AN AMERICAN, AND THUS I TAKE AS MY STARTING POINT U.S. SECURITY POLICY TOWARD EUROPE.

-- I WOULD LIKE TO BEGIN WITH AN IMAGE FROM ANATOLI SHCHARANSKY, WHO, ON ARRIVING IN ISRAEL FROM MOSCOW, SPOKE OF A "TREE OF PRINCIPLES" WHICH HE CONSTRUCTED IN HIS MIND TO MAINTAIN HIS BALANCE WHILE IN PRISON. HIS IMAGE IS AN APT ONE BECAUSE IT EMBODIES BOTH CONNECTIONS AND PRIORITIES, AND WHEN WE CONSIDER U.S. POLICY WE SEE FUNDAMENTAL CONNECTIONS AND PRIORITIES BINDING THE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF ARMS REDUCTION TALKS, CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING EFFORTS, AND THE BROADER POLITICAL PROCESSES, EMBODIED IN THE CSCE, WHICH ATTEMPT TO GIVE CONSTRUCTIVE SHAPE TO THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP. EACH OF THESE AREAS HAS ITS OWN SPECIFIC FOCUS; BUT, FOR THE UNITED STATES, EACH REPRESENTS AN ASPECT OF WHAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS CALLED "THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE OF THE UNITED STATES" IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT; THAT IS, TO CONTRIBUTE TO EUROPEAN SECURITY IN THE LARGER SENSE, ENCOMPASSING POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND HUMANITARIAN MATTERS AS WELL AS STRICTLY MILITARY MATTERS.

-- WITH ATTENTION NOW CONCENTRATED ON ARMS CONTROL, THERE IS NO BETTER TIME TO DISCUSS THE OBJECTIVES OF U.S. SECURITY POLICIES. SECURITY, BY DEFINITION, DEPENDS ON MAINTAINING THE NECESSARY STRENGTH TO DEFEND ONESELF AND ONE'S ALLIES AND DETER ATTACK; THIS MUST BE THE BASIC GOAL OF ANY SECURITY POLICY.

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CONSONANT WITH THAT FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENT, THE UNITED STATES PURSUES A COMPLEMENTARY GOAL; THAT IS, NEGOTIATING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS WHICH ENHANCE NATIONAL SECURITY. AT THE CENTER OF PUBLIC AWARENESS ABOUT SECURITY ISSUES TODAY ARE THE ARMS REDUCTION TALKS: STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES AND SPACE AND DEFENSIVE WEAPONS IN BILATERAL US-SOVIET TALKS IN GENEVA AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT, ALSO IN GENEVA. ALTHOUGH DETAILS VARY, OUR OBJECTIVE IN ALL OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS IS THE SAME: RADICAL REDUCTIONS IN FORCE LEVELS LEADING, ULTIMATELY, TO ELIMINATION OF WHOLE CLASSES OF WEAPONS FROM THE FACE OF THE EARTH. WE ARE REALISTIC ABOUT THIS OBJECTIVE; TOTAL ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR CHEMICAL WEAPONS WILL BE A LONG-TERM PROPOSITION. BUT WHILE KEEPING THE LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE IN MIND, WE ARE SEEKING BALANCED STEP-BY-STEP REDUCTIONS WHICH WOULD ENHANCE STABILITY AND REDUCE THE RISK OF WAR.

-- IN START, THE NEGOTIATIONS ON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WE HAVE PROPOSED 50 CUTS IN LAND-BASED ICBMS. IN INF, ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES, WE PROPOSE REMOVING ALL U.S. AND SOVIET INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES FROM EUROPE AS WELL AS ELIMINATING THEM FROM ASIA WITHIN THREE YEARS. IN THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT, WE HAVE PROPOSED A WORLD-WIDE BAN ON THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, STOCKPILING AND USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

-- BEYOND THE OBJECTIVE OF SIGNIFICANT CUTS, ALL OF THESE EFFORTS HAVE IN COMMON THE BASIC REQUIREMENT THAT THEY BE EQUITABLE, VERIFIABLE AND STABILIZING. THESE QUALITIES SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES. NO GOVERNMENT WOULD ENTER INTO AN AGREEMENT WHICH FAVORED ONE SIDE MORE THAN ANOTHER. NO GOVERNMENT WHICH WAS TRULY SERIOUS ABOUT SIGNIFICANT ARMS REDUCTIONS COULD EVER ENTER INTO AN AGREEMENT WHICH LACKED EFFECTIVE MEANS OF VERIFICATION, WHICH LACKED THE MEANS TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE. EQUITABILITY AND VERIFIABILITY THUS ARE ESSENTIAL. BUT THE THIRD QUALITY, STABILITY, MAY BE SEEN AS THE ESSENTIAL CORE TYING THE WHOLE TOGETHER.

-- THUS, IN START, FOR EXAMPLE, U.S. EFFORTS CENTER FIRST ON REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF LARGE LAND-BASED MIRV'D MISSILES. SINCE THEY HOLD THE POTENTIAL FOR A FIRST STRIKE, THEY ARE MOST DESTABILIZING. WE ARE EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EFFECTIVE STRATEGIC DEFENSE -- AND DISCUSSING IT WITH THE SOVIET UNION AS WELL AS OUR ALLIES -- BECAUSE WE BELIEVE IT COULD SERVE BOTH AS A MOTIVE FOR REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR MISSILES AND ALSO AS A STABILIZING FACTOR IN THE TRANSITION TO THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IN THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS TALKS, FOR ANOTHER

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EXAMPLE, WE SEEK A WORLD-WIDE BAN BECAUSE, GIVEN THE NATURE OF THESE WEAPONS, ANYTHING LESS, SUCH AS A REGIONAL BAN, WOULD BE INHERENTLY UNSTABLE AND COULD BE EASILY CIRCUMVENTED IN A CRISIS.

-- IMPORTANT AS THEY ARE, NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION EFFORTS ARE ONLY PART -- ONE SET OF BRANCHES -- OF THE WHOLE TREE OF U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND SECURITY POLICY. NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY STEPS TO REDRESS THE IMBALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE; THESE STEPS WE ARE PURSUING IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS. NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE PROVIDED A NECESSARY FACTOR IN DETERRING WAR IN EUROPE FOR MORE THAN FORTY YEARS. IT WOULD BE IRRESPONSIBLE TO ELIMINATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ONLY TO MAKE CONVENTIONAL WAR MORE LIKELY. MAJOR CONVENTIONAL WAR IN EUROPE, GIVEN THE DESTRUCTIVE POWER OF TODAY'S ARSENALS, WOULD BE DEVASTATING BEYOND OUR EXPERIENCE. IN VIENNA, THE WEST HAS TAKEN A MAJOR NEW STEP DESIGNED TO BREAK A DEADLOCK OF A DECADE; WE HAVE AGREED TO SIDESTEP THE ISSUE OF HOW MANY TROOPS ARE NOW IN THE REDUCTION ZONE AND PROCEED WITH REDUCTIONS, PROVIDED THAT VERIFICATION OF THE REDUCTIONS AND OF THE FORCES REMAINING AFTER REDUCTIONS IS POSSIBLE.

-- A STABLE PROCESS OF ARMS CONTROL ALSO REQUIRES THAT EXISTING MILITARY FORCES BE SUBJECT TO RULES OF BEHAVIOR TO MAKE THEIR ACTIVITIES MORE PREDICTABLE AND THUS REDUCE THE RISK OF CONFRONTATION OR CONFLICT. ENACTING SUCH A SET OF RULES IS THE OBJECTIVE OF THE CDE. IN STOCKHOLM, WE SEEK TO REDUCE THE DANGER OF SURPRISE ATTACK OR WAR BY MISCALCULATION OR MISINTERPRETATION BY CREATING ARRANGEMENTS FOR COOPERATION IN THE MILITARY FIELD. WE WANT TO PREVENT THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE FOR POLITICAL INTIMIDATION. OUR DIRECT OBJECTIVE IS ENHANCED PREDICTABILITY AND, THUS, STABILITY IN THE EUROPEAN MILITARY SITUATION. WE WANT TO PREVENT THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE FOR POLITICAL INTIMIDATION. OUR BROADER OBJECTIVE IS TO CONTRIBUTE TO AN IMPROVED EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP, TO INCREASE OPENNESS AND HELP TO LOWER THE ARTIFICIAL BARRIERS WHICH NOW DIVIDE EAST FROM WEST IN EUROPE.

-- AS AN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATION, THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE COMPLEMENTS NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT ARMS REDUCTIONS. WE SEEK TO ENACT A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME THROUGH WHICH ALL THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED IN THE EUROPEAN SECURITY EQUATION WILL BE REQUIRED TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION ABOUT THEIR FORCES IN EUROPE AND ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES THEY PLAN TO ENGAGE IN. THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME WOULD AMOUNT TO A SET OF RULES REGULATING THE MILITARY BEHAVIOR OF

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NATO, THE WARSAW PACT AND ALSO THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES. THE REGIME SHOULD LEAD TO BETTER MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE INTENTIONS BEHIND THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH TAKE PLACE ON THE CONTINENT. BY ESTABLISHING SCHEDULES FOR ACTIVITIES, THE REGIME CAN HELP US DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE ROUTINE AND THE THREATENING. ON THE ONE HAND, THIS CAN PREVENT OVER-REACTION TO NORMAL TRAINING ACTIVITIES. ON THE OTHER, IT CAN HELP US TO REACT TO WHAT IS ABNORMAL: POLITICAL INTIMIDATION OR EVEN PREPARATION FOR ARMED AGGRESSION. THE TASK OF STOCKHOLM IS SECURITY-BUILDING AS WELL AS CONFIDENCE-BUILDING. A REGIME WHICH CONTRIBUTES TO BOTH GOALS MUST REST FIRMLY ON POLITICALLY BINDING MECHANISMS AND NOT DEPEND ON GESTURES OR GOODWILL.

-- BUT IF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IS AN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATION AIMED AT A MILITARY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME AND A MORE STABLE MILITARY ENVIRONMENT, THE PRINCIPLE WHICH UNDERLIES OUR APPROACH AND THE MEASURES WE HAVE PROPOSED TRANSCENDS PURELY MILITARY ISSUES. THAT IS THE PRINCIPLE OF OPENNESS. SOME OF YOU MAY HAVE HEARD THIS REFERRED TO AS TRANSPARENCY. THE SUCCESS OF ANY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME ENACTED BY THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE WILL DEPEND UPON ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONCEPT BY ALL THE PARTICIPATING STATES THAT GREATER OPENNESS AND IMPROVED MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ABOUT MILITARY INTENTIONS AND PRACTICES WILL CONTRIBUTE TO ENHANCED STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE.

-- THIS CONCEPT IS, IN FACT, GAINING INCREASED ACCEPTANCE. WHEN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE OPENED IN 1984, THE EAST REJECTED "TRANSPARENCY" AS "LEGALIZED ESPIONAGE." TODAY, THE AGREEMENT WHICH IS SLOWLY EMERGING IS ALMOST ENTIRELY ABOUT "TRANSPARENCY" -- INFORMATION, FORECASTS, NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION AND INSPECTION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES. IN A BROADER SENSE, IT IS RELEVANT THAT A CENTRAL THEME OF THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS NOW IN PROGRESS IN MOSCOW IS "OPENNESS" -- "GLASNOST" IN RUSSIAN; OPENNESS TO CRITICISM AND TO REFORM; PUBLICITY; EVEN, IF YOU WILL, TRANSPARENCY.

-- I HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED BY INDICATIONS THAT THE EAST IS PREPARED TO EXTEND THAT CONCEPT TO COVER VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH AGREEMENTS AS WELL. THIS IS CENTRAL TO OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION IN STOCKHOLM, AS IT IS IN VIENNA, GENEVA AND ELSEWHERE WHERE WE ARE DISCUSSING ARMS REDUCTION. COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS IS ESSENTIAL TO CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING; THEREFORE, THE AGREEMENTS MUST HAVE VERIFICATION MEASURES BUILT INTO THEM. THE ONLY FORM OF VERIFICATION OF MILITARY

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ACTIVITIES ACCESSIBLE TO ALL THIRTY-FIVE STOCKHOLM PARTICIPANTS IS INSPECTION; ON THOSE VERY FEW OCCASIONS WHEN PARTICIPATING STATES FEEL THEY MUST CONFIRM WHETHER AN ACTIVITY IS OCCURRING WHICH THREATENS THE INTEGRITY OF THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME, THEY MUST BE ENTITLED TO SEND INSPECTORS TO HAVE A THOROUGH BUT NON-INTRUSIVE LOOK AT WHAT IS GOING ON IN THE FIELD. THE ADMISSION OF INSPECTORS MUST BE PROMPT; THE ACTIVITIES WHICH CONCERN US DO NOT LAST LONG, AND CONSULTATION AS A PRELUDE TO INSPECTION, WHICH SOME HAVE SUGGESTED, COULD TOO EASILY BE ABUSED AS A DEVICE TO DELAY.

SUBJECT: TEXT OF AMB BARRY SPEECH IN BERN, 2/27/86  
 -- SO FAR, IT SEEMS TO BE THE SOVIET POSITION THAT INSPECTION IS FOR ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENTS, NOT CONFIDENCE-BUILDING ARRANGEMENTS SUCH AS WE ARE NEGOTIATING IN STOCKHOLM. BUT IF THEY ARE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT INSPECTION OF TROOPS EXERCISING IN THE FIELD, WHY WOULD THEY EVER ACCEPT THE MUCH MORE INTENSIVE INSPECTIONS OF MILITARY GARRISONS, NUCLEAR TEST SITES AND MISSILE LAUNCHING FACILITIES WHICH WOULD BE NECESSARY TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR FORCE REDUCTIONS OR A COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN? IN MY VIEW, SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF INSPECTION IN THE STOCKHOLM CONTEXT WILL BE A BELLWETHER OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THEIR STATED WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT INSPECTION ON COOPERATIVE VERIFICATION MEASURES IN START, INF, MBFR, THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS TALKS, AND OTHER ARMS CONTROL FORUMS.

-- FROM THIS EXCURSION INTO SOME OF THE SPECIFICS OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, LET ME RETURN TO THE TRUNK OF MY TREE OF PRINCIPLES. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT MILITARY-SECURITY AFFAIRS CAN BE DEALT WITH IN ISOLATION. THAT IS WHY WE EMPHASIZE THAT CDE IS SUBORDINATE TO THE CSCE PROCESS AS A WHOLE. I KNOW THE GOVERNMENT OF SWITZERLAND SHARES THIS VIEW. WITH THE VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING APPROACHING RAPIDLY, WE HAVE TO LOOK AHEAD, TO CONSIDER HOW BALANCE IN THE PROCESS CAN BEST BE ENSURED.

-- OUR REFERENCE POINT FOR THIS BALANCE IS, OF COURSE, THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. IN 1975 THE THIRTY-FIVE PARTICIPATING STATES, WITH SWITZERLAND AMONG THE LEADERS, CODIFIED A SYSTEM OF VALUES FOR EUROPE WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY WESTERN AND DEMOCRATIC. THE EAST WANTED TO LEGALIZE THE DIVISION OF EUROPE; THE FINAL ACT LOOKS TOWARDS ITS UNIFICATION. THE EAST WANTED TO ENSHRINE THE STATE AS THE CENTRAL ACTOR; THE FINAL ACT RESTS ON INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS. THE EAST WANTED A VOICE IN WESTERN SECURITY POLICIES; THE FINAL ACT ESTABLISHES A

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LEGITIMATE WESTERN INTEREST IN HOW EASTERN GOVERNMENTS TREAT THEIR CITIZENS.

-- EASTERN BEHAVIOR IN CSCE NEGOTIATIONS SINCE HELSINKI HAS SOMETIMES SEEMED LIKE A SERIES OF REAR-GUARD ACTIONS TO RECAPTURE LOST GROUND. WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT EASTERN ATTEMPTS TO CREATE A CO-EQUAL SEPARATE MILITARY-SECURITY FORUM WHICH COULD OVERSHADOW EFFORTS TO IMPROVE HUMAN RIGHTS, CULTURAL CONTACTS AND POLITICAL OPENNESS AND COOPERATION BETWEEN PEOPLES ACROSS BORDERS. WE ARE COMMITTED TO SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM, IN PART BECAUSE IT SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO LOWERING THE BARRIERS IN EUROPE. BUT NO MATTER HOW SUCCESSFUL, STOCKHOLM MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO DOMINATE THE OTHER ASPECTS OF THE CSCE. IN NOVEMBER, THE CONFERENCES IN VIENNA WILL HAVE TO CONSIDER THE RESULTS OF THE OTTAWA HUMAN RIGHTS MEETING, THE BUDAPEST CULTURAL FORUM AND THE FORTHCOMING BERN HUMAN CONTACTS MEETING, AS WELL AS THE OUTCOME OF THE CDE.

-- BUT MEETINGS ARE ONLY GENERAL INDICATORS. MORE IMPORTANT IS THE QUESTION OF HOW WELL THE PARTICIPATING STATES HAVE LIVED UP TO THEIR FINAL ACT PLEDGES. THE IMPRISONMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS IN THE SOVIET UNION, THE PERSECUTION OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS IN ROMANIA AND THE TURKISH MINORITY IN BULGARIA, THE THREAT OF FORCE HANGING OVER THE PEOPLE OF POLAND, EASTERN INSISTENCE ON STATE DOMINATION OF CULTURAL AND HUMAN CONTACTS -- ALL OF THESE ARE NEGATIVE FACTORS WHICH WILL BE WEIGHED ALONG WITH WHAT WE ARE OR ARE NOT ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH IN STOCKHOLM. WE DO NOT SEEK A MECHANICAL BALANCE IN ALL ASPECTS OF THE CSCE PROCESS, BUT WE DO INSIST ON MOVING AHEAD IN ALL AREAS BECAUSE WE BELIEVE ALL TEN PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT HAVE EQUAL WEIGHT AND VALIDITY. THE QUESTION OF HOW AND WHETHER THE CDE PROCESS WILL CONTINUE WILL DEPEND ON OUR REVIEW OF THE ENTIRE "TREE OF PRINCIPLES," NOT JUST THE MILITARY-SECURITY BRANCH WE HAVE BEEN TRYING TO FASHION IN STOCKHOLM.

-- UNDERLYING OUR VIEW OF THE CSCE PROCESS IS A VISION OF EUROPE: STABLE, COOPERATIVE, OPEN, WHERE CONFIDENCE IS BUILT ON RESPECT FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS, AND WHERE STRONG POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TIES PRODUCE GREATER SECURITY AND PROSPERITY FOR ALL. THIS IS A DIFFICULT TASK, FULL OF POTENTIAL CONTRADICTIONS. I BEGAN BY SPEAKING OF ANATOLI SHCHARANSKY; LIKE SO MANY SOVIET POLITICAL PRISONERS, HE WAS BOTH A VICTIM AND A BENEFICIARY OF THE CSCE PROCESS -- VICTIM BECAUSE HE SOUGHT TO PURSUE THE PROMISES OF HELSINKI WHILE THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES WANTED TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO THEIR PEOPLE THAT THOSE

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PROMISES WERE NOT TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY. BENEFICIARY  
BECAUSE, TEN YEARS LATER, THE SOVIET LEADER PERHAPS  
REALIZED THAT THE WEST DOES TAKE THE PROMISES OF  
HELSINKI SERIOUSLY AND THAT THE COSTS IN  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF KEEPING MR. SHCHARANSKY IN  
PRISON EXCEEDED ANY BENEFITS IN OTHER AREAS. IF SO,  
OTHERS, LIKE ANDREI SAKHAROV, MAY EVENTUALLY BE FREED  
AS WELL. LET US WORK FOR THESE HUMAN GOALS BECAUSE  
THERE CANNOT BE REAL PROGRESS ON SECURITY IN ITS  
NARROW SENSE UNLESS IT IS BUILT ON THE FOUNDATION OF  
SECURITY FOR INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND HUMAN DIGNITY.  
END TEXT. BARRY  
END OF MESSAGE

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Unofficial translation

S T A T E M E N T

by Oleg A. GRINEVSKY,

Ambassador at Large,

Head of the USSR Delegation

to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-

Building Measures and Disarmament in

Europe

Stockholm, February 28, 1986

Comrade Chairman,

The Soviet delegation would like to draw the attention of the participants in the Stockholm Conference to important assessments of the development of the international situation and to the basic provisions of the foreign policy programme of the Soviet Union set forth by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail S. Gorbachev in the Political Report to the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

In the past year the Soviet Union put forth a number of major initiatives to improve the international situation and strengthen peace. We made several unilateral steps - we put a moratorium on the deployment of intermediate - range missiles in Europe, cut back the number of those missiles, and stopped all nuclear explosions. The Soviet-French and the Soviet-U.S. summits were necessary and useful steps.

The Soviet Union has made energetic efforts to give a fresh impetus to the negotiations in Geneva, Stockholm and Vienna, the purpose of which is to scale down the arms race and build confidence between States. Negotiations are always a delicate and complex matter. Of cardinal importance here is to lead up to a mutually acceptable balance of interests.

The comprehensive set of foreign policy initiatives contained in the Statement by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail S. Gorbachev of January 15 forms an organic part of the foreign policy programme of the Soviet Union set forth at the Party Congress. Our programme is essentially an alloy of the philosophy of shaping a safe world in the nuclear-space age with



a platform of concrete actions. Our integral programme to eliminate completely weapons of mass destruction by the end of this century is an historic programme by its scope and significance. Its implementation would open for mankind an essentially new avenue of development, a possibility to concentrate only on creation. The USSR intends to work perseveringly for its realization, regarding it as the central direction of our foreign policy for the coming years.

It was stressed at the Congress that in President Reagan's reply to the Statement of January 15 certain positive pronouncements are swamped in various reservations, "linkages" and "conditions" which in fact block the solution of radical problems of disarmament including the elimination of Soviet and U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Europe. The reluctance to embark on the path of nuclear disarmament manifests itself most clearly in the question of terminating nuclear explosions.

However, despite the complexity of the current international situation, stated Miknail Gorbachev, one can see that, by all the evidence, the prerequisites for improving the international situation are beginning to form. But prerequisites for a turn are not the turn itself. The arms race continues and the threat of nuclear war remains.

Having thoroughly considered the situation and having analyzed the nature and the scope of the nuclear threat, Mikhail Gorbachev elaborated a fundamental basis for establishing a comprehensive system of international security in military, political, economic and humanitarian fields.

This broad and comprehensive programme of international security meets the urgent requirements of our time. Objective logic itself of the development of international relations in the nuclear age calls for an awareness that the world cannot be saved and preserved if the thinking and actions built up over the centuries on the acceptability and permissibility of wars and armed conflicts are not shed once and for all, irrevocably.

The policy from strength, of total contention and military confrontation has no future. It is a flight into the past and not a response to the challenges of the future. In conditions of the total unacceptability of nuclear war it is not confrontation but rather peaceful coexistence of different systems that should become the law of interstate relations.

This means that security can be, if we take international relations in general, only universal. The ultimate wisdom is not in caring exclusively for oneself, especially to the detriment of the other side. It is vital that all should feel equally secure, for the fears and anxieties of the nuclear age generate uncertainty in politics and concrete actions.

As Mikhail Gorbachev stated, we regard the European direction as one of the main directions of our international activity. Europe's historic opportunity and its future lie in peaceful

cooperation among the nations of the continent. And it is important, while preserving the assets that have already been accumulated, to move further: from the initial to a more lasting phase of detente, to mature detente, and then to the building of dependable security on the basis of the Helsinki process, of a radical reduction of nuclear and conventional weapons.

The Soviet delegation has distributed the report by Mikhail S. Gorbachev to the 27th Congress of the CPSU and all delegations can study in greater detail its important provisions.

The Stockholm Conference also has a role to play in lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament. The agreements to be agreed upon at the Conference would become a component part of a comprehensive system of international security as regards, in the first place, the elaboration of a set of measures designed to strengthen confidence between states.

In order to move forward in the solution of those tasks it is necessary to manifest readiness for mutually acceptable compromise and orientation not on confrontation but on dialogue and mutual understanding. Acting in this spirit the Soviet Union suggested getting down to grips with outstanding issues at the Stockholm Conference.

The key to the solution of those problems - questions regarding notifications - is provided in the Statement by Mikhail Gorbachev of January 15. Discussions at the Conference and in its corridors demonstrate, in our view, that his proposal is met with understanding as it gives a way out of the existing difficult

situation. In this respect, the plenary statement of February 7 made by the distinguished head of the Italian delegation, Ambassador Ciarrapico is most characteristic. He said: "It is indeed encouraging that the Soviet Government shows interest for the problem of how to overcome the bottleneck encountered in the field of notification!" Obviously, we can understand if one needs time to study in depth and constructively our proposals. However, we should also take account of the fact that the Conference does not have that much time to delay any solution to this question.

So much so as beyond the walls of the Conference attempts are being publicly made to distort the essence of the Soviet proposal, to describe it as if the Soviet Union nearly accepted the position of those who consider that only those types of naval activities are subject to notification which are directly linked to land forces activities. Sometimes they surround this proposal with various reservations which would bring the discussion back to the old circles.

In this connection we wish to make this question perfectly clear. The Soviet Union has favoured and continues to favour notification measures covering major manoeuvres of land, naval and air forces, movements and transfers of troops in the whole of Europe and in the adjoining sea (ocean) area and air space. This is only natural as those types of forces can seriously threaten European security. This position is in full accord with the mandate of the Conference enacted by the Madrid meeting of the CSCE participating States.

Regrettably, certain Western countries take a different approach. They attempt to reduce notification to land forces activities alone and do not wish to consider the question of notifications concerning air and naval forces in its entirety.

Where is, then, a way out of the situation? Is it in continued fruitless discussions on the subject or in concrete actions aimed at eliminating the obstacle? The Soviet Union and the socialist countries give an unequivocal answer: we suggest moving from words to deeds and solve this problem too.

It goes without saying that questions regarding notification of major manoeuvres of land, naval and air forces should be solved thoroughly, in the interests of enhancing security in Europe. But, as Mikhail Gorbachev stated on January 15, "if their comprehensive solution cannot be achieved at this time, why not explore ways of their solution in parts, for instance reach agreement now about notifications of major ground force and air force manoeuvres, postponing the question of naval activities until the next stage of the Conference". Such a solution to the question would take account not only of the situation that has evolved at the Conference but of the security interests of all its participants.

We are speaking of postponing till the next stage not some part of naval activities, whether independent or functional, the more so since such categories do not exist in the Madrid mandate, but all naval activities, so as to address them thoroughly and adopt a solution corresponding to the Madrid mandate.

Sometimes a question is asked: how activities of amphibious and airborne troops would be dealt with in this case? Speaking of notification of major land force manoeuvres, we also have in mind manoeuvres conducted independently or in combination with components of amphibious or airborne troops, as recorded in the

Helsinki Final Act for that matter. So our solution gives an answer to this question too.

Summing up, I would like to stress that such a solution to the question of postponing naval activities until the next stage of the Conference would enable it to focus now on notification of major manoeuvres of land and air forces as well as of movements and transfers of troops in the whole of Europe and in the adjoining sea (ocean) area and air space.

Understanding to this effect should, in our view, be registered in the form of a recorded agreement, as at hand is a serious matter which has fundamental significance. This would be fully in accord both with the mandate of the Conference and with the decisions of the Helsinki Preparatory Meeting of November 11, 1983, that provide for undertaking, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions. The same documents envisage that the provisions established by the negotiators will come into force in the forms and according to the procedure to be agreed upon by the Conference.

Comrade Chairman,

Negotiation of agreements that has started in the working groups is, by all means, a useful thing. We, like many other participants in the Conference, exerted much effort to get this positive process started and intend to maintain it in every way. However, it is no secret that in not so distant a future the process of drafting will, in this way or another, come up against the main question - what should be notified. An answer to it affects not

only groups dealing with notification but with exchanges of annual plans of notifiable military activities and with the invitation of observers. In fact, solution to this question determines whether the Conference will be able to achieve positive results before the Vienna meeting.

In our contacts with all delegations we explained the way out of the situation proposed by the Soviet Union. We did this publicly as well. The Soviet delegation expects a reply to this proposal so as to elaborate jointly a mutually acceptable agreement.

In conclusion I can only say that time is running out on us. Each working group has only nineteen meetings left.

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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 01499

SUBJECT: CDE: U.S. PLENARY RESPONSE TO SOVIET PLENARY STATEMENT, FEBRUARY 28, 1986

1. CDE IX - 075.
2. UNCLASSIFIED - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. U.S. RESPONDED TO SOVIET STATEMENT IN CDE PLENARY FEBRUARY 28. TEXT OF RESPONSE BY U.S. DEL, AMBASSADOR LYNN M. HANSEN FOLLOWS. GRINEVSKY PARODIED GOBACHEV'S SPEECH TO THE PARTY OF THE 27TH CONGRESS WHICH INCLUDED CRITICISM OF THE US RESPONSE TO GOBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 PROPOSAL. BEGIN TEXT.

MR. CHAIRMAN,  
FOR NEARLY FIVE WEEKS, MY DELEGATION HAS WORKED INTENSIVELY WITH OTHER DELEGATIONS IN AN EFFORT TO BRING DRAFTING TO SOME RESULTS AND TO BEGIN DRAFTING LANGUAGE FOR WHAT COULD BECOME A FINAL AGREEMENT IN OUR CONFERENCE. TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER SPONSORS OF DOCUMENT SC.1, WE HAVE DEMONSTRATED OUR WILLINGNESS TO DRAFT ACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE WITHOUT REGARD TO THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE TEXT WHICH SERVES AS THE BASIS FOR DRAFTING. WE EXPECT THE SAME APPROACH TO BE ADOPTED BY OTHERS. ALONG THESE LINES, I CAN STATE EMPHATICALLY THAT MY DELEGATION WOULD LIKE TO SEE AGREED LANGUAGE NOTED IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK IN EVERY, I REPEAT, IN EVERY WORKING GROUP BEFORE THE END OF THIS SESSION. WHILE WE ARE ENCOURAGED THAT THE PROCESS SEEMS FINALLY TO HAVE BEGUN, IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT THE RESULTS ARE STILL MEAGER.

MEANINGFUL RESULTS, SIGNIFICANT IN TERMS OF INCREASING SECURITY AND CONFIDENCE, MR. CHAIRMAN, IS THE BUSINESS -- THE ONLY BUSINESS -- OF THIS CONFERENCE. THIS IS NOT A UNILATERAL NOR A BILATERAL EFFORT BUT ONE THAT INVOLVES EACH OF THE 35 SOVEREIGN, INDEPENDENT STATES PARTICIPATING IN THIS NEGOTIATION IN A COMMON SEARCH FOR CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH MEET THE CONDITIONS AND OBJECTIVES SET FOR US IN THE MADRID MANDATE.

PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS INSTRUCTED THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO PURSUE CONCRETE RESULTS IN STOCKHOLM. HE HAS EXPRESSED THE DESIRE OF THE UNITED STATES FOR AN ACCORD, INDEED HIS PERSONAL BELIEF THAT AN ACCORD CAN BE REACHED THIS YEAR WHICH WOULD HAVE IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS FOR THE OVERALL EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP. BUT THE UNITED STATES CANNOT AND WILL NOT MAKE UNILATERAL DECISIONS IN A MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION.

THE FOCUS OF NEGOTIATIONS ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES MUST BE IN STOCKHOLM, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS MANDATE, FOR CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS IN VIENNA, FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT, AND FOR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ISSUES IN THE APPROPRIATE FORUM IN GENEVA. IT IS IN

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THESE SPECIALIZED FORUMS THAT OUR REPRESENTATIVES HAVE THE EXPERTISE AND AUTHORITY TO DEAL WITH THE INTRICATE AND COMPLICATED SUBJECTS WHICH AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY HAS SEEN FIT TO INTRODUCE AGAIN INTO THIS MEETING. THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES IS CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL. WE SEEK A STABLE WORLD IN WHICH MANKIND CAN ENJOY ITS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: LIFE, LIBERTY AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS. WHILE WE WILL PURSUE THESE OBJECTIVES WITHOUT APOLOGY, WE WILL CONTINUE OUR SEARCH FOR WAYS TO REDUCE, AND EVENTUALLY ELIMINATE, BOTH THE ROOT CAUSES OF WAR AND THE WEAPONS WITH WHICH WAR, NOT ONLY NUCLEAR WAR, IS WAGED. DEEP, EQUITABLE AND VERIFIED REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS AND A TOTAL GLOBAL BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARE KEY REQUIREMENTS IN THE PURSUIT OF THESE LONGER TERM OBJECTIVES. BUT THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS MUST NOT MAKE WAR WITH CONVENTIONAL MEANS ATTRACTIVE OR MORE LIKELY AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING POLITICAL OBJECTIVES OR RESOLVING DISPUTES. OUR CONFERENCE PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN ATTEMPTING TO AGREE ON VERIFIABLE MEASURES WHICH GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF ALL STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE TO RESOLVE DISPUTES. PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS SO INDIVIDUALS EVERYWHERE CAN FREELY PARTICIPATE IN DETERMINING THEIR OWN DESTINY WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE IS ALSO KEY TO CREATING A PEACEFUL AND STABLE ENVIRONMENT. THE CSCE PROCESS, OF WHICH OUR CONFERENCE IS AN INTEGRAL PART, ALSO HAS A VITAL ROLE IN CREATING THE STABLE ENVIRONMENT MY GOVERNMENT SEEKS. IT IS THIS LARGER PROCESS WHICH OFFERS REAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IN THE LARGER AND MORE MEANINGFUL SENSE. IN NOVEMBER OF THIS YEAR, WE SHALL GATHER IN VIENNA TO PUT ALL THE PIECES OF THE CSCE PROCESS BACK TOGETHER BY REVIEWING OUR ADHERENCE TO ALL THE COMMITMENTS MADE AT HELSINKI INCLUDING RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS WHICH IS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE TO THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES. THERE, IN VIENNA, WE MUST RE-ESTABLISH THE BALANCE OF THE CSCE PARENT PROCESS WHICH IS NECESSARY TO THE SUCCESS OF ANY OF ITS OFF-SPRING AND THERE WE WILL DETERMINE THE FUTURE OF CSCE AS WELL AS OF ITS COMPONENT PARTS INCLUDING THIS CONFERENCE. MR. CHAIRMAN, MY GOVERNMENT SEEKS A BETTER U.S./SOVIET WORKING RELATIONSHIP AS WELL AS BETTER WEST/EAST RELATIONSHIPS. WHAT WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO DO IN STOCKHOLM IS PART OF THAT SEARCH. IT WOULD BE ILLOGICAL AND UNREASONABLE TO IMPEDE PROGRESS IN THIS IMPORTANT FORUM BECAUSE THE RESOLUTION OF ISSUES IN OTHER AREAS IS MORE DIFFICULT. INDEED, SUCH AN EFFORT WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV AND PRESIDENT REAGAN AT GENEVA TO EMPHASIZE AND BUILD ON

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AREAS OF COMMON GROUND.  
WITH THE LIMITED AMOUNT OF TIME AVAILABLE TO US BEFORE  
SEPTEMBER 19, WHEN WE WILL CONCLUDE OUR EFFORTS HERE TO  
PREPARE FOR VIENNA, WE MUST USE THE DRAFTING UPON WHICH  
WE HAVE EMBARKED TO EXPAND AREAS OF COMMON GROUND INTO A  
MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT. IT IS  
IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES, IN HAND WITHIN THE  
DRAFTING PROCESS WHERE WE MUST DECIDE THE OUTCOME OF  
THIS CONFERENCE. END TEXT.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01536

SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS,

- FEBRUARY 24-28, 1986

REF: A) STATE 31397, B) STOCKHOLM 1469

1. CDE IX - 080

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. BEGIN SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT: THE DRAFTING PROCESS HAS BEGUN. THE FIRST ELEMENTS OF A STOCKHOLM CONCLUDING DOCUMENT HAVE BEEN NOTED IN THE COORDINATORS' NOTEBOOKS ON THE SUBJECTS OF VERIFICATION AND OBSERVATION. THESE WORDS, THOUGH INNOCUOUS, REPRESENT THE FIRST STEP TOWARD AGREEMENT ON SOME COMMON LANGUAGE IN ALL THE OTHER WORKING GROUPS (NOTIFICATION, ANNUAL FORECASTS, AND NON-USE OF FORCE), POSSIBLY BEFORE THE END OF THE WINTER SESSION IN TWO WEEKS. WHILE THE REAL WORK OF THE CONFERENCE -- DRAFTING AN ACCORD ON CONCRETE MEASURES -- ADVANCES, ALBEIT IN FITS AND STARTS, THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO PRESS THE U.S. FOR A FORMAL REPLY TO THE CDE ELEMENTS OF GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 STATEMENT. SPECIFICALLY, THEY WANT THE CONFERENCE TO REGISTER AGREEMENT THAT CONSIDERATION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES WILL BE POSPONED WITH THE EXPLICIT UNDERSTANDING THAT THEY WILL BE TAKEN UP IN A LATER PHASE. THE SOVIETS HAVE USED THE LACK OF AN OFFICIAL U.S. RESPONSE TO PRESS SOME OF OUR MORE SUSCEPTIBLE ALLIES TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING ON RELATED SUBJECTS SUCH AS INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES. IN RESPONSE, WE HAVE SAID THAT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE MUST ABIDE BY THE TERMS OF ITS MANDATE WITH DECISIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE TO BE MADE AT THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING. CONCERNING CONSTRAINTS, ANOTHER NETTLESOME AREA, THERE IS GOOD NEWS AND BAD NEWS: THE BAD NEWS IS THAT THERE IS GROWING INSISTENCE THAT SOME KIND OF CONSTRAINING MEASURE MUST BE INCLUDED IN A FINAL DOCUMENT; THE GOOD NEWS IS THAT THE NNA ARE STRONGLY INCLINED TO TIE CONSTRAINING MEASURES TO THE ANNUAL FORECAST. THE EAST, FOR POLITICAL REASONS, AND SWEDEN, FOR PROPRIETARY INTERESTS, DO NOT SEEM TO HAVE HEARD THE GOOD NEWS. FINALLY, THE DRAFTING METHODOLOGY SEEMS TO BE EVOLVING IN THE WESTERN DIRECTION, I.E., DRAFTING IS BEING DONE IN THE WORKING GROUPS AND WITH ELLIPSES (DOTS) RATHER THAN BRACKETS. END SUMMARY.

4. NOTIFICATION: THE WORKING GROUP MOVED CLOSER TO AGREEMENT ON DRAFT LANGUAGE ON THE METHOD AND PERIOD OF NOTIFICATION. FRUSTRATED BY THE LACK OF EFFORT BY THE SWEDISH COORDINATOR OR SWEDISH UNWILLINGNESS TO DRAFT ON THIS OR ANY OTHER SUBJECT, THE WEST SEIZED THE INITIATIVE IN AN ATTEMPT TO RECORD SOME LANGUAGE ON THE METHOD/ PERIOD OF NOTIFICATION. IN ORDER TO MAKE SOME FORWARD PROGRESS ON THE WORKING GROUP FIELD, RATHER THAN HAGGLE WITH THE EAST IN MORE RESTRICTED SIDELINE HUDDLES, THE WEST PROPOSED THAT A CZECH TEXT SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR

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NEGOTIATION. IN A PARALLEL ATTEMPT TO RECOVER THE COORDINATOR'S FUMBLE, THE NNA ALSO INTRODUCED A TEXT. A TIME-OUT WAS CALLED, DURING WHICH EASTERNERS CLAIM THEY SUCCEEDED IN PRESSING THE SOVIET GENERAL TO ACCEPT THE NATO SUGGESTION. WHEN THE GROUP REASSEMBLED, THE EAST AND THE NNA INDICATED ACCEPTANCE OF NATO'S PROPOSED CHANGES AND THE USE OF "DOTS" (VICE SQUARE BRACKETS), THUS CONFIRMING THEIR AGREEMENT TO THE DRAFTING METHODOLOGY PREFERRED BY THE WEST. IT IS NOW THE BASIS FOR BEHIND-THE-SCENES CONSULTATIONS.

THE GDR TABLED A TEXT ON TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED (SEE SEPTTEL) CONTAINING SEVERAL NOTABLE FEATURES, INCLUDING A REFERENCE TO THE ZONE IN TERMS INCONSISTENT WITH THE MANDATE. SUSPECTING SOVIET PERFDY, THE WEST (WITH THE TURKS IN FRONT) HAS SAID THAT IT WOULD NOT AGREE TO DRAFTING ON SUBSTANCE UNTIL ACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE REFERRING TO THE ZONE IS DRAFTED. AT U.S. SUGGESTION THE COORDINATOR CONVOKED A CONTACT GROUP OF INTERESTED PARTIES FROM THE THREE GROUPS TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE. THE EAST DID NOT SHOW. ONE EASTERNER LATER TOLD US THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAD RECEIVED TWO SETS OF INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW. THE MESSAGE RECEIVED VIA THE POLITICAL CHANNEL HAD ENCOURAGED MEETING IN SMALL CONTACT GROUPS -- THE PREFERRED SOVIET DRAFTING METHODOLOGY -- WHILE THE MILITARY WERE REPORTEDLY TOLD NOT TO TOUCH THE ZONE ISSUE AT THIS TIME. NEVERTHELESS, A CONTACT GROUP ON LANGUAGE REFERRING TO THE ZONE WAS HELD THE FOLLOWING DAY WITH SOVIET MILITARY PARTICIPATION. THE MOST LIKELY SOLUTION APPEARS TO BE REFERENCE TO THE ZONE FOLLOWED BY AN ASTERISK WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A FOOTNOTE REPEATING THE THREE PARAGRAPHS OF THE MANDATE DEALING WITH THE ZONE.

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5. NON-USE OF FORCE: THE FRENCH-INSPIRED EC-12 TEXT WAS INTRODUCED INTO THE CAUCUS AS A "CONTRIBUTION" TO NATO EFFORTS TO ARRIVE AT A COMMON POSITION ON NUF. HOWEVER, CONSISTENT WITH THEIR PECK'S BAD BOY BEHAVIOR ON THIS ISSUE, THE FRENCH HELD UP THE TEXT AT THE LAST MINUTE BY INSISTING THAT THE 12 SWEAR ALLEGIANCE TO THE DRAFT BEFORE IT INTRODUCING IT INTO THE NATO ARENA. PARIS WAS FIRMLY REBUFFED BY ITS INCREASINGLY EXASPERATED COMMUNITY PARTNERS. AS IT STANDS THE "FEBRUARY 26" PAPER (OUR UNOFFICIAL DESIGNATION FOR THE EC-12 DRAFT) IS NOT A BAD STARTING POINT FOR NATO DELIBERATIONS. HOWEVER, WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT OUR LARGER CONCEPT OF SECURITY OUTLINED IN NUF INSTRUCTIONS (REF A) MUST BE REFLECTED IN ANY FINAL NATO POSITION. MEANWHILE, THE NNA COORDINATOR HAS INFORMALLY CIRCULATED TWO COORDINATOR'S TEXTS -- ONE ON THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE TAKEN FROM THE MADRID MANDATE AND THE OTHER ON THE NEED FOR IMPROVED AND CONSISTENT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT

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COMMITMENT. IN OUR VIEW, THESE PHRASES ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE WESTERN APPROACH TO NON-USE OF FORCE AND WE PLAN TO GIVE OUR ASSENT TO NOTE ONE OR BOTH OF THESE PASSAGES IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK BEFORE THE END OF THE SESSION. SUCH A MOVE WOULD TAKE MUCH OF THE EDGE OFF EASTERN ALLEGATIONS THAT THE WEST IS FOOTDRAGGING ON NUF AND THAT THE EAST IS THUS JUSTIFIED IN DOING THE SAME IN OTHER WORKING GROUPS. ONLY THE FRENCH STRONGLY OPPOSE THE COORDINATOR TABLING TEXT AND THREATEN TO OBJECT PUBLICLY IN THE WORKING GROUP IF HE TAKES SUCH AN INITIATIVE. THE NNA CONTINUE TO BE DIVIDED INTO TWO DISTINCT AND PERHAPS IRRECONCILABLE CAMPS, THE NEUTRALS (AUSTRIA, SWEDEN, AND SWITZERLAND) WHO FAVOR A MINIMALIST NUF TEXT, AND THE NNA (YUGOSLAVIA, CYPRUS, AND MALTA) WHO PREFER AN ELABORATION OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE. THE ENIGMATIC FINNS REMAIN MORE NEUTRAL THAN THE NEUTRALS AND MORE NONALIGNED THAN THE NONALIGNED ON THIS ISSUE.

6. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION/COMMUNICATIONS:

SURPRISINGLY, THIS GROUP NOTED THE CONFERENCE'S FIRST DRAFTING LANGUAGE ON THE ISSUE OF VERIFICATION (REPORTED

- SEPTEL). THE GROUP AGREED TO NOTE IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK A SENTENCE BASED ON THE MANDATE ON THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF CSBM'S. ALTHOUGH THE ACTUAL TEXT WAS FAR FROM EARTH-SHAKING, ITS MERE EXISTENCE MAY HELP US TO ADVANCE OUR POSITION THAT VERIFICATION SHOULD BE A SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT MEASURE AND MAY AID OUR EFFORT TO DRAFT SIMULTANEOUSLY ON VERIFICATION AND OTHER MEASURES. THE EASTERN POSITION HAS BEEN THAT DRAFTING ON VERIFICATION SHOULD FOLLOW THE ELABORATION OF CSBM'S. IN WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS THE EAST CONTINUED PRO-FORMA TO REJECT ON-SITE INSPECTION FOR CHECKING COMPLIANCE WITH CSBM'S AND REITERATED EARLIER STATEMENTS THAT INSPECTION WAS ONLY APPROPRIATE FOR DISARMAMENT OR ARMS REDUCTIONS AGREEMENTS. THE SOVIETS CLAIM THAT CSBM VERIFICATION MEASURES NEED TO BE MORE "ELEGANT AND STREAMLINED". OTHER EASTERNERS, PARTICULARLY THE GDR, CONTINUED TO MAKE FAVORABLE NOISES ABOUT THE NNA'S "OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST" PROPOSAL AS A MEANS OF VERIFICATION AND THE NNA CONTINUED TO FLOG THE PROPOSAL TO THE WEST. THIS WEEK SWITZERLAND VOICED WHAT APPEARS TO BE ITS NATIONAL POSITION, EMPHASIZING THAT THE "RIGHT OF REFUSAL" CLAUSE WOULD BE USED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES OF "SUPREME NATIONAL INTEREST," I.E., IN A CRISIS SITUATION WHERE THE ENTIRE CSBM SYSTEM HAD ALREADY BROKEN DOWN. THE COORDINATOR'S PERFORMANCE IN THIS GROUP, ADMITTEDLY ONE OF THE MORE DIFFICULT, IS IMPROVING AND WE HAVE HAD SOME SUCCESS IN REVERSING HIS EARLIER INCLINATION TO MOVE DRAFTING OUTSIDE THE WORKING GROUP STRUCTURE INTO INFORMAL "COFFEE GROUPS."

7. OBSERVATION: BOTH SUBSTANTIVE AND ATMOSPHERIC

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PROGRESS WAS MADE THIS WEEK. THE HIGHLIGHT WAS AGREEMENT TO A COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK TEXT ON THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS WHICH CONFIRMED: 1) EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF OBLIGATORY INVITATION OF OBSERVERS FROM ALL CDE STATES (ALTHOUGH THE EAST HAS YET TO AGREE THAT OBSERVATION WILL BE FOR ALL NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES), AND 2) AN APPARENT NNA CONCESSION THAT A MAXIMUM OF TWO OBSERVERS MAY BE SENT TO A MILITARY ACTIVITY (SC.7 HAD HELD OPEN THE POSSIBILITY

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OF MORE OBSERVERS FOR "PARTICULARLY LARGE" ACTIVITIES). THE IMPROVEMENT IN THE ATMOSPHERE OF THIS WEEK'S WORKING GROUP SESSION, HOWEVER, MAY HAVE BEEN EQUALLY AS IMPORTANT AS ALL SIDES MADE A CONCERTED EFFORT TO BE BUSINESS-LIKE AND CONSTRUCTIVE. THE EAST'S EARLIER RELUCTANCE TO DRAFT ON ANY PART OF OBSERVATION BEFORE A DETERMINATION HAS BEEN MADE ON WHAT TYPE OF ACTIVITIES WOULD BE NOTIFIED AND OBSERVED IS FAST DISSOLVING, AND THEY NOW SEEM PREPARED TO DRAFT ON THE "HOUSEKEEPING" ASPECTS OF OBSERVATION (E.G., PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES, TRANSPORTATION, COSTS, ETC.). POLEMICAL EASTERN STATEMENTS ON THE NECESSITY OF OBSERVING AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES VIRTUALLY DISAPPEARED FROM THIS WEEK'S DISCUSSION AND THE EAST JOINED NATO AND THE NNA IN ENCOURAGING THE COORDINATOR (KAHILUOTO, FINLAND) TO ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP COORDINATORS TEXT WHEREVER POSSIBLE. FOR ITS PART, NATO EMPHASIZED PROGRESS BOTH BY IDENTIFYING NNA LANGUAGE WE COULD ACCEPT (I.E., ON EQUAL TREATMENT OF OBSERVERS) AND BY ENCOURAGING THE COORDINATOR TO MAKE EFFORTS EVEN ON ISSUES IN WHICH THE EAST HAS YET TO OFFER A PROPOSAL. REASONS FOR THIS IMPROVED ATMOSPHERE ARE VARIED BUT MAY REFLECT AN EASTERN DECISION THAT FURTHER FOOTDRAGGING ON DRAFTING PERIPHERAL ISSUES IN THE MOST NONCONTENTIOUS WORKING GROUP WAS UNLIKELY TO WORK TO THEIR LONG-TERM ADVANTAGE (PARTICULARLY GIVEN NATO'S VOCAL ENCOURAGEMENT OF DRAFTING PROGRESS) AS WELL AS THE HIGH DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE ALL GROUPS HAVE IN THE FINNISH COORDINATOR'S HONEST BROKER ABILITIES.

8. ANNUAL FORECASTS: SINCE THE ZONE ISSUE FIRST CAME TO A HEAD SEVERAL WEEKS AGO DURING A DISCUSSION OF FORECASTS, THE WEST HAS REFUSED TO AGREE TO THE RECORDING OF TEXTS ON THIS SUBJECT UNTIL THE CONTACT GROUP ON THE ZONE MAKES SOME PROGRESS. WITH THE EASTERN SCUTTILING OF THE FIRST PROPOSED CONTACT GROUP MEETING, NATO REPS LIMITED THEIR WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES TO TABLING THE REST OF MEASURE 2, PROVIDING A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE INFORMATION A FORECAST WOULD CONTAIN AND ENGAGING THE NNA IN A DETAILED EXCHANGE ON THE CONTENT. THE NNA, EAST

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AND WEST ARE CLOSE TO AGREEMENT ON THE FIRST TWO ITEMS IN THE CONTENT OF THE ANNUAL FORECAST: THE TYPE/ DESIGNATION OF THE ACTIVITY AND ITS MAIN PURPOSE(S).

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YUGOSLAVIA ATTEMPTED TO MAKE A CASE FOR INCLUDING UNNOTIFIABLE AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN THE FORECAST, ARGUING THAT THE GREATER THE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION EXCHANGED, THE MORE CONFIDENCE -- ESPECIALLY NNA CONFIDENCE -- WOULD BE ENHANCED.

9. CONSTRAINTS: THE EAST APPEARED TO BE GRASPING AT STRAWS TO GET THE WEST TO AGREE TO CONSTRAINTS IN PRINCIPLE. THE GDR INTRODUCED A TEXT PLACING A 7,000-TROOP CEILING ON AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE MANEUVERS. THE POLISH AMBASSADOR ADDRESSED THE WORKING GROUP LATE IN THE DAY TO EXPRESS HIS "DISSATISFACTION" WITH THE STATE OF AFFAIRS REGARDING CONSTRAINTS AND RAISING A LONGSTANDING POLISH CALL FOR PARALLEL PROGRESS, HE MADE UNVEILED THREATS ABOUT THE NECESSITY FOR "HARMONIOUS DEVELOPMENTS" IN ALL AREAS. SINGLING OUT THE WEST AS THE FOOTDRAGGERS, HE NOTED THAT A "MAJORITY" OF STATES NOW ACCEPTS THE SC.7 APPROACH TO CONSTRAINTS. KONARSKI'S SELF-SERVING STATEMENT WAS MISLEADING IN THAT THE EAST HAS ACCEPTED ONLY THE PORTION OF THE SC.7 CONSTRAINTS PROPOSAL CALLING FOR A CEILING TIED TO THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD. MUCH TO THE CHAGRIN OF THE EAST, THE IRISH DEPUTY EARLIER LEAPT INTO THE VOID LEFT BY THE ALL TOO PARTISAN NNA, PRESENTING TENTATIVE IDEAS DESIGNED TO INCREASE THE CONSTRAINING EFFECT OF THE ANNUAL FORECAST, E.G., LONGER FORECAST PERIODS FOR LARGER EXERCISES.

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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01617  
 SUBJECT: AGREED COORDINATOR'S TEXT ON OBSERVATION

1. CDE IX - 085
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. FOLLOWING IS THE FIRST TEXT IN WORKING GROUP B-2 (OBSERVATION) WHICH WAS AGREED FOR NOTATION IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK ON FEBRUARY 27. THE TEXT DEALS WITH THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS AND CONTAINS A SIGNIFICANT CONCESSION IN THAT THE EAST HAS AGREED THAT OBSERVERS WILL BE INVITED FROM "ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES." THE TEXT ALSO REFLECTS AN APPARENT NNA

-  
 CONCESSION IN THAT THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF OBSERVERS FROM EACH PARTICIPATING STATE IS SET AT TWO (SC.7 HAD HELD OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF SENDING MORE OBSERVERS TO "PARTICULARLY LARGE ACTIVITIES.) DOTS IN THE TEXT INDICATE ISSUES ON WHICH THERE IS NO CONSENSUS.

BEGIN TEXT:

A PARTICIPATING STATE WILL INVITE OBSERVERS FROM ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES TO . . . .  
 THE HOST STATE WILL EXTEND THE INVITATIONS IN WRITING THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES AT THE TIME OF NOTIFICATION.  
 EACH PARTICIPATING STATE MAY SEND UP TO TWO OBSERVERS TO THE MILITARY ACTIVITY TO BE OBSERVED.  
 REPLIES TO THE INVITATION WILL BE GIVEN IN WRITING NOT LATER THAN . . . DAYS AFTER THE ISSUE OF THE INVITATION.  
 IF THE INVITATION IS NOT ACCEPTED IN TIME IT WILL BE ASSUMED THAT NO OBSERVERS WILL BE SENT.

END TEXT.

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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01634

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION TEXT

1. IX - 084.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. AFTER MUCH WRANGLING, WORKING GROUP B AGREED TO NOTE THE FOLLOWING TEXT IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK:

BEGIN TEXT:

PRIOR NOTIFICATION

THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL GIVE ... IN WRITING THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS IN AN AGREED FORM OF CONTENT TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES ... DAYS OR MORE IN ADVANCE OF THE START OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES (ASTERISK)... (ASTERISK-TO BE DEFINED)

... WILL BE GIVEN BY THE PARTICIPATING STATE ON WHOSE TERRITORY THE ACTIVITY IN QUESTION IS PLANNED TO TAKE PLACE EVEN IF THE FORCES OF THAT STATE ARE NOT ENGAGED IN THE ACTIVITY OR THEIR STRENGTH IS BELOW THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL. THIS WILL NOT RELIEVE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES OF THEIR OBLIGATION TO GIVE ..., IF THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE PLANNED MILITARY ACTIVITY REACHES THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL. END TEXT.

4. THE WORKING GROUP HAS DETERMINED THAT EXCEPTIONS (I.E., ALERT ACTIVITIES IN THE WESTERN PACKAGE) ARE STILL TO BE DISCUSSED AND TEXT NOTED. ACCEPTANCE OF THE HEADING PRIOR NOTIFICATION DOES NOT PREJUDGE THE HANDLING OF ALERT ACTIVITIES OR WHAT IS TO BE INSERTED IN PLACE OF ELLIPSES AT A LATER DATE; FINAL ACT LANGUAGE USES PRIOR NOTIFICATION AS A HEADING AND NOTIFICATION AS OPERATIVE LANGUAGE.

5. THE FIRST SET OF ELLIPSES INDICATES THAT EITHER NOTIFICATION OR PRIOR NOTIFICATION WILL BE ADDED AT A LATER DATE. THE SECOND SET OF ELLIPSES INDICATES SPACE TO DETERMINE THE NUMBER OF DAYS IN ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF A NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY WILL BE GIVEN. THE THIRD SET OF ELLIPSES ARE RESERVED PLACE FOR "IN THE ZONE". (THAT ISSUE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RESOLVED IN A SPECIAL CONTACT GROUP. SEE BELOW) THE FIRST SET OF ELLIPSES IN THE SECOND PARAGRAPH INDICATE EITHER NOTIFICATION OR PRIOR NOTIFICATION WILL BE ADDED AT A LATER DATE.

6. WE HAVE REFUSED TO AGREE TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION AS OPERATIVE LANGUAGE, DESPITE PRESSURES FROM OUR MORE WOBBLY ALLIES, PENDING A THOROUGH DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF THE NNA CONCEPTS IN RELATION TO DOCUMENT SC.1.

7. THE ISSUE OF HOW TO REFER TO THE ZONE IN THE DRAFTING LANGUAGE WAS RESOLVED IN AN AFTERNOON CONTACT GROUP CONVENED FOR THAT PURPOSE. THE SOLUTION, AGREED AD REF, IS AS FOLLOWS: A SPECIAL BODY OF TEXT WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE FINAL DOCUMENT WHICH FOR THE TIME BEING WILL BE CONSIDERED TO BE "FLOATING", I.E., THE TEXT IS AGREED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO WHERE IT EVENTUALLY MAY FIND ITS PLACE IN A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. THE FLOATING

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TEXT WOULD READ AS FOLLOWS:

- -- "UNDER THE TERMS OF THE MADRID MANDATE, THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S IS AS FOLLOWS:"

- -- THE THREE PARAGRAPHS FROM THE MADRID MANDATE WILL BE QUOTED VERBATIM, INCLUDING THE USE OF THE ASTERISK DEALING WITH ADJOINING SEA AREA;

- -- THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT APPEARS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE THREE MANDATE PARAGRAPHS: "HEREINAFTER, THE ABOVE WILL BE REFERRED TO AS THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S." THIS FORMULATION WOULD THEN BE USED EVERYWHERE IN THE DRAFT LANGUAGE WHERE THE NEED TO REFER TO THE ZONE APPEARS.

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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01726

SUBJECT: CONSTRAINING ASPECTS OF THE ANNUAL CALENDAR  
- AND THE IRISH PROPOSAL

1. CDE - 090  
 2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.  
 3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE IRISH HAVE PRESENTED A PROPOSAL FOR DEVELOPING THE ANNUAL CALENDAR AS A CONSTRAINING MEASURE. ALTHOUGH THIS SPECIFIC PROPOSAL HAS WEAKNESSES, USDEL BELIEVES U.S. SHOULD BEGIN CONSIDERING WAYS TO ENHANCE CONSTRAINING ASPECTS OF THE CALENDAR. END SUMMARY.

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 4. AT THE 27 FEBRUARY WORKING GROUP MEETING OF A-3 (ANNUAL FORECASTS/CONSTRAINING MEASURES), THE IRISH ORALLY PRESENTED A TEXT (AT PARA 4), PRIVATELY CIRCULATED IN WRITING, WHICH FOCUSES ON THE CONSTRAINING ELEMENTS OF THE ANNUAL CALENDAR. THE IRISH APPEAR TO HAVE TAKEN ON THE ROLE OF HONEST BROKER IN A-3 BY PROPOSING THAT THE ANNUAL CALENDAR BE MADE MORE "CONSTRAINING." THE NNA HAVE EXHIBITED EXTREME AMBIVALENCE ON THIS ISSUE: THEY SEEM TO MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF USING THE CALENDAR AS A MEANS OF SATISFYING THEIR REQUIREMENTS FOR A CONSTRAINING MEASURE WHILE ALSO STRESSING THE URGENCY OF AGREEING ON CEILINGS. THE EAST HAVE NOT YET EVEN RECOGNIZED THE CONSTRAINING ASPECTS OF THE CALENDAR AS AN OPTION AND, IF ONLY TO MAKE NATO UNCOMFORTABLE, WILL CERTAINLY CONTINUE TO SUPPORT MORE TRADITIONAL CONSTRAINTS (I.E., CEILINGS) FOR SOME WEEKS. AS THE EAST AND NNA GROW MORE STRIDENT IN THEIR SUPPORT FOR TRADITIONAL CONSTRAINTS, THE WEST MORE VIGOROUSLY INDICATES ITS OPPOSITION TO THAT APPROACH. DELEGATION DOES EXPECT THE NNA WILL--AFTER A LONG AND STRIDENT BATTLE--SEE THE LIGHT OF THE "CONSTRAINING ASPECTS OF THE CALENDAR" APPROACH AND THAT THE IRISH BRIDGE-BUILDING EFFORT WILL EVENTUALLY BE THE SUBJECT OF GROWING ATTENTION BY MOST PARTICIPANTS.

5. BEGIN TEXT OF IRISH PROPOSAL: EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL ANNUALLY TRANSMIT TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES A TABLE, TO BE KNOWN AS THE ANNUAL CALENDAR, OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES NOTIFIABLE PURSUANT TO ..., WHICH IT INTENDS TO CARRY OUT IN THE FOLLOWING CALENDAR YEAR. ANNUAL CALENDARS WILL BE TRANSMITTED IN WRITING THROUGH NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS NOT LATER THAN 1 NOVEMBER EACH YEAR.

- IF A PARTICIPATING STATE MAKES CHANGES IN A MILITARY ACTIVITY INCLUDED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR, SUCH CHANGES WILL BE COMMUNICATED IN THE NOTIFICATION OF THE ACTIVITY PURSUANT TO ....

- IF, IN ADDITION TO THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES INCLUDED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR, A PARTICIPATING STATE CARRIES

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OUT ONE OR MORE MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION PURSUANT TO ...., NO SUCH ADDITIONAL MILITARY ACTIVITY SHALL INVOLVE MORE THAN 50,000 TROOPS, AND THE NUMBER OF SUCH ADDITIONAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES SHALL BE NO MORE THAN ... OF THE NUMBER OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT BY THAT PARTICIPATING STATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ANNUAL CALENDAR.

- ANNUAL CALENDARS SHALL PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WITH RESPECT TO EACH MILITARY ACTIVITY INCLUDED:

.....  
- IN AN ADDENDUM TO THE ANNUAL CALENDAR, EACH PARTICIPATING STATE SHALL, WHENEVER POSSIBLE, PROVIDE INFORMATION ON MAJOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES NOTIFIABLE PURSUANT TO ...., WHICH IT INTENDS TO CARRY OUT IN CALENDAR YEARS SUBSEQUENT TO THE NEXT CALENDAR YEAR.

- THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL ABIDE BY THE CONSTRAINT THAT

-- NO MILITARY ACTIVITY SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION PURSUANT TO ... AND INVOLVING MORE THAN 75,000 TROOPS SHALL BE CARRIED OUT ON THE TERRITORY OF ANY PARTICIPATING STATE UNLESS INCLUDED IN THE ADDENDUM TO THE ANNUAL CALENDAR TRANSMITTED IN THE YEAR FALLING TWO YEARS EARLIER THAN THE YEAR IN WHICH THE ACTIVITY TAKES PLACE AND

-- NO MILITARY ACTIVITY SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION PURSUANT TO .... AND INVOLVING MORE THAN 100,000 TROOPS SHALL BE CARRIED OUT ON THE TERRITORY OF ANY PARTICIPATING STATE UNLESS INCLUDED IN THE ADDENDUM TO THE ANNUAL CALENDAR TRANSMITTED IN THE YEAR FALLING THREE YEARS EARLIER THAN THE YEAR IN WHICH THE ACTIVITY TAKES PLACE.

END TEXT OF IRISH PROPOSAL.

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6. INITIAL NATO REACTION TO THE IRISH PROPOSAL HAS BEEN MIXED. SEVERAL NATO AMBASSADORS BELIEVE STRONGLY THAT IT PROVIDES NATO A WAY OUT OF THE CONSTRAINTS "DILEMMA." AT THE WORKING LEVEL, IT HAS BEEN POINTED OUT THAT EITHER A PERCENTAGE OR A NUMERICAL CEILING ON NON-FORECAST ACTIVITIES IS UNACCEPTABLE IN MILITARY TERMS. IN PRIVATE, MOST NATO COUNTRIES HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THEY COULD PROBABLY ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF A "TIME CONSTRAINT" (I.E., FORECASTING LARGER ACTIVITIES SEVERAL YEARS IN ADVANCE). RECOGNIZING THE TACTICAL PRESSURES NATO WILL FACE OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS, HOWEVER, MOST ARE WARY OF INDICATING POLITICALLY ANY SUPPORT FOR "TIME CONSTRAINTS" AS A POTENTIAL SOLUTION AT THIS STAGE. IN DELEGATION'S VIEW, THESE TYPES OF "CONSTRAINTS" ARE TROUBLESOME BECAUSE THEY COULD IMPLICITLY SUPPORT THE ARGUMENT THAT LARGE-SCALE

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ACTIVITIES (OF WHICH NATO HAS FAR MORE THAN THE WARSAW PACT) ARE INHERENTLY MORE THREATENING THAN OTHER ACTIVITIES, AND, THEREFORE, CONSTITUTE THE GREATEST THREAT TO EUROPE. THE U.K. IS LIKewise WARY OF "TIME CONSTRAINTS" FOR THAT REASON.

7. ALTHOUGH IN THE DELEGATION'S VIEW IT WILL BE SOME TIME BEFORE CONSTRAINING ASPECTS OF THE ANNUAL CALENDAR DEVELOP A STRONG CONFERENCE-WIDE FOLLOWING, WE NEVERTHELESS BELIEVE THERE ARE TACTICAL ADVANTAGES IN PURSUING THAT APPROACH. DELEGATION BELIEVES WASHINGTON SHOULD CONSIDER DEVELOPING THE CONSTRAINING ASPECTS OF THE CALENDAR, AND WE WILL PROVIDE INITIAL SUGGESTIONS SEPTEL.

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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 01535

SUBJECT: US STATEMENT AT CDE ON OLOF PALME DEATH

1. IX - 081.
2. U - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS GIVEN ON BEHALF OF CO-SPONSERS OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED, BY DEPUTY HEAD OF USDEL CDE, AMBASSADOR LYNN HANSEN, IN 3 MARCH MEETING OF WORKING GROUP AB WHICH WAS DEDICATED TO CONDOLENCE STATEMENTS.

BEGIN TEXT.

THE GROUP OF SIXTEEN STATES, ON WHOSE BEHALF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION IS SPEAKING TODAY, WISHES TO ADD ITS COLLECTIVE AND INDIVIDUAL VOICES TO THOSE FROM EVERY CORNER OF THE GLOBE TO EXPRESS PROFOUND SORROW AND INDIGNATION AT THE INSANE ACT OF VIOLENCE WHICH ENDED THE LIFE OF A MAN WHO HIMSELF OPPOSED EVERY FORM OF VIOLENCE. PRIME MINISTER OLOF PALME WAS NOT ONLY A LEADING POLITICAL FIGURE IN SWEDEN, HE WAS AN INTERNATIONAL SYMBOL OF COMPASSION AND HUMANITY, A MAN KNOWN FOR HIS UNTIRING EFFORTS IN PURSUIT OF PEACE, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND DISARMAMENT. WE, WHO ARE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS CONFERENCE, HAVE A SHARE IN THE VISION OF THIS MAN AS WE PURSUE OUR WORK HERE. TO THE PALME FAMILY, WE EXPRESS OUR DEEPEST FELT SYMPATHY IN THE MOMENT OF LOSS OF HUSBAND AND FATHER. WE PRAY THAT MRS. PALME'S PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL WOUNDS SOON MAY BE HEALED.

TO OUR SWEDISH COLLEAGUES IN THE CONFERENCE, MEMBERS OF THE SWEDISH DELEGATION AND THOSE WHO SERVE US IN THE SECRETARIAT, WE EXTEND OUR SINCEREST CONDOLENCES. USING THE MEANS AVAILABLE TO US, WE WISH TO CONVEY TO THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF SWEDEN OUR EMPATHY AND UNDERSTANDING AS THEY GRIEVE THE SENSELESS DEATH OF ONE OF SWEDEN'S GREATEST SONS AND AN INTERNATIONAL STATESMAN, OLOF PALME. THE WORLD WILL BE POORER BECAUSE OF THIS MAN'S UNTIMELY DEPARTURE FROM US.

END TEXT.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01584

SUBJECT: NON-USE OF FORCE: UPDATE AND ANALYSIS OF

- "FEBRUARY 26" TEXT

REF: A) STATE 31397, B) STOCKHOLM 1470

1. CDE IX - 083

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS CABLE UPDATES THE STATUS OF THE CAUCUS' EFFORTS TO FORMULATE A COMMON NATO POSITION ON NON-USE OF FORCE AND PROVIDES INITIAL DELEGATION COMMENTS ON THE EC-12 NUF TEXT (HEREAFTER REFERRED TO AS THE FEBRUARY 26 TEXT). THE CABLE ALSO OUTLINES DELEGATION APPROACH TO NUF AT THIS STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE, INCLUDING HOW TO INCORPORATE AS MUCH OF THE U.S. DRAFT AS POSSIBLE INTO AN EVENTUAL ALLIED TEXT. END SUMMARY.

4. THE NATO NON-USE OF FORCE CLUSTER CAUCUS BEGAN WORK ON A COMMON ALLIED TEXT ON MONDAY, MARCH 3. THE "FEBRUARY 26" NUF TEXT, I.E., THE EC-12 TEXT, FORMS THE BASIS OF THESE DISCUSSIONS; HOWEVER, WE HAVE MADE IT CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT THE INCLUSION OF KEY CONCEPTS SUCH AS HUMAN RIGHTS AND ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE LANGUAGE IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO US AND COULD BE USEFUL IN DIRECTING THE NUF EXERCISE TO SERVE WESTERN INTERESTS. FURTHERMORE, WE HAVE INDICATED THAT THE WESTERN APPROACH ON NUF MUST REFLECT THE LARGER CONCEPT OF SECURITY OUTLINED IN REFTEL. WE HAVE ALSO EXPLAINED THAT WE PREFER THE PIECEMEAL APPROACH ON INTRODUCING WESTERN LANGUAGE IN ORDER TO CONTROL THE PACE AND THE SUBSTANCE OF NUF DRAFTING. ALTHOUGH OUR APPROACH HAS FOUND A GOOD DEAL OF SYMPATHY EVEN AMONG MANY EC-12 DELEGATIONS, WE EXPECT TO CARRY THE BURDEN OF FORGING THE "FEBRUARY 26" TEXT INTO AN ACCEPTABLE FINAL PRODUCT; HOWEVER, WE ANTICIPATE SOME ASSISTANCE FROM OUR CANADIAN AND NORWEGIAN COLLEAGUES; THE UK AND, TO A LESSER EXTENT, THE FRG SHOULD SUPPORT SOME OF OUR AMENDMENTS. THE CAUCUS, OF COURSE, WILL MAKE THE FINAL DETERMINATION WHEN AND HOW TO USE THE AGREED UPON TEXT. AS NOTED REF B, WE WILL CONTINUE TO REPORT THE TEXT TO WASHINGTON AS THE SITUATION DEVELOPS.

5. PARA 6 CONTAINS SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS DELEGATION INTENDS TO INTRODUCE. IN GENERAL WE WILL TRY TO INCORPORATE AS MUCH OF THE U.S. DRAFT AS POSSIBLE INTO AN ALLIED TEXT, BEARING IN MIND THAT SOME OF THE ELEMENTS CAN BEST BE USED FOR TACTICAL PURPOSES, E.G.,

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WE CAN INTRODUCE THE "FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION" ELEMENT TO COUNTER INTRODUCTION OF LANGUAGE "OUTLAWING WAR PROPAGANDA" SUCH AS THAT CONTAINED IN THE ROMANIAN PROPOSAL. OUR OVERALL APPROACH WILL BE TO ENSURE THAT NUF LANGUAGE IS INCORPORATED INTO A POLITICALLY BINDING DOCUMENT, WHICH FOCUSES ON CONCRETE CSBM'S. IN ORDER TO

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MAINTAIN THIS SUBORDINATE AND FUNCTIONAL STATUS OF NUF OUR INITIAL THINKING IS THAT THE NUF SECTION SHOULD BE PREAMBULAR WHILE THE CSBM'S SECTION SHOULD BE THE OPERATIONAL HEART OF THE AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, WE WILL RESERVE OUR POSITION ON THE PLACEMENT OF CERTAIN PARTS OF THE NUF TEXT. FOR EXAMPLE, THE TYPE OF LANGUAGE CONTAINED IN THE FIRST FOUR OR FIVE PARAGRAPHS OF THE "FEBRUARY 26" TEXT COULD WELL FORM PART OF A "CHAPEAU" TO A STOCKHOLM CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. FINALLY, WE WILL SEEK TO MAKE A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE LEGAL OBLIGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE UN CHARTER AND THE POLITICALLY BINDING STATUS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

6. WASHINGTON WILL NOTE THAT THE "FEBRUARY 26" TEXT IS IN THE INDICATIVE (THEY AGREED, THEY REAFFIRMED) RATHER THAN THE MORE TRADITIONAL PREAMBULAR (REAFFIRMING, RECALLING) FORM. OUR COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES, INCLUDING THE FRENCH, ASSURE US THAT THIS FORM HAS BEEN CHOSEN TO STRESS THE CSBM'S/NUF LINK AND NOT TO UPGRADE THE STATUS OF THE NUF SECTION. IN FACT, THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR ASSURED US IT DOES NOT INDICATE THAT PARIS WANTS A SEPARATE NUF DOCUMENT OR A POLITICAL DECLARATION ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE AS IT HAD CONTEMPLATED LAST YEAR. THE USE OF THE FUTURE TENSE, E.G., WILL, RATHER THAN THE CONDITIONAL, E.G., WOULD, WAS INTENDED TO MAKE COMMITMENT TO THE ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF CSBM'S LESS CONDITIONAL (SEE PARAS 1.5, 1.6, FOR EXAMPLE). FINALLY, IT IS DOUBTFUL -- EVEN WITH THE BEST OF INTENTIONS (AND, GIVEN THE FRENCH NEGOTIATING HISTORY ON THIS SUBJECT, THEIR INTENTIONS CAN BE QUESTIONED) -- WHETHER THE ALLIANCE CAN AGREE ON A FULL TEXT IN THE TEN DAYS REMAINING IN THIS SESSION. THEREFORE, WHILE WORKING ON THE FULL TEXT, WE WILL PRESS THE CLUSTER TO

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AGREE ON SOME LANGUAGE TO INTRODUCE INTO THE WORKING GROUP, E.G. LANGUAGE ON THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE (CONCRETE MEASURES) AND/OR LANGUAGE IN THE NUF/CSBM'S LINKAGE.

7. BEGIN TEXT AND COMMENTS:

1.1. THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE 35 STATES OF THE CSCE MET IN STOCKHOLM FROM 17 JANUARY 1984 TO 19 SEPTEMBER 1986, IN ORDER TO ADOPT A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE AGREED AT THE MADRID FOLLOW-UP MEETING TO CONVENE A CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE, AS A SUBSTANTIAL AND INTEGRAL PART OF THE MULTILATERAL PROCESS INITIATED BY THE CSCE.

- DELETE "IN ORDER TO ADOPT A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S." SUBSTITUTE "BEGIN A PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS AND ADOPTION OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S." THIS CHANGE WOULD KEEP OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF DISCUSSING CSBM'S RATHER THAN DISARMAMENT IN PHASE 1B OF

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THE CDE PROCESS.

1.2. ACCORDINGLY THEY AGREED ON SUCH A SET OF CSBM'S WHICH ARE OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE, POLITICALLY BINDING PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION AND WHICH COVER THE WHOLE OF EUROPE, AS LAID DOWN IN THE ABOVE-MENTIONED MANDATE.

- LANGUAGE SHOULD REFLECT THE COFFEE GROUP DISCUSSIONS CURRENTLY IN PROGRESS ON "THE ZONE" ISSUE.

1.3. IN DOING SO, THEY RECOGNIZED THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THOSE AGREED CSBM'S WILL, AS STATED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING THE DANGERS OF ARMED CONFLICT AND OF MISUNDERSTANDING OR MISCALCULATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD GIVE RISE TO APPREHENSION.

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- THIS LANGUAGE REFLECTS HELSINKI FINAL ACT LANGUAGE (P.84); HOWEVER, IT DELETES THE KEY PHRASE TYING APPREHENSION" WITH THE "LACK OF CLEAR AND TIMELY INFORMATION." IN ANY CASE, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE ALLIANCE, ON ITS OWN INITIATIVE, SHOULD INTRODUCE THE TERM INTO THE NUF DIALOGUE. FIRSTLY, IT IS INEXACT AND SUBJECTIVE; THE NUF PRINCIPLE RELATES NARROWLY TO THE ACTUAL THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE UN CHARTER; ACTIONS WHICH "GIVE RISE TO APPREHENSION" ARE NOT NECESSARILY WITHIN THE NUF PRESCRIPTION. SECONDLY, AND MORE IMPORTANT FROM OUR SECURITY POINT OF VIEW, THE CONCEPT OF DETERRENCE IS BASED ON APPREHENSION. WE WANT OUR ENEMIES TO BE APPREHENSIVE ABOUT THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST US. THEREFORE, WE RECOMMEND THAT THE PHRASE "WHICH COULD GIVE RISE TO APPREHENSION" BE DELETED.

1.4. THEY FURTHERMORE EXPRESSED THEIR DETERMINATION, BY IMPLEMENTING THESE CSBM'S, TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE AMONG THEM AND THUS CONTRIBUTE TO INCREASING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND, MORE GENERALLY, TO ELIMINATE THE CAUSES OF TENSION THAT MAY EXIST AMONG THEM AND THEREFORE TO MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE WORLD.

- DELETE "AND, MORE GENERALLY, . . . ."

THE LINK TO WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY IS ALREADY COVERED IN 3.2. FURTHERMORE, CSBM'S ALONE OR EVEN PRIMARILY CANNOT "ELIMINATE THE CAUSE OF TENSIONS" IN EUROPE. (WASHINGTON SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THIS AGAIN IS HFA LANGUAGE, P.84).

1.5. THEY RECOGNIZED MOREOVER THAT THIS SET OF CSBM'S ADOPTED IN STOCKHOLM, BY THEIR SCOPE AND BY THEIR NATURE, WILL MAKE AN IMPORTANT AND APPROPRIATE CONTRIBUTION TO ACHIEVING THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE WHICH IS DESIGNED TO UNDERTAKE, IN STAGES, NEW, EFFECTIVE AND CONCRETE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO MAKE PROGRESS IN STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND ACHIEVING DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE.

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- LINK BETWEEN CSBM'S ADOPTED BY THE CONFERENCE AND A SHORTHAND VERSION OF THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE TAKEN FROM THE MADRID MANDATE. BY SHORTENING THE MANDATE LANGUAGE THE "INTEGRAL" LINK BETWEEN THE CDE AND THE CSCE PROCESS, FOR EXAMPLE, IS ELIMINATED. IT MIGHT BE ADVISABLE TO RESTORE THE FULL TEXT OF THE CONFERENCE'S MANDATE. THE CSBM'S ELEMENT OF THIS PHRASE, MOREOVER, MERELY NOTES THAT CSBM'S WILL MAKE "AN IMPORTANT AND APPROPRIATE" CONTRIBUTION TO THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE. THEREFORE, THE IMPORTANT LINK BETWEEN CSBM'S, THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE AND THE NUF PRINCIPLE MIGHT BE BETTER PROTECTED IN THE NEXT PARAGRAPH. A FINAL NOTE, PARAS 1.1-1.5 DO NOT NECESSARILY BELONG IN THE NUF SECTION OF A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT; THESE PHRASES COULD JUST AS EASILY SERVE AS A CHAPEAU TO SUCH A DOCUMENT, I.E., THEY DISCUSS THE LINK BETWEEN THE CSBM'S AND THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE AND NOT BETWEEN CSBM'S AND NUF (1.6). THEREFORE, THE WEST SHOULD CAREFULLY CONSIDER WHETHER WE SHOULD TABLE SUCH LANGUAGE IN THE NUF WORKING GROUP.

1.6. IN THIS CONTEXT THEY RECOGNIZED THAT SUCH MEASURES AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION WILL, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE LAID DOWN IN THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT, SERVE THE PROCESS OF STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE SO AS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THEIR DUTY TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.

- IN ORDER TO MAKE THE LINK MORE EXPLICIT IN THIS PARAGRAPH "SUCH MEASURES" CAN BE REPLACED WITH "THE SET OF CSBM'S ADOPTED IN STOCKHOLM."

2.1. CONSEQUENTLY THE PARTICIPATING STATES REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO RESPECT AND PUT INTO PRACTICE THIS PRINCIPLE LAID DOWN IN THE FINAL ACT AS FOLLOWS:

- THIS SENTENCE LINKS THE OVERALL APPROACH OF THE "FEBRUARY 26" TEXT CONTAINED IN 1.1-1.6 AND THE NUF AND COLLATERAL PRINCIPLES CONTAINED IN 2.2-3.3.

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2.2. THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL REFRAIN IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL, FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND WITH THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES OF THE FINAL ACT. NO CONSIDERATIONS MAY BE INVOKED TO SERVE TO WARRANT RESORT TO THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THIS PRINCIPLE.

2.3. ACCORDINGLY, THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTS CONSTITUTING A THREAT OF FORCE OR DIRECT OR INDIRECT USE OF FORCE AGAINST ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE. LIKewise THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY MANIFESTATION OF FORCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE TO RENOUNCE THE FULL EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN

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RIGHTS. LIKEWISE THEY WILL ALSO REFRAIN IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS FROM ANY ACT OF REPRISAL BY FORCE.

2.4. NO SUCH THREAT OR USE OF FORCE WILL BE EMPLOYED AS A MEANS OF SETTLING DISPUTES, OR QUESTIONS LIKELY TO GIVE RISE TO DISPUTES, BETWEEN THEM.

- PARAS 2.2 AND 2.4, THE HEART OF THIS PAPER'S NON-USE OF FORCE SECTION, ARE DIRECTLY LIFTED FROM THE FINAL ACT'S PRINCIPLE II. THE FRENCH INSISTED ON THIS FULL QUOTATION IN ORDER TO AVOID QUARRELS ABOUT HOW THE PRINCIPLE SHOULD BE REAFFIRMED OR RECALLED. WHILE IT IS DIFFICULT TO ARGUE AGAINST HFA LANGUAGE, PRINCIPLE II OF THE ACT IS MUCH MORE PROBLEMATICAL THAN THE UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF THE UN CHARTER. FOR EXAMPLE, THESE TWO PARAGRAPHS CALL ON PARTICIPATING STATES TO REFRAIN FROM, INTER ALIA, "DIRECT AND INDIRECT FORCE," MANIFESTATIONS OF FORCE," AND "REPRISAL BY FORCE." WE WILL HAVE TO FIGHT THESE BATTLES LATER, NO DOUBT, BUT WHY SHOULD THE WEST FOCUS ON THEM IN OUR OWN PAPER? THE NUF PRINCIPLE SHOULD, THEREFORE, REFLECT AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE ARTICLE 2/4 OF THE CHARTER TO BE FOLLOWED BY THE PRIME EXCEPTION OF THE NUF PROHIBITION, THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE, SET FORTH IN ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER. THE "FEBRUARY 26" TEXT DOES NEITHER.

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3.1. THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZED THEIR COMMITMENT TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONSHIP AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

- AN UNNECESSARY REPETITION OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE.

3.1.1. NO CONSIDERATION WHATSOEVER WHETHER OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY OR ANY OTHER NATURE CAN BE INVOKED TO JUSTIFY THE THREAT OF FORCE OR THE DIRECT OR INDIRECT USE OF FORCE.

THEY RECALL THAT AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, NOTHING SHALL IMPAIR THE INHERENT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE SELF DEFENSE IF AN ARMED ATTACK OCCURS.

- AGAIN, REPETITIVE OF 2.2-2.3. SUCH A LINK BETWEEN THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF FORCE AND THE SELF-DEFENSE CLAUSE IS NECESSARY -- BUT ONLY ONCE.

3.1.2. THEY WILL LIKEWISE REFRAIN FROM ANY MANIFESTATION OF FORCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE OR ANY OTHER STATE TO RENOUNCE THE FULL EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND, IN PARTICULAR, OF ITS LIBERTY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND ITS RIGHT FREELY TO CHOOSE AND DEVELOP ITS OWN POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL SYSTEM.

- AGAIN, THIS OTHERWISE UNEXCEPTIONABLE PARAGRAPH CLEARLY AIMED AT SOVIET INTIMIDATION OF EASTERN EUROPE, REFERS TO "MANIFESTION OF FORCE" RATHER THAN THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.

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3.1.3. THEY WILL LIKEWISE REFRAIN FROM MAKING EACH OTHER'S TERRITORY THE OBJECT OF MILITARY OCCUPATION OR OTHER DIRECT OR INDIRECT MEASURES OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, OR THE OBJECT OF ACQUISITION BY MEANS OF SUCH MEASURES OR THE THREAT OF THEM. NO SUCH OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS LEGAL.

- THIS PARAGRAPH WAS INSERTED AT GREEK INSISTENCE IN DELIBERATIONS IN THE 12 AND IS CLEARLY AIMED, IN ATHENS' VIEW, AT TURKISH OCCUPATION OF NORTHERN CYPRUS. IT IS BOUND TO CAUSE THE ALLIANCE DIFFICULTIES.

3.1.4. THEIR COMMITMENT APPLIES TO THEIR RELATIONS WITH EACH OF THE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PART OF AN ALLIANCE OR NEUTRAL AS WELL AS TO THEIR RELATIONS WITH ALL OTHER STATES.

- ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE LANGUAGE. THIS OR A STRONGER PARAGRAPH SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN ANY WESTERN TEXT.

3.1.5. THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IS A COMPLEMENT TO REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.

- WE PREFER THE LANGUAGE OF THE U.S. TEXT, PERHAPS WEDDED TO THIS ELEMENT.

3.2. THEY RECOGNIZED THE CLOSE LINK BETWEEN PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE AND ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED FOR EACH OF THEM TO MAKE ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRENGTHENING OF WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY AND TO THE PROMOTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS AND WELL-BEING FOR ALL PEOPLES.

- THIS IS A VERY WATERED DOWN "HUMAN RIGHTS" PARAGRAPH WHICH IS IN FACT WEAKER THAN THE NNA TEXT, SC.7. IT IS NOT ENOUGH AND WE WILL TRY TO GET AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE OF OUR HUMAN RIGHTS SECTIONS INTO THE FINAL TEXT.

3.3. THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO ALL TEN PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT, WHICH ARE ALL OF PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE AND ACCORDINGLY WILL BE EQUALLY AND UNRESERVEDLY APPLIED, EACH OF THEM BEING INTERPRETED TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE OTHERS.

- THIS IMPORTANT "BALANCE" PARAGRAPH TAKEN FROM THE FINAL ACT PERHAPS SHOULD BE QUOTED IN TOTO AS IT IS IN SC.7 OR PARAPHRASED AS IN THE U.S. TEXT.

FOOTNOTE:

AN ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO OBTAIN WORDING SIMILAR TO OR IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FIFTH PARAGRAPH ON HUMAN RIGHTS AS LAID DOWN IN THE SEVENTH PRINCIPLE OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT WHICH IS THE SOURCE OF THE RELEVANT PARAGRAPH IN THE DRAFT NNA PROPOSAL ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE. IN CASE THIS WOULD APPEAR NOT TO BE POSSIBLE DELEGATIONS IN STOCKHOLM COULD MAKE USE OF PARAGRAPH

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3.2. IN THE DRAFT DOCUMENT.

- THIS FOOTNOTE REFLECTS THE INABILITY OF THE 12 TO  
AGREE ON A SEPARATE HUMAN RIGHTS PARAGRAPH.  
IT IS CLEAR THAT THE "FEBRUARY 26" DOES NOT DIRECTLY  
REFLECT MANY VITAL CONCEPTS CONTAINED IN THE U.S. TEXT  
BESIDES HUMAN RIGHTS. WE WILL WORK TO GET SUCH OTHER  
KEY IDEAS TIED TO THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE AS THE  
IMPORTANCE OF TREATY IMPLEMENTATION, VERIFICATION, EQUAL  
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES, ETC., INTO THE FINAL NATO  
TEXT.

END TEXT AND COMMENTARY.

HANSEN

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01738  
SUBJECT: NOTEBOOK TEXT ON ANNUAL CALENDAR

1. CDE IX - 097.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. AT THE 6 MARCH MEETING OF WORKING GROUP A-3, THE FOLLOWING TEXT WAS NOTED IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK. NATO AGREED TO THE USE OF THE MORE PRECISE TERM "ANNUAL CALENDAR" RATHER THAN "ANNUAL FORECAST" WHILE WESTERN ATTEMPTS TO USE THE IRISH FORMULATION "A TABLE, TO BE KNOWN AS THE ANNUAL CALENDAR," WERE SABOTAGED BY THE COORDINATOR, AS WELL AS EASTERN AND NNA PARTICIPANTS. THE TEXT DOES ESTABLISH EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE CONCEPT OF AN ANNUAL CALENDAR.

4. BEGIN TEXT: EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL EXCHANGE, WITH ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, AN ANNUAL CALENDAR OF ITS NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES(//), WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS, FORECASTED FOR THE SUBSEQUENT CALENDAR YEAR. IT WILL BE TRANSMITTED EVERY YEAR, IN WRITING, THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, NOT LATER THAN ... FOR THE FOLLOWING YEAR.

- (//) TO BE DEFINED.  
END TEXT.

BARRY  
END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01725  
SUBJECT: AGREED TEXT IN WORKING GROUP B-2 (OBSERVATION)  
1. CDE IX - 095  
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.  
3. THE FOLLOWING TEXT ON EQUAL TREATMENT OF OBSERVERS  
WAS AGREED MARCH 6 FOR NOTATION IN THE COORDINATOR'S  
NOTEBOOK IN WORKING GROUP B-2.  
BEGIN TEXT:  
OBSERVERS WILL BE PROVIDED EQUAL TREATMENT AND OFFERED  
EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES TO CARRY OUT THEIR FUNCTIONS.  
END TEXT.  
BARRY  
END OF MESSAGE

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S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 01778

SUBJECT: CDE: U.S. DEMARCHE ON GORBACHEV CDE PROPOSALS

REF: STATE 69324

1. CDE IX - 098

2. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. OEGIN SUMMARY: AT A MARCH 7 MEETING INVOLVING CDE AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY AND GENERAL TATARNIKOV ON THE SOVIET SIDE AND AMBASSADORS BARRY AND HANSEN ON THE U.S. SIDE, BARRY MADE THE POINTS IN REFTEL, EMPHASIZING THAT OUR REACTION HAD BEEN CAREFULLY CONSIDERED IN WASHINGTON AND WAS A POSITIVE APPROACH WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE CONFERENCE TO MAKE PROGRESS. GRINEVSKY'S REACTION WAS GUARDEDLY NEGATIVE. AS THE DISCUSSION WORE ON, HE BECAME INCREASINGLY INSISTENT ON "REGISTERING" AN AGREEMENT ON THE POSTPONEMENT OF DISCUSSION OF ALL NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNTIL AFTER VIENNA. BARRY SUGGESTED THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION WAS TRYING TO LEAD US BACK INTO THE STALEMATE THAT THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT SEEMED DESIGNED TO RESOLVE.

END SUMMARY.

4. AT A MARCH 7 MEETING INVOLVING GRINEVSKY AND TATARNIKOV ON THE SOVIET SIDE AND BARRY AND HANSEN ON THE U.S. SIDE, BARRY MADE THE POINTS IN REFTEL, EMPHASIZING THAT OUR REACTION HAD BEEN CAREFULLY CONSIDERED IN WASHINGTON. THE ENSUING DISCUSSION LASTED OVER AN HOUR. A DETAILED MEMCON IS BEING SENT BY SEPTTEL.

5. IN SUM, GRINEVSKY'S REACTION WAS GUARDEDLY NEGATIVE. HE ASKED WHETHER OUR PROBLEM WITH AGREEING TO POSTPONE NAVAL ACTIVITIES WAS SUBSTANTIVE OR JURIDICAL; IF WE WERE MAINLY WORRIED ABOUT PRESERVING THE STATUS OF THE VIENNA CONFERENCE, HE IMPLIED THAT A SOLUTION COULD BE FOUND.

6. BARRY REPLIED THAT THE SOVIET UNION OBVIOUSLY WOULD WANT TO RAISE THE NAVAL ISSUE IN THE POST-VIENNA PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE AND THAT, SINCE ANY COUNTRY CAN RAISE ANY QUESTIONS IT WISHES, NAVAL ACTIVITIES WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE POST-VIENNA PHASE. PART OF OUR PROBLEM ON "AGREEING" THAT NAVAL ACTIVITIES WOULD BE DISCUSSED AFTER VIENNA WAS JURIDICAL. PART WAS PRACTICAL; THERE WILL BE MANY ISSUES WHICH WILL NOT BE AGREED AT STOCKHOLM; SINGLING OUT ONE WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE. IN ADDITION, WE HAVE A SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEM; WE THINK THAT AGREEING TO DISCUSS ALL NAVAL ACTIVITIES AFTER VIENNA WOULD UNDERMINE THE MADRID MANDATE. THE U.S. HAD NOW WELCOMED THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL AND HAD RECOGNIZED THAT AN IMPEDIMENT TO DRAFTING HAD BEEN LIFTED. MOREOVER, THE INSTRUCTIONS AUTHORIZED THE U.S. TO DISCUSS AIR ACTIVITIES, RECOGNIZING THE FACT THAT 90 PER CENT OR MORE OF SUCH ACTIVITIES ARE RELATED TO GROUND FORCE EXERCISES. BARRY STRESSED THAT THE OFFICIAL U.S. RESPONSE IS A POSITIVE APPROACH WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE CONFERENCE TO MAKE PROGRESS.

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7. AS THE DISCUSSION WORE ON, GRINEVSKY BECAME INCREASINGLY INSISTENT ON "REGISTERING" AN AGREEMENT ON THE POSTPONEMENT OF DISCUSSION OF ALL NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNTIL AFTER VIENNA. BARRY SUGGESTED THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION WAS TRYING TO LEAD US BACK INTO THE STALEMATE THAT THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT SEEMED DESIGNED TO RESOLVE.

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8. GRINEVSKY SAID THAT THE U.S. STATEMENT WOULD BE CAREFULLY STUDIED IN MOSCOW; HOWEVER, HIS INITIAL REACTION WAS NEGATIVE. HE CRITICIZED THE U.S. REACTION FOR "DISTORTING" THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL; HE HAD NOT SUGGESTED "DROPPING" THE NAVAL ISSUE BUT POSTPONING IT. THE U.S. STATEMENT CONTAINED OTHER "RESERVATIONS AND PRECONDITIONS." GRINEVSKY SAW NO DESIRE ON THE PART OF THE U.S. TO "FOLLOW THE SOVIET APPEAL" TO RESOLVE BASIC ISSUES.

9. BARRY PREDICTED THAT WASHINGTON WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED WITH GRINEVSKY'S NEGATIVE RESPONSE SINCE THE U.S. HAD THOUGHT IT WAS BEING AS POSITIVE AS POSSIBLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. HE WARNED THAT WASHINGTON MIGHT CONCLUDE THAT PROSPECTS FOR AGREEMENT WERE NOT GOOD AT ALL. HE THEN REITERATED THAT THE U.S. WAS EAGER TO MOVE AHEAD. EXPRESSING PUZZLEMENT THAT GRINEVSKY COULD THINK THAT THE U.S. WOULD CHANGE ITS OPINION REGARDING NAVAL ACTIVITIES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE MANDATE, BARRY EXPLAINED WHAT HAD BEEN HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE SPIRIT OF THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT: HE THOUGHT IT WAS DESIGNED TO PERMIT THE CONFERENCE TO PRODUCE AGREEMENT ON AREAS WHERE THERE WAS COMMON GROUND. HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS SEEMED TO BE SAYING THAT BECAUSE THE U.S. COULD NOT ACCEPT THE SOVIET VIEW ON NAVAL ACTIVITIES, THERE COULD BE NO MOVEMENT. THIS, BARRY INSISTED, WAS A RECIPE FOR STALEMATE.

10. GRINEVSKY REITERATED THE SOVIET DESIRE FOR A FIXED UNDERSTANDING THAT THE CONFERENCE WAS PUTTING OFF UNRESOLVABLE ISSUES FOR THE MOMENT, BUT THAT IT WAS NOT THROWING THE BABY OUT WITH THE BATH WATER." HE STRESSED THAT A WAY COULD BE FOUND TO DO THIS IF BOTH SIDES SHARED THE SAME APPROACH. HE INDICATED THAT THE ISSUE WILL BE AT THE TOP OF HIS AGENDA IN WASHINGTON.

11. THE DISCUSSION THEN MOVED ON TO COVER NOTIFICATION OF GROUND AND AIR ACTIVITIES; THE SOVIETS ASSERTED THAT WHILE AGREEMENT ON GROUND FORCE THRESHOLDS WOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE, THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO DEAL WITH THIS SEPARATELY FROM THE QUESTIONS OF NOTIFYING AIR ACTIVITIES AND TRANSFERS.

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12. AT A SUBSEQUENT HEADS-OF-DELEGATION ONLY NATO CAUCUS ON MARCH 7, BARRY REPORTED ON THE U.S. DEMARCHE AND THE SOVIET RESPONSE. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT WE HAD BEEN AS POSITIVE AS WE COULD BE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES

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AND PUZZLEMENT ABOUT THE SOVIET INSISTENCE ON "AGREEMENT" TO POSTPONE THE DISCUSSION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES. VARIOUS THEORIES WERE PUT FORWARD TO EXPLAIN THIS:

-- GENERAL STAFF OBJECTIONS TO THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT DROPPING NAVAL ACTIVITIES FOR THIS ROUND, RESULTING IN AN EFFORT TO BACKTRACK;

-- A DESIRE TO STALL ON DRAFTING TO INCREASE THE CHANCES OF A MINI-PACKAGE;

-- COLD FEET IN THE FACE OF A REAL TRANSPARENCY AGREEMENT AND A DESIRE TO STICK THE BLAME FOR FAILURE ON THE WEST;

-- EAGERNESS TO ESTABLISH THE CONCEPT OF POST-VIENNA CDE CONTINUITY BY GETTING STOCKHOLM TO AGREE TO ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION IN A RESUMED "PHASE IB;"

-- CONTINUED UNHAPPINESS WITH THE MANDATE AND A DESIRE TO CHIP AWAY AT IT WHENEVER POSSIBLE.

13. THE NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE OBJECTED TO THE U.S. REJECTION OF INDEPENDENT AIR, SAYING THAT WE HAD GOTTEN AHEAD OF NATO POLICY. BARRY REPLIED THAT SC.1 REPRESENTED NATO APPROVAL OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH.

14. SEVERAL OTHERS (UK, FRG, NETHERLANDS) SAID WE NEEDED STRONGER ARGUMENTS AGAINST INDEPENDENT AIR; OUR MAIN POINT AT PRESENT IS VERIFIABILITY BUT FUNCTIONALLY RELATED AIR IS NO MORE VERIFIABLE THAN INDEPENDENT AIR. BARRY SAID HE WOULD BE GLAD TO PROVIDE SOME ARGUMENTATION BASED ON THE MANDATE AND THE PRACTICAL POINT THAT UNDER THE SOVIET APPROACH THERE WOULD BE ALMOST NO NOTIFICATIONS; ONLY THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH WOULD HAVE ANY REAL EFFECT.

15. COMMENT: SEVERAL EAST EUROPEANS SAY THEY SHARE OUR PUZZLEMENT OVER THE SOVIET TACTIC OF INSISTING ON AGREEMENT TO POSTPONE DISCUSSION OF ALL NAVAL ACTIVITIES. THEY CLAIM GRINEVSKY WAS INSTRUCTED TO MAKE THIS CONDITION PUBLIC IN HIS FEBRUARY 28 SPEECH BUT THAT THE DELEGATION IS LOOKING FOR A FACE-SAVING WAY OUT. SOME SUGGEST THEY WOULD SETTLE FOR AS LITTLE AS AN ORAL AGREEMENT THAT ANY STOCKHOLM PARTICIPANT COULD CARRY OVER ANY UNRESOLVED ISSUE UNTIL A POSSIBLE POST-VIENNA CDE, A STATEMENT OF THE OBVIOUS. UNFORTUNATELY, SOME OF THE NNA ARE "OFFERING" CONSIDERABLY MORE THAN THIS, AND POSSIBLY THE "WET" ALLIES ARE TOO.

16. AS FOR INDEPENDENT AIR, WE COULD USE THE NEW ARGUMENTATION THE WASHINGTON COMMUNITY IS WORKING ON BEFORE THE END OF THE ROUND.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01811

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN AMBASSADOR  
 - ROBERT L. BARRY, HEAD OF U.S. CDE DELEGATION,  
 - AND AMBASSADOR OLEG A. GRINEVSKY, HEAD OF  
 - SOVIET DELEGATION TO THE CDE

REF: STATE 69324

1. CDE IX - 102
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. SUMMARY. AMBASSADOR BARRY FIRST READ INSTRUCTIONS CONVEYING THE OFFICIAL U.S. RESPONSE TO THE CDE PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN GORBACHEV'S JAN 17 STATEMENT. GRINEVSKY INITIAL REACTION WAS CAUTIOUSLY NEGATIVE, ALTHOUGH HE SAID THAT HE WOULD CAREFULLY STUDY THE U.S. DEMARCHE AND WOULD REPORT IT TO WASHINGTON. BARRY STRESSED THAT THE U.S. RESPONSE HAD BEEN CAREFULLY CONSIDERED IN WASHINGTON AND WAS DESIGNED TO BE POSITIVE AND TO HELP MOVE THE CONFERENCE FORWARD. WHILE GRINEVSKY APPEARED WILLING EARLY IN THE MEETING TO ACCEPT A VAGUE INFORMAL AGREEMENT TO POSTPONE DISCUSSION OF THE NOTIFICATION OF ALL NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNTIL THE NEXT STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE, AS THE MEETING PROGRESSED HE BECAME INCREASINGLY INSISTENT THAT SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING HAD TO BE "REGISTERED". BARRY SAID THAT HE COULD NOT AGREE TO ANYTHING WHICH WOULD UNDERMINE THE U.S. INTERPRETATION OF THE MANDATE OR WOULD DECIDE WHAT WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN A POST-VIENNA CDE PHASE; THAT WAS UP TO THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING TO DECIDE. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR EVADED BARRY'S SUGGESTION THAT THE TWO COULD USE THEIR TIME MORE PROFITABLY DISCUSSING ISSUES WHERE COMMON GROUND EXISTED, I.E., GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES AND FUNCTIONALLY RELATED AIR ACTIVITIES MORE CONCRETELY. END SUMMARY.

## 4. BEGIN MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION:

- MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE : MARCH 7, 1986

TIME : 10:30-13:00

PLACE : U.S. DELEGATION, AMBASSADOR BARRY'S OFFICE

## PARTICIPANTS

|                          |   |                        |
|--------------------------|---|------------------------|
| - U.S.                   | - | USSR                   |
| AMB. ROBERT L. BARRY     |   | AMB. OLEG A. GRINEVSKY |
| AMB. LYNN M. HANSEN      |   | GEN. VICTOR TATARNIKOV |
| MS. PRISCILLA H. GALASSI |   | MR. ANDREY GROSHEV     |
| NOTETAKER/INTERPRETER    |   | NOTETAKER/INTERPRETER  |

5. BARRY OPENED THE MEETING BY ASKING FOR AN EXPLANATION OF THE SOVIET ATTITUDE VIS-A-VIS THE QUESTION OF THRESHOLDS FOR GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES. HE SAID THAT HE WAS NOT TRYING TO BREAK THE SOVIET LINKAGE BUT NOTED THAT THE U.S. DELEGATION WOULD SOON RETURN TO WASHINGTON WHERE THE GROUND FORCE ISSUES AS WELL AS THE AIR ISSUES WOULD

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BE EXAMINED. IT WOULD BE USEFUL, HE SAID, TO HAVE THE SOVIET ATTITUDE ON THESE ISSUES.

6. GRINEVSKY SAID THAT IN PRINCIPLE HE WAS READY TO LOOK AT THE GROUND FORCE ISSUES, BUT WANTED FIRST TO KNOW WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY CHANGE IN THE ISSUES WHICH HAD BEEN DISCUSSED PRIVATELY BEFORE, I.E., THE GORBACHEV JANUARY 15 PROPOSAL. HE SAID THAT THE QUESTION WAS STILL ACTIVE ("BEFORE US") AND THE SOVIET UNION WAS AWAITING A RESPONSE IN ORDER TO START TO CONSIDER HOW DO WORK OUT AN AGREEMENT IN THIS REGARD. HE NOTED THAT PREVIOUSLY BARRY HAD HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS.

7. BARRY REPLIED THAT HE NOW HAD INSTRUCTIONS AND WAS ABOUT TO MAKE AN INSTRUCTED DEMARCHE. HE THEN READ FROM THE INSTRUCTION CONTAINED IN REFTEL.

8. GRINEVSKY SAID THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD STUDY CAREFULLY WHAT BARRY HAD CHARACTERIZED AS THE OFFICIAL RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET JANUARY 15 PROPOSAL. HE THEN POSED SEVERAL QUESTIONS "TO BETTER UNDERSTAND THE ESSENCE OF THE U.S. RESPONSE:" WAS THE U.S. WILLING TO CONSIDER THAT SOME ISSUES LINKED WITH NAVAL ACTIVITIES COULD BE POSTPONED TO THE NEXT PHASE, BUT THAT "JURIDICALLY" IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO TAKE A DECISION HERE? GRINEVSKY INSISTED THAT NO ONE COULD FORBID THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION IN STOCKHOLM TO DISCUSS OUTSIDE THE CONFERENCE WHAT ISSUES WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE NEXT PHASE. HE NOTED THAT IT WAS NATURAL FOR THE U.S. TO ASK THE SOVIET UNION WHAT THE LATTER'S POSITION WOULD BE AT THE VIENNA CONFERENCE AND AFTER. IN HIS VIEW THE REAL ISSUE WAS THE FORM SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD TAKE. HE WANTED TO KNOW WHETHER THE U.S. WAS READY (FOR SUCH AN AGREEMENT) AND SIMPLY WAS BOTHERED BY HOW TO AGREE.

9. BARRY SAID THAT HE HAD THREE POINTS TO MAKE ON WHAT GRINEVSKY HAD SAID: 1) ON THE ESSENCE OF THE ISSUE, HE NOTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD WANT TO RAISE THE NAVAL ISSUE IN A POSSIBLE POST-VIENNA PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE. NAVAL ACTIVITIES, THUS, WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN A POST-VIENNA PHASE BECAUSE ANY COUNTRY COULD RAISE ANY ISSUE; 2) REGARDING THE JURIDICAL ASPECT OF THE ISSUE, BARRY POINTED OUT THAT HIS INSTRUCTIONS CONVEY THE U.S. VIEW THAT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IS NOT EMPOWERED TO TAKE DECISIONS WHICH WILL AFFECT THE POST-VIENNA PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE. ADDITIONALLY, IN PRACTICAL TERMS, HE SAID, THERE ARE MANY ISSUES WHERE WE WON'T SUCCEED IN GETTING OUR PROPOSALS ACCEPTED AT THIS STAGE. IF THIS OCCURS, GRINEVSKY WOULDN'T BE IN A POSITION TO AGREE THAT WESTERN ISSUES SHOULD BE SINGLED OUT TO BE AT THE CENTER OF ATTENTION AT THE NEXT PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE. HOWEVER, GRINEVSKY WOULD RECOGNIZE THAT SUCH ISSUES WOULD BE RAISED DURING THE NEXT PHASE. FOLLOWING SUCH AN APPROACH, THERE WOULD BE A LIST WITH

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LARGE NUMBERS OF SUBJECTS WHICH COULD NOT BE AGREED AT THIS STAGE, E.G., CONSTRAINTS FOR THE MNA. BARRY SAID THAT HE COULD THINK OF A WHOLE LIST OF ITEMS WE WOULDN'T AGREE ON DURING THIS PHASE. THERE IS ANOTHER PRACTICAL PROBLEM: PEOPLE HAVE BEEN TALKING ABOUT A PREAMBLE TO THE AGREEMENT. THIS, IN BARRY'S VIEW, WOULD BE AS HARD TO DRAFT AS THE CSBM'S THEMSELVES; THERE IS NO TIME FOR THAT; 3) IN THE INSTRUCTIONS WHICH BARRY HAD CONVEYED, THE SOVIETS HAD SEEN THE U.S. DO WHAT THE SOVIETS WANTED: THE U.S. HAD WELCOMED THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL; IT HAD RECOGNIZED THAT AN IMPEDIMENT TO DRAFTING HAD BEEN LIFTED; THE INSTRUCTIONS TOLD THE DELEGATION TO FOCUS ON AIR ACTIVITIES, RECOGNIZING THAT 90 PER CENT OR MORE OF SUCH ACTIVITIES ARE RELATED TO GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES. THUS, IT IS A POSITIVE APPROACH WHICH WILL ALLOW US TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THESE AREAS.

10. GRINEVSKY ADMITTED THAT IT IS THE NATURAL RIGHT OF EACH STATE TO RAISE ANY QUESTION IT WISHES AT THE CONFERENCE NOW, OR DURING A SECOND OR EVEN A THIRD PHASE. OF COURSE, HE CONTINUED, THE SOVIET UNION HAS THE RIGHT TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF NOTIFICATION OF ALL NAVAL ACTIVITIES. HE THEN ASKED WHETHER THE U.S. WAS READY TO AGREE WITH THE SOVIET UNION THAT THAT ISSUE COULD BE DISCUSSED DURING A LATER PHASE.

11. BARRY RESPONDED THAT THAT WOULD PREJUDICE THE U.S.' INTERPRETATION OF THE MADRID MANDATE. GRINEVSKY WOULD BE ASKING HIM TO GIVE UP FUNCTIONALLY RELATED ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE PART OF THE MANDATE. THUS, HE SAID, HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO AGREE TO GRINEVSKY'S PROPOSITION BECAUSE IT WOULD UNDERMINE THE U.S. APPROACH TO THE MANDATE.

12. GRINEVSKY SAID THAT HE DID NOT HAVE IN MIND UNDERMINING THE U.S. INTERPRETATION OF THE MANDATE.

13. BARRY SAID THAT HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND SOVIET MOTIVATIONS: WERE THEY TRYING TO DETERMINE WHAT WOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED HERE? WERE THEY INTERESTED IN EXCLUDING NAVAL ACTIVITIES, EXCEPT FOR AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES, FROM DISCUSSION DURING THIS PHASE OR WERE THEY INTERESTED IN WHAT WOULD OR WOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED IN A FUTURE PHASE? IN ESSENCE, WERE THE SOVIETS INTERESTED IN ENSURING THAT NO NAVAL ACTIVITIES, BESIDES AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES, WOULD BE DISCUSSED NOW?

14. GRINEVSKY SAID THAT THIS ALREADY HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN DETAIL, BUT THAT HE WOULD EXPLAIN THE SOVIET POSITION AGAIN. THE SITUATION AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AS THE SOVIETS SAW IT, BASED ON STATEMENTS MADE AT THE LAST SESSION BY BARRY, HANSEN AND BY THE USSR, WAS THAT THE GREATEST STUMBLING BLOCK (LIT. "DIFFICULTY") WAS THE ISSUE OF WHAT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION. THE SOVIET POSITION WAS THAT NOTIFICATION WOULD INCLUDE LARGE SCALE EXERCISES OF GROUND, AIR, AND NAVAL FORCES,

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AND MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS OF FORCES. THIS, THE SOVIETS WERE CONVINCED, FULLY CORRESPONDS TO THE MANDATE. HE SAID HE WOULD NOT GO INTO HOW OR WHY. UNFORTUNATELY, GRINEVSKY ADDED, THE U.S. HAS A DIFFERENT APPROACH: IT LINKS NOTIFICATION WITH GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES AND THUS EXCLUDES A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF NAVAL AND AIR FORCES. HE THEN ASKED HOW TO PROCEED IN SUCH A SITUATION: SHOULD WE CONTINUE TO TRY TO PROVE WHOSE INTERPRETATION OF THE MANDATE IS MORE CORRECT OR, CONSIDERING THE SHORT TIME REMAINING, SHOULD WE MAKE A RATIONAL DECISION TO FOCUS ON RESOLVING THE ISSUE OF NOTIFICATION OF LARGE-SCALE EXERCISES OF GROUND AND AIR ACTIVITIES AND MOVEMENTS/TRANSFERS, AND CARRY OVER NAVAL ACTIVITIES TO THE NEXT PHASE. THE LATTER, HE SAID, WAS THE ESSENCE OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL. THE "COMPOSITE "KOMPLEKSNOYE" UNDERSTANDING," I.E., WHAT TO DO NOW AND WHAT TO PUT OFF UNTIL LATER, SHOULD BE WORKED OUT AND "FIXED" (REGISTERED). HE ARGUED THAT THERE ARE MANY VARIATIONS WHICH COULD BE WORKED OUT WHICH WOULD NOT AFFECT THE PREROGATIVES OF THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE. SUCH A FIXED UNDERSTANDING WOULD PROVIDE A GUARANTEE, HOWEVER, THAT NOTHING WOULD BE FORGOTTEN, THAT "THE BABY WOULD NOT BE THROWN OUT WITH THE BATH WATER."

15. REGARDING BARRY'S COMMENT THAT OTHER IDEAS COULD BE TAKEN UP, GRINEVSKY ADMITTED THAT OTHERS COULD NOT BE FORBIDDEN TO ADD IDEAS. HOWEVER, HE INSISTED, THE NAVAL ISSUE IN THE MANDATE FRAMEWORK HAS A SPECIAL STATUS. HE THEN REFERRED TO "CONCESSIONS" THE SOVIETS HAD MADE IN MADRID, EXTENDING THE ZONE TO THE URALS, AND THE "CORRESPONDING" STEPS THEY HAD EXPECTED FROM THE WEST IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE. ACCORDING TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR, THE MADRID MANDATE REFLECTS WHAT THE SOVIETS HAVE IN MIND, I.E., GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL EXERCISES. THE ISSUE IS CLEAR-CUT, GRINEVSKY STATED: ARE WE (THE CONFERENCE) READY TO PUT OFF RESOLUTION OF COMPLEX QUESTIONS WHICH WE CANNOT RESOLVE DUE TO LACK OF TIME WITHOUT ANY RESOLUTION IN ANYONE'S FAVOR OR ARE WE NOT READY TO POSTPONE THESE ISSUES? IF THE LATTER IS THE CASE, WE ARE BACK TO SQUARE ONE.

16. BARRY SAID THAT IT IS NOT THE U.S. WHICH IS ENGAGING IN UNPRODUCTIVE ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE MANDATE. U.S. ARGUMENTS ARE WELL KNOWN; THEY WERE STATED IN FULL DURING THE LAST ROUND. WE STAND BY THESE VIEWS. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION NOT WASTE TIME DISCUSSING THESE ISSUES BILATERALLY OR IN THE CONFERENCE BECAUSE SUCH DISCUSSIONS ARE A RECIPE FOR STALEMATE. HE THEN POINTED OUT THAT SINCE IT IS ONLY THE SOVIETS WHO WOULD RAISE THIS (THE MANDATE DISPUTE), THE SOVIETS WOULD BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY STALEMATE. THE U.S. HAS NO DESIRE TO REARGUE THESE QUESTIONS.

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17. TURNING TO NAVAL ACTIVITIES, HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT HAD HAPPENED: HE AGREED THAT GORBACHEV HAD TAKEN A CONSTRUCTIVE STEP. HOWEVER, IN AN ABSTRACT WAY THE SOVIET DELEGATION WAS TAKING US BACK DOWN A BLIND ALLEY ("TUPIK"). HE SAID THAT THE NAVAL QUESTION WAS BEING PUT AT THE CENTER OF ATTENTION AS A PRECONDITION, I.E., THAT THE CONFERENCE COULD NOT GET ON WITH DRAFTING WITHOUT AGREEING FIRST TO TAKE UP ALL NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN THE NEXT PHASE. THIS PUT US BACK WHERE WE WERE LAST ROUND. IN BARRY'S VIEW, GRINEVSKY SEEMED TO BE SAYING THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PROGRESS UNLESS THE U.S. SAID ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE MANDATE WAS FALSE.

18. BARRY STRESSED THAT THERE IS NOT MUCH TIME LEFT AND THAT NEXT ROUND WE WOULD HAVE TO DRAFT FASTER AND MORE INTENSIVELY. HE SAID THAT THE U.S. WAS READY TO DO THIS ON GROUND FORCES AND ON FUNCTIONALLY RELATED AIR ACTIVITIES. THIS, HE CONCLUDED, IS WHERE WE COULD MAKE PROGRESS.

19. BARRY THEN SUGGESTED MOVING ON TO A MORE CONCRETE DISCUSSION. HE EXPRESSED HIS HOPE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD CAREFULLY CONSIDER HIS INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WERE DESIGNED TO BE POSITIVE AND TO PERMIT US TO MOVE AHEAD.

20. GRINEVSKY FIRST SAID THAT HE DID NOT INTEND TO FOLLOW BARRY DOWN "THE PATH OF ACCUSATIONS" AND THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT HEAR A SINGLE WORD OF ACCUSATION FROM THE SOVIET SIDE. HE THEN ACCUSED BARRY OF NOT BEING SERIOUS WHEN HE TOOK THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT AND ACCUSED THE DELEGATION OF DISTORTING IT. HE SAID THAT IT WAS BARRY'S "DUTY" TO CITE GORBACHEV ACCURATELY WHEN HE REPORTED BACK TO WASHINGTON; BARRY, AFTER ALL, WAS NOT AT A PRESS CONFERENCE BUT AT A NEGOTIATION. HE THEN INSISTED THAT NOWHERE IN THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT COULD THE IDEA OF THROWING OUT NAVAL ACTIVITIES BE FOUND. HE QUOTED GORBACHEV: "TO REACH AGREEMENT (HE STRESSED "AGREEMENT") NOW ABOUT NOTIFICATIONS OF MAJOR GROUND FORCE AND AIR FORCE EXERCISES, POSTPONING THE QUESTION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNTIL THE NEXT STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE." HE THEN ASKED WHETHER, IN THE U.S. VIEW, THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT WAS NOT FORECLOSED, BUT COULD CONTINUE TO BE DISCUSSED.

21. BARRY FOCUSED FIRST ON THE ISSUE OF ACCUSATIONS: EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENTS REPEATEDLY HAVE ACCUSED THE WEST OF FOOTDRAGGING. BARRY NOTED THAT THE U.S. HAD NOT SAID ANYTHING BUT HE WARNED THAT HIS PATIENCE HAD BEEN TRIED WHEN HE HEARD SUCH ACCUSATIONS IN THE PLENARY AND IN WORKING GROUP SESSIONS. HE THEN SAID THAT HE HAD READ GORBACHEV CAREFULLY AND THAT THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT DID NOT SAY THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO AGREE TO NOTIFY LARGE-SCALE GROUND AND AIR EXERCISES AND TO AGREE TO CARRY OVER NAVAL ACTIVITIES. LOOKING AT THE RUSSIAN

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SYNTAX, CARRYING OVER NAVAL ACTIVITIES WAS NOT A TOPIC OF AGREEMENT (WOULD HAVE READ "DOGOVORIT'SYA O PERENOSE" VICE "PERENOSIT.'" ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE ISSUE WOULD REMAIN OPEN, OF COURSE IT WOULD CONTINUE TO BE DISCUSSED, BUT IT WAS NOT THE MOST PRACTICAL ISSUE TO FOCUS ON. THEREFORE, BARRY SUGGESTED DISCUSSING OTHER ISSUES.

22. GRINEVSKY SAID THAT IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY MISUNDERSTANDING REGARDING THE GORBACHEV TEXT, THE SOVIET DELEGATION'S EXPLANATION HAD BEEN CLEAR AND THE U.S. SHOULD PROCEED FROM THIS. HE INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD STUDY WHAT BARRY HAD CONVEYED AND WOULD ASK ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS IF THEY ARISE. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT HE WOULD NOT BE ACTING PROPERLY IF HE DID NOT SAY THAT, BASED ON WHAT HE HAD HEARD, THE U.S. RESPONSE COULD HARDLY BE CALLED CONSTRUCTIVE. HE SAID THAT, FIRST OF ALL, IT DISTORTED THE ESSENCE OF THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL; IT WAS FULL OF RESERVATIONS AND PRECONDITIONS; IN ESSENCE, THE U.S. RESPONSE BOILED DOWN TO A READINESS TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE U.S. POSITION ON THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. IN GENERAL, HE ADDED, HE SAW NO DESIRE ON THE PART OF THE U.S. TO FOLLOW THE SOVIET APPEAL TO RESOLVE BASIC ISSUES. THESE, HE SAID, WERE PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS BASED ON WHAT HE HAD HEARD THAT DAY. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD STUDY THE U.S. RESPONSE CAREFULLY AND REPORT IT TO MOSCOW.

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23. BARRY SAID THAT HE WOULD RELAY TO WASHINGTON GRINEVSKY'S NEGATIVE PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS AND THAT WASHINGTON WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED. THE U.S. HAD THOUGHT THAT IT WAS BEING AS POSITIVE AS POSSIBLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. HE WARNED THAT WASHINGTON MAY CONCLUDE THAT PROPECTS FOR AGREEMENT ARE NOT GOOD AT ALL. HE REPEATED THAT THE U.S. IS EAGER TO MOVE AHEAD. BARRY SAID THAT HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND HOW GRINEVSKY COULD THINK THAT THE U.S. WOULD CHANGE ITS OPINION REGARDING NAVAL ACTIVITIES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE MANDATE. HE HAD THOUGHT THAT THE SPIRIT OF THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT HAD BEEN TO ALLOW THE CONFERENCE TO GO AHEAD "IN PARTS" TO PRODUCE AGREEMENT ON AREAS WHERE THERE WAS COMMON GROUND. IN BARRY'S VIEW THERE WAS COMMON GROUND ON GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES AND DEVELOPING COMMON GROUND ON AIR ACTIVITIES. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIETS SEEMED TO BE SAYING THAT BECAUSE THE U.S. COULDN'T ACCEPT THE SOVIET VERSION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES, THERE COULD BE NO MOVEMENT: THIS WOULD LEAD TO STALEMATE.

24. GRINEVSKY RESPONDED THAT IF THIS WAS THE BARRY'S REACTION, HE WAS DISTORING THE SOVIET POSITION ON PURPOSE. THE SOVIETS HAD NO INTENTION OF IMPOSING THEIR INTERPRETATION OF THE MANDATE ON THE U.S. OR OF ACCEPTING

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THE U.S. INTERPRETATION. WHAT THE SOVIETS WANTED WAS A  
FIXED UNDERSTANDING THAT WE WERE PUTTING OFF UNRESOLVABLE  
ISSUES FOR THE MOMENT, THAT WE WERE NOT THROWING THE BABY  
OUT WITH THE BATH WATER. THE MANDATE REMAINS, HE SAID,  
AND THE SOVIET UNION HAS NO INTENTION OF IMPOSING ITS  
INTERPRETATION. HOWEVER, HE CONCLUDED THAT WE POSSESS  
SUFFICIENT INTELLECT SO THAT IF WE SHARE THE SAME  
APPROACH WE WILL BE ABLE TO EXPRESS WHAT WE WANT IN A  
FIXED UNDERSTANDING.

END TEXT OF MEMCON.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01727  
 SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, MARCH 3-7, 1986  
 REF: STOCKHOLM 1634

1. CDE IX -
  2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
  3. BEGIN SUMMARY AND OVERALL ASSESSMENT: TWO DISTINCT -- AND SUPERFICIALLY CONFLICTING -- TENDENCIES APPEARED DURING THE WEEK. ON ONE HAND, DRAFTING HAS TAKEN PLACE IN FOUR OF THE FIVE WORKING GROUPS. THE NOTIFICATION AND ANNUAL CALENDARS' GROUPS JOINED THE INFORMATION/VERIFICATION AND OBSERVATION GROUP IN AGREEING ON CONSENSUS LANGUAGE. ONLY THE NON-USE OF FORCE GROUP, MOSTLY DUE TO GALLIC PRIDE, HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO AGREE ON ANY LANGUAGE. HOWEVER, THE FRENCH NOW SEEM PREPARED TO AGREE TO A MINIMAL TEXT NEXT WEEK. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE EAST SEEMS TO HAVE ADOPTED A DISTINCTLY AMERICAN PARLIAMENTARIAN TECHNIQUE IN MANY OF THE WORKING GROUPS: THE FILIBUSTER. IN THE CONSTRAINTS MEETING, THE EAST FILIBUSTERED FOR THREE HOURS AS A WAY OF PRESSURING THE WEST TO MOVE ON THE ISSUE. ON INFORMATION, A WELL-REHEARSED CHORUS OF EASTERN SPEAKERS MONOPOLIZED THE ALLOTTED TIME ARGUING THAT ONLY INFORMATION PROVIDED WITH NOTIFICATION WAS WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE WORKING GROUP, I.E., NO STATIC INFORMATION. ON CLOSE EXAMINATION THESE TWO CONTRADICTORY TENDENCIES -- DRAFTING AND EASTERN FILIBUSTERING -- ARE NOT DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN. THE CONFERENCE WILL CONTINUE TO DRAFT, BUT ONLY ON MARGINAL ISSUES. ON THE CORE ISSUES -- INSPECTION, INFORMATION, NOTIFICATION PARAMETERS, FOR EXAMPLE -- NO PROGRESS IN THE CONFERENCE WILL BE POSSIBLE UNTIL BOTH EAST AND WEST MAKE SOME HARD DECISIONS. THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO HOLD OUT FOR PUBLIC AGREEMENT TO POSTPONE DISCUSSION OF ALL NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNTIL A POST-VIENNA CDE. AT THE SAME TIME THEY SAY THEY WON'T DISCUSS NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES UNTIL THE WEST AGREES TO PARAMETERS FOR NOTIFICATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES AND TRANSFERS. THUS, FOR ONCE, THE CONFERENCE FACES A SUBSTANTIVE DEADLOCK RATHER THAN A PROCEDURAL ONE; IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN IF THE SOVIETS WILL BE PREPARED TO SHOULDER THE BLAME FOR PUTTING US THERE. END SUMMARY AND OVERALL ASSESSMENT.
  4. NOTIFICATION: THE WORKING GROUP FINALLY AGREED ON LANGUAGE REGARDING THE METHOD AND PERIOD OF NOTIFICATION WHICH THE COORDINATOR NOTED IN HIS BOOK (REFTEL). IN THIS TWO-PARAGRAPH TEXT THERE WERE ELLIPSES INDICATING -
- TWO OUTSTANDING ISSUES: PRIOR NOTIFICATION (EAST AND NNA WORDING) VS NOTIFICATION (NATO WORDING); AND THE NUMBER OF DAYS FOR ADVANCE NOTIFICATION. (THE NNA APPROACH HAS BEEN TO DIVIDE NOTIFICATION INTO PRIOR NOTIFICATION AND NOTIFICATION OF ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT AT SHORT NOTICE READ ALERTS; THE LATTER IS DESIGNED TO AVOID OBSERVA-

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TION OF MOBILIZATIONS AND MOVEMENTS CONDUCTED AS ALERTS -- ONLY A SUBSEQUENT MANEUVER PHASE OF SUCH AN ALERT COULD BE OBSERVED.) THE CONSENSUS TEXT FOLLOWS THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT PRACTICE OF USING "PRIOR NOTIFICATION" AS THE TITLE OF THE SECTION AND USES ELLIPSES IN THE BODY OF THE TEXT TO PERMIT USE OF "NOTIFICATION" ALONE (AS IN THE FINAL ACT).

- THE LACK OF A CLEAR WESTERN POSITION ON THRESHOLDS, I.E., FILLING IN THE BLANKS IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED OR RAISING THE THRESHOLDS, WILL SOON BECOME A MAJOR IMPEDIMENT TO FURTHER PROGRESS IN THE NOTIFICATION GROUP. ONLY THE SOVIETS NOW HAVE A CLEARLY DEFINED THRESHOLD WHICH IS 20,000 TROOPS. SOON THE CONFERENCE WILL HAVE TO MAKE SOME HARD DECISIONS REGARDING, INTER ALIA, NOTIFICATION PARAMETERS (BOTH THE ACTUAL LEVEL AND THE TYPE OF PARAMETER, I.E., STRUCTURAL, NUMERICAL, EQUIPMENT).

5. NON-USE OF FORCE: THE NUF WORKING GROUP STOOD IN NOT SO SPLENDID ISOLATION AS THE ONLY GROUP NOT TO HAVE RECORDED ANY TEXT IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK, MUCH TO THE CONSTERNATION OF THE NNA COORDINATOR (LOIBL - AUSTRIA). THE EAST, NOT UNEXPECTEDLY, IS TRYING TO EXPLOIT THIS BY ACCUSING THE WEST OF FOOTDRAGGING ON NUF AND THUS SABOTAGING PROGRESS IN THE CONFERENCE. THE FRENCH, COMFORTABLE IN THEIR SPOILER ROLE, HAVE SO FAR WITHHELD A NATO CONSENSUS WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE WEST TO GO ALONG WITH THE NOTATION OF TEXT IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK. AT THE SAME TIME, PARIS HAS SOUGHT TO SPLIT THE EC-12 FROM THE U.S. APPROACH TO NON-USE OF FORCE AS MUCH FOR REASONS OF GALLIC PRIDE AND PERSONAL PIQUE (D'ABOVILLE'S) AS SUBSTANCE. HOWEVER, AS ONE AFTER ANOTHER OF THEIR COMMUNITY PARTNERS DESERTED THEM, THE

- FRENCH IN STOCKHOLM REALIZED THAT THEY WERE DAMAGING THEIR OWN CONCEPT OF AN INCREASED ROLE FOR THE EC. THUS THEY GRUDGINGLY SEEM TO HAVE ACCEPTED A CAREFULLY CRAFTED COMPROMISE WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE NUF GROUP TO JOIN THE REST OF THE CONFERENCE IN NOTING LANGUAGE. THE COMPROMISE: 1) A REPRESENTATIVE OF NATO WOULD READ A CONCEPTUAL STATEMENT ELABORATING THE WEST'S APPROACH TO NUF AND INCLUDING U.S. LANGUAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE, AND COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS. THE STATEMENT WOULD OUTLINE THE MANDATED AIMS OF THE CONFERENCE, I.E., CONCRETE CSBM'S AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUCH MEASURES AND THE NUF COMMITMENT; 2) AFTER THIS STATEMENT, THE WEST WOULD INTRODUCE INTO THE WORKING GROUP THE FIRST SIX PARAGRAPHS OF THE "FEBRUARY 26" TEXT (ON THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE, THE ADOPTION OF CONCRETE CSBM'S, AND ON THE LINK BETWEEN CSBM'S AND THE NUF COMMITMENT) AS AMENDED BY THE U.S., NOTING THAT THIS LANGUAGE WAS TABLED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ITS ULTIMATE FORM OR PLACEMENT IN ANY CONCLUDING

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DOCUMENT. 3) FOLLOWING AND BASED UPON THE INTRODUCTION OF ELEMENTS FROM THE NATO PAPER, THE WEST WOULD ACCEPT THE NOTATION OF AN INNOCENT QUOTATION FROM THE MADRID MANDATE ON THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE, I.E., TO NEGOTIATE CONCRETE MEASURES, SO AS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE NUF PRINCIPLE. IF THIS WORKS WE WILL BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO CONTINUE TO PRESS THE EAST FOR PROGRESS ON CONCRETE CSBM'S DURING THE NEXT SESSION WHILE HOLDING BACK ON NUF. MEANWHILE, THE NATO CLUSTER GROUP CONTINUES TO HAMMER AWAY AT A FULL WESTERN TEXT ON NON-USE OF FORCE, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS, COMPLIANCE, AND ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE LANGUAGE.

6. INFORMATION/VERIFICATION/COMMUNICATIONS: IN THE WORKING GROUP THIS WEEK THE EAST STONEWALLED ANY CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION OF THE PRINCIPAL TOPIC, INDEPENDENT INFORMATION. THE MEETING QUICKLY TURNED INTO AN EASTERN FILIBUSTER IN SUPPORT OF THEIR INTERPRETATION OF THE OCTOBER 14, 1985 GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT THAT ONLY INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED WITH NOTIFICATION IS

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 WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THIS GROUP. A LINE-UP OF EASTERN SPEAKERS PUSHED FOR AGREEMENT ON THE FIRST SENTENCE OF A USSR PROPOSAL ON INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION. NATO, IN AN EFFORT TO OBTAIN SOME AGREED TEXT ON ITS MEASURE 1 INFORMATION BEFORE THE END OF THE SESSION, SUGGESTED LANGUAGE ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE WHICH WAS CAREFULLY DRAFTED NOT TO PREJUDICE ANYONE'S POSITION. THE NATO LANGUAGE RECEIVED SOME LUKEWARM SUPPORT FROM SWITZERLAND AND SWEDEN BUT THE MEETING RAPIDLY DISSOLVED INTO A DIVISIVE TWO-HOUR EXCHANGE OVER THE TYPE OF INFORMATION TO BE DISCUSSED AS BOTH EAST AND WEST PRESSURED THE COORDINATOR (SCHENK - SWITZERLAND) TO FOCUS DISCUSSION ON ITS RESPECTIVE PROPOSAL. AS EXPECTED, THE EAST SEEMS INTENT ON BLOCKING ANY PROGRESS IN THIS GROUP. THE EASTERN TACTIC IS TO USE THE TIME IN THE A-2 WORKING GROUP TO DISCUSS ONLY INFORMATION IN THE CONTEXT OF A NOTIFICATION, THUS DENYING THE WEST A FORUM FOR "INDEPENDENT" INFORMATION. ANOTHER RESULT OF THE INFORMATION FILIBUSTER WAS TO PREVENT ANY DISCUSSION ON VERIFICATION THIS WEEK. WE ARE CONSIDERING VARIOUS WAYS OF DEALING WITH A SITUATION IN WHICH WE ARE NOT ABLE TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE TWO KEY ISSUES OF VERIFICATION AND INFORMATION.

- CONSULTATIONS/COMMUNICATIONS WAS ADDRESSED IN SOME DETAIL BY THE NNA, MORE TO LAY DOWN A MARKER THAT THE SUBJECT REMAINS ON THE TABLE THAN IN ANTICIPATION OF ANY EARLY PROGRESS ON THE SUBJECT. SWITZERLAND AND AUSTRIA PRESENTED SIMILAR BUT NOT IDENTICAL VIEWS ON CONSULTATIONS, THE SWISS STRESSING QUICK AD HOC CONSULTATIONS ON COMPLIANCE, AND THE AUSTRIANS FOCUSING ON A MECHANISM FOR ROUTINE DISCUSSIONS PERTAINING TO CSBM IMPLEMENTATION.

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OF INTEREST WAS SWITZERLAND'S OPEN ACKNOWLEDGMENT THAT IT FAVORED A VERIFICATION REGIME WITHOUT ANY "RIGHT OF REFUSAL." NATO REACTED WITH SKEPTICISM TO THE CONCEPT OF CONSULTATIONS, WHILE THE EAST COMMENTED FAVORABLY ON URGENT CONSULTATIONS REGARDING COMPLIANCE, BUT DID NOT SUPPORT ANY INSTITUTIONALIZED MEETINGS TO REVIEW IMPLEMENTATION.

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7. OBSERVATION: SOME PROGRESS WAS MADE THIS WEEK, ALTHOUGH EASTERN TACTICS SEEM TO INDICATE THAT NATO AND THE NNA MAY BE TRYING TO PUSH THE WORKING GROUP TOO FAR TOO FAST FOR THEIR TASTE. THE EAST UNVEILED ITS LONG ANTICIPATED POSITION THAT OBSERVERS SHOULD NOT BE INVITED TO ALL NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES. CITING THE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN OF OBSERVATION, POLAND ASKED THAT THE GROUP CONSIDER A "QUOTA" ON THE NUMBER OF ACTIVITIES EACH STATE WOULD BE REQUIRED TO INVITE OBSERVERS TO EACH YEAR AND SUGGESTED FIVE AS THE MAXIMUM. NATO WAS SUCCESSFUL IN FOCUSING THE DISCUSSION ON THE SCOPE OF OBSERVATION AT A VERY PRECISE MILITARY-TECHNICAL LEVEL, IDENTIFYING COMMON ELEMENTS IN NATO, NNA AND IRISH PROPOSALS. THE U.S. FOCUSED PARTICULARLY ON COMMON VIEWS CONCERNING THE IMPORTANCE OF OBSERVING STRUCTURE. THE EAST, HOWEVER, WAS CLEARLY UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THIS DISCUSSION AND THE SOVIETS REFLEXIVELY TROTTED OUT STANDARD POLEMICAL ARGUMENTS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF OBSERVATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES AND TROOP TRANSFERS. OF PARTICULAR NOTE WAS A SOVIET STATEMENT THAT OBSERVATION MODALITIES HAD TO BE GENERAL ENOUGH TO COVER ALL "TYPES" OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THEY ALSO IMPLIED THAT BOTH NATO AND NNA PROPOSALS IN THIS AREA ARE TANTAMOUNT TO INSPECTION, NOT OBSERVATION. THERE ARE TWO POSSIBLE AND COMPLEMENTARY REASONS FOR EASTERN BEHAVIOR ON THIS SUBJECT: 1) THEY HAVE GENUINELY BEEN THROWN OFF BALANCE BY THE DETAILED LEVEL OF OBSERVATION THAT NATO, THE NNA AND IRELAND ARE PROPOSING AND, AS OF YET, HAVE NO DEVELOPED POSITION OF THEIR OWN TO DISCUSS; AND 2) THEY ARE NOT WILLING TO DISCUSS THE MILITARY-TECHNICAL DETAILS OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY OBSERVATION FOR FEAR THAT IT WOULD PREJUDICE THEIR POSITION ON NAVAL AND, PARTICULARLY, AIR ACTIVITIES. THIS SIGNALS THAT, WHILE PROGRESS IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE ON THE PERIPHERAL ISSUES (COSTS, TRANSPORTATION, ETC.), PROGRESS ON THE CORE ISSUES (I.E., WHAT OBSERVERS WILL BE ALLOWED TO OBSERVE) WILL CONTINUE TO BE DIFFICULT AND DEPENDENT ON DEVELOPMENTS ON THE PARAMETERS OF NOTIFICATION.

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8. ANNUAL FORECASTS: AFTER THE THREE-HOUR CONSTRAINTS FILIBUSTER, THE COORDINATOR (SWITZERLAND - JUNOD) CIRCULATED A TEXT FOR NOTATION IN HIS NOTEBOOK ON THE COMMITMENT TO EXCHANGE ANNUAL FORECASTS. YUGOSLAVIA

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IMMEDIATELY ACCEPTED IT WITH ONE UNSPECIFIED CONDITION, AN APPROACH WHICH THE U.S. IMMEDIATELY REJECTED. WHILE EVERYONE ASSUMED THAT BOZOVIC'S CONDITION WAS PARALLEL PROGRESS ON CONSTRAINTS, IT APPEARS THAT HE PLANNED TO TIE HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE FORECASTS LANGUAGE TO THE NOTING OF NUF LANGUAGE IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK ON MARCH 11. THE NUF COORDINATOR (AUSTRIA - LOIBL), APPARENTLY AWARE OF BOZOVIC'S REAL MOTIVATION, PREVAILED UPON HIM TO DROP HIS CONDITION SO THAT THE FORECASTS LANGUAGE COULD BE NOTED AND THAT PRESSURE WOULD BE GREATER ON THE WEST TO NOTE NUF LANGUAGE ON MARCH 11. EARLIER IN THE WEEK, THE WEST HAD TRIED TO CONVINCE THE COORDINATOR TO INCLUDE IN HIS FORECASTS TEXT SOME LANGUAGE FROM THE IRISH PROPOSAL, WHICH WHILE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT IN SUBSTANCE, WAS A SUPERIOR FORMULATION. JUNOD REFUSED TO RAISE THIS SUGGESTION WITH THE EAST IN CORRIDOR CONVERSATIONS IN THE DAYS BEFORE THE MEETING AND DURING THE MEETING ITSELF HE REFUSED TO CONVEY NATO'S REQUESTS FOR AN EASTERN DISCUSSION OF THE IRISH PROPOSAL, TRYING INSTEAD TO RAILROAD ACCEPTANCE OF HIS OWN TEXT. DURING A COFFEE BREAK, IT EVENTUALLY BECAME CLEAR THAT ALL COULD AGREE TO THE COORDINATOR'S LANGUAGE ALTHOUGH NATO SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED WITHHOLDING CONSENSUS ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS AND IT WAS NOTED IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK. WHILE THE COORDINATOR ULTIMATELY PREVAILED AND THE TEXT WAS NOTED, HIS VICTORY MAY PROVE TO HAVE BEEN PYRRHIC: HIS APPARENT ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE CONSTRAINTS FILIBUSTER AND HIS STRONG-ARM TACTICS ON THE FORECASTS LANGUAGE DEEPLY ANGFRED SEVERAL NATO DELEGATIONS WHO PUBLICLY EXPRESSED THEIR DISAPPOINTMENT AND "BITTERNESS" AT HIS HANDLING OF THE MEETING. IN ORDER TO MARK ITS EXTREME DISPLEASURE AT EASTERN/NNA/COORDINATOR BULLYING THIS WEEK NATO HAS DECIDED TO FILIBUSTER ON FORECASTS AT THE NEXT WORKING GROUP MEETING (MARCH 13) AND TO BE SILENT ON CONSTRAINTS FOR THE NEXT FEW MEETINGS.

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9. CONSTRAINTS: THE EAST, JOINED BY THE NNA, FILIBUSTERED FOR THREE HOURS IN THE WORKING GROUP THIS WEEK AS A MEANS OF PRESSURING THE WEST TO MOVE ON CONSTRAINTS. BULGARIA REINTRODUCED LANGUAGE ON THE COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF CEILINGS ON THE SIZE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES. BOTH THE EAST AND THE NNA BADGERED THE WEST TO AGREE IN PRINCIPLE TO THE INCLUSION OF CONSTRAINTS IN A FINAL DOCUMENT. THE FRENCH REITERATED NATO'S STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH TO CONFIDENCE-BUILDING. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF THE GDR PROPOSAL FOR A 7,000-MAN CEILING ON AMPHIBIOUS/AIRBORNE ACTIVITIES, WITH THE EAST AND NNA SUPPORTING THE IDEA OF LIMITING SUCH ACTIVITIES AND THE FRG POINTING OUT THE PROPOSAL'S LACK OF BALANCE. THE WEST BRIEFLY MENTIONED THE IRISH

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PROPOSAL (DISCUSSED SEPTTEL) FOR ENHANCING THE CONSTRAINING EFFECT OF THE ANNUAL CALENDAR BUT THE NNA AND EAST WERE STRIKINGLY SILENT ON THE SUBJECT.

10. THE SOVIETS: THE CENTRAL ISSUE OF THE WEEK WAS THE REACTION TO GRINEVSKY'S PLENARY STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 28 HIGHLIGHTING GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 STATEMENT. IN PRIVATE, GRINEVSKY IS INSISTING THAT THERE MUST BE AGREEMENT TO POSTPONE DISCUSSION OF ALL NAVAL ACTIVITIES UNTIL A POST-VIENNA STAGE OF CDE; ABSENT SUCH AGREEMENT HE WILL HAVE TO PUT THE NAVAL ISSUE BACK ON THE TABLE. PUBLICLY HE HAS STOPPED SHORT OF SUCH A CATEGORICAL STATEMENT, PERHAPS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF COMMENTS BY NATO DELEGATES UNDERLINING THEIR POSITION ON THE MANDATE AND THE SUBORDINATION OF STOCKHOLM TO VIENNA. OTHERWISE, THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN STRESSING THAT THEY WILL NOT BE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE ON GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES UNLESS NATO AGREES FIRST ON INCLUSION OF AIR ACTIVITIES AND TRANSFERS. (THEIR BOTTOM LINE HERE IS PROBABLY FUNCTIONALLY RELATED AIR.) IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE SOVIETS WILL RESUME THE EFFORT TO STRESS SUBSTANTIVE BLOCKAGE IN THE NEXT ROUND; IF THEY DO, THEY WILL HAVE TO WORK HARD TO PLACE THE BLAME ON THE WEST.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01911  
 SUBJECT: "FEBRUARY 26" NON-USE OF FORCE TEXT  
 - WITH AMENDMENTS

1. CDE IX - 103
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS CABLE CONTAINS THE REMAINDER OF THE "FEBRUARY 26" TEXT WITH AMENDMENTS AND ADDITIONS, MOSTLY SUBMITTED BY THE U.S. SEE PARA 5 FOR ACTION REQUESTED. END SUMMARY.

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4. IN THE MARCH 11 WORKING GROUP ON NON-USE OF FORCE, NATO TABLED ITS FIRST SIX PARAGRAPHS OUTLINING THE WESTERN APPROACH TO THE ESSENTIAL LINK BETWEEN CSBM'S AND THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE (SEE SEPTTEL). THE NATO CLUSTER CAUCUS IS CURRENTLY DISCUSSING THE SUBSTANCE AND TACTICS OF HANDLING THE REMAINDER OF THE WESTERN TEXT. THE FOLLOWING TEXT (SEE PARA 6) REFLECTS THE EC-12/"FEBRUARY 26" TEXT WITH SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS AND ADDITIONS, MOSTLY SUBMITTED BY THE U.S. NATO DELEGATIONS WERE ASKED TO FORWARD THIS TEXT WITH AMENDMENTS AND ADDITIONS TO CAPITALS OVER THE SPRING BREAK FOR CONSIDERATION WITH A VIEW TOWARDS ARRIVING AT A FINAL NATO TEXT EARLY NEXT ROUND WHICH BEGINS ON APRIL 15. WHEN NATO AGREES UPON A FULL TEXT WE WILL BE BETTER ABLE TO DECIDE UPON THE TACTICS OF PIECEMEAL INTRODUCTION OF THE TEXT. ALL 19 PARTS OF OTHE U.S. ILLUSTRATIVE TEXTS ARE ADDRESSED IN SOME FORM IN THE "FEBRUARY 26" TEXT WITH U.S. AMENDMENTS AND ADDITIONS.
  5. ACTION REQUESTED: SINCE IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT ALL U.S. SUGGESTIONS WILL BE ACCEPTED, IT MIGHT BE WORTHWHILE TO CONVENE A CDE WORKING GROUP ON NUF DURING THE COMING BREAK, E.G., SOMETIME BETWEEN MARCH 24 AND APRIL 9, TO DISCUSS U.S. APPROACH TO NUF DURING THE TENTH ROUND.
  6. BEGIN TEXT:

- 2.1. CONSEQUENTLY THE PARTICIPATING STATES REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO RESPECT AND PUT INTO PRACTICE THIS PRINCIPLE LAID DOWN IN THE FINAL ACT AS FOLLOWS:
  - NO SPECIFIC AMENDMENT. USA REQUEST THAT PARAS 2.1
  - TO 2.4 BE REPLACED BY THE FOLLOWING TEXT:  
 "THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECALL THEIR OBLIGATION TO REFRAIN IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AS REAFFIRMED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT WITH RESPECT TO THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS, AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS."

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- 2.2. THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL REFRAIN IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL, FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE

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AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND WITH THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES OF THE FINAL ACT. NO CONSIDERATIONS MAY BE INVOKED TO SERVE TO WARRANT RESORT TO THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THIS PRINCIPLE.

- NO SPECIFIC AMENDMENT.

2.3. ACCORDINGLY, THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTS CONSTITUTING A THREAT OF FORCE OR DIRECT OR INDIRECT USE OF FORCE AGAINST ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE. LIKEWISE THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY MANIFESTATION OF FORCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE TO RENOUNCE THE FULL EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS. LIKEWISE THEY WILL ALSO REFRAIN IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS FROM ANY ACT OF REPRISAL BY FORCE.

- NO SPECIFIC AMENDMENT.

2.4. NO SUCH THREAT OR USE OF FORCE WILL BE EMPLOYED AS A MEANS OF SETTLING DISPUTES, OR QUESTIONS LIKELY TO GIVE RISE TO DISPUTES, BETWEEN THEM.

- NO SPECIFIC AMENDMENT.

3.1. THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZED THEIR COMMITMENT TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONSHIP AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

- PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:

GREECE: LINE 1, DELETE "RECOGNIZED," TO BE REPLACED BY "STRESSED."

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UK : THIS PARAGRAPH COULD BE COMBINED WITH PARA 3.1.4 AS FOLLOWS:

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"THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZED THEIR COMMITMENT TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS WITH EACH OF THE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER THEY ARE PARTIES TO THE SAME ALLIANCE, OR NEUTRAL OR NONALIGNED, AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS."

3.1.1. NO CONSIDERATION WHATSOEVER WHETHER OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY OR ANY OTHER NATURE CAN BE INVOKED TO JUSTIFY THE THREAT OF FORCE OR THE DIRECT OR INDIRECT USE OF FORCE.

THEY RECALL THAT AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, NOTHING SHALL IMPAIR THE INHERENT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE SELF DEFENSE IF AN ARMED ATTACK OCCURS.

- PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:

CANADA: LINE 2, AFTER "MILITARY" ADD "IDEOLOGICAL."

USA : LINE 3, DELETE "THE DIRECT OR INDIRECT."

USA : ADD THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH:

"THEY CONFIRM THAT IN THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNDER

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THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ANY OTHER TREATY OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER WILL PREVAIL."

3.1.2. THEY WILL LIKEWISE REFRAIN FROM ANY MANIFESTATION OF FORCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE OR ANY OTHER STATE TO RENOUNCE THE FULL EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND, IN PARTICULAR, OF ITS LIBERTY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND ITS RIGHT FREELY TO CHOOSE AND DEVELOP ITS OWN POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL SYSTEM.

- PROPOSED AMENDMENT:

UK: LINE 5, DELETE "LIBERTY" TO BE REPLACED BY FREEDOM."

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3.1.3. THEY WILL LIKEWISE REFRAIN FROM MAKING EACH OTHER'S TERRITORY THE OBJECT OF MILITARY OCCUPATION OR OTHER DIRECT OR INDIRECT MEASURES OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, OR THE OBJECT OF ACQUISITION BY MEANS OF SUCH MEASURES OR THE THREAT OF THEM. NO SUCH OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS LEGAL.

- NO SPECIFIC AMENDMENT.

3.1.4. THEIR COMMITMENT APPLIES TO THEIR RELATIONS WITH EACH OF THE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PART OF AN ALLIANCE OR NEUTRAL AS WELL AS TO THEIR RELATIONS WITH ALL OTHER STATES.

- PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:

UK : PARAGRAPH TO BE COMBINED WITH PARA 3.1

CANADA: TRANSPOSE THIS PARAGRAPH TO APPEAR IMMEDIATELY AFTER PARA 3.1.

3.1.5. THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IS A COMPLEMENT TO REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.

- PROPOSED AMENDMENT:

USA: LINE 2, ADD "NECESSARY" BEFORE "COMPLEMENT."

UK : LINE 3, ADD AFTER "USE OF FORCE," " . . . BOTH BEING ESSENTIAL THOUGH NOT EXCLUSIVE FACTORS FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY."

USA : ADD THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS:

"THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION ENSURING STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH CSBM'S ARE INDISPENSABLE FOR BUILDING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY.

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"THEY CONFIRM THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF ALL STATES AND NOTE THAT ALL SOVEREIGN NATIONS HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS AMONG NATIONS AND EQUAL DUTIES."

CANADA: ADD THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS:

"THE PRINCIPLE OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE DEPENDS FOR ITS ULTIMATE EFFECTIVENESS ON THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AND ON

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THE STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE-SETTLING MECHANISMS AND INSTITUTIONS. THE FAILURE TO SETTLE A DISPUTE THROUGH ANY PEACEFUL MEANS SHOULD AT NO TIME CONSTITUTE A JUSTIFICATION FOR THE USE OF FORCE.

"IN ORDER TO ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE PROHIBITION OF THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, STATES WILL SETTLE DISPUTES AMONG THEM BY EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL MEANS IN GOOD FAITH AND THE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION SO AS TO REACH A RAPID AND EQUITABLE SOLUTION ON THE BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

"THE PARTICIPATING STATES, PARTIES TO A DISPUTE AMONG THEM, AS WELL AS OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION WHICH MIGHT AGGRAVATE THE SITUATION TO SUCH A DEGREE AS TO ENDANGER THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND THEREBY MAKE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE MORE DIFFICULT."

3.2. THEY RECOGNIZED THE CLOSE LINK BETWEEN PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE AND ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED FOR EACH OF THEM TO MAKE ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRENGTHENING OF WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY AND TO THE PROMOTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS AND WELL-BEING FOR ALL PEOPLES.

- PROPOSED AMENDMENT:

UK : LINE 7, ADD "AND THE NEED TO PROMOTE AND

- ENCOURAGE THE EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF THESE RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS."

USA: DELETE PARA 3.2, TO BE REPLACED EITHER BY THE FOLLOWING TEXT:

"THEY STRESSED THE NECESSITY TO PROMOTE AND ENCOURAGE THE EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, ALL OF WHICH DERIVE FROM THE INHERENT DIGNITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL HUMAN BEING, AND ARE ESSENTIAL FOR HIS FREE AND FULL DEVELOPMENT, AND TO ASSURE CONSTANT AND TANGIBLE PROGRESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FINAL ACT, AIMING AT FURTHER AND STEADY DEVELOPMENT IN THIS FIELD IN ALL PARTICIPATING STATES, IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS.

"THEY REAFFIRMED THE UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, THE RESPECT FOR WHICH IS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR FOR THE CSCE PROCESS AND FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY."

- OR ALTERNATIVELY BY THE FOLLOWING TEXT:

"THEY REAFFIRMED THE UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, RESPECT FOR WHICH IS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR FOR PEACE, JUSTICE AND WELL-BEING NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AMONG THEMSELVES AS AMONG ALL STATES AND THE NEED TO PROMOTE AND ENCOURAGE THE EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF THOSE RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS. THEY REAFFIRMED THE

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UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, THE RESPECT FOR WHICH IS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR FOR THE CSCE PROCESS AND FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY."

3.3. THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO ALL TEN PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT, WHICH ARE ALL OF PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE AND ACCORDINGLY WILL BE EQUALLY AND UNRESERVEDLY APPLIED, EACH OF THEM BEING INTERPRETED TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE OTHERS.

- NO SPECIFIC AMENDMENT.

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THE U.S. ALSO ADVANCED THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE FOR NATO CONSIDERATION TO BE USED DEPENDING ON THE TACTICAL SITUATION IN THE NUF WORKING GROUP AND IN THE CONFERENCE IN GENERAL:

A) ON TERRORISM

"THEY RECOGNIZED THAT THEY WILL TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN PREVENTING THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES FROM BEING USED FOR THE PREPARATION, ORGANIZATION OR COMMISSION OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING THOSE DIRECTED AGAINST OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES AND THEIR CITIZENS, AND FURTHER INCLUDING MEASURES TO PROHIBIT ON THEIR TERRITORIES ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES OF PERSONS, GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS THAT INSTIGATE, ORGANIZE OR ENGAGE IN THE PERPETRATION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM (MCD)."

AN ALTERNATIVE TERRORISM PARAGRAPH DERIVED FROM THE NNA DRAFT AND UNGA RES 38/130 COULD PROVIDE:

"THEY CONFIRMED THAT THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM DIRECT OR INDIRECT ASSISTANCE TO TERRORIST ACTS AGAINST ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE AND EXPRESSED THEIR DETERMINATION TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM AND TO TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN PREVENTING THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES FROM BEING USED FOR THE PREPARATION, ORGANIZATION OR COMMISSION OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING MEASURES TO PROHIBIT ON THEIR TERRITORIES ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES OF PERSONS, GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS THAT INSTIGATE, ORGANIZE OR ENGAGE IN THE PERPETRATION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM."

B) ON HUMAN RIGHTS


"THEY AFFIRMED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS A LEGITIMATE, PARAMOUNT INTEREST IN PROMOTING AND ENCOURAGING COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS OF STATES CONCERNING HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS."

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THEY RECALLED THE PRINCIPLE IN THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT CONCERNING THE RIGHT OF THE INDIVIDUAL TO KNOW AND ACT UPON HIS RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, AS EMBODIED IN THE FINAL ACT, AND THAT THEY WILL TAKE THE NECESSARY ACTION IN THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES TO EFFECTIVELY ENSURE THIS RIGHT."

"THEY RECOGNIZED THAT AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT IN THE

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EXERCISE OF INDIVIDUAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS IS THE FREE AND UNRESTRICTED FLOW OF INFORMATION ACROSS INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES." THEY RECOGNIZED THAT TO FURTHER INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND TRUST AMONG NATIONS, ALL STATES SHOULD PROMOTE AND ENCOURAGE RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS OF ALL INDIVIDUALS, INCLUDING THE RIGHTS FREELY TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN GOVERNMENTS BY FREE ELECTIONS, TO EMIGRATE, TO PRACTICE THEIR RELIGIOUS FAITHS, TO ENJOY EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS, TO ESTABLISH AND JOIN FREE TRADE UNIONS AND TO PARTICIPATE EQUALLY IN THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL LIFE OF THEIR NATIONS." END TEXT AND AMENDMENTS.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01910  
 SUBJECT: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE AT  
 THE CDE

REF: A) STATE 73789, B) ROME 6146

1. CDE IX - 105

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AFTER WEEKS OF EXCRUCIATING DEBATE, NATO WAS ABLE TO INTRODUCE ITS OWN LANGUAGE ON THE CSBM'S-NUF LINK, TO DELIVER A CONCEPTUAL STATEMENT, TO PUT THE NUF COMMITMENT IN THE BROADER WESTERN APPROACH TO SECURITY, AND TO AGREE TO A NOTATION IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK OF AN INNOCENT TEXT WHICH DOES NOT PREJUDICE THE NATO POSSIBILITIES. THE NOTATION OF THIS LANGUAGE ENABLES US TO ARGUE THAT PROGRESS ON DRAFTING HAS BEEN ACHIEVED IN ALL WORKING GROUPS, THUS, WE WILL HAVE A BETTER CASE TO PUSH THE SOVIETS FOR MOVEMENT IN THE CSBM'S WORKING GROUPS. WHILE WE HAVE REACHED OUR MODEST OBJECTIVES IN NUF THIS ROUND, DIFFERENCES WITH THE ITALIANS (ON HUMAN RIGHTS), BETWEEN THE TURKS AND GREEKS (ON TERRITORIAL OCCUPATION), AND WITH THE FRENCH (ON JUST ABOUT EVERYTHING ELSE) REMAIN UNRESOLVED. END SUMMARY.

4. AFTER MUCH DIVISIVE DEBATE, WE FINALLY SUCCEEDED IN GETTING WHAT WE WANTED: 1) NOTATION IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK OF AN INNOCENT TEXT WHICH DID NOT PREJUDICE THE WEST'S POSITION; 2) A NATO CONCEPTUAL STATEMENT WHICH OUTLINED THE BROADER WESTERN APPROACH TO SECURITY AND NUF, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS AND ANTI-BREZHNEV LANGUAGE; AND 3) MODIFICATION OF THE EC-12 FEBRUARY 26 TEXT WHICH WAS TABLED TO BRING IT MORE IN LINE WITH U.S POSITION ON NUF.

5. THE COORDINATOR'S TEXT: THE TEXT NOTED IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK READS AS FOLLOWS: ". . . THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE IS, AS A SUBSTANTIAL AND INTEGRAL PART OF THE MULTILATERAL PROCESS INITIATED BY THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, TO UNDERTAKE, IN STAGES, NEW, EFFECTIVE AND CONCRETE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO MAKE PROGRESS IN STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND IN ACHIEVING DISARMAMENT, SO AS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL. . . ." THIS FORMULATION

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 REFLECTS MORE ACCURATELY THE MADRID MANDATE TEXT UPON WHICH IT IS BASED THAN EARLIER VERSIONS. IN ADDITION, THE EAST HAD WANTED THE SENTENCE TO END AFTER "MUTUAL RELATIONS," WHILE THE NNA SUPPORTED THE MORE COMPLETE FORMULATION. IN CORRIDOR CONVERSATIONS WE WERE ABLE TO SUPPORT THE NNA IN ADDING THE FINAL NON-MANDATE PHRASE

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"AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL." WHEN PUSH CAME TO SHOVE DURING A COFFEE BREAK AT THE WORKING GROUP MEETING, THE EAST, DESPERATE TO GET LANGUAGE NOTED ON NUF, AND UNWILLING TO OPPOSE THE NNA, ACCEPTED THIS LANGUAGE. THE NOTATION OF NUF LANGUAGE IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK NOW ENABLES US TO ARGUE THAT PROGRESS ON DRAFTING HAS BEEN ACHIEVED IN ALL WORKING GROUPS AND THAT WE HAVE BEEN FAITHFUL TO THE NAC DICTUM OF "FLEXIBLE PARALLELISM." AS A RESULT WE WILL BE ABLE TO PUSH THE SOVIETS HARDER IN THE CSBM'S WORKING GROUP MEETINGS WHERE OUR REAL INTERESTS LIE. IT WILL BE HARDER, MOREOVER, FOR THE SOVIETS TO ARGUE THAT THE WEST IS FOOTDRAGGING ON NUF. WE WILL SEE NEXT ROUND WHETHER THE SOVIETS, HAVING LOST ONE RATIONALE, WILL MOVE ON CSBM'S.

6. THE CONCEPTUAL STATEMENT: THE LONG DAYS AND FULL WEEKENDS SPENT ON THE EXCRUCIATING NEGOTIATION OF A CONCEPTUAL STATEMENT HIGHLIGHTED THE DIFFICULTIES OF TRYING TO BLEND THE VIEWS OF THE 16: THE TURKS INSISTED ON INCLUDING LANGUAGE ON TERRORISM (WE SUPPORTED THEM); THE ITALIANS WERE ALLERGIC TO EVEN THE MINIMALIST EC-12 HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE, SAYING THAT THEY WERE CARRYING OUT INSTRUCTIONS FROM FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREOTTI; THE FRENCH INSISTED THAT THEY WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE INTRODUCTION OF ANYTHING LESS THAN AN ENTIRE NUF TEXT UNLESS A CONCEPTUAL STATEMENT ACCOMPANIED IT; AT THAT POINT WE INSISTED ON INTRODUCING A LINKAGE OF OUR OWN: IN ORDER FOR US TO AGREE TO THE FRENCH SCENARIO, IT MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY NATO ACCEPTANCE OF THE COORDINATOR'S TEXT AND A CONCEPTUAL STATEMENT WHICH FULLY REFLECTED THE VIEWS OF THE 16. AS A RESULT OF U.S./CANADIAN/NORWEGIAN (IN OTHER WORDS NON-EC-12 MEMBERS) HAGGLING, WE WERE

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ABLE TO MAKE THE CONCEPTUAL STATEMENT REFLECT A BROADER CONCEPT OF NUF THAN THE NARROW EC-12 VIEW. THE CONCEPTUAL STATEMENT, DELIVERED BY THE FRENCH DELEGATE AT PARIS' INSISTENCE (IN FRENCH) DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE FRENCH RAISED THE MOST OBSTACLES DURING DRAFTING AND THAT THE U.S. AND OTHERS WERE THE PRIMARY DRAFTERS, EMPHASIZED THAT ONLY THE ADOPTION OF MEANINGFUL CSBM'S TOTALLY CONSISTENT WITH THE MANDATE CRITERIA (THE OPERATIONAL HEART" OF OUR WORK IN STOCKHOLM) WOULD JUSTIFY A RENEWED COMMITMENT TO THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE. FURTHERMORE, THE STATEMENT STRESSED THAT THE WORK OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE WAS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE CSCE PROCESS AND OF A WIDER SECURITY PERSPECTIVE WHICH "ENCOMPASSES NOT ONLY STRICTLY MILITARY MATTERS BUT ALSO POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS." FINALLY, IN OUTLINING COLLATERAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO THE NUF PRINCIPLE, THE STATEMENT RECALLED THE

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"ERGA OMNES" (ANTI-AFGHANISTAN) AND ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE CONCEPTS, THE "UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS" AND "THE EQUAL RIGHTS AND EQUAL DUTIES OF STATES" INCLUDING THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPLIANCE WITH AGREEMENTS."

7. PROBLEM AREAS: WHILE WE WERE ABLE -- ALBEIT WITH SOME PAIN -- TO PLAY OUT OUR SCENARIO, CERTAIN PROBLEMS FESTER WITHIN NATO: THE FRENCH ROLE, ITALIAN INABILITY TO AGREE TO EVEN MINIMALIST HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE, TURKISH INSISTENCE ON -- AND FRENCH OBJECTIONS TO -- INCLUDING LANGUAGE ON TERRORISM, AS WELL AS POTENTIAL PROBLEMS BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY ON LANGUAGE REGARDING THE PROHIBITION OF TERRITORIAL OCCUPATION, I.E., CONTAINED IN THE "FEBRUARY 26" (EC-12) TEXT. WHILE WE ANTICIPATED PROBLEMS WITH THE FRENCH AND THE GREEKS AND TURKS, THE ITALIAN PROBLEM IS MORE PERPLEXING. ACCORDING TO THE ITALIAN DELEGATION IN STOCKHOLM, ANDREOTTI HAS TAKEN A PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE NON-USE OF FORCE DISCUSSION AT THE CDE. HE REPORTEDLY BELIEVES THAT BY INTRODUCING HUMAN RIGHTS INTO THE CDE CONTEXT WE

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PREJUDICE OUR ABILITY TO PREVENT THE EAST FROM BRINGING UP INAPPROPRIATE SUBJECTS SUCH AS SOVIET DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS IN OTHER CSCE FORA. HIS EC-12 PARTNERS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO DISSUADE HIM ON THIS ACCOUNT, HENCE THE TEPID HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE IN THE "FEBRUARY 26" TEXT. JUST TO GET ITALIAN AGREEMENT TO A CONCEPTUAL STATEMENT READ IN A WORKING GROUP REQUIRED CONSTANT PRESSURE BY ALMOST ALL OTHER NATO DELEGATIONS IN STOCKHOLM AND NUMEROUS CALLS TO ROME, AS WELL AS A U.S. DEMARCHE TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IN ROME (REF A). IT IS STILL NOT CLEAR WHAT THE ITALIAN POSITION REALLY IS. IF IT IS THAT THEY WANT TO ENSURE THAT HUMAN RIGHTS DOES NOT ENTER INTO THE DISCUSSION OF SPECIFIC CSBM'S, AS SUGGESTED IN REF B, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO AGREE UPON APPROPRIATE HUMAN RIGHTS REFERENCES IN NATO'S NUF TEXT; IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE ITALIANS VETO THE INTRODUCTION OF ANY NATO NUF LANGUAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, WE MAY HAVE TO CONSIDER SOME HIGH-LEVEL DEMARCHES IN ROME. WITH THIS IN MIND, AMBASSADOR BARRY HAS SCHEDULED C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 STOCKHOLM 01910 GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION CONSULTATIONS IN ROME ON APRIL 21, SOON AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE NEXT ROUND.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 01952  
SUBJECT: AGREED TEXT IN WORKING GROUP B-2 (OBSERVATION)  
1. CDE IX - 109  
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.  
3. WORKING GROUP B-2 (OBSERVATION) AGREED TO ENTER THE  
FOLLOWING TWO TEXTS IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK ON  
MARCH 13:

-

(1) BEGIN TEXT:  
THE INVITING STATE MAY DELEGATE SOME OF ITS RESPONSIBI-  
LITIES AS HOST TO ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE ENGAGED IN  
THE MILITARY ACTIVITY ON THE TERRITORY OF THE INVITING  
STATE. IN SUCH CASES, THE INVITING STATE WILL SPECIFY  
THE ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES IN ITS INVITATION TO  
OBSERVE THE ACTIVITY.

END TEXT.

(2) BEGIN TEXT:  
THE PARTICIPATING STATES ACCEPTING AN INVITATION WILL  
PROVIDE THE NAMES AND RANKS OF THEIR OBSERVERS IN THEIR  
REPLY TO THE INVITATION.

END TEXT.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 01953

SUBJECT: TEXT OF AMB. BARRY SPEECH IN CDE, 3/14/86

1. CDE IX - L07
2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE SPEECH AMBASSADOR ROBERT L. BARRY, HEAD OF THE US DELEGATION, MADE TO THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE (CDE) TODAY, MARCH 14, THE FINAL DAY OF CDE ROUND IX.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

MR. CHAIRMAN:

SO FAR DURING THIS ROUND I HAVE MADE MY CONTRIBUTION TO THE SUCCESS OF THIS CONFERENCE BY MAKING MY SPEECHES ELSEWHERE. BUT FACED WITH THE END OF THE ROUND, I FIND THE TEMPTATION TO BREAK MY SELF-IMPOSED VOW OF SILENCE TOO STRONG TO RESIST. AFTER ALL, END-OF-ROUND SUMMARIES ARE A TRADITION, AND EVEN IN A CONFERENCE WHICH HAS ONLY LASTED TWO YEARS, TRADITION PLAYS AN IMPORTANT ROLE.

THE FIRST PROBLEM ONE FACES IN SUMMATIONS OF THIS SORT IS WHETHER TO DESCRIBE THE GLASS AS PARTLY EMPTY OR PARTLY FULL. LOOKING AT WHAT WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED HERE IN THE PAST SEVEN WEEKS, IT WOULD BE ALL TOO EASY TO CONCENTRATE ON WHAT WE HAVE NOT DONE. BUT, AT THE RISK OF BEING THOUGHT UNREALISTIC, I'D LIKE TO BEGIN WITH WHAT WE HAVE DONE. WE ARE ALL MORE OR LESS OPTIMISTS, OR ELSE WE WOULDN'T BE HERE; BUT MORE IMPORTANT, IF WE CHOOSE TO ACCENTUATE THE NEGATIVE IT WILL BE ALL TOO EASY TO CONVINCE OURSELVES AND OUR GOVERNMENTS THAT IT IS TOO LATE TO NEGOTIATE THE KIND OF CONCLUDING DOCUMENT WE WERE SENT HERE TO ACHIEVE. WE ARE NOT GOING TO SETTLE FOR MARGINAL IMPROVEMENTS ON THE HELSINKI CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES -- WHAT WE CALL A MINI-PACKAGE. THE MANDATE TELLS US NOT TO. SO LET'S THINK ABOUT HOW WE CAN ACCOMPLISH MORE.

THE MAIN FACTOR WHICH ENCOURAGES ME IS THAT I BELIEVE THAT THE THIRTY-FIVE GOVERNMENTS REPRESENTED HERE WANT TO REACH AGREEMENT. THERE IS EVIDENCE OF THIS IN WHAT OUR POLITICAL LEADERS HAVE SAID.

--THE US-SOVIET JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED IN GENEVA ON NOVEMBER 21, 1985, COMMITS BOTH COUNTRIES TO SEEK AN EARLY AND SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION TO THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. THE US-SOVIET SUMMIT GAVE POLITICAL MOMENTUM TO OUR CONFERENCE, AND WE HOPE THAT A CONTINUING PROCESS OF HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS WILL FACILITATE OUR WORK HERE.

--PRESIDENT REAGAN STRESSED TO ME THE IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHES TO CDE WHEN I MET HIM ON JANUARY 21 BEFORE THIS ROUND BEGAN. HIS STATEMENT OF THAT DATE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS SUCCESS HERE COULD HAVE FOR THE OVERALL EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP. HE ALSO NOTED THAT THE CONFERENCE COULD "HELP TO LOWER THE

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BARRIERS WHICH NOW DIVIDE EUROPE ARTIFICIALLY EAST FROM WEST, THEREBY MAKING THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE LESS LIKELY."

--THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS GENSCHER AND DUMAS AT OUR OPENING PLENARY DEMONSTRATED THE IMPORTANCE FRANCE AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY ATTACH TO OUR CONFERENCE AS A KEY INSTRUMENT FOR ENHANCING EUROPEAN STABILITY AND SECURITY.

--MY DELEGATION ALSO WELCOMED THAT SECTION OF GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 STATEMENT RELATING TO CDE. FIRST, IT CONTAINED SOME GOOD ADVICE WITH WHICH WE AGREE, IN THAT IT SUGGESTED CONCENTRATING ON AREAS WHERE COMMON GROUND EXISTED OR COULD BE DEVELOPED. SECONDLY, IT REMOVED AN OBSTACLE TO DRAFTING BY RECOGNIZING THAT THE ISSUE OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES IS NOT TO BE DISCUSSED IN STOCKHOLM. ASIDE FROM THE POLITICAL IMPETUS PROVIDED BY OUR LEADERS' STATEMENTS, I WAS ENCOURAGED THAT ALL DELEGATIONS RETURNED TO STOCKHOLM LAST JANUARY WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO BEGIN DRAFTING. NOT ONLY THAT, BUT I BELIEVE THERE WAS AN UNSPOKEN CONSENSUS THAT WE COULD BEGIN PRODUCING TEXT ON NON-CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES WHILE AT THE SAME TIME TRYING TO DEAL WITH THE MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE RESOLVED BEFORE SOME IMPORTANT SECTIONS OF A FINAL DOCUMENT COULD BE DRAFTED.

I THINK IT IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT DELEGATIONS LIKE MY OWN, WHICH BELIEVE THAT THE MANDATE TELLS US TO CONCENTRATE ON MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES, DID NOT INSIST THAT ALL DRAFTING ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE COME ONLY AFTER DRAFTING OF THE CSBMS THEMSELVES. THE WESTERN PROPOSALS ON NON-USE OF FORCE, AND OUR AGREEMENT TO A PARAGRAPH OF TEXT, ARE THE RESULTS OF AN EFFORT ON OUR PART TO MEET THE CONCERNS OF THOSE WHO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS ASPECT OF OUR WORK.

GIVEN THAT WE ALL HAD ORDERS TO GET ON WITH THE BUSINESS OF DRAFTING, WE CANNOT BE TOO PROUD OF WHAT OUR COLLECTIVE EFFORTS HAVE PRODUCED -- A FEW SPARSE SENTENCES, MANY RECYCLED FROM THE MADRID MANDATE OR THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. BUT I REFUSE TO BE DISCOURAGED BY THE UNDENIABLE MODESTY OF OUR ACCOMPLISHMENT. AS SOME OF YOU HAVE POINTED OUT, WE HAVE VENTURED INTO TERRA INCOGNITA. THERE IS NO "BRIDGE PROPOSAL" ON THE TABLE. THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED DELEGATIONS SUPPLY INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE NEUTRAL AS COORDINATORS, BUT THEY ALSO SUPPORT THE CONCEPTS AND LANGUAGE OF SC-7. GOING FROM ONES' OWN PROPOSALS TO COMPROMISE POSITIONS IS NEVER EASY; WHEN MILITARY SECURITY ISSUES AND GROUP MECHANISMS ARE INVOLVED, THE PROCESS IS EVEN MORE HESITANT AND PAINFUL.

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I DO THINK THAT THE DRAFTING PROCESS HAS GAINED MOMENTUM AS THE SESSION HAS WORN ON. THROUGH A COMBINATION OF PROCESSES -- DRAFTING IN THE WORKING GROUPS, SUBMISSION OF TEXTS BY COORDINATORS, RESOLUTION OF SOME SPECIFIC ISSUES IN SMALL "CONTACT GROUPS" -- PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN SOLVED AND TEXT HAS EMERGED. WE HAVE NOW BROKEN THE ICE IN ALL FIVE WORKING GROUPS. LET'S HOPE THAT THE TRANSITIONAL PAINS ARE OVER AND THAT WHEN WE RETURN OUR PROBLEMS WILL BE SUBSTANTIVE, NOT PROCEDURAL.

I EVEN SEE THE SUBSTANTIVE GLASS AS HALF-FULL, NOT HALF-EMPTY.

--WE ALL AGREE THAT WE MUST EXCHANGE CONSIDERABLE INFORMATION ABOUT MILITARY UNITS IF FORECASTING, NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION ARE TO BE MEANINGFUL.

--WE ALL AGREE THAT ACTIVITIES WHICH WE WILL NOTIFY SHOULD BE FORECAST ON AN ANNUAL BASIS.

--WE ALL AGREE THAT NOTIFICATION THRESHOLDS SHOULD BE WELL BELOW THOSE SET IN HELSINKI.

--WE ALL AGREE THAT THE ROLE OF OBSERVATION SHOULD BE MORE IMPORTANT THAN UNDER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, THAT OBSERVERS SHOULD BE INVITED FROM ALL PARTICIPATING STATES, AND THAT OBSERVERS OUGHT TO BE AFFORDED EQUAL OPPORTUNITY TO SEE MORE OF THE EXERCISES THAN IN THE PAST.

--WE ALL AGREE THAT THE MEASURES WE ADOPT MUST BE VERIFIABLE.

--AND WE ALL AGREE THAT THE ADOPTION OF CSBMS SHOULD GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE, WHICH WE ARE PREPARED TO REAFFIRM. ON THAT BASIS, LET ME SUGGEST SOME PRIORITY SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED EARLY IN THE NEXT ROUND IF WE ARE TO ACCELERATE THE DRAFTING PROCESS. UNLESS WE ARE PREPARED TO TACKLE THESE PROBLEMS CONSTRUCTIVELY, WE WILL NOT MAKE PROGRESS WHEN WE RETURN BUT WILL DRIFT INTO A NEW STALEMATE.

--LET US AGREE ON THE THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFYING GROUND FORCE AND COMBINED ARMS ACTIVITY, SINCE SO MUCH DEPENDS ON THIS. WE HAVE A BASIS FOR RESOLVING THIS ISSUE SINCE ALL HERE HAVE, IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER, RECOGNIZED THAT THE THRESHOLD SHOULD BE BASED ON A COMBINATION OF STRUCTURAL AND NUMERICAL PARAMETERS INCLUDING BOTH PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT. AND ALL RECOGNIZE THAT LARGE-SCALE AIR EXERCISES OVER EUROPE ARE CONNECTED WITH GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY.

--LET US SET ASIDE PROCEDURAL DISPUTES AND BEGIN TO DRAFT ON THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION AND FORECASTING WHERE THERE IS, IN FACT, CONSIDERABLE COMMON GROUND.

--LET US ACCEPT, ONCE AND FOR ALL, THE PRINCIPLE THAT ALL ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE NOTIFIED WILL BE OBSERVED.

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-- LET US BEGIN TO DEVISE A VERIFICATION SYSTEM WHICH MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE MANDATE. BECAUSE OF OUR CONCERNS OVER COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, ADEQUATE VERIFICATION IS THE SINE QUA NON FOR MY DELEGATION. TO US, ADEQUATE VERIFICATION MEANS INSPECTION.

WHEN WE RETURN HERE IN APRIL WE HOPE TO CONTRIBUTE TO RESOLUTION OF THESE ISSUES. WE ARE PREPARED TO BE FLEXIBLE, AND WE EXPECT THE SAME FROM OTHERS. MR. CHAIRMAN, LET ME LOOK AHEAD SOMEWHAT TO SEPTEMBER. AGAIN, PROCEEDING FROM MY OPTIMISTIC ASSUMPTION, LET US SAY THAT WE HAVE A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT TO WHICH OUR GOVERNMENTS WILL AGREE. OBVIOUSLY, SUCH A DOCUMENT WILL NOT ACCOMMODATE ALL OF THE PROPOSALS NOW BEFORE US; SOME OF SC-L WILL NOT BE THERE, SOME OF SC-7 WILL BE MISSING, AND NOT ALL EASTERN IDEAS WILL BE REFLECTED. WHAT HAPPENS TO THE LEFT-OVERS? CLEARLY, AS THEY ARE THE IDEAS OF SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS, THEY MAY LIVE ON AFTER STOCKHOLM AND CAN BE RAISED AGAIN IN OTHER APPROPRIATE FORUMS -- INCLUDING A POSSIBLE POST-VIENNA CDE -- IF THE PROPOSALS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE MADRID MANDATE, AS IS OR AS SUPPLEMENTED IN VIENNA. BUT IT IS NOT OUR JOB HERE TO DETERMINE WHAT OUR SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS WILL OR WILL NOT RAISE IN THE FUTURE; IT IS NOT IN OUR POWER, WE DO NOT HAVE TIME, AND WE DO NOT KNOW THE POST-VIENNA MANDATE. TWO WEEKS AGO, MR. CHAIRMAN, THE WORLD WAS SHOCKED BY THE BRUTAL AND SENSELESS ASSASSINATION OF PRIME MINISTER OLOF PALME. WORLD LEADERS ARE GATHERING HERE IN STOCKHOLM TO PAY TRIBUTE TO HIS MEMORY AND TOMORROW WILL JOIN THE SWEDISH PEOPLE IN THEIR GRIEF AND MOURNING. MY COUNTRY, AND ALL OF US HERE, HAVE SUFFERED FROM SENSELESS AND COWARDLY ACTS OF VIOLENCE. WE ARE REMINDED NOW AGAIN THAT WE CANNOT MEANINGFULLY TALK ABOUT BUILDING SECURITY AND CONFIDENCE IN EUROPE WITHOUT CONSIDERING WAYS OF DEALING WITH THE ISSUE OF TERRORISM, WHICH REPRESENTS THE USE OF FORCE IN ITS MOST BRUTAL AND DIRECT FASHION. THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE PARTICIPANTS IN THIS CONFERENCE, IN REAFFIRMING THE PRINCIPLE OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE, TO EXPRESS THEIR DETERMINATION TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO COMBAT TERRORISM. I ALSO THINK IT APPROPRIATE, MR. CHAIRMAN, FOR US IN THIS HALL TO RECALL THE HOPES WHICH PRIME MINISTER PALME HAD FOR US. THE FIRST ITEM ON OUR AGENDA IN JANUARY OF 1984 WAS MR. PALME'S WELCOMING SPEECH. HE SPOKE OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS -- THE COMMITMENT OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES TO "WORK TOGETHER TOWARDS A MORE STABLE ORDER IN EUROPE, REDUCTION OF TENSIONS, PROMOTION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION, RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND -- GENERALLY SPEAKING -- GREATER MUTUAL

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UNDERSTANDING." HE SPOKE OF A "GRAND STRATEGY OF PEACE  
-- ENCOMPASSING ALL FIELDS OF HUMAN ENDEAVOR AND  
RELATIONS BETWEEN NATIONS." HE REMINDED US THAT "THE  
STRICT OBSERVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATY  
OBLIGATIONS IS A SHIELD" PROTECTING SMALLER STATES  
"AGAINST ATTEMPTS TO SUBJUGATE THEM TO THE WILL OF  
OTHERS." HE URGED US TO SEEK CONSENSUS ON MEASURES TO  
REDUCE SUSPICION AND INCREASE CONFIDENCE AND  
COOPERATION.

AS PARTICIPANTS IN THIS CONFERENCE, MR. CHAIRMAN, WE  
CAN PAY HONOR TO MR. PALME'S MEMORY BY SEEKING TO  
FULFILL THE VISION WHICH HE ARTICULATED AND WHICH WE  
SHARE. LET US RETURN WITH A NEW SENSE OF URGENCY AND  
DETERMINATION TO SUCCEED. TIME IS RUNNING OUT.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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