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Intelligence**

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# **Soviet Bloc and Neutral/Nonaligned Country Statements at the CSCE Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) (CDE-VI)**

## **14 May – 5 July 1985 Volume I**

25X1

**A Reference Aid**

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*CR 85-13401  
September 1985*

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
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**FOREWORD**



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FOREWORD

This reference aid contains a chronological history of topics discussed during the Sixth Round of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) which commenced in Stockholm on 14 May and recessed on 5 July 1985. It is indexed according to subjects and countries. In the case of the Soviet Union the individual delegate speaking, if identified, is also specified. Furthermore, the forum in which the statement(s) occurred is noted. [REDACTED]

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The conference record has been retained in straight chronological order. The index, located at the beginning, is designed to guide the user to pages for specific topics, countries, and, in the case of the Soviet Union, personalities. By using the type of entry key located at the front of the index, users can determine whether the references are from cables reporting on plenary, post-plenary, or working group meetings and limit their searches by these types of references when desired. Users interested in statements by a particular country are directed to the country index where each country has its own subject index. In the case of the Soviet Union, an additional letter code will identify the individual delegate who made the statement, if noted in the text. Each Soviet delegate who spoke is also included in the main subject index. [REDACTED]

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Statements by the following countries are indexed: Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Finland, German Democratic Republic (GDR), Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and Yugoslavia. Please note that there is also a separate entry for the "East." In this section are found statements which were attributed to "the East" in general but to no country in particular. In addition, when a delegate from one country speaks on behalf of one or more other countries, his statements are cited in each of the various countries' indexes. [REDACTED]

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All statements made by participating countries during plenary and working group AB meetings are summarized in the "Statement Summaries" section of this reference aid.

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Three items of note which might otherwise be overlooked are brought to the user's attention: "weekly wrap-up" cables summarizing developments in all CDE forums are included chronologically and can be located by referring to the subject index; a group of miscellaneous cables found at the end of the "cables" section and referenced in the subject index as "miscellaneous cables" cover such topics as delegation personnel changes, analyses of delegation and group positions or motives at CDE, and procedural issues and similar subjects; the three working documents submitted by the East were introduced in working group AB. However, the Eastern delegates requested that the proposals be distributed as working group B documents. For this reason they have been indexed with a page number followed by "b/c." [REDACTED]

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**BACKGROUND PAPERS**

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CONFERENCE ON SECURITY  
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FINAL ACT

HELSINKI 1975

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*Convinced* that the peaceful settlement of disputes is a complement to refraining from the threat or use of force, both being essential though not exclusive factors for the maintenance and consolidation of peace and security:

*Desiring* to reinforce and to improve the methods at their disposal for the peaceful settlement of disputes:

1. Are resolved to pursue the examination and elaboration of a generally acceptable method for the peaceful settlement of disputes aimed at complementing existing methods, and to continue to this end to work upon the "Draft Convention on a European System for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes" submitted by Switzerland during the second stage of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, as well as other proposals relating to it and directed towards the elaboration of such a method.
2. Decide that, on the invitation of Switzerland, a meeting of experts of all the participating States will be convoked in order to fulfil the mandate described in paragraph 1 above within the framework and under the procedures of the follow-up to the Conference laid down in the chapter "Follow-up to the Conference".
3. This meeting of experts will take place after the meeting of the representatives appointed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the participating States, scheduled according to the chapter "Follow-up to the Conference" for 1977; the results of the work of this meeting of experts will be submitted to Governments.

## 2.

### Document on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament

**The participating States,**

*Desirous* of eliminating the causes of tension that may exist among them and thus of contributing to the strengthening of peace and security in the world:

*Determined* to strengthen confidence among them and thus to contribute to increasing stability and security in Europe:

*Determined* further to refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States as adopted in this Final Act:

*Recognizing* the need to contribute to reducing the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to apprehension, particularly in a situation where the participating States lack clear and timely information about the nature of such activities:

*Taking into account* considerations relevant to efforts aimed at lessening tension and promoting disarmament:



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*Recognizing* that the exchange of observers by invitation at military manœuvres will help to promote contacts and mutual understanding;

*Having studied* the question of prior notification of major military movements in the context of confidence-building;

*Recognizing* that there are other ways in which individual States can contribute further to their common objectives;

*Convinced* of the political importance of prior notification of major military manœuvres for the promotion of mutual understanding and the strengthening of confidence, stability and security;

*Accepting* the responsibility of each of them to promote these objectives and to implement this measure, in accordance with the accepted criteria and modalities, as essentials for the realization of these objectives;

*Recognizing* that this measure deriving from political decision rests upon a voluntary basis;

*Have adopted the following:*

## I

### *Prior notification of major military manœuvres*

They will notify their major military manœuvres to all other participating States through usual diplomatic channels in accordance with the following provisions:

Notification will be given of major military manœuvres exceeding a total of 25,000 troops, independently or combined with any possible air or naval components (in this context the word "troops" includes amphibious and airborne troops). In the case of independent manœuvres of amphibious or airborne troops, or of combined manœuvres involving them, these troops will be included in this total. Furthermore, in the case of combined manœuvres which do not reach the above total but which involve land forces together with significant numbers of either amphibious or airborne troops, or both, notification can also be given.

Notification will be given of major military manœuvres which take place on the territory, in Europe, of any participating State as well as, if applicable, in the adjoining sea area and air space.

In the case of a participating State whose territory extends beyond Europe, prior notification need be given only of manœuvres which take place in an area within 250 kilometres from its frontier facing or shared with any other European participating State, the participating State need not, however, give notification in cases in which that area is also contiguous to the participating State's frontier facing or shared with a non-European non-participating State.

Notification will be given 21 days or more in advance of the start of the manœuvres or in the case of a manœuvres arranged at shorter notice at the earliest possible opportunity prior to its starting date.

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Notification will contain information of the designation, if any, the general purpose of and the States involved in the manoeuvre, the type or types and numerical strength of the forces engaged, the area and estimated time-frame of its conduct. The participating States will also, if possible, provide additional relevant information, particularly that related to the components of the forces engaged and the period of involvement of these forces.

#### *Prior notification of other military manoeuvres*

The participating States recognize that they can contribute further to strengthening confidence and increasing security and stability, and to this end may also notify smaller-scale military manoeuvres to other participating States, with special regard for those near the area of such manoeuvres.

To the same end, the participating States also recognize that they may notify other military manoeuvres conducted by them.

#### *Exchange of observers*

The participating States will invite other participating States, voluntarily and on a bilateral basis, in a spirit of reciprocity and goodwill towards all participating States, to send observers to attend military manoeuvres.

The inviting State will determine in each case the number of observers, the procedures and conditions of their participation, and give other information which it may consider useful. It will provide appropriate facilities and hospitality.

The invitation will be given as far ahead as is conveniently possible through usual diplomatic channels.

#### *Prior notification of major military movements*

In accordance with the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations the participating States studied the question of prior notification of major military movements as a measure to strengthen confidence.

Accordingly, the participating States recognize that they may, at their own discretion and with a view to contributing to confidence-building, notify their major military movements.

In the same spirit, further consideration will be given by the States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to the question of prior notification of major military movements, bearing in mind, in particular, the experience gained by the implementation of the measures which are set forth in this document.

#### *Other confidence-building measures*

The participating States recognize that there are other means by which their common objectives can be promoted.

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In particular, they will, with due regard to reciprocity and with a view to better mutual understanding, promote exchanges by invitation among their military personnel, including visits by military delegations.

\* \* \*

In order to make a fuller contribution to their common objective of confidence-building, the participating States, when conducting their military activities in the area covered by the provisions for the prior notification of major military manoeuvres, will duly take into account and respect this objective.

They also recognize that the experience gained by the implementation of the provisions set forth above, together with further efforts, could lead to developing and enlarging measures aimed at strengthening confidence.

## II

### *Questions relating to disarmament*

The participating States recognize the interest of all of them in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament which are designed to complement political détente in Europe and to strengthen their security. They are convinced of the necessity to take effective measures in these fields which by their scope and by their nature constitute steps towards the ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and which should result in strengthening peace and security throughout the world.

## III

### *General considerations*

Having considered the views expressed on various subjects related to the strengthening of security in Europe through joint efforts aimed at promoting détente and disarmament, the participating States, when engaged in such efforts, will, in this context, proceed, in particular, from the following essential considerations:

- The complementary nature of the political and military aspects of security;
- The interrelation between the security of each participating State and security in Europe as a whole and the relationship which exists, in the broader context of world security, between security in Europe and security in the Mediterranean area;
- Respect for the security interests of all States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe inherent in their sovereign equality;
- The importance that participants in negotiating fora see to it that information about relevant developments, progress and results is provided on an appropriate basis to other States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and, in return, the justified interest of any of those States in having their views considered.

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## **ABSCHLIESSENDES DOKUMENT**

DES MADRIDER TREFFENS 1980 DER VERTRETER DER TEILNEHMER-  
STAATEN DER KONFERENZ ÜBER SICHERHEIT UND ZUSAMMENAR-  
BEIT IN EUROPA, WELCHES AUF DER GRUNDLAGE DER BESTIM-  
MUNGEN DER SCHLUSSAKTE BETREFFEND DIE FOLGEN DER  
KONFERENZ ABGEHALTEN WURDE

## **CONCLUDING DOCUMENT**

OF THE MADRID MEETING 1980 OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE  
PARTICIPATING STATES OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND  
CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, HELD ON THE BASIS OF THE PROVISIONS  
OF THE FINAL ACT RELATING TO THE FOLLOW-UP TO THE  
CONFERENCE

## **DOCUMENTO DE CLAUSURA**

DE LA REUNION DE MADRID DE 1980 DE LOS REPRESENTANTES DE  
LOS ESTADOS PARTICIPANTES EN LA CONFERENCIA SOBRE LA  
SEGURIDAD Y LA COOPERACION EN EUROPA, CONVOCADA SOBRE  
LA BASE DE LAS DISPOSICIONES DEL ACTA FINAL RELATIVAS A LA  
CONTINUIDAD DE LA CONFERENCIA

## **DOCUMENT DE CLOTURE**

DE LA REUNION DE MADRID 1980 DES REPRESENTANTS DES ETATS  
AYANT PARTICIPE A LA CONFERENCE SUR LA SECURITE ET LA  
COOPERATION EN EUROPE, TENUE CONFORMEMENT AUX DISPOSI-  
TIONS DE L'ACTE FINAL RELATIVES AUX SUITES DE LA  
CONFERENCE

## **DOCUMENTO CONCLUSIVO**

DELLA RIUNIONE DI MADRID 1980 DEI RAPPRESENTANTI DEGLI  
STATI CHE HANNO PARTECIPATO ALLA CONFERENZA SULLA SICU-  
REZZA E LA COOPERAZIONE IN EUROPA CONVOCATA IN BASE ALLE  
DISPOSIZIONI DELL'ATTO FINALE RELATIVE AI SEGUITI DELLA  
CONFERENZA

## **ИТОГОВЫЙ ДОКУМЕНТ**

МАДРИДСКОЙ ВСТРЕЧИ 1980 ГОДА ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЕЙ  
ГОСУДАРСТВ-УЧАСТНИКОВ СОВЕЩАНИЯ ПО  
БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ И СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВУ В ЕВРОПЕ,  
СОСТОЯВШЕЙСЯ НА ОСНОВЕ ПОЛОЖЕНИЙ  
ЗАКЛЮЧИТЕЛЬНОГО АКТА, ОТНОСЯЩИХСЯ К  
ДАЛЬНЕЙШИМ ШАГАМ ПОСЛЕ СОВЕЩАНИЯ

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Upon invitation of the Government of Canada, the meeting of experts will be held in Ottawa, beginning on 7 May 1985. It will draw up conclusions and recommendations to be submitted to the governments of all participating States.

The meeting will be preceded by a preparatory meeting which will be held in Ottawa upon the invitation of the Government of Canada, starting on 23 April 1985.

In conformity with the recommendation contained in the Report of the Montreux Meeting of Experts, another meeting of experts of the participating States will be convened, at the invitation of the Government of Greece. It will take place in Athens and will commence on 21 March 1984, with the purpose of pursuing, on the basis of the Final Act, the examination of a generally acceptable method for the peaceful settlement of disputes aimed at complementing existing methods. The meeting will take into account the common approach set forth in the above-mentioned report.

Recalling the right of any participating State to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance, and also the right to neutrality, the participating States take note of the declaration of the Government of the Republic of Malta in which it stated that, as an effective contribution to detente, peace and security in the Mediterranean region, the Republic of Malta is a neutral State adhering to a policy of non-alignment. They call upon all States to respect that declaration.

#### **Conference on Confidence- and Security- building Measures and Disarmament in Europe**

##### **The participating States,**

Recalling the provisions of the Final Act according to which they recognize the interest of all of them in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament,

Have agreed to convene a Conference on Confidence- and Security- building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

The aim of the Conference is, as a substantial and integral part of the multilateral process initiated by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, with the participation of all the States signatories of the Final Act, to undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations.

Thus the Conference will begin a process of which the first stage will be devoted to the negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe.

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The first stage of the Conference will be held in Stockholm commencing on 17 January 1984.

On the basis of equality of rights, balance and reciprocity, equal respect for the security interests of all CSCE participating States, and of their respective obligations concerning confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe, these confidence- and security-building measures will cover the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area\* and air space. They will be of military significance and politically binding and will be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content.

As far as the adjoining sea area\* and air space is concerned, the measures will be applicable to the military activities of all the participating States taking place there whenever these activities affect security in Europe as well as constitute a part of activities taking place within the whole of Europe as referred to above, which they will agree to notify. Necessary specifications will be made through the negotiations on the confidence- and security-building measures at the Conference.

Nothing in the definition of the zone given above will diminish obligations already undertaken under the Final Act. The confidence- and security- building measures to be agreed upon at the Conference will also be applicable in all areas covered by any of the provisions in the Final Act relating to confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament.

The provisions established by the negotiators will come into force in the forms and according to the procedure to be agreed upon by the Conference.

Taking into account the above-mentioned aim of the Conference, the next follow-up meeting of the participating States of the CSCE, to be held in Vienna, commencing on 4 November 1986, will assess the progress achieved during the first stage of the Conference.

Taking into account the relevant provisions of the Final Act, and having reviewed the results achieved by the first stage of the Conference, and also in the light of other relevant negotiations on security and disarmament affecting Europe, a future CSCE follow-up meeting will consider ways and appropriate means for the participating States to continue their efforts for security and disarmament in Europe, including the question of supplementing the present mandate for the next stage of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

A preparatory meeting, charged with establishing the agenda, time-table and other organizational modalities for the first stage of the Conference, will be held in Helsinki, commencing on 25 October 1983. Its duration shall not exceed three weeks.

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\* In this context, the notion of adjoining sea area is understood to refer also to ocean areas adjoining Europe.

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The rules of procedure, the working methods and the scale of distribution for the expenses valid for the CSCE will, *mutatis mutandis*, be applied to the Conference and to the preparatory meeting referred to in the preceding paragraph. The services of a technical secretariat will be provided by the host country.

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CSCE  
CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE-  
AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES  
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE  
STOCKHOLM 1984

Distr.  
RESTRICTED  
CSCE/SC.1/Amplified<sup>\*/</sup>  
Stockholm, 8 March 1985  
Original: ENGLISH

The Delegations of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America, as the sponsors of CSCE/SC.1 wish, in the interest of facilitating the work of the Conference, to put forward the following compilation of CSCE/SC.1/Working Documents I-VI amplifying measures 1 - 6 proposed in CSCE/SC.1.

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\*/ As submitted by the authors.



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CSCE/SC.1/Amplified

Measure 1: Exchange of Military Information

1. Each participating State will annually exchange information concerning its military command organization, and its regulations for accredited military personnel, in the zone. Such information will be provided to all other participating States and will be exchanged no later than the first day of January of each calendar year, and will be effective as of that date.
2. For each participating State, such information will be provided in writing, and will include the following:
  - (a) In chart form, the command organization in the zone, including designation, normal headquarters location in exact geographic terms, and composition of its ground and land-based air forces down to:
    - (i) major ground formations and main combat units; and
    - (ii) land-based air formations, specifying wing, air regiment or equivalent formations; and
  - (b) Its regulations governing the presence and activities in the zone of military personnel accredited to it from other participating States.
3. Clarification of such information may be requested through consultation by appropriate means.

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CSCE/SC.1/Amplified

Measure 2: Exchange of Forecasts of Activities Notifiable in Advance

1. Each participating State will exchange annual forecasts of its military activities within the zone for which notification is required by Measure 3 of this document. Such forecasts will be provided to all other participating States. The forecasts, organized into calendar year quarters, will be exchanged for each calendar year, and will be issued not later than the fifteenth day of November for the following calendar year.
2. If a participating State adds a military activity to those that have been forecast or changes information concerning a military activity from that which has been forecast, such additions or changes will be provided in the notification for that activity pursuant to Measure 3.
3. A participating State will present forecasts in writing organized into calendar year quarters, in the following format, for each military activity planned:
  - (a) Designation of the activity, including, if applicable, the name of the exercise.
  - (b) The general purpose of the activity.
  - (c) The thirty-day period during which the activity is planned to begin.
  - (d) The names of the participating States that will be engaged in the activity.
  - (e) The geographic co-ordinates of the area where the activity is planned to take place.
  - (f) The duration of the activity.
  - (g) The number of troops, to include amphibious and airborne troops, directing staff, and umpires that will be engaged in the activity.
  - (h) The type of forces that will be engaged in the activity.
4. Clarification of information contained in an annual forecast may be requested through consultation by appropriate means.

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CSCE/SC.1/Amplified

Measure 3: Notification of Military ActivitiesA. General

1. Each participating State that plans to carry out a military activity, that is, an out-of-garrison land activity, a mobilization activity, or an amphibious activity, in the zone, will give notification 45 days before such activity begins. If a military activity is conducted as an alert, notification will be given in accordance with Section E of this measure. Notifications will be provided to all other participating States.

2. A participating State on whose national territory a military activity is planned to take place will give notification of the entire activity conducted on its territory even if the forces of that State are not engaged in the activity. This will not limit the obligation of other participating States whose participation amounts to a military activity on its own to notify these activities.

3. Compliance with the provisions of this measure will be evaluated on the basis of information exchanged in accordance with Measures 1-3 of this document and will be subject to verification by appropriate means. Participating States will be invited to send observers to military activities within the zone, as provided in Measure 4 of this document. Furthermore, participating States will be permitted to inspect such military activities or possible military activities for the purpose of monitoring compliance, as provided in Measure 5 of this document.

B. Out-of-Garrison Land Activities

1. An "out-of-garrison land activity" is an activity in which:

(a) One or more ground force divisions, equivalent formations, or formations which are temporarily organized into a structure comparable to a division formation, are engaged, if:

(i) one-half or more of the major combat elements of the division or equivalent formation, that is, tank, infantry,

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CSCE/SC.1/Amplified

motorized rifle, airborne brigades or regiments or equivalent-sized formations, and at least one supporting artillery or engineer or helicopter element are out-of-garrison at the same time and carrying out a common activity under a single command; or

(ii) 6,000 or more of the troops of the division or equivalent formation are out-of-garrison at the same time and carrying out a common activity under a single command; or

(iii) (X) main battle tanks or (Y) armoured carriers (AC) of the division or equivalent formation are out-of-garrison at the same time and carrying out a common activity under a single command; or

(b) The combat elements of ground forces not organized into division formations are engaged, if:

(i) 6,000 or more troops are out-of-garrison at the same time, and carrying out a common activity under a single direct operational command; or

(ii) (X) main battle tanks or (Y) armoured carriers (AC) are out-of-garrison at the same time and engaged in a common activity under a single direct operational command.

2. Ground forces garrisoned inside of the zone will be considered to be out-of-garrison when they are away from their normal peacetime locations and are in the zone. Ground forces normally garrisoned outside of the zone will be considered to be out-of-garrison when they leave their arrival base within the zone to engage in a military activity on land within the zone.

3. A participating State will give notification of an out-of-garrison land activity whether the activity is independent or combined with air or amphibious support.

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CSCE/SC.1/Amplified

4. A participating State will give notification at the start of ground force movements in the case of an out-of-garrison land activity to carry out an activity outside the zone from a point of embarkation inside the zone.

C. Mobilization Activities

1. A "mobilization activity" is an activity involving a recall of reservists in which:

- (a) 25,000 or more troops, either reservists or reservists in combination with regulars, are involved in the same activity in the zone; or
- (b) The majority of the major combat elements, that is, tank, infantry, motorized rifle, airborne brigades or regiments or equivalent-sized formations, of each of three or more divisions or equivalent formations are involved in the same recall activity in the zone.

D. Amphibious Activities

1. An "amphibious activity" is any landing from the sea onto the land in which:

- (a) A formation equivalent to three or more battalions, whether marine, naval infantry or ground forces, lands in the zone; or
- (b) 3,000 or more combat troops land in the zone.

2. If the troops engaged in the landing, as defined in paragraph one, embark in the zone, then the date and place of embarkation will be included in the notification. If the area of landing is changed or decided upon after the initial notification, then that additional information will be given as soon as the area of landing is determined.

E. Alert Activities

1. Each participating State carrying out a military activity as an alert will give notification at the time its troops are ordered to carry out the activity.

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CSCE/SC.1/Amplified

2. Except as specifically provided, a military activity conducted as an alert will be subject to the same provisions as military activities generally.

F. Contents of Notifications

1. A participating State will present notification of a military activity in writing, in the following format:

- (a) Description of the activity in the zone, including, if applicable, the name of the exercise.
- (b) The name of the headquarters conducting the activity.
- (c) The general purpose of the activity, including the relation of the activity to that of any other military activity for which notification is given under this Measure.
- (d) The dates and duration of the different phases of the activity in the zone, including the beginning of out-of-garrison deployments, the active exercise phase if applicable, and the recovery phase during which troops are returned to normal peacetime locations, if the recovery phase is to occur immediately after the activity.
- (e) The names of the participating States engaged in the activity.
- (f) Boundaries of the geographical area in the zone where the activity will take place, including a map trace or geographic co-ordinates.
- (g) The number of troops to include amphibious and airborne troops, directing staff and umpires engaged. If more than one participating State engages in the activity, then the number of troops, staff and umpires for each participating State will be specified.
- (h) The designation of the ground force divisions engaged in the activity.
- (i) The type of other forces engaged in the activity, including ground-based tactical air forces and naval ship-to-shore combat forces, i.e., those executing amphibious operations, air support of ground

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troops or ship-to-shore gunnery, if part of a military activity in the zone.

- (j) Clarifying information if the activity is one for which no forecast was made pursuant to Measure 2 of this document or if the activity is one for which a forecast was made but the information provided in the forecast has been changed.

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Measure 4: Observation of Certain Military Activities

1. Each participating State will be permitted to send observers to military activities. Observation of a military activity will include observation of all forces participating in the activity, including the forces of participating States other than the host State.
2. Invitations. At the time notification of a military activity is given pursuant to Measure 3 of this document, the host State will invite the other participating States to send observers to the activity. A host State need not invite to a military activity observers from a participating State which has given notice to the host State that it does not desire to receive such invitations. A participating State which has given such notice should thereafter receive invitations at any time if it gives notice to the host State of its desire to receive such invitations. A host State need not invite observers to a military activity from a participating State which does not maintain diplomatic relations with the host State.
3. Duration. The host State will permit observers to begin observation of a military activity at the time that activity commences. The host State need not permit observation once the end of the activity is reached as indicated in the notification or once the criteria for a military activity pursuant to Measure 3 of this document are no longer met, whichever occurs later.
4. Alerts. The participating States need not invite observers to a military activity carried out as an alert unless the alert has a duration of more than 48 hours. If an alert activity has a duration of more than 48 hours, the other participating States will be permitted to observe the alert 36 hours after it begins.
5. Observer personnel. A participating State will be permitted to send not more than two observers to a military activity. Each participating State will provide the names of its observers to the host State at the earliest possible time. Wherever possible, at least one of these observers



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will be from the military personnel of that participating State accredited to the host State.

6. Protection and immunities. When in the territory within the zone of any participating State, observers will be granted those diplomatic privileges and immunities necessary to enable them to perform their tasks fully and unhindered at all times. (Details to be decided in the course of negotiations.)

7. Co-ordination and arrangements. Invitations to observe a military activity will be issued through diplomatic channels at the time of notification of the activity. Arrangements for observation will be co-ordinated between the host State and the observing State through the embassy of the observing State to the host State, unless those States agree to use another channel.

8. Co-ordination with other participating States. Host State responsibilities, other than the responsibility to invite observers, may be delegated by the host State to another participating State engaged in the military activity on the territory of the host State, if that other participating State agrees to assume the responsibility. In such cases, the allocation of responsibilities will be specified in the invitations to observe the activity.

9. Logistics. The host State will provide appropriate facilities and hospitality for observers at the site of a military activity being observed.

10. Transportation. The host State will provide transportation for observers in the area of the military activity. If requested by an observing State, the host State will provide transportation for observers from the embassy of the observing State or its nearest consulate to the area of the activity. The observing State may use its consular or diplomatic vehicles to transport its own observers to a location designated by the host State, where the observers will transfer to vehicles of the host State. The transfer point will be near a location suitable for observation of the activity.

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11. Communications. Observers will have access to telecommunication facilities that will allow timely contact with their embassies or nearest consulates.

12. Scope of observation.

(a) For each military activity, the host State will:

- (i) guide the observers in the area of the activity;
- (ii) allow the observers to use personal optical observation equipment necessary to perform their duties;
- (iii) give detailed briefings on exercise scenarios;
- (iv) inform the observers of the progress of the activity and provide an opportunity to view directly all formations engaged in the activity;
- (v) provide other information and observation opportunities sufficient to allow the observers to form a judgement as to the non-threatening nature of the activity.

(b) In addition, the host State will:

- (i) in the case of out-of-garrison land activities, allow the observers to observe all phases of the activity, including associated air landings, and rail, port and road movements, in the zone between the garrison and the area of out-of-garrison deployment;
- (ii) in the case of an amphibious activity, allow observers to observe sea landings and associated air landings from a location on land;
- (iii) in the case of a mobilization activity, allow observers to observe the arrival at garrisons of personnel and vehicles; and
- (iv) allow the observing State all the rights of observation provided for each type of activity when different types of military activities are combined.

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Measure 5: Compliance and Verification

1. Each participating State will use available national technical means of verification in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.
2. No participating State may interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other participating States operating in accordance with paragraph 1.
3. Inspections. Each participating State will be permitted to inspect a military activity or possible military activity within the zone for the purpose of monitoring compliance with agreed CSBMs. A participating State requesting such an inspection will cite the circumstances occasioning its request, and the participating State receiving the request will comply with the request. Any possible dispute as to the validity of this citation will not prevent or delay the conduct of an inspection.
4. Inspection Quota. No more than two per participating State per calendar year. An inspection will not be counted if, due to force majeure, it cannot be made or is discontinued.
5. Method of Inspection. A receiving State will permit inspections from the ground, from the air, or both.
6. Area for Inspection. Except as stipulated in paragraph 7, below, an inspecting State is permitted to designate any area for inspection within the territory of a participating State within the zone. Such an area is referred to as a "designated area". In a designated area, the inspecting State will be permitted access, entry and unobstructed survey.
7. Exceptions. The receiving State will not be required to permit inspections of any restricted areas. These areas should, however, be as few in number and as limited in extent as possible. In particular, the receiving State will also not be required to permit inspections within:

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- (a) defence installations, for example, naval bases, dockyards, garrisons, military airfields, firing ranges, buildings or defence research development or production establishments to which access by the general public is normally restricted or denied;
  - (b) naval vessels, military vehicles or aircraft.
8. Communication Channels. The participating States will use diplomatic channels for communications concerning inspections unless the receiving State and inspecting State agree otherwise.
9. Co-ordination. In its request, the inspecting State will notify the receiving State of:
- (a) the location of the designated area, by giving the geographical co-ordinates of the area;
  - (b) the mode of transport to and from the designated area;
  - (c) whether the inspection will be from the ground, the air, or both;
  - (d) information for the issuance of diplomatic visas to inspectors entering the receiving State.
10. Timing. An inspection will proceed in the following sequence:
- (a) within 12 hours after the issuance of an inspection request, the receiving State will reply to the inspecting State, make necessary administrative arrangements for the inspection, and transmit co-ordinating information, including the points of entry to its territory. The receiving State will ensure that the inspection team is able to reach the designated area without delay from the points of entry;
  - (b) within not less than 24 hours nor more than 36 hours after the issuance of an inspection request, unless otherwise mutually agreed, the inspection team will be permitted to enter the territory of the receiving State;

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- (c) the inspecting State will inform the receiving State of any delay in its arrival within 36 hours at the points of entry to the territory of the receiving State and indicate the extra time needed to arrive at the points of entry;
- (d) within 48 hours after the arrival of the inspection team at the designated area, unless otherwise mutually agreed, the inspection will be terminated.
11. Report of an Inspection. The inspecting State will prepare a report of its inspection and will provide a copy of that report to all participating States.
12. Third Parties. The forces of participating States other than the receiving State within the designated area will be included in an inspection at the discretion of the inspecting State. All participating States will facilitate the passage of inspection teams through their territory.
13. Inspection Team. An inspection team will consist of no more than four inspectors, in addition to aircraft crew and one accompanying driver for each land vehicle supplied by the inspecting State. The personnel of the inspection team may be brought into the receiving State by the inspecting State for the purpose of the inspection, or be drawn from the personnel of the diplomatic and consular facilities of the inspecting State in the receiving State.
14. Transportation. The inspecting State may provide its own transportation, or, upon request, the receiving State will provide transportation. The inspection team is permitted, unless otherwise mutually agreed, one aircraft and two land vehicles.
15. Logistic Support. Upon request, the receiving State will furnish adequate food and lodging for the inspection team. The inspection team may provide their own tents or rations, and may make use of civilian facilities.

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16. Communications. The inspection team will have access to and may carry telecommunications equipment, the type of which will be subject to the approval of the receiving State.
17. Equipment. The inspection team will have the unrestricted use of its own maps, personal optical viewing devices, cameras and tape recorders. The use of other sensors or information-gathering devices for ground inspections is prohibited.
18. Protection and Immunities. When in the territory within the zone of any participating State, inspectors will be granted those diplomatic privileges and immunities necessary to enable them to perform their tasks fully and unhindered at all times. (Details to be decided in the course of negotiations.)
19. Travel with Inspectors. The receiving State will be permitted to accompany the inspection team during the period that the team is in the designated area. A representative of the receiving State may travel on each of the vehicles of the inspecting State while the vehicles are moving on land within the territory of the receiving State, and on the aircraft of the inspecting State from the time of the first landing of the aircraft on the territory of the receiving State until the time of the final take-off of the aircraft from the territory of the receiving State.
20. Modalities for Inspection. (Other modalities for inspection to be inserted here.)

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Measure 6: Development of Means of Communication

1. The participating States will establish dedicated communications links.
2. The participating States may use such dedicated communications links to quickly and directly contact each other for the expeditious handling of the flow of information required by agreed CSBMs.
3. Under certain circumstances, the participating States may use such dedicated communications links for communications on matters of urgency related to agreed CSBMs.

The sixteen sponsors of this document note that this measure should be agreed insofar as the CSBMs finally agreed at the Conference warrant such a measure.

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DEFINITIONS

1. The "zone" will cover the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area\* and air space. As far as the adjoining sea area\* and air space is concerned, the measures will be applicable to the military activities of all participating States taking place there whenever these activities affect security in Europe as well as constitute a part of activities taking place within the whole of Europe as referred to above, which they will agree to notify. Necessary specifications will be made through the negotiations on the confidence- and security-building measures at the Conference. Nothing in the definition of the zone given above will diminish obligations already undertaken under the Final Act. The confidence- and security-building measures to be agreed upon at the Conference will also be applicable in all areas covered by any of the provisions in the Final Act relating to confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament.
2. A "military activity" is an out-of-garrison land activity, mobilization activity or amphibious activity, in the zone. The definitions of these activities are set forth in Measure 3 of this document.
3. An "alert" is a particular type of "military activity" undertaken without advance notice to the troops involved.
4. A "host State" is a participating State upon whose territory a military activity takes place.
5. An "observer" is a representative designated by an observing State to observe a military activity under Measure 4 of this document.

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\* In this context, the notion of adjoining sea area is understood to refer also to ocean areas adjoining Europe.

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6. An "observing State" is a participating State that accepts an invitation under Measure 4 and sends one or more representatives to observe a military activity.
7. A "receiving State" is a participating State upon whose territory an inspection takes place under Measure 5.
8. An "inspecting State" is a participating State that requests an inspection under Measure 5.
9. An "inspector" is a representative designated by an inspecting State to inspect a military activity or possible military activity under Measure 5.
10. Other terms would also have to be defined, including:
  - "major ground formations and main combat units"
  - "land-based air formations"
  - "wing, air regiment or equivalent formations"
  - "normal peacetime location"

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PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY THE DELEGATION OF ROMANIA  
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs)  
(Outline)

In accordance with the aim of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, as agreed upon by the second CSCE follow-up meeting, which is for this Conference, "as a substantial and integral part of the multilateral process initiated by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, with the participation of all States signatories of the Final Act, to undertake, in stages, new effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations;"

In accordance, also, with the provision of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting, which states that "the Conference will begin a process of which the first stage will be devoted to the negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe;"

In view of the prevailing conditions in Europe;

Romania considers that the goal of the first stage of the Conference could be achieved by the negotiation and the adoption of effective measures aimed at:

- elimination of suspicions and the sense of insecurity caused by certain military activities;

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- diminution of military activities in the border areas; restraint of military activities generating mistrust and tension; limitation of the geographical area of military activities causing the risk of confrontation;
- extension of information, communication and consultations between States, especially in critical situations.

Such measures should be so formulated as to respond to the criteria provided in the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting, which, in turn, are to be so applied as to ensure the attainment of maximum efficiency of these measures. The negotiations could be conceived as a gradual process, aimed at the adoption of an increasingly larger set of measures, in keeping with the relevant provisions of the Concluding Document.

Proceeding from these considerations, Romania proposes the following measures:

## I

Notification at least 30 days in advance of military manoeuvres in which take part:

- land or combined forces in excess of (18,000-20,000) troops;
- special forces, such as paratroops and amphibious, in excess of (5,000) troops;
- more than (10-12) surface battle-ships having a total displacement of (50,000-60,000) tons;
- airforce units with more than (45-50) aircraft fighters.

Notification will contain information on the purpose and duration of the manoeuvre, the type of armed forces engaged, numerical strength, armament, combat technique and means of transport, the area of deployment, as well as any other useful information.

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Notification at least 30 days in advance of major military movements involving:

- two or more divisions or their equivalent;
- major transportation of heavy armaments and other war material with which two or more divisions or their equivalent could be equipped.

Notification will contain similar information as above.

Prior notification, or as soon as possible in emergency situations, of the placing in a state of alert of national or foreign armed forces or of important components of such forces.

## II

Limitation of the armed forces participating in military manoeuvres to a maximum of (40,000-50,000) land troops and establishment of ceilings for the number of battle-ships and aircraft fighters.

Renunciation of multinational military manoeuvres within a zone along each side of the borders between States (width to be determined).

Creation along the borders between States of security zones (width to be determined) in which there would be no manoeuvres, movements or concentrations of armed forces and armaments and no placing in a state of alert of important components of such forces; limitation of the armed forces, armaments and military activities in such regions, as a step towards the establishment of demilitarized zones.

Establishment along the borders between the countries members of NATO and the countries participating in the Warsaw Treaty of a corridor free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (width to be determined) and, in a longer perspective, of any armaments and military activities, except for order and border forces.

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Prohibition of manoeuvres and movements of ships and aircraft with nuclear weapons on board within a zone along the land and maritime borders with other States (width to be determined).

Non-stationing of additional troops and non-deployment of additional military bases on the territory of other States, as well as cessation of the extension and modernization of the existing ones.

Encouragement of, and support for the establishment of zones of peaceful co-operation and good neighbourliness, free of nuclear weapons, in the Balkans, in the North of Europe and in other regions of the continent.

## III

Establishment of a system of information, communication and consultations among States on problems relating to their security, and prevention and management of crises. Such a system could include:

- consultations between governmental representatives on regular basis and wherever necessary;
- setting-up of a standing consultative body which would meet periodically and in emergency sessions;
- establishment of a system of telephone connections for consultations between the heads of State and government and organization of summit meetings in emergency situations.

Adoption of measures to prevent nuclear conflict by error or accident, including:

- creation of a mechanism of rapid communication between governmental representatives;
- adoption of emergency procedures and development of technical means.

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IV

Conclusion of an all-European Treaty on the non-use or threat of force, containing concrete provisions and measures designed to give practical effect to the duty of States to refrain from the use or threat of force in their mutual relations. Such a treaty will constitute a corollary of the efforts being deployed at the Stockholm Conference.

Freezing of the military expenditures of States at the level of 1984 until further agreement is reached on their gradual reduction.

Such measures should be accompanied by the prohibition of war propaganda and the encouragement of peaceful relations between States. Systematic information of the public opinion on the progress achieved in the negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures would also contribute to the creation of a favourable climate for the work of the Stockholm Conference.

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PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY THE DELEGATIONS OF AUSTRIA, CYPRUS,  
FINLAND, LIECHTENSTEIN, MALTA, SAN MARINO, SWEDEN  
SWITZERLAND AND YUGOSLAVIA

on

CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES

The above-mentioned States,

RECALLING that this Conference, which is held within the CSCE process shall take place outside military alliances,

REAFFIRMING their respective policies of neutrality or non-alignment which constitute important contributions to stability in Europe,

EMPHASIZING that their military capabilities by their very structure and organization are solely devoted to national defence purposes and do not present a threat to other States,

STRESSING the need for the respect of the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, according to which the participating States will refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions of the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, in particular from invasion of or attack on its territory,

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CONSCIOUS of the need for all participating States to give due attention to the complementary nature of the political and military aspects of security within the CSCE process and to contribute to the efficient and successful work of this Conference,

SUBMIT THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS:

- A) The situation in Europe and the equal respect for the legitimate security interests of every participating State require determined efforts by all of them to build mutual confidence, lessen military confrontation, strengthen security for all and promote disarmament.
- B) The measures to be negotiated and adopted in Stockholm should, with the added dimension of security, constitute important progress with respect to the confidence-building measures contained in the Final Act and thereby promote the subsequent negotiations on disarmament.
- C) The aim of this Conference is, as a substantial and integral part of the multilateral process initiated by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, with the participation of all the States signatories of the Final Act, to undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations.
- D) The Conference has thus begun a process of which the first stage will be devoted to the negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe.
- E) The negotiations should be conducive to dialogue and the improvement of communication among the participating States in general, thereby making the Conference in itself a factor of confidence-building and reduction of tensions. Common efforts to increase confidence contribute to achieving security for all participating States.



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- F) The provision of the Final Act, according to which security in Europe is to be considered in the broader context of world security and is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean area as a whole, should be borne in mind.
- G) A balanced set of mutually complementary measures to be negotiated and adopted should - in conformity with the relevant provisions of the mandate - include the further development and enlargement of the confidence-building measures contained in the Final Act and their adaptation to the mandate, as well as qualitatively new confidence- and security-building measures, including inter alia constraints on certain military activities. Concrete measures, such as the following, should be actively considered:

- 1) Prior notification of major military manoeuvres.

Substantially improved parameters as compared to those laid down in the Final Act, including earlier prior notification, more detailed information, inter alia on the purpose of the manoeuvres, on the units involved and on the level of command as well as parameters relating to the organizational level and/or the number of troops.

- 2) Prior notification of smaller-scale military manoeuvres which are carried out close to each other in time and space, if the total forces engaged exceed the levels agreed upon under item 1.
- 3) Prior notification of military manoeuvres involving amphibious, sea-transported, air-borne, air-mobile forces or combinations thereof.

The parameters should be significantly lower than for major military manoeuvres and relate to the organizational level, the number of troops and the capacity of their specialized means of transport.

- 4) Prior notification of major military movements.

The parameters should relate to the organizational level, the number of troops and/or the capacity of their specialized means of transport.

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- 5) Prior notification of major military activities, including manoeuvres, in the adjoining sea area and air space, whenever these activities affect security in Europe as well as constitute a part of activities taking place within the whole of Europe and within all other areas covered by any of the provisions of the Final Act relating to confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament, which the participating States will agree to notify.
- 6) Invitation of observers to military manoeuvres and movements subject to prior notification at levels to be determined; improved and standardized conditions for observers.
- 7) Prior notification of redeployment of major military units as well as of major rotations of military personnel.  
  
The parameters should relate to the organizational level, the number of troops and/or the capacity of their specialized means of transport.
- 8) Notification of certain other major military activities.
- 9) Exchange of annual calendars of preplanned major military activities.
- 10) Ceiling for the forces engaged in a major military manoeuvre or in manoeuvres which are carried out close to each other in time and space.  
  
The parameters should relate to the organizational level and/or the number of troops.
- 11) Ceiling for amphibious, air-borne, air-mobile forces or combinations thereof engaged in military manoeuvres.

The parameters should be significantly lower than under item 10 and relate to the organizational level, the number of troops and the capacity of their specialized means of transport.

- 12) Constraints on the deployment in areas to be determined of military units and/or equipment of vital importance for sustained offensive

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- H) A wide range of confidence- and security-building measures should be subject to negotiation already from the outset. The measures will include adequate verification provisions which correspond to their content.
- The negotiations could initially focus on a combination of mutually complementary measures - as illustrated in paragraph G) - on which early agreement might be reached.
- I) Such concrete confidence- and security-building measures serve, by their very nature, to give effect and expression to the duty of the participating States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations as well as in their international relations in general. They thereby create conditions for considering a reaffirmation, in appropriate ways and forms, of this obligation and the commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes, undertaken in the United Nations Charter and the Final Act.
- J) The Conference could also consider other measures, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the mandate, which are conducive to lessening the risk of military confrontation and the possibility of surprise attack, and to exerting genuine efforts towards containing an increasing arms build-up as well as to strengthening confidence and security and promoting disarmament.
- K) Arrangements for dealing with information, notification and rapid exchange of views with regard to measures that may be adopted could be envisaged.
- L) The negotiations should take due account of the mandate, according to which the provisions established by the negotiators will come into force in the forms and according to the procedure to be agreed upon by the Conference.
- M) A meaningful contribution to the building of confidence would be the undertaking by the participating States to apply the standardized reporting system on military expenditure elaborated by the United Nations.

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- N) Negotiations should aim at timely and substantial progress in order to provide the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting with sufficient new elements when considering the question of supplementing the present mandate for the next stage of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe in order to deal also with disarmament.

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CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES IN EUROPE

Proposals of the Soviet Union

The situation in Europe and in the entire world requires a radical turn in the policies of States away from confrontation to peaceful co-operation and major practical steps commensurate with the extent of the existing threat to peace.

Attempts to upset the existing military and strategic balance result in a sharp aggravation of international tension and an increased risk of military confrontation, including nuclear confrontation. The continuing deployment of new United States missiles in some West European countries undermines confidence and security in Europe and outside it.

The vital interests of the European peoples and of the whole of mankind require that the relations between nuclear powers be governed by certain norms and that the prevention of nuclear war become the main objective of their foreign policies.

Acting in accordance with the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and with the mandate of the present Conference adopted at the Madrid Meeting, the Soviet delegation submits the following proposals and suggestions concerning confidence- and security-building measures in Europe.

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CSCE/SC.4

## I

The participating States of the Conference possessing nuclear weapons should assume an obligation not to be the first to use them. Such an obligation could be assumed unilaterally by each nuclear State which has not yet done so or it could become the subject of an appropriately drafted international agreement.

The assumption of such an obligation and strict compliance with it would equally meet the interests of all States, both nuclear and non-nuclear. It would constitute a measure of paramount importance, leading to a genuine political breakthrough in the field of confidence-building, and that not only among the nuclear powers.

In order to preclude the emergence of situations fraught with the risk of nuclear conflict, provision could be made for the nuclear States participating in the Conference to hold urgent consultations, seek clarifications and provide each other with the necessary information in the event of such a danger arising.

## II

The conclusion of a treaty on the non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations, as proposed by the Warsaw Treaty member States, would be a major confidence-building measure.

The States participating in the Conference could assume such obligations in accordance with their constitutional procedures, irrespective of whether they belong to military alliances, are neutral or non-aligned. Of course, all States of both the Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic alliance, military confrontation between whom is particularly dangerous in Europe, should become parties to such a treaty.

An obligation not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional arms against each other, and hence, not to use military force against each other at all, could form the central provision of the treaty.

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Such an obligation would cover the territories of all parties to the treaty, as well as their military and civilian personnel, naval, air and space craft, and other facilities belonging to them, wherever situated. Further, the parties to the treaty should undertake not to endanger the security of international sea, air and space communications passing through areas not covered by any national jurisdiction.

The treaty could also contain other important provisions, aimed at creating confidence, developing co-operation and reducing military confrontation.

The conclusion of the proposed treaty would have a beneficial effect on the development of the entire international situation, would radically reinforce the political and legal foundation underlying compliance with the principle of refraining from the use or threat of force and would enhance the effectiveness of that principle, thereby creating substantive guarantees against the outbreak of military conflicts in Europe, and not in Europe alone.

### III

Taking into account the fact that the steep rise in military expenditures intensifies the arms race and imposes an increasingly heavy burden on the peoples, the Warsaw Treaty States on 5 March 1984 addressed a proposal to the NATO member States on the freezing and reduction of military spending in percentage points or absolute figures. Of course, all the States represented at the Stockholm Conference, and especially those possessing major military capabilities, could participate in the efforts to halt the further growth of military spending and reduce it. The resources released as a result of a cut in military spending would be used for the purposes of economic and social development, including assistance to developing countries.

Agreement on that score would constitute a major contribution to confidence building and at the same time provide a realistic means of curbing the arms race.

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IV

Ridding Europe of chemical weapons and, above all, not stationing such weapons where there are none at present, as envisaged in the proposals of the Warsaw Treaty member States of 10 January 1984, would help to overcome mistrust between States. The presence of chemical weapons in the densely populated territory of Europe poses a grave threat to all European States and peoples. Given the current aggravation of international tension and the existing risk of the use of chemical weapons, the task of ridding Europe of chemical weapons has become especially pressing.

Such steps would also facilitate agreement to ban chemical weapons and destroy stockpiles of such weapons on a global scale.

V

The Soviet Union takes a positive view of proposals to create nuclear-free zones in various parts of Europe, as is advocated by a number of European States. The creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans, the turning of Northern Europe into a nuclear-free zone, and the establishment of a zone in Europe free from battlefield nuclear weapons on both sides of the contact line between the States of the Warsaw Treaty and of NATO, are directly related to reducing the risk of war and strengthening confidence. These questions deserve serious attention at the Conference.

VI

Taking into account the useful experience gained in implementing the confidence-building measures specified in the relevant provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, it is proposed that a start should now be made on the elaboration of additional confidence-building measures, more significant in nature and broader in scope, specifically such as:

Limitation to a certain numerical level of the scale of ground-force military manoeuvres, conducted independently or jointly with air-force or naval components, including amphibious and airborne troops, in Europe as well as in the adjoining sea (ocean) area and air space.

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This measure is all the more pressing since it is difficult to differentiate between modern large-scale military manoeuvres and the preparatory stages of deployment of armed forces for the purpose of commencing hostilities in the European theatre.

Prior notification of major military manoeuvres, exceeding a certain level, of ground troops, air and naval forces, conducted independently, jointly in Europe and the adjoining sea (ocean) area and air space. In this context the term "troops" also includes amphibious and airborne troops.

Prior notification of major movements and transfers, exceeding a certain level, of ground troops and air forces in Europe and in the adjoining sea (ocean) area and air space, as well as into this area and out of it. In this context the term "troops" also includes amphibious and airborne troops.

Development of the existing practice of inviting observers from other participating States to attend major military manoeuvres.

In accordance with the mandate, confidence- and security-building measures will be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content and are to be agreed upon at the Conference.

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CSCE  
CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE-  
AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES  
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE  
STOCKHOLM 1984

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CSCE/SC.5  
Stockholm, 8 November 1984  
Original: ENGLISH

PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY THE DELEGATION OF MALTA

Confidence- and Security-Building Measures

The Participating States

Conscious that navigation on the High Seas and overflight are to be reserved for peaceful purposes,

Deeply aware that the Mediterranean provides important commercial sea and air routes for participating and non-participating States,

Recognising that the particular nature of an enclosed sea such as the Mediterranean imposes specific constraints on the otherwise uninhibited exercise of navigation on the high seas,

Recognising further that the riparian Mediterranean states participating and non-participating alike, have special security interests in this sea,

Recalling the close linkage between security in Europe and security in the Mediterranean as expounded in the CSCE Final Act and reiterated in the Madrid Concluding Document,

Acknowledging the desirability of strengthening confidence and security in the Mediterranean region even in the interest of security in Europe itself,

Agree to the following confidence and security building measures:

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A. Measures of information

At the start of each calendar year participating states will exchange:

1. Information on the number and structure of armed personnel stationed in the Mediterranean, whose duties are directly related to Naval Movements.
2. Information on the type and number of amphibious and other troop-carrying sea-borne units stationed in the Mediterranean.
3. Information on the type and number of major surface combat units stationed in the Mediterranean.

B. Measures of notification

Participating states agree to give each other notification in advance:

1. Of all instances of the exercise of the right of innocent passage through the territorial waters of Mediterranean participating states.
2. Of naval movements involving the sea transportation at any one time across Mediterranean waters of armed personnel in excess of agreed number.
3. Of amphibious activities involving a combined troop transportation capacity in excess of an agreed number of armed personnel.
4. Of naval manoeuvres involving more than a given number of surface combat units, having a total displacement of a specified tonnage.
5. Notifications under B3 and B4 will contain information about the purpose of and the states involved in the manoeuvre, the type or types and numerical strength of the forces engaged and the naval units involved, the area and estimated time frame of its conduct, as well as any other relevant information.

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C. Measures of restraint

Participating states agree

1. To restrict deployment and manoeuvres involving naval units and/or equipment of vital importance for sustained offensive operations to areas to be determined in the Mediterranean.
2. To progressively scale down the number of major naval manoeuvres involving combined amphibious, airborne and surface combat units, in which they participate each year.
3. Respect a ceiling of an agreed number of armed personnel and an agreed number of surface combat units for any independent or joint naval exercise in the Mediterranean.

D. Measures of observation and verification

1. Participating states agree to provide necessary facilities for all other participating states to observe pre-notified naval manoeuvres.
2. Adequate verification measures corresponding to the restraint measures outlined above will be agreed upon.

E. Measures of security

1. Participating states undertake not to use their land, sea and/or air forces in the Mediterranean against riparian states except in self-defence.
2. Participating states undertake not to allow the utilisation of foreign armaments, forces, bases and military facilities existing on their territories against Mediterranean riparian states.
3. They shall also desist from deploying their naval forces in a manner that constitutes a threat of the use of force against Mediterranean riparian states.
4. Participating states undertake not to station nuclear weapons in Mediterranean waters.

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F. Final consideration

It is understood that the above measures will also apply vis-à-vis non-participating Mediterranean states to the extent that these states accept them.

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Working Document  
of the Delegation of the Soviet Union

BASIC PROVISIONS FOR A TREATY ON THE MUTUAL  
NON-USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND THE MAINTENANCE  
OF PEACEFUL RELATIONS

The objective of an accord on the non-use of military force is to take, in conditions of a persisting nuclear threat, a large-scale step aimed at lessening the danger of military confrontation and facilitating a radical turn in the policies of states away from confrontation to peaceful co-operation.

Reaffirming the obligation they assumed under the United Nations Charter to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force, the States participating in the Conference consider it necessary to develop and give concrete form to this principle, and to make it binding to a maximum extent.

Taking into account the fact that the States represented at the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe recognized in the Helsinki Final Act the necessity to make the provision on refraining from the threat or use of force an effective norm of international life and undertook to give effect and expression by all the ways and forms which they consider appropriate to the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force in their relations with one another, they now consider it very timely to conclude for that purpose a treaty on the non-use of military force.

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1. An obligation not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional arms against each other, and hence, not to use military force against each other at all, would form the central provision of the proposed treaty.

2. This obligation would mean that the parties to the treaty

- would refrain from any use of military force against another State party, inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, in particular from invasion of or attack on its territory;

- would not endanger the security of international sea, air and space communications passing through areas not covered by any national jurisdiction.

3. Such an obligation would cover the territories of all parties to the treaty as well as their military and civilian personnel, naval, air and space craft, and other facilities belonging to them, wherever situated.

4. The treaty would bind its parties not to use force against third countries, whether those countries maintain with them bilateral relations of alliance, are non-aligned or neutral.

5. The parties to the treaty would make efforts aimed at preventing a space weapons race, terminating the race in nuclear as well as conventional arms, limiting and reducing arms and achieving disarmament based on the principle of equality of rights, balance and reciprocity, and equal respect for security interests.

6. The treaty could include an obligation for its parties to consider jointly and individually practical measures aimed at preventing the danger of a surprise attack.

7. The parties to the treaty would co-operate in enhancing the effectiveness of the United Nations in fulfilling, in accordance with its Charter, the tasks of peaceful settlement of international disputes and situations of conflict, suppressing acts of aggression, and removing the threat to international peace and security.

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8. In the event of the emergence of a risk of war and the use of military force the parties to the treaty would hold urgent consultations, seek clarifications and provide one another with necessary information.

9. The treaty would not limit the inalienable right of its parties to individual and collective defence in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

10. Nothing in the treaty would affect the rights and duties of the participating States under the United Nations Charter, treaties and agreements previously concluded by them.

11. The parties would assume obligations under the treaty in accordance with their constitutional procedures, irrespective of whether they belong to military alliances, are neutral or non-aligned.

12. The treaty would be open for participation in it by all other States that so desired, and would enter into force upon accession to it by all States members of the Warsaw Treaty and of the North Atlantic alliance.

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CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE-  
AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES  
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE  
STOCKHOLM 1984

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CSCE/SC/WGA.1  
Stockholm, 7 February 1985

ENGLISH  
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Working Document  
of the Delegations of the People's Republic of Bulgaria,  
the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics

LIMITATION OF THE SCALE OF MILITARY MANOEUVRES

With the aim of undertaking new, effective and concrete actions  
designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security,

Taking into account the fact that large-scale troop manoeuvres,  
which are at present difficult to distinguish from the preparatory stages  
of deployment of armed forces for the purpose of commencing hostilities,  
represent a grave threat to the security of States as well as a source of  
unpredictability, possible miscalculations and misunderstanding of the  
purposes of such manoeuvres,

Bearing in mind that limitation of the scale of military manoeuvres  
would contribute to reducing military confrontation in Europe,

The following is proposed:

Military manoeuvres involving a total of more than 40,000 troops  
should not be conducted, independently or jointly with other participating  
States, on the territory of the participating States in Europe including  
the adjoining sea (ocean) area and air space. This provision applies to  
ground-force manoeuvres, conducted independently or jointly with any  
possible air or naval components.

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In the case of independent manoeuvres of amphibious or airborne troops, or of combined manoeuvres involving them, these troops will be included in the aforementioned total.

In the context of this document the term "forces" ("troops") also includes amphibious and airborne troops.

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**DELEGATION LISTS**

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CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE-  
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AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

20 May 1985

STOCKHOLM 1984

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS  
(as communicated by Delegations)

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\* The previous edition was printed  
on 4 February 1985

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Mr Pierre SCHORI	Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Delegate
Mr Curt LIDGARD	Ambassador, Head of Delegation
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Mr Sture ERICSON	Member of Parliament, Delegate
Mr Rune ÅNGSTRÖM	Member of Parliament, Delegate
Mr Stig ALEMYR	Member of Parliament, Delegate
Mrs Anita BRÅKENHIELM	Member of Parliament, Delegate
Mr Jan ELIASSON	Ambassador, Under-Secretary for Political Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Delegate
Mr Carl-Magnus HYLTIENIUS	Assistant Under-Secretary, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Delegate

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Mr Jan PRAWITZ	Special Adviser on Disarmament, Ministry of Defence, Expert

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Captain (Navy) Jan ÅKERHJELM	Defence Staff, Expert
Lieutenant Colonel Vulf HESSULF	Ministry of Defence, Expert
Mr Johan TUNBERGER	Senior Security Policy Analyst, National Defence Research Institute, Expert
Mr Lars LÖNNBACK	Ambassador, Assistant Under- Secretary, Head of Press and Information Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Expert
Mr Bertil JOBEUS	Head of Press Division, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Expert
Mr Johan NORDENFELT	Deputy Director, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Expert
Mr Thomas GANSLANDT	Counsellor, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Expert
Mr Ove BRING	Doctor of Laws, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Expert
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Ms Britt-Marie HEDIN	Senior Administrative Officer
Ms Sophie PIUVA	Senior Administrative Officer

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Mr Benoit JUNOD	Counsellor, Deputy Head of Delegation
Mr Josef SCHÄRLI	Major EMG, Military Adviser
Mr Urs STEMMLER	Second Secretary
Miss Susanna JUTZI	Secretary of the Delegation

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Mr Gérard STOUDMANN	Second Secretary (non-permanent)
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Mr Pierre MONOD	Counsellor
Mr André MURISSET	Attaché
Colonel Hans STÖSSEL	Defence Attaché
Captain Urs BERGER	Deputy Defence Attaché

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Ambassador, Head of Delegation

Mr Deniz BÖLÜKBASI

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I.S. ROZANOV	Member of Delegation
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V.V. LEZHEN	Expert
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P.N. KUGUYENKO	Counselor
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G.S. BAKHTIN	Second Secretary
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Colonel R.W. BACK	Military Adviser
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Mr J.L. TAYLOR	First Secretary
Mr S.R.H. PEASE	Second Secretary
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Miss S.A. CHURCHLEY	Personal Assistant
Miss K.E. GILLMORE	Administrative and Technical Assistant
Mr I. JONDORF	
Mr J. BERG	

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Sir Richard PARSONS, KCMG, HM	Ambassador
Mr R.M. JACKSON, CVO	Counsellor
Mr B.S. ROBERTS	Counsellor
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Mrs M. BRADFIELD, MBE	First Secretary
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Major General Jonas BLANK	Delegate
Mr Jeremy CURTIN	Delegate
Mr John FINNERTY	Delegate
Ms Priscilla GALASSI	Delegate
Mr Jon GUNDERSEN	Delegate
Mr Kenneth HUCK	Delegate
Major Carl C. KREHBIEL	Delegate
Mr Rolf MOWATT-LARSSON	Delegate
Dr Howard STOFFER	Delegate
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Commander Howard N. THORKILSON	Delegate
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Mr Ints SILINS	Counsellor for Political Affairs, American Embassy, Stockholm
Mr Jerry KOMISAR	First Secretary, American Embassy, Stockholm
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Mr Allen F. SCHEEL	Attaché (Security)

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Mr Jan FRIBERG  
Mr Karl-Erik STENBÄCK  
Mr Guy ROSENQVIST  
Mr Åke BLIXT  
Ms Marie JÄGLUND  
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## Y U G O S L A V I A

Mr Aleksandar BOZOVIC	Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Colonel Branislav MIHAJLOVIC	Deputy Head of Delegation
Dr Ljubivoje ACIMOVIC	Special Adviser
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Mr Marjan OSOLNIK	Ambassador to Sweden
Mr Dobrosav VEIZOVIC	Counsellor of the Embassy, Stockholm
Mr Nedzad HADZIMUSIC	First Secretary of the Embassy, Stockholm

Administrative and Technical Staff

Mr Miodrag MARKUS	Administrative Secretary to the Delegation
Mrs Ratomirka DJORDJEVIC	Secretary
Mr Vojislav DJORDJEVIC	
Mr Vitomir STERNEN	

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**STATEMENT SUMMARIES**

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SUMMARY OF  
PLENARY STATEMENTS

14 MAY 1985

SPAIN

- Expression of importance Spain places on CDE.
- Helsinki, Madrid and CDE goal is reciprocal trust, end of arms race.
- All proposals including NUF and constraints deserve study.
- Notation of security concerns in Africa, Middle East and Latin America.
- Call for "more encouraging results" from CDE than achieved to date.

AUSTRIA

- Reaffirmation of the importance of NUF but only with comprehensive set of CSBMs (outlined).
- Call for end of mutual mistrust and the threat or use of force between states.
- Stress on importance of Helsinki process.

POLAND

- Reiteration of East's insistence on complementary "political-military" and "military-technical" measures.
- Call for "intense negotiations" to reach final agreements.
- Criticism of SDI.
- Support of NNA call for substantive negotiations.

IRELAND

- Call for openness to develop mutual trust.
- Outline of specific positions on notification (mandatory, standardized, broad, using structural parameters) and observation.
- Acknowledgement of difficulties in establishing constraints.
- Reaffirmation of NUF could be possible.

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ROMANIA

- Revised "common ground" speech calling for balanced measures commensurate with security interests of all participants.
- Focal point a solemn declaration of NUF, framed in non-treaty form.
- Outline of four concrete measures to ensure NUF.

UNITED STATES

- Using the Helsinki Final Act as a starting point, the CDE must reduce the possibility of war through detailed examination of concrete CSBMs in conjunction with principle of NUF.
- Request for clarification of three Eastern working documents (i.e., how they differ from past proposals).
- Explanation of US views on NUF.
- Observation of relationship between economic, cultural, humanitarian and security affairs.
- Repetition of importance of CDE to President.
- Criticism of USSR for murder of Major Nicholson.

USSR

- Attack on US for barbaric plans for chemical warfare in Europe.
- Response to US complaint concerning Major Nicholson with complaint that US is introducing a purely bilateral question into the conference.
- Repetition of standard Soviet views concerning the incident.

24 MAY 1985

FRG

- Statement applauding beginning of rapprochement on issues.
- Pledge of FRG cooperation.
- Stress on need for adequate verification.

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FRANCE

- Call for conclusion of Stockholm conference by summer of 1986.
- Need for informal working groups especially to discuss CSBMs and Eastern working papers.

BULGARIA

- Defense against charges that Pact proposals are abstract and propagandistic.
- Score West for rejection of NFU.
- ROMB better than annual calendars.
- Reiteration of commitment to verification.

UNITED STATES

- Call for further analysis of CSBMs before entering into intensive negotiations.
- Depiction of Warsaw Pact papers as weak while stating US willingness to study proposals conforming to the Mandate.
- Reaffirmation of the interrelationship between all principles of the Final Act.
- Strong statement on murder of Major Nicholson.

USSR

- Attack on US for alleged buildup of chemical weapons, which is blocking CW agreements at Geneva and Stockholm.

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31 MAY 1985

USSR

- Call for end of arms race, with NUF treaty playing important role.
- Political and military aspects of security mutually complementary.
- Applaud "businesslike" statement by US on 20 May but criticize bypassing of political aspects of CSBMs.
- Chide US for refusing to engage in "constructive negotiations" concerning Eastern proposals, especially NUF.
- Accuse US of "double standard" on NUF in public and at conference.

PORTUGAL

- Attribute greatest risk of war to wrong assessment by one state of another's intentions due to a lack of reliable information.
- Declaration that NATO package most viable for providing this information.

HUNGARY

- Justification of Eastern proposals on notification of independent air and naval activities, using non-geographic concept of Europe as potential area of confrontation.
- Expression of need for "sophistication and flexibility" in dealing with asymmetry in constraints.

UNITED STATES

- Statement chastising Soviets for introducing bilateral issues into CDE.
- Rejection of assertion that the US is refusing to discuss non-use of force.

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7 JUNE 1985

UNITED STATES

- Assertion that some participating states fail to observe Helsinki rules, noting failure of East to properly provide information on "Druzhiba-85" exercise.
- Assertion that CDE must carry out Madrid Mandate to develop precise specifications for CSBMs, not redefine the Mandate.
- Rejection of Hungarian attempt to redefine Mandate in quasi-strategic terms.

SWEDEN

- Presentation of verification as an expanded observation regime.
- Support of structural parameters over "counting soldiers" while at the same time lending support to Eastern call for notification of independent air and naval activities.
- Suggestion of "observation by challenge" during times of crisis.

ITALY

- Call for establishment of informal contact groups.
- Reiteration of NUF as a "valid operational projection" of concrete CSBMs.
- No opposition to constraint measures if they guarantee equal respect to all states.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- Discussion of parallel progress, "concrete negotiations," support for SC.4, etc.

USSR

- Claim that the US is seeking "unilateral advantage" in rejecting notification of independent air and naval exercises.

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FRG

- Caution to Soviet delegate to avoid misuse of mandate language that occurred in his preceding statement.

15 JUNE 1985

CYPRUS

- Statement concerning 11 June incident in which Turkish chairman refused to properly recognize Cypriot representative.
- Reminder of Helsinki Final Act assuring all states equal participation in the conference.

TURKEY

- Reiteration of Turkish reservation concerning the Final Act ruling mentioned by the Cypriot representative.

GDR

- Suggestion that a ban on chemical weapons would be of "special interest" to both Germanys.
- Progress on framework for a chemical weapons free zone in Central Europe agreed to by West German Social Democrats and East German Communist Party cited as evidence of shared interests.

FRG

- Rejection of East German implication that their views are compatible on the issue of regional chemical weapons.
- FRG supports Geneva agreement on a worldwide ban.

BULGARIA

- Argument that a NFU agreement would not be contrary to the Madrid Mandate or the right of states to self-defense as contained in the UN Charter.
- Assertion that NATO strategy seeks to reestablish nuclear superiority.

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NORWAY

- Outline of "elements of a possible agreement" at the conference including a set of concrete CSBMs conforming to the Madrid Mandate, a reaffirmation of non-use of force in the framework of CSBMs, and a set of constraints in accordance with the Mandate.
- Call for more effective working structure at the conference.

POLAND

- Reply to Norwegian statement questioning importance of NUF to the West and whether it is to be expressed only through CSBMs.
- Issue of form and content for NUF.
- Defense of Eastern notification papers.
- Time "has not yet come" to consider verification.
- Constraints should be viewed in the context of the whole package.

21 JUNE 1985

UNITED STATES

- Reaffirmation of the inseparable nature of all principles of the Helsinki Final Act.
- Results of the Ottawa meeting "will inevitably influence our evaluation of the achievements and prospects for the CSCE process as a whole".
- Commitment of US to negotiating substantial concrete and verifiable measures in Stockholm.

CANADA

- Expression of disappointment at the lack of a concluding document in the Ottawa human rights conference.
- Hope and expectation that CDE will achieve meaningful results.

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HUNGARY

- Introduction on behalf of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union of the East's fourth working document of this session dealing with prior notification of major military movements and transfers (defined as change in location of 20,000 troops within, into, or out of the area covered by CSBMs or transfer of more than 100 aircraft into the area).
- Major military movements in the sea and air space adjoining Europe to be notified "whenever these activities affect security in Europe as well as constitute a part of military activities taking place within the whole of Europe."
- Details of method and content of notification given.

SWITZERLAND

- Reinforcement of the connection between three baskets of the Helsinki Final Act.
- "Avowed failure" of Ottawa has serious implications for the CSCE process.
- Rejection of more than a "brief recall" of NUF especially while no progress is made in human rights basket.
- Swiss will present NUF proposal along these lines in future.

USSR

- Statement supporting new Eastern working paper.
- Claim that the West is deviating from the agenda of CDE in raising "unrelated matters" of human rights in contrast to the East's "businesslike" attitude.

GDR

- Follow-up on Soviet theme.
- Question of whether West wants extraneous issues (such as Cruise and Pershing missiles) to be raised at CDE.

ITALY

- Reading of the EC-10 foreign ministers meeting statement acknowledging that Ottawa "did not result in progress," but was nevertheless necessary and useful.

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CYPRUS

- Criticism of Canadian and Swiss statements tying Ottawa to Stockholm.
- Vienna is the appropriate forum to seek balanced progress within the CSCE process.

YUGOSLAVIA

- Reaffirmation of Yugoslav government's "strict respect" for all provisions of the Final Act and its opposition to all selective approaches.
- Brake (sic) in CDE progress because of Ottawa would set a bad precedent.
- Vienna is the appropriate forum to discuss such matters.

SPAIN

- Outline of some thoughts on NUF, verification and continuation of the present working structure.

28 JUNE 1985

CYPRUS

- Outline of Cypriot 8 March "Stockholm declaration of the non-use of force combining the 'static' principle of NUF with 'dynamic' CSBMs."
- Expectation that the "Ottawa cloud" would pass.
- Need to begin the drafting process as soon as possible in the next session.

FRG

- Welcome of Eastern notification papers as a contribution to the "subject of this conference," i.e., concrete CSBMs.
- Criticism of Eastern independent air and naval papers as "incompatible with the (CDE) zone."
- Claim that papers will not impact on Soviet activities.
- Western expectations include extension of the notification period, lower structural threshold, and more comprehensive "out-of-garrison" concept.

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FINLAND

- General assessment of the state of the conference including comments on notification/observation, verification, NUF, and constraints.

GDR

- Praise of the fourth Eastern notification paper as a "new dynamic element" for dispelling perceptions of threat.
- GDR especially concerned with troop movements from US.
- Now that the East has been so forthcoming, it is NATO's turn to compromise.

UNITED KINGDOM

- Query of GDR as to why US and UK movements were threatening and why GDR did not send observers to "Lion Heart 84" exercise.

USSR

- Statement disputing FRG contention that Soviet notification proposals "barely affect" the East.
- Characterization of SC.1/Amplified's inspection provision as "legalized espionage."
- Contrast of unacceptable NATO proposal with the Soviet vision of "optimal" verification (which must include air and naval exercises and the movements and transfers of troops in addition to ground force activities).

MALTA

- Proposal to continue present working structure until the end of the seventh session.

SWITZERLAND

- Interpretive statement on the "cut-off clause."

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FRANCE

- Request that the formal working structure be supplemented with informal arrangements next session.

POLAND

- Call for a "more advanced" phase of negotiation next session through informal working arrangements within the current working structure.

ROMANIA

- Notation of Romanian concern for rapid results and readiness to discuss all efforts to initiate concrete discussion.

5 JULY 1985

UNITED STATES

- Statement assessing progress at CDE VI as disappointing, lacking tangible results although positions on some key issues were clarified.
- "Limited vision" of Eastern delegations described using their working documents as evidence compared to SC.1/Amplified.
- Reiteration of US position that reaffirmation of NUF must be accompanied by concrete CSBMs.
- Connection of CDE to all aspects of Helsinki Final Act noted.
- US Congressional delegation headed by Dante Fascell introduced.

UNITED KINGDOM - FRG

- Accusation that East's notification papers on air, naval and movements/transfers are inconsistent with the CDE zone as defined by the Madrid Mandate.

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USSR

- Claim that the West ignored Warsaw Pact security concerns at CDE VI (examples given).
- "Poem" urging the NNA to make their contribution to substantive discussion as soon as possible.
- Statement defending Eastern interpretation of Madrid Mandate as valid.

USSR/POLAND

- Statement defending Eastern interpretation of Madrid Mandate as valid, and hence, their notification papers are all in accordance with the Mandate.

POLAND

- Statement outlining Eastern "accomplishments" during the sixth round.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- Upbeat statement noting the "lively discussion" and clarification of views in the sixth session.
- Expectation that more intense negotiations in the beginning of the seventh session will lead to drafting.

ROMANIA

- Suggestions on how to proceed next session in order to move into intensified negotiations.

CANADA

- Pessimistic evaluation of CDE VI focusing on lack of real give and take.

LUXEMBOURG

- Assessment of the sixth round noting positive emphasis on discussion of concrete CSBMs.
- Madrid Mandate, Helsinki Final Act and UN Charter must remain integral part of CDE.

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SUMMARY OF  
WORKING GROUP AB STATEMENTS

20 MAY 1985

CZECHOSLOVAKIA - POLAND - USSR

- Working document presented by Czechoslovakia, Poland and USSR calling for 30 day prior notification of major maneuvers of land forces (20,000 or more troops, including naval and air forces).
- Multinational maneuvers are included as well as transfer of troops to maneuver area.
- Information required in notification is specified.

GDR - HUNGARY - USSR

- Working document presented on behalf of the GDR, Hungary and USSR on prior notification of major air force maneuvers calling for 30 day advance notification of maneuvers of 200 or more military planes.
- Included is transfer of forces from outside area of activity.
- Information to be given is listed.

USSR - BULGARIA - POLAND

- Working document calling for prior notification of major maneuvers of naval forces (30 combat ships and 100 military planes) in the sea and air space adjoining Europe.
- Notification to be given to all participating states.
- National and joint maneuvers included.
- Information required in notification is listed.
- SDI and US first-strike capability criticized.

UNITED KINGDOM

- Statement welcoming Romanian areas of broad convergence.
- NUF and CSBMs must be linked.
- Outline of areas of convergence, constraints being excluded from such areas.

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UNITED STATES

- Pledge to study three Eastern proposals with the reservation that they do not at first appear to solve problems in differing approaches.
- The following subjects are vital to progress at CDE: types of military activities to be notified; threshold levels and unit of account for notification; effective use of observers; verification/information.

3 JUNE 1985

POLAND

- Attack on slow evolution of NATO position on NUF.
- Simple reaffirmation of NUF, or its "expression through measures," no longer acceptable to East.
- Praise of Eastern notification working documents and criticism of Western package as not in the security interests of all participants.
- Comments on the existing conference working structure.

GDR

- Demand that NATO explain its position on constraints and on NUF, especially FRG call for an "all-encompassing reaffirmation" of NUF.

FRG

- In response to GDR request, contrast of East's long awaited "piecemeal" proposals with NATO's fully developed package introduced early on.

CANADA

- Clarification of position on NUF: a treaty is not the appropriate form; language must not undermine UN Charter or Helsinki Final Act and concrete CSBMs must be included with reaffirmation of NUF.

PORTUGAL

- Question to Poland asking if the East's evolution on NUF is expressed by SC.4 and SC.6 or if there is more.
- Is the East willing to replace the formula by another?

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NETHERLANDS

- Justification of Measure 1 (information) and Measure 5 (verification) as separate measures of SC.1.
- Rejection of Eastern argument that information must be given in the context of notification.
- Verification and inspection part of an integrated element of the package.
- All states have some form of NTM.

ROMANIA

- Call for a balanced, substantive "common package" in conformity to the Madrid Mandate that meets the security concerns of each participant.
- Proposal that the conference draw up elements and framework of an agreement, concentrate on content of measures which will help reach consensus, proceed toward final agreement, and guide working groups to bring positions closer together for wider consensus.
- Explanation of discrepancy between Romanian aide-memoire and SC.2.

AUSTRIA

- Notation that contents of a common package are not yet so readily recognizable.
- Suggestions for improvement to working structure.

10 JUNE 1985

UNITED STATES

- Request for the East to explain verification provisions it contemplates for their proposals on notification of major maneuvers.
- Detailed explanation of Western approach to verification as embodied in SC.1/Amplified, specifically such "tools" of verification as national technical means, information, observation, consultations and inspections.

FRG

- Rebuttal of Soviet claim that FRG official statements on NUF differ from CDE delegation views.
- FRG seeks a "renewed, reiterated political" strengthening of NUF but only in the context of concrete CSBMs.

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BULGARIA

- Examination of the differences between East and West on the issue of NUF, i.e., basis in treaty (SC.6) vs. concrete measures of SC.1.
- Given Soviet willingness to discuss the latter why will the West not discuss the former?

USSR

- Rejection of the out-of-garrison concept which focuses on the units leaving the garrison rather than the threatening nature of the activity.
- Rejection of the structural parameter for notification because of the differing unit size, organization structure and equipment of armies as well as its inapplicability to air and naval forces.

MALTA

- Acknowledgement of two areas of common ground vis-a-vis constraints: that constraints must be part of a package of measures agreed on in CDE and that they are in accord with the Madrid mandate.
- Discussion of annual calendars.

19 JUNE 1985

UNITED STATES

- Acknowledgement that observation is a principle which all participants agree must be further developed.
- Examples of uneven implementation of observation principle and the need for any new document to provide for the same standards of implementation applicable to all participants.
- Request that the East expand on their views on how to improve observation of ground activities.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- Suggestion that the freeze and reduction of military budgets (FROMB) should be discussed at Stockholm.
- Accusation that US is planning to increase its defense budget in pursuit of "Star Wars."

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FRG

- Assertion that the East has failed to respond to two Western questions on FROMB.
- UN is the appropriate forum to answer these questions.

USSR

- Accusation that FRG Ambassador Citron constantly provides a "retort or reply" whenever Eastern countries speak.
- West is using the issue of verification to avoid discussing FROMB in the working group.

1 JULY 1985

UNITED STATES

- Discussion of critical common ground problems at the conference: types of military activities to be notified; threshold levels and unit of account for notification; effective use of observers; verification/information.

SWITZERLAND

- Statement that verification must be based on NTMs, information, observation, consultations and inspection.
- Request for NATO clarification of NTMs envisaged by Measure 5.
- List of observation questions raised by Measure 5.

USSR

- Allegation that the West has created independent measures for information and verification as an "obstructive device" in negotiation.
- Exchange of information cannot be an independent CSBM.
- Measure 1 of SC.1/Amplified does not meet the requirements of the Madrid Mandate.
- The scope of military information exchanged must be determined by the scale and content of agreed measures and must reflect the security interests of all participants.

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**SUBJECT INDEX**

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MAIN SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

- p - plenary meeting
- a - working group A
- b - working group B
- c - working group AB
- d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
- e - NATO caucus

ADJOINING SEA AND AIRSPACE: 20b, 21b/c, 25b/c, 28b/c, 31b/c, 35b/c, 59b, 105b, 159p, 267b, 322a, 348p, 377d, 388a, 408p, 416p.

ALERTS: 22b/c, 125b, 392a.

AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES: 106b, 270b, 417p.

BOGDANOV, I.S.: 290a, 457a.

CDE-VI:

General references to: 66e, 372a.

Expressions of dissatisfaction: 85p.

CDE ZONE: see also ZONAL CONSTRAINTS 20b, 21b/c, 23b/c, 25b/c, 28b/c, 31b/c, 59b, 148p, 158p, 348p, 376d, 377d, 390a, 460b.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS FREE ZONE: 303p.

COMMUNICATIONS: see DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS

COMPLIANCE: see also MEASURE 5 178a, 211p, 322a, 408p.

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 3p, 25b/c, 28b/c, 31b/c, 34b/c, 68a, 80e, 101a, 117a, 125b, 137d, 149p, 153p, 158p, 171c, 179a, 204p, 212p, 252c, 266b, 271b, 285a, 290a, 306p, 317a, 318a, 321a, 348p, 363a, 367a, 377d, 393a, 403p, 405p, 411p, 416p, 423c, 438a, 449d, 455a.

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**COUNTRY INDEXES**

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AUSTRIA SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

- p - plenary meeting
- a - working group A
- b - working group B
- c - working group AB
- d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
- e - NATO caucus

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    INSPECTIONS; OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES

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NON-FIRST-USE (OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS): 365a.

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NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE

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BULGARIA SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

- p - plenary meeting
- a - working group A
- b - working group B
- c - working group AB
- d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
- e - NATO caucus

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NFU: see NON FIRST USE (OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS)

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Geographic coordinates of the location of the activity: 33b/c.

Names of participating states: 32b/c.

Type of forces involved: 20b, 181b.

Number of troops participating: 33b/c.

Number of naval vesssels involved: 33b/c.

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NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE

NUF TREATY: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY

NWFZ: see NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE

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CYPRUS SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

- p - plenary meeting
- a - working group A
- b - working group B
- c - working group AB
- d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
- e - NATO caucus

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 411p.

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CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES

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HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 179a, 410p.

HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

MADRID MANDATE: 180a, 414p.

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NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE

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Verification by cadres: 414p.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

- p - plenary meeting
- a - working group A
- b - working group B
- c - working group AB
- d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
- e - NATO caucus

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CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES

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FROMB: see FREEZE AND REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS

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Of naval forces: 347p.

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NON-USE-OF-FORCE:

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Purpose of the activity: 42c, 349p.

Type of forces involved: 25b/c, 42c, 349p.

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NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE

NUF TREATY: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY

OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

General references to: 290a, 347p.

OOG: see OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES:

OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES (including discussion of differences): 447b.

PHASE II: 361a.

PRENOTIFICATION: 347p.

PRIOR NOTIFICATION: 23b/c, 25b/c, 290a, 343p.

SC.4: 330c, 348p.

SC.6: 178a.

SDI: see STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: 330c.

STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS: 447b.

THRESHOLDS: see EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS; MANPOWER THRESHOLDS;  
STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS.

TRANSFER/MOVEMENT OF TROOPS: 26b/c, 343p, 348p.

VERIFICATION:

General references to: 117a.

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EAST SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

- p - plenary meeting
  
- a - working group A
- b - working group B
- c - working group AB
- d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
- e - NATO caucus

ADJOINING SEA AND AIRSPACE: 21b/c.

ALERTS: 22b/c.

CDE ZONE: 21b/c.

EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS: 21b/c.

FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 21b/c.

HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: 21b/c.

MADRID MANDATE: 21b/c.

MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXERCISES (including discussion of differences):

General references to: 21b/c.

Of ground forces: 21b/c.

Of naval forces: 21b/c.

Of air forces: 21b/c.

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MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 21b/c.

NOTIFICATIONS:

General references to: 21b/c.

Designation of the activity: 22b/c.

Duration of the activity: 22b/c.

Geographic coordinates of the location of the activity: 22b/c.

Names of participating states: 22b/c.

Purpose of the activity: 22b/c.

Type of forces involved: 21b/c.

Number of troops participating: 21b/c.

Number of naval vessels involved: 21b/c.

Number of military aircraft involved: 21b/c.

Transfer/movement of troops, naval vessels or aircraft: 21b/c.

Information to be included: 22b/c.

SC.1 (also SC.1/Amplified): 22b/c.

SC.4: 16e.

TRANSFER/MOEMENT OF TROOPS: 21b/c.

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FINLAND SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

- p - plenary meeting
- a - working group A
- b - working group B
- c - working group AB
- d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
- e - NATO caucus

ADJOINING SEA AND AIRSPACE: 322a.

COMMUNICATIONS: see DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS

COMPLIANCE: 322a.

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 285a, 317a, 321a, 403p.

CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 290a, 403p, 465d.

CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES

DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS: 317a, 322a, 403p.

EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS: 266b.

EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS (of Activities Notifiable in Advance): see also MEASURE 2

General references to: 261b.

Military calendars: 261b.

EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION: see also MEASURE 1

General references to: 285a, 317a, 322a, 403p.

FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

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FINAL DOCUMENT: 465d.

HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 285a, 321a.

HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

IMPLEMENTATION: 317a, 321a.

INSPECTIONS:

General references to: 317a, 323a.

MADRID MANDATE: 321a, 403p.

MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 266b.

MEASURE 1: see also EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION 285a.

MEASURE 2: see also EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS 266b.

NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS: see also VERIFICATION 285a.

NON-USE-OF-FORCE:

General references to: 403p.

NOTIFICATIONS:

General references to: 321a, 403p.

NTM: see NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS

NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE

OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

General references to: 285a, 321a, 403p.

SC.1 (also SC.1/Amplified): 317a, 322a.

SC.2: 317a, 322a.

SC.3: 266b, 290a, 317a, 323a.

SC.6: 317a, 323a.

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STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS: 266b.

THRESHOLDS: see EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS; MANPOWER THRESHOLDS;  
STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS.

VERIFICATION: see also NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS

General references to: 317a, 321a, 403p.

Verification by cadres: 285a.

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GDR SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

- p - plenary meeting
- a - working group A
- b - working group B
- c - working group AB
- d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
- e - NATO caucus

ADJOINING SEA AND AIRSPACE: 28b/c, 59b.

CDE ZONE: 23b/c, 28b/c.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS FREE ZONE: 303p.

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 28b/c.

CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES

CWFZ: see CHEMICAL WEAPONS FREE ZONE

DEPLOYMENTS OF US PERSHING II MISSILES AND GLCMS IN EUROPE: 344p.

EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS: 23b/c, 29b/c, 43c.

FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 28b/c, 361a.

HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: 28b/c, 43c, 59b, 126b, 335b.

MADRID MANDATE: 361a.

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MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXERCISES (including discussion of differences):

Of air forces: 23b/c, 28b/c, 43c.

MEASURE 5: 17a.

NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS: see also NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NTM

NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS (NTM): 17a.

NON-USE-OF-FORCE:

General references to: 50a.

Legally binding reaffirmation of NUF: 361a.

NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY: 50a, 55a, 361a.

NOTIFICATIONS: see also PRIOR NOTIFICATION

General references to: 28b/c, 403p.

Designation of the activity: 28b/c.

Duration of the activity: 30b/c.

Geographic coordinates of the location of the activity: 30b/c, 446b.

Names of participating states: 28b/c.

Type of forces involved: 28b/c.

Number of military aircraft involved: 23b/c, 30b/c, 43c.

Transfer/movement of troops, naval vessels or aircraft: 23b/c.

Information to be included: 23b/c, 30b/c, 446b.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE CORRIDOR: 103a.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE: 103a.

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NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE

NUF TREATY: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY

NWFC: see NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE CORRIDOR

NWFZ: see NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE

OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

General references to: 126b, 335b.

Host country responsibilities: 126b.

Logistical arrangements for observers: 126b, 335b.

Scope of observation: 126b, 335b.

OOG: see OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES

OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES (including discussion of differences): 446b.

PRIOR NOTIFICATION: 23b/c, 28b/c, 43c.

SC.1 (also SC.1/Amplified): 17a, 447b.

SC.6: 50a.

SDI: see STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: 17a.

THRESHOLDS: see EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS

TRANSFER/MOVEMENT OF TROOPS: 29b/c, 403p, 446b.

UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES: 447b.

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HUNGARY SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

- p - plenary meeting
- a - working group A
- b - working group B
- c - working group AB
- d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
- e - NATO caucus

ADJOINING SEA AND AIRSPACE: 28b/c, 159p, 348p.

CDE ZONE: see also ZONAL CONSTRAINTS 23b/c, 28b/c, 148p, 158p, 348p.

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 28b/c, 158p, 348p.

CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 18a, 148p, 157p, 162p,  
189a, 312b, 333a.

CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES

DISARMAMENT: 162p.

EQUAL SECURITY: 158p.

EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS: 23b/c, 29b/c, 43c, 182b, 349p.

FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 28b/c, 102a, 308a, 310a, 343p, 347p.

HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: 28b/c, 43c, 59b, 148p, 158p,  
181b, 347p.

MADRID MANDATE: 158p, 334a.

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MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXERCISES (including discussion of differences):

General references to: 162p, 343p, 347p.

Of ground forces: 158p, 347p.

Of naval forces: 347p.

Of air forces: 23b/c, 28b/c, 43c, 347p.

MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 312b, 348p.

MEASURE 2: 18a.

NON-USE-OF-FORCE:

General references to: 308a, 310a, 465d.

NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY: 102a.

NOTIFICATIONS: see also PRIOR NOTIFICATION

General references to: 28b/c, 148p, 157p, 181b, 347p, 465d.

Designation of the activity: 28b/c, 181b.

Duration of the activity: 30b/c, 349p.

Geographic coordinates of the location of the activity: 30b/c, 148p, 349p.

Names of participating states: 28b/c, 348p.

Purpose of the activity: 349p.

Type of forces involved: 28b/c, 59b, 158p, 181b, 349p.

Number of troops participating: 312b, 348p.

Number of naval vessels involved: 148p.

Number of military aircraft involved: 23b/c, 30b/c, 43c, 148p.

Transfer/movement of troops, naval vessels or aircraft: 23b/c.

Information to be included: 23b/c, 30b/c, 349p.

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NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE

NUF TREATY: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY

OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

General references to: 161p, 347p.

OOG: see OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES:

OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES (including discussion of differences): 160p.

PRIOR NOTIFICATION: 23b/c, 28b/c, 43c, 343p, 347p.

SC.4: 308a, 348p.

SC.6: 102a, 308a, 310a.

THRESHOLDS: see EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS; MANPOWER THRESHOLDS;

TRANSFER/MOVEMENT OF TROOPS: 29b/c, 343p, 348p.

VERIFICATION:

General references to: 160p.

ZONAL CONSTRAINTS: see also CDE ZONE 148p.

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MALTA SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

- p - plenary meeting
- a - working group A
- b - working group B
- c - working group AB
- d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
- e - NATO caucus

ADJOINING SEA AND AIRSPACE: 105b.

AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES: 106b.

CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 175d, 233c, 246c.

EQUAL SECURITY: 247c.

EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS: 106b.

EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS (of Activities Notifiable in Advance): see also  
MEASURE 2

Military calendars: 234c, 248c.

Annual forecasts of military activities: 391a.

MADRID MANDATE: 233c, 246c.

MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 106b.

MEASURE 1: 106b.

MEASURE 2: see also EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS 175d, 234c, 247c.

NFU: see NON FIRST USE (OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS)

NON-FIRST-USE (OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS): 176d.

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**NON-USE-OF-FORCE:**

Politically binding reaffirmation of NUF: 176d.

**NOTIFICATIONS: see also PRENOTIFICATION**

General references to: 106b, 234c.

Designation of the activity: 106b.

Type of forces involved: 106b.

**NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE**

**PRENOTIFICATION: 175d, 247c.**

**SC.1 (also SC.1/Amplified): 106b, 247c.**

**SC.2: 234c.**

**SC.3: 247c.**

**SC.5: 247c.**

**THRESHOLDS: see EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS; MANPOWER THRESHOLDS**

**VERIFICATION:**

General references to: 247c.

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POLAND SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

- p - plenary meeting
- a - working group A
- b - working group B
- c - working group AB
- d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
- e - NATO caucus

ADJOINING SEA AND AIRSPACE: 25b/c, 31b/c, 35b/c.

CDE ZONE: 25b/c, 31b/c.

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 25b/c, 31b/c, 34b/c, 171c, 306p.

CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 23b/c, 34b/c, 306p, 392a.

CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES

EQUAL SECURITY: 37b/c, 171c, 306p.

EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS: 31b/c, 44c.

EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS (of Activities Notifiable in Advance): see also MEASURE 2

Annual forecasts of military activities: 392a.

FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

FINAL DOCUMENT: 305p.

FREEZE AND REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS: 37b/c.

FROMB: see FREEZE AND REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS

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HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 25b/c, 31b/c, 336b, 438a.

HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: 31b/c, 34b/c, 44c, 77b.

MADRID MANDATE: 466p.

MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXERCISES (including discussion of differences):

Of ground forces: 23b/c, 25b/c.

Of naval forces: 23b/c, 31b/c, 44c.

MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 23b/c, 26b/c, 42c, 106b, 267b, 335b.

MEASURE 2: see also EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS 336b, 392a.

MILITARIZATION OF SPACE: 36b/c.

NON-USE-OF-FORCE:

General references to: 34b/c, 171c, 305p, 438a.

Legally binding reaffirmation of NUF: 34b/c, 103a.

Reaffirmation of NUF: 171c.

NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY: 36b/c, 103a, 439a.

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NOTIFICATIONS: see also PRIOR NOTIFICATION

General references to: 23b/c, 25b/c, 32b/c, 34b/c, 42c, 106b, 171c, 191b, 267b, 306p, 447b.

Designation of the activity: 25b/c, 32b/c, 42c.

Duration of the activity: 26b/c, 33b/c, 42c.

Geographic coordinates of the location of the activity: 26b/c, 33b/c.

Names of participating states: 25b/c, 32b/c, 42c.

Purpose of the activity: 42c.

Type of forces involved: 25b/c, 42c, 77b, 447b.

Number of troops participating: 23b/c, 26b/c, 33b/c, 42c, 267b, 335b.

Number of naval vessels involved: 33b/c.

Number of military aircraft involved: 33b/c.

Information to be included: 23b/c, 26b/c, 32b/c.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE: 37b/c.

NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE

NUF TREATY: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY

NWFZ: see NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE

OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

General references to: 77b, 191b, 306p, 447b, 459b.

Duration of observers' stay: 191b.

Host country responsibilities: 191b.

Invitations of observers: 77b.

Scope of observation: 191b, 335b, 447b, 459b.

PRIOR NOTIFICATION: 23b/c, 25b/c, 31b/c, 34b/c, 44c.

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SC.1 (also SC.1/Amplified): 171c, 267b, 336b, 392a.

SC.4: 23b/c.

SC.6: 23b/c, 103a.

SDI: see STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: 4p.

STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS: 267b.

THRESHOLDS: see EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS; MANPOWER THRESHOLDS;  
STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS.

TRANSFER/MOVEMENT OF TROOPS: 26b/c, 191b.

UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES: 23b/c, 37b/c.

VERIFICATION:

General references to: 306p.

Verification by cadres: 77b.

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ROMANIA SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

- p - plenary meeting
- a - working group A
- b - working group B
- c - working group AB
- d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
- e - NATO caucus

CDE ZONE: see also ZONAL CONSTRAINTS 390a.

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 363a, 367a, 393a.

CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 6p, 118a, 288a, 393a.

CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES

DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS: 7p.

DISARMAMENT: 370a.

EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS (of Activities Notifiable in Advance):

General references to: 6p.

EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION: see also MEASURE 1

General references to: 6p.

FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

FINAL DOCUMENT: 173c, 288a.

HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 5p, 6p, 107b, 362a, 367a.

HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

IMPLEMENTATION: 370a.

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INSPECTIONS:

General references to: 7p.

MADRID MANDATE: 173c, 368a, 390a.

MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXERCISES (including discussion of differences):

General references to: 288a.

MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 107b.

MEASURE 1: see also EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION 6p.

MEASURE 5: see also VERIFICATION 6p, 390a.

NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS: see also VERIFICATION 7p.

NON-USE-OF-FORCE:

General references to: 5p, 6p, 366a.

Politically binding reaffirmation of NUF: 5p, 6p, 362a, 366a.

Reaffirmation of NUF: 366a.

NOTIFICATIONS:

General references to: 6p.

Designation of the activity: 107b.

Geographic coordinates of the location of the activity: 107b.

Information to be included: 107b.

NTM: see NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS

NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE

OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

Invitations of observers: 6p.

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SC.1 (also SC.1/Amplified): 6p, 390a.

SC.2: 6p, 118a, 174c, 366a.

SC.3: 118a, 368a.

SC.4: 368a.

SC.6: 368a.

SOLEMN DECLARATION: 5p, 6p, 362a, 367a.

STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS: 107b.

THRESHOLDS: see MANPOWER THRESHOLDS; STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS.

VERIFICATION: see also MEASURE 5; NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS

General references to: 7p.

Verification by cadres: 7p.

ZONAL CONSTRAINTS: see also CDE ZONE 288a.

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SWEDEN SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

- p - plenary meeting
- a - working group A
- b - working group B
- c - working group AB
- d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
- e - NATO caucus

ALERTS: 125b.

COMMUNICATIONS: see DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS

COMPLIANCE: 211p.

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 125b, 204p, 212p.

CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 189a, 204p, 211p.

CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES

DEDICATED COMMUNICATIONS: 204p, 211p.

DISARMAMENT: 210p.

EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS: 215p.

EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION:

General references to: 211p.

FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 125b, 211p.

HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

IMPLEMENTATION: 216p.

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MADRID MANDATE: 210p.

MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 126b, 215p, 458b.

MOBILIZATION: 458b.

NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS: see also VERIFICATION 218p.

NON-USE-OF-FORCE:

General references to: 211p.

NOTIFICATIONS:

General references to: 204p, 211p.

NTM: see NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS

NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE

OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

General references to: 125b, 204p, 211p, 458b.

Duration of observers' stay: 126b, 215p.

Host country responsibilities: 125b.

Invitations of observers: 125b, 215p.

Logistical arrangements for observers: 125b.

Scope of observation: 125b, 215p.

SC.1 (also SC.1/Amplified): 217p.

SC.2: 217p.

SC.3: 213p.

STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS: 126b, 204p, 215p, 458b.

THRESHOLDS: see EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS; MANPOWER THRESHOLDS;  
STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS

VERIFICATION: see also NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS

General references to: 204p, 211p, 458b.

Verification by cadres: 125b, 215p.

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SWITZERLAND SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

- p - plenary meeting
- a - working group A
- b - working group B
- c - working group AB
- d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
- e - NATO caucus

ADJOINING SEA AND AIRSPACE: 388a.

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 449d.

CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 392a.

CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES

EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION:

General references to: 422c.

FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 343p, 449d.

HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: 388a.

INSPECTIONS:

General references to: 422c

Areas of inspection: 422c.

MADRID MANDATE: 388a.

MEASURE 5: see also VERIFICATION 422c.

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MOBILIZATION: 106b.

NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS: see also VERIFICATION 422c.

NON-USE-OF-FORCE:

General references to: 344p, 448d.

Reaffirmation of NUF: 448d.

NOTIFICATIONS:

General references to: 77b, 106b, 191b.

NTM: see NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS

NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE

OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

General references to: 77b, 191b, 388a, 422c.

Duration of observers' stay: 191b.

Scope of observation: 191b.

SC.1 (also SC.1/Amplified): 388a, 422c.

VERIFICATION: see also MEASURE 5; NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS

General references to: 388a, 422c.

Verification by cadres: 422c.

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## USSR SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key	Speaker Key
p - plenary meeting	A - Bogdanov
a - working group A	B - Grinevskiy
b - working group B	C - Rakhmaninov
c - working group AB	D - Rozanov
d - post-plenary or other informal conversations	E - Tatarnikov
e - NATO caucus	F - Yerofeyev

ADJOINING SEA AND AIRSPACE: 25b/c, 28b/c, 31b/c, 35b/cB, 59b, 348p, 377bE, 408pE, 416pE.

AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES: 417pE.

BOGDANOV, I.S.: 290a, 457a.

CDE-VI:

General references to: 66eB.

Expressions of dissatisfaction: 85pF.

CDE ZONE: see also ZONAL CONSTRAINTS 23b/c, 25b/c, 28b/c, 31b/c, 59b, 348p, 376dD, 377dE, 460b.

COMPLIANCE: see also MEASURE 5 408pE.

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 25b/c, 28b/c, 31b/c, 34b/cB, 68a, 80eB, 101aF, 137dE, 149pB, 153pB, 179aC, 252cE, 318a, 348p, 377dE, 405pE, 416pE, 423cD, 438aC, 455a.

CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 19a, 23b/cB, 34b/cB, 117a, 252cE, 290aA, 347p, 393aE, 416pE, 457aA.

CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES

EQUAL SECURITY: 37b/cB, 233cE, 377dD, 407pE, 420pE, 423cD, 466pB.

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EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS: 23b/c, 29b/c, 31b/c, 43c, 44c, 59b, 137dE, 312b, 349p, 377dE, 419pE.

EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS (of Activities Notifiable in Advance):

General references to: 457aA.

Exercise schedules: 242cE.

EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION: see also MEASURE 1

General references to: 18a, 67a, 136dE, 252cE, 302dE, 318a, 421pE, 423cD, 430cD, 454a.

Locations of major ground formations, main combat units: 252cE, 455a.

Locations of land-based air formations, wings, regiments: 136dE, 455a.

Transparency, openness in military activities: 421pE.

FINAL ACT: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

FREEZE AND REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS: 37b/cB, 330cB.

FROMB: see FREEZE AND REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS

GRINEVSKIY, O.A.: 34b/c, 66e, 80e, 82d, 92p, 149p, 151p, 205p, 234c, 330c, 343p, 435d, 466p.

HELSINKI FINAL ACT: 18a, 25b/c, 28b/c, 31b/c, 68a, 136dE, 179aC, 252cE, 261aC, 343pB, 347p, 364aC, 416pE, 423cD, 430cD, 454a, 460b.

HFA: see HELSINKI FINAL ACT

IMPLEMENTATION: 68a, 454a.

INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES: 18a, 28b/c, 31b/c, 34b/cB, 43c, 44c, 59b, 127bE, 136dE, 182b, 205pB, 312b, 347p, 377dE, 406pE, 416pE, 459b.

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INSPECTIONS:

General references to: 11d, 18a, 68a, 404pE, 406pE.

Areas of inspection: 68a, 406pE.

Quotas: 407pE.

Timing of inspections: 18a.

KRASNOYARSK RADAR: 11d, 12d.

MADRID MANDATE: 51aC, 59b, 376dE, 377dE, 393aE, 405pE, 423cD, 430cD, 466pB.

MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS/EXERCISES (including discussion of differences):

General references to: 131bE, 181b, 252cE, 268b, 290aA, 343pB, 347p, 420pE.

Of ground forces: 23b/c, 25b/c, 347p, 417pE.

Of naval forces: 23b/cB, 31b/c, 44c, 252cE, 312b, 347p.

Of air forces: 23b/c, 28b/c, 43c, 252cE, 347p, 420pE.

MANPOWER THRESHOLDS OR PARAMETERS: 19a, 23b/c, 26b/c, 42c, 233cE, 291aA, 348p, 418pE, 459b.

MBFR: see MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS

MEASURE 1: see also EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION 66eB, 68a, 318a, 423cD, 430cD, 454a.

MEASURE 3: see also NOTIFICATIONS 376dE.

MEASURE 5: see also COMPLIANCE; VERIFICATION 68a, 318a.

MILITARIZATION OF SPACE: 10aF, 36b/cB.

MOBILIZATION: 78b, 376dE, 388a, 416pE.

MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS: 19a.

NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS: see also VERIFICATION 406pE.

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NFU: see NON FIRST USE (OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS)

NON-FIRST-USE (OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS): 10aF, 365aF.

NON-USE-OF-FORCE:

General references to: 34b/cB, 51aC, 67a, 80eB, 82dB, 149pB, 234cB, 261aC, 309aC, 318a, 435dB, 438aC.

Legally binding reaffirmation of NUF: 34b/cB, 151pB, 179aC.

Reaffirmation of NUF: 179aC.

NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY: 36b/cB, 151pB.

NOTIFICATIONS: see also MEASURE 3; PRIOR NOTIFICATION

General references to: 18a, 23b/c, 25b/c, 28b/c, 32b/c, 34b/cB, 42c, 68a, 78b, 83dB, 133d, 181b, 182b, 252cE, 268b, 290aA, 318a, 347p, 377dE, 394bE, 404pE, 418pE, 454a, 459b.

Designation of the activity: 25b/c, 28b/c, 32b/c, 42c, 59b, 181b, 233cE.

Duration of the activity: 26b/c, 30b/c, 33b/c, 42c, 349p.

Geographic coordinates of the location of the activity: 26b/c, 30b/c, 33b/c, 59b, 349p.

Names of participating states: 25b/c, 28b/c, 32b/c, 42c, 348p.

Purpose of the activity: 42c, 59b, 78b, 349p.

Type of forces involved: 18a, 25b/c, 28b/c, 42c, 59b, 181b, 182b, 233cE, 252cE, 349p.

Number of regiments or brigades: 252cE.

Number of troops participating: 23b/c, 26b/c, 33b/c, 42c, 252cE, 348p.

Number of naval vessels involved: 33b/c, 252cE.

Number of military aircraft involved: 23b/c, 30b/c, 33b/c, 43c, 137dE, 252cE.

Transfer/movement of troops, naval vessels or aircraft: 23b/c, 252cE.

Information to be included: 23b/c, 26b/c, 30b/c, 32b/c, 136dE, 349p.

NTM: see NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE: 37b/cB.

NUF: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE

NUF TREATY: see NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY

NWFZ: see NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE

OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

General references to: 78b, 83dB, 127bE, 131bE, 181b, 290aA, 347p, 377dE, 394bE, 420pE.

Host country responsibilities: 127bE, 131bE, 394bE.

Invitations of observers: 78b, 252cE, 460b.

Logistical arrangements for observers: 127bE, 131bE, 394bE.

Scope of observation: 127bE, 131bE, 192b.

OOG: see OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES:

OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES (including discussion of differences): 82dB, 181b, 233cE, 252cE.

PRIOR NOTIFICATION: 23b/cB, 25b/c, 28b/c, 31b/c, 34b/cB, 43c, 44c, 252cE, 343pB, 347p, 409pE, 417pE.

RAKHMANINOV, Yu.N.: 50a, 179a, 261a, 309a, 364a, 438c.

ROZANOV, I.S.: 376d, 423c, 430c.

SC.1 (also SC.1/Amplified): 60b, 68a, 78b, 233cE, 376dE, 404pE, 418pE, 423cD.

SC.3: 417pE.

SC.4: 23b/cB, 153pB, 348p.

SC.6: 23b/cB, 51aC, 261aC, 309aC, 318a.

STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS: 18a, 83dB, 136bE, 233cE, 418pE.

TATARNIKOV, V.M.: 127b, 131b, 136d, 233c, 252c, 302d, 376d, 393a, 394b, 404p, 405p, 416p.

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THRESHOLDS: see EQUIPMENT THRESHOLDS; MANPOWER THRESHOLDS;  
STRUCTURAL THRESHOLDS.

TRANSFER/MOVEMENT OF TROOPS: 23b/c, 26b/c, 29b/c, 136dE, 181b, 268b,  
343pB, 348p, 395bE, 406pE, 416pE.

UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES: 23b/cB, 37b/c, 68a, 205pB, 406pE, 421pE, 423cD.

VERIFICATION: see also MEASURE 5; NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS

General references to: 18a, 67a, 136dE, 318a, 330cB, 404pE, 405pE,  
420pE, 423cD, 430cD.

YEROFYEV, V.: 10a, 85p, 101a, 365a.

ZONAL CONSTRAINTS: see also CDE ZONE 59b.

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YUGOSLAVIA SUBJECT INDEX

Type Key

- p - plenary meeting
- a - working group A
- b - working group B
- c - working group AB
- d - post-plenary or other informal conversations
- e - NATO caucus

ADJOINING SEA AND AIRSPACE: 267b.

ALERTS: 392a.

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES: 266b.

CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES: 118a, 390a, 392a.

CSBMs: see CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES

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EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS (of Activities Notifiable in Advance): see also  
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OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES

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General references to: 267b, 459b.

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Information to be included: 267b.

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General references to: 267b, 459b.

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OOG: see OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES:

OUT-OF-GARRISON/OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES (including discussion of differences): 267b.

SC.2: 118a.

SC.2: 118a, 267b.

THRESHOLDS: see MANPOWER THRESHOLDS

TRANSFER/MOVEMENT OF TROOPS: 267b.

VERIFICATION:

General references to: 267b.

Verification by cadres: 267b.

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**SESSION CARDS**

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SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY OPENING ROUND VI, MAY 14  
1. CDE VI - 004  
2. C - SPANISH PRIME MINISTER FELIPE GONZALEZ WAS THE LEAD  
SPEAKER FOR TODAY'S PLENARY OPENING ROUND VI OF THE CDE.  
NEITHER THE UNITED STATES NOR THE SOVIET UNION SPOKE.  
EXCEPT FOR A FEW ANTI-US REMARKS BY THE POLISH DELEGATE,  
STATEMENTS WERE GENERALLY CONSTRUCTIVE AND BUSINESSLIKE.  
DETAILS FOLLOW SEPTTEL. END

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SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY STATEMENTS, MAY 14, 1985

REF: BUCHAREST 2708

1. CDE VI -003.

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE PLENARY OPENING THE SIXTH SESSION OF CDE, SPANISH PRIME MINISTER FELIPE GONZALEZ APPEALED TO THE CONFERENCE TO PRODUCE MORE ENCOURAGING RESULTS THAN HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED TO DATE. STRESSING THE "FUNDAMENTALLY EUROPEAN" NATURE OF SPAIN, HE NOTED THAT THE CDE MUST ESTABLISH RECIPROCAL TRUST BASED ON A CONCRETE AND TANGIBLE RESULT WHICH MEETS THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL PARTICIPANTS. AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR LOIBL ARGUED THAT A NUF REAFFIRMATION WAS A FUNCTION OF CONCRETE CSBM'S. POLISH AMBASSADOR KONARSKI REITERATED THE EAST'S INSISTENCE ON COMPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT ON "POLITICAL-MILITARY" MEASURES AND "MILITARY-TECHNICAL" MEASURES. THE IRISH AMBASSADOR ELABORATED HIS COUNTRY'S POSITION ON NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION, AND CONSTRAINTS, SUPPORTING THE STRUCTURAL PARAMETER FOR NOTIFICATION AND ACKNOWLEDGING THE DIFFICULTIES OF NEGOTIATING CONSTRAINT MEASURES. REPEATING THE ROMANIAN AIDE-MEMOIRE OF APRIL 26 (REFTEL), ROMANIAN AMBASSADOR CETERCHI OUTLINED "COMMON GROUND" EMERGING IN THE CONFERENCE, INCLUDING A "SOLEMN DECLARATION" (AS OPPOSED TO A TREATY) ON NUF; NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION; CONSTRAINTS; AND COMMUNICATIONS/CONSULTATIONS. PM GONZALEZ, KONARSKI, CETERCHI, AND LOIBL URGED THE CONFERENCE TO ENTER INTO SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. END SUMMARY.

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4. CITING SPAIN'S RESOLVE TO "BELONG TO EUROPE IN ALL DIMENSIONS," PRIME MINISTER FELIPE GONZALEZ DEMONSTRATED THE EMPHASIS HIS GOVERNMENT PLACES ON CDE. HE REVIEWED THE HELSINKI PROCESS, ONE IN WHICH 35 STATES PARTICIPATE ON AN EQUAL FOOTING "BEYOND MILITARY ALLIANCES". FROM THIS PROCESS, HE ASSERTED, DETENTE HAS EMERGED STRENGTHENED. TURNING TO MADRID, THE PRIME MINISTER NOTED THAT THE LANGUAGE OF THE FINAL AGREEMENT WAS CAREFULLY CRAFTED TO MEET THE SECURITY CONCERNS OF ALL PARTICIPANTS. THE GOAL OF THIS PROCESS (INCLUDING THE CDE), HE SAID, IS TO ESTABLISH RECIPROCAL TRUST. ULTIMATELY, HE OPINED, WE MUST HALT THE ARMS RACE. GONZALEZ REFERRED TO SC.1 AS AN ATTEMPT TO DELINEATE SECURITY CONCERNS SHARED BY ALL; OTHER PROPOSALS -- SUCH AS NUF AND CONSTRAINTS -- DESERVE SERIOUS STUDY AND AN "OPEN" POSITION. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE EMPHASIZED THAT NO GROUP HAS A MONOPOLY ON SECURITY CONCERNS AND THAT AN AGREEMENT MUST THEREFORE BE BASED ON MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. THE PRIME MINISTER APPEALED TO THE CONFERENCE TO NEGOTIATE

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CONCRETE, TANGIBLE ACHIEVEMENTS WHICH WILL NOT DISAPPOINT THE PUBLIC. IN SO DOING, HE SAID, CDE MUST SEEK "MORE ENCOURAGING RESULTS" IN THE FUTURE THAN IT HAS ACHIEVED TO DATE. WHILE CONCENTRATING ON THE EUROPEAN ASPECTS OF SECURITY, THE SPANISH PM ALSO REFERRED TO "ARABIC AND AFRICAN COUNTRIES'" RELATIONS WITH SPAIN, AS WELL AS SPAIN'S FRATERNAL LINKS WITH LATIN AMERICA. HE ALSO STRESSED THE INDIVISIBLE LINK BETWEEN MEDITERRANEAN AND EUROPEAN SECURITY IN HIS CLOSING COMMENTS. (BEGIN COMMENT: GONZALEZ PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN DEVELOPING THE CONSENSUS MANDATE FOR THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, WHICH EMERGED OUT OF THE MADRID CSCE REVIEW MEETING. NOT SURPRISINGLY, HE HAS TAKEN A PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. WHILE THE SPANISH PM'S STATEMENT WAS GENERALLY SUPPORTIVE OF WESTERN POSITIONS, HIS EMPHASIS ON SPAIN'S OPEN POSITION ON NUF AND CONSTRAINTS MAY CAUSE TROUBLE DOWN THE LINE. END COMMENT)

5. USING THE OCCASION OF THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE AUSTRIAN STATE TREATY, AMBASSADOR LOIBL ELABORATED AUSTRIA'S POSITION ON NUF. ALLUDING TO AUSTRIA AS THE FIRST VICTIM OF THE USE OF FORCE IN WORLD WAR II, LOIBL SAID THAT "THE EXPERIENCE OF CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS PROVES" THAT THE USE OR THREAT OF FORCE IS -- DESPITE AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL BAN AND NUMEROUS AGREEMENTS -- A PART OF INTERSTATE EXISTENCE. SUGGESTING THAT THE USE OF FORCE IS NOT LEGAL OR WORTH THE PRICE, HE SAID THE PROBLEM IS NOT WHETHER WE SHOULD REINFORCE NUF, BUT HOW TO DO IT BEST. IN THE PREVAILING CLIMATE OF MUTUAL MISTRUST, HE ARGUED THAT REAFFIRMATION OF NUF MUST BE CONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF AN AGREEMENT ON "PRACTICAL STEPS" WHICH REDUCE MISTRUST. WITHOUT SUCH A COMPREHENSIVE SET OF CSBM'S, HE ADDED, THE MISTRUST WHICH IS A REALITY OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SITUATION WILL NOT BE ELIMINATED. THUS, ANY REAFFIRMATION OF NUF SHOULD BE A FUNCTION OF THE CONTENT OF THE CSBM'S NEGOTIATED. AMONG IMPORTANT CONCRETE MEASURES LOIBL INCLUDED NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION, CONSTRAINTS, AND VERIFICATION. THE AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR ALSO POINTED OUT THAT STOCKHOLM IS ONLY A PARTIAL -- ALBEIT IMPORTANT -- PART OF THE LARGER HELSINKI PROCESS. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF ENCOURAGING "DEMOCRATIC THINKING" BETWEEN STATES AND OF THE NEED TO RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS. (BEGIN COMMENT: LOIBL'S STATEMENT SUBORDINATES A REAFFIRMATION OF NUF TO THE MORE URGENT TASK OF DEVELOPING CONCRETE CSBM'S, A POSITION CONSISTENT WITH OURS. END COMMENT.)

6. AMBASSADOR KONARSKI (POLAND) REMINDED THE CONFERENCE OF THE EAST'S INSISTENCE ON ADOPTION OF COMPLEMENTARY "POLITICAL-MILITARY" AND "MILITARY-TECHNICAL" MEASURES. HE CALLED FOR "INTENSE NEGOTIATIONS" TO ACHIEVE MUTUALLY

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ACCEPTABLE FINAL AGREEMENTS (PLURAL) WHICH ARE BASED ON EQUAL RESPECT FOR THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL PARTICIPANTS. KONARSKI NOTED THE 26 APRIL WARSAW SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE ON THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF WORLD WAR II, AND CITED THE LEGACY OF TEHRAN, YALTA, AND POTSDAM AS THE BASIS FOR EUROPEAN STABILITY. KONARSKI ALSO CRITICIZED THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE AS AN OBSTRUCTION TO THE PROCESS OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. IN CLOSING, HE PRAISED THE "CALL OF THE NNA STATES" FOR SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS TO COMMENCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

7. THE IRISH DELEGATE PRESENTED AN ELABORATION OF HIS COUNTRY'S VIEWS ON NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION. WHILE HE IMPLICITLY RECOGNIZED THE EAST'S UNWILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT THE WEST'S CALL FOR "OPENNESS," HE NONETHELESS ASSERTED THAT OPENNESS IS NECESSARY TO DEVELOP TRUST AND TO REASSURE OTHER STATES OF ONE'S OWN PEACEFUL INTENTIONS. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE OUTLINED SPECIFIC IRISH POSITIONS ON NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION:

A. NOTIFICATION: SHOULD BE MANDATORY, STANDARDIZED, WITH DETAILED CONTENT, COVERING A RANGE OF ACTIVITIES BROADER THAN THE FINAL ACT. A STRUCTURAL PARAMETER SHOULD BE USED TO NOTIFY LAND ACTIVITIES (THE FOCUS OF THE THREAT). THE STRUCTURAL PARAMETER ALLOWS FOR BEST ASSESSMENT OF THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF AN ACTIVITY. MOREOVER, IT ENHANCES SECURITY THROUGH ITS OPENNESS. THERE SHOULD BE AN ALTERNATE NUMERICAL "SAFETY NET" TO CATCH ACTIVITIES WHICH SLIP THROUGH THE UNIT THRESHOLD. THERE SHOULD BE A SEPARATE THRESHOLD, E.G., FOR AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES, WHICH SHOULD BE LOWER THAN THE LOWEST DIVISIONAL FIGURES.

B. OBSERVATION: THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTACTS BETWEEN MILITARY PERSONNEL AND NEED TO INCREASE SUCH CONTACTS IS EVIDENT. OBSERVERS PLAY A ROLE IN VERIFICATION IN THAT THEIR WORK MUST BE SHAPED TO ENABLE THEM TO ASCERTAIN THE NONTHREATENING NATURE OF THE ACTIVITY, AS WELL AS THE ACCURACY OF NOTIFICATION GIVEN. THE STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION IS AGAIN IMPORTANT DUE TO THE DIFFICULTY OF COUNTING MEN AND EQUIPMENT.

- AMBASSADOR O'BROIN ALSO INCLUDED AGREEMENT ON CONSTRAINTS AMONG HIS "HIERARCHY" OF MEASURES WHICH SHOULD BE ADOPTED IN STOCKHOLM. HE DID NOT UNDERESTIMATE, HOWEVER, THE "PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS" OBSTRUCTING DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTRAINTS, FOR EXAMPLE, "IMPORTANT ASYMMETRIES" IN GEOGRAPHY AND MILITARY DOCTRINES. WITH "ALL DUE TENTATIVENESS," HE SUGGESTED A LIMITATION ON THE SIZE AND NUMBER OF MANEUVERS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT CONSIDERATIONS SUCH AS TRAINING REQUIREMENTS. HE THEN FURTHER HEDGED ON CONSTRAINTS, ALLOWING THAT "IN THE FIRST INSTANCE," INFORMATION, NOTIFICATION

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AND OBSERVATION MUST BE ACCEPTED BY THOSE WHO ADVOCATE  
ONEROUS CONSTRAINTS. HE NOTED "THE WIDESPREAD VIEW" IN  
THE CONFERENCE THAT A REAFFIRMATION OF NUF AS PROPOSED  
BY PRESIDENT REAGAN IN DUBLIN AND REITERATED IN  
STRASBOURG COULD BE POSSIBLE.

8. ROMANIAN AMBASSADOR CETERCHI OFFERED A REVISED  
"COMMON GROUND" SPEECH WHICH, IN HIS VIEW, SOUGHT TO  
CAPTURE A PACKAGE OF BALANCED MEASURES COMMENSURATE WITH  
THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL PARTICIPANTS. AT THE  
FOCAL POINT OF THE PACKAGE HE PLACED A "SOLEMN  
DECLARATION OF NUF" CONSISTENT WITH THE HELSINKI FINAL  
ACT AND UN CHARTER. (AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROMANIAN  
STATEMENT WILL FOLLOW SEPTTEL.) END

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SUBJECT: CDE ROMANIAN COMMON GROUND INITIATIVE: AN  
- ANALYSIS

REF: A) STOCKHOLM 3610, B) BUCHAREST 2664,  
- C) BUCHAREST 2708, D) STOCKHOLM 3611

1. CDE VI - 009
2. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. SUMMARY: THE ROMANIAN STATEMENT OF MAY 14 PROPOSED THAT THE CONFERENCE EXPLOIT EMERGING COMMON GROUND TO DEVELOP AN AGREED FRAMEWORK WHICH INCLUDES SOME ELEMENTS, HOWEVER AMBIGUOUS, OF ALL OF THE SIX MEASURES OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED PLUS A SOLEMN DECLARATION ON NUF AND CONSTRAINTS. THE ROMANIANS CLEARLY MOVE BEYOND THEIR POSITION IN ROUND V BY FRAMING NON-USE OF FORCE IN NON-TREATY FORM, BY EXPLICITLY RECOGNIZING THE NEED FOR FORECASTS OF NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES, AND BY DEFERRING PARTS OF THEIR SC.2 PROPOSAL ON CONSTRAINTS TO FUTURE WORK. THEY ARE LEAST FORTHCOMING ON MEASURES 1 AND 5. ANY PREMATURE WESTERN CONCESSIONS IN RESPONSE WILL ONLY ENCOURAGE THE SOVIETS TO DEFER SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED AND DELAY AN AGREEMENT. THEREFORE, THE DELEGATION INTENDS TO TAKE A LINE WHICH RECOGNIZES THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN THE ROMANIAN POSITION BUT UNDERSCORES ITS INADEQUACY AS A FRAMEWORK FOR DRAFTING. END SUMMARY.

4. KEY POINTS OF ROMANIAN STATEMENT: THE ROMANIAN STATEMENT ESTABLISHES THE FOLLOWING OUTLINE OF COMMON GROUND THAT THEY BELIEVE CONSTITUTES THE BASIS FOR A FINAL AGREEMENT (REF A):

-- NUF: A SOLEMN DECLARATION CONSISTENT WITH THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND UN CHARTER AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE: PROVISIONS TO PREVENT ATTACK BY SURPRISE, ERROR, OR ACCIDENT; PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES; AND CONCRETE MEASURES WHICH WOULD EXPRESS THE DUTY OF STATES NOT TO USE FORCE. THESE CONCRETE MEASURES ARE:

- 1) COMPULSORY NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES, PLUS EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS OF ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE NOTIFIABLE IN ADVANCE, PLUS CERTAIN INFORMATION CONCERNING MILITARY FORCES WHICH ARE TO PARTICIPATE IN THESE ACTIVITIES, A FLEDGLING STEP TOWARD MEASURE 1, ALTHOUGH THE CONCEPT OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE INDEPENDENT OF NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES IS NOT INCLUDED;
- 2) INVITATIONS TO OBSERVERS OF ALL PARTICIPATING STATES TO MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH BY SIZE AND AREA OF DEPLOYMENT COULD GENERATE SUSPICIONS AND INSECURITY;
- 3) CONSTRAINTS TO LIMIT FORCES ENGAGED IN MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS, THEIR DURATION AND THEIR FREQUENCY;
- 4) FUTURE CONSTRAINTS TO LIMIT MANEUVERS IN

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BORDER AREAS OR IN SENSITIVE ZONES; STATES WOULD SHOW SELF-RESTRAINT UNTIL SUCH MEASURES ARE NEGOTIATED.

-- IMPLEMENTATION AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PROCEDURES AND CHANNELS FOR INFORMATION, COMMUNICATIONS AND CONSULTATIONS; E.G., SPECIAL TELEPHONE AND TELEX CONNECTIONS, ENCOURAGEMENT OF EXCHANGE OF MILITARY DELEGATIONS, EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON NATIONAL REGULATIONS REGARDING ACCREDITED MILITARY PERSONNEL, ESTABLISHMENT IN EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCES OF FACT-FINDING MISSIONS;

-- VERIFICATION: CSBM'S AGREED UPON WILL INCLUDE ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION CORRESPONDING TO THEIR CONTENT; SUCH AS, NTM AND SOME OF THE COMMUNICATION/CONSULTATION PROCEDURES MENTIONED ABOVE, INCLUDING THE UNSPECIFIED OPERATIONAL ASPECTS OF "FACT-FINDING MISSIONS" IN EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCES.

5. DIFFERENCES WITH AIDE-MEMOIRE/ROUND V STATEMENTS: THERE WERE FEW DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE MAY 14 STATEMENT AND THE AIDE-MEMOIRE GIVEN TO AS NEWELL IN BUCHAREST ON APRIL 26 (REFTELS B AND C). THE MAY 14 STATEMENT INCLUDES A CALL FOR "MORE DYNAMIC USE" OF THE WORKING GROUPS AS WELL AS INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS TO INTENSIFY DEVELOPMENT OF "COMMON GROUND." MOREOVER, IT CONTAINS A VAGUE CALL FOR CONSIDERATION OF OTHER EXISTING PROPOSALS (PERHAPS THE SOVIET NON-STARTERS) IN A FORM WHICH WOULD ACHIEVE CONSENSUS AS WELL AS COMPREHENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO AN ACCORD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

- THIS MOST RECENT STATEMENT CLEARLY MOVES BEYOND THE ROMANIAN POSITION IN ROUND V BY FRAMING NON-USE OF FORCE IN NON-TREATY FORM, I.E., A SOLEMN DECLARATION, BY EXPLICITLY RECOGNIZING THE NEED FOR FORECASTS OF NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES, AND BY DEFERRING PARTS OF THEIR SC.2 PROPOSAL ON CONSTRAINTS TO FUTURE WORK, I.E., CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN BORDER AREAS AND SENSITIVE ZONES.

6. ROMANIAN MOTIVATIONS: THE ROMANIANS MAY BE SEEKING TO SET THE FRAMEWORK FOR DISCUSSIONS AND FUTURE DRAFTING ON THEIR OWN TERMS WHICH INCLUDE SOME ELEMENTS OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED PLUS OTHER MEASURES IN SC.3 AND SC.4 (CONSTRAINTS, NUF). HOWEVER, THE ROMANIAN INITIATIVE MAY BE NOTHING MORE THAN A STRAW MAN FOR THE EAST TO GAUGE WESTERN AND NNA REACTION AND TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON THOSE MEMBERS OF NATO WHO WANT A WESTERN CONSTRAINTS MEASURE AS WELL AS OTHER CHANGES TO THE NATO PACKAGE. NONETHELESS, THERE ARE SOME INDICATIONS FROM THE HUNGARIANS AND THE ROMANIANS THEMSELVES THAT THE LATTER ARE PLAYING THEIR TRADITIONAL MAVERICK ROLE OUTSIDE OF THE WARSAW PACT AND FLOATING THIS INITIATIVE, LIKE THEIR LAST ONE, WITHOUT SUPPORT AND COORDINATION FROM EASTERN COLLEAGUES. THERE MAY BE TACIT SOVIET APPROVAL FOR SUCH

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INDEPENDENT ACTION, HOWEVER, IN ORDER TO DRAW OUT WESTERN REACTION, DRIVE WEDGES AMONG THE NATO ALLIES, AND EVEN TO ELICIT POSSIBLE PREMATURE CONCESSIONS.

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7. IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO: THE MAY 14 ROMANIAN STATEMENT ARGUABLY INCORPORATES SOME ASPECTS OF ALL THE MEASURES OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED, BUT IS LEAST FORTHCOMING ON MEASURES 1 AND 5, AS EXPLAINED IN PARA 4. ON THE ONE HAND, THE INITIATIVE IS A POSITIVE STEP FORWARD BECAUSE THE ROMANIANS INCLUDE THE NOTION OF FORECASTS OF NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES, DROP THE IDEA OF A NUF TREATY, AGREE TO A SINGLE INTEGRATED DOCUMENT, AND DEFER SOME OF THE MORE OBJECTIONABLE AND COMPLEX ELEMENTS OF THEIR PROPOSED CONSTRAINTS MEASURES IN SC.2. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEIR OUTLINE HARDLY CONSTITUTES A FRAMEWORK FOR DRAFTING, SINCE MANY ESSENTIAL DETAILS OF THE NATO PACKAGE ARE NOT ADDRESSED (E.G., OUT-OF-GARRISON, THRESHOLD PARAMETER, OBLIGATORY NATURE OF OBSERVATION) AND NUMEROUS CONCEPTS ARE INCLUDED THAT ARE INCONSISTENT WITH SC.1/AMPLIFIED (E.G., ROMANIAN TERMS OF REFERENCE ON VERIFICATION, EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, CONSTRAINTS). TO EVEN CONSIDER THIS AS A FRAMEWORK WOULD BYPASS NECESSARY DISCUSSION ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AND RISK HAVING ACCEPTANCE OF PRINCIPLES OVERRIDE THE NEED FOR CONCRETE DETAILS IN A FINAL AGREEMENT.

8. WESTERN REACTIONS: AS REPORTED IN REF D, WESTERN REACTION HAS BEEN CAUTIOUS BUT OPTIMISTIC. THE FRENCH AND GERMANS SEE SOME IMPORTANT CHANGES IN THE ROMANIAN STATEMENT, SUCH AS FORECASTS AND TREATMENT OF NUF, BUT ALSO RECOGNIZE HOW FAR THE ROMANIAN POSITION HAS YET TO GO BEFORE THE WEST COULD CHARACTERIZE IT AS ANYTHING MORE THAN A FIRST STEP TOWARD COMMON GROUND. SPAIN AND PORTUGAL ARE EVEN MORE CAREFUL, SINCE THE INITIATIVE MAY BE NOTHING MORE THAN A TEMPTING PLOY TO UPSET WESTERN UNITY. OTHER DELEGATIONS, USUALLY QUICK TO GRASP AT ANY PROSPECT OF AN EASTERN CONCESSION, HAVE REMAINED CAUTIOUS AND SILENT SO FAR.

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9. DELEGATION APPROACH: THE DELEGATION IS HANDLING THE ROMANIAN INITIATIVE IN THE FOLLOWING WAY:

- -- PLANNING TO POCKET ROMANIAN CONCESSIONS ON NUF, FORECASTS, AND A SINGLE INTEGRATED FINAL DOCUMENT;
- -- WELCOMING THE INITIATIVE AS AN EXPLORATORY STEP FORWARD THAT REPRESENTS MERELY AN INITIAL MOVEMENT TOWARD COMMON GROUND;
- -- MAKING CLEAR THAT THE PROPOSAL CANNOT AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE THE BASIS FOR A RESPONSE FROM THE WEST EITHER SUBSTANTIVELY OR PROCEDURALLY WITH RESPECT TO DRAFTING;
- -- PREVENTING ANY SHIFT OF FOCUS IN THE CONFERENCE FROM SC.1/AMPLIFIED TO THE ROMANIAN INITIATIVE;
- -- MAINTAINING WORKING GROUP ATTENTION ON DETAILED

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DISCUSSION OF CONCRETE CSBM'S AND PLANNING TO DETER ANY ALLIED EFFORT TO TABLE NEW NATO INITIATIVES (E.G., WESTERN CONSTRAINT MEASURES) WHICH THE EAST WOULD POCKET AS A RESPONSE TO THE ROMANIANS.

- A MEASURED U.S. RESPONSE, WHICH RECOGNIZES SOME POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN THE NEW ROMANIAN POSITION, BUT UNDERSCORES ITS INADEQUACY AS A FRAMEWORK FOR DRAFTING, WILL PUT THE ONUS ON THE SOVIETS AND OTHER EASTERN DELEGATIONS TO MOVE AWAY FROM THEIR NON-STARTERS AND INTO SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS ON THE SC.1/AMPLIFIED.  
END

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SUBJECT: CDE WORKING GROUP A, TUESDAY, MAY 14, 1985

1. CDE VI - 007  
2. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT).  
3. IN HIS MAIDEN APPEARANCE AT THE CDE, SOVIET DELEGATE YEROFEYEV, THE ONLY SPEAKER OF THE DAY, DELIVERED A LOW-KEY, CONVENTIONAL REITERATION OF THE SOVIET POSITION ON THE NON-FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NFU). (BEGIN COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THE OFFICIAL CONFERENCE LIST INDICATING THE PROTOCOL RANKING OF DELEGATES HAS NOT YET BEEN DISTRIBUTED, WE BELIEVE THAT YEROFEYEV IS REPLACING YEVGENIY KUTOVOY WHO WAS SERIOUSLY HURT LATE LAST ROUND WHEN HE WAS HIT BY A CAR WHILE JOGGING. END COMMENT) REFERRING TO THE SOVIET STATEMENT ON THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF VE DAY, YEROFEYEV SAID THAT TIME IS NOT/NOT ON OUR SIDE GIVEN THE ARMS RACE AND PLANS TO MILITARIZE OUTER SPACE; WE NEED MAJOR PRACTICAL STEPS IN THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY FIELDS TO REVERSE THESE DANGEROUS TRENDS. A NFU PLEDGE TAKEN BY THE NUCLEAR STATES AT THE CONFERENCE WOULD BE SUCH A STEP, THE SOVIET DELEGATE ASSERTED.

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4. COMMENT: YEROFEYEV'S TONE AND WHAT HE DID NOT SAY ARE MORE IMPORTANT THAN WHAT HE DID SAY: HE REFRAINED FROM ATTACKING THE U.S. BY NAME WHEN HE MENTIONED MILITARIZING OUTER SPACE AND HE DID NOT FLESH OUT OR PRESS FOR WORKING GROUP CONSIDERATION OF THE SOVIET NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF) OR NFU POSITION. WE ARE ALSO PLEASED THAT NO ONE FELT OBLIGED TO OFFER ANY FURTHER COMMENTS ON NUF. WE ARE PERFECTLY CONTENT TO BIDE OUR TIME ON THIS ISSUE WHILE WE TRY TO DRAW OUT THE SOVIETS ON CONCRETE CBM'S. WE DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT WORKING GROUP QUIESCENCE ON NUF WILL CONTINUE, GIVEN THE EASTERN POSITION AND THE PROCLIVITY OF THE NNA AND EVEN SOME OF OUR ALLIES TO APPEAR FLEXIBLE ON NUF. END COMMENT.

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SUBJECT: SOVIET DISINFORMATION EFFORT

1. CDE VI-008 - SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.
  2. IN CONVERSATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPEANS, AS REPORTED TO US HERE, THE SOVIETS ARE SAYING THAT AFTER DOBRYNIN OFFERED TO ACCEPT ON-SITE INSPECTION OF THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR, THE U.S. LOST INTEREST IN THE WHOLE SUBJECT. ALTHOUGH THIS MAY BE RANDOM CONVERSATION, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE SOVIETS ARE SPREADING THIS WORD AROUND EUROPE IN ORDER TO CAMOUFLAGE AN UNPLEASANT FACT WHICH UNDERMINES THEIR EFFORTS TO PORTRAY THEMSELVES AS CHAMPIONS OF THE ABM TREATY. AN EFFORT ON OUR PART TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT, IF WE HAVE NOT ALREADY DONE SO, MIGHT BE USEFUL.
- END

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SUBJECT: SOVIET COMMENTS ON DOBRYNIN'S OFFER OF  
ON-SITE INSPECTION AT KRASNOYARSK  
REFTEL: A. STOCKHOLM 3626 (NOTAL) B. STATE 123655  
(NOTAL)

1. REFTEL A REPORTED CDE-RELATED CONVERSATIONS WITH  
EASTERN EUROPEANS WHO QUOTED THE SOVIETS TO THE EFFECT  
THAT FOLLOWING SOVIET AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN'S "OFFER" TO  
ACCEPT ON-SITE INSPECTION OF THE KRASNOYARSK LARGE PHASED  
ARRAY RADAR, THE US LOST INTEREST IN THE WHOLE SUBJECT.

2. THE SOVIET CLAIM IS UNTRUE. ADDRESSEES MAY USE  
GUIDANCE PROVIDED PARAS 5 AND 6 TO RESPOND AS APPROPRIATE  
OO CDE REPRESENTATIVES, HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND  
MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES REPEATING THIS SOVIET PROPAGANDA  
LINE.

3. BEGIN FYI: DOBRYNIN WAS A PARTICIPANT IN A SYMPOSIUM  
ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL HELD APRIL  
9-13 AT THE CARTER CENTER OF EMORY UNIVERSITY. AN  
UNOFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF DOBRYNIN'S RATHER DISJOINTED  
REMARKS ABOUT KRASNOYARSK QUOTE HIM AS FOLLOWS:

--"IT'S A RADAR WHICH IS USED -- OR IT'S GOING TO BE  
USED, BECAUSE IT'S NOT FINISHED; IT'S JUST IN THE MIDDLE  
OF CONSTRUCTION; PROBABLY GENERAL MIKHILOV WHO IS SITTING  
THERE MAY HAVE A CHANCE TO TELL YOU A LITTLE BIT MORE --  
BUT THIS WOULD LOOK AFTER OUR SPUTNIKS. AND I AM SURE  
WHEN IT WILL BE OVER (SIC) IN TWO YEARS...I DON'T KNOW  
BUT WE MAY EVEN INVITE YOU -- AT LEAST I KNOW THAT OUR  
ACADEMICIANS HAVE THIS IDEA -- MAYBE TO INVITE THE STAFFS  
OF YOUR SKEPTICS TO SEE THIS, HOW IT WORKS, BECAUSE IT  
WILL BE VERY EASY FOR YOU, FROM THE LENGTHS OF WAVES, TO  
(PAUSE) DETERMINE WHAT KIND OF REAL (PAUSE) WHAT IS THE  
REAL PURPOSE OF THIS PARTICULAR RADAR INSTALLATION."

4. CONTINUE FYI:

DURING THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN  
ON APRIL 18, THE SUBJECT OF POSSIBLE ON-SITE INSPECTION  
OF KRASNOYARSK CAME UP. DOBRYNIN SAID THAT HIS COMMENTS  
IN ATLANTA HAD BEEN IN RESPONSE TO A HYPOTHETICAL  
QUESTION, AND THAT HE HAD ONLY BEEN SPECULATING ABOUT THE  
POSSIBILITY OF US SCIENTISTS VISITING THE RADAR AFTER ITS  
COMPLETION TWO OR THREE YEARS HENCE, IN THE CONTEXT OF  
BETTER RELATIONS THAN NOW. END FYI

5. BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED: THE FOLLOWING PRESS GUIDANCE ON  
DOBRYNIN'S COMMENT WAS USED AT THE APRIL 15 NOON PRESS  
BRIEFING:

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT ON PROPOSALS MADE AT THE  
EMORY UNIVERSITY ARMS CONTROL CONFERENCE SUCH AS...A  
POSSIBLE US INSPECTION OF THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR?

A. WE ARE, OF COURSE, INTERESTED IN ANY SOVIET  
RECOGNITION OF OUR CONCERNS FOR STRENGTHENING  
VERIFICATION PROCEDURES FOR EXISTING ARMS CONTROL  
AGREEMENTS AND WE HAVE RAISED THESE CONCERNS WITH THE  
SOVIETS ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS. AS YOU KNOW, THE

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PRESIDENT DETERMINED, IN HIS FEBRUARY 1, 1985, REPORT TO CONGRESS, THAT THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR VIOLATES THE ABM TREATY.

THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT FORMALLY PROPOSED US ON-SITE INSPECTION OF THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR, AND AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN'S REMARKS ON THE MATTER AT EMORY UNIVERSITY ARE UNCLEAR. THERE ARE SEVERAL FORA AVAILABLE FOR THE SOVIETS TO RAISE THE SUBJECT FORMALLY, AS WELL AS NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. IF THEY DO, WE WILL OF COURSE STUDY THE PROPOSAL CAREFULLY IN LIGHT OF OUR COMPLIANCE CONCERNS. END PRESS GUIDANCE

6. IN ADDITION TO THE FOREGOING PRESS GUIDANCE, POSTS ARE AUTHORIZED TO RESPOND AS FOLLOWS TO SUGGESTIONS THAT THE USG HAS "LOST INTEREST" IN KRASNOYARSK:

--"THE CONTINUED CONSTRUCTION OF THE SOVIET LARGE PHASED ARRAY RADAR AT KRASNOYARSK IS A CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE ABM TREATY. IN OUR VIEW, IT IS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THE CURRENT SOVIET STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL VIOLATIONS. BY VIRTUE OF ITS SITING, ORIENTATION AND LOCATION, IT IS NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY REQUIREMENTS FOR THIS TYPE OF LPAR. WHILE WE HAVE RAISED KRASNOYARSK WITH THE SOVIETS ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS, THEY HAVE YET TO OFFER ANY CREDIBLE EXPLANATION. EVEN THE WIDELY-REPORTED "OFFER" BY SOVIET AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN FOR AN ON-SITE INSPECTION OF KRASNOYARSK HAS PROVEN TO BE WITHOUT SUBSTANCE. RATHER THAN ELABORATE ON THE PROPOSAL, THE SOVIETS RESPONDED TO OUR FOLLOW-UP INQUIRY WITH AN OFF-HAND COMMENT THAT THE "OFFER" WAS ONLY A RESPONSE TO AN HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION. END

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SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, MAY 14, 1985

1. CDE VI - 006
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY. CAUTIOUS SATISFACTION WAS THE NOTE OF THE DAY ON THE FIRST 36 HOURS OF ROUND VI. THE UK AND BELGIUM REPORTED THAT THE SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING HAD RESTRAINED EASTERN STATEMENTS IN THE PLENARY WHILE AMBASSADOR GOODBY LAUDED THE ATTENTION FOCUSED ON SC.1/AMPLIFIED IN THE INFORMATION VERIFICATION WORKING GROUPS. THE FRG, DENMARK, AND UK CIRCULATED WORKING PAPERS ON MEASURES 2 AND 3 OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED. THE UK ALSO PLUGGED ITS CONSTRAINT PAPER WHICH AMBASSADOR GOODBY INSISTED MUST BE SUBMITTED TO BRUSSELS. END SUMMARY.

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4. IMPRESSIONS -- THE FIRST 36 HOURS: THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DAY, KAYSER (LUXEMBOURG), DESCRIBED THE OPENING PLENARY AND WORKING GROUP MEETINGS AS BUSINESSLIKE AND INTERESTING. CITRON (FRG), EDES (UK), AND STANDAERT (BELGIUM) NOTED THAT THE SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING IN VIENNA HAD RESTRAINED EASTERN STATEMENTS. EDES EXPRESSED PARTICULAR SATISFACTION WITH THE IRISH STATEMENT AS HELPFUL TO NATO'S POSITION. STANDAERT NOTED THAT IRISH EMPHASIS ON CONSTRAINTS WAS MADE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM DUBLIN. GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) CHARACTERIZED THE ROMANIAN STATEMENT AS AN IMPORTANT OPENING ON SOME POINTS, SUCH AS FORECASTS AND NUF, SILENT ON OTHERS (E.G., OUT-OF-GARRISON OR INFORMATION EXCHANGE), AND NOTHING VERY NEW ON VERIFICATION AND CONSTRAINTS. FUENTES (SPAIN) POINTED OUT THAT THE ROMANIANS MAY WELL HAVE RAISED A STRAW MAN FOR THE EAST (ANALYSIS TO FOLLOW SEPTEL). HANSEN (U.S.) POINTED OUT THAT SOVIET REP ROZANOV'S TACTIC IN WEDNESDAY'S VERIFICATION WORKING GROUP ON INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION WAS TO LINK THE SUBJECTS TO THE DISCUSSION IN THE NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP, ALTHOUGH HE APPEARED TO MAKE A GREATER COMMITMENT TO BOTH THAN HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN THE CASE. AMBASSADOR GOODBY ADDED THAT THE FOCUS OF DISCUSSION WAS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED, PRECISELY WHAT HAD BEEN DECIDED AT OSLO AND BRUSSELS.

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5. DISCUSSION/ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS. THE FRG AND UK DISTRIBUTED NATIONAL DISCUSSION PAPERS ON MEASURES 2 AND 3 TO BE USED IN THE WORKING GROUPS TO KEEP THE FOCUS ON SC.1/AMPLIFIED (TEXTS TO BE SENT SEPTEL). EDES (UK), BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS), OZGUL (TURKEY), AND MELLBIN (DENMARK) EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO INTRODUCE THEM FORMALLY TO THE CONFERENCE AND HAVE THEM TRANSLATED INTO SIX LANGUAGES AS WORKING DOCUMENTS. DELWORTH (CANADA), MEVIK (NORWAY), CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL), STANDAERT, AND FUENTES, ON THE CONTRARY, WERE CONCERNED THAT ELEVATING

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THEM AND OTHERS THAT MAY FOLLOW TO FORMAL CONFERENCE STATUS MIGHT GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT NATO IS DIVERTING THE THRUST OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED. MOREOVER, THEY ARGUED IT COULD STIMULATE A RASH OF EASTERN PAPERS ON THEIR NON-STARTERS. EDES RETORTED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD TABLE PAPERS ON THEIR NON-STARTERS, IF THAT WERE THEIR INTENTION, IRRESPECTIVE OF NATO'S HANDLING OF THE IMPLEMENTATION PAPERS. ALSO, TABLING OF THE FRG AND UK PAPERS WOULD MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM THE WEST BUILT UP IN THE LAST ROUND. THE CHAIR REACHED CONSENSUS BY SUGGESTING A CAUCUS REVIEW OF THE PAPERS NEXT WEEK.

- THE DANES CIRCULATED TWO PAPERS (TEXTS TO BE SENT SEPTTEL) ON AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES AND THE NEED TO ESTABLISH A SPECIAL REGIME WITH MORE VIGOROUS RULES FOR NOTIFICATION IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED. ONE PAPER IS A BACKGROUND PIECE NOT TO BE USED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE OTHER A DISCUSSION PAPER FOR EVENTUAL SUBMISSION IN WORKING GROUP B. THE CAUCUS AGREED TO POSTPONE FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THESE PAPERS UNTIL DECISIONS WERE MADE ON THE FRG AND UK PAPERS REFERRED TO IN PARA 5 ABOVE.

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6. UK CONSTRAINTS PAPER: THE UK URGED PROMPT CONSIDERATION BY THE CAUCUS OF ITS CONSTRAINTS PAPER (REFTEL). EDES ARGUED THAT NATO IS NOT IN A GOOD POSITION ON THE CONSTRAINTS ISSUE FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: 1) THE SOVIETS HAVE HINTED THAT THEY MAY INTRODUCE ADDITIONAL CONSTRAINT MEASURES; 2) THE IRISH STATEMENT ON CONSTRAINTS REFLECTS NEW MOMENTUM ON THE ISSUE; 3) THE NNA ARE DETERMINED TO PRODUCE A CONSTRAINT PAPER; 4) THE ALLIANCE MUST BE PREPARED TO TABLE QUICKLY ONE OF ITS OWN, ALBEIT FOR TACTICAL PURPOSES ALONE; AND 5) PROSPECTS IN BRUSSELS FOR REACHING AGREEMENT ON A CONSTRAINT MEASURE APPEAR REMOTE. AMBASSADOR GOODBY RESPONDED THAT THE YUGOSLAV POSITION ON CONSTRAINTS MAY ALSO CREATE SOME PRESSURES AS WILL OTHERS. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO UNIFIED NNA POSITION AND THE ISSUE NEED NOT BECOME A FOCUS OF THE CONFERENCE. MOREOVER, HE ADDED, DECISIONS ON INTRODUCING CONSTRAINTS SHOULD BE MADE BY BRUSSELS, NOT STOCKHOLM. SINCE THE ISSUE HAD BEEN RAISED IN NATO CONSULTATIONS ON MAY 10, THE BRITISH PAPER SHOULD BE SUBMITTED DIRECTLY TO BRUSSELS SINCE THE NATO CAUCUS CANNOT REPLACE THE NATO MACHINERY. CUTILEIRO AND CIARRAPICO PROPOSED HOLDING AN OPEN-ENDED CAUCUS MEETING TO DISCUSS THE UK PAPER AND TO OFFER COMMENTS BEFORE ITS POSSIBLE SUBMISSION TO NATO. EDES MADE CLEAR THAT THE FINAL DECISION ON WHETHER TO FORWARD THE PAPER TO BRUSSELS WOULD BE MADE IN LONDON. THE CHAIR SET THE MEETING FOR WEDNESDAY, MAY 22.

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7. CONTACTS: GASCHIGNARD REPORTED ON A MEETING BETWEEN FRENCH DISARMAMENT EXPERTS (RENOUARD, D'ABOVILLE, ET AL)

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AND THEIR SOVIET COUNTERPARTS IN MOSCOW OVER THE INTER-SESSION, NOTING THAT GRINEVSKY HAD ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FRENCH SCHEME FOR INFORMAL GROUPS. THE FRENCH ALSO INDICATED SOVIET HESITANCY TO INTRODUCE NEW PROPOSALS, ALTHOUGH THEY NOTED THEY ARE THINKING OF MEASURES TO PREVENT SURPRISE ATTACK AND POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL CONSTRAINTS. CITRON DISCUSSED BILATERALS WITH THE HUNGARIANS WHO REPORTED THAT, ACCORDING TO THEM, THE ROMANIAN INITIATIVE DOES NOT CORRESPOND TO THE EAST'S THINKING AND GOES FURTHER THAN THE PACT IS WILLING TO GO. THE HUNGARIANS ALSO SAID THE EAST APPARENTLY WILL OFFER NOTHING BEYOND THE PURVIEW OF SC.4 EXCEPT POSSIBLY CONSTRAINT MEASURES. AMBASSADOR GOODBY REPORTED ON HIS MAY 15 ROMANIAN LUNCH AND STATED THE ROMANIAN INTENTIONS TO INITIATE DETAILED SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS AS A RESULT OF THEIR STATEMENT AND AIDE-MEMOIRE. GOODBY EMPHASIZED THAT HIS REPLY TO THE ROMANIANS SPECIFIED THE NEED FOR MORE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS BEFORE WORK ON DRAFTING COULD PROCEED. EDES REPORTED ON A CONVERSATION WITH GRINEVSKY WHO TOLD HIM THAT EVGENY KUTOVOY WOULD BECOME DEPUTY HEAD OF THE USSR MISSION TO THE UN IN NEW YORK AFTER HE RECOVERED SUFFICIENTLY FROM INJURIES INCURRED IN AN ACCIDENT IN STOCKHOLM LAST MARCH.

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8. OTHER BUSINESS: BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) RAISED THE MATTER OF THE "RUMP-SQUEEZING THE PACKAGE." HE NOTED THAT THE ANOMALIES IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED RANGE FROM EASY LINGUISTIC PROBLEMS TO QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE. BUWALDA RECOMMENDED THAT A CAUCUS GROUP MADE UP OF DEPUTIES AND MIL REPS REVIEW THE ANOMALIES IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE CAUCUS. CIARRAPICO (ITALY) WELCOMED THE IDEA AND SAW THE NEED FOR TWO APPROACHES TO THE PACKAGE. ONE APPROACH WOULD IDENTIFY PROBLEMS THAT COULD BE SOLVED IN STOCKHOLM; THE OTHER APPROACH WOULD IDENTIFY ISSUES THAT ONLY BRUSSELS COULD ADDRESS. NAMIESNIOWSKI (CANADA), CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY ADVISORS GROUP, DESCRIBED THE WORK OF THE RUMP (FRG, NETHERLANDS, TURKEY, U.S., UK, AND CANADA) DURING THE INTERSESSION WHICH WAS REPORTED TO CAPITALS AND DISCUSSED IN BRUSSELS. AMBASSADOR GOODBY CAUTIONED THAT THE PRIORITIES OF THE CAUCUS SHOULD BE DIRECTED AT THE SUBSTANCE OF WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS AND NOT ON THE ANOMALIES OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED. BUWALDA AGREED, YET URGED THAT WORK PROCEED IN ORDER TO DEVELOP ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ALREADY RAISED ABOUT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE NATO PACKAGE. THE CHAIR SET FRIDAY, MAY 24, FOR A JOINT MEETING OF CAUCUS DEPUTIES AND MIL REPS TO REVIEW WHAT STEPS TO TAKE ON THE ISSUE OF ANOMALIES IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED.

- THE CAUCUS ALSO AGREED TO HOLD ITS NEXT MEETING ON TUESDAY, MAY 21.

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SUBJECT: CDE: REPORT OF WORKING GROUP MEETINGS, MAY 15 AND 16

REF: STOCKHOLM 3627

1. CDE VI - 011.

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT WORKING GROUP A/WEDNESDAY, DIALOGUE DEVELOPED BETWEEN U.S. AND SOVIET REPS ON INFORMATION, WITH SOVIET REP ACKNOWLEDGING THAT IF A STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD WERE TO BE AGREED FOR NOTIFICATION, INFORMATION SHOULD BE EXCHANGED REGARDING THE STRUCTURE OF FORCES PARTICIPATING IN THE ACTIVITY. FOR FIRST TIME, EAST MADE SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO SDI, DENOUNCING IT AS REPRESENTING POSSIBLE FUTURE INTERFERENCE WITH NTM. (SUMMARIZED IN PARAS 4 AND 5 BELOW). AT WORKING GROUP B/ THURSDAY, ON OBSERVATION, THE U.S. REP (GEN. BLANK) WAS THE ONLY SPEAKER, EXPLAINING THE WESTERN POSITION REGARDING OBSERVATION OF ALERT ACTIVITIES. AT WORKING GROUP A/THURSDAY, THE SOVIETS QUOTED WESTERN STATEMENTS IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS IN 1974 ADVOCATING A LIMITATION ON THE SIZE OF MEASURES TO 50,000 (SUMMARIZED IN PARA 6 BELOW). END SUMMARY.

4. WORKING GROUP A/WEDNESDAY. AFTER THE PERFUNCTORY EASTERN PERFORMANCE THE PREVIOUS DAY IN "THEIR" WORKING GROUP A/TUESDAY SESSION (REFTEL), WE WERE SURPRISED THAT THE SOVIETS ENGAGED IN A SUBSTANTIVE DIALOGUE ON INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION. THE UK OPENED THE MEETING WITH A ROUTINE REBUTTAL OF SOME EASTERN ARGUMENTS AGAINST MEASURE 1, CHALLENGING, IN PARTICULAR, THE SOVIET IDEA THAT INFORMATION SHOULD BE PROVIDED ONLY IN THE EVENT OF A THREAT OR CRISIS. U.S. REP (STRAUSS) ADDRESSED THE ESSENTIAL ROLE OF VERIFICATION, STRESSING THAT WITHOUT VERIFICATION THERE COULD BE NO AGREEMENT. HE NOTED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THAT THE CDE'S FOCUS ON DYNAMIC MILITARY ACTIVITIES REQUIRES COMPLEMENTARY FORMS OF VERIFICATION; THUS, THE NEED FOR TIMELY INFORMATION TO CORRECT MISPERCEPTIONS AND/OR TO PROVIDE WARNING IS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE. THE GDR AMBASSADOR USED THE PARAGRAPH IN MEASURE 5 OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED CONCERNING NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS AND QUOTATIONS FROM AVERILL HARRIMAN TO TAKE THE UNITED STATES TO TASK ON SDI. HE ASKED THE RHETORICAL QUESTION OF WHETHER SDI (HE CALLED IT "STAR WARS") WOULD POSE THE DANGER OF IMPEDING NTM FOR COMPLIANCE OF CSBMS. (COMMENT: THIS WAS AN UNUSUAL AND UNEXPECTED POLEMIC FROM AMB. BUHRING, GIVEN THE GOOD RECORD OF BUSINESS-LIKE DISCUSSIONS IN THE WORKING GROUPS. LATER, DURING HIS INTERCHANGE WITH THE SOVIET REP, U.S. REP HANSEN RESPONDED TO BUHRING BY SAYING THE UNITED STATES WILL RESPECT ANY AGREEMENT IT UNDERTAKES

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AND THAT THERE IS ONLY ONE ASAT SYSTEM CURRENTLY IN EXISTENCE AND THAT DOES NOT BELONG TO THE UNITED STATES. END COMMENT)

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5. THE SOVIET REP THEN MADE A LENGTHY INTERVENTION WHICH WAS HELPFUL BY BEING SERIOUS, THOUGHTFUL AND CLEAR, EVEN THOUGH NOT CHANGING THE BASICALLY NEGATIVE SOVIET POSITION. A DIALOGUE THEN DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE SOVIET REP AND U.S. REP HANSEN, WHEN HANSEN FIRST DROVE HOME THE NEED AND RELEVANCE OF INFORMATION BY DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE INADEQUATE SOVIET NOTIFICATION OF ZAPAD-81, AND LATER, USED SOVIET INSISTENCE THAT INFORMATION EXCHANGE WAS DEPENDENT ON THE CONTENT OF THE NOTIFICATION MEASURE TO GET THE SOVIET REP TO ADMIT THAT IF A STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION WERE TO BE ADOPTED, INFORMATION ON THE STRUCTURE OF FORCES PARTICIPATING IN NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE PROVIDED. IN BRIEF, BASIC POINTS MADE BY THE SOVIET REP WERE:

-- INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND VERIFICATION REPRESENT MEANS FOR IMPLEMENTING NOTIFICATION MEASURES. THUS, THE AMOUNT AND TYPE OF INFORMATION PROVIDED DEPENDS ON THE CONTENT OF THE NOTIFICATION MEASURE.

-- TO GO BEYOND THE FINAL ACT'S NOTIFICATION CBM, THE SOVIETS ARE PROPOSING TO EXTEND NOTIFICATION TO AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES, MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS. "THAT IS THE WAY TO EXPAND THE VOLUME OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE."

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-- VERIFICATION IS NOT AN AIM IN ITSELF AND CANNOT INTERFERE WITH THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF A STATE OR UNDERMINE NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY. (COMMENT: THIS LATTER ARGUMENT SEEMS DIRECTED AT OUR IDEAS OF INSPECTION "ON DEMAND," WITHOUT NEED TO DEMONSTRATE CAUSE.)

-- "IF WE AGREE ON THE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION REQUIRED BY THE SPECIFICS OF THE NOTIFICATION MEASURES, THAT INFORMATION WOULD BE GIVEN, HOWEVER DETAILED. IF INSPECTIONS WERE CARRIED OUT IN CONNECTION WITH CSBMS, OKAY. BUT INSPECTION PERMITTED IN ADVANCE, UNRELATED TO THE CSBMS, NO."

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6. WORKING GROUP A/THURSDAY. THE HUNGARIAN AND DANISH REPS GAVE ROUTINE INTERVENTIONS, WITH BOTH ADDRESSING BOTH MEASURE 2 AND LIMITATIONS ON THE SIZE OF MANEUVERS. THE HUNGARIAN REP ARGUED THAT MEASURE 2 CANNOT BE A SUBSTITUTE FOR CONSTRAINTS. THE DANISH REP ARGUED THAT IT IS NOT SIZE WHICH IS NECESSARILY THE MOST SIGNIFICANT OR MOST THREATENING ASPECT OF A MILITARY ACTIVITY, BUT HOW AND WHEN ACTIVITIES ARE USED, AND THAT MEASURE 2, BY INHIBITING THE USE OF FORCE

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FOR PURPOSES OF POLITICAL INTIMIDATION, SERVES THE PURPOSES OF THE CONFERENCE MORE EFFECTIVELY THAN THE EASTERN CONSTRAINT PROPOSAL. THE SOVIET REP QUOTED EXTENSIVELY FROM BELGIAN PLENARY STATEMENTS IN MBFR IN 1974 JUSTIFYING THE WESTERN PROPOSAL IN THAT FORUM FOR A LIMITATION ON THE SIZE OF MANEUVERS AT 50,000 MEN. HE ACCUSED THE WEST OF RENEGING ON THIS PREVIOUS PROPOSAL AND OF NOW WANTING TO PRESERVE ITS FREEDOM OF ACTION TO INCREASE THE SIZE AND INTENSITY OF NATO MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE. (BEGIN COMMENT: THIS WAS AN EFFECTIVE SOVIET PERFORMANCE, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE NNA AND MANY OF OUR ALLIES ARE NOT AWARE OF THE DETAILS OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. U.S. REP HANSEN SAVED WHAT WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN A MOST EMBARRASSING WESTERN DEFEAT IN OUR DEBATING-POINTS GAME BY NOTING THAT THAT WESTERN PROPOSAL IN MBFR WAS MADE IN ASSOCIATION WITH SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS, INCLUDING THE REDUCTION OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY OR 5 DIVISIONS. APART FROM OTHER DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE VIENNA AND STOCKHOLM FORUMS, SUCH REDUCTIONS PROVIDED CONFIDENCE FOR SUCH A CONSTRAINT ON MANEUVERS, WHILE IN CDE NO SUCH BASE OF CONFIDENCE EXISTS. END COMMENT).

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7. (NOTE: THE HUNGARIAN INTERVENTION REFERRED AGAIN TO THE PREVIOUS HUNGARIAN SUGGESTIONS FOR ADDITIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE DURATION AND FREQUENCY OF MANEUVERS, BUT GAVE NO INDICATION THAT THE EAST INTENDS TO TABLE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS IN THESE POINTS. CORRIDOR INFORMATION NOW IS THAT THE EAST INTENDS TO PRESENT WORKING PAPERS ON AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES AND ON MOVEMENTS.).  
END

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SUBJECT: CDE: REPORT OF WORKING GROUP B, MAY 17

1. CDE VI - 013.

2. UNCLASSIFIED - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. SUMMARY. U.S., FRANCE, BULGARIA AND FRG GAVE ROUTINE STATEMENTS AT FIRST MEETING OF WORKING GROUP SESSION ON NOTIFICATION. BULGARIAN STATEMENT ADDRESSED NOTIFICATION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. END SUMMARY.

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4. FIRST MEETING ON NOTIFICATION REFLECTED THE SLOW PACE AND PERFUNCTORY NATURE OF THE FIRST WEEK'S WORKING GROUP SESSIONS. U.S. (HANSEN) LED OFF WITH A REVIEW OF THE AREAS OF CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE ON NOTIFICATION ISSUES, EMPHASIZING THE NEED TO GO SIGNIFICANTLY BEYOND THE HELSINKI CBM. THE FRENCH REP WELCOMED POSITIVE POINTS OF THE ROMANIAN AIDE MEMOIRE, SUCH AS ACCEPTANCE OF AN ANNUAL CALENDAR AND INCLUSION OF INFORMATION ON MILITARY FORCES, THEN FOCUSED ATTENTION ON THE NEED FOR A STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOVIET DIVISIONS HAVE FEWER TROOPS THAN U.S. AND FRG DIVISIONS, BUT ARGUED THAT, IN TERMS OF THE MILITARY POTENTIAL OF DIVISIONS, THE ADVANTAGE LAY WITH THE USSR. MOREOVER, THE DANGER, FROM THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW, WAS FROM NATO DIVISIONS, NOT FROM NATO TROOPS PER SE. THUS, IN TERMS OF ENHANCING THE SECURITY OF ALL, A STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD SHOULD BE PREFERABLE TO ALL CONCERNED. THE BULGARIAN REP NOTED THAT THE MANDATE DEFINES THE ZONE AS COVERING EUROPE AND THE ADJOINING SEA AND AIR SPACE; THEREFORE, AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN THOSE AREAS SHOULD BE COVERED BY NOTIFICATION AS WELL AS GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES ON LAND. HE CLAIMED THAT BETWEEN JANUARY AND AUGUST 1984, NATO HELD 17 NAVAL MANEUVERS IN THE NORTH, BALTIC AND MEDITERRANEAN SEAS AND THE ATLANTIC, MEANING THAT NOT ONE DAY PASSED DURING THAT TIME WITHOUT NAVAL MANEUVERS BEING HELD OFF THE COASTS OF EUROPE. HE ARGUED THAT TO LEAVE SUCH ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE THE NOTIFICATION REGIME WOULD GIVE SPECIAL PRIVILEGE TO NATO. THE FRG REP CLOSED THE SESSION CRITICIZING THE EASTERN PROPOSAL TO LOWER THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD TO 20,000 IN FAMILIAR TERMS. END

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SUBJECT: CDE: EAST TABLES WORKING PAPERS ON NOTIFICATION OF GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS

1. CDE VI - 015.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. AT WORKING GROUP AB MEETING TODAY, MAY 20, EASTERN DELEGATES TABLED THREE WORKING PAPERS DEALING, IN TURN, WITH NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE MANEUVERS, AIR FORCE MANEUVERS, AND NAVAL MANEUVERS. TEXTS WILL FOLLOW SEPTEL. (COMMENT: WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY EASTERN DELEGATES THAT THE ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN PAPERS ARE NOT PRECISE OR CORRECT IN SOME PLACES. WE WILL REVIEW ENGLISH TRANSLATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE). DELEGATION'S ANALYSIS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS WILL BE FORWARDED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

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4. IN BRIEF, THE EAST PROPOSES TO NOTIFY MAJOR GROUND FORCE MANEUVERS OVER 20,000 MEN (I.E., THE SAME AS PROPOSED LAST SESSION IN PLENARY SESSION); AIR FORCE MANEUVERS (INDEPENDENT OR COMBINED WITH GROUND OR NAVAL FORCES) INVOLVING MORE THAN 200 MILITARY AIRCRAFT SIMULTANEOUSLY OVER THE DECLARED AREA OF A MANEUVER; AND NAVAL MANEUVERS INVOLVING MORE THAN 30 VESSELS AND 100 MILITARY AIRCRAFT, EXECUTED INDEPENDENTLY OR COMBINED WITH GROUND OR AIR FORCES. ALL SUCH MANEUVERS WOULD BE NOTIFIED 30 DAYS IN ADVANCE.

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5. THE WORKING PAPERS PROVIDED ADDITIONAL DETAILS, OF WHICH THE MOST NOTEWORTHY ARE (BASED ON ENGLISH INTERPRETATION AT TIME OF DELIVERY):

A. AREA OF APPLICATION. THE EAST DEFINES THE ZONE AS ALL AREAS COVERED BY ANY PART OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT (A DEFINITE REFERENCE TO THE EXTRA-EUROPEAN PARTS OF TURKEY AND THE SOVIET UNION COVERED EXPLICITLY IN THE FINAL ACT, BUT ONLY IMPLICITLY IN THE MADRID MANDATE). THE DOCUMENTS REFER TO THE ZONE AS BEING THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AS WELL AS THE ADJOINING SEA AND AIR SPACE (AS IN THE MANDATE). FOR AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS, THE EASTERN PAPERS REFER TO BOTH CONDITIONS OF THE MANDATE FOR COVERING THE ADJOINING SEA AND AIR SPACE. (THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS REPETITION OF THE MANDATE, WHICH THE EAST HAS NOT ALWAYS ACCEPTED, HAS YET TO BE DETERMINED).

B. TRANSFERS. ALL THREE PAPERS INCLUDE THE POINT THAT IF, BEFORE A MANEUVER TAKES PLACE, A TRANSFER/ MOVEMENT OF TROOPS IS INVOLVED, INCLUDING FROM OUTSIDE THE ZONE, TO THE AREA OF THE MANEUVER, NOTIFICATION

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OF SUCH TRANSFER/MOVEMENT WILL BE GIVEN.

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C. INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN THE NOTIFICATION WILL INCLUDE: DESIGNATION/NAME OF THE MANEUVER; THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF THE MANEUVER; A SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE TROOPS/FORCES DURING THE MANEUVER; THE STATES INVOLVED IN THE MANEUVER; THE AREA OF THE MANEUVER WITH APPROXIMATE GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES; THE TIME-FRAME FOR THE MANEUVER. FOR GROUND FORCE MANEUVERS, ALSO THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF FORCES AND COMPONENTS, AND THE TIME WHEN TROOPS LEAVE GARRISON. FOR AIR FORCE MANEUVERS, ALSO INFORMATION REGARDING THE TRANSFER OF FORCES TO THE MANEUVER, AND THE NUMBER AND TYPES OF AIRCRAFT. FOR NAVAL MANEUVERS, THE NUMBER AND TYPES OF AIRCRAFT AND SHIPS. IN ADDITION, IN ALL THREE WORKING PAPERS, ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SHOULD BE PROVIDED WHENEVER POSSIBLE.

D. THE EAST HAS PURPOSEFULLY PICKED UP LANGUAGE OR IDEAS FROM SC.1, INCLUDING: CONCEPT OF "UNDER A SINGLE COMMAND"; CONCEPT THAT THE HOST-COUNTRY SHOULD NOTIFY THE MANEUVER EVEN IF IT DOES NOT HAVE FORCES PARTICIPATING IN THE MANEUVER; THE CONCEPT OF ALERTS, OR SHORT-NOTICE MANEUVERS (I.E., THEY SHOULD BE NOTIFIED AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME.)  
END

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SUBJECT: WORKING GROUP AB MEETING, MAY 20, 1985

1. CDE VI - 020

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT

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3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE MAY 20 WORKING GROUP AB MEETING, THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES TABLED THREE WORKING DOCUMENTS RELATING TO NOTIFICATION OF GROUND, AIR, AND NAVAL MANEUVERS. THEY PROPOSED A 30-DAY ADVANCE NOTIFICATION FOR ALL THREE TYPES OF ACTIVITIES. THEY SET A NUMERICAL THRESHOLD OF 20,000 MEN FOR GROUND FORCE MANEUVERS; 30 COMBAT SHIPS AND 100 MILITARY PLANES FOR NAVAL ACTIVITIES; AND 200 MILITARY PLANES FOR MAJOR AIR FORCE MANEUVERS. (TEXTS FOLLOW SEPTEL.) AMBASSADOR GOODBY OUTLINED FOUR AREAS REQUIRING INTENSIFIED DISCUSSION PRIOR TO PROCEEDING TO NEGOTIATIONS. (COMPLETE TEXT SENT SEPTEL.) AMBASSADOR EDES (UK) OFFERED HIS ASSESSMENT OF COMMON GROUND AND WORK WHICH MUST BE DONE PRIOR TO MOVING TO THE NEXT PHASE. END SUMMARY.

4. AMBASSADOR REZNIK OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA INTRODUCED THE FIRST WORKING DOCUMENT, "PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MANEUVERS OF LAND FORCES," ON BEHALF OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, POLAND, AND THE SOVIET UNION. IN FORMALIZING HIS MARCH 15 PLENARY STATEMENT, THE CZECH REPRESENTATIVE CITED A 20,000-MAN THRESHOLD TO TRIGGER 30 DAYS ADVANCE NOTIFICATION. IN ADDITION, THE WORKING DOCUMENT LISTS INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN THE NOTIFICATION. (TEXT SENT SEPTEL.)

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5. GDR AMBASSADOR BUHRING FOLLOWED WITH AN INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT ON THE SECOND WORKING DOCUMENT, "PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR AIR FORCE MANEUVERS," ON BEHALF OF THE GDR, HUNGARY, AND THE USSR. THE DOCUMENT PROPOSES 30 DAYS ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF 200 OR MORE MILITARY PLANS -- COMBAT, TRANSPORT OR AUXILIARY AVIATION, AS WELL AS ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE -- THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. IN ADDITION, THE WORKING DOCUMENT INCLUDES THE TRANSFER OF SUCH UNITS AND FORMATIONS FROM ANOTHER AREA -- INCLUDING FROM OUTSIDE THE ZONE. INFORMATION TO BE GIVEN IN THE NOTIFICATION IS LISTED. (TEXT SENT SEPTEL.)

6. THE THIRD WORKING DOCUMENT WAS INTRODUCED BY AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY (USSR), ENTITLED "PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MANEUVERS OF NAVAL FORCES," ON BEHALF OF THE USSR, BULGARIA, AND POLAND. (TEXT SENT SEPTEL.) GRINEVSKY NOTED THAT ALL THREE WORKING DOCUMENTS SHOULD BE NUMBERED AS WORKING DOCUMENTS OF GROUP "B." HIS SUBSEQUENT PREPARED REMARKS (SENT SEPTEL) CRITICIZED ALLEGED U.S. "FIRST-STRIKE" CAPABILITY AS WELL AS THE "DESTABILIZING" EFFECT OF SDI. IN CONTRAST, HE NOTED THE "BUSINESSLIKE AND SERIOUS CONTRIBUTIONS" OF THE EAST BLOC TO THE CONFERENCE, I.E., SC.4, SC.6, CONSTRAINTS, AND NOW MEASURES

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DESIGNED TO PREVENT SURPRISE ATTACK. HE ALSO REFERRED TO AMBASSADOR GOODBY'S OFF-SESSION TRAVEL TO OSLO AND ANKARA, ACCUSING GOODBY OF SPREADING ALLEGATIONS OF THE DECLARATORY NATURE OF EASTERN PROPOSALS.

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7. CITING THE ROMANIAN STATEMENT AND AIDE-MEMOIRE WHICH ATTEMPT TO DELINEATE AREAS OF EMERGING COMMON GROUND, AMBASSADOR EDES (UK) OFFERED HIS ASSESSMENT OF WHERE WE ARE AND WHERE WE ARE GOING. HE OPINED THAT THE ROMANIAN AREAS OF BROAD CONVERGENCE ARE A WELCOME EFFORT, ALTHOUGH WE ARE STILL FAR FROM REAL CONVERGENCE. EDES CITED GEOFFRY HOWE'S OPENING SPEECH TO CDE REGARDING THE LINK BETWEEN NUF AND CSBM'S, TO MAKE HIS POINT THAT A NUF REAFFIRMATION MUST BE CONSIDERED IN THE "CONTEXT" OF CSBM'S. WITH TONGUE IN CHEEK, EDES THEN OUTLINED SIX OTHER AREAS OF CONVERGENCE, I.E., THE SIX MEASURES OF SC.1. HE NOTED THAT NO ONE IS OPPOSED TO INFORMATION OR EXCHANGE OF CALENDARS IN PRINCIPLE. MANDATORY NOTIFICATION, HE SAID, PERHAPS ENJOYS THE GREATEST DEGREE OF CONVERGENCE. SIMILARLY, THE PRINCIPLE OF INVITATION OF OBSERVERS TO CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES HAS GAINED GENERAL ACCEPTANCE. FINALLY, EDES SEES "BROAD CONVERGENCE" DEVELOPING IN VERIFICATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, ALTHOUGH, UNLIKE THE OTHER MEASURES, HE OFFERED NO ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES. THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR EXCLUDED CONSTRAINTS FROM THE AREAS OF CONVERGENCE, STRESSING THAT THERE IS NO REAL SIGN OF CONVERGENCE DESPITE A READINESS TO DISCUSS AND CONSIDER CONSTRAINTS IN LIGHT OF THE THE MANDATE.

8. WITH A LIGHT TOUCH, AMBASSADOR GOODBY REBUKED GRINEVSKY'S CRITICAL COMMENTARY ON HIS TRAVELS. HE INCORPORATED PRELIMINARY COMMENTS REGARDING THE THREE WORKING DOCUMENTS ON HIS PREPARED STATEMENT. HE SAID WE WOULD STUDY THEM WITH INTEREST BUT AVOIDED ANY POSITIVE CHARACTERIZATIONS. AMBASSADOR GOODBY CONTRASTED THE EAST'S EFFORT WITH THE "FULLY DEVELOPED" POSITION OF NATO. HE ALSO RAISED AN EARLY MARKER THAT THE EAST'S LATEST POSITIONS DO NOT AT FIRST APPEAR TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS WE FACE IN RESOLVING OUR DIFFERENT APPROACHES. (FULL TEXT OF SPEECH SENT SEPTEL.)  
END

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CSCE  
CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE-  
AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES  
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE  
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Working Document  
of the Delegations of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic,  
the Polish People's Republic and the  
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MANOEUVRES OF LAND FORCES

For the purposes of reducing the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to apprehension,

Having regard to the importance of prior notification of major military manoeuvres for promoting mutual understanding and confidence-building, stability and security,

Taking into account the useful experience of implementing the confidence-building measures provided for in the relevant provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and having in mind the adoption of confidence-measures which will be more substantial in nature and broader in scope,

The following is proposed:

1. The participating States will notify major manoeuvres of land forces conducted independently or jointly with other participating States on the territory of any participating State (participating States) in Europe as well as in the adjoining sea (ocean) area and air space.

This confidence- and security-building measure will also be applicable in all areas covered by any of the provisions in the Final Act relating to confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament.

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Major manoeuvres of land forces mean land-force manoeuvres conducted independently or in combination with any possible air, naval, as well as amphibious and airborne troop components under a common intention and plan and involving forces with a total numerical strength of more than 20,000 troops.

2. Notifications will be given to all participating States through the usual diplomatic channels by each State which conducts a major military manoeuvre, 30 days in advance of the start of the manoeuvre or at the earliest possible opportunity if the manoeuvre is arranged at shorter notice.

In the case of the conduct of multinational manoeuvres notification will be given by the participating State on the territory of which the conduct of a manoeuvre is planned even if that State's troops are not involved in the manoeuvre. This will not restrict the obligation of other participating State to give notification of these activities if they correspond to the established level of notification.

3. If prior to the start of a manoeuvre it is planned to move (transfer troops to the area of the manoeuvre from another area, including one outside the area covered by confidence-building measures, notification of their movement (transfer) to the area of manoeuvres and back shall be given in accordance with the measure of notification of military movements (transfers).

4. Notification of major manoeuvres of land forces will contain the following information:

- the designation of the manoeuvre, if any;
- the general purpose of the manoeuvre, with a short description of the forthcoming military activities of the troops in the course of the manoeuvre;
- States engaged in it;
- the numerical strength and components of the forces;
- the area of the conduct of the manoeuvre;
- the time-frame of the conduct of the manoeuvre, and the period during which troops will be away from their permanent locations;

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- on the transfer of troops to the area of the manoeuvre (prior to its start) from other areas, including those outside the area covered by confidence building measures.

Besides, the participating States will, whenever possible, provide additional information, in particular with regard to the composition of forces military hardware involved, and other information.

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the Hungarian People's Republic and the  
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MANOEUVRES OF AIR FORCES

For the purposes of undertaking new, effective and concrete actions  
designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security,

Taking into account the high mobility of air forces, the fact that they  
are equipped with highly effective strike weapons and the particularly  
dangerous nature of their activities,

Taking into consideration the fact that major manoeuvres of air forces  
can be a source of serious threat to the security of States, as well as of  
unpredictability, possible miscalculations and misunderstanding of the  
purposes of such manoeuvres,

The following is proposed:

1. The participating States will notify major manoeuvres of air  
forces on the territory of any participating State(s) in Europe, and  
also in the adjoining sea (ocean) area and air space.

This confidence- and security-building measure will also be applicable  
in all areas covered by any of the provisions in the Final Act relating to  
confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament.

Major manoeuvres of air forces mean manoeuvres of air forces, naval  
aviation and aviation of air defence forces conducted under a common intention  
and plan independently or in combination (including those conducted in

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combination with land and naval forces), in the course of which it is foreseen that more than two hundred military aircraft will be in the air space over the notified area at the same time.

The term "military aircraft" in the context of this measure includes combat, military transport and auxiliary aircraft of the air forces, naval forces and air defence forces taking part in the notified manoeuvre.

2. Notifications will be given to all participating States through the usual diplomatic channels by each State which conducts manoeuvres, 30 days in advance of the start of the manoeuvre or at the earliest possible opportunity if the manoeuvre is arranged at shorter notice.

3. In the context of this measure it is understood that notifications will be given both of national manoeuvres and of those conducted jointly with other participating States in the area covered by confidence-building measures

In the case of the conduct of multinational manoeuvres notification will be given by the participating State on whose territory the manoeuvre is planned to take place or by the State which is the principal organizer of the manoeuvre, even if that State's air forces and troops are not involved in the manoeuvre. This will not restrict the obligation of other participating States to give notification of these activities if they correspond to the established level of notification.

As far as the sea (ocean) area and air space adjoining Europe is concerned notification of major manoeuvres of air forces conducted there will be given whenever these activities affect security in Europe as well as constitute a part of military activities taking place within the whole of Europe, which the States concerned will agree to notify.

4. If prior to the start of a manoeuvre of air forces it is planned to transfer air-force, naval-aviation and air-defence formations and units to the area of the manoeuvre from another area, including one outside the area covered by confidence-building measures, notification of such transfers shall be given in accordance with the measure of notification of military movements (transfer

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5. Notification of major manoeuvres of air forces shall contain the following information:

- the designation of the manoeuvre, if any;
- the general purpose of the manoeuvre, with a short description of the military activities that will take place in the course of it;
- States engaged in it;
- the number of aircraft and the types of aviation involved in the manoeuvre;
- the area of the conduct of the manoeuvre with an indication of approximate geographic co-ordinates;
- the time-frame of the manoeuvre;
- on the transfer of air forces to the area of the manoeuvre (prior to its start) from other areas, including those outside the area covered by confidence-building measures.

Besides, the participating States will, whenever possible, provide additional information.

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the People's Republic of Bulgaria and  
the Polish People's Republic

PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MANOEUVRES OF NAVAL FORCES

For the purposes of undertaking new, effective and concrete actions  
designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security,

Taking into account the particularly dangerous nature of naval forces  
and the fact of their being heavily equipped with modern strike weapons,

Taking into consideration the fact that major manoeuvres of naval forces  
can be a source of serious threat to the security of States as well as of  
unpredictability, possible miscalculations and misunderstanding of the purpose  
of such manoeuvres,

The following is proposed:

1. The participating States will notify major manoeuvres of naval force  
in the sea (ocean) area and air space adjoining Europe.

This confidence- and security-building measure will also be applicable in  
all areas covered by any of the provisions in the Final Act relating to  
confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament.

Major manoeuvres of naval forces mean manoeuvres of naval forces,  
amphibious troops and aviation conducted under a common intention and plan  
independently or in combination (including those conducted in combination  
with land and air forces) if over 30 combat ships and 100 military aircraft  
are involved in the manoeuvres.

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The term "combat ships" in the context of this measure includes ships of main classes from patrol ships, frigates, destroyers up to multi-purpose aircraft carriers; submarines (except nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines).

The term "military aircraft" in the context of this measure includes carrier-based aircraft as well as land-based naval and air-force combat and patrol aircraft which are involved jointly with combat ships in the naval manoeuvre.

2. Notifications will be given to all participating States through the usual diplomatic channels by each State which conducts a manoeuvre, 30 days in advance of the start of the manoeuvre or at the earliest possible opportunity the manoeuvre is arranged at shorter notice.

3. In the context of this measure it is understood that notifications will be given both of national manoeuvres and of those conducted jointly with other participating States in the area covered by confidence-building measures

In the case of the conduct of multinational manoeuvres notification will be given by the participating State which is the principal organizer of the manoeuvre. This will not restrict the obligation of other participating States to give notification of these activities if they correspond to the established level of notification.

As far as the sea (ocean) area and air space adjoining Europe is concerned notification of major naval manoeuvres will be given whenever these activities affect security in Europe as well as constitute a part of military activities taking place within the whole of Europe, which they will agree to notify.

4. Notification of major manoeuvres of naval forces will contain the following information:

- the designation of the manoeuvre, if any;
- the general purpose of the manoeuvre, with a short description of the military activities that will take place in the course of it;

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CSCE/SC/WGB.3

- States engaged in it;
- the numerical strength of the personnel involved;
- the number of combat ships and auxiliary vessels involved in the manoeuvre;
- types of aviation and the number of military airplanes and helicopters;
- the area of the conduct of the manoeuvre with an indication of approximate geographic co-ordinates;
- the time-frame of the manoeuvre, and the period during which naval forces and aviation will be away from their permanent locations (bases).

Besides, the participating States will, whenever possible, give additional information regarding the composition of the forces involved and other information.

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SUBJECT: CDE: TEXT OF STATEMENT GIVEN BY OLEG A. GRINEVSKY, MAY 20, 1985

1. CDE VI - 023.

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT BY OLEG A. GRINEVSKY, USSR AMBASSADOR AT LARGE IN WORKING GROUP A & B ON MONDAY, MAY 20, 1985.

4. BEGIN TEXT: DISTINGUISHED MR. CHAIRMAN, ON BEHALF OF THE DELEGATIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION, BULGARIA AND POLAND I WAS ENTRUSTED TO SUBMIT THE WORKING DOCUMENT "PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MANOEUVRES OF NAVAL FORCES" FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE CONFERENCE. (BELOW FOLLOWS THE TEXT OF THE DOCUMENT). I REQUEST THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE CONFERENCE TO DISTRIBUTE THESE PROPOSALS AS A WORKING DOCUMENT OF THE WORKING GROUP B. MR. CHAIRMAN, THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE ARRIVED IN STOCKHOLM WITH A BUSINESSLIKE SPIRIT. WE ARE PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN SERIOUS AND PRACTICAL

NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO THE EARLIEST ELABORATION OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY MEASURES OF CONFIDENCE IN BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY AREAS. THIS POSITION HAS BEEN EXPRESSED NOT IN GENERAL STATEMENTS BUT IN CONCRETE INITIATIVES AIMED AT MAKING PROGRESS IN BOTH AREAS.

LET ME BRIEFLY RECALL THESE INITIATIVES. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE PREVIOUS SESSION THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, DISPLAYING FLEXIBILITY, SUBMITTED A DOCUMENT ON BASIC PROVISIONS OF A TREATY ON THE NON-USE OF MILITARY FORCE. THIS INITIATIVE IS AIMED AT ACHIEVING THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE OF THE CONFERENCE AND PAVES THE WAY TOWARDS A REAL REDUCTION OF THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE.

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE WISHES OF MANY NEUTRAL COUNTRIES THE DELEGATION OF BULGARIA SUBMITTED A WORKING DOCUMENT ON LIMITING MILITARY MANOEUVRES - ONE OF THE MOST EFFECTIVE AND MEANINGFUL MEASURES OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING BECAUSE TODAY'S MAJOR MILITARY MANOEUVRES CANNOT BE DISTINGUISHED FROM THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES WITH A VIEW TO STARTING COMBAT OPERATIONS. WE HAVE STATED PARAMETERS, MANY SPECIFIC DETAILS AND PROVISIONS REVEALING THE ESSENCE OF OUR PROPOSALS.

THIS IS WHY "A TRAVELLER JOURNEYING FROM WASHINGTON TO OSLO TO ANKARA" STATES TO THE AUDIENCES OF LAYMEN THAT THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION BOILS DOWN TO MERE "DECLARATORY MEASURES", GIVES A BLATENTLY DISTORTED PICTURE OF THE STATE OF AFFAIRS AT THE CONFERENCE.

THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES BEGIN THE CURRENT SESSION WITH A NEW CONSTRUCTIVE INITIATIVE LEADING TO DETENTE IN THE MILITARY FIELD IN EUROPE. THESE PROPOSALS CONCERN VERY IMPORTANT AREAS OF CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING. THEY ARE INTRINSICALLY INTERRELATED AS THEY EXPRESS THE ESSENCE OF THE NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MANOEUVERS.

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IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT MODERN LAND, AIR AND NAVAL FORCES ARE EQUIPPED WITH QUALITATIVELY NEW TYPES OF ARMAMENTS, POSSESS A GREAT STRIKING POWER AND ARE CAPABLE OF ACCOMPLISHING A

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BROAD RANGE OF COMBAT TASKS BOTH INDEPENDENTLY AND IN CLOSE INTERACTION WITH EACH OTHER IN THE SEA (OCEAN) AREA AND AIR SPACE ADJOINING EUROPE. THEIR INTENSIVE TRAINING IN THE COURSE OF WHICH THEY PRACTICE TO DELIVER STRIKES ON LAND, AT SEA AND IN THE AIR BECOMES OF AN EVER GREAT MAGNITUDE AND SCALE.

LARGE-SCALE AIR FORCE MANOEUVRES INVOLVING MANY HUNDREDS OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT CARRYING DEADLY NUCLEAR WEAPONS MAY POSE A THREAT TO THE SECURITY, THUS LEADING TO SITUATIONS WHICH, AS OUR WESTERN COLLEGUES ARE FOND OF SAYING, INCREASE THE DANGER OF "MISCALCULATIONOR MISUNDERSTANDING OF INTENTIONS". LET US TAKE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE NATO MANOEUVRES "CENTRAL ENTERPRISE-84" HELD IN JUNE 1984 WITH A VIEW TO PRACTICING OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS OF THE AIR FORCE AT THE INITIAL STAGE OF WAR IN EUROPE. THEY INVOLVED ABOUT ONE THOUSAND COMBAT AIRCRAFT. THREE MONTHS LATER NATO ONCE MORE STAGED MANOEUVRES OF ITS AIR FORCE - "COLD FIRE-84" AGAIN INVOLVING ONE THOUSAND AIRCRAFT. WOULDNT' EARLY NOTIFICATION OF THIS TYPE OF MANOEUVRES CONTRIBUTE TO GREATER CONFIDENCE?

NAVAL MANOEUVRES ARE HELD IN AN EVER CLOSER PROXIMITY TO EUROPE, WHICH IN ITSELF CANNOT BUT CAUSE CONCERN AND INCREASED TENSIONS. THE PERMANENT MODERNIZATION OF THE NAVY, ITS BEING EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, INCLUDING LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES AND, LASTLY, THE PRESENCE OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS CAPABLE OF DELIVERING STRIKES BOTH AT SEA AND ON LAND RIGHTLY GIVE RISE TO ALARM AND APPREHENSIONS PRECISELY IN EUROPE BECAUSE SUCH MANOEUVRES INVOLVE EUROPE AND AFFECT THE SECURITY OF ITS STATES. THE PURPOSE OF THE RECENT MANOEUVRES OF THE NATO NAVAL FORCES IN THE ATLANTIC - "TEAM-WORK-84" - WAS, FOR EXAMPLE, TO SIMULATE THE TRANSITION OF A WAR-TIME SITUATION AND CONDUCT THE INITIAL NAVAL, AIR AND LAND OPERATIONS. THESE MANOEUVRES INVOLVED 120 SHIPS AND 250 COMBAT AIRCRAFT. ONE SHOULD NOT FORGET YET ANOTHER ASPECT. ALL OF US WERE WITNESSES TO SITUATIONS WHEN LITERALLY BEFORE THE VERY EYES OF THE WHOLE WORLD SEEMINGLY ROUTINE OCEAN MANOEUVRES

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OF THE MILITARY FLEETS OF CERTAIN POWERS WERE TRANSFORMED INTO AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS AGAINST SOVEREIGN STATES. MR. CHAIRMAN, THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE RESUMED ITS WORK IN THE DAYS WHEN THE ENTIRE WORLD IS SOLEMNLY OBSERVING THE FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE VICTORY OVER FASCISM AND THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR, WHICH BROUGHT ABOUT DEVASTATION AND BLOODSHED UNPRECEDENTED IN THE HISTORY OF MANKIND. ITS SEVERE AND EDUCATING LESSONS CANNOT BE FORGOTTEN. THEY TEACH THAT WAR SHOULD BE FOUGHT AGAINST BEFORE IT BREAKS

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OUT, THAT THE USE OR THREAT OF MILITARY FORCE SHOULD BE FOREVER RENUNCIATED. THIS IS PARTICULARLY RELEVANT IN THE PRESENT-DAY COMPLICATED AND TENSE SITUATION. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT YET SEE ANY REAL INDICATIONS OF THE READINESS ON THE PART OF THOSE WHO DETERMINE THE POLICY AND STRATEGY OF THE USA TO RENOUNCE THE ESCALATION OF THE ARMS RACE BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL. THE PLANS FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW FIRST STRIKE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE BEING IMPLEMENTED IN SOME NATO COUNTRIES OF EUROPE AS WELL. THE MILITARIZATION OF SPACE AND ATTEMPTS TO INVOLVE WEST EUROPEAN STATES IN IT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY DESTABILIZE THE SITUATION ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT.

TO CURB THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE ON EARTH AND PREVENT IT IN SPACE, TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES AIMED AT STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY, TO IMPROVE RADICALLY THE ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION - SUCH IS THE IMPERATIVE REQUIREMENT OF TODAY. THIS WAS STATED WITH ALL RESPONSIBILITY AT THE SUMMIT MEETING OF PARTY AND STATE LEADERS OF THE WARSAW TREATY MEMBER-COUNTRIES ON APRIL 26, 1985.

AS IT WAS STRESSED IN THE APPEAL OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU, THE PRESIDUM OF THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET AND THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS "TO THE PEOPLES, PARLIAMENTS AND GOVERNMENTS OF ALL COUNTRIES, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THERE EXISTS NO FATAL INEVITABILITY OF WAR. THERE CAN BE NO OBJECTIVES THAT WOULD JUSTIFY THE UNLEASHING OF NUCLEAR WAR. THERE EXIST NO INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS WHICH CANNOT

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BE SETTLED AT A NEGOTIATING TABLE. DETENTE AND BUSINESS-LIKE COOPERATION CAN AND MUST BE A NATURAL AND PERMANENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. REASON MUST OVERCOME RECKLESSNESS AND FOLLY."

THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AS WELL CAN AND MUST MAKE ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS GOAL. OUR FORUM IS FACING SERIOUS TASKS OF VAST MAGNITUDE - WE SHOULD TACKLE THEM JOINTLY, WITH AN EQUAL SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY AND REALISM. THE HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE SUGGESTS THAT A COMBINATION OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY MEASURES REPRESENTS THE TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN WHICH IS CALLED EUROPEAN CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY.

THE OBLIGATION NOT TO BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE IN THE PRESENT-DAY SITUATION. SHOULD SUCH AN OBLIGATION - FOLLOWING THE EXAMPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION - BE ASSUMED BY OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS PARTICIPATING IN THIS CONFERENCE, THIS WOULD ENSURE A RADICAL TURN IN SECURING CONFIDENCE AMONG STATES AND IN ESTABLISHING REAL GUARANTEES OF PREVENTING NUCLEAR CONFLICT IN EUROPE AND IN THE WHOLE WORLD.

THE PROPOSAL TO CONCLUDE A TREATY ON THE MUTUAL NON-USE OF MILITARY FORCE SUBMITTED BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES CONTRIBUTES TO LESSENING TENSIONS. OUR INITIATIVE IS AIMED AT

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CONSOLIDATING, MAKING MORE PRECISE AND CONCRETE THIS FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE AS APPLIED TO THE REALITIES OF THE PRESENT-DAY DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN EUROPE. OTHER INITIATIVES PUT FORWARD BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ARE ALSO OF NO SMALL POTENTIAL - FREEING EUROPE FROM CHEMICAL WEAPONS, THE NON-INCREASE AND REDUCTION OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES, PROMOTING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE CONTINENT. THOSE WOULD BE THE REAL STEPS TOWARDS DETENTE, STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND TOWARDS DISARMAMENT. THE MEASURES OF MILITARY DETENTE PROPOSED BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ALSO SERVE THE PURPOSE OF IMPROVING THE POLITICAL

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CLIMATE IN EUROPE. THEY GO BEYOND THE LIMITED STEPS OF MILITARY AND TECHNICAL NATURE AND ARE NOT AIMED AT GAINING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES. THOSE ARE MAJOR AND SUBSTANTIVE MEASURES LEADING TO A REDUCED MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE. THEY ARE EQUITABLE IN THEIR NATURE AND FULLY TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY OF THE SIDES. THE WORKING DOCUMENTS PRESENTED TO-DAY BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES SERVE AS AN EXAMPLE TO THAT EFFECT. THE SOVIET UNION AND SOCIALIST COUNTRIES STAND FOR HONEST AND EQUITABLE NEGOTIATIONS, FOR ACHIEVING IN STOCKHOLM WEIGHTY AGREEMENTS WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO STRENGTHENING PEACE IN EUROPE. WE BELIEVE THAT AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IT IS HIGH TIME TO PROCEED FROM WORDS TO ACTIONS, FROM SPEECHES AND STATEMENTS OF A GENERAL NATURE TO CONCRETE NEGOTIATIONS. IT DEPENDS ON THE USA AND ITS ALLIES WHETHER THE CONFERENCE WOULD BE ABLE TO CROSS THIS LINE. END TEXT.

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SUBJECT: TEXT OF U.S. STATEMENT IN WORKING GROUP AB,  
MAY 20, 1985.

1. CDE VI - 022
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR  
JAMES E. GOODBY, HEAD OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION  
IN WORKING GROUP AB ON MAY 20, 1985.

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4. BEGIN TEXT: MR. CHAIRMAN, LAST SESSION'S DISCUSSIONS IN THE WORKING GROUPS WERE BUSINESSLIKE AND CONSTRUCTIVE. ISSUES WERE EXAMINED AND EXPLORED; POSITIONS WERE EXPLAINED AND QUESTIONED. THESE DISCUSSIONS REPRESENTED AN ENCOURAGING START TO THE PROCESS OF DEFINING PROBLEMS AND NARROWING DIFFERENCES. A TENTATIVE FRAMEWORK OF COMMON GROUND BECAME VISIBLE. BUT MORE NEEDS TO BE DONE. THE CONFERENCE MUST PUT SOME FLESH ON THE BONES OF THAT STILL SKELETAL, AND EVEN RATHER GHOSTLY, FRAMEWORK. WE ALL MUST WORK TO ENLARGE AND MAKE MORE TANGIBLE THE AREA OF COMMON GROUND BEFORE WE CAN CONSIDER MOVING TO THE NEXT PHASE OF OUR WORK. I TAKE NOTE OF THE WORKING PAPERS INTRODUCED TODAY. MY DELEGATION WILL STUDY THEM CAREFULLY AND WILL COMMENT IN DUE COURSE. AT FIRST GLANCE, THE ISSUES TO WHICH I WILL REFER IN A FEW MOMENTS DO NOT SEEM TO BE MADE ANY EASIER TO RESOLVE BY THE POSITIONS DESCRIBED IN THESE DOCUMENTS. I WELCOME, HOWEVER, EFFORTS TO GIVE GREATER PRECISION TO THE DISCUSSION OF CONCRETE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND THANK THOSE DELEGATIONS WHO INTRODUCED THEM. IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT MY DELEGATION JOINED IN THE TABLING DURING THE LAST SESSION OF THE INDIVIDUAL WESTERN WORKING DOCUMENTS AND THEN OF DOCUMENT SC.1/AMPLIFIED, THE FIRST FULLY DEVELOPED CONTRIBUTION TO THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT WHICH WE HOPE WILL EMERGE FROM THIS CONFERENCE. WE HOPE THAT DELEGATIONS USED THE RECESS TO ANALYZE THE CONTENTS OF THAT DOCUMENT AND TO REFLECT UPON ITS FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES AND UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES. IN MY CLOSING PLENARY STATEMENT LAST SESSION, MR. CHAIRMAN, I IDENTIFIED SOME ISSUES WHICH MY DELEGATION CONSIDERED KEY TO DETERMINING WHETHER THERE IS SUFFICIENT COMMON GROUND TO WARRANT MOVING TO A NEW AND MORE INTENSE STAGE OF OUR WORK. I SHALL REVIEW THESE ISSUES TODAY.

(1) TYPES OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED. IT SEEMS THAT THERE WE HAVE TWO BASIC PROBLEMS TO WORK OUT, AND THIS REMAINS THE CASE EVEN AFTER THE TABLING OF WORKING DOCUMENTS TODAY. FIRST, SHOULD WE MAINTAIN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN "MANEUVER" AND "MOVEMENT," OR SHOULD WE ADOPT A MORE COMPREHENSIVE,,

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## LESS ARBITRARY DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES

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WHICH SHOULD BE NOTIFIED, SUCH AS "OUT-OF-GARRISON LAND ACTIVITIES?" THE SPONSORS OF SC.1 HAVE PRESENT SUBSTANTIVE REASONS WHY THE PRESENT DISTINCTION IS INADEQUATE: IT RAISES SEMANTIC QUESTIONS, SINCE ONE STATE'S DEFINITIONS MAY NOT BE THE SAME AS ANOTHER'S AND, THEREFORE, MAY GIVE RISE TO AMBIGUITY AND QUESTIONS OF COMPLIANCE. IN RETURN, WE HAVE HEARD NO CONVINCING ARGUMENTS WHY THE PRESENT DISTINCTION IS MORE ADVANTAGEOUS AND SHOULD BE MAINTAINED. THE ARGUMENTS WE DO HEAR SEEM TO BE BASED ON THE SIMPLE PROPOSITION THAT WHAT WAS "GOOD ENOUGH" THEN SHOULD BE "GOOD ENOUGH" NOW. FOLLOWING THAT PRINCIPLE WILL LEAD US NOWHERE IF WE ARE TO MEET THE CHALLENGE OF OUR MANDATE TO GO BEYOND WHAT WAS POSSIBLE TEN YEARS AGO.

A SECOND PROBLEM TO BE WORKED OUT CONCERNS WHAT ADDITIONAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE NOTIFIED. HERE, ISSUES OF PRINCIPLE SEEM TO BE INVOLVED. THE WESTERN PROPOSALS FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THAT THE MOST LIKELY RISKS OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION COME FROM THE POTENTIAL CLASH OF GROUND FORCES. THE SPONSORS OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED THEREFORE EXTEND NOTIFICATION TO MOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES, WHICH COULD BE ONE OF THE FIRST INDICATORS OF HOSTILITIES; TO AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES, WHICH REPRESENT THE MEANS FOR PROJECTING FORCE ON TO LAND; AND TO SHORT-NOTICE ACTIVITIES OR ALERTS, WHICH ARE THE MOST LIKELY "COVERS" FOR HOSTILE MILITARY OPERATIONS.

OTHERS SEEM TO BELIEVE, AND WE HAVE HEARD THIS AGAIN TODAY, THAT THIS CONFERENCE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO DEAL WITH EXTRA-ZONAL MATTERS BY INCLUDING ALL AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION. SUCH A VAGUE NOTION OF THE JURISDICTION OF THIS CONFERENCE IS IMPRACTICAL, UNMANAGEABLE, AND, IN ANY CASE, CONTRARY TO THE AGREED MANDATE. THE NOTIFICATION MEASURE PROPOSED IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED COVERS AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY SUPPORT GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES IN THE ZONE. THIS IS A PRACTICAL AND CLEAR YARDSTICK WHICH FULLY REFLECTS THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE MANDATE.

(2) THRESHOLD LEVELS AND UNIT OF ACCOUNT FOR NOTIFICATION. ONE OF THE MAJOR PROBLEMS TO BE WORKED OUT IS, AGAIN, THE QUESTION OF WHETHER WE CONTINUE WITH

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THE OLD APPROACH BECAUSE "WHAT WAS GOOD THEN IS GOOD NOW." THIS TIME THE ARGUMENT CENTERS ON HOW TO MEASURE OR QUANTIFY THE FORCES OF INTEREST FOR NOTIFICATION PURPOSES AND THIS, TOO, REMAINS AN ISSUE EVEN AFTER TODAY'S TABLING OF WORKING PAPERS. ALTHOUGH

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SC.1/AMPLIFIED INCLUDES THRESHOLDS MEASURED IN MANPOWER LEVELS AS A SECONDARY PARAMETER, OR "SAFETY NET," AS THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF IRELAND TERMED IT, THESE MANPOWER PARAMETERS ARE ADDED AS A BACK-UP TO THE MORE IMPORTANT STRUCTURAL UNIT OF ACCOUNT. WE BELIEVE ADOPTION OF A STRUCTURAL PARAMETER IS IMPORTANT FOR TWO BASIC REASONS. FIRST, IT WOULD ENHANCE THE VERIFIABILITY OF THE NOTIFICATION MEASURE, A POINT WHICH HAS NOT BEEN DISPUTED. SECOND, STRUCTURE IS A MORE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT PARAMETER SINCE IT GIVES A SENSE OF TRUER MILITARY POTENTIAL. WE HAVE HEARD SOME OF THE PROBLEMS OTHERS HAVE WITH THE DIVISIONAL PARAMETER; WE NEED TO ENGAGE IN FURTHER CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION OF THOSE PROBLEMS THIS SESSION.

A SECOND QUESTION CONCERNS THE THRESHOLD LEVEL FOR TRIGGERING NOTIFICATION. FOR A NOTIFICATION MEASURE TO BE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT, THE PRESENT THRESHOLD LEVEL NEEDS TO BE SIGNIFICANTLY LOWERED SO THAT ANY POTENTIAL PREPARATIONS FOR USE OF FORCE WOULD BE IDENTIFIED AT AN EARLIER STAGE THAN AT PRESENT. FOR A NOTIFICATION MEASURE TO BE USEFUL IN ESTABLISHING A PREDICTABLE PATTERN OF PEACETIME MILITARY ACTIVITIES, THE THRESHOLD NEEDS TO BE LOWERED SO THAT MORE MILITARY ACTIVITIES ARE NOTIFIED. THE PROPOSAL, REPEATED IN ONE OF THE WORKING DOCUMENTS INTRODUCED TODAY, TO LOWER THE THRESHOLD TO 20,000 WOULD SERVE NEITHER OF THESE PURPOSES. THE THRESHOLD LEVEL PROPOSAL IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED -- SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF A DIVISION OUT-OF-GARRISON -- IS ONE WHICH REFLECTS PEACETIME TRAINING PRACTICES AND PROVIDES A REASONABLE BASIS FOR IDENTIFYING PREPARATIONS WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.

(3) EFFECTIVE USE OF OBSERVERS. ALL OF US SEEM TO AGREE THAT CURRENT PRACTICES WITH REGARD TO OBSERVATION OF NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES SIMPLY ARE INADEQUATE FOR MAKING A JUDGMENT AS TO THE ROUTINE NATURE OF A MILITARY ACTIVITY. THE DIALOGUE ON WAYS TO DEVELOP AN EFFECTIVE OBSERVATION REGIME LINKED TO NOTIFICATIONS WAS BARELY BEGUN LAST SESSION; WE HAVE A LOT OF WORK TO DO ON THIS

ISSUE THIS SESSION. THERE IS NO LEGITIMATE REASON FOR POSTPONING DISCUSSION OF AN OBSERVATION REGIME.

(4) VERIFICATION/INFORMATION. THERE SEEMS TO BE SOME COMMON GROUND ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES, NAMELY, THAT EACH MEASURE MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY PROVISIONS FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION, AND THAT INFORMATION EXCHANGE IS AN ESSENTIAL COMPONENT TO ENSURE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN EFFECTIVE NOTIFICATION/OBSERVATION REGIME. BUT THE CONFERENCE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE YET TO IDENTIFY MUCH COMMON GROUND ON SPECIFIC APPLICATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES. INFORMATION IS OBVIOUSLY NECESSARY IN ORDER TO CLARIFY AMBIGUOUS SITUATIONS AND PREVENT MISCALCULATION, AND I

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DO NOT BELIEVE THAT ANYONE CHALLENGES THIS POINT. IN TERMS OF THE SPECIFIC APPLICATION OF THIS OBVIOUS FACT, THE RECIPROCAL AND COOPERATIVE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ABOUT MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES RELEVANT FOR THE NOTIFICATION REGIME, IN ADVANCE OF THE ACTUAL ACTIVITY, AND INDEPENDENT OF INDIVIDUAL NOTIFICATIONS, WOULD PROVIDE EVEN GREATER ABILITY TO CLARIFY AMBIGUOUS SITUATIONS BEFORE THEY BECOME SOURCES OF CONCERN. IT WOULD SERVE TO REDUCE THE NEED FOR SPECIAL INQUIRIES, THUS EASING THE VERIFICATION PROCESS. AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, WE SHOULD COOPERATE IN PROVIDING MEANS WHEREBY EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY OF ASSURING ITSELF THAT AGREEMENTS ARE RESPECTED. IN APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE, THE SPONSORS OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED ARE CONVINCED OF THE VALUE OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR DIRECT, ON-THE-SPOT INSPECTION OF AMBIGUOUS ACTIVITIES, DESIGNED TO CLARIFY SUCH SITUATIONS TO THE SATISFACTION OF ALL CONCERNED. THE WESTERN PROVISION FOR INSPECTION IS REASONABLE AND LIMITED. IT IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONTENT OF THE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES PROPOSED AND IS IN LINE WITH THE SIGNIFICANT QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS WE WISH TO MAKE IN THE REGIME CREATED BY THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

MR. CHAIRMAN, I HAVE REVIEWED THESE ISSUES BECAUSE I BELIEVE THAT SERIOUS AND PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION OF THEM WILL BE NECESSARY TO PROVIDE A SOLID AND PROMISING BASIS FOR PROCEEDING TO THE NEXT STAGE OF OUR WORK. THIS SESSION WILL BE AN IMPORTANT ONE FOR OUR CONFERENCE. BY PRIOR AGREEMENT, THE WORKING STRUCTURE WE HAVE NOW WILL BE REVIEWED AT THE END OF THIS SESSION. MY DELEGATION'S POSITION AT THAT TIME WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE QUALITY

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OF THE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS DURING THIS SESSION AND THE FURTHER PROGRESS THE CONFERENCE MAKES IN EXPANDING THE LIMITED COMMON GROUND WE HAVE BEGUN TO GLIMPSE. WE WILL REVIEW THE WORKING DOCUMENTS INTRODUCED TODAY IN THE SPIRIT OF TRYING TO BUILD ON THAT LIMITED COMMON GROUND.

THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN. END TEXT.

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SUBJECT: INITIAL EVALUATION OF EASTERN NOTIFICATION PAPERS

REF: STATE 152001

1. CDE VI - 035
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. SUMMARY. THE EAST TABLED THREE WORKING DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE NOTIFICATION OF GROUND, AIR, AND NAVAL MANEUVERS AT THE MAY 20 WORKING GROUP A&B MEETING. THE THREE PAPERS ARE MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING SUBSTANTIVELY, BUT THEY COULD PRESENT TACTICAL PROBLEMS. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES WILL ATTEMPT TO TOUT THESE PAPERS AS MEETING PRESIDENT REAGAN'S CALL FOR NEGOTIATION OF CSBM'S AND THUS CALL FOR DISCUSSION OF NUF PROVISIONS. THESE PAPERS ARE A CONCRETE FORMALIZATION OF THE VARIOUS PROPOSALS THAT THE EASTERN COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN TOUTING IN THE VARIOUS WORKING GROUP MEETINGS. THE PAPER ON NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MANEUVERS OF LAND FORCES CREATES ALL OF THE INHERENT DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS THAT THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT AVOIDS. THE INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES NOTIFICATION DEALS WITH ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE MANDATE; WHILE THE PAPER ON INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES IS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE MANDATE IN THE ADJOINING AIR SPACE AND UNVERIFIABLE WHERE IT PERTAINS TO ACTIVITY OVER THE WHOLE OF EUROPE. THE EAST HAS USED THE DEFINITION FROM THE MADRID MANDATE ON THE INCLUSION OF ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE, BUT AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION INTERPRETS THE "AS WELL AS" PORTION TO MEAN "OR". END SUMMARY.

4. SC/WGB 1: PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MANEUVERS OF LAND FORCES, WORKING DOCUMENT SUBMITTED BY THE DELEGATIONS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC, POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. THIS PAPER FORMALIZES THE EASTERN POSITION SUBMITTED LAST ROUND TO "NOTIFY MAJOR MANEUVERS OF LAND FORCES OF 20,000 TROOPS OR MORE AT LEAST 30 DAYS IN ADVANCE." A LINE BY LINE COMPARISON OF THIS PROPOSAL SHOWS LITTLE IN COMMON BETWEEN SC.1/AMPLIFIED, AND THE EASTERN PAPER.

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- A. AREAS OF AGREEMENT (SC.1/AMPLIFIED VS EASTERN PAPER)
- -ALL PARTICIPATING STATES WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION.
  - -IN MULTINATIONAL EXERCISES THE HOST STATE MUST NOTIFY THE ACTIVITY EVEN IF IT HAS NO FORCES PARTICIPATING.
  - NO RESTRICTION ON THE OBLIGATION OF STATES OTHER THAN THE HOST STATE TO NOTIFY ACTIVITIES THAT CORRESPOND TO THE ESTABLISHED LEVEL OF NOTIFICATION.
  - -NOTIFICATION OF AN ACTIVITY WHETHER INDEPENDENT OR COMBINED.

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- -DESIGNATION/NAME OF THE ACTIVITY.
- -GENERAL PURPOSE OF THE ACTIVITY.
- NAMES OF PARTICIPATING STATES.
- B. AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT: (SC.1/AMPLIFIED VS EASTERN PAPER)
- -STRUCTURAL PARAMETER VS. NUMERICAL PARAMETER.
- -OUT-OF GARRISON CONCEPT VS. MAJOR MANEUVERS OF LAND FORCES.
- -45 DAYS ADVANCE NOTIFICATION VS. 30 DAYS ADVANCE NOTIFICATION.
- -EASTERN PAPER MAKES NO MENTION OF MOBILIZATION, OR ALERT ACTIVITIES.
- -AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES ARE INCLUDED IN THE OVERALL 20,000 TROOP CEILING VS. SEPARATE TREATMENT WITH A LOWER THRESHOLD IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED.
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- -EASTERN PAPER MAKES NO MENTION OF COMPLIANCE, VERIFICATION, OR OBSERVATION.
- EASTERN PAPER CALLS FOR NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFERS WHEN THEY DEPART THEIR BASE, EVEN IF THE BASE IS OUTSIDE THE ZONE.
- EASTERN PAPER DOES NOT MENTION NOTIFICATION OF ACTIVITIES OF FORCES DEPARTING THE ZONE TO CARRY OUT AN ACTIVITY OUTSIDE THE ZONE.
- -EASTERN PAPER DOES NOT REQUIRE DESIGNATION OF THE HEADQUARTERS CONDUCTING THE ACTIVITY.
- -EASTERN PROPOSAL DOES NOT CALL FOR INDICATING THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE NOTIFIED ACTIVITY WITH ANOTHER NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY.
- -SC.1/AMPLIFIED CALLS FOR SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON THE PHASES OF THE ACTIVITY WHILE THE EASTERN PAPER IS LESS SPECIFIC.
- -SC.1/AMPLIFIED CALLS FOR THE BOUNDARIES OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL AREA WHERE THE ACTIVITY WILL TAKE PLACE TO INCLUDE A MAP TRACE OR GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES.
- -SC.1/AMPLIFIED IS FAR MORE DEFINITIVE IN THE REQUIREMENT TO LIST THE PARTICIPATING TROOPS AND THE NUMBER OF TROOPS FROM VARIOUS PARTICIPATING STATES.
- -EASTERN PAPER MAKES A VAGUE REFERENCE TO NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFERS OF TROOPS TO A MANEUVER AREA UNDER A MEASURE THAT HAS YET TO BE TABLED ON THE NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS.
- 5. A. SC/WGB 2: PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MANEUVERS OF AIR FORCES, WORKING DOCUMENT SUBMITTED BY THE DELEGATIONS OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
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- REPUBLICS. THIS PAPER FORMALIZES THE EAST'S INSISTENCE IN THE WORKING GROUPS THAT MAJOR INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE NOTIFIED. THE EAST HAS STATED THAT "NOTIFICATION WILL BE MADE WHEN IT IS FORESEEN THAT MORE

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THAN 200 AIRCRAFT WILL BE IN THE AIRSPACE OVER THE NOTIFIED AREA AT THE SAME TIME." SINCE THIS PAPER FOCUSES ON AIR ACTIVITIES THERE IS A NO COMPARISON TO THE PROVISIONS OF MEASURE 3. THIS PROPOSAL IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE MANDATE OF THE CONFERENCE WHERE IT DEALS WITH INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITY IN THE ADJOINING AIR SPACE, AND IT IS UNVERIFIABLE WHERE IT APPLIES TO INDEPENDENT AIR ACTIVITY OVER THE WHOLE OF EUROPE. ADDITIONALLY THIS PAPER HAS THE FOLLOWING DEFICIENCIES:

- -NO PROVISION FOR VERIFICATION, OBSERVATION, OR COMPLIANCE.
- -SPECIFIC PROVISION FOR THE NOTIFICATION OF THE TRANSFER OF AIR UNITS FROM OUTSIDE THE ZONE INTO THE ZONE.
- -WOULD HAVE A GREATER IMPACT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF NATO FORCES THAN ON THE FORCES OF THE WARSAW PACT. EXERCISE REQUIREMENTS OF THE VARIOUS ORGANIZATIONS RESULTS IN LARGER AIR ACTIVITIES FOR NATO FORCES THAN WARSAW PACT FORCES.
- -WORDING IS VAGUE AND EASILY CIRCUMVENTABLE.

6. A. SC/WGB 3: PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MANEUVERS OF NAVAL FORCES, WORKING DOCUMENT SUBMITTED THE DELEGATIONS OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA, AND POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC. AS WAS STATED IN PARA 4, THIS PAPER FORMALIZES THE WORKING GROUP COMMENTS OF THE EASTERN DELEGATIONS, AND IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF

THE MADRID MANDATE. THE THRESHOLD CALLS FOR THE "NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MANEUVERS OF NAVAL FORCES, AMPHIBIOUS TROOPS AND AVIATION CONDUCTED UNDER A COMMON INTENTION AND PLAN INDEPENDENTLY OR COMBINED (INCLUDING THOSE COMBINED WITH LAND AND AIR FORCES) IF OVER 30 COMBAT SHIPS AND 100 MILITARY PLANES ARE INVOLVED IN THE MANEUVERS." ADDITIONALLY THIS PAPER HAS THE FOLLOWING DEFICIENCIES:

- -NO PROVISION FOR VERIFICATION, OBSERVATION, OR COMPLIANCE.
  - -WOULD HAVE A GREATER IMPACT ON NATO FORCES THAN WTO FORCES. SOVIET CARRIERS HAVE APPROXIMATELY 14 PLANES ONBOARD THAT WOULD MEET THE DEFINITION FOR A MILITARY PLANE WHILE THEY HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY MORE HELICOPTERS THAT ARE OUTSIDE THE DEFINITION.
  - -WORDING IS VAGUE AND EASILY CIRCUMVENTABLE.
  - -NEGATES OUR GAIN IN THE ZONE WON AT MADRID.
7. COMPARISON OF SC/WGB1, WGB2, AND WGB3. IN COMPARING THE EASTERN PAPERS WITH EACH OTHER THERE ARE SOME DIFFERENCES THAT MAY OR MAY NOT INDICATE FUTURE SOVIET INTENTIONS.
- -LANGUAGE IN THE LAND PAPER IS BASED ON THE FINAL

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ACT WHEREAS THE AIR AND NAVAL PAPER RELY ON CONCLUDING DOCUMENT LANGUAGE. WITH THE INCORPORATION OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED LANGUAGE IN THE LAND PAPER IT CAN BE EXPECTED THAT THE EAST WILL TRY TO REFLECT SC.1/AMPLIFIED AS OLD, AND AS DEALING WITH OLD CONCEPTS, THUS GIVING THE AIR AND NAVAL PAPERS THE AIR OF NEWNESS. THIS APPROACH COULD THEN BE USED FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES.

- -IT IS NOTED THAT THE AIR PAPER DOES NOT INCLUDE AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE TROOPS, AND THE NAVAL PAPER DOES

- NOT INCLUDE AIRBORNE FORCES IN THE NOTIFICATION PROVISION. THIS COULD BE JUST AN ADMINISTRATION OVERSIGHT, OR MIGHT INDICATE AN INTENTION TO EXCLUDE/PROTECT THESE FORCES FROM NOTIFICATION. IT IS HARD TO SEE WHAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT GAIN FROM SUCH A MOVE.

- -THE AIR PAPER CALLS FOR THE SIMULTANEOUS PRESENCE WHILE THE NAVAL PAPER ONLY CALLS FOR PARTICIPATION. IN THE AIR PAPER THE SIMULTANEOUS PRESENCE IS PROBABLY THE BIGGEST LOOPHOLE IN THE PAPER.

- -THE DEFINITION FOR AIRCRAFT IN THE AIR AND NAVAL PAPERS EXCLUDES HELICOPTERS WHICH PROVIDES A LARGE BREAK FOR THE EAST.

- -THE LAND AND AIR PAPER CALL FOR THE EARLY NOTIFICATION OF REINFORCEMENTS, GENERALLY BEFORE THEY HAVE LEFT THE UNITED STATES, BUT AS CURRENTLY WRITTEN WOULD NOT CAPTURE PURE TRANSITS. THE PAPER ON THE NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS (TRANSFERS) HAS NOT YET BEEN PUBLISHED AND THIS WILL PROBABLY BE HOW THE EAST CAPTURES TRANSITS.

- -THE DEFINITION OF THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE IS NOT CONSISTENT, BUT AFTER CLOSE SCRUTINY IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT IT WOULD REQUIRE DIFFERENT APPLICATIONS.

- -THE EAST INDICATES THEY WILL PROVIDE APPROXIMATE GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES IN AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITY BUT REPORTING IN LAND ACTIVITY, ON THE AREA OF THE MANEUVER, REMAINS IDENTICAL TO THE FINAL ACT.

- -IN THE VOLUNTARY INFORMATION CLAUSE CONTAINED IN EACH PAPER THERE ARE VARIATIONS. WORDING IN THE LAND AND NAVAL PAPER ARE VERY CLOSE WITH THE ADDITION OF MILITARY HARDWARE IN THE LAND PAPER. THE MILITARY HARDWARE SECTION WOULD SEEM TO PLAY UP TO THE NEUTRALS

- AS THE SWISS, SWEDES AND FINNS HAVE ALL FOCUSED ON REPORTING OF MILITARY HARDWARE. AS THE EASTERN NATIONS HAVE NEVER IMPLEMENTED THE VOLUNTARY INFORMATION PROVISION OF THE FINAL ACT IT IS HARD TO BELIEVE THAT THEY SUDDENDLY INTEND TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING. THIS IS A POSSIBLE INDICATOR, HOWEVER, THAT THE EAST MAY BE

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WILLING TO MAKE SOME MOVEMENT IN THE AREA OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE, BUT SINCE THE MANDATORY PROVISIONS OF THE NOTIFICATION ANNOUNCEMENT ARE SO CLOSE TO THE FINAL ACT WE SHOULDN'T EXPECT ANYTHING NEW.

8. INITIAL REACTIONS. INITIAL REACTION OF NNA TO THE PAPERS SUGGESTED THE EASTERN PAPERS HAVE A FATAL FLAW--THEY VIOLATE THE ZONE AS AGREED IN MADRID. THUS MOST OBSERVERS BELIEVE THE EASTERN PAPERS ARE IN FOR ROUGH TIMES IN DISCUSSION. THE NEUTRALS ARE STUDYING THE PAPERS NOW. SOME NEUTRALS HAVE IMPLIED THAT THEY DO NOT OPPOSE INCLUSION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN A NOTIFICATION REGIME, BUT THAT THE SOVIETS WENT TOO FAR. AT THE VERY LEAST, THE PAPERS WILL ENCOURAGE THE MALTESE, BASED ON THEIR PROPOSALS IN SC.5, AND PERHAPS OTHERS, TO QUESTION THE WEST'S EXCLUSION OF SUCH FORCES BASED ON THE MANDATE ARGUMENT. THE SOVIETS, WHO ARE KEENLY AWARE OF WESTERN AGREEMENTS IN PRINCIPLE AGAINST INCLUDING INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES, PROBABLY WILL NEED NNA SUPPORT IF THEY HAVE INTENTIONS TO FORCE THE WEST INTO DISCUSSING THEIR PAPERS. THUS, WE EXPECT THE EAST TO ACTIVELY WORK TO OBTAIN NNA SUPPORT, AT LEAST FOR THE PRINCIPLE, OF EXPANDING NOTIFICATION TO INCLUDE INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES.

9. CONSIDERATIONS. THE THREE WORKING PAPERS OFFER NOTHING NEW SUBSTANTIVELY TO THE WORK ON THE CONFERENCE. THERE IS NOTHING IN THESE PAPERS THAT IS DIFFERENT FROM THE EASTERN LINE THAT HAS BEEN TAKEN IN THE VARIOUS WORKING GROUPS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO STRESS ADHERENCE TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE MADRID MANDATE, AND WILL PROTECT OUR INTERESTS IN INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES, AS WELL AS STRESS THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE

VERIFICATION; AND WILL CRITICIZE THE SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES ON THIS POINT AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY. ON THE OTHER HAND, OUR ALLIES WILL PROBABLY SEARCH FOR COMMON AREAS IN THESE PAPERS TO SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR DIALOGUE WITH THE EAST. WE WILL DISCOURAGE ATTEMPTS TO TAKE A POSITIVE APPROACH TO THESE PAPERS, AND WILL STRESS THE NEED TO DOWNPLAY ANY REFERENCE TO PROGRESS RESULTING FROM THE PRESENTATION OF THESE PAPERS.

10. FINALLY, THESE PROPOSALS MAY HAVE TWO OBJECTIVES WHICH ARE NOT IMMEDIATELY CLEAR. FIRST, THE EAST WILL PROBABLY TOUT THESE PROPOSALS AS ITS REPLY TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S 4 JUNE STATEMENT REAFFIRMED AT STRASBOURG ON 8 MAY, EVEN THOUGH THEY CONTAIN LITTLE THAT IS SUBSTANTIVELY NEW. THE EAST'S LINE WOULD THEN BE THAT THE BALL IS IN THE U.S. COURT AND THAT IT IS UP TO THE U.S. AND NATO TO ADDRESS THE SOVIET NUF PROPOSAL IN A MORE "CONSTRUCTIVE" WAY. AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY'S 31 MAY PLENARY ADDRESS SUPPORTS THIS THOUGHT (SEE SEPTTEL). ULTIMATELY, WE EXPECT PRESSURE TO BEGIN DRAFTING A

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WESTERN NUF FORMULATION. SECOND, THE PARAMETERS FOR NOTIFYING INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES ARE SUFFICIENTLY HIGH TO SUGGEST THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT EXPECT MANY ACTUAL NOTIFICATIONS. THEIR PRIMARY OBJECTIVE, IN OUR VIEW, IS TO ESTABLISH EXTENSIONS OF THE ZONE SO THAT EUROPE BECOMES A STRATEGIC ENTITY, NOT A GEOGRAPHICAL ONE, THUS UNDOING THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH AND THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE MADRID MANDATE.  
END

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JSUBJECT: Q&amp;A ON EASTERN TABLING

1. CDE VI - 012
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. THE EAST YESTERDAY, MAY 20, TABLED THREE WORKING DOCUMENTS IN THE CDE DESCRIBING POSITIONS ON PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF LAND, AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS. FOLLOWING ARE Q&A FOR POSSIBLE USE BY THE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN SHOULD THE ISSUE COME UP IN TODAY'S NOON BRIEFING.

Q: IN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE YESTERDAY, THE EAST TABLED WORKING DOCUMENTS PROPOSING CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES CALLING FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR LAND, AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS. WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES REACTION?

A: THE UNITED STATES WELCOMES THE PRESENTATION OF MORE DETAILED IDEAS ON PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES. WE BELIEVE THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE MUST FOCUS ON THIS KIND OF CONCRETE ISSUE, AND NOTIFICATION IS CERTAINLY AT THE CENTER OF ANY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME.

ON THE OTHER HAND, THE EAST'S TABLING OF WORKING DOCUMENTS YESTERDAY HAS NOT MADE THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE ANY EASIER. INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS LIE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE CONFERENCE'S PRESENT WORK.

AS FOR THE PROPOSAL TO NOTIFY THIRTY DAYS IN ADVANCE MAJOR LAND MANEUVERS INVOLVING MORE THAN 20,000 TROOPS, SUCH A PARAMETER IS AN INADEQUATE IMPROVEMENT OVER THE CURRENT MEASURES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT OF 1975, WHICH CALL FOR NOTIFICATION TWENTY-ONE DAYS IN ADVANCE FOR MANEUVERS OVER 25,000 TROOPS. TO HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE MILITARY SITUATION IN EUROPE AND ENHANCE STABILITY AND SECURITY ON THE CONTINENT, THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE MUST MAKE A SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT OVER THE HELSINKI MEASURES. THE EASTERN MEASURE PROBABLY WOULD NOT EVEN INCREASE THE NUMBER OF EXERCISES NOTIFIED BY EITHER THE SOVIET UNION OR THE UNITED STATES. IN CONTRAST, THE MEMBERS OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE HAVE SUGGESTED SIX CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVE ON THE HELSINKI REGIME. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ALLIANCE CALLS FOR NOTIFICATION FORTY-FIVE DAYS IN ADVANCE OF ALL POTENTIALLY THREATENING MILITARY ACTIVITIES, THOSE INVOLVING ONE COMBAT DIVISION OR, IN SOME CASES, EVEN AS FEW AS 6,000 MEN.

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Q: DOES THE EAST'S TABLING OF FAIRLY DETAILED WORKING DOCUMENTS INDICATE THAT THE EAST IS NOW PREPARED FOR SERIOUS, DETAILED DISCUSSION OF CONCRETE

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CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES?

A: IT IS TOO EARLY TO TELL. AS PRESIDENT REAGAN SAID ON MAY 9, "THE CONFERENCE IS NOW AT A POINT WHERE IT COULD MOVE INTO A MORE INTENSE NEGOTIATING PHASE, IF THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED TO JOIN THE REST OF THE CONFERENCE IN NEGOTIATING MEANINGFUL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH GO BEYOND EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS." THE EASTERN DOCUMENTS OF YESTERDAY DO NOT NECESSARILY INDICATE THAT THE EAST IS PREPARED FOR DISCUSSION OF TRULY MEANINGFUL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. BUT BY FOCUSING ON THE IMPORTANT ISSUE OF NOTIFICATION, THE EAST COULD BE TAKING A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

Q: PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS SAID THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE IF THE EAST NEGOTIATED SERIOUSLY ON CONCRETE-CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. WITH THE EAST TABLING ITS WORKING DOCUMENTS ON CONCRETE MEASURES, IS THE UNITED STATES NOW PREPARED TO DISCUSS NON-USE OF FORCE?

A: WE HAVE ALREADY DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH THE ISSUE OF NON-USE OF FORCE IN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. OUR POSITION IS CLEAR: WE ARE PREPARED TO REAFFIRM THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE AS PART OF AN AGREEMENT ON CONCRETE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. AS I HAVE SAID, HOWEVER, FULL AND DETAILED DISCUSSION OF CONCRETE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES HAS NOT YET TAKEN PLACE. THE EAST'S TABLING OF WORKING PAPERS YESTERDAY DOES NOT  
THE KIND OF DETAILED, CONCRETE IDEAS REQUIRED.

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SUBJECT: WORKING GROUP A, TUESDAY, MAY 21, 1985

1. CDE VI - 028.

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT

3. SUMMARY. THE EAST (BULGARIA, GDR, USSR) INDICATED THAT THE WARSAW PACT STILL INTENDS TO FLOG ITS NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF) TREATY -- AT LEAST PUBLICLY. EASTERN DELEGATES ALSO INSISTED THAT A NUF TREATY WOULD NOT AFFECT OTHER OBLIGATIONS. DENMARK ONCE AGAIN REJECTED THE IDEA OF A NUF TREATY AND CHALLENGED WHAT IT SAW AS THE "SEQUENTIAL" SOVIET APPROACH WHEREBY A TREATY WOULD BE CONCLUDED FIRST, FOLLOWED THEN BY CONSIDERATION OF CSBM'S. THE SOVIETS TRIED TO LURE THE WEST INTO DISCUSSING CSBMS ON THEIR TERMS, I.E., WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, SC.6. FORTUNATELY, NONE OF OUR ALLIES ROSE TO THE BAIT. END SUMMARY.

4. THE NEW BULGARIAN DEPUTY (PETROV) OPENED HIS REMARKS ON NUF BY "ANSWERING" A DANISH QUESTION POSED LAST SESSION REGARDING THE EFFECT OF A NUF TREATY ON ALREADY EXISTING BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS. REFERRING TO THE SOVIET UNION'S PROPOSAL (SC.6) TO "CONCRETIZE THE NUF PRINCIPLE IN TREATY FORM" (IN THE ORIGINAL RUSSIAN, THE WORD "DOGOVOR" OR "TREATY" WAS USED; WHEREAS THE WORD WAS TRANSLATED "AGREEMENT" IN ENGLISH), PETROV ASSERTED THAT A TREATY WOULD NOT AFFECT EARLIER OBLIGATIONS SUCH AS THOSE CONTAINED IN THE UN CHARTER. HE CITED ARTICLE 103 OF THE UN CHARTER ("IN THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNDER THE PRESENT CHARTER AND THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ANY OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE PRESENT CHARTER SHALL PREVAIL") TO SUPPORT HIS POINT. PETROV ALSO USED ARTICLE 52 OF THE UN CHARTER ("NOTHING IN THE PRESENT CHARTER PRECLUDES THE EXISTENCE OF REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS...FOR DEALING WITH...THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY") TO BUTTRESS EASTERN ARGUMENT FOR A "REGIONAL" NUF TREATY.

5. THE GDR (GEORGI) INSISTED THAT THE "PRESENT SITUATION IN EUROPE" MAKES AGREEMENT ON THE RENUNCIATION OF THE USE OF FORCE IMPERATIVE. THE EAST GERMAN ARGUED THAT A "TREATY" SHOULD PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR IMPROVING COOPERATION WHICH WOULD NOT BE BROKEN EVEN IN TIME OF CRISIS AND POINTED TO SC.6, PARAS 6 (JOINT AND INDIVIDUAL CONSIDERATION OF PRACTICAL WAYS TO PREVENT SURPRISE ATTACK), 7 (ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UN), AND 8 (URGENT CONSULTATIONS IN THE EVENT OF THE "RISK OF WAR") AS OFFERING A "PATH OF PEACE EVEN IN THE BEGINNING OF A CONFLICT." HE EXPANDED THE EAST'S DEFINITION OF MAINTENANCE OF PEACEFUL RELATIONS (THE SECOND HALF OF THE TITLE OF THEIR NUF PROPOSAL) TO INCLUDE NOT ONLY THE NON-USE OF POLITICAL FORCE, BUT

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ALSO ECONOMIC PRESSURE AND BOYCOTTS.

6. RAHMANINOV (USSR) REJECTED THE IDEA THAT A CONCESSION WAS BEING MADE BY CERTAIN DELEGATIONS BY CONSIDERING NUF, NOTING THAT THE MADRID MANDATE CALLS ON THE CONFERENCE TO EXPRESS THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE USE OR THREAT OF FORCE. HE ALSO ACCUSED "CERTAIN COUNTRIES" OF MAKING "DECLARATORY AFFIRMATIONS" WITH REGARD TO THEIR READINESS TO DISCUSS NUF, BUT FAILING TO LAY OUT ANY SPECIFIC DETAILS OF THE SUBSTANCE OR FORM OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT ("DOGOVORENNOST").

7. THE DANISH DEPUTY (ROSENTHAL) NOTED THAT THERE WAS NO DISAGREEMENT IN THE CONFERENCE REGARDING THE NUF PRINCIPLE, BUT SAID THAT IT WAS UNNECESSARY TO REPEAT IT IN TREATY FORM. WHILE IT WAS ALREADY CLEAR THAT THE SPONSORS OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED DO NOT OBJECT TO REAFFIRMING THE NUF PRINCIPLE IN THE CONTEXT OF AGREEMENT ON MEANINGFUL AND CONCRETE CSBM'S, HE CHALLENGED THE "SEQUENTIAL" SOVIET APPROACH, AS CONTAINED IN SC.6, REGARDING THE RELATIONSHIP IN PARA 6 BETWEEN CONCRETE CSBM'S AND REAFFIRMATION OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE: FIRST A TREATY SHOULD BE CONCLUDED, THEN CONSIDERATION, WHICH HE SURMISED MEANT NEGOTIATION, OF CSBM'S WOULD OCCUR. HE INSISTED, TO THE CONTRARY, THAT IF THERE WERE TO BE AGREEMENT ON REAFFIRMING THE NUF PRINCIPLE, IT WOULD HAVE TO OCCUR WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF AGREEMENT ON CONCRETE CSBM'S IN THE CDE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. HE THEN POINTED OUT THAT FOR OBVIOUS REASONS THE "WORKLOAD" OF NEGOTIATING CSBM'S WOULD BE HEAVIER THAN THAT OF A NUF REAFFIRMATION. HE ALSO CRITICIZED THE REFERENCE IN SC.6 EXPLICITLY AND SOLELY TO MEASURES TO PREVENT SURPRISE ATTACK, NOTING THAT THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND OTHER CDE PROPOSALS FOCUS MORE BROADLY ON THE "GREY AREA" OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT AS WELL AS ON PREVENTION OF SURPRISE ATTACK.

8. RAHMANINOV RESPONDED ON THE SPOT TO ROSENTHAL'S INTERVENTION BY ASKING HOW A "NEW REPETITION OR AFFIRMATION" OF THE NUF COMMITMENT WOULD UNDERMINE EARLIER OBLIGATIONS TAKEN BY STATES AND BY SUGGESTING THAT OTHERS PROVIDE NEW ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS OF SC.6'S ARTICLE SIX.

9. COMMENT: TODAY'S EASTERN INTERVENTIONS INDICATED THAT THE WARSAW PACT STILL INTENDS TO FLOG ITS NUF TREATY -- AT LEAST PUBLICLY. A FINNISH COLLEAGUE SPECULATED THAT THE AMBIGUITY OVER THE USE OF THE WORDS "TREATY" AND "AGREEMENT" WAS CALCULATED TO PRESERVE EASTERN FLEXIBILITY FOR FUTURE NUF DISCUSSIONS. THE SOVIETS ALSO TRIED TO LURE THE WEST INTO DISCUSSING CSBM'S ON THEIR TERMS, I.E., WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF SC.6, ARTICLE 6. FORTUNATELY, NONE OF OUR ALLIES ROSE TO THE

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НР Болгария  
Рабочая группа "А"  
21.05.1985

Господин Председатель,

На сегодняшнем заседании рабочей группы "А" болгарская делегация хотела бы остановиться вкратце на некоторых аспектах договора о взаимном неприменении военной силы и поддержании отношений мира. В ходе предыдущей сессии вопросу о неприменении силы было уделено большое внимание. По данному вопросу развилась полезная дискуссия.

В своем выступлении сегодня я хотел бы коснуться вопроса уважаемого представителя Дании, который был им задан на заседании рабочей группы "А" от 26 февраля с.г.

Вопрос был такой: "Если предположить, что определенная группа стран устанавливает многосторонние отношения, то следовало бы понимать, что характер этих многосторонних отношений остается незатронутым предлагаемым договором? Или: следует просто понимать, что ранее заключенные договоры и соглашения не будут затрагиваться предлагаемым договором в той степени, в какой они не противостоят новому договору?"

Как известно, делегации, поддерживающие документ СК.6, предлагают, чтобы на нашей конференции был конкретизирован в договорной форме принцип неприменения силы. Дискуссия здесь в Стокгольме показала, что все государства-участники рассматривают этот принцип как императивную норму, отклонение от которой недопустимо.

Возможно ли при такой конкретизации принципа в новом договоре противоречие с ранее заключенными соглашениями и договорами государств? По убеждению болгарской делегации,

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противоречий с предыдущими обязанностями государств по ранее заключенным договорам и соглашениям не может быть, поскольку речь идет об основополагающем принципе, иными словами, об императивной норме международного права по смыслу ст. 53 Венской конвенции о праве международных договоров. Т.е. речь идет о таком принципе, который не мог не учитываться государствами и при ранее заключенных договорах.

Для иллюстрации хотел бы привести такой пример. Заключенные в начале 70-ых годов договоры ФРГ с СССР, ПНР, ГДР и ЧССР содержали формулировки, подтверждающие принцип неприменения силы. Стороны принимали на себя /цитирую/: "обязательство в вопросах, затрагивающих безопасность Европы и международную безопасность, как и в своих взаимных отношениях, воздерживаться согласно статье 2 Устава ООН от угрозы силой или ее применения" /конец цитаты из ст.2 договора СССР-ФРГ от 12 августа 1970 года/. Всем известно, что эти договоры не затрагивали и не ограничивали многосторонних обязанностей вышеперечисленных государств по ранее заключенным договорам.

По мнению болгарской делегации, внимательное рассмотрение всех двенадцати пунктов документа СК.6 показывает, что среди них нет ни одного, который мог бы вызвать опасения, что с его принятием были бы затронуты обязанности государств по предыдущим соглашениям, или что его положения вошли бы в коллизии с положениями предыдущих соглашений.

В пункте 10 основных положений сказано /цитирую/: "Ничто в договоре не затрагивало бы прав и обязанностей государств-участников по Уставу ООН, договорам и соглашениям,

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заклученным ими ранее"/конец цитаты/. Это целиком и полностью относится и к ст. 103 Устава ООН, которая гласит:/цитирую/  
"В том случае, когда обязательства Членов Организации по настоящему Уставу окажутся в противоречии с обязательствами по какому-либо другому международному соглашению, преимущественную силу имеют обязательства по настоящему Уставу"  
/конец цитаты/.

А что касается сомнения в том, затронет ли предлагаемый региональный договор характер многосторонних отношений определенной группы стран, которые могут быть установлены после его заключения, необходимо сказать следующее: ни одна группа стран не может создавать свои региональные нормы международного права, которые противоречили бы императивной норме, какой является неприменение силы. Как указано в уже упомянутой ст. 53 Венской конвенции, отклонение от такой нормы недопустимо.

Благодарю Вас ,г-н Председатель!

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Rede DDR in AG - A - , 21. 5. 1985

Herr Vorsitzender!

Im Zusammenhang mit der Diskussion über den Vorschlag zum Abschluß eines Gewaltverzichtsvertrages tauchte verschiedentlich die Frage nach der Bedeutung bzw. dem Inhalt des Zusatzes "Aufrechterhaltung friedlicher Beziehungen" auf. Der damalige Leiter der österreichischen Delegation, Botschafter Torovsky, fragte beispielsweise am 4. 12. 1984, ob nicht die Beziehungen friedlich seien, wenn keine Gewalt angewandt wird. Ich möchte heute eine Antwort auf diese Frage geben. Zunächst ist zu unterstreichen, daß das Hauptziel einer GV-Vereinbarung darin besteht - ich zitiere aus der Präambel der Grundbestimmungen -, "angesichts der andauernden nuklearen Bedrohung einen großangelegten Schritt in Richtung auf die Verringerung der Gefahr der militärischen Konfrontation zu tun und eine grundsätzliche Wende in der Politik der Staaten von der Konfrontation zur friedlichen Zusammenarbeit zu erleichtern".

Angesichts der Lage in Europa stellt der eindeutige Verzicht auf die Androhung und Anwendung militärischer Gewalt die vordringliche Aufgabe der Sicherung des Friedens und der Erhöhung des Vertrauens zwischen Ost und West dar.

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Die sozialistischen Staaten betrachten eine solche Verpflichtung jedoch nicht als auf die Sicherung eines kriegslosen Zustandes beschränkt. Dem Element des Verbots fügen sie mit der Formulierung "Aufrechterhaltung friedlicher Beziehungen" bewußt ein konstruktives Element hinzu. Ihr Standpunkt, daß 10mal verhandeln besser als 1mal schießen ist, gilt auch und gerade für diesen Zusatz. Dialog und Verhandlungen unter allen Umständen- das ist der Sinn.

Der Vertrag soll die Grundlagen festigen, auf denen sich - auch in Verwirklichung der anderen Verpflichtungen aus der KZSE-Schlußakte - eine prosperierende, sich zum gegenseitigen Vorteil entwickelnde, umfassende Zusammenarbeit der hier vertretenen Staaten gründet, die auch im Fall einer kritischen Situation nicht unterbrochen werden sollte.

Das wiederum setzt ein Mindestmaß an Vertrauen zwischen den Staaten voraus. Die kombinierte Wirkung von GV-Vereinbarung und Maßnahmen militärischen Charakters, der Beschränkung und Ankündigung von mil. Aktivitäten der Land-, Luft- und Seestreitkräfte - so wie in den gestern von den Delegationen der CSSR, der UdSSR und der DDR unterbreiteten Arbeitsdokumenten vorgeschlagen - wäre sehr gut geeignet, dieses notwendig Maß an Vertrauen zu sichern.

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Herr Vorsitzender!

Voraussetzungen zur Aufrechterhaltung friedlicher Beziehungen werden in den Punkten 6, 7 und 8 der Grundbestimmungen konkret skizziert. Diese Empfehlungen zu einem konkreten Vertragsinhalt gehen über das bloße Verbot der Gewaltanwendung deutlich hinaus, indem sie Wege der Aufrechterhaltung friedlicher Beziehungen zwischen den Staaten auch unter Bedingungen des Auftretens von Konflikten aufzeigen. Friedliche Beziehungen vermögen insofern - ganz im Sinne der am 24. 10. 1970 durch die UN-Vollversammlung im Konsens verabschiedeten "Deklaration über die Prinzipien des Völkerrechts betreffend die freundschaftlichen Beziehungen und die Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Staaten in Übereinstimmung mit der Charta der Vereinten Nationen" - in freundschaftliche Beziehungen zwischen den Staaten in Ost und West hinüberzuwachsen. Noch deutlicher: Unter friedlichen Beziehungen verstehen wir freundschaftliche Beziehungen im Sinne dieser Prinzipien Deklaration. Natürlich schließt die Aufrechterhaltung friedlicher Beziehungen auch den Verzicht auf pol. und ökonomische Gewaltanwendung mittels Maßnahmen des Boykotts, der Einmischung in innere Angelegenheiten souveräner Staaten oder der Mißachtung nationaler Interessen ein.

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Herr Vorsitzender!

Die DDR plädiert für das "Machbare" im Rahmen des der Stockholmer Konferenz zugrunde liegenden Mandats. Sollte es der Wunsch der hier vertretenen Staaten sein, die Präzisierung des Gewaltverzichts und der nicht-militärischen Aspekte der Aufrechterhaltung friedlicher Beziehungen in einem Vertrag zu berücksichtigen, wird es die Delegation der DDR nicht an gutem Willen fehlen lassen, geeignete Formulierungen zu suchen.

Ich danke für Ihre Aufmerksamkeit.

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SUBJECT: CDE: SUMMARY OF WORKING GROUP B, MAY 21

1. CDE VI- 031.

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. BEGIN SUMMARY: EASTERN REPS DEALT WITH AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES (TWO OF THEIR THREE RECENTLY TABLED WORKING DOCUMENTS), ARGUING THAT INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE NOTIFIED AND THAT THIS WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE MADRID MANDATE. THEY CITED, IN PARTICULAR, ACTIVITIES OF THE U.S. 2ND AND 6TH FLEETS AND NATO EXERCISE COLD FIRE AS ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE AT LEAST STRATEGICALLY LINKED TO THE GROUND SITUATION IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AND WHICH REPRESENT A REAL THREAT TO EUROPE. U.S. REP HANSEN RESPONDED, REPEATING THE TWO CONDITIONS OF THE MANDATE TO REFUTE THE EASTERN POSITION, AND QUESTIONED THE EASTERN APPROACH AS PRESENTED IN THE WORKING DOCUMENTS (SUMMARIZED IN PARAS 4-5 BELOW). THE NETHERLANDS REP GAVE A FAMILIAR REVIEW OF THE WESTERN POSITION, KEYED TO QUESTIONS PREVIOUSLY ASKED BY THE HUNGARIAN REP. U.S. REP GALASSI PRESENTED, IN RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH, THE NATO DEFINITION FOR THE WORD "GARRISON" (SUMMARIZED IN PARA 6 BELOW). END SUMMARY.

4. THE HUNGARIAN REP ARGUED THAT ARMED FORCES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN THEIR INTERACTION, BUT THAT EACH FORCE COMPONENT HAS ITS INDEPENDENT SIGNIFICANCE. THEREFORE, ALL ARMED FORCES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN NOTIFICATION; THERE WAS NO LOGIC IN ADDRESSING ONLY ONE FORCE COMPONENT. THE GDR REP ARGUED THAT EVEN INDEPENDENT MANEUVERS OF AIR AND NAVAL FORCES IN THE WATERS ADJOINING EUROPE HAVE A STRATEGIC CONNECTION WITH GROUND FORCE SITUATION. THE SOVIET REP ELABORATED, MAKING FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- THE ZONE OF APPLICATION ACCORDING TO THE MANDATE WAS "THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AS WELL AS THE ADJOINING SEA AND AIR SPACE." ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA/AIR SPACE WERE OF NO LESS SIGNIFICANCE THAN ACTIVITIES IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE.

-- EXPERIENCE SHOWS THAT MOST NATO AND WTO AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS ARE PLANNED SIMULTANEOUSLY OVER THE LAND THEATER, IN THE AIR AND AT SEA, ALL CLOSELY INTERRELATED, UNDER A SINGLE COMMAND.

-- U.S. FORCES FOR DEALING WITH EUROPE, INCLUDING THE 2ND ATLANTIC FLEET AND 6TH MEDITERRANEAN FLEET, FUNCTION IN RELATION TO EUROPE AND CARRY OUT THE STRATEGY OF NATO. THEY MAY BE CONNECTED WITH LAND ACTIVITIES OR INDEPENDENT, BUT WHENEVER THESE FORCES CARRY OUT ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA/AIR SPACE THEY MUST BE NOTIFIED.

-- ALL WTO AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES WHICH EXCEED THE PROPOSED THRESHOLD IN THE MEDITERRANEAN NORTH, BALTIC, BLACK SEAS WOULD LIKEWISE BE NOTIFIED.

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-- IN NATOS AIR EXERCISE COLD FIRE STRATEGIC AIR OPERATIONS OF THE SORT USED IN THE INITIAL STAGES OF A WAR IN EUROPE WERE PRACTICED. HE SAID THAT WESTERN REPS IN THE PAST HAVE STATED THAT UNDER SC.1, SOME ELEMENTS OF COLD FIRE WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE NOTIFICATION OF THE ASSOCIATED GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY; BUT IF THE WEST IS WILLING TO NOTIFY SOME ELEMENTS, WHY NOT THE ENTIRE ACTIVITY?

5. LATER IN THE SESSION, U.S. REP HANSEN RESPONDED TO THE SOVIET INTERVENTION, REPEATING THE TWO CONDITIONS OF THE MANDATE FOR DETERMINING WHEN AIR/NAVAL ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE COVERED BY NOTIFICATION THEREBY REJECTING THE EASTERN ARGUMENT. HANSEN ARGUED THAT THE MANDATE TERMS ANSWERED THE SOVIET QUESTION ABOUT COLD FIRE: IT WAS THE LAND ACTIVITY WHICH WAS TO BE NOTIFIED, AND SUPPORTING AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES WERE INCLUDED IN THE NOTIFICATION. HANSEN THEN TOOK THE OFFENSIVE, ASKING TWO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ABOUT THE EASTERN POSITION: (A) C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (DOWNGRADING INSTRUCTIONS)

-- HOW WOULD NOTIFICATION OF AIR/NAVAL MANEUVERS BE VERIFIED (HE CITED THE UNRELIABILITY OF DEPENDENCE UPON RADAR TRACKS TO COUNT NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT); AND (B) HOW WOULD THE PROPOSED THRESHOLDS FOR INDEPENDENT AIR/NAVAL ACTIVITIES AFFECT WTO FORCES (HE CITED THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET KIEV CLASS CARRIERS CARRIED ONLY 14 YAK-36 AIRCRAFT AND PROBABLY WOULDN'T MEET THE THRESHOLD).

6. U.S. REP GALASSI PRESENTED AGREED NATO DEFINITION FOR "GARRISON" (I.E., THE SOVIET DEFINITION FOR "VOENNY GORODOK", BUT WITHOUT MENTIONING THE WORDS "VOENNY GORODOK"), BOTH IN RUSSIAN AND IN ENGLISH, TO EXPLAIN THE WESTERN OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT. FOR THE RECORD, THAT DEFINITION AS GIVEN IS:

"A GARRISON IS AN AREA HAVING BUILDINGS AND STRUCTURES LOCATED IN IT AND DESIGNED FOR ACCOMMODATING ONE OR SEVERAL MILITARY UNITS, INSTALLATIONS, MILITARY TRAINING SCHOOLS AND ENTERPRISES. IT CONSISTS OF OFFICES/BARRACKS, EQUIPMENT AND HOUSING AREAS. THE STAFFS, BARRACKS, PARADE GROUNDS, TRAINING CLASSROOMS, GUARD ROOMS, SOLDIERS' MESSSES, CLUBS AND DISPENSARIES ARE LOCATED IN THE OFFICE/BARRACKS AREA. THE PARKS WITH COMBAT AND SPECIAL EQUIPMENT, STORAGE FACILITIES, AND OTHER SPECIAL INSTALLATIONS ARE LOCATED IN THE EQUIPMENT AREA. QUARTERS FOR OFFICERS, SHORE-BASED WARRANT OFFICERS, WORKERS AND EMPLOYEES, AS WELL AS AMENITIES, ARE LOCATED IN THE HOUSING AREA. TRAINING FIELDS, LIVE FIRE RANGES, TEST RANGES AND TANK AND VEHICLE DRIVING RANGES ARE LOCATED OUTSIDE THE GARRISON."

END

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SUBJECT: REMARKS BY MEMBER OF USDEL IN WORKING GROUP B  
- ON MAY 21, 1985

1. CDE VI - 034
2. TEXT OF U.S. STATEMENT DELIVERED ON MAY 21 BY PRISCILLA H. GALASSI, MEMBER, USDEL, FOLLOWS.

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BEGIN TEXT:

- THE NOTIFICATION MEASURE IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED ADDRESSES THREE TYPES OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE THE FOCUS OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS HERE: SPECIFICALLY, OUT-OF-GARRISON LAND ACTIVITIES, MOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES AND AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES. IN SO DOING, IT GOES SIGNIFICANTLY BEYOND THE LIMITED NOTIFICATION PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT WHICH CALL FOR THE MANDATORY NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS AND NONBINDING COMMITMENTS TO NOTIFY SMALLER SCALE MILITARY MANEUVERS AND MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS. THE FINAL ACT'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN, AND DIFFERENT TREATMENT OF, MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS AND MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS AT TIMES HAS CAUSED UNNECESSARY CONFUSION; FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN BOTH A MANEUVER AND A MOVEMENT TOGETHER ARE COMPONENTS OF THE SAME OVERALL MILITARY ACTIVITY. IT ALSO HAS CREATED THE POSSIBILITY OF CIRCUMVENTING THE AGREEMENT BY ARBITRARILY DESIGNATING A SIGNIFICANT MILITARY OPERATION AS A TYPE OF ACTIVITY FOR WHICH NOTIFICATION IS NOT MANDATORY. AND FINALLY, IT COMPLICATES THE TASK OF QUICKLY DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT A STATE HAS COMPLIED WITH THE FINAL ACT'S REQUIREMENT TO NOTIFY MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTY OF DISTINGUISHING MANEUVERS FROM MOVEMENTS AND OTHER TYPES OF MILITARY ACTIVITY WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF ON-SITE OBSERVERS OR INSPECTORS. MEASURE 3 OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED INCLUDES ALL THESE DIFFERENT TYPES OF MILITARY ENDEAVORS IN THE BROADER TERM MILITARY ACTIVITY; THUS, THE THRESHOLDS FOR NOTIFYING THEM ARE IDENTICAL AND THE DIFFICULT TASK OF DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN THEM IS ELIMINATED.

- THE SIMPLICITY AND EXACTITUDE OF THIS APPROACH IS COMPLEMENTED BY THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT WHICH ESTABLISHES THE CRITERION FOR DETERMINING WHEN MILITARY ACTIVITIES ARE CONDUCTED AWAY FROM THEIR NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATIONS AND ARE THEREFORE SUBJECT TO MANDATORY NOTIFICATION. MEASURE 3 OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED PROVIDES THAT "EACH PARTICIPATING STATE THAT PLANS TO CARRY OUT A MILITARY ACTIVITY, THAT IS, AN OUT-OF-GARRISON LAND ACTIVITY, A MOBILIZATION ACTIVITY, OR AN AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITY, IN THE ZONE, WILL GIVE NOTIFICATION 45 DAYS BEFORE SUCH ACTIVITY BEGINS."

- AT FIRST GLANCE, THE TERM "OUT-OF-GARRISON" WOULD APPEAR TO BE SELF-EVIDENT; AND IT IS, ONCE THE TERM "GARRISON" HAS BEEN DEFINED. AFTER ALL, A MILITARY UNIT

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IS OUT-OF-GARRISON WHEN IT IS OUT OF GARRISON. THE CRUCIAL WORD CLEARLY IS "GARRISON." AMERICAN DICTIONARIES DEFINE "GARRISON" AS "A MILITARY POST, ESPECIALLY ONE PERMANENTLY ESTABLISHED." THE WORD "GARRISON" THUS MEANS FACILITIES LOCATED WITHIN A FENCE OR WALL WHERE TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT ARE HOUSED. IF ENGLISH WERE THE ONLY OFFICIAL LANGUAGE OF THE CONFERENCE, THE TASK OF DEFINING GARRISON WOULD BE STRAIGHTFORWARD. OUR TASK IS NOT SO SIMPLE, HOWEVER, FOR WE MUST FACE THE REALITY THAT THERE ARE SIX OFFICIAL LANGUAGES AT THIS CONFERENCE. ANYONE WHO HAS EVER WORKED WITH TRANSLATIONS KNOWS HOW DIFFICULT IT CAN BE TO RENDER THE EXACT SHADE OF MEANING OF A WORD FROM ONE LANGUAGE TO ANOTHER. EVEN WHEN COGNATES EXIST, THEY ARE ALL TOO OFTEN MISLEADING. SUCH COGNATES OFTEN TURN OUT TO BE "FAUXAMIS" ("FALSE FRIENDS") AS THE FRENCH SO APTLY CALL THEM. THE RUSSIAN COGNATE FOR "GARRISON" -- "GARNIZON" -- IS SUCH A FAUX AMI. THE RUSSIAN WORD "GARNIZON" IS COMMONLY USED TO REFER TO AN AREA BOUNDED BY SEVERAL TOWNS, OR EVEN A GEOGRAPHICAL AREA DESIGNATED BY A MAJOR MILITARY COMMANDER SUCH AS THE COMMANDER OF A MILITARY DISTRICT. IN CONTRAST, THE WORD "GARRISON" IN ENGLISH HAS A FAR MORE PHYSICALLY RESTRICTED MEANING. USUALLY SEPARATED FROM THE SURROUNDING TOWN OR COUNTRYSIDE BY A FENCE OR WALL, IT IS THE PLACE WHERE THE TROOPS, OFFICERS AND OTHER PERSONNEL ARE BILLETED AND FED, AND WHERE CLASSROOMS, PARADE GROUNDS, EQUIPMENT AND STORAGE FACILITIES ARE LOCATED. TROOPS, THEREFORE, LEAVE THE GARRISON TO CONDUCT MANEUVERS.

USING THE RUSSIAN CONCEPT OF "GARNIZON" WITH ITS ADMINISTRATIVE, AS OPPOSED TO PURELY PHYSICAL, SENSE OF BOUNDARY, COULD CONCEIVABLY EXTEND TO LARGE AREAS WHICH WOULD INCLUDE TRAINING AREAS, ASSEMBLY POINTS, ETC. THIS DEFINITIONAL CONCEPT, IF ADOPTED, WOULD ALLOW LARGE CONTINGENTS OF TROOPS TO ENGAGE IN MILITARY ACTIVITIES "OUT-OF-GARRISON" WHICH COULD WELL BE PERCEIVED AS THREATENING AND YET NOT BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION AS "OUT-OF-GARRISON LAND ACTIVITIES." IN FACT, IF THE RUSSIAN ADMINISTRATIVE COGNATE WERE PUSHED TO ITS

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ULTIMATE, SOVIET TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT COULD MOVE DOZENS OF MILES FROM THEIR BARRACKS WITHOUT HAVING LEFT THE "GARNIZON."

- THERE IS A WAY OUT OF THIS DILEMMA, HOWEVER. THAT IS FOR THE SPONSORS OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED TO PROVIDE A DEFINITION OF WHAT THEY MEAN BY THE WORD "GARRISON" AND THEREBY TO GIVE INCREASED MEANING AND PRECISION TO THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT. BECAUSE I HAVE EMPHASIZED THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN "GARRISON" AND ITS FALSE RUSSIAN COGNATE "GARNIZON," I NOW WOULD LIKE TO INTRODUCE THIS DEFINITION FIRST IN RUSSIAN FOR DISCUSSION IN THE

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WORKING GROUP AND TO SUGGEST THAT IT BE ADOPTED BY THE RUSSIAN SPEAKING DELEGATIONS AS THE WEST'S INTENDED MEANING FOR "GARRISON." IT READS AS FOLLOWS: (READ RUSSIAN DEFINITION).

- FOR THOSE OF YOU WHO ARE NOT RUSSIAN SPEAKERS, PERMIT ME TO SHARE WITH YOU AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF WHAT I HAVE JUST READ IN RUSSIAN:

- "A GARRISON IS AN AREA HAVING BUILDINGS AND STRUCTURES LOCATED IN IT AND DESIGNED FOR ACCOMMODATING ONE OR SEVERAL MILITARY UNITS, INSTALLATIONS, MILITARY TRAINING SCHOOLS AND ENTERPRISES. IT CONSISTS OF OFFICES/BARRACKS, EQUIPMENT AND HOUSING AREAS. THE STAFFS, BARRACKS, PARADE GROUNDS, TRAINING CLASSROOMS, GUARD ROOMS, SOLDIERS' MESSSES, CLUBS AND DISPENSARIES ARE LOCATED IN THE OFFICE/BARRACKS AREA. THE PARKS WITH COMBAT AND SPECIAL EQUIPMENT, STORAGE FACILITIES, AND OTHER SPECIAL INSTALLATIONS ARE LOCATED IN THE EQUIPMENT AREA. QUARTERS FOR OFFICERS, SHORE-BASED WARRANT OFFICERS, WORKERS AND EMPLOYEES, AS WELL AS AMENITIES, ARE LOCATED IN THE HOUSING AREA. TRAINING FIELDS, LIVE FIRE RANGES, TEST RANGES AND TANK AND VEHICLE DRIVING RANGES ARE LOCATED OUTSIDE THE GARRISON."

- THIS DEFINITION DESCRIBES OFFICES, TROOP BILLETING AND FACILITIES FOR HOUSING COMBAT AND OTHER EQUIPMENT -- IN OTHER WORDS, THE GARRISONS, WHERE TROOPS ARE NORMALLY STATIONED IN THE CDE ZONE IN PEACETIME. AGREEMENT TO THIS DEFINITION IN ALL SIX LANGUAGES WOULD ENSURE THAT THERE ARE NO LINGUISTIC AND CONSEQUENTLY FUNCTIONAL

- MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF THE TERM "OUT-OF-GARRISON." WE BELIEVE THAT IF WE COULD REACH A LINGUISTIC ACCORD, THIS CONFERENCE WILL HAVE TAKEN AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD IN DEFINING AND ULTIMATELY AGREEING UPON A MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT AND VERIFIABLE NOTIFICATION MEASURE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL 35 PARTICIPANTS.

END TEXT.

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SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, MAY 21, 1985

1. CDE VI - 025
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT

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3. SUMMARY: THE CAUCUS REVIEWED THREE EASTERN NOTIFICATION PROPOSALS AND FOCUSED ATTENTION ON TACTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSES. AMBASSADOR GOODBY FRAMED THE DISCUSSION BY SUGGESTING THAT THE WEST WELCOME THE GREATER PRECISION IN THE EASTERN POSITION BUT CRITICIZE THE VARIOUS OMISSIONS, ERRORS, AND INCONSISTENCIES OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS AND COMPARE THE THREE TO THE MORE SUBSTANTIVE MEASURES OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED. THE CAUCUS DIVIDED OVER THE QUESTION OF TABLING AS NATIONAL PRESENTATIONS THE FRG AND UK ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS, SINCE THE CAUCUS HAD NOT REACHED CONSENSUS ON THEIR CONTENTS. AGREEMENT WAS REACHED TO REVIEW THEM AGAIN ALONG WITH THE DANISH AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS PAPER, ALTHOUGH THE MOOD WAS RELATIVELY DISHARMONIOUS. IN CONTACTS, THE EAST HAS ALREADY STARTED ASKING FOR A WESTERN RESPONSE ON NUF NOW THAT THE WARSAW PACT STATES HAVE PROVIDED DETAILS ON CONCRETE CSBM'S. END SUMMARY.

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4. WARSAW PACT NOTIFICATION PAPERS: THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DAY, BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS), SUGGESTED THAT DISCUSSION FOCUS ON BOTH TACTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSES TO THE EAST'S TABLING OF THREE WORKING GROUP DOCUMENTS ON LAND, AIR, AND NAVAL NOTIFICATIONS. AMBASSADOR GOODBY ARGUED THAT ONE SOVIET OBJECTIVE MAY BE TO PUT THE ONUS ON THE WEST TO PRODUCE PAPERS ON NUF IN RESPONSE TO THE EAST'S DETAILED PAPERS ON NOTIFICATION. MOREOVER, THE SOVIETS ALSO WOULD LIKE TO COMPLICATE THE WEST'S POSITION ON NOTIFICATION OF AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS. NATO COULD USE THE SOVIET PAPERS TO ITS ADVANTAGE, GOODBY ADDED, BY FOCUSING DISCUSSION ON NOTIFICATION OF LAND MANEUVERS AND BY RAISING VARIOUS OMISSIONS, ERRORS, OR INCONSISTENCIES THAT THE MILREPS AND OTHERS MAY FIND IN THE THREE PAPERS. GOODBY ADVOCATED THAT THE WEST SHOULD WELCOME THE INCREASED PRECISION IN THE EAST'S PAPERS, BUT CAUTIONED THAT THE WARSAW PACT'S PROVISIONS ON NOTIFICATION ARE NOT A STEP FORWARD. GOODBY RECOMMENDED FOUR AREAS FOR STUDY: 1) FAILURE OF THE EASTERN PAPERS TO GO MUCH BEYOND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT IN TERMS OF INFORMATION REQUIRED TO BE PROVIDED IN NOTIFICATIONS; 2) COMPLEXITY AND POTENTIAL FOR LOOPHOLES IN THE EASTERN DISTINCTION BETWEEN MANEUVERS AND MOVEMENTS, IN CONTRAST TO THE SIMPLICITY AND COMPREHENSIVENESS OF NATO'S OUT-OF-GARRISON PROVISIONS; 3) THE PERIOD OF TIME TO PROVIDE ADVANCE NOTIFICATION (E.G., EAST'S 30-DAY REQUIREMENT REPRESENTS NO REAL ADVANCE BEYOND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT), AS WELL AS LOOPHOLES IN THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR LAND NOTIFICATIONS; AND 4) THE TOTAL OMISSION OF VERIFICATION PROVISIONS IN THE EASTERN PAPERS. GOODBY STATED THAT CRITICAL EVALUATIONS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED NOT ONLY IN THE NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP, BUT ALSO IN THE

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VERIFICATION AND INFORMATION WORKING GROUPS. GOODBY RECOMMENDED THAT THE THREE WARSAW PACT PAPERS BE REVIEWED IN THE MILITARY ADVISORS GROUP ON A PRIORITY BASIS. FINALLY, HE NOTED THAT THE DISCUSSION OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS COULD HELP THE CONFERENCE FOCUS ATTENTION ON CONCRETE CSBM'S, WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF ALLEVIATING PRESSURE TO INTRODUCE NATO'S ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS.

- CITRON (FRG), EDES (UK), MEVIK (NORWAY), DELWORTH (CANADA), CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL), MELLBIN (DENMARK), CIARRAPICO (ITALY), GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE), OZGUL (TURKEY), AND BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) ALL SUPPORTED GOODBY'S ASSESSMENT AND SUGGESTED APPROACH. THEIR COMMENTS GENERALLY REFLECTED A BELIEF THAT COMPARISONS OF THE THREE EASTERN PAPERS WITH SC.1/AMPLIFIED WOULD BE TO THE WEST'S ADVANTAGE AND THAT THE MILITARY ADVISORS' GROUP SHOULD GIVE THESE PAPERS A HIGH PRIORITY. MOREOVER, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE MILITARY GROUP'S REVIEW SHOULD DEVELOP THE BEST ARGUMENTS TO USE AGAINST THE THREE PROPOSALS. CIARRAPICO AND MELLBIN DIFFERED WITH GOODBY'S TACTICAL RECOMMENDATION TO APPORTION CRITICAL COMMENT AMONG THE NOTIFICATION, VERIFICATION, AND INFORMATION WORKING GROUPS AND INSTEAD ADVOCATED FOCUSING THEM IN THE NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP ALONE. BUWALDA LED GENERAL OPINION IN OPPOSITION TO THAT VIEW, ARGUING THAT SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD CONFORM TO SOVIET VIEWS ON REPACKAGING THE PROVISIONS OF THE NATO PROPOSALS ON INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION INTO THE NOTIFICATION MEASURES. THIS DISCUSSION WAS INCONCLUSIVE; THUS, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DAY CHARGED THE MILITARY ADVISORS' GROUP WITH CONDUCTING AN URGENT AND COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE THREE EASTERN PAPERS.

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5. CAUCUS PAPERS: THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY ADVISORS' GROUP, NAMIESNIEWSKI (CANADA), INFORMALLY REPORTED ON THE MILITARY'S REVIEW OF THE FRG MEASURE 2 AND UK MEASURE 3 PAPERS. THE DANISH PAPER ON AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS WAS REPORTED AS STILL UNDER MILREP CONSIDERATION. IN PRINCIPLE, THE FRG AND UK PAPERS WERE CLEARED WITH RESPECT TO CONSISTENCY WITH SC.1/AMPLIFIED, EXCEPT FOR MAJOR DUTCH RESERVATIONS, RAISED AGAIN BY BUWALDA IN THE CAUCUS. WITH RESPECT TO THE FRG PAPER, HE CRITICIZED ITS USE OF JUST ONE QUARTER OF A CALENDAR YEAR; REGARDING THE UK PAPER, HE CRITICIZED ITS USE OF AN EXCEPTIONALLY LARGE EXERCISE AS AN EXAMPLE OF MEASURE 3, SINCE IT GIVES TOO MUCH EMPHASIS TO NUMERICAL RATHER THAN STRUCTURAL INFORMATION. CITRON (FRG) AND EDES (UK) BOTH EXPRESSED A STRONG INTEREST IN TABLING THEIR RESPECTIVE PAPERS AS NATIONAL PRESENTATIONS IN THE WORKING GROUPS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. MEVIK (NORWAY), DELWORTH (CANADA), AND CIARRAPICO (ITALY), ARGUED THAT THE FRG AND UK PAPERS SHOULD BE TABLED WITHOUT DELAY AS OFFICIAL WORKING GROUP DOCUMENTS. IN OPPOSITION, BUWALDA AND ALLENDESALAZAR (SPAIN) ARGUED THAT THE CAUCUS SHOULD HAVE A CHANCE TO REVIEW THE PAPERS AGAIN, SINCE TABLING THEM, EVEN AS

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SUPPLEMENTS TO NATIONAL INTERVENTIONS, PROVIDES AN INTERPRETATION OF A COMMON ALLIANCE POSITION (I.E., SC.1/AMPLIFIED), WHICH REQUIRES CAUCUS CONSENSUS. MOREOVER, THEIR POSITION WAS UNDERScoreD BY DEBATE OVER WHETHER TO TABLE THE ILLUSTRATIVE CAUCUS PAPERS AS OFFICIAL WORKING GROUP DOCUMENTS WHICH WOULD LEND THEM GREATER STATUS. MELLBIN AND EDES FAVORED NUMBERING THE PAPERS AS WORKING GROUP DOCUMENTS. AMBASSADOR GOODBY SOUGHT TO FIND A WAY OUT OF THIS "CUL DE SAC" BY NOTING THAT THE ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS WOULD DEMONSTRATE HOW THE NATO PROPOSALS ARE MORE SOLID AND SUBSTANTIVE THAN THE EAST'S POSITION, PARTICULARLY ITS THREE NEW NOTIFICATION INITIATIVES. HE RECOMMENDED THAT THE FRG AND UK PRESENTATIONS BE TABLED AS NATIONAL PAPERS WITHOUT OFFICIAL STATUS. GOODBY AGREED WITH THE DUTCH ARGUMENTS TO REVIEW THE PAPERS AGAIN, SINCE HE SAW NO NEED TO TABLE THEM IMMEDIATELY. ADDITIONALLY, THE CAUCUS HAD YET TO ADDRESS

THE QUESTION OF TACTICS, I.E., WHICH WORKING GROUPS WOULD BEST SERVE NATO'S INTERESTS AND GIVE THE PAPERS THEIR GREATEST EFFECT? THE CAUCUS CHAIRMAN SUMMED UP THE RELATIVELY DISHARMONIOUS DEBATE AND STATED THAT THE CAUCUS WOULD REVIEW THE FRG AND UK PAPERS AGAIN THURSDAY, MAY 23, ON THE BASIS OF BOTH CONTENT AND TACTICS.

6. OTHER BUSINESS: THE CAUCUS AGREED TO ALLOW THE MILREPS TO COMPLETE THEIR REVIEW OF THE DANISH AMPHIBIOUS LANDING PAPER AND THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE THREE EASTERN INITIATIVES AS THEIR PENULTIMATE PRIORITY. WORK ON ANOMALIES IN THE NATO PACKAGE WAS POSTPONED.

7. CONTACTS: OZGUL (TURKEY) REPORTED THAT THE ROMANIANS SAID THAT THE NNA WERE PREPARING A JOINT STUDY OF THE ROMANIAN MAY 14 INITIATIVE; POSITIVE COMMENTS HAD ALREADY BEEN SOLICITED FROM OTHER WARSAW PACT MEMBERS, ACCORDING TO THE ROMANIANS. MEVIK (NORWAY) NOTED THAT GRINEVSKY HAD VOICED THE EXPECTED EASTERN LINE THAT NOW IT IS UP TO THE WEST TO TABLE SUBSTANTIVE PAPERS ON NUF. CITRON (FRG) HAD ALSO MET GRINEVSKY AND REPORTED THAT THE SOVIETS APPEAR HOPEFUL FOR A POSITIVE OUTCOME AT THE CDE. GRINEVSKY HAD SAID HE BELIEVED REAL PROGRESS WOULD BE MADE WHEN DRAFTING BEGAN, WHICH SHOULD BE SOON, SINCE ONE COULD NOT "WAIT ENDLESSLY FOR THE NNA'S." GRINEVSKY ALSO TOLD CITRON THAT THE WEST WOULD NOT GET EVERYTHING IT WANTS IN MEASURE 1; CITRON WARNED GRINEVSKY THAT THE CONTINUING EASTERN DENIAL OF THE MADRID MANDATE WILL HAVE VERY NEGATIVE RAMIFICATIONS IN CAPITALS. AMBASSADOR GOODBY GAVE A BRIEF READOUT ON THE SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING.

8. THE NEXT CAUCUS MEETING WILL BE HELD ON THURSDAY, MAY 23.  
END

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SUBJECT: CDE: REPORT OF WORKING GROUP A, MAY 22  
REF: STOCKHOLM 3756

1. CDE VI - 036.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: WORKING GROUP A/WEDNESDAY WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY THREE WESTERN INTERVENTIONS POCKETING (AND EXPLOITING TO WESTERN ADVANTAGE) SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION, AND SOVIET REACTION TO SUCH EXPLOITATION. THE SOVIET REP FIRMLY REJECTED MEASURE 1 AND 5 OF SC.1 AND MADE CLEAR THAT INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION WERE ACCEPTABLE ONLY AS MEANS OF IMPLEMENTING THE NOTIFICATION MEASURE. (SUMMARIZED IN PARAS 4-5 BELOW). ANOTHER HIGHLIGHT WAS THE AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR'S HELPFUL OPENING INTERVENTION SUPPORTING THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON FORCE STRUCTURE, IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER, AND OF VERIFICATION MEANS AVAILABLE TO ALL 35 STATES. (SUMMARIZED IN PARA 6 BELOW). END SUMMARY.  
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4. FRENCH REP NOTED THAT WHILE POSITIONS WERE NOT CLOSE ON THE ISSUE OF INFORMATION, THE PRINCIPLE IS ACCEPTED BY ALL AND THEREFORE OUR TASK IS TO CRYSTALLIZE BASIC CONCEPTS. HE SUGGESTED THAT DISCUSSION OF THE PLACE AND FORM OF VERIFICATION AND INFORMATION BE SET ASIDE FOR THE TIME BEING, AND INSTEAD WE SHOULD FOCUS ON SUBSTANCE. HE ASKED WHAT THE EASTERN AND ROMANIAN PROPOSALS ENVISAGED WITH REGARD TO INFORMATION. THE ITALIAN REP NOTED THAT EVEN IF INDICATIONS WERE FRAGMENTARY AND LIMITED, IT APPEARED THAT CONDITIONS ARE BEING SET FOR MOVING THE SIDES CLOSER TOGETHER REGARDING INFORMATION. HE NOTED THAT IT IS AGREED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF INFORMATION IS NECESSARY TO RENDER CSBMS EFFECTIVE, AND THAT THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION MUST BE RELATED TO OTHER CSBMS. HE SUGGESTED THAT DISCUSSION SHOULD NOW TURN TO HOW THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION SHOULD INTERACT WITH OTHER CSBMS, LEAVING ASIDE WHAT NAME (I.E., AN INDEPENDENT MEASURE OR OTHERWISE) TO GIVE SUCH AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION.  
THE SPANISH REP INDICATED AGREEMENT WITH MANY EASTERN STATEMENTS REGARDING VERIFICATION (E.G., VERIFICATION IS NOT AN END IN ITSELF; VERIFICATION IS RELATED TO THE CONTENT OF THE CSBMS) TO HIGHLIGHT AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN POSITIONS. HE CHALLENGED THE EAST TO PRESENT VERIFICATION PROVISIONS TO ACCOMPANY THEIR NEW NOTIFICATION PROPOSALS.
5. SOVIET REP TOOK ISSUE WITH APPARENT WESTERN ASSUMPTIONS THAT EAST AND WEST WERE MOVING CLOSER TOGETHER REGARDING INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION. HE CRITICIZED IN PARTICULAR AND AT LENGTH THE UK AMBASSADOR'S SPEECH AT THE PREVIOUS SESSION OF WORKING GROUP AB (REFTEL) FOR CLAIMING THAT CONSENSUS WAS EMERGING AROUND AN OUTCOME WHICH WOULD COMBINE NUF WITH

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THE SIX MEASURES OF SC.1. HE THEN PROCEEDED TO MAKE CLEAR THE SOVIET POSITION. IN BRIEF, THE POINTS MADE BY THE SOVIET REP INCLUDED:

-- REJECTION OF INDEPENDENT MEASURES FOR THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION AS EMBODIED IN MEASURES 1 AND 5 OF SC.1. "NATO SAYS THAT INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION DEMAND A CERTAIN INDEPENDENCE AND SELF-CONTAINED CHARACTER. WE CATEGORICALLY REJECT THIS."

-- THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT EXCLUDES INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION FROM THE SET OF CSBMS WHICH WE ARE TO BUILD UPON AND DEVELOP. THEY ARE ONLY MEANS FOR IMPLEMENTING CSBMS.

-- THE CONCEPT OF VERIFICATION AS PRESENTED IN SC.1 INFRINGES UPON NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY BECAUSE IT FOISTS AN ARBITRARY VERIFICATION UPON STATES; IT INVOLVES A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CONTROL OVER MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF A STATE WHETHER OR NOT THOSE ACTIVITIES POSE A THREAT.

-- THE WESTERN SYSTEM OF INSPECTION, FROM LAND VEHICLES OR BY AIR, OPENS VAST POSSIBILITIES OF BROAD AND LEGALLY-ESTABLISHED METHODS OF OPENING THE TERRITORY OF THE USSR TO THE URALS, GIVING A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE TO THE U.S. AND CANADA.

-- THE SOVIET APPROACH IS REALISTIC. THE SOVIETS SUPPORT THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR IMPLEMENTING ADEQUATE MEASURES OF VERIFICATION. THE VOLUME AND SCALE OF INFORMATION IS DETERMINED BY THE CHARACTER AND CONTENT OF CSBMS, I.E. NOTIFICATION.

-- INFORMATION MUST BE PART AND PARCEL OF NOTIFICATION. WE COULD WRITE DOWN A LIST OF SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR INFORMATION AND MEET THEM.

-- IF WE WERE TO ACCEPT MEASURES 1 AND 5 NOW, BEFORE AGREEING ON THE CONTENT OF THE NOTIFICATION MEASURE, HOW DO WE KNOW THEY WOULD BE ADEQUATE FOR THE NOTIFICATION MEASURE? FOR EXAMPLE, MEASURE 5 EXCLUDES INSPECTORS FROM NAVAL BASES; SINCE THE SOVIET UNION PROPOSES THE NOTIFICATION OF NAVAL MANEUVERS, THE WEST COULD ARGUE THERE WERE NO MEANS FOR VERIFYING SUCH MANEUVERS.

6. THE AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR OPENED THE MEETING WITH A VERY HELPFUL STATEMENT CHALLENGING SEVERAL SOVIET ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION. POINTS MADE INCLUDED:

-- THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION SHOULD BE SEEN AS AN INVESTMENT IN THE FUTURE.

-- AUSTRIA PUBLISHES INFORMATION ON ITS FORCE STRUCTURE. THE LOGIC OF THE SOVIET POSITION WAS THAT MILITARILY STRONGER STATES WOULD BE MORE ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THE PUBLICATION OF SUCH INFORMATION -- A LOGIC THE AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR REJECTED.

-- THERE ARE GOOD ARGUMENTS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ISSUE REGARDING WHETHER INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION WERE INDEPENDENT MEASURES. BUT HIS DELEGATION WAS MORE INTERESTED IN RESULTS; IF THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

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WERE MORE EASILY ACCEPTABLE IF ACCOMPANIED BY OTHER MEASURES, SO BE IT.

-- HE DISAGREED THAT INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION COULD BE DISCUSSED ONLY AFTER THE CONTENTS OF THE NOTIFICATION MEASURES WERE AGREED. IN ANY CASE, THE GENERAL CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION WAS ALREADY KNOWN IN SUFFICIENT DEPTH TO PERMIT DISCUSSION OF THE SUBSTANCE OF INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION.

-- IF THE CURRENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DOES NOT PERMIT THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, THEN THE LACK OF TRUST INTENSIFIES; IN THAT CASE, VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS INCREASE ACCORDINGLY.

-- NTM IMPLIES THE USE OF SATELLITES; THEREFORE PARAS 1 AND 2 OF MEASURE 5 APPLY ONLY TO THE U.S. AND USSR. THIS IS NOT NECESSARY FOR A CDE AGREEMENT AND EMPHASIZES THE EXISTING DIFFERENCES AMONG THE 35 STATES. NTM CANNOT BE PART OF THE NORMAL VERIFICATION PROCESS OF CSCE. AUSTRIA IS INTERESTED IN OTHER FORMS OF APPROPRIATE VERIFICATION WHICH WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO ALL STATES.  
END

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SUBJECT: CDE: SPECIAL NATO CAUCUS -- OPEN-ENDED  
 - MEETING OF MAY 22, 1985

REF: A) STOCKHOLM 3317, B) STOCKHOLM 3316

1. CDE VI - 030
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT

3. SUMMARY. DISCUSSION OF THE UK CONSTRAINT PAPER WAS DIVIDED INTO TWO SECTIONS: FIRST, ON WHETHER A CONSTRAINTS MEASURE IS NEEDED FOR THIS SESSION, AND SECOND, ON THE SPECIFIC CONTENT OF THE PROPOSED MEASURE. AMBASSADOR GOODBY ARGUED THAT THE ALLIANCE IS IN A GOOD POSITION AND DOES NOT FACE MOUNTING PRESSURE FROM THE NNA OR THE SOVIETS TO PRODUCE ONE. MOST ALLIES STRONGLY DIFFERED WITH THE U.S. AND FELT WORK ON CONSTRAINTS SHOULD PROCEED IN ORDER TO HAVE A CONSTRAINT MEASURE IN HAND IF THE NEED ARISES. WHILE THE ALLIES AGREED THAT THERE IS NO PRESSURE AT PRESENT FROM THE NNA OR THE EAST, SOME VOICED CONCERN THAT THE SITUATION COULD CHANGE QUICKLY. TURNING TO SUBSTANCE, AMBASSADOR GOODBY NOTED, INTER ALIA, THAT THE UK PAPER PREJUDICES MEASURE 4 (OBSERVATION). OTHER ALLIES ARGUED THAT THE UK PAPER ALSO WEAKENS MEASURES 1 (INFORMATION), 2 (FORECASTS), AND 5 (VERIFICATION), AND LACKS BOTH A STRUCTURAL PARAMETER AND PROVISIONS FOR SHORT-NOTICE CRISIS MANAGEMENT, ALERTS, AND RAPID REINFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES. ALL AGREED THE PAPER SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO BRUSSELS FOR REVIEW. END SUMMARY.

4. INTRODUCTION: THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DAY, VAN CORP (NETHERLANDS), ASKED EDES (UK) TO SUMMARIZE THE CONTENTS OF THE UK CONSTRAINTS PAPER. EDES RECOMMENDED THAT THE DISCUSSION BE HELD IN TWO PARTS: FIRST, WHETHER A CONSTRAINTS MEASURE IS NEEDED THIS SESSION; AND SECOND, ON THE SPECIFIC CONTENT OF THE PROPOSED CONSTRAINT MEASURE (REF A).

5. ALLIANCE POSTURE ON CONSTRAINTS -- U.S. POSITION: AMBASSADOR GOODBY BEGAN THE DEBATE BY REPEATING WHAT HE HAD SAID IN OSLO ON CONSTRAINTS (REF B). HE NOTED THAT THE ALLIANCE IS IN A GOOD POSITION AND THAT PRESSURE FOR A CONSTRAINTS MEASURE HAD DIMINISHED IN THE FIFTH SESSION. GOODBY ARGUED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE NO SUBSTANTIVE INTEREST IN A CONSTRAINTS MEASURE BUT MAY TABLE A NEW ONE TO ALIGN THEMSELVES TACTICALLY WITH THE NNA ON THE ISSUE. THE NNA, HE SAID, HAVE BEEN TALKING ABOUT CONSTRAINTS FOR A LONG TIME AND APPEAR TO HAVE NO IMMEDIATE PROSPECTS FOR PRODUCING A CONSTRAINTS PAPER. GOODBY ADDED THAT IT WOULD BE UNLIKELY FOR THE NNA TO SWING THEIR SUPPORT TO THE SOVIETS, SINCE CONSTRAINTS INVOLVE THEIR OWN SECURITY INTERESTS WHICH COULD BE NEGATIVELY AFFECTED BY THE TYPE OF FUTURE CONSTRAINT MEASURE THE SOVIETS MAY BE LIKELY TO TABLE. THEREFORE,

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GOODBY STATED, NATO IS NOT PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE ON THE ISSUE. FURTHERMORE, THE ALLIANCE HAS REGULARLY STATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER A BALANCED AND EQUITABLE CONSTRAINT IF ONE COULD BE DEVELOPED. SUCH AN OPEN ATTITUDE IS A GOOD TACTIC, GOODBY SUGGESTED, BECAUSE TIME IS ON OUR SIDE. CONSTRAINT MEASURES WILL BE COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE AND MAY EVEN LEAD TO AN IMPASSE BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE NNA. AS THE CONFERENCE DRAWS CLOSER TO VIENNA, THE LACK OF TIME WILL BE A MAJOR INHIBITING FACTOR TO DEVELOPING CONSTRAINTS. THE END GAME, GOODBY EMPHASIZED, WOULD BE NO TIME TO DEAL WITH CONSTRAINT MEASURES. IF THE YUGOSLAVS, FOR EXAMPLE, HOLD UP AN AGREEMENT A LA MALTESE OVER CONSTRAINTS, IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE PRESSURE WOULD BE ON NATO RATHER THAN ON THEM. MANY WOULD LIKE TO SEE NATO MOVE ON CONSTRAINTS, AND PRESSURE ON CONSTRAINTS MAY DEVELOP WHEN WE CONSIDER PROCEDURAL ISSUES. HOWEVER, GOODBY CONCLUDED, THAT WOULD BE A QUITE DIFFERENT MATTER WHICH NATO COULD HANDLE WITHOUT HAVING TO TABLE A WESTERN CONSTRAINTS PAPER. IT WOULD BE FAR WORSE IF NATO WERE TO TABLE A PAPER AND SUBSEQUENTLY BE OUTMANEUVERED BY SOVIET TABLING OF A MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE CONSTRAINT.

6. ALLIANCE POSTURE ON CONSTRAINTS -- ALLIED VIEWS: GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE), LIAN (NORWAY), CITRON (FRG), PAPADAKIS (GREECE), FUENTES (SPAIN), VAN DER GRAAF (NETHERLANDS), MELLBIN (DENMARK), DU MOULIN (BELGIUM), AND CIARRAPICO (ITALY) UNIVERSALLY AGREED THAT WORK SHOULD PROCEED ON CONSTRAINTS IN ORDER TO BE READY IF AND WHEN NATO MUST STEP UP TO THIS PROBLEM. ALTHOUGH MOST CONCURRED WITH GOODBY THAT THERE IS NO APPARENT PRESSURE FROM EITHER THE NNA OR THE EAST AT THE MOMENT, ALL THE ABOVE AGREED THAT NATO CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT AVOID STARTING SERIOUS AND EXPEDITIOUS WORK ON AN AGREED WESTERN POSITION AND TO HAVE A CONSTRAINT MEASURE THAT NATO CAN ACCEPT AND ULTIMATELY TABLE, IF THIS BECOMES NECESSARY. MOREOVER, THESE DELEGATIONS ARGUED THAT, TACTICALLY, NATO NEEDS A POSITIVE POSTURE ON CONSTRAINTS NOW IN ORDER TO NULLIFY TALK ABOUT CONSTRAINTS AMONG THE NNA AND THE EASTERN BLOC, SOMEWHAT IN THE SAME WAY THAT REAGAN'S OFFER ON NUF NEUTRALIZED PRESSURE ON THE ISSUE. (COMMENT: IT WAS NOT CLEAR FROM THE DISCUSSION HOW THEY ENVISIONED IMPLEMENTING THIS TACTIC. END COMMENT.) EDES (UK) RHETORICALLY ASKED A CRUCIAL QUESTION REGARDING THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE SOVIETS COULD USE EXISTING AND FUTURE CUNSTRAINTS MEASURES TO DEVELOP A NEW ONE ALONG SIMILAR LINES SIMPLY TO EMBARRASS THE WEST. EDES CAUTIONED, THEREFORE, THAT THE LONGER NATO WAS WITHOUT A POSITION, THE MORE LIKELY IT WOULD BE FOR THE SOVIETS TO PROPOSE SUCH A NEW CONSTRAINT MEASURE IN ADDITION TO ONE THEY HAVE ALREADY TABLED. MOREOVER, IT WOULD NOT BE SENSIBLE

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FOR NATO TO DEPEND ON THE NNA TO REMAIN AT AN IMPASSE INDEFINITELY ON CONSTRAINTS. EDES ARGUED THAT THE NNA SEE PROGRESS ON CONSTRAINTS AS THEIR UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION TO THE CONFERENCE. NATO NEEDS TO BE PREPARED IF THE NNA DECIDE TO COALESCE AROUND A SOVIET CONSTRAINT MEASURE. IF NATO IS UNPREPARED, WHAT PRICE, EDES ASKED, WOULD THE SOVIETS ASK FOR DROPPING THE CONSTRAINT IN THE END GAME AND WHAT PRICE WOULD THE WEST PAY TO MAINTAIN NNA SUPPORT IN THIS PERIOD? EDES CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT THE UK CONSTRAINTS PAPER IS INTENDED TO ALERT THE CAUCUS AS WELL AS BRUSSELS TO THE TACTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE NEED TO ACT

QUICKLY TO FIND ANY ACCEPTABLE CONSTRAINT MEASURE. GOODBY REPLIED THAT THE PROBABILITIES OF SOVIET-NNA COLLUSION ON CONSTRAINTS WERE NOT VERY LIKELY SINCE THE NNA WERE DEEPLY DIVIDED SUBSTANTIVELY ON THE ISSUE; ADDITIONALLY, THEY WOULD ABANDON THEIR TRADITIONAL ROLE IF THEY JOINED THE SOVIETS AS POSTULATED. GOODBY NOTED THAT THERE ARE OTHER WAYS TO HANDLE THE NNA WITHOUT HAVING A NATO CONSTRAINTS PROPOSAL. IT WOULD BE FAR MORE EFFECTIVE TO WORK ON SHOWING THE NNA WHY CONSTRAINTS ARE A PROBLEM THAN IT WOULD BE TO PROVIDE THEM WITH A NATO PROPOSAL. CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL) AND ANSTIS (CANADA) WERE THE ONLY ALLIES TO STRONGLY SUBSCRIBE TO THE U.S. VIEW THAT NATO SHOULD DO NO MORE THAN EXPLORE IDEAS. CUTILEIRO HEARTILY AGREED WITH GOODBY THAT THE WEST SHOULD NOT TABLE A CONSTRAINTS MEASURE NOW OR IN THE FUTURE, ESPECIALLY WITH THE NNA DIVIDED AND UNABLE TO ACT.

7. UK CONSTRAINTS PAPER -- SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS: EDES (UK) NOTED THAT MOST CAUCUS MEMBERS PROVIDED INITIAL SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS IN OSLO, MAY 2-3 (SEE REF B). AMBASSADOR GOODBY STRONGLY RECOMMENDED THAT THE UK PAPER BE SENT TO THE MILITARY COMMITTEE IN BRUSSELS FOR REVIEW IN THE USUAL WAY. ON SUBSTANCE, HE STATED THAT THE CRITICAL COMMENTS HE MADE IN OSLO STILL STAND; ESPECIALLY THE CONCERNS HE RAISED ABOUT THE UK PAPER'S UNDERMINING EFFECT ON MEASURE 4 (OBSERVATION) OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED (REF B). ON TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN NOTIFICATIONS AND OBSERVATION, GOODBY SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF PENALTIES FOR CONDUCTING LARGE EXERCISES ON SHORT NOTICE; I.E., ADDING OBLIGATIONS TO THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATIONS AS WELL AS INSPECTIONS WHICH WOULD NOT BE CHARGED TO THE ANNUAL QUOTA PERMITTED UNDER MEASURE 5. THE IDEA, GOODBY CONCLUDED, WOULD BE TO ENRICH THE NATO PACKAGE RATHER THAN WEAKEN IT, AS THE CURRENT VERSION OF THE UK PAPER APPARENTLY DOES. GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE), ANSTIS (CANADA), LIAN (NORWAY), VAN DER GRAAF (NETHERLANDS), ESPARZA (SPAIN), DI GIOVANNI (ITALY, AND MELLBIN (DENMARK) ALL COMMENTED CRITICALLY ON THE LACK OF A STRUCTURAL PARAMETER IN THE UK PAPER. MOREOVER, SOME OF

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THEM NOTED THAT THE PAPER WEAKENS CONSIDERABLY THE EFFECT OF MEASURE 4 ON MANDATORY OBSERVATION AND LENDS SUPPORT TO THE EAST'S POSITION THAT OBSERVATION SHOULD BE LINKED TO THE TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED. OTHERS ADDED THAT THE UK PAPER COULD ALSO UNDERCUT THE PROVISIONS OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED ON MEASURE 5 (VERIFICATION), AND MEASURE 2 (FORECASTS), AND EVEN MEASURE 1 (INFORMATION). ESPARZA, LIAN, AND DI GIOVANNI, AMONG OTHERS, NOTED THAT THE PAPER ALSO LACKS PROVISIONS FOR SHORT-NOTICE CRISIS MANAGEMENT, ALERTS, AND RAPID REINFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES. THE CHAIR SUMMED UP BY NOTING THAT THERE WAS CONSENSUS THAT: 1) THE PAPER NEEDS CONSIDERABLE REVISION; 2) THE MILITARY ADVISORS' GROUP IN STOCKHOLM SHOULD NOT REVIEW THE PAPER; AND 3) THE BRITISH SHOULD SUBMIT THE PAPER TO THE NATO MACHINERY FOR CONSIDERATION. EDES NOTED THAT THE UK PAPER WOULD BE REWORKED AND THAT HE WOULD INFORM THE CAUCUS OF UK VIEWS REGARDING NEXT STEPS.  
END

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НР Болгария

Рабочая группа "А" /З

23 мая 1985 г.

Господин Председатель,

Включение ограничительных мер в четыре из внесенных предложений, выраженная рядом делегаций-соавторов СК.1 готовность обсуждать такие меры являются, по нашему мнению, позитивным моментом в работе конференции. Это отражает оценку значения ограничительных мер, которые в сочетании с другими мерами, в том числе с развернутыми мерами уведомления, недавно внесенными в виде рабочих документов, в случае их претворения в жизнь внесли бы существенный вклад в уменьшение опасности военной конфронтации.

По нашему убеждению, введение ограничений для военной деятельности, и более конкретно, для динамического элемента такой деятельности, каким является проведение крупных учений сухопутных войск, самостоятельно или совместно с военноморскими и военновоздушными силами - настоятельное требование сегодня международной обстановки в Европе. Ведь если сохранится тенденция к росту масштабов этих учений, параллельно с ней будет возрастать опасность вспышки военного конфликта, внезапного нападения. Тем более, что такие учения проводятся в непосредственной близости от границ других государств и пересечения этих границ - вопрос нескольких часов.

Нам говорят, что крупные учения, проводимые странами Североатлантического союза, всегда имели и имеют только оборонительную цель. Однако с военной точки зрения они служат подготовке войск к наступательным, агрессивным действиям. Они проводятся согласно требованиям полевого устава США "Ф-100-5" в которых

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в частности, говорится /цитирую/: "Мы должны захватить инициативу и подавить боеспособность противника на всю глубину с помощью наступления на его боевые порядки, эффективной боевой мощи и решительного продвижения войск... Главные бои должны отныне продолжаться часы, а не дни или недели" /конец цитаты/

Я привел эту цитату не для того, чтобы вносить драматический элемент в нашу дискуссию. Моя цель - еще раз привлечь внимание уважаемых коллег к очевидному - несмотря на объявленные общие цели, крупные военные учения не могут не являться источником повышенной опасности военной конфронтации.

Для того, чтобы уменьшить эту опасность и таким образом продвинуться к цели, определенной в мандате нашей конференции нам необходимо заняться вплотную проблемой ограничения военной деятельности в Европе.

Господин Председатель,

Некоторые ораторы, выступающие против внесенного делегациями НРБ, ГДР и СССР предложения, пытаются охарактеризовать в качестве достаточной ограничительной меры меру № 2 своего документа. Я присоединяюсь к выраженному до сих пор уже многими делегациями мнению, что эта мера не может иметь сколь-либо заметную ограничительную роль.

Как известно, ряд учений являются плановыми и проводятся ежегодно или через год в примерно одно и то же время. Тем не менее их масштабы постоянно возрастают. Включить эти учения в ежегодные предварительные планы означало бы лишь зафиксировать крупномасштабную военную деятельность, на практике - придать ей законность. Болгарская делегация - решительно против такого формулирования ограничительных мер, которое могло бы привести к указанным последствиям.

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Заканчивая, господин Председатель, хотел бы выразить уверенность этой делегации в том, что начатая дискуссия по ограничительной мере будет углубляться и обогащаться новыми идеями и предложениями, что позволит нам в конечном счете достичь взаимоприемлимую договоренность.

Благодарю Вас, господин Председатель.

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SUBJECT: CDE: REPORT OF WORKING GROUP B, MAY 23

1. CDE VI - 037.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: DISCUSSION ON OBSERVATION AT SESSION OF WORKING GROUP B ON MAY 23 WAS CONSTRUCTIVE. THE SWISS AND AUSTRIANS INTERVENED TO CHALLENGE EASTERN POSITIONS THAT NOTIFICATIONS ISSUES MUST BE RESOLVED FIRST AND THAT OBSERVATION IS DIFFERENT FROM VERIFICATION. IN THE END, THE SOVIETS WERE FORCED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THEY OWED THE CONFERENCE THEIR VIEWS REGARDING OBSERVATION OF AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS. END SUMMARY.
4. FRG AND SPANISH REPS ADDRESSED THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN THE OBSERVATION REGIME BY MAKING INVITATIONS MANDATORY, BY INVITING ALL PARTICIPATING STATES TO ALL NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES AND BY PROVIDING FOR MORE CONCRETE AND STANDARDIZED CONDITIONS. THE POLISH REP ARGUED THT THE EAST HAD PROPOSED NOTIFICATION OF AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS AS WELL AS GROUND FORCE MANEUVERS AND UNTIL THAT QUESTION WAS RESOLVED, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO WORK OUT ISSUES OF OBSERVATION. REFLECTING AN INHERENT AMBIGUITY OR DILEMMA IN THE EASTERN POSITION ON OBSERVATION, THE POLISH REP REITERATED THAT THE PURPOSE OF OBSERVATION WAS TO FORM A JUDGMENT AS TO THE NON-THREATENING NATURE OF AN ACTIVITY AND TO VERIFY THAT THE ACTIVITY WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NOTIFICATION -- BUT THEN POINTED OUT THAT OBSERVERS, AS NOTED IN THE RECENT EXPERIENCE IN OBSERVING THE SWEDISH EXERCISE VASTGRANS, HAD DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF TROOPS INVOLVED IN AN ACTIVITY AND IN DETERMINING THE TYPES OF MILITARY FORMATIONS AND UNITS INVOLVED. THE POLISH REP CONCLUDED THAT OBSERVATION COULD NOT PERFORM A VERIFICATION FUNCTION, AND ARGUED THAT THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS ITSELF WAS ONE WAY TO DEMONSTRATE THE PEACEFUL INTENT OF A STATE. HE SUGGESTED IT WOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF THE INVITING STATE TO CONVINCE OBSERVERS OF THE PEACEFUL INTENT OF THE ACTIVITY.
5. THE FRENCH REP BLUNTLY CRITICIZED THE POLISH REP FOR THE LATTER'S IMPLIED POSITION THAT SINCE THE WEST REFUSED TO PROPOSE THE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS, THE EAST WILL NOT DISCUSS OBSERVATION OF GROUND FORCE MANEUVERS. THE FRENCH REP CHALLENGED THE EAST TO PRESENT THEIR OWN VIEWS ON OBSERVATION. THE SWISS REP ASKED WHAT CRITERIA THE EAST PROPOSES THAT OBSERVERS USE IN MAKING A JUDGMENT AS TO THE NON-THREATENING NATURE OF AN ACTIVITY. HE SUGGESTED IT IS ONLY THROUGH THE PROVISION OF DETAILED INFORMATION IN THE NOTIFICATION THAT SUCH A JUDGMENT COULD BE MADE, THAT MERE PRESENCE IN THE FIELD IS NO SUBSTITUTE. THE AUSTRIAN REP AGREED WITH THE POLISH REP'S COMMENTS REGARDING THE DIFFICULTY OBSERVERS WOULD HAVE IN

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DETERMINING THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF FORCES INVOLVED IN AN ACTIVITY, AND ARGUED THAT THIS DEMONSTRATED THE NEED FOR STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS AND INFORMATION.

6. THE SOVIET REP ARGUED THAT THE ISSUE OF WHICH ACTIVITIES ARE TO BE NOTIFIED SHOULD BE RESOLVED BEFORE DECIDING SUCH QUESTIONS AS THE MANDATORY NATURE OF THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS. HE STATED THAT, FOR EXAMPLE, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS TO MOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES AS DEFINED IN SC.1. "THIS WOULD BE A DIRECT THREAT TO THE SOVIET UNION. WE WILL NOT GIVE A PROMISSORY NOTE REGARDING THE MANDATORY INVITATION OF OBSERVERS UNTIL WE KNOW WHAT ACTIVITIES OBSERVERS WILL BE INVITED TO." IN RESPONSE TO VARIOUS COMMENTS FROM OTHERS, THE SOVIET REP ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HIS DELEGATION WAS BOUND TO PRESENT ITS VIEWS REGARDING THE OBSERVATION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES.  
END

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SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, MAY 23, 1985

1. CDE VI - 038

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. SUMMARY. A DANISH AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS PAPER, REVISED TO REFLECT THE MILITARY ADVISORS GROUP'S CONCERNS, WILL BE RETURNED TO COPENHAGEN FOR CONSIDERATION. THE FRG AND UK DIFFERED OVER THE TACTICAL QUESTION OF WHETHER TO TABLE THEIR OWN TWO PAPERS IMMEDIATELY OR WAIT A COUPLE OF WEEKS TO EVALUATE THEIR POSSIBLE EFFECT ON THREE OTHER PAPERS IN THE PIPELINE. THE CAUCUS AGREED TO A PROCEDURE ENCOURAGING THE DELEGATIONS TO PROCEED WITH TABLING THEIR PAPERS AS NATIONAL PRESENTATIONS AT ANY TIME FOLLOWING CAUCUS REVIEW. END SUMMARY.

4. DANISH AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS PAPER: THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DAY, MEVIK (NORWAY), ASKED THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY ADVISORS' GROUP, NAMIESNIEWSKI (CANADA), TO REPORT ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE DANISH AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS PAPER. NAMIESNIEWSKI NOTED THAT THE DANISH PAPER COULD NOT BE SUBSTANTIVELY CLEARED ON THE BASIS OF CONFORMITY WITH SC.1/AMPLIFIED EVEN IN ITS AMENDED VERSION. THE PAPER, HE EXPLAINED, GOES BEYOND THE NATO PACKAGE WITH RESPECT TO NOTIFICATIONS OF AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES. THE MILITARY ADVISORS' GROUP RECOMMENDED A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO THE DANES, USING FICTITIOUS DATA FOR U.S., UK, AND EASTERN AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISES TO ILLUSTRATE HOW NOTIFICATIONS OF AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS WOULD WORK IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED. MELLBIN (DENMARK) RETORTED THAT HE FAILED TO UNDERSTAND IN WHAT WAYS HIS DELEGATION'S PAPER WENT BEYOND THE NATO PACKAGE, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE AMENDMENTS THAT HAD BEEN SUGGESTED EARLIER WERE INCORPORATED, ACCORDING TO MELLBIN'S RECKONING. HE REPORTED THAT THE PAPER WOULD BE RETURNED TO COPENHAGEN IN REVISED FORM TO REFLECT THE MILREPS' RECOMMENDATIONS AS WELL AS THE NEW PROPOSED APPROACH. MELLBIN CONTENDED THAT THE ORIGINAL PAPER ATTEMPTED TO DEVELOP A CLEAR AND EFFECTIVE DEFINITION OF AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS AND TO DESCRIBE EXACTLY HOW NOTIFICATIONS AND OBSERVATIONS OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS WOULD BE HANDLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF MEASURES 3 AND 4. HE PROMISED TO REPORT COPENHAGEN'S REACTIONS TO THE CAUCUS. BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) SUMMARIZED THREE KEY PROBLEMS WITH THE PAPER. FIRST, THE HEAVY EMPHASIS ON ONE SMALL SECTION OF NOTIFICATIONS MADE IT INAPPROPRIATE TO SERVE AS AN ILLUSTRATIVE NATO PAPER. SECOND, THE PAPER OPENS THE WAY FOR THE EAST TO ASK AWKWARD QUESTIONS, ESPECIALLY ON TRANSFERS. THIRD, THE MILREPS' CONCERN THAT THE PAPER GOES BEYOND THE NATO PACKAGE. BUWALDA EMPHASIZED THAT HE WOULD NOT CONSIDER STOPPING THE DANES FROM MAKING A NATIONAL INTERVENTION AND CIRCULATING COPIES. HE CONCLUDED THAT HE OPPOSED GIVING

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THE PAPER ANY OTHER STATUS AS A FORMAL CAUCUS DOCUMENT.

5. CAUCUS PAPERS -- ACT II: CITRON (FRG) REPORTED THAT HE INTENDED TO CIRCULATE IN WORKING GROUP A ON CONSTRAINTS, THURSDAY, MAY 30, THE FRG PAPER WHICH SHOWS HOW MEASURE 2 (FORECASTS) WOULD WORK FOR THE SECOND QUARTER OF 1985. HE NOTED THAT IF BONN PROVIDES THE EXERCISE CALENDAR FOR 1984, IT WOULD ALSO BE INCLUDED. CITRON ARGUED THAT THE PAPER WOULD COUNTER THE PERCEPTION OF APPARENT DETAIL IN THE THREE EASTERN PAPERS. EDES (UK) STATED THAT THE UK PAPER ON MEASURE 3 (NOTIFICATION) WAS ALSO READY FOR TABLING. HOWEVER, HE NOTED THAT PREPARING THE ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS DEMONSTRATED THAT FUTURE PROBLEMS MAY NEED TO BE SOLVED BY USING EXAMPLES TO SHOW HOW THE NATO PACKAGE WORKS. EDES RAISED THE QUESTION WHETHER THE CAUCUS IS CREATING PROBLEMS FOR FUTURE ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS BY MOVING AHEAD QUICKLY WITH THE FRG AND UK PAPERS. HE SUGGESTED WAITING A WEEK OR TWO TO STAND BACK AND EVALUATE BOTH TACTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE RAMIFICATIONS. CITRON OPPOSED THAT IDEA; THE FRG AND UK PAPERS, HE ARGUED, WOULD BE LOW-KEY NATIONAL STATEMENTS THAT HELP DETAIL HOW THE NATO PACKAGE WOULD WORK. CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL) EXPRESSED SYMPATHY FOR BOTH POSITIONS, BUT PREFERRED TO WAIT ON TACTICAL GROUNDS TO BE SURE THAT THE TWO PAPERS WOULD NOT PREJUDICE THOSE IN THE PIPELINE. AMBASSADOR GOODBY STATED THAT THE DECISION TO TABLE WAS UP TO THE COUNTRY THAT PREPARED THE WORKING PAPER. ALTHOUGH HE SAW NO URGENCY TO TABLE THE PAPERS IMMEDIATELY, GOODBY STATED THAT HE COULD ACCEPT THE FRG DECISION TO USE THEIR PAPER AS A NATIONAL PRESENTATION AND RECOMMENDED THAT ALL SUCH PAPERS BE INTRODUCED THAT WAY. BUWALDA AND GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) SUPPORTED GOODBY'S VIEW. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DAY, MEVIK (NORWAY), REPORTED THAT FIVE OF THE SIX PLANNED PAPERS: MEASURE 1 (BRITISH PAPER UNDERWAY), MEASURE 2 (FRG), MEASURE 3 (UK), MEASURE 4 (FRENCH PAPER UNDERWAY), AND MEASURE 5 (CANADIAN PAPER UNDERWAY). MEVIK NOTED THAT THE CONSENSUS WAS TO ALLOW EACH DELEGATION TO TABLE ITS OWN PAPER AS A NATIONAL PRESENTATION, AT A TIME OF ITS CHOOSING, FOLLOWING CAUCUS REVIEW.

6. CONTACTS: AMBASSADOR GOODBY BRIEFLY DESCRIBED HIS LUNCHEON CONVERSATION OF MAY 23 WITH GRINEVSKY. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR SAID IN SHORT THAT HIS HANDS WERE TIED ON CSBM'S UNTIL NATO TALKED ABOUT NUF. CITRON (FRG) DISCUSSED HIS LUNCH WITH GDR AMBASSADOR BUHRING, WHO SUGGESTED THAT THE WEST VIEW THE THREE EASTERN NOTIFICATION PAPERS AS A REAL GESTURE TOWARD SC.1. CITRON REPLIED, AS HE HAD TO GRINEVSKY EARLIER IN

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THE ROUND, THAT THE EAST'S LATEST DOCUMENTS WENT BEYOND THE MADRID MANDATE AND WOULD, THEREFORE, GENERATE A VERY NEGATIVE REACTION IN WESTERN CAPITALS. CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL) BROUGHT UP A CONVERSATION HE HAD WITH SWISS AMBASSADOR RITTER WHO REPORTED THAT A TENSE RELATIONSHIP HAS DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE SWISS AND THE SWEDES AS WELL AS AMONG THE NNA GENERALLY. RITTER SAID HE DID NOT EXPECT WORK IN THE FIVE NNA GROUPS TO BE COMPLETED THIS SESSION. RITTER ALSO TOLD CUTILEIRO THAT THE SWEDES WERE HOLDING UP THE NNA NOTIFICATION PAPER TO GET SWISS CONCESSIONS ON CONSTRAINTS. MEVIK (NORWAY) REPORTED THAT THE NNA PLAN TO HOLD A SPECIAL MEETING IN STOCKHOLM THE FIRST WEEK OF JUNE WHICH WOULD INCLUDE LEGAL EXPERTS FOR A NUF DRAFTING EXERCISE.

7. MEETINGS: THE MILITARY ADVISORS' GROUP WILL HOLD A JOINT MEETING WITH DEPUTIES TO CONDUCT A FULL "RUMP SQUEEZING OF THE PACKAGE" EXERCISE ON ANOMALIES IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED.

8. THE NEXT CAUCUS MEETING WILL BE TUESDAY, MAY 28.  
END

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SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH GRINEVSKY - MAY 23, 1985

1. CDE VI-041. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AT HIS INVITATION I LUNCHEDED WITH GRINEVSKY ON THURSDAY, MAY 24. THIS WAS OUR FIRST SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF THE SIXTH SESSION OF THE CDE. HE BEGAN THE CONVERSATION BY NOTING THAT VARIOUS DELEGATIONS WERE SAYING THAT THE TIMING WOULD NOT BE RIGHT FOR BEGINNING DRAFTING UNTIL THE FALL. HE ASKED FOR MY VIEWS. I REPLIED THAT I DID NOT LOOK AT IT AS A MATTER OF THE CALENDAR. THE CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY MOVING ON TO DRAFTING DID NOT NOW EXIST. THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE MORE AGREEMENT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF WHAT THE CONFERENCE WOULD BE DRAFTING BEFORE DRAFTING WOULD BE JUSTIFIED. UNTIL THE SUBSTANCE BEGAN TO FALL INTO PLACE I SAW NO REASON TO CONSIDER MOVING INTO A DRAFTING PHASE.
3. GRINEVSKY ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS A CONNECTION WITH GENEVA IN MY MIND. I SAID THAT THERE WAS A SUBSTANTIVE LINKAGE IN THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO MAKE A CONVENTIONAL WAR LESS LIKELY BY REDUCING THE POSSIBILITY OF MISCALCULATION OR SURPRISE ATTACK; THIS WOULD COMPLEMENT EFFORTS IN GENEVA TO REDUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. OTHERWISE, I THOUGHT THAT EACH NEGOTIATION WOULD PROCEED ACCORDING TO ITS OWN INTERNAL LOGIC.
4. I ASKED HIM WHAT MOSCOW'S ATTITUDE WAS TOWARDS THE PROPOSALS PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD MADE IN HIS STRASBOURG SPEECH. GRINEVSKY THOUGHT IT WOULD TAKE MOSCOW A LITTLE TIME TO THINK IT THROUGH AND WE SHOULDN'T THINK WE HAVE HEARD THE LAST WORD.
5. GRINEVSKY THEN DEVOTED CONSIDERABLE EFFORT TO SUGGESTING THAT WE DISCUSS NON-USE OF FORCE ON A NON-COMMITTAL BASIS. HE SAID THAT MOSCOW WAS VERY SKEPTICAL OF THE INTENTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD OF ARMS CONTROL, THAT WE WERE "NOT SERIOUS" IN ANY OF THE TALKS. HE SAID HE PERSONALLY BELIEVED, HOWEVER, THAT CDE HAD A BETTER CHANCE OF REACHING AN AGREEMENT THAN DID THE OTHER NEGOTIATIONS. NON-USE OF FORCE, HE SAID, WAS SEEN IN MOSCOW AS A SYMBOLIC GESTURE WHICH WOULD HELP TO DEFINE AND SET A STANDARD FOR U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS IN THE FUTURE. BUT IF ALL WASHINGTON WAS PREPARED TO DO WAS TO REPEAT THE WORDS OF THE U.N. CHARTER, THE U.S. SHOULDN'T BOTHER. I SAID THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE ITSELF COULD NOT BE CHANGED, NOR WOULD IT BE DESIRABLE TO APPLY NON-USE OF FORCE TO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS AS THE SOVIET PROPOSALS ATTEMPTED TO DO. I SAID, HOWEVER, THAT I COULD VISUALIZE NON-USE OF FORCE AND PERHAPS OTHER THINGS FITTING INTO ONE PART OF A DOCUMENT WHICH WOULD HAVE AS ITS OPERATIVE ELEMENTS A SERIES OF AGREEMENTS ON CONCRETE CBMS. AFTER MUCH TIME SPENT ON THIS SUBJECT I TOLD GRINEVSKY THAT HIS TIME WAS UP AND NOW WE SHOULD DISCUSS CONCRETE CBMS.

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6. TO BEGIN WITH, I ASKED HIM TO COMMENT ON THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT. HE SAID THAT IT WAS TOO BURDENSOME TO ANNOUNCE EVERY TIME A DIVISION WENT OUT OF ITS BARRACKS FOR WHATEVER REASON AND THAT NOTIFICATION AT THIS LEVEL OF DETAIL HAD NO RELEVANCE TO THE PROBLEMS WITH WHICH THE CONFERENCE WAS DEALING. IF TROOPS WERE OUT OF THEIR BARRACKS TO TAKE PART IN A MANEUVER OR MILITARY MOVEMENT, THAT WAS ONE THING, BUT TO ANNOUNCE EVERY TIME THEY WENT OUT FOR ANY PURPOSE AT ALL WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL.

7. I ASKED HIM WHY HE HADN'T SAID MORE ABOUT THE SOVIET POSITION ON OBSERVERS SINCE I WAS NOT AWARE OF MAJOR DIFFERENCES AT THIS POINT, AND IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO UNDERSTAND HOW THE SOVIETS SAW THE OBSERVATION REGIME BEING EXERCISED. I ASKED IF HE ACCEPTED THAT OBSERVERS WOULD BE MANDATORY FOR EACH NOTIFIED ACTIVITY. HE SAID THAT WAS POSSIBLE BUT HE COULDN'T AT THIS MOMENT GIVE SUCH AN UNQUALIFIED REPLY.

8. I THEN ASKED HIM TO COMMENT ON THE STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATIONS. HE REPLIED THAT THE SIZE OF DIVISIONS WERE SO DIFFERENT THAT IT WOULD NOT BE EQUITABLE FOR THE SOVIETS TO ANNOUNCE THEIR DIVISIONS ON THE SAME BASIS AS THE U.S.

9. GRINEVSKY BROKE OFF THIS LINE OF DISCUSSION AT THIS POINT BY SAYING THAT UNTIL THE U.S. REVEALED MORE ABOUT ITS POSITION ON NON-USE OF FORCE, HIS HANDS WERE TIED. HE WOULD BE ABSOLUTELY UNABLE TO BE MORE SPECIFIC ABOUT HIS POSITIONS. WHEN I SAID THAT IF THAT WAS THE CASE THERE WOULD BE VERY LITTLE FOR US TO TALK ABOUT, HE SUGGESTED THAT I SHOULDN'T DRAW THAT CONCLUSION. HE REFERRED, IN THAT CONNECTION, TO A LUNCHEON WHICH HAS BEEN ARRANGED FOR MAY 30 BETWEEN THE U.S. DEPUTY AND JCS REP WITH THEIR SOVIET COUNTERPARTS.

10. I ASKED HIM WHETHER HE WOULD TABLE ADDITIONAL PAPERS DURING THIS SESSION. HE NEVER ANSWERED BUT ASKED RHETORICALLY HOW I WOULD LIKE TO SEE PAPERS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES, ETC. THE PAPERS HE HAD ALREADY TABLED, HE SAID, WERE RESPONSIVE TO THE WESTERN INTEREST IN TALKING ABOUT NOTIFICATION.

11. COMMENT: GRINEVSKY SEEMED RECONCILED TO A SLOWER PACE THAN HE HAD ADVOCATED DURING THE LAST SESSION. HE SAID NOTHING ABOUT FORMING DRAFTING GROUPS, FOR EXAMPLE, AND NEVER VOICED ANY IMPATIENCE WITH THE PROCEEDINGS. HE STRESSED QUITE FIRMLY THE LINKAGE HE IS TRYING TO ESTABLISH BETWEEN NUF AND CBM AND GAVE LITTLE SIGN OF BEING READY FOR A SUBSTANTIVE DIALOGUE ON CBM ISSUES.  
END

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SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY, MAY 24, 1985

REF: A. STOCKHOLM 8332 B. STOCKHOLM 3831

1. CDE VI - 040.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE MAY 24 CDE PLENARY WAS CAPPED BY U.S.-USSR EXCHANGE ON MURDER OF MAJOR NICHOLSON IN GDR. FRG ADDRESSED PERCEIVED CONVERGENCE ON CDE PROPOSALS. FRANCE SUGGESTED MOVING INTO PARALLEL "INFORMAL" WORKING GROUPS AND ESTABLISHING A SUMMER CUT-OFF DATE. BULGARIA DEFENDED WARSAW PACT POSITIONS. U.S. AMBASSADOR GOODBY DELIVERED AN INTERVENTION CALLING FOR MORE ATTENTION TO THE SPECIFICS OF CSBMS TO DETERMINE WHETHER COMMON GROUND IN FACT DOES EXIST. END SUMMARY.
4. AMBASSADOR CITRON OF THE FRG ALLUDED TO THE RECENT NNA FONMIN CONFERENCE AND THE ROMANIAN AIDE-MEMOIRE AS EFFORTS TO INTENSIFY THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE AND FIND AREAS OF CONVERGENCE, NOTING THAT A "FURTHER RAPPROCHEMENT ON ISSUES IS BEGINNING TO TAKE PLACE." HE PLEDGED HIS DELEGATION'S COOPERATION IN SUCH EFFORTS. HE MENTIONED, IN PARTICULAR, NOTIFICATION, THRESHOLDS, AND FUTURE MODALITIES FOR OBSERVERS, AND STRESSED THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF ALL THE MEASURES AS OPPOSED TO "BLIND CONFIDENCE".
5. FRENCH AMBASSADOR GASCHINARD CALLED FOR CONCLUSION OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE BY THE SUMMER OF 1986 AND SUGGESTED THAT INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS BE ESTABLISHED PARALLEL TO THE EXISTING GROUPS IN ORDER TO INTENSIFY NEGOTIATIONS. (BEGIN COMMENT. THIS INTERVENTION WAS GIVEN WITH ONLY THE BRIEFEST ADVANCE NOTICE, AND WITHOUT CONSULTATION IN THE NATO CAUCUS. THE SUGGESTION ON INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS AND SUMMER CUT-OFF DATE IS CLEARLY AHEAD OF THE U.S. DELEGATION POSITION AND THAT OF MOST OF THE OTHER ALLIES. END COMMENT.) THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR MENTIONED SEVERAL TOPICS FOR "INFORMAL WORKING GROUP DISCUSSION", INCLUDED SEVERAL NATO CSBM MEASURES, AND CALLED UPON THE EASTERN DELEGATIONS TO DISCUSS THEIR THREE RECENT WORKING PAPERS VIS-A-VIS THE MADRID MANDATE.
6. BULGARIAN AMBASSADOR TODOROV ARGUED AGAINST WESTERN CHARGES THAT THE PACT PROPOSALS ARE ABSTRACT AND PROPAGANDISTIC. HE THEN PROCEEDED TO CHARGE THE WEST WITH LACK OF POLITICAL WILL IN REJECTING NO FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NFU), AND MAINTAINED, THAT ROMB "IS BETTER THAN ANNUAL CALENDARS". THE BULGARIAN AMBASSADOR ALSO REITERATED HIS DELEGATION'S COMMITMENT TO VERIFICATION, BUT "NOT AS A PURPOSE IN ITSELF." (BEGIN COMMENT. TODOROV'S DELIVERY WAS RELATIVELY NON-POLEMICAL COMPARED WITH HIS DELEGATION'S PAST OFFERINGS. IN ADDITION, HIS PREFERENCE FOR FRENCH, AS OPPOSED TO HIS PREDECESSOR'S RUSSIAN, MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO A LESS HEAVY-HANDED STYLE. END COMMENT.)

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7. WITH A DETAILED STATEMENT (SEE REF B) WHICH NOTED THE CONTOURS OF AN AGREEMENT THAT ARE BECOMING VISIBLE AMBASSADOR GOODBY CALLED FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS OF CSBM "BUILDING BLOCKS" BEFORE ENTERING INTO INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS. HE CALLED ATTENTION TO THE WEAKNESS OF THE RECENTLY-SUBMITTED WARSAW PACT PAPERS ON NOTIFICATION, AND REMINDED THE ASSEMBLY OF THE INSUFFICIENT TIME THAT HAS BEEN DEVOTED TO IMPROVING EXISTING HELSINKI CBMS. AMBASSADOR GOODBY ALSO COMMENTED ON THE DIFFICULTY OF DEVISING CONSTRAINT MEASURES THAT DEAL SUCCESSFULLY WITH THE REALITIES OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SITUATION BUT HE EXPRESSED THE U.S. DELEGATION'S WILLINGNESS TO STUDY PROPOSALS CONFORMING TO THE MANDATE. IN ADDITION, THE U.S. AMBASSADOR REFERRED TO THE OTTAWA MEETING AND REAFFIRMED THE INTERRELATIONSHIP THAT EXISTS AMONG ALL THE PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT.
8. SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE YEROFEEV THEN CASTIGATED THE ALLEGED AMERICAN BUILD-UP OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, RECENT ADMINISTRATION DECISIONS, CONGRESSIONAL FUNDING, ETC. ACCORDING TO YEROFEEV, THE U.S. HAS A FIVE-YEAR PLAN TO PRODUCE HUGE STOCKPILES OF CW AND IS THEREFORE BLOCKING CW AGREEMENTS AT THE GENEVA TALKS AND STOCKHOLM CDE. HE CLAIMED THAT THE CDE WAS BEGINNING TO RESEMBLE A SCIENTIFIC SEMINAR AND CLAIMED IT WAS "TIME TO GET DOWN TO BUSINESS". (BEGIN COMMENT: THE U.S. RESPONDED IN DETAIL TO THESE CHARGES IN THE MAY 28 SESSION OF WORKING GROUP A. END COMMENT)
9. AS THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE WAS DELIVERING HIS TIRADE ON THE ALLEGED BARBARIC U.S. POLICIES ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, WASHINGTON INSTRUCTIONS ON THE U.S. STATEMENT ON THE MURDER OF MAJOR NICHOLSON ARRIVED AT THE PLENARY HALL. AMBASSADOR GOODBY EMPLOYED THE RIGHT OF REPLY TO DELIVER A STRONG STATEMENT ON THE KILLING, NOTING THE LOW REGARD THAT THE SOVIETS ATTACH TO HUMAN LIFE. HE SAID THAT SOVIET FAILURE TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS MATTER HINDERED CREATION OF CONFIDENCE IN EUROPE AND EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF STOCKHOLM IN PREVENTING SUCH FUTURE INCIDENTS (TEXT REF A).
10. FOLLOWING AMBASSADOR GOODBY'S RIGHT OF REPLY ON THE SUBJECT OF THE NICHOLSON KILLING, SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY CALLED THE REMARKS A "STRANGE" REPLY TO THE CW INTERVENTION. HE CLAIMED THAT THE ISSUE WAS A BI-LATERAL ONE, UNRELATED TO STOCKHOLM, AND REPEATED THE SOVIET LINE THAT " THE TRAGIC RESULT IS A CAUSE FOR REGRET", BUT THAT THE U.S. BEARS FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INCIDENT.
- END

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SUBJECT: US PLENARY STATEMENT, MAY 24

1. CDE VI -033

2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR GOODBY IN THE CDE PLENARY TODAY, MAY 24.

4. BEGIN TEXT: MR. CHAIRMAN, ON THE EVE OF THE CURRENT SESSION, PRESIDENT REAGAN EXPRESSED HIS BELIEF THAT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IS "IN A UNIQUE POSITION TO PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN IMPROVING EAST-WEST RELATIONS" AND THAT IT HAS "AN OPPORTUNITY TO WORK IN PRACTICAL WAYS TO REDUCE TENSION IN EUROPE." THIS CONFERENCE HAS A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO DEEPEN AND TO BROADEN COOPERATION AMONG THE THIRTY-FIVE PARTICIPATING STATES BY DEVELOPING FURTHER THE SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THE UNITED STATES JOINED WITH OTHERS IN SUBMITTING CONCRETE PROPOSALS IN THE BELIEF THAT THEY WOULD FOSTER ENHANCED COOPERATIVE EFFORTS IN THE MILITARY FIELD, WHICH WOULD RESULT IN STRENGTHENING THE FOUNDATIONS OF PEACEFUL COOPERATION AMONG ALL OUR NATIONS.

. THIS OBJECTIVE OF OUR WORK DESERVES FRESH EMPHASIS IN THESE DAYS AND AS WE BEGIN THIS NEW SESSION. SPEAKING LAST MARCH, THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF BULGARIA SAID THAT THIS CONFERENCE SHOULD "MAKE REAL STEPS ALONG THE LONG ROAD OF RECONSTRUCTING THE MILITARY-POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTICIPATING STATES FROM CONFRONTATION TO THE REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF MILITARY CONFLICT." I THINK MANY OF US MIGHT SHARE THAT VISION. I THEREFORE WOULD LIKE TO TAKE A MOMENT TO SUM UP AMERICAN VIEWS OF THE ESSENTIAL PURPOSES OF THIS CONFERENCE, PUTTING INTO PERSPECTIVE SOME OF THE MORE DETAILED AND SPECIFIC POINTS WE WILL BE DISCUSSING THROUGHOUT THIS SESSION.

. NEARLY TEN YEARS AGO OUR NATIONS EMBARKED ON A PROGRAM OBLIGING EACH OF US TO ACT AS A MATTER OF COURSE IN A WAY WHICH WOULD SERVE TO EASE CAUSES OF TENSION AND REDUCE THE POSSIBILITIES OF POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS MISUNDERSTANDING OR MISCALCULATION. TODAY, WE COULD BE ABOUT TO EMBARK ON A MUCH MORE AMBITIOUS PROGRAM OF ACTIVE AND VERIFIABLE COOPERATION AIMED AT FURNISHING BETTER REASSURANCE ABOUT THE INTENT OF A SIGNIFICANT RANGE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THE PROPOSALS MANY OF US ARE NOW SUPPORTING WOULD BUILD OPERATIONAL BARRIERS AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE; THEY WOULD HAVE THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF REINFORCING THE OBLIGATION OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE BY REQUIRING OF PARTICIPATING STATES TANGIBLE PROOF THAT MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE ARE PEACEFUL IN INTENT AND ARE

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NON-THREATENING. BY PROVIDING MEANS TO ENSURE AGAINST THE ARBITRARY USE OF LETHAL FORCE -- ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF WHICH WE HAVE WITNESSED BUT RECENTLY -- THEY WOULD HELP TO PREVENT THE OCCURRENCE OF TERRIBLE AND TRAGIC EVENTS

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WHICH CAN RESULT FROM THE LACK OF CONTACT AND COMMUNICATION.

. OUR CONFERENCE HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH A SUPREMELY IMPORTANT BUT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TASK WHICH, AMONG EXISTING OR PREVIOUS SECURITY NEGOTIATIONS, IS NEARLY UNIQUE TO OUR CONFERENCE. WE SEEK TO PUT INTO PLACE PROCEDURES WHICH WILL ACT DIRECTLY TO ELIMINATE MANY OF THE CAUSES OF WAR. WHILE IN GENEVA WE SEEK TO REDUCE THE CAPABILITIES FOR WAR, HERE IN STOCKHOLM WE SHOULD SEEK TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR ANY WAR. THE COMMEMORATION OF THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR HAS REMINDED US, OFTEN IN ANGUISHING, PERSONAL WAYS, OF THE PHYSICAL AND SPIRITUAL DEVASTATION WHICH WAR, EVEN WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS, CAN BRING.

. FOR SOME TIME NOW, MR. CHAIRMAN, MANY OF US HAVE BEEN SAYING THAT THE OUTLINES OF A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT WHICH IN TIME MIGHT EMERGE FROM THIS CONFERENCE ARE BECOMING VISIBLE. SOME OF US HAVE EVEN BEEN ABLE TO SKETCH THE CONTOURS OF CONVERGING POSITIONS, THE LATEST EXAMPLE BEING THE STATEMENT OF THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE

OF ROMANIA ON MAY 14. NOT SURPRISINGLY, THE CONTOURS AT THIS TIME ARE NOT TOTALLY CONGRUENT. RATHER DIFFERENT EMPHASES HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS. BUT PRESENT AT THE HEART OF ALL OF THESE DESCRIPTIONS OF POTENTIAL COMMON GROUND HAS BEEN A GROUP OF MEASURES WHOSE ANTECEDENTS MAY BE FOUND IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND WHICH GUIDED THE LIMITED EFFORTS TOWARDS COOPERATION IN THE SECURITY FIELD IN WHICH ALL OF US ARE NOW ENGAGED AND WHICH WE SEEK TO IMPROVE. IN PARTICULAR, THESE MEASURES INCLUDE INFORMATION-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS OF VARIOUS TYPES, NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION ARRANGEMENTS, AND VERIFICATION PROCEDURES. SOME DELEGATIONS HAVE URGED THAT SUCH CONCRETE MEASURES AS THESE SHOULD BE LINKED TO A RE-STATEMENT OF THAT BASIC PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WHICH REQUIRES ALL STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE. AND SEVERAL

DELEGATIONS HAVE URGED THAT THE AGREEMENT TO BE NEGOTIATED HERE INCLUDE A CATEGORY OF MEASURES WHICH WOULD PLACE LIMITS OF VARIOUS TYPES ON CERTAIN KINDS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS.

. I WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT TODAY ON SOME OF THESE IDEAS SO THAT MY DELEGATION'S POSITION WILL BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD, BUT FIRST ALLOW ME TO SET FORTH WHAT MY DELEGATION'S GENERAL APPROACH TO THIS SESSION WILL BE. IN OUR OPINION, IT IS NOW CLEAR ENOUGH WHICH PROPOSALS ENJOY SOME SIGNIFICANT DEGREE OF SUPPORT AND ARE COMPATIBLE WITH THE MANDATE GIVEN TO THIS CONFERENCE AT MADRID. YET IT IS FAR FROM CLEAR THAT THERE IS ENOUGH SIMILARITY OF VIEWS ON THE DETAILS OF THESE PROPOSALS.

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THIS BEING THE CASE, I SEE NO "ROYAL ROAD" TO AGREEMENT, NO POSSIBILITY THAT AGREEMENTS IN PRINCIPLE WOULD ENHANCE THE PROSPECTS FOR RAPIDLY RESOLVING OUR DIFFERENCES OF DETAIL. THE SOLUTION TO OUR NEGOTIATING PROBLEM, IT SEEMS TO ME, IS TO WORK ON THE BASIC BUILDING BLOCKS OF THE MATERIAL WE HAVE BEFORE US. WE NEED TO EXAMINE ANALYTICALLY THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF A NOTIFICATION REGIME, FOR EXAMPLE, IN ORDER TO IDENTIFY ELEMENTS WE CAN ALL AGREE UPON WHICH WE COULD THEN DEVELOP INTO AN ACCEPTABLE NOTIFICATION PROCEDURE.

. THIS IS WHY, IN MY REMARKS ON MARCH 22 AND AGAIN LAST MONDAY, AND IN THE COMMENTS THAT MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION ARE MAKING IN THE MEETINGS OF THE TWO WORKING GROUPS, THERE IS AN EMPHASIS ON EXAMINING THE COMPONENT PARTS OF THE AGREEMENT WE ARE TRYING TO PUT TOGETHER. WE HAVE ENOUGH INFORMATION ABOUT HOW THE AGREEMENT, UNDER OPTIMAL CIRCUMSTANCES, MIGHT LOOK GROSSO MODO. WE LACK THE INFORMATION WHICH WOULD GIVE US THE ASSURANCE THAT THE MODEL WE ARE CONTEMPLATING IS, IN FACT, FEASIBLE. THIS IS THE GAP THAT WE IN THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION WILL BE SEEKING TO SEE FILLED DURING THIS SESSION.

. WITH THIS IN MIND, WE ARE CAREFULLY ANALYZING THREE WORKING DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY EASTERN DELEGATIONS THIS WEEK. SOME OF MY COMMENTS IN MY STATEMENT OF MAY 20 DEAL WITH MY DELEGATION'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS AIR AND NAVAL

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ACTIVITIES, AND I WILL NOT REPEAT THEM NOW. BUT I WOULD LIKE TO HEAR FROM THE SPONSORS WHETHER THE CONTENT OF THE NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITY WAS INTENDED BY THEM TO REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT STEP BEYOND THE CONTENT OF SIMILAR NOTIFICATIONS NOW BEING PROVIDED UNDER THE TERMS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. I NOTE ALSO THAT THE FINAL ACT'S DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED HAS ESSENTIALLY BEEN PERPETUATED IN THE NEW PROPOSAL AND THAT ONLY MODEST CHANGES WERE MADE IN THE TIME REQUIRED FOR ADVANCE NOTIFICATION. AS FOR THE THRESHOLD LEVEL FOR NOTIFICATION AS COMPARED WITH SIMILAR EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS, ANY REAL IMPROVEMENT IS DIFFICULT TO PERCEIVE. FINALLY, I HAD HOPED TO FIND THE ELUSIVE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS RELATED TO THESE PROPOSALS SINCE WE HAD REPEATEDLY HEARD THAT ADEQUATE VERIFICATION SHOULD BE PROVIDED, CORRESPONDING TO THE CONTENT OF THE MEASURES TABLED. AND WE HAVE HEARD THIS AGAIN TODAY BUT WE HAVE FAILED TO FIND ANY VERIFICATION THERE, JUST AS WE HAVE FAILED TO FIND ANY SPECIFIC PROPOSALS IN THE RELEVANT WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS. PERHAPS THE EASTERN SPONSORS WILL INFORM US OF THEIR THINKING IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

. MR. CHAIRMAN, WITH RESPECT TO THE NON-USE OR THREAT OF

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USE OF FORCE, MY DELEGATION IS ENCOURAGED BY THE FACT THAT NEARLY EVERY DELEGATION - AND PERHAPS EVEN ALL - CONSIDER THAT OUR TASK IS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THIS PRINCIPLE IN WAYS THAT WOULD HAVE A REAL AND LASTING IMPACT ON THE EVERYDAY WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE NOTED WITH INTEREST THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF AUSTRIA ON MAY 14, WHO STRESSED THAT THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE SHOULD BE A FUNCTION OF THE CONTENT OF THE CONCRETE MEASURES WE ARE NOW NEGOTIATING. IN THE SAME MEETING, THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF IRELAND POINTED OUT THAT THE QUESTION IS NOT WHETHER TO REINFORCE THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE, BUT HOW BEST TO DO SO.

. THE POSITION OF MY DELEGATION ON THIS QUESTION IS CLEAR. PRESIDENT REAGAN STATED IT BEFORE THE IRISH PARLIAMENT IN DUBLIN LAST YEAR AND BEFORE THE EUROPEAN

PARLIAMENT IN STRASBOURG THIS YEAR. HE MENTIONED IT AGAIN ON MAY 13, AND ON OTHER OCCASIONS WHEN HE HAS SPOKEN, AS HE OFTEN HAS, OF THE HIGH IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHES TO THIS CONFERENCE. MY DELEGATION HAS REPEATEDLY SUGGESTED THAT WE EXPLORE A COMBINATION OF THE "STATIC" PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE WITH "DYNAMIC" CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, OR -- AS OUR SOVIET COLLEAGUE PUT IT -- AN "ORGANIC FUSION." WE BELIEVE THIS APPROACH OFFERS AN OPPORTUNITY TO AGREE ON OBLIGATIONS WHICH WOULD PROVIDE TANGIBLE, VERIFIABLE PROOF OF A NATION'S PEACEFUL INTENTIONS AND, THUS, LEND SUBSTANCE TO A SUITABLE STATEMENT OF OUR INTENTIONS AND GOALS, INCLUDING THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OR THREAT OF USE OF FORCE. IN OTHER WORDS, WE DO NOT FAVOR THE MERE RE-AFFIRMATION OF AN EXISTING PRINCIPLE BUT RATHER THE REINFORCING OF THE PRINCIPLE THROUGH ADDITIONAL PRACTICAL OBLIGATIONS.

. MY DELEGATION'S VIEWS ON PROPOSALS REGARDING NON-USE OF FORCE ARE THAT THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE ITSELF SHOULD NOT DEPART FROM THE PRINCIPLE AS EXPRESSED BY THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT; IT SHOULD DEAL WITH THE THREAT AS WELL AS THE USE OF FORCE, AND IT SHOULD APPLY EQUALLY TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES IN THEIR MUTUAL, AS WELL AS IN THEIR THIRD-COUNTRY RELATIONS. TO SPELL OUT THE APPLICATION OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE TO SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD BE REDUNDANT IN TERMS OF EXISTING OBLIGATIONS AND WOULD IMPINGE ON MANY EXISTING AGREEMENTS WHICH RELATED TO SUCH SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES. THAT PORTION OF THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT TO BE AGREED HERE WHICH CONTAINED THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE COULD BE AN EFFECTIVE MEANS OF PLACING IN CONTEXT THE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT, CONCRETE MEASURES WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE THE OPERATIONAL

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CONTENT OF THE AGREEMENT.

. IN THE MARCH 22 PLENARY MEETING, I REFERRED TO AN IMBALANCE IN THE DISCUSSIONS OF THIS CONFERENCE WHICH NEEDS TO BE REDRESSED: THERE STILL HAS BEEN INSUFFICIENT DETAILED CONSIDERATION OF PROPOSALS DESIGNED TO IMPROVE SIGNIFICANTLY ON THE PROGRAM OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES ADOPTED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THIS IS THE INFORMATION GAP TO WHICH I REFERRED EARLIER AND THIS IS WHAT MY DELEGATION HOPES

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CAN BE DEALT WITH DURING THIS SESSION SO THAT THE CONFERENCE, IN THE WORDS OF PRESIDENT REAGAN "COULD MOVE INTO A MORE INTENSE NEGOTIATING PHASE."

. MR. CHAIRMAN, MY DELEGATION HAS STUDIED CAREFULLY A NUMBER OF POTENTIAL CONSTRAINT MEASURES, WHICH HAVE BEEN OFFERED OR DISCUSSED IN GENERAL TERMS. WE SUPPORT THE VIEW THAT THIS CONFERENCE SHOULD AIM TOWARD AN AGREEMENT WHICH IS MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT. UNFORTUNATELY, SO FAR WE HAVE FOUND THE VARIOUS CONSTRAINT PROPOSALS TO BE MUCH MORE COMPLEX AND MORE DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE THAN ANY OF THE RELATIVELY SIMPLE MEASURES CONTAINED IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED. THE DISTINGUISHED HEAD OF THE SWEDISH DELEGATION WAS QUITE RIGHT WHEN HE SAID THAT DEVISING AN EQUITABLE CONSTRAINT WILL BE "NO EASY TASK CONSIDERING THE DIFFERENCE IN TERRAIN, GEOGRAPHY, FORCE STRUCTURES AND OTHER REALITIES OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY EQUATION." STILL, MY DELEGATION WILL CONTINUE TO ASSESS CAREFULLY ALL SERIOUS PROPOSALS WHICH CONFORM TO OUR MANDATE.

. MR. CHAIRMAN, I NOTE IN CLOSING THAT THE HELSINKI PROCESS, TO WHICH THIS CONFERENCE BELONGS, IS COMMITTED TO ENCOURAGING COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC, CULTURAL, AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS AS WELL AS IN SECURITY MATTERS. IMPROVEMENT IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF ANY OF THE HELSINKI "BASKETS" CAN HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT IN OTHER AREAS AS WELL, WHICH IS WHY THE OTTAWA MEETING NOW PROCEEDING IS IMPORTANT TO THE WHOLE HELSINKI PROCESS. MY GOVERNMENT IS CLOSELY FOLLOWING THE EVENTS IN OTTAWA. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT -- EACH OF THE BASKETS -- IS NOT AN INVENTION OF THE AUTHORS OF THAT DOCUMENT -- THE 35 NATIONS REPRESENTED HERE -- BUT THE CODIFICATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL REALITY.

. MR. CHAIRMAN, AT OUR CONFERENCE, THE ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH GO WELL BEYOND THE LIMITED MEASURES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT WOULD GIVE A NEW IMPETUS TO THE PROCESS INITIATED BY THAT ACT ALMOST TEN YEARS AGO. SUCH MEASURES WOULD ALSO REPRESENT AN IMPORTANT COOPERATIVE EFFORT TO LESSEN COMMON RISKS AND REDUCE CONFRONTATION IN THE AREA OF MILITARY AFFAIRS. IF SUCCESSFUL, THE RESULTS OF THIS

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CONFERENCE COULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF IMPROVING THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AND ALL THE NATIONS REPRESENTED HERE. OUR CONFERENCE, MOREOVER, HAS THE POTENTIAL TO PROVIDE A FIRM FOUNDATION, NOT ONLY FOR FUTURE ARMS CONTROL AND SECURITY AGREEMENTS, BUT ALSO FOR OTHER AREAS OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS.

. IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE SUCCESS HERE, WE MUST AGREE ON TANGIBLE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH WILL MAKE THE EUROPEAN MILITARY SITUATION MORE OPEN, PREDICTABLE, AND STABLE, AND WHICH WILL REDUCE THE RISK OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION. BY ADDRESSING THE MOST LIKELY PROXIMATE CAUSES OF WAR -- MISUNDERSTANDING, MISCALCULATION OR ACCIDENT -- IN CONCERT, WE CAN BEGIN TO DEVELOP THE HABIT OF COOPERATION ACROSS THE BARRIERS THAT DIVIDE EUROPE AND, OVER TIME, REMOVE THE MORE PERSISTENT AND PERNICIOUS DANGERS OF CONFRONTATION INHERENT IN TODAY'S POLITICAL RELATIONS.

. MR. CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENT REAGAN IS PERSONALLY COMMITTED TO THE SUCCESS OF OUR ENDEAVORS. AS I HAVE NOTED, ON MAY 8 BEFORE THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN STRASBOURG, HE REITERATED HIS PLEDGE MADE LAST JUNE IN DUBLIN TO DISCUSS NON-USE OF FORCE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEGOTIATION OF CONCRETE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. HE ALSO CALLED FOR REDUCING TENSIONS IN THE WORLD THROUGH AGREEMENT ON A NUMBER OF MEASURES, SOME BILATERAL, BUT ALSO INCLUDING THE CONCRETE MEASURES PROPOSED IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED. THE AGREEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES WOULD LOWER THE RISK THAT A SMALL INCIDENT MIGHT LEAD TO IRREVERSIBLE TRAGEDIES THROUGH ERROR, ACCIDENT OR MISUNDERSTANDING.  
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SUBJECT: STATEMENT ON MAJOR NICHOLSON

1. CDE VI-033. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ON MAY 24, AMBASSADOR GOODBY IN A PLENARY MEETING OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT CONCERNING THE MURDER OF MAJOR NICHOLSON: BEGIN TEXT: "MR. CHAIRMAN, JUST AFTER OUR CONFERENCE RECESSED THIS PAST ROUND, WE HAD A TRAGIC EXAMPLE OF THE LACK OF CONFIDENCE AND OF THE NEED FOR GOOD FAITH IMPLEMENTATION OF PRACTICAL, CONCRETE MEASURES IF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE IS TO BE BUILT. THE MURDER OF MAJOR NICHOLSON BY A SOVIET GUARD IN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, AND THE FAILURE OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS MATTER, SERVED AS A TERRIBLE AND GRAPHIC REMINDER OF THE DIFFICULTY IN BUILDING A REGIME OF CONFIDENCE IN EUROPE. IT IS THE VIEW OF MY GOVERNMENT, AS STATED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN ON MAY 8 IN STRASBOURG, THAT THIS KILLING ILLUSTRATES THE OBSTACLES POSED BY OUR SO FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT CONCEPTS OF HUMANITY, OF HUMAN RIGHTS, AND OF THE VALUE OF A HUMAN LIFE, THAT IMPEDE OUR EFFORTS TO SUSTAIN A PRODUCTIVE DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THIS FATAL EVENT UNDERLINES THE IMPORTANCE OF WORK HERE AND OF THE NEED FOR

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 AGREED MULTILATERAL MEASURES DESIGNED TO BUILD CONFIDENCE AND ENHANCE SECURITY. THE NICHOLSON KILLING HELPS EXPLAIN WHY WE ARE SKEPTICAL OF PROMISES NOT TO USE FORCE WHICH ARE NOT BACKED UP BY CONCRETE MEASURES SUCH AS THOSE WE AND OTHERS HAVE PROPOSED AT THIS CONFERENCE. AS PRESIDENT REAGAN SAID ON MAY 8 IN STRASBOURG: IF WE ARE TO SUCCEED IN REDUCING EAST-WEST TENSIONS, WE MUST FIND MEANS TO INSURE AGAINST THE ARBITRARY USE OF LETHAL FORCE IN THE FUTURE." MAJOR NICHOLSON'S DEATH REMINDS US HOW MUCH NEEDS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED. END TEXT.

3. THE SOVIET CHIEF DELEGATE, AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY, EXERCISING RIGHT OF REPLY, STATED THAT INTRODUCTION OF THIS BILATERAL ISSUE IN THIS MULTILATERAL FORUM RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT U.S. INTENTIONS. THE INCIDENT, HE SAID, IS BEING CONSIDERED BY COMPETENT MILITARY AUTHORITIES. HE ALSO REPEATED THE VIEW OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT THAT THE INCIDENT WAS TRAGIC AND A MATTER OF REGRET. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INCIDENT RESTS COMPLETELY WITH THE UNITED STATES.

4. THE U.S. DELEGATION NOTES THAT THE ABOVE TEXT (PARA 2) WAS DICTATED TO US OVER THE TELEPHONE AND THAT AS OF DISPATCH OF THIS TELEGRAM WE HAVE STILL NOT RECEIVED THE AUTHORIZED TEXT IN WRITING. DURING AMBASSADOR GOODBY'S READING OF HIS PREPARED PLENARY STATEMENT, SENT SEPTTEL, WE RECEIVED A TELEPHONE MESSAGE FROM THE NSC STAFF TELLING US THAT A TELEGRAM CONTAINING THE TEXT HAD BEEN APPROVED FOR DISPATCH. IN VIEW OF NEED FOR TIMELY ADDRESSAL OF THIS ISSUE, AMBASSADOR GOODBY PROCEEDED

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IMMEDIATELY WITH DELIVERY OF THE TEXT.  
5. COMMENT: I BELIEVE THAT, IN ORDER TO REINFORCE MY STATEMENT, OTHER U.S. REPRESENTATIVES IN FORUMS WHICH INCLUDE SOVIET GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD ALSO SPEAK OUT ALONG SIMILAR LINES. I THEREFORE URGE THAT, AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY, AMBASSADORS SCHIFTER, KAMPELMAN, LOWITZ AND BLACKWILL ALSO USE THE PRECEDING TEXT, SUITABLY AMENDED TO SUIT THEIR PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES. UNLESS THIS IS DONE, IT WOULD DIMINISH THE IMPACT WE WANT IT TO HAVE. END COMMENT.  
END

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SUBJECT: CDE WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS, MAY 14-24  
 REF: STOCKHOLM 3316

1. CDE VI - 039
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT

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3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AS THE SIXTH SESSION OF THE STOCKHOLM CSBM'S SEANCE STARTED AMIDST THE SWEDISH SUMMER SUNSHINE, EAST AND WEST PLAYED AN ELABORATE GAME OF ALPHONSE AND GASTON. THE SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES FIRST PUT OUT THE WORD THAT THEY WERE ANTICIPATING A READOUT OF THE SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING. THEY THEN CLAIMED THEY AWAITED THE WESTERN RESPONSE TO THEIR THREE WORKING DOCUMENTS TABLED ON MAY 20. THE ALLIANCE, TOO, BIDED ITS TIME, FIRST WAITING FOR THE EXPECTED EASTERN WORKING DOCUMENTS AND THEN FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EASTERN CAMP ON CSBM'S, CONSTRAINTS, AND NUF. WHILE BOTH SIDES WAITED FOR THE OTHER TO BLINK, THE NNA -- THE INVETERATE BRIDGE-BUILDERS -- WAITED FOR THE EAST-WEST GAP ON SUBSTANCE TO NARROW. PUBLIC RETICENCE AT THE CONFERENCE DID NOT MEAN PRIVATE QUIESCENCE, HOWEVER. EAST, WEST, AND NNA ALL WORKED FEVERISHLY ON FURTHER WORKING DOCUMENTS TO PRESENT DURING THE REMAINDER OF THE ROUND. THE QUIET OPENING PHASE OF THE SESSION ENDED NOT WITH THE EXPECTED WHIMPER, BUT WITH A BANG, AS THE UNITED STATES SCORED THE SOVIET UNION ON THE MURDER OF MAJOR NICHOLSON, DRAWING A DEFENSIVE SOVIET RESPONSE. END SUMMARY.

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4. NATO: SPANISH PRIME MINISTER FELIPE GONZALEZ ADDRESSED THE CONFERENCE'S OPENING SESSION WITH AN APPEAL TO END THE ARMS RACE AND TO NEGOTIATE A CONCRETE AND TANGIBLE AGREEMENT BASED ON RECIPROCAL TRUST; IN OTHER WORDS, ALL MOTHERHOOD AND APPLE PAELLA. WHILE GONZALEZ, WHO WAS ONE OF THE PRIME MOVERS BEHIND THE CONSENSUS MANDATE ESTABLISHING THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, WAS GENERALLY SUPPORTIVE OF WESTERN POSITIONS, HIS EMPHASIS ON SPAIN'S OPEN POSITION ON NUF AND CONSTRAINTS MAY INDICATE TROUBLE FOR US DOWN THE LINE. (SEE PARA 6).

5. OTHER WESTERN DELEGATIONS WERE CONSPICUOUS BY THEIR SILENCE. EVERYONE, INCLUDING MANY OF OUR ALLIES, SEEMS TO BE PLAYING A WAITING GAME IN PUBLIC WHILE THE SOVIETS GET THEIR COLLECTIVE ACT TOGETHER. PUBLIC RETICENCE DOES NOT MEAN PRIVATE QUIESCENCE, HOWEVER. DURING THE FIRST NATO CAUCUS ON MAY 14, THE FRG AND THE UK DISTRIBUTED NATIONAL DISCUSSION PAPERS ON MEASURES 2 AND 3 TO BE USED IN THE WORKING GROUPS TO KEEP THE FOCUS OF THE CONFERENCE ON SC.1/AMPLIFIED. THE DANES CIRCULATED TWO PAPERS DEALING WITH AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES AND ON THE NEED TO ESTABLISH A SPECIAL REGIME WITH MORE VIGOROUS RULES FOR NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION. THE U.S., IN THE MEANTIME, HELD BACK A PAPER ON MEASURE 1 PENDING, FIRST, DISCUSSIONS WITH THE TURKS AND THEN INSTRUCTIONS FROM

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WASHINGTON. DECISIONS ON TABLING ALL OF THESE WORKING DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING A U.S. PAPER ON MEASURE 2, SHOULD BE MADE BY EARLY JUNE IF THEY ARE TO HAVE SOME EFFECT DURING THIS ROUND.

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6. CONSTRAINTS AND NUF: TROUBLE ON THE HORIZON. WHILE THE ALLIES TEMPORIZED ON HOW TO HANDLE OUR OWN MEASURES, THEY AGONIZED OVER HOW TO AVOID HANDLING OTHERS' PROPOSALS. SOME, IN FACT, OPENLY ADVOCATED DEVELOPING EARLY NATO POSITIONS ON CONSTRAINTS AND NUF. ON CONSTRAINTS, THE BRITISH, NORMALLY OUR MOST STALWART ALLIES IN THE CAUCUS, URGED PROMPT CONSIDERATION OF THEIR CONSTRAINTS PAPER FIRST DISCUSSED AT THE OSLO NATO MEETING, MAY 2-3 (REFTEL). THE ALLIANCE, THEY ARGUE, MUST HAVE A CONSTRAINTS MEASURE IN HAND WHEN AND IF THE NEED ARISES. IN ADDITION, THE DUTCH HAVE TOLD US THEY ARE CONSIDERING A VARIATION OF NATO CONSTRAINTS OPTION 3, WHICH THEY, TOO, WANT TO INTRODUCE INTO THE NATO MACHINERY. MOST OF OUR ALLIES NOW ARGUE THAT IF THE WEST REJECTS CONSTRAINTS OUT OF HAND, THE NNA WILL NOT HELP OUT WITH NATO'S MEASURES. THEY ALSO FEAR THAT THE SOVIETS, AS WELL AS THE NNA, SEEM DETERMINED TO PRODUCE NEW CONSTRAINTS PAPERS. IN THE CAUCUS, WE HAVE TRIED TO PUT A BRAKE ON THE APPARENT BUILDING MOMENTUM. THE ALLIANCE, WE CONTEND, IS STILL IN A GOOD POSITION AND DOES NOT FACE MOUNTING PRESSURE FROM THE NNA OR THE EAST -- BOTH OF WHICH HAVE YET TO GET THEIR CONSTRAINTS HOUSE IN ORDER. FURTHERMORE, AS THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE APPROACHES, IT MAY WELL BECOME CLEAR THAT IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO DEVELOP A MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT CONSTRAINT MEASURE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL. TIME, OR THE LACK OF IT, WILL THEN BE ON OUR SIDE.

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7. ON NUF, THE DANES AND THE FRG HAVE BEEN QUIETLY PUSHING FOR ALLIED CONSIDERATION OF DRAFTING AN ACCEPTABLE NUF PREAMBLE TO A CSBM'S AGREEMENT. WE HAVE SO FAR SUCCESSFULLY DISSUADED THEM FROM BEING LURED BY THE SOVIETS INTO UNEXPLORED NUF AVENUES IN WORKING GROUP A -- AT LEAST FOR THE MOMENT. OUR NAY-SAYING ON BOTH CONSTRAINTS AND NUF HAS LED TO A CERTAIN INCHOATE RESENTMENT TOWARD THE U.S. AS WE INTRODUCE WESTERN WORKING DOCUMENTS AND FOCUS ON SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION IN THE COMING WEEKS, WE HOPE TO RESTORE ALLIANCE HARMONY. WE HAVE ALSO SUGGESTED TO OUR ALLIES THAT THIS PRETERNATURAL ACTIVISM ON WHAT ARE, AFTER ALL, PERIPHERAL ISSUES FOR THE WEST COULD BETTER BE CHANNLED INTO DISCUSSION OF OUR OWN CSBM'S.

8. THE EAST: THE WARSAW PACT KEPT A CONSCIOUSLY AND MYSTERIOUSLY LOW PROFILE DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF THE CONFERENCE. THE SOVIETS PUT OUT THE WORD THAT THEY WOULD AWAIT A SIGNAL FROM THE SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING IN

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VIENNA BEFORE SPEAKING. WHILE THE MINISTERIAL SUMMIT CERTAINLY HAD SOME EFFECT ON SOVIET BEHAVIOR, IT ALONE DID NOT ACCOUNT FOR EASTERN ACTIVITIES -- OR LACK THEREOF -- DURING THE FIRST WEEK.

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9. THERE WAS, FOR EXAMPLE, AN ALMOST TOTAL LACK OF EASTERN PARTICIPATION IN INFORMAL BANTER AROUND THE CONFERENCE COFFEE BAR -- LONG CONSIDERED AN ACCEPTABLE "NEUTRAL" MEETING PLACE. WHILE ABSENCE DOES NOT NECESSARILY MAKE THE HEART GROW FONDER, IT CERTAINLY MAKES THE IMAGINATION RUN WILDER; EAST BLOC NO-SHOWS NATURALLY HAVE BEEN GRIST FOR THE ACTIVE CDE RUMOR MILL. THERE ARE AS MANY THEORIES FOR THIS AS THERE ARE NEW NATO CONSTRAINT MEASURES. ONE THEORY SUGGESTED THAT THE UNUSUALLY LARGE EASTERN TURNOVER -- FIVE NEW SOVIETS, TWO NEW BULGARIANS, TWO NEW CZECHS, TWO NEW POLES, ETC. -- HAD CAUSED THE EAST TO CIRCLE THE WAGONS WHILE THE NEW BOYS GOT ACQUAINTED WITH EACH OTHER. ANOTHER THEORY HAD IT THAT MOSCOW HAS ISSUED A "NO CONTACT" DIRECTIVE WHILE THE EAST FORMULATED ITS TACTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE APPROACH FOR THE SESSION. THIS THEORY IS CONSISTENT WITH THE SOVIETS' PENCHANT TO DEVELOP A "CORRIDOR LINE," ESPECIALLY BEFORE THEY INTRODUCE ANY OF THEIR PAPERS. (SEE PARA 11 ON NEW EASTERN WORKING DOCUMENTS.) SUCH A "NO CONTACT" UKASE MAY ALSO HAVE STEMMED FROM FEARS OF PREMATURE (AS OPPOSED TO PREMEDITATED) LEAKS IN EASTERN POSITIONS. A MORE INTRIGUING THEORY WAS THAT THE CHANGE HAS BEEN CAUSED BY SCANDALS WITHIN SEVERAL EASTERN DELEGATIONS. A CONFIRMED STORY HAS BEEN MAKING THE ROUNDS ABOUT A YOUNG SOVIET DELEGATE WHO BECAME INVOLVED IN BLACK MARKET ACTIVITIES AND ANOTHER ABOUT AN EAST EUROPEAN DELEGATE WITH A WELL DEVELOPED TASTE FOR THE PLEASURES OF WESTERN SOCIETY; NEITHER DELEGATE HAS BEEN SIGHTED THIS ROUND. WHATEVER THE REAL REASONS FOR THE WARSAW PACT BOYCOTT OF THE "COFFEE BAR," OR COMBINATION OF REASONS, EASTERN DELEGATES BEGAN TO REAPPEAR THE SECOND WEEK AS QUICKLY AND MYSTERIOUSLY AS THEY HAD DISAPPEARED DURING THE FIRST.

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10. THE EAST'S AGENT OF INFLUENCE? WHILE HIS EASTERN BRETHREN STUDIOUSLY AVOIDED WESTERN CONTACTS DURING THE FIRST WEEK, THE HUNGARIAN DEPUTY, ISTVAN KORMENDY, BLITHELY AND ACTIVELY MADE THE ROUNDS AMONG WESTERN AND NNA DELEGATES. KORMENDY IS THE VERY ESSENCE OF THE NEW BREED OF EAST EUROPEAN DIPLOMAT: WITTY, URBANE, AND SEEMINGLY INDEPENDENT. HE WILL HINT, WITH A WINK AND A NOD, THAT HE, OF COURSE, DOES NOT ASCRIBE TO THE PARTY LINE DICTATED BY MOSCOW. AND HE WILL ENCOURAGE HIS FREQUENT WESTERN CONTACTS TO THINK "EQUALLY INDEPENDENTLY." NO U.S. DELEGATION MEETING OR NATO CAUCUS IS COMPLETE WITHOUT A REPORT ON A SUGGESTION/IDEA/

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TRIAL BALLOON-FLOATED BY EVERYBODY'S FAVORITE COMMUNIST. KORMENDY'S AD LIB LINES ARE TOO WELL REHEARSED. WHAT IS INFORMATION AND WHAT IS DISINFORMATION IS, HOWEVER, DIFFICULT TO DECIPHER. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ARRIVAL OF FIVE NEW SOVIET DELEGATES, MOST OF WHOM SPEAK NO ENGLISH, THE UNOFFICIAL LINGUA FRANCA OF THE CONFERENCE, OR HAVE ANY CDE/CSCE EXPERIENCE, NATURALLY ENGENDERED CORRIDOR SPECULATION, MOST OF IT NEGATIVE I.E., WAS MOSCOW DOWNGRADING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CDE? AFTER WAITING A DECENT INTERVAL, IN ORDER TO LISTEN TO THE CONFERENCE SCUTTLEBUTT, KORMENDY PUT OUT THE WORD -- AS ALWAYS, IN SUCH A WAY THAT HIS MANY WESTERN AND NNA INTERLOCUTORS FELT THEY HAD BEEN AFFORDED A UNIQUE PEEK INSIDE EAST BLOC THINKING -- THAT THE PERSONNEL CHANGES IN THE SOVIET DELEGATION WERE, IN FACT, A SIGN THAT MOSCOW TOOK THE CONFERENCE MORE SERIOUSLY THESE MEN WERE, ACCORDING TO KORMENDY, PRAGMATIC TYPES (A LA ANDROPOV, GORBACHEV) YOU "COULD DO BUSINESS WITH." (THE DELEGATION WILL REPORT, OF COURSE, THE FIRST SIGHTING OF A HAROLD ROBBINS NOVEL OR A SCOTCH AND SODA IN THE HANDS OF OUR NEW SOVIET COMRADES.)

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11. EASTERN WORKING DOCUMENTS: AT THE MAY 20 WORKING GROUP AB MEETING, THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES TABLED THREE NEW WORKING DOCUMENTS RELATING TO NOTIFICATION OF GROUND, AIR, AND NAVAL MANEUVERS. THEY PROPOSED A 30-DAY ADVANCE NOTIFICATION FOR ALL THREE TYPES OF ACTIVITIES. THEY SET A NUMERICAL THRESHOLD OF 20,000 MEN FOR GROUND FORCE MANEUVERS; 30 COMBAT SHIPS AND 100 MILITARY PLANES FOR NAVAL ACTIVITIES; AND 200 MILITARY PLANES IN THE AIR SIMULTANEOUSLY FOR MAJOR AIR FORCE MANEUVERS. EASTERN DELEGATES CLAIM THAT THEY HAVE NOW MET THEIR HALF OF THE BARGAIN PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN IN DUBLIN, I.E., EASTERN NEGOTIATIONS OF CONCRETE CSBM'S IN EXCHANGE FOR WESTERN DISCUSSION OF NUF. WE BELIEVE, ON THE CONTRARY, THAT THESE PAPERS REPRESENT NO SIGNIFICANT ADVANCE OF HELSINKI NOTIFICATION MEASURES FOR LAND ACTIVITIES, AND RUN CONTRARY TO THE TERMS OF THE MANDATE ON NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. WHILE WE DEVELOP OUR SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSES TO THESE MEASURES, WE HAVE TAKEN THE FOLLOWING PUBLIC LINE: THE WEST WELCOMES GREATER PRECISION OF THE CSBM'S BEFORE US HOWEVER, THE EASTERN PAPERS CONTAIN VARIOUS OMISSIONS, ERRORS, AND INCONSISTENCIES AND DO NOT ADVANCE OUR WORK HERE. (COMPLETE ANALYSIS OF THE PAPERS FOLLOWS SEPTTEL.)

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12. THE NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED. THE NNA REMAIN INTERESTED SPECTATORS IN THIS EAST-WEST WAITING GAME. IN PUBLIC, THEY RITUALISTICALLY RECITE THE CSCE THEOLOGY OF THE NNA AS BRIDGE-BUILDERS; LN PRIVATE, THEY

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RIGOROUSLY REPEAT WELL DEFINED NATIONAL POSITIONS. THE YUGOSLAVS, AND TO A LESSER DEGREE THE SWEDES, APPEAR WEDDED TO A FINAL AGREEMENT WHICH INCLUDES CONSTRAINTS. AT THE OTHER END OF THE NNA SPECTRUM, THE SWISS INSIST THEY ARE PREPARED TO FALL ON THEIR SWORDS TO PRESERVE THE CSCE LINKAGE BETWEEN SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRESS AND TO ESCHEW A CONSTRAINTS MEASURE FOR ITS OWN SAKE. WHILE THE SWISS TALK A TOUGH GAME, WE DOUBT THAT THEY WILL HOLD UP ANY NNA CONSENSUS IF IT SHOULD DEVELOP IN STOCKHOLM. THEIR HARD LINE HAS BEEN UNDERMINED BY NATO CAUCUS LEAKS ON THE ALLIANCE'S "CONSIDERATION" OF THE BRITISH CONSTRAINT PROPOSAL. IN ANY CASE, THE NNA ASTUTELY SURMISE THAT THE GAP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST IS STILL TOO WIDE FOR EVEN THE MOST AMBITIOUS BRIDGE-BUILDER TO CLOSE AT THIS POINT. MEANWHILE, THE NNA DELIVERED SOME INTERESTING, AND LARGELY HELPFUL STATEMENTS, FROM THE WEST'S POINT OF VIEW. THE IRISH, IN EFFECT, ACCEPTED NATO'S OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT AND THE AUSTRIANS BOTH ACKNOWLEDGED THAT A NUF REAFFIRMATION WAS NECESSARILY A COMPONENT OF THE CONCRETE CSBM'S AGREED UPON IN STOCKHOLM AND CAME OUT SQUARELY IN FAVOR OF INFORMATION AND MEANS OF VERIFICATION THAT WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO ALL PARTICIPANTS, I.E., NTM'S ARE NOT ENOUGH.

13. FRIDAY'S FIREWORKS: THE FIRST TWO WEEKS OF THE CONFERENCE, THUS, HAVE DONE LITTLE TO JUSTIFY THE HOPES OF MANY -- AND FEARS OF SOME -- FOR RAPID MOVEMENT IN STOCKHOLM. FRIDAY'S PLENARY (MAY 24), HOWEVER, ADDED A LITTLE SPICE TO AN OTHERWISE DULL BROTH. THE U.S. DELEGATION HAD PLANNED TO USE THE OCCASION TO DELIVER OUR FIRST MAJOR POLICY STATEMENT THIS ROUND, WHICH WOULD HAVE INCLUDED A STRONG STATEMENT ABOUT SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN THE KILLING OF MAJOR NICHOLSON, LINKING THE TRAGEDY TO THE NECESSITY OF AGREEING ON VERIFIABLE CSBM'S IN STOCKHOLM, WHICH WOULD INHIBIT THE USE OF LETHAL FORCE, AS PRESIDENT REAGAN NOTED IN HIS MAY 8 STRASBOURG SPEECH. UNFORTUNATELY, WASHINGTON'S INSTRUCTIONS ON THE MATTER ARRIVED AFTER THE PLENARY HAD BEGUN AND WERE RELAYED BY A USDEL MEMBER DIRECTLY TO THE U.S. DELEGATION IN THE CONFERENCE HALL, LITERALLY IMMEDIATELY AS AMBASSADOR GOODBY WAS FINISHING HIS PREPARED REMARKS. (THE U.S. STATEMENT CONTRASTED THE SOVIET PIE-IN-THE-SKY DECLARATORY APPROACH WITH THE WEST'S APPROACH OF PRACTICAL STEPS WITH TANGIBLE RESULTS.) HOWEVER, JUST AS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DAY WAS ABOUT TO GAVEL THE MEETING TO A CLOSE, THE SOVIETS INADVERTENTLY, BUT IN THEIR OWN INIMITABLE STYLE, SAVED THE DAY. THE SOVIET DELEGATE, YEROFEEV (ONE OF THE NEW SOVIETS WE "CAN DO BUSINESS WITH") LAUNCHED INTO A VINTAGE ATTACK ON "BARBARIC" AMERICAN PLANS FOR CHEMICAL WARFARE IN EUROPE. (WE WILL ANSWER HIS ATTACK IN SOME DETAIL ON TUESDAY, MAY 28.)

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SUCH POLEMICS HAD BEEN ABSENT FROM THE CONFERENCE SINCE THE FALL ROUND. FOR US, ITS REINTRODUCTION COULD NOT HAVE COME AT A BETTER TIME, FOR IT ENABLED AMBASSADOR GOODBY TO REQUEST THE FLOOR FOR AN EMINENTLY JUSTIFIABLE RIGHT OF REPLY. USING YEROFEEV'S ACCUSATION OF U.S. "BARBARISM" ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS AS A TAKEOFF POINT, GOODBY CONDEMNED THE KILLING OF MAJOR NICHOLSON BY A SOVIET GUARD USING THE JUST-DELIVERED TALKING POINTS FROM WASHINGTON (SEPTEL). SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY, APPARENTLY TAKEN OFF GUARD, RETORTED THAT THE U.S. HAD INTRODUCED A PURELY BILATERAL QUESTION INTO THE CONFERENCE. THOUGH HE REPEATED THE STANDARD SOVIET LINE EXPRESSING REGRET FOR THE LOSS OF LIFE, HE PUT THE BLAME ON U.S. SHOULDERS.

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14. NOT SURPRISINGLY, THIS HEATED EXCHANGE CAUSED NO SMALL DEGREE OF DISCOMFORT AMONG SOME OF OUR MORE SQUEAMISH WESTERN COLLEAGUES. NEVERTHELESS, MANY DELEGATES GRUDGINGLY COMPLIMENTED US ON OUR HANDLING OF THIS CONTENTIOUS SUBJECT. WHILE THE REST OF THE CONFERENCE MAY SEE MORE METHOD IN AMERICAN "MADNESS" THAN WARRANTED, WE BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE MADE AN ESSENTIAL POINT: CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES MUST NOT MERELY BE AGREED UPON, THEY MUST BE IMPLEMENTED!  
END

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SUBJECT: WORKING GROUP A, TUESDAY, MAY 28, 1985  
 REF: STOCKHOLM 3933

1. CDE VI - 050
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT

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 3. SUMMARY. DRAWING ON UNCLASSIFIED DATA AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS, THE U.S. SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON U.S. AND SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS POLICIES FOLLOWING LAST FRIDAY'S (MAY 24) POLEMICAL STATEMENT BY SOVIET DELEGATE YEROFEYEV ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS WHICH ATTACKED THE RECENT SENATE ACTION ON BINARY WEAPONS AND IMPLIED U.S. INTENTIONS TO USE CW IN EUROPE (REFTEL). THE U.S.-SOVIET EXCHANGE ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, FOLLOWING THE PLENARY EXCHANGE ON THE MURDER OF MAJOR NICHOLSON, HAS CAUSED DISCOMFORT AMONG SOME DELEGATIONS AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE WHO ARE INCLINED TO AVOID THE PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF ANY STRONG DISAGREEMENTS. HOWEVER, AS THE DUST HAS BEGUN TO SETTLE, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS ARE RELUCTANT TO ENGAGE IN A PUBLIC SPITTING MATCH ON CW CHARGES. IN OTHER INTERVENTIONS, THE GDR AND THE FRG EXCHANGED QUESTIONS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS-FREE ZONES (NWFZ). POLAND AND HUNGARY DELIVERED LEGALISTIC STATEMENTS ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF). END SUMMARY.

4. DRAWING ON UNCLASSIFIED DATA AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS, THE U.S. (GUNDERSEN) SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON U.S. AND SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS POLICIES FOLLOWING LAST FRIDAY'S (MAY 24) POLEMICAL STATEMENT BY SOVIET DELEGATE YEROFEYEV ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS WHICH ATTACKED THE RECENT SENATE ACTION ON BINARY WEAPONS AND IMPLIED U.S. INTENTIONS TO USE CW IN EUROPE (REFTEL). GUNDERSEN STRESSED THAT THE MANDATED WORK OF THIS CONFERENCE WAS TO NEGOTIATE CONCRETE CSBM'S AND THAT THE SOVIET INTRODUCTION OF TENDENTIOUS CW STATEMENTS DID NOT FURTHER THIS TASK; HE, THEREFORE, PROPOSED THAT THE WORKING GROUP RETURN TO ITS APPOINTED TASK. IN ORDER TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT, HOWEVER, GUNDERSEN FIRST NOTED:

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 -- THE SOVIET UNION'S INTEREST IN DEVELOPING AND POSSESSING CAPABILITIES FOR CHEMICAL WARFARE SPANS SEVEN DECADES, FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ITS MILITARY CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE IN 1918 TO THE EXPANSION IN RECENT YEARS OF ITS SHIKHANY CHEMICAL WARFARE PROVING GROUND.

-- THE USSR MAINTAINS THE LARGEST CW STOCKPILES AND THE LARGEST CORPS OF CHEMICAL OFFICERS IN THE WORLD;

-- SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE HAS INTEGRATED THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS DOWN TO THE DIVISION LEVEL;

-- UNLIKE THE SOVIET UNION, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLICIZES ITS MILITARY PROGRAMS AND LEAVES NO DOUBT ABOUT THE OBJECTIVES AND EXTENT OF THESE PROGRAMS;

-- RECENT USE OF CW, INCLUDING TOXIN WEAPONS, IN AFGHANISTAN AND SOUTHEAST ASIA AND IN THE IRAN-IRAQ

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CONFLICT DEMONSTRATES THAT THE THREAT OF CHEMICAL WARFARE WILL PERSIST AS LONG AS THESE WEAPONS EXIST IN THE ARSENALS OF NATIONS. HENCE, FIRST PRIORITY OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IN THIS AREA IS THE GLOBAL AND VERIFIED ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILES AND MEANS OF PRODUCTION;

-- U.S. CW DETERRENCE POLICY IS TO MAINTAIN A LIMITED BUT EFFECTIVE CHEMICAL WEAPONS RETALIATORY CAPABILITY UNTIL A VERIFIABLE INTERNATIONAL CW BAN IS ACHIEVED;

-- SINCE 1969 THE U.S. HAS NOT MANUFACTURED ANY LETHAL OR INCAPACITATING CW. THIS U.S. RESTRAINT HAS NOT BEEN MATCHED BY THE USSR; DURING THIS SAME 16-YEAR PERIOD, THE SOVIET UNION HAS CONTINUED ITS PROGRAMS, STEADILY STRENGTHENING ITS WORLDWIDE MILITARY ADVANTAGE IN CW CAPABILITY.

-- THE U.S. CW MODERNIZATION EFFORT IS DESIGNED TO REPLACE OLD AND DETERIORATING CHEMICAL MUNITIONS WITH NEW STOCKS WHICH ARE DESIGNED FOR INCREASED SAFETY; AS NEW BINARY MUNITIONS ARE PRODUCED, OLDER STOCKS WILL BE DEMILITARIZED SO THERE WILL BE NO NET INCREASE IN THE SIZE OF THE EXISTING U.S. RETALIATORY CHEMICAL STOCKPILE;

-- SOVIET CW TRAINING AND STOCKPILES ALONE ARE NOT THE SOLE REASON FOR OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE CREDIBILITY OF THE U.S. DETERRENT; THE SOVIET UNION HAS SHOWN A PROPENSITY TO USE THESE WEAPONS BY ITS NONCOMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS.

5. AS EXPECTED, YEROFEYEV RESPONDED WITH A LONG, PARTIALLY PREPARED TEXT. HE JUSTIFIED HIS MAY 24 INTERVENTION IN THE PLENARY (REFTEL) BY SAYING THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD FELT COMPELLED TO TAKE THE FLOOR BECAUSE A CW CSBM WOULD BE "VERY SIGNIFICANT." NOTING THAT THE SENATE DECISION CAME AFTER "YEARS OF NON-DECISION," HE CALLED THE SENATE ALLOCATION OF FUNDS FOR BINARY WEAPONS A "SERIOUS SYMPTOM AND AN ACT WHICH GIVES THE GREEN LIGHT TO FURTHER CW ARMAMENT."

-- DELVING DEEP INTO THE PAST, HE ACCUSED THE U.S. OF HAVING DEVELOPED IN THE LATE 50'S-EARLY 60'S THE MOST EFFECTIVE POISONOUS AGENT (PHOSPHORIC ORGANIC SUBSTANCE), "ONE KILOGRAM OF WHICH COULD KILL FOUR MILLION PEOPLE." HE CALLED THIS DEVELOPMENT "BARBARIC" (A TERM HE HAD USED IN HIS MAY 24 PLENARY STATEMENT) BECAUSE IT WAS DIRECTED AT CIVILIAN POPULATIONS SINCE THE ARMED FORCES HAVE THE NECESSARY PROTECTION. THE SOVIET DELEGATE NOTED THAT 1.3 MILLION PEOPLE WERE INJURED AND 100,000 DIED DURING WWI FROM CHEMICAL WEAPONS; YEROFEYEV SAID THAT MODERN BINARY WEAPONS WERE MUCH MORE LETHAL THAN THOSE EARLY CW. CONSEQUENTLY, THE SOVIET UNION HAS DEMANDED A BAN ON THE PRODUCTION OF BINARY WEAPONS

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DURING THE PAST TWO UNGA MEETINGS: MOST RECENTLY, 152 NATIONS VOTED IN FAVOR OF THE SOVIET RESOLUTION WITH ONLY THE U.S. VOTING AGAINST IT.

-- CHARGING THAT THREE MILLION HAD SUFFERED FROM THE EFFECTS OF U.S. CW USE IN VIETNAM, YEROFEYEV CATEGORICALLY DENIED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS USED CW AND REFERRED TO THE UN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION STUDY WHICH HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO FIND CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF SOVIET USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

-- RETURNING THE FOCUS OF HIS COMMENTS TO EUROPE HE QUOTED WHAT HE CALLED "A HIGH LEVEL PENTAGON OFFICIAL" AS SAYING THAT "CW REEQUIPMENT IS DESIGNED TO HAVE THE POSSIBILITY OF CONDUCTING LARGE-SCALE CW (ATTACKS) IN EUROPE AGAINST THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES." HE REFERRED TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF BINARY CW IN EUROPE -- AND SAID THAT 10,000 TONS WERE BEING STOCKPILED IN ONE COUNTRY IN EUROPE -- AS EVIDENCE OF THE DANGEROUS SITUATION IN EUROPE. HE THEN GAVE AN EXHAUSTIVE HISTORY OF SOVIET EFFORTS TO SECURE A CW BAN, STARTING IN 1928 WHEN THE USSR ACCEDED TO THE 1925 GENEVA CONVENTION ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

6. GUNDERSEN DELIVERED A TERSE RIGHT OF REPLY, NOTING THAT MANY OF THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE'S ALLEGATIONS ARE SUBJECT TO DISPUTE, WHILE FOCUSING ON TWO MISLEADING STATEMENTS MADE BY YEROFEYEV: 1) WHEN REFERRING TO THE UN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION'S REPORT TO THE UN FIRST COMMITTEE ON SOVIET CW USE, THE SOVIET DELEGATE NEGLECTED TO NOTE THAT THE REASON THE INDEPENDENT UN COMMISSION HAD BEEN UNABLE TO COME TO ANY CONCLUSIONS WAS THAT IT HAD BEEN DENIED ACCESS TO AREAS WHERE THERE HAD BEEN REPORTS OF CW USE; AND 2) DURING A UN VOTE ON BINARY WEAPONS, 62 NATIONS ABSTAINED, AN UNHEARD OF NUMBER IN UN FIRST COMMITTEE VOTING, WHICH SHOWED A GENERAL RELUCTANCE TO TAKE SIDES ON THIS CONTENTIOUS ISSUE. MOREOVER, GUNDERSEN NOTED, VOTES ON TWO OTHER (FRENCH- AND AMERICAN-SPONSORED) RESOLUTIONS IN THE 39TH UNGA CALLING FOR CW STUDIES AND INVESTIGATIONS WERE PASSED BY VAST MAJORITIES, WHILE THE SOVIET UNION FOUND ITSELF A MEMBER OF A VERY SMALL MINORITY ON THESE VOTES. GUNDERSEN CONCLUDED BY INVITING HIS SOVIET COUNTERPART TO DISCUSS THE CURRENT SOVIET CW PROGRAM AS OPENLY AS HE HAD DISCUSSED THE U.S. PROGRAM.

7. KORMENDY (HUNGARY) ANSWERED AN AUSTRIAN QUESTION FROM THE PREVIOUS ROUND REGARDING THE EMPHASIS IN THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ON BASIC PROVISIONS OF A NUF TREATY (SC.6) ON "MILITARY FORCE". HE NOTED THAT THERE WAS NO INTENTION BY THE EAST TO DIMINISH OR LIMIT THE SCOPE OF THE GENERAL PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE CONTAINED IN THE UN CHARTER AND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THE REFERENCE IN SC.6'S TITLE TO MILITARY FORCES, ACCORDING TO

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KORMENDY, "RELATES TO THE SPECIFIC MANIFESTATIONS OF THE USE OF FORCE WHICH ARE PARTICULARLY RELEVANT IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CSCE STATES."

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8. KASPRZYK (POLAND) DISCUSSED NUF AND ITS PRACTICAL APPLICATION. NOTING THAT THE NUF PRINCIPLE CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 2/4 OF THE UN CHARTER, ALSO UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED, WAS FREQUENTLY VIOLATED IN PRACTICE, HE ARGUED THAT THE NUF TREATY PROPOSED IN SC.6 WOULD SATISFY THE NEED FOR THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE NUF PROHIBITION AND WOULD HELP HIGHLIGHT THE INHERENT OBLIGATION OF THE UN CHARTER PRINCIPLE. KASPRZYK INSISTED THAT THERE WAS NO CONTRADICTION BETWEEN SC.6 AND THE UN CHARTER, SINCE NOTHING FORBIDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUS COGENS AND ITS CODIFICATION.

9. GDR (GEORGI) ASKED NATO REPS TWO QUESTIONS: 1) WILL THE IDEA OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS-FREE CORRIDORS BE PART OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND, IF NOT, WHY WAS IT BEING REJECTED? AND 2) WHAT PROSPECTS DOES NATO ENVISAGE FOR THE WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL ON NWFZ IN THE TRANSITION TO THE SECOND STAGE? HE EXPRESSED HIS DELEGATION'S SUSPICIONS THAT NATO WAS TRYING TO LET NWFZ "FALL UNDER THE TABLE." URGING, INSTEAD, THAT THE CONFERENCE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THOSE STATES SEEKING TO ESTABLISH NWFZ'S IN EUROPE, HE SAID THAT THE GDR WAS WAITING FOR OTHER STATES TO ENABLE THE CONFERENCE TO DEVELOP COMMON GROUND ON THE USEFULNESS AND IMPLEMENTABILITY OF NWFZ'S.

10. THE FRG, RESPONDING TO THE GDR, RAISED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS LEFT UNANSWERED: 1) WHAT CONTRIBUTION WOULD THE CREATION OF NWFZ, WHICH WOULD ONLY GIVE THE ILLUSION OF SECURITY, MAKE TO PREVENTING CONFLICT? 2) HOW WOULD THE GDR PREVENT THE USE OF WEAPONS FROM BEYOND THE NWFZ OR THE RETURN OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO THE ZONE SECRETLY IN TIME OF CRISIS? 3) DOESN'T THE DANGER EXIST THAT A NUCLEAR-ARMED AGGRESSOR WOULD ATTACK A NWFZ BECAUSE IT WOULD HAVE NO FEAR OF RETALIATION? THE FRG THEN NOTED THE DIFFICULTY OF IMPLEMENTING NWFZ AND CALLED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE MEASURES (TO BE NEGOTIATED, PRESUMABLY, IN OTHER FORA), SUCH AS THE DESTRUCTION OF ALL INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

11. BEGIN COMMENT. THE U.S.-SOVIET EXCHANGE ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, FOLLOWING THE PLENARY EXCHANGE ON THE MURDER OF MAJOR NICHOLSON, HAS CAUSED DISCOMFORT AMONG SOME DELEGATIONS AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE WHO ARE INCLINED TO AVOID THE PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF ANY STRONG DISAGREEMENTS. HOWEVER, U.S. DELEGATION BELIEVES BOTH INTERVENTIONS HAVE HAD THEIR INTENDED EFFECT: TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT AND TO DEFEND FUNDAMENTAL U.S. VALUES AND POLICIES. FURTHERMORE, THE U.S. STATEMENT MAY HAVE A CERTAIN DETERRENT EFFECT HERE IN STOCKHOLM. THE SOVIETS CLEARLY

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DO NOT WANT TO FOCUS CONFERENCE ATTENTION ON THEIR  
EXTENSIVE CW PROGRAM. (SEVERAL DELEGATIONS HAVE  
APPROACHED US TO EXPRESS SURPRISE -- AND DISMAY -- AT  
THE EXTENT OF THE SOVIET CW PROGRAM.) IN FACT, THE  
SOVIET REP IN WG A (YEROFEYEV) HAS TOLD US THAT HE DOES  
NOT WANT TO ENGAGE US IN FURTHER POLEMICS ON U.S. VS  
SOVIET CW PROGRAMS. END COMMENT.

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SUBJECT: CDE: REPORT OF WORKING GROUP B, MAY 28

1. CDE VI - 47.

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. SUMMARY: MAY 28 SESSION ON NOTIFICATION WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY MALTESE INTERVENTION ELABORATING ON SC.5, INCLUDING MALTESE INTERPRETATION OF THE MANDATE TO COVER ALL NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, AND CALLING FOR EXTENSION OF SC.1'S OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT TO AN "OUT-OF-BASE" APPROACH. (SUMMARIZED IN PARAS 4-5 BELOW). EASTERN DELEGATES ATTEMPTED TO DEFEND THE PARAMETERS IN THEIR WORKING DOCUMENTS FOR NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE MANEUVERS (20,000 TROOPS, 30 DAYS IN ADVANCE) WHICH PROMPTED CRITICAL RESPONSES FROM UK AND SWITZERLAND (SUMMARIZED IN PARAS 6-7 BELOW). ROMANIA ATTEMPTED TO IDENTIFY COMMON GROUND REGARDING THE CONTENTS OF INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN NOTIFICATION (SUMMARIZED IN PARA 8 BELOW). THE SOVIETS (AND U.S.) REMAINED SILENT. NORWAY AND THE FRG DEFENDED MEASURE 3 AND CRITICIZED THE EASTERN WORKING DOCUMENTS. END SUMMARY.

4. BECAUSE OF ITS POTENTIAL IMPORTANCE FOR THE "END-GAME", THE TEXT OF THE MALTESE INTERVENTION IS BEING REPORTED IN FULL IN SEPTEL. THE MALTESE POSITION COULD PROVE TROUBLESOME BECAUSE:

-- 1) THE NNA CANNOT BE COUNTED UPON TO STICK FIRMLY WITH OUR DEFINITION OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH EVEN THOUGH MOST OF THEM NOW SUPPORT THE WESTERN POSITION. SWEDEN AND YUGOSLAVIA HAVE NATIONAL REASONS FOR DESIRING A MORE LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, AND AUSTRIA AND SWITZERLAND, WHILE GENERALLY STRONG BELIEVERS IN A STRICT INTERPRETATION OF THE MANDATE, ARE LAND-LOCKED STATES

-- 2) THE MALTESE POSITION SUPPORTS THE DANISH NATIONAL POSITION REGARDING AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES (AS REPORTED PREVIOUSLY).

5. IN BRIEF, THE MALTESE AMBASSADOR:

-- REJECTED THE WESTERN POSITION THAT THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH AND THE "INDEPENDENT APPROACH" ARE INHERENTLY CONTRADICTORY,

-- REJECTED WHAT HE TERMED TWO ASSUMPTIONS OF NATO'S DEFINITION OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH: 1) THAT "ADJOINING SEA" REVOLVES AROUND OR IS DEFINED BY THE COASTLINE OF EUROPE; HE SAID THAT THE "WHOLE OF EUROPE" MUST INCLUDE TERRITORIAL SEAS AND THEREFORE IS NOT RESTRICTED TO THE "SOIL" OF EUROPE AND 2) THAT THE "ORGANIC LINK" (WHICH HE ADMITTED IS REQUIRED BETWEEN NAVAL AND GROUND ACTIVITIES) MEANS THE ACTIVITIES MOST OCCUR SIMULTANEOUSLY. THE ACTIVITIES OF AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER BATTLE GROUP, FOR EXAMPLE, WHICH HAS AS A PRIMARY MISSION THE DELIVERY OF STRIKES AGAINST LAND, ARE BY DEFINITION ORGANICALLY LINKED TO CONFLICT ON LAND

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AND SECURITY IN EUROPE.

-- INDICATED THAT NOTIFICATION OF INNOCENT PASSAGE WOULD IN EFFECT BE AN EXTENSION, WITH REGARD TO WARSHIPS, TO THE MULTILATERAL ARENA OF THE 35 OF THE NOTIFICATION WHICH IS ALREADY DONE BILATERALLY BETWEEN CONCERNED STATES.

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-- EXPLAINED THAT NOTIFICATION OF THE SEA TRANSPORT OF ARMED PERSONNEL SHOULD APPLY ONLY TO THE ACTUAL PASSAGE OF SUCH TRANSPORT THROUGH THE MEDITERRANEAN. THE POINT OF ORIGIN AND DESTINATION NEED NOT BE NOTIFIED IF OUTSIDE THE ZONE. IT IS PREMATURE TO SUGGEST A SPECIFIC PARAMETER, BUT IT REFERS TO "AN UNUSUALLY LARGE NUMBER OF TROOPS." ACCEPTANCE OF AN "OUT-OF-BASE" CONCEPT ANALOGOUS TO SC.1'S OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT MIGHT REQUIRE A DIFFERENT PARAMETER. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE ASKED WHY MEASURE 1 OF SC.1 DOES NOT INCLUDE INFORMATION ON NAVAL BASES, SINCE EVEN THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH WOULD JUSTIFY THIS.

-- ARGUED THAT THE ENTIRETY (AND INDIVIDUAL PHASES) OF AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE NOTIFIED, NOT JUST AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS. IN PARTICULAR, THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD SHOULD BE THE TROOP TRANSPORTATION CAPACITY OF THE EXERCISE.

6. POLISH AND CZECH REPS DEFENDED THE SPECIFIC PARAMETERS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE MANEUVERS. THEY ARGUED THAT THE REDUCTION FROM 25,000 TO 20,000 REPRESENTED A 20 PERCENT IMPROVEMENT AND THE INCREASE FROM 21 TO 30 DAYS A 33 PERCENT IMPROVEMENT. THE POLISH REP ARGUED THAT 21 DAYS WAS CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT IN 1975 TO ASSESS THE CHARACTER OF A NOTIFIED MANEUVER AND TO PREPARE ONE'S FORCES FOR ACTION IF NECESSARY. HE MAINTAINED THAT HIS DELEGATION CONTINUED TO BELIEVE 21 DAYS WAS SUFFICIENT, BUT WAS PREPARED TO ACQUIESCE TO OTHERS' DEMANDS FOR AN INCREASE TO 30 DAYS. HE CLAIMED THE WEST HAD PRESENTED NO CONVINCING REASONS FOR A 45-DAY ADVANCE NOTIFICATION, OTHER THAN "LONGER IS BETTER". THE UK REP CHALLENGED THE EAST, AGAIN, TO DEFEND THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 20,000 PROPOSAL IN TERMS OF THE NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL ACTIVITIES WHICH WOULD BE NOTIFIED. HE ALSO CHALLENGED THE EASTERN CONCEPT THAT THE TIME FOR ADVANCE NOTIFICATION WAS DICTATED BY THE TIME NEEDED TO PREPARE FORCES FOR CONTINGENCY ACTION, ARGUING THAT, ON THE CONTRARY, IT WAS A FUNCTION OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING. THE SWISS REP INTERJECTED THAT PERHAPS A LENGTHY TIME FOR NOTIFICATION WAS NOT A SECURITY ISSUE FOR THOSE STATES WHICH MAINTAIN FORCES AT NEAR COMBAT STRENGTH, BUT FOR SUCH STATES AS SWITZERLAND, WHICH DEPENDED ON MOBILIZATION FOR DEFENSE, THE LONGER THE TIME FOR ADVANCE NOTIFICATION, THE BETTER.

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7. THE ONLY ITEM OF INTEREST IN THE EASTERN STATEMENTS WAS THE CZECH COMMENT, REGARDING THE CONTENTS OF INFORMATION IN NOTIFICATION, THAT "WE ENVISAGE ALSO THE POSSIBILITY OF SUBMITTING SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION DURING THE COURSE OF THE MANEUVER, A SIGNIFICANT ASPECT."

8. THE ROMANIAN REP CLAIMED THAT POSITIONS WERE NOT AS FAR APART AS THEY MIGHT SEEM AND NOTED AREAS OF CONVERGENCE AS REGARDS THE CONTENTS OF INFORMATION IN NOTIFICATION. NOTING THAT ALL PROPOSALS PROPOSE TO GO BEYOND THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, HE POINTED TO CONVERGENCE REGARDING DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTIVITY AND GEOGRAPHIC AREA. HE ALSO NOTED SOME CONSENSUS REGARDING INFORMATION ON MAJOR ARMAMENTS. FINALLY, HE SUGGESTED THAT THE CONTENTS OF NOTIFICATION WOULD REFLECT THE CONFERENCE'S DECISION REGARDING WHETHER A STRUCTURAL OR NUMERICAL THRESHOLD -- OR A COMBINATION -- SHOULD BE ADOPTED.

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SUBJECT: CDE: TEXT OF MALTESE STATEMENT ON NOTIFICATION

1. CDE VI - 48.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY. AS NOTED SEPTEL, MALTESE AMBASSADOR MADE AN INTERVENTION IN WORKING GROUP B ON MAY 28, IN WHICH HE ELABORATED UPON THE NOTIFICATION PROVISIONS OF SC.5. BECAUSE THE MALTESE POSITION WILL DEFINE SOME OF THE END-GAME ISSUES, WE ARE REPORTING THE FULL TEXT OF THE MALTESE INTERVENTION.

BEGIN TEXT.

THE INCLUSION OF NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES IN A NOTIFICATION REGIME HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF SOME DETAILED SCRUTINY IN THIS WORKING GROUP. MY DELEGATION IS ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN THE NOTIFICATION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES, AS IS MORE THAN EVIDENT IN THE PROPOSALS SUBMITTED IN SC.5. I WISH TO MAKE SOME OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE NOTIFICATION MEASURES PROPOSED IN SECTION B OF SC.5, IN THE LIGHT OF THE COMMENTS WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN MADE ON THE SUBJECT.

BEFORE DOING SO I WOULD LIKE TO TOUCH VERY BRIEFLY UPON THE QUESTION OF THE INTERPRETATION OF THE MADRID MANDATE IN THIS CONTEXT. I DO SO RELUCTANTLY BECAUSE IT IS BVIOUS THAT POLITICAL REALITIES CAN NEVER BE SIDE-STEPPED THROUGH LINGUISTIC NICETIES. AND THE POLITICAL REALITY IS THAT NAVAL DEPLOYMENT AND ACTIVITIES IN AND AROUND EUROPEAN WATERS ARE VERY MUCH A VITAL PART OF THE SECURITY OF THE WHOLE OF EUROPE WHICH IS A CENTRAL CONCERN TO THIS CONFERENCE.

NEVERTHELESS THE VIRTUOSITY OF SOME INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MADRID MANDATE IN THIS CONTEXT, INVITE COMMENT. I AM THINKING IN PARTICULAR OF THE ATTITUDE WHICH JUXTAPOSES, AS INHERENTLY CONTRADICTORY, THE FUNCTIONAL AND INDEPENDENT APPROACHES IN RELATION TO NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN AND AROUND EUROPEAN WATERS.

WE DO NOT UNDERSTAND, AND FAR LESS DO WE APPRECIATE, THIS CONTRADICTION. WE SEE THAT CERTAIN ELEMENTS HAVE BEEN ADDED TO THE MEANING OF THE PHRASES IN QUESTION WHICH, GOING WELL BEYOND THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE MADRID MANDATE, LEAD TO AN APPARENT CONTRADICTION. THUS WHEN THE FUNCTIONAL LINKAGE IS BROUGHT UP THIS IS DONE IN THE FRAMEWORK OF TWO ASSUMPTIONS WHICH MY DELEGATION FINDS RATHER ASTONISHING. THE FIRST IS THAT WHAT MAY BE CALLED, THE AXIS OF THE LINKAGE, LIES PRECISELY ON THE SHORELINE. THE SECOND REFERS TO THE TIME DIMENSION: IT IS ASSUMED THAT SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES MUST OCCUR CONTEMPORANEOUSLY IN EUROPE AND IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA FOR THE FUNCTIONAL LINKAGE TO BECOME OPERATIONAL. MY DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT BOTH THESE ASSUMPTIONS ARE UNJUSTIFIED. THE MADRID MANDATE DOES NOT SPEAK, AS OUR COLLEAGUE FROM THE NETHERLANDS DID ON THE 19 FEBRUARY, OF THE EUROPEAN SOIL. IT SPEAKS OF THE WHOLE OF EUROPE. WHEN IT IS RECALLED THAT THE FINAL ACT REFERS TO "THE TERRITORY IN EUROPE OF PARTICIPATING STATES" PERHAPS THE POINT I WISH TO MAKE BECOMES CLEARER. EVEN

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THE PHRASE "THE TERRITORY IN EUROPE OF PARTICIPATING STATES" CANNOT BE READ AS REFERRING TO THE SHORELINE BUT TO THE LIMIT OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA. MUCH MORE THEREFORE MUST THE MADRID PHRASE THE "WHOLE OF EUROPE" EXTEND BEYOND THE LAND LIMIT - AND THIS EXTENSION DOES NOT ONLY COVER ANY EUROPEAN 'SOIL' NOT ORIGINALLY INCLUDED IN THE FINAL ACT, BUT ALSO ALL EUROPEAN WATERS BEYOND THE TERRITORIAL SEAS, WHICH AS I NOTED IN MY INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS OF THE 12 NOVEMBER, INCLUDES EXTENSIVE PARTS OF THE MEDITERRANEAN.

AS REGARDS THE TIME DIMENSION THE ABSOLUTE INSISTENCE UPON A CONTEMPORANEOUS ELEMENT IN THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED THROUGH ANY REASONABLE READING OF THE MADRID MANDATE. ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA MAY OR MAY NOT BE CONTEMPORANEOUS WITH ACTIVITIES IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE. THE LINKAGE DOES NOT HOLD OR BREAK UPON THIS POINT.

SHORN OF THESE TWO, IN OUR VIEW UNJUSTIFIED, ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS, THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH IS NOT INHERENTLY CONTRADICTORY TO THE NOTION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES AS CONTEMPLATED IN THE WORKING OF THE FINAL ACT. A PROPER UNDERSTANDING OF THE NOTION OF INDEPENDENT ACTIVITIES MUST RECOGNIZE AN ORGANIC LINKAGE BETWEEN ANY TYPE OF ACTIVITY WHICH SHOULD BE NOTIFIED AND OTHER NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES UNDER A CSBM REGIME. WHAT IS INCORRECT IS TO ASSERT THAT AS FAR AS NAVAL ACTIVITIES ARE CONCERNED THE MADRID MANDATE MEANS THAT THIS ORGANIC LINKAGE MUST INEVITABLY RESIDE IN THOSE RIGID TEMPORAL AND SPATIAL CHARACTERISTICS, WHICH I HAVE NOTED EARLIER.

IT IS EVIDENT HOWEVER BY NOW THAT HAVING BECOME EXPLOITED SLOGANS FOR CONTRASTING VIEWPOINTS THE PHRASES 'FUNCTIONAL' AND 'INDEPENDENT' APPROACHES HAVE LOST ALL UTILITY IN A SEARCH FOR A MEANINGFUL AGREEMENT.

IT IS WITH THIS IN MIND THAT I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THE FOUR SPECIFIC MEASURES OF NOTIFICATION INCLUDED IN SC.5. FIRST OF ALL I WILL RECALL WHAT I SAID WHEN ORIGINALLY INTRODUCING THE PAPER LAST NOVEMBER. OUR PROPOSALS DEAL SPECIFICALLY WITH NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, BECAUSE WE ARE CONVINCED THAT ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE THERE UNDOUBTEDLY FORM PART OF THE SECURITY OF THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AS UNDERSTOOD IN THE MADRID MANDATE. WE DO NOT EXCLUDE THAT OTHER EUROPEAN WATERS AND THE SEAS ADJOINING THEM ARE ALSO THE LOCATION OF ACTIVITIES RELATING EQUALLY STRICTLY TO EUROPEAN SECURITY, IN WHICH CASE WHAT WE PROPOSE IN OUR PAPER IS ALSO APPLICABLE THERE.

THE FIRST MEASURE WE PROPOSE IN SC. 5 RELATES TO THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE. AT THIS STAGE I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING CLARIFICATIONS ON THIS MEASURE.

IN THE FIRST PLACE AS THE ACTIVITIES ENVISAGED UNDER THIS MEASURE TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF PARTICIPATING STATES THE QUESTION OF THE DEFINITION OF

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THE ZONE DOES NOT ARISE.

IN THE SECOND PLACE WE WISH TO STRESS THAT A NOTIFICATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE UNDER A CSBM REGIME IS ENVISAGED IN THE FRAMEWORK OF EXISTING AND GENERALLY ACCEPTED INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE ON THE SUBJECT. WHERE THERE ARE DIFFERING VIEWPOINTS REGARDING THE APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE THESE DIFFERENCES WILL REMAIN UNTOUCHED BY THIS MEASURE. I AM HERE THINKING IN PARTICULAR OF THE DIFFERENT POSITIONS WHICH EXIST AMONG PARTICIPANTS OF THIS CONFERENCE CONCERNING THE EXTENT OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA.

THE QUESTION MIGHT ARISE AS TO WHETHER OUR PROPOSED MEASURE ENVISAGES NOTIFICATION OF SHIPPING, INCLUDING MERCHANT SHIPPING, WHICH IS PROCEEDING THROUGH TERRITORIAL WATERS TO REACH THE INTERNAL WATERS OF A PARTICIPATING STATE. IN OUR VIEW THIS SITUATION IS ALREADY COVERED BY THE FACT THAT EVEN AT PRESENT ALL MOVEMENTS LEADING TO AN ENTRY IN INTERNAL WATERS ARE NOTIFIED TO THE STATE INVOLVED. WE INTEND THAT IN THESE INSTANCES THE EXISTING SYSTEM OF BILATERAL NOTIFICATION REMAINS UNCHANGED. WHAT IS ADDITIONAL IN OUR PROPOSAL IS THAT IN ALL INSTANCES WHERE NAVAL WARSHIPS PASS THROUGH THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF A PARTICIPATING STATE, WITHOUT PROCEEDING TO ITS INTERNAL WATERS, ALL PARTICIPATING STATES BE INFORMED. THE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION REGIMES APPLICABLE IN SUCH CASES COULD BE ANALOGOUS TO THE ONES ENVISAGED FOR ALERT ACTIVITIES IN SC.1. AMPLIFIED.

OUR SECOND PROPOSED MEASURE CONCERNS MOVEMENTS INVOLVING THE SEA TRANSPORTATION OF ARMED PERSONNEL. THERE ARE TWO WAYS IN WHICH ONE COULD APPROACH THIS QUESTION. ON THE ONE HAND THERE IS THE APPROACH ADOPTED IN S.C.1. WHICH DOES NOT DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN MOVEMENTS AND OTHER ACTIVITIES, BUT WHICH CONCENTRATES ON THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT. WHAT WE WISH TO ASK IN THIS CONTEXT IS WHAT LINE OF REASONING HAS BEEN USED TO EXCLUDE, AS IS MANIFESTLY DONE IN SC.1., BOTH ANY INFORMATION ABOUT THE STRUCTURE OF FORCES IN NAVAL BASES LOCATED IN EUROPE, AS WELL AS THE OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES OF SUCH FORCES. IT WOULD SEEM TO US THAT EVEN THE REASONING ADOPTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE MOST RIGID DEFINITION OF A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH DOES NOT JUSTIFY THE EXCLUSION.

SECTION A OF SC.5. ENVISAGES THE PROVISION OF INFORMATION ABOUT NAVAL FORCES WHICH, IN THE FRAMEWORK OF AGREED CONDITIONS FOR THE OUT-OF-GARRISON APPROACH COULD ALSO BE APPLIED TO OUT-OF-BASE ACTIVITIES, OF WHICH MOST, THOUGH NOT ALL, OF THE NAVAL MOVEMENTS WE ENVISAGE IN OUR PROPOSAL COULD FORM PART. ANY QUESTION WHICH COULD EVENTUALLY ARISE IN THIS CONNECTION, FOR EXAMPLE THE MOVEMENT OF FORCES FROM A NAVAL BASE IN, SAY, THE MEDITERRANEAN, TO A LOCATION WELL BEYOND THE ZONE, FOR EXAMPLE THE INDIAN OCEAN, OR VICE-VERSA, WOULD

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NOT BE DIFFERENT IN SUBSTANCE TO RELATED QUESTIONS REGARDING THE OUT-OF-GARRISON LAND AND AIR ACTIVITIES AS INCORPORATED IN SC.1.

ON THE OTHER HAND OUR PROPOSAL AS IT PRESENTLY STANDS APPROACHES THE QUESTION OF NAVAL MOVEMENTS AS AN ACTIVITY READILY IDENTIFIABLE FROM OTHER NAVAL ACTIVITIES. THINKING IN TERMS OF THE SPECIFIC CONTEXT OF A CLOSED SEA LIKE THE MEDITERRANEAN, WHICH IS ALSO A MAJOR INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY, WE CONSIDER THAT ANY POINT-TO-POINT NAVAL MOVEMENT INVOLVING THE TRANSPORT OF AN UNUSUALLY LARGE NUMBER OF ARMED PERSONNEL IS A MATTER OF DIRECT SECURITY CONCERN TO PARTICIPATING STATES. THIS IS THE CASE EVEN IN INSTANCES WHEN THE EVENTUAL DESTINATION, OR POINT OF ORIGIN, OR BOTH, ARE BY ANY DEFINITION WELL OUTSIDE THE ZONE. IN THESE INSTANCES WE ARE PROPOSING THAT ONLY THE ACTUAL PASSAGE THROUGH THE MEDITERRANEAN WILL BE NOTIFIABLE, WITHOUT ANY DETAILS REGARDING EITHER POINT OF ORIGIN OR DESTINATION NECESSARILY BEING GIVEN.

I WISH TO UNDERLINE THE NATURE OF THE PARAMETER WE ENVISAGE FOR THIS MEASURE - NAMELY THE NUMBER OF ARMED PERSONNEL BEING TRANSPORTED IN PROXIMITY TO PARTICIPATING STATES, BECAUSE THIS IN OUR VIEW CONSTITUTES THE MAJOR ELEMENT IN THE THREAT PERCEPTIONS OF PARTICIPATING STATES INVOLVED. A NOTIFICATION MEASURE INTENDED TO ASSURE THAT THE EXPECTED OR SUDDEN ARRIVAL OF A LARGE NUMBER OF ARMED PERSONNEL IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO A PARTICIPATING STATE OR STATES IS BOTH OF A TEMPORARY NATURE - BECAUSE IT IS IN PASSAGE - AND IS OF NON-AGGRESSIVE INTENT, IS IN OUR VIEW VERY MUCH RELATED BOTH TO THE SECURITY OF EUROPE IN GENERAL, AS INTENDED IN THE MADRID MANDATE, AS WELL AS TO SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES WHICH MAY TAKE PLACE BOTH ON LAND AND SEA IN EUROPE DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY IN RESPONSE TO SUCH MOVEMENTS.

I HAVE USED IN THIS CONTEXT THE PHRASE "UNUSUALLY LARGE" NUMBER OF ARMED PERSONNEL AS AN INDICATION OF THE NUMERICAL PARAMETER WE ENVISAGE IN THIS CONTEXT. WE DO NOT YET FEEL HOWEVER THAT THIS POINT HAS BEEN SUFFICIENTLY DISCUSSED FOR A SPECIFIC FIGURE TO BE GIVEN AT THE PRESENT STAGE. THIS IS EVEN MORE THE CASE IN THE LIGHT OF THE CONSIDERATION THAT THE OUT-OF-BASE APPROACH IS ONE WHICH WE ARE PREPARED TO STUDY ALSO IN THIS CONNECTION, IN WHICH CASE THE NATURE OF THE PARAMETER ITSELF COULD CONCEIVABLY BE DIFFERENT.

THE THIRD PROPOSED NOTIFICATION MEASURE IN SC.5 RELATES TO AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES. ALL PROPOSALS TABLED SO FAR ENVISAGE THE INCLUSION OF AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES IN A CSBM REGIME. SPECIFIC IDEAS ON NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD HAVE ALSO BEEN ADVANCED. SC.2 REFERS TO 5000 OR MORE TROOPS TAKING PART. SC.1 SPEAKS OF THREE OR MORE BATTALIONS, OR 3000 AMPHIBIOUS TROOPS, CARRYING OUT A LANDING IN THE ZONE. SC.1 AMPLIFIED ALSO PROPOSES THAT IF THE AMPHIBIOUS TROOPS INVOLVED EMBARK IN THE ZONE THE

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DATE AND PLACE OF EMBARKATION ARE ALSO NOTIFIABLE. THE PROponents OF SC. 2 HAVE FURTHER EXPLAINED THAT IN RELATION TO THEIR PROPOSED MEASURE SEA-BASED AIR AND FIRE SUPPORT TO A NOTIFIABLE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING OPERATION WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE NOTIFICATION. WE BELIEVE THAT THERE IS ALREADY SUFFICIENT MATERIAL FOR A FAIRLY DETAILED EXAMINATION OF THIS PROPOSAL. IN THIS CONTEXT I WOULD LIKE TO TOUCH UPON TWO ASPECTS: THE FIRST CONCERNS THE SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE TO BE NOTIFIED AND THE SECOND CONCERNS THE THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION.

A RECENT STUDY ON NAVAL DEVELOPMENT - A BOOK ENTITLED "US NAVAL DEVELOPMENTS" BY J. S. BREEMER, HAS THIS TO SAY IN DEFINING AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION: AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION IS CONDUCTED IN THREE STAGES; LRST THE ASSAULT ECHELON SECOND THE ASSAULT FOLLOW-ON ECHELON AND THIRD THE FLY-IN ECHELON. PRECEDING THE ASSAULT ECHELON'S ASSAULT ITSELF IS THE PRE-ASSAULT PHASE. THIS IS THE PERIOD OF TIME WHEN THE SUPPORTING NAVAL FORCE COMBINES WITH THE MARINE AIRCRAFT WING TO PREPARE THE LANDING AREAS WITH GUN AND AIR BOMBARDEMENT. IF MINEFIELDS BAR THE WAY, MINE-SWEEPING VESSELS AND HELICOPTERS MUST FIRST CLEAR A CHANNEL. IN ADDITION THE SUPPORTING NAVAL FORCE WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ESTABLISHING AN ANTI-SUBMARINE AND ANTI-SURFACE SHIP PERIMETER AROUND THE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE. OVERHEAD PROTECTION WILL, IN MOST CASES, BE SUPPLIED BY THE AIRCRAFT FROM A NEARBY BATTLE GROUP. FIVE DAYS AFTER THE ASSAULT ECHELON HAS SECURED THE AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA, THE ASSAULT FOLLOW-ON IS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE. IF A SERVICEABLE HARBOR IS AVAILABLE THE TRANSPORT FORCE OF COMMERCIAL SHIPS CAN UNLOAD SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT TO EXTEND THE ASSAULT ECHELON'S THIRTY DAY SUPPLY. THE THIRD FORCE INCREMENT, THE FLY-IN ECHELON, WILL NOT ARRIVE UNTIL THE LANDING HAS SECURED AN AIRFIELD CABLE OF HANDLING THE ARRIVAL OF SUPPLIES AND REPLACEMENTS FOR A SUSTAINED ADVANCE".

IT IS THIS WHOLE ACTIVITY, FROM THE PRE-ASSAULT STAGE TO THE FINAL FORCE INCREMENT STAGE, WITH ALL THEIR LOGISTIC AND TACTICAL SUPPORT THAT WE CONSIDER NOTIFIABLE AS AN AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITY, ONCE THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD IS REACHED. WE ALSO PROPOSE THAT THE DIFFERENT PHASES OF THIS ACTIVITY, ARE INDIVIDUALLY NOTIFIABLE EVEN IF THEY ARE CONDUCTED SEPARATELY IN TIME OR SPACE.

IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT WE PROPOSE AS THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD, NOT THE ACTUAL LANDING IN THE ZONE OF A DEFINED NUMBER OF TROOPS AT ANY GIVEN TIME, BUT THE TROOP TRANSPORTATION CAPACITY OF THE EXERCISE ITSELF. TO SPEAK IN TERMS OF SC.1 IF LESS THAN 3000 TROOPS LAND IN THE ZONE IN THE CONTEXT OF AN EXERCISE WHICH INCLUDED EQUIPMENT WHICH HAS A TROOP CARRYING CAPACITY OF OVER 3000 TROOPS -- TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL THE DIFFERENT PHASES OF THE EXERCISES, -- THEN THE WHOLE ACTIVITY BECOMES NOTIFIABLE.

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THERE IS ONE POINT REGARDING THE OBSERVATION OF AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES WHICH I MIGHT AS WELL BRING UP HERE. SC.1 AMPLIFIED ENVISAGES THE OBSERVATION OF SEA LANDINGS AND ASSOCIATED AIR LANDINGS FROM A LOCATION ON LAND. IT IS NOT OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT OBSERVATION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO "A LOCATION ON LAND". WE WILL RETURN TO THIS POINT IN ANOTHER MEETING OF THIS WORKING GROUP. THE FOURTH NOTIFICATION MEASURE IN SC.5 DEALS WITH NAVAL MANOEUVRES. UNDER THIS WE INTEND TO INCLUDE ALL ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE NOT COVERED BY THE FIRST THREE MEASURES, NAMELY INNOCENT PASSAGE, MOVEMENTS AND AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES. I SHOULD RECALL AT THIS POINT THAT OUR PROPOSALS ARE CONCEIVED IN THE CONTEXT OF AN ENCLOSED SEA LIKE THE MEDITERRANEAN, WHICH EVEN IN TERMS OF THE TWO ARMED EUROPEAN ALLIANCES FORMS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY DOMAIN.

I MUST ADMIT THAT MY DELEGATION WAS PARTICULARLY INTRIGUED BY THE EXPLANATION GIVEN BY OUR COLLEAGUE FROM THE NETHERLANDS OF THE 19 FEBRUARY WHEN HE GAVE THE SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF A SIMULATED SEA BATTLE BETWEEN TWO OPPOSING NAVAL FORCES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AS, IN HIS OPINION, AN ACTIVITY WHICH NEED NOT BE NOTIFIED. ON THE CONTRARY THIS IS PRECISELY THE TYPE OF ACTIVITY TAKING PLACE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN WHICH WE CONSIDER EMINENTLY NOTIFIABLE, BECAUSE IT FORMS VERY MUCH PART, BOTH DIRECT AND INDIRECT, OF THE SECURITY EQUATION IN THE REST OF THE CONTINENT.

IT WILL TAKE A LOT OF REASONING TO PERSUADE US TO THE CONTRARY. NAVAL BATTLES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, GOING BACK TO ABOUKIR BAY, LEPANTO, EVEN SALAMIS, HAVE HISTORICALLY BEEN BOTH AN INTEGRAL ELEMENT OF A CONFLICT TAKING PLACE IN EUROPE AS WELL AS A MAIN FACTOR IN THE CONTINUING EVOLUTION OF THAT CONFLICT. THE COMMAND OF THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR, OF WHICH MALTA WAS A FOCAL POINT, CONSTITUTED ONE OF THE MAJOR FACTORS DETERMINING THE EVOLUTION OF THAT WAR AT ITS MOST CRITICAL AND UNCERTAIN PERIODS.

IN DISCUSSIONS RELATING TO THIS QUESTION THERE HAS BEEN AN ATTEMPT TO ISOLATE CERTAIN ASPECTS OF A NAVAL ACTIVITY - NAMELY THE PROVISION OF SEA-BASED, AIR AND FIRE SUPPORT TO AN ONGOING LAND ACTIVITY--AND TO IDENTIFY THESE ASPECTS, IN ISOLATION, AS QUALIFYING FOR INCLUSION IN THE NOTIFICATION REGIME. VERY OFTEN THIS ATTEMPT HAS REMINDED ME OF PAINTINGS BY THE SURREALIST MAGRITTE, WHERE DOORS AND WINDOWS OPEN INTO NOWHERE, LIMBS FLOAT AROUND DETACHED FROM BODIES AND SKIES PEER THROUGH THE BODIES OF BIRDS. WE DO NOT SEE HOW IN THE REAL CONTEXT OF THE MEDITERRANEAN, SUCH AN APPROACH IS POSSIBLE.

IT IS INCONCEIVABLE TO CONSIDER FOR EXAMPLE THAT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN A BASIC NAVAL FORMATION SUCH AS AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER BATTLE GROUP, ONE OF WHOSE PRIMARY FUNCTIONS IS AIR STRIKES AGAINST LAND TARGETS, OR

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ANOTHER MAJOR FORMATION SUCH AS THE SURFACE ACTION GROUP, ONE OF WHOSE PRIMARY FUNCTIONS IS STRIKE WARFARE WITH CONVENTIONAL OR NUCLEAR HEADED MISSILES AGAINST INLAND TARGETS, COULD UNDERTAKE ANY ACTIVITY WHICH DOES NOT HAVE AN IMMEDIATE AND DIRECT RELATIONSHIP WITH WHAT IS HAPPENING ON THE MAINLAND IN EUROPE.

IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED HERE THAT, CERTAINLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE MEDITERRANEAN, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAND AND SEA IS NOT ONLY ONE WAY. THERE IS NO REASON TO DOUBT THAT ANY NAVAL ACTIVITY THERE WILL BE GIVEN INSTANT AND DIRECT AIR SUPPORT FROM BASES ON LAND. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT WE PROPOSE A NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD FOR NAVAL ACTIVITIES, CERTAINLY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, WHICH RELATES SPECIFICALLY TO THE NUMBER OF COMBAT UNITS INVOLVED, WITH POSSIBLY THEIR TOTAL DISPLACEMENT, AND NOT TO ANY FORMALISTIC TEMPORAL RELATIONSHIP WHICH THEY MAY HAVE WITH ACTIVITIES ON LAND. IN THIS CONNECTION SPECIFIC PARAMETERS HAVE ALREADY BEEN PROPOSED BOTH IN SC.2 AS WELL AS IN THE RECENT WORKING DOCUMENT SUBMITTED BY THE DELEGATIONS OF THE USSR, BULGARIA AND POLAND. THE ADDITIONAL CLARIFICATIONS ALREADY REQUESTED ABOUT THE CONTENTS OF THIS WORKING DOCUMENT, IN PARTICULAR CONCERNING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 30 COMBAT SHIPS AND THE 100 MILITARY PLANES MENTIONED, WILL HELP US FURTHER IN ANALYSING THIS PROPOSAL. WE COULD HOWEVER CONSIDER TENTATIVELY THAT THE FIGURES MENTIONED IN SC.2 AND IN THE WORKING DOCUMENT PROVIDE BETWEEN THEM ADEQUATE LOW AND HIGH REFERENCE POINTS WITHIN WHICH A FURTHER DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT COULD TAKE PLACE.

MR. CHAIRMAN,

I HAVE GONE INTO SOME DETAIL ON THE SUBJECT OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES FOR THREE MAIN REASONS.

FIRST MY DELEGATION WISHES TO UNDERLINE OUR VERY SPECIAL INTEREST IN THIS ASPECT OF OUR WORK, WITHOUT OF COURSE IN ANY WAY REDUCING THE IMPORTANCE OF OTHER ASPECTS. IN THE SECOND PLACE WE WISH TO TAKE STOCK OF WHATEVER COMMON GROUND HAS ALREADY EMERGED, AND WHERE VIEWS STILL NEED TO BE RECONCILED. THIS IS PARTICULARLY USEFUL AT THIS STAGE WHERE CERTAIN INITIATIVES MAY BE CONTEMPLATED SEEKING TO IDENTIFY THOSE ELEMENTS WHICH COULD FORM A PACKAGE OF SUBSTANTIVE AND BALANCED CSBM'S. I AM HERE THINKING ALSO OF THE RUMANIAN IDEAS CONTAINED IN THEIR AIDE MEMOIRE OF 11 MAY, WHICH MY DELEGATION WISHES TO ENCOURAGE.

FINALLY WE WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT WE ARE MAKING OUR PROPOSALS IN THE STRONG CONVICTION THAT THEY FORM A DIRECT CONTRIBUTION TO OUR WORK AS ENVISAGED IN THE MADRID MANDATE.

THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.

END TEXT.

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SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS, MAY 28, 1985

REF: STOCKHOLM 3908

1. CDE VI - 045

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT

3. SUMMARY. THE CAUCUS HELD AN UNUSUALLY BRIEF BUT PLUMBIFEROUS MEETING CHAIRED BY CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL). NO CONTACTS WERE REPORTED; DISCUSSION FOCUSED SOLELY ON THE U.S. AND FRG MEASURE 2 PAPERS. THE DUTCH CONTINUED THEIR CRITICISM OF THE FRG PAPER AND ADDED THAT THE U.S. AND FRG PAPERS SHOULD BE ESSENTIALLY IDENTICAL. AMBASSADOR GOODBY NOTED THAT THE PAPERS COULD BE DIFFERENT IN MINOR WAYS, PROVIDED THAT THEIR BASIC CONTENTS CONFORMED TO THE NATO PACKAGE AND ARE SUBSTANTIVELY THE SAME. END SUMMARY.

4. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DAY, CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL), PRESIDED OVER AN UNUSUALLY BRIEF BUT PLUMBIFEROUS MEETING ATTENDED BY A NUMBER OF DEPUTIES IN LIEU OF AMBASSADORS. FOLLOWING THE LONG THREE-DAY WEEKEND, NO CONTACTS WERE REPORTED.

5. ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS: AMBASSADOR GOODBY CIRCULATED COPIES OF THE U.S. MEASURE 2 (FORECASTS) PAPER DEMONSTRATING HOW A CALENDAR OF ANNUAL FORECASTS WOULD WORK USING 1984 U.S. EXERCISE DATA, BUT NOTED THAT THERE WAS NO URGENCY TO CONSIDERATION OF THE U.S. PAPER. MOREOVER, GOODBY EXPRESSED AGREEMENT WITH AMBASSADOR EDES' (UK) COMMENTS AT THE LAST NATO CAUCUS MEETING (REFTEL) CONCERNING THE NEED TO DEVELOP TACTICS ON THE BEST WAY TO PROCEED WITH ALL OF THE ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS BEFORE THE FIRST IS TABLED. EDES REPEATED HIS CALL FOR A SHORT DELAY IN TABLING PAPERS. HE NOTED THAT THE EXPERIENCE GAINED IN PREPARING THE MEASURE 3 (NOTIFICATION) PAPER INDICATED THAT THERE WOULD BE PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING SC.1/AMPLIFIED, PARTICULARLY IN THE AREAS ADDRESSED BY THE "RUMP SQUEEZING THE PACKAGE." EDES STATED THAT A REVISED BRITISH MEASURE 3 AND A NEW BRITISH MEASURE 1 PAPER WOULD BE OUT NEXT WEEK, ALTHOUGH THE MEASURE 1 PAPER STILL POSED SERIOUS PROBLEMS (E.G., INFORMATION ON LAND-BASED AIR FORCE STRUCTURES IS REQUESTED IN WINGS, AN ORGANIZATIONAL UNIT THE RAF DOES NOT HAVE). BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) STATED THAT ON CURSORY REVIEW HE SAW NO PROBLEMS WITH THE U.S. PAPER, BUT HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE U.S. AND FRG MEASURE 2 PAPERS SHOULD BE ABSOLUTELY IDENTICAL AS EXAMPLES OF THE SAME MEASURE. IF NOT COORDINATED, THE PAPERS COULD OPEN SC.1/AMPLIFIED TO NEW EASTERN CRITICISM, HE SAID. CITRON (FRG), MEVIK (NORWAY), AND GOODBY EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT THE PAPERS COULD BE DIFFERENT IN MINOR WAYS, PROVIDED THAT THEIR BASIC CONTENTS CONFORM TO THE NATO PACKAGE AND ARE SUBSTANTIVELY THE SAME. GOODBY ALSO INVITED THE FRG TO WORK WITH THE U.S. TO COORDINATE THE TWO PAPERS TO THE

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MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE. MOREOVER, HE NOTED THAT THE MILITARY ADVISORS' GROUP WOULD BE REVIEWING THE U.S.

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PAPER. CITRON REPORTED THAT THE FRG MEASURE 2 PAPER WOULD BE INCORPORATING 1984 GERMAN EXERCISE DATA AS SUGGESTED BY BUWALDA AND WOULD BE TABLED, AS AGREED, ON THURSDAY. GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) SAID HE PREFERRED PRESENTING ONLY ONE PAPER, SINCE TWO COULD UNDERSCORE DIFFERENCES OF VIEW WITHIN NATO AND LEAD TO CONFUSION. CUTILEIRO POINTED OUT THAT, IF THE CAUCUS ACCEPTS THE IDEA OF NATIONAL PAPERS, THEN DIFFERENCES OF INTERPRETATION AND POINTS OF VIEW MUST BE EXPECTED AS A CONSEQUENCE. CITRON STRESSED, AS HE HAD AT THE MAY 23 CAUCUS, THAT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS SHOULD NOT BE EXAGGERATED. (COMMENT: CITRON WAS QUITE ANNOYED THAT THE DUTCH CONTINUED TO CRITICIZE THE FRG PAPER AND CALLED FOR DELAYS IN ITS TABLING, SINCE THE CAUCUS REACHED A DECISION AT THE MAY 23 MEETING TO ALLOW NATIONAL PAPERS TO BE TABLED IF THEY CONFORMED TO THE NATO PACKAGE. END COMMENT.)

6. OTHER BUSINESS: EDES (UK) REPORTED THAT THE MINISTER OF STATE OF THE MFA, RICHARD LUCE, WOULD BE VISITING THE CDE ON JUNE 12-13. MEVIK (NORWAY) REQUESTED THAT THE CAUCUS CONSIDER AT A FUTURE MEETING THE IMPLICATIONS OF A NATIONAL POSITION BEING STATED IN PLENARY SESSION ON SUCH AN IMPORTANT ISSUE AS THE FUTURE WORKING STRUCTURE AND A CDE SUSPENSION DATE. AMBASSADOR GOODBY STATED FIRMLY THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT WILLING TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS ON A FUTURE WORKING STRUCTURE UNTIL MORE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS ARE HELD. THAT, HE SAID, IS ALSO A NATIONAL POSITION. HE POINTED OUT THAT MID-1986 COULD BE A REASONABLE TARGET DATE FOR ENDING THIS STAGE OF THE CDE, BUT THAT WE WOULD NOT MAKE A PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENT ON THIS ISSUE. (COMMENT: THE FRENCH SPEECH IN LAST FRIDAY'S PLENARY APPEARS TO HAVE RAISED THE IRE OF SEVERAL DELEGATIONS THAT ARE A LITTLE PIQUED AT PARIS' HABIT OF GOING IT ALONE. END COMMENT.) EDES, DELWORTH (CANADA), BUWALDA AND CUTILEIRO ALSO JOINED THE SENSE OF THE CAUCUS, BUT RESERVED FURTHER COMMENT FOR THE THURSDAY, MAY 30, MEETING.  
END

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SUBJECT: CDE: REPORT OF WORKING GROUP A MEETINGS,  
MAY 29 AND 30

1. CDE VI - 58.

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. BEGIN SUMMARY: WORKING GROUP MEETINGS ON INFORMATION/VERIFICATION AND ON CONSTRAINTS WERE ROUTINE. ON WEDNESDAY, CZECH REP INDICATED THE EAST WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS INFORMATION IN NOTIFICATION, BUT THAT ISSUES OF NOTIFICATION, ESPECIALLY REGARDING AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES MUST BE RESOLVED FIRST. ON THURSDAY, THE FRG TABLED ITS NATIONAL PAPER DEMONSTRATING WHAT MEASURE 2 WOULD LOOK LIKE. THE SOVIETS INDICATED FLEXIBILITY ON THE DETAILS OF CONSTRAINTS MEASURES IF THE WEST WOULD AGREE TO DISCUSS THEM. END SUMMARY.

4. AT WORKING GROUP A/WEDNESDAY, THE NETHERLANDS REP ARGUED THAT INFORMATION IN NOTIFICATION WAS INSUFFICIENT SINCE AN OVERALL PICTURE OF FORCE STRUCTURES IS NEEDED. THE FRG REP CHALLENGED THE EAST TO PRESENT VERIFICATION PROVISIONS TO ACCOMPANY THEIR NOTIFICATION MEASURES. THE CZECH REP PICKED UP A PREVIOUS FRENCH QUESTION ABOUT WHETHER THE EAST WOULD AGREE TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION IN NOTIFICATIONS ON EQUIPMENT, STRUCTURE, ETC. THE CZECH REP SAID THIS QUESTION WAS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION AND COULD BE PRODUCTIVELY DISCUSSED ONCE THE NOTIFICATION ISSUES WERE RESOLVED. HE REPEATED THE EASTERN POSITION THAT INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION ARE ONLY A COMPONENT OF CSBMS, AND THEREFORE MUST BE ADDRESSED IN THE CONTEXT OF AGREED NOTIFICATION MEASURES.

5. AT WORKING GROUP A/THURSDAY, FRG REP TABLED ITS NATIONAL PAPER SHOWING WHAT MEASURE 2 WOULD LOOK LIKE. THE CZECH REP ARGUED THAT LIMITATIONS ON MANEUVERS WERE A NECESSARY SUPPLEMENT TO NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION IN ORDER TO REDUCE RISKS OF CONFRONTATION. THE SOVIET REP ARGUED THAT AN OUTCOME FROM STOCKHOLM SHOULD BE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT AND THEREFORE MUST INCLUDE A LIMITATION ON MANEUVERS. HE AGREED THAT SUCH A LIMITATION SHOULD BE VERIFIABLE, BUT DID NOT DEVELOP THAT IDEA. REGARDING THE WESTERN ARGUMENT THAT VARIOUS ASYMMETRIES REQUIRE SUCH LARGE-SCALE WESTERN MANEUVERS, THE SOVIET REP ARGUED THAT, LOOKING AT THE WHOLE PICTURE, ALL THE VARIOUS ASYMMETRIES BETWEEN NATO AND THE WTO BALANCE OUT. HE ARGUED THAT WE NEED TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF LIMITATIONS; "WE COULD THEN NARROW DIFFERENCES REGARDING PARAMETERS, SCALE OF MANEUVER, AND AREA OF MANEUVER AND MAYBE OTHER ASPECTS." U.S. REP (HANSEN) AND UK REP REGRETTED THE LACK OF ATTENTION PAID TO FRG NATIONAL PAPER ON MEASURE 2. BOTH REPS ARGUED THAT IT DEMONSTRATED THE POTENTIAL CONSTRAINING EFFECT OF MEASURE 2. THE U.S. REP ADDED THAT IT ALSO

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DEMONSTRATED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DETAILED INFORMATION:  
IF WE CANNOT AGREE TO PROVIDE THIS DEGREE OF  
INFORMATION, HOW CAN WE PROCEED TO CONSTRAINTS? UK REP  
REITERATED THE BASIC WESTERN STANCE ON CONSTRAINTS: WE  
ARE WILLING TO CONSIDER ANY TABLED PROPOSAL; WE HAVE  
EXPLAINED WHY THE ONE TABLED IS UNACCEPTABLE; TRY  
AGAIN. THE U.S. REP ACKNOWLEDGED THAT UNDER PROPER  
CIRCUMSTANCES, LESS MILITARY ACTIVITY MIGHT BE USEFUL,  
BUT THAT WE HAVEN'T BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH THESE PROPER  
CIRCUMSTANCES. HE POINTED, FOR EXAMPLE, TO THE LACK OF  
INFORMATION AND QUESTIONS ABOUT VERIFICATION. THE  
ROMANIAN AND YUGOSLAV REPS CHIDED THE U.S. AND UK REPS  
FOR REFERRING ONLY TO THE EASTERN PROPOSAL ON  
CONSTRAINTS, NOTING THAT IN SC.2 AND SC.3 SEVERAL OTHER  
IDEAS FOR CONSTRAINTS WERE OFFERED WHICH PROVIDED  
SUFFICIENT FOOD FOR THOUGHT FOR CONFERENCE DISCUSSION.  
THE YUGOSLAV REP, IN RESPONSE TO U.S. REP'S CALL FOR  
MORE INFORMATION, SAID, "THE QUESTION CAN BE TURNED  
AROUND: IF YOU WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT CONSTRAINTS,  
WE WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT MEANINGFUL INFORMATION."  
END

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SUBJECT: TEXT OF FRG MEASURE 2 PROTOTYPE

1. CDE VI - 051

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT

-

3. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT, ADAPTED TO TELEGRAM FORMAT, OF THE PROTOTYPE PAPER TABLED IN WORKING GROUP A BY THE FRG ON MAY 30. BEGIN TEXT.

4. ANNUAL EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS--IN MEASURE 2 OF THEIR PROPOSAL, THE 16 CO-SPONSORS OF DOCUMENT SC.1/AMPLIFIED HAVE SUGGESTED AN ANNUAL EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS OF ACTIVITIES NOTIFIABLE IN ADVANCE. SUCH AN EXCHANGE OF FORECASTS IS TO SERVE A DOUBLE PURPOSE:

-- IT WOULD, AFTER A PERIOD OF GENERAL APPLICATION, CREATE A "PATTERN" OF NORMAL MILITARY BEHAVIOUR OF THE 35 PARTICIPATING STATES. MILITARY ACTIVITIES WOULD THUS BE MADE PREDICTABLE AND CALCULABLE A LONG TIME IN ADVANCE.

-- SINCE ANY DEVIATION FROM THAT ROUTINE PATTERN OF EXERCISES WOULD GIVE RISE TO AN INCREASED ATTENTION OF OTHERS, PARTICIPATING STATES WOULD MAKE AN EFFORT TO STICK TO THE ANNUAL FORECASTS AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE WHEN PLANNING AND CARRYING OUT THEIR MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THIS MEASURE WOULD THUS HAVE A CONSTRAINING EFFECT. IN PARTICULAR, IT WOULD MAKE IT POLITICALLY MORE DIFFICULT TO USE MILITARY ACTIVITIES FOR POLITICALLY THREATENING GESTURES OR FOR THE PURPOSE OF INTIMIDATION.

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5. THE ANNUAL FORECAST DOES NOT ENTAIL:

-- ADDITIONAL PLANNING ACTIVITIES OF MILITARY STAFFS. FOR A VARIETY OF ORGANIZATIONAL REASONS, MANY STATES ARE PLANNING THEIR NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES A LONG TIME IN ADVANCE, OFTEN MORE THAN TWO YEARS AHEAD.

-- ANY RESTRICTIONS OF THE NECESSARY FLEXIBILITY OF INSTRUCTIVE AND TRAINING PROGRAMMES. CHANGES OR ADDITIONS TO THE ANNUAL FORECAST REMAIN POSSIBLE. THEY NEED TO BE PROVIDED ONLY IN THE INDIVIDUAL NOTIFICATION OF THAT PARTICULAR ACTIVITY.

6. IN ORDER TO ILLUSTRATE THE ABOVE MENTIONED AIMS OF SUCH AN EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL FORECASTS AND THE REQUIREMENTS ENVISAGED FOR PARTICIPATING STATES, THE DELEGATION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY SUBMITS A LIST OF THOSE MILITARY ACTIVITIES NOTIFIABLE ACCORDING TO THE CRITERIA IN MEASURE 3 OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED WHICH THE BUNDESWEHR HAS CARRIED OUT IN 1984 AND CARRIES OUT IN THE SECOND QUARTER OF 1985. THE FOLLOWING TABLES (ADAPTED TO NARRATIVE), THEREFORE, PROVIDE EXAMPLES OF A COMPLETE FORECAST COVERING A WHOLE CALENDER YEAR WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN ISSUED NOT LATER THAN NOVEMBER 15TH OF THE PRECEDING YEAR. IN ADDITION, A GENUINE FORECAST

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THOUGH LIMITED TO THE CURRENT QUARTER IS ATTACHED.

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7. OUT-OF-GARRISON ACTIVITIES BUNDESWEHR, FIRST QUARTER  
1984

- A. EXERCISE ON TRAINING AREA
- B. FIRING AND COMBAT TRAINING
- C. JANUARY 1984
- D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
- E. TRAINING AREA BERGEN-MUNSTER 52 DEG 59 MIN N  
10 DEG 7 MIN E

- F. 12 DAYS
- G. 7,000 TROOPS
- H. ARMOUR, ARMOURED RECONNAISSANCE, ARTILLERY,  
ARMOURED INFANTRY

- A. EXERCISE ON TRAINING AREA
- B. FIRING AND COMBAT TRAINING
- C. FEBRUARY 1984
- D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
- E. TRAINING AREA BERGEN-MUNSTER 52 DEG 59 MIN N  
10 DEG 7 MIN E

- F. 14 DAYS
- G. 7,000 TROOPS
- H. ARMOUR, ARMOURED RECONNAISSANCE, ARTILLERY,  
ARMOURED INFANTRY

- 
- A. EXERCISE ON TRAINING AREA
  - B. FIRING AND COMBAT TRAINING
  - C. FEBRUARY 1984
  - D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
  - E. TRAINING AREA GRAFENWOHR 49 DEG 40 MIN N 11 DEG  
50 MIN E

- F. 4 DAYS
- G. 7,000 TROOPS
- H. ARMOUR, ARMOURED INFANTRY, ARTILLERY, ENGINEERS

- A. EXERCISE ON TRAINING AREA
- B. FIRING AND COMBAT TRAINING
- C. FEBRUARY 1984
- D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
- E. TRAINING AREA BERGEN-MUNSTER 52 DEG 59 MIN N  
10 DEG 7 MIN E

- F. 12 DAYS
- G. 7,000 TROOPS
- H. ARMOUR, ARMOURED RECONNAISSANCE, ARTILLERY,  
ARMOURED INFANTRY

- 
- A. EXERCISE ON TRAINING AREA
  - B. FIRING AND COMBAT TRAINING
  - C. MARCH 1984
  - D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
  - E. TRAINING AREA BERGEN-MUNSTER 52 DEG 59 MIN N  
10 DEG 7 MIN E

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- F. 14 DAYS
  - G. 7,000 TROOPS
  - H. ARMOUR, ARMoured RECONNAISSANCE, ARTILLERY, ARMoured INFANTRY
8. OUT-OF-GARRISON ACTIVITIES BUNDESWEHR, SECOND QUARTER 1984
- A. EXERCISE ON TRAINING AREA
  - B. FIRING AND COMBAT TRAINING
  - C. MAY 1984
  - D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
  - E. TRAINING AREA BERGEN-MUNSTER 52 DEG 59 MIN N 10 DEG 7 MIN E
  - F. 14 DAYS
  - G. 7,000 TROOPS
  - H. ARMOUR, ARMoured RECONNAISSANCE, ARTILLERY, ARMoured INFANTRY
- 
- A. EXERCISE ON TRAINING AREA
  - B. FIRING AND COMBAT TRAINING
  - C. JUNE 1984
  - D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
  - E. TRAINING AREA BERGEN-MUNSTER 52 DEG 59 MIN N 10 DEG 7 MIN E
  - F. 16 DAYS
  - G. 7,000 TROOPS
  - H. ARMOUR, ARMoured RECONNAISSANCE, ARTILLERY, ARMoured INFANTRY
- A. EXERCISE ON TRAINING AREA
  - B. FIRING AND COMBAT TRAINING
  - C. JUNE 1984
  - D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
  - E. TRAINING AREA BERGEN-MUNSTER 52 DEG 59 MIN N 1U DEG 7 MIN E
  - F. 14 DAYS
  - G. 7,000 TROOPS
  - H. ARMOUR, ARMoured RECONNAISSANCE, ARTILLERY, ARMoured INFANTRY
- 
- A. EXERCISE ON TRAINING AREA
  - B. FIRING AND COMBAT TRAINING
  - C. JULY 1984
  - D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
  - E. TRAINING AREA BERGEN 52 DEG 50 MIN N 9 DEG 58 MIN E
  - F. 21 DAYS
  - G. 7,000 TROOPS
  - H. ARMOUR, ARMoured RECONNAISSANCE, ARMoured INFANTRY
9. OUT-OF-GARRISON ACTIVITIES BUNDESWEHR, THIRD QUARTER 1984
- A. "WEISSE BIRKE"

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- B. COMMAND POST EXERCISE IN THE FIELD
  - C. SEPTEMBER 1984
  - D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
  - E. HAMBURG 53 DEG 36 MIN N 10 DEG 3 MIN E; HANOVER 52 DEG 24 MIN N 9 DEG 44 MIN E; RHEINE 52 DEG 18 MIN N 7 DEG 28 MIN E; BREMEN 53 DEG 4 MIN N 8 DEG 51 MIN E
  - F. 5 DAYS
  - G. 10,000 TROOPS
  - H. GROUND FORCES
- 
- A. "FLINKER IGEL"
  - B. FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE
  - C. SEPTEMBER 1984
  - D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
  - E. NURNBERG 49 DEG 27 MIN N 11 DEG 4 MIN E; PASSAU 48 DEG 34 MIN N 13 DEG 26 MIN E; MUNCHEN 48 DEG 11 MIN N 11 DEG 33 MIN E
  - F. 9 DAYS
  - G. 55,000 TROOPS
  - H. ARMOUR, ARMoured RECONNAISSANCE, ARMoured INFANTRY, ARTILLERY, AIR DEFENSE, ENGINEERS, AIR SUPPORT
- A. EXERCISE ON TRAINING AREA
  - B. FIRING AND COMBAT TRAINING
  - C. SEPTEMBER 1984
  - D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
  - E. TRAINING AREA BERGEN-MUNSTER 53 DEG 59 MIN N 10 DEG 7 MIN E
  - F. 14 DAYS
  - G. 7,000 TROOPS
  - H. ARMOUR, ARMoured RECONNAISSANCE, ARTILLERY, ARMoured INFANTRY
- 
- A. EXERCISE ON TRAINING AREA
  - B. FIRING AND COMBAT TRAINING
  - C. SEPTEMBER 1984
  - D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
  - E. TRAINING AREA BERGEN-MUNSTER 52 DEG 59 MIN N 10 DEG 7 MIN E
  - F. 14 DAYS
  - G. 7,000 TROOPS
  - H. ARMOUR, ARMoured RECONNAISSANCE, ARTILLERY, ARMoured INFANTRY
- A. "SICHERE FESTUNG"
  - B. FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE
  - C. OCTOBER 1984
  - D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, BELGIUM
  - E. KASSEL 51 DEG 19 MIN N 9 DEG 30 MIN E; BAD HERSFELD 52 DEG 52 MIN N 9 DEG 43 MIN E; GIessen 50 DEG 35 MIN N 8 DEG 41 MIN E
  - F. 4 DAYS
  - G. 10,000 TROOPS

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H. ARMOUR, ARMoured RECONNAISSANCE, ARMoured  
INFANTRY, ARTILLERY, AIR DEFENSE, ENGINEERS, AIR SUPPORT

- 
- A. EXERCISE ON TRAINING AREA
- B. FIRING AND COMBAT TRAINING
- C. OCTOBER 1984
- D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
- E. TRAINING AREA BERGEN 52 DEG 49 MIN N  
9 DEG 58 MIN E
- F. 12 DAYS
- G. 7,000 TROOPS
- H. ARMOUR, ARMoured RECONNAISSANCE, ARMoured  
INFANTRY
- 10. OUT-OF-GARRISON ACTIVITIES BUNDESWEHR, FOURTH  
QUARTER 1984
  - A. "KUHLE BRISE"
  - B. FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE
  - C. NOVEMBER 1984
  - D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, DENMARK
  - E. FLENSBURG 54 DEG 49 MIN N 9 DEG 23 MIN E;  
KIEL 54 DEG 19 MIN N 10 DEG 9 MIN E; HAMBURG 53 DEG  
36 MIN N 10 DEG 3 MIN E
  - F. 4 DAYS
  - G. 12,000 TROOPS
  - H. ARMOUR, ARMoured RECONNAISSANCE, ARMoured  
INFANTRY, ARTILLERY, AIR DEFENSE, ENGINEERS, AIR SUPPORT

- 
- A. EXERCISE ON TRAINING AREA
- B. FIRING AND COMBAT TRAINING
- C. NOVEMBER 1984
- D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
- E. TRAINING AREA BERGEN-MUNSTER 52 DEG 59 MIN N  
10 DEG 7 MIN E
- F. 2 DAYS
- G. 7,000 TROOPS
- H. ARMOUR, ARMoured RECONNAISSANCE, ARTILLERY,  
ARMoured INFANTRY
- 11. OUT-OF-GARRISON ACTIVITIES BUNDESWEHR, SECOND  
QUARTER 1985 (COMMENT: NO FIRST QUARTER 1985.)
  - A. EXERCISE ON TRAINING AREA
  - B. FIRING AND COMBAT TRAINING
  - C. APRIL 1985
  - D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
  - E. TRAINING AREA BERGEN 52 DEG 50 MIN N  
9 DEG 58 MIN E
  - F. 12 DAYS
  - G. 8,000 TROOPS
  - H. ARMOUR, ARMoured RECONNAISSANCE, ARMoured  
INFANTRY

- 
- A. COMMAND POST EXERCISE AT CORPS LEVEL "FRANKISCHE

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REISE"

- B. PREPARATION FOR ARMY EXERCISE 1986
- C. MAY 1985
- D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, UNITED STATES,

FRANCE

- E. HEIDELBERG 48 DEG 58 MIN N 8 DEG 40 MIN E;  
GERSFELD 50 DEG 27 MIN N 9 DEG 56 MIN E; SCHWEINFURT  
50 DEG 2 MIN N 10 DEG 15 MIN E; STUTTGART 48 DEG  
47 MIN N 9 DEG 11 MIN E; KARLSRUHE 48 DEG 58 MIN N  
8 DEG 23 MIN E

F. 6 DAYS

G. 9,000 TROOPS

H. GROUND FORCES

A. EXERCISE ON TRAINING AREA

B. FIRING AND COMBAT TRAINING

C. JUNE 1985

D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

E. TRAINING AREA BERGEN 52 DEG 50 MIN N 9 DEG  
58 MIN E

F. 13 DAYS

G. 8,000 TROOPS

H. ARMOUR, ARMoured RECONNAISSANCE, ARMoured  
INFANTRY

A. EXERCISE ON TRAINING AREA

B. FIRING AND COMBAT TRAINING

C. JUNE 1985

D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

E. TRAINING AREA BERGEN/MUNSTER SUD 52 DEG 59 MIN N  
10 DEG 7 MIN E

F. 14 DAYS

G. 8,000 TROOPS

H. ARMOUR, ARMoured RECONNAISSANCE, ARMoured  
INFANTRY, ARTILLERY

END

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SUBJECT: WORKING GROUP B, MAY 30, 1985  
 REF: A) STOCKHOLM 3756, B) STOCKHOLM 3869

1. CDE VI - 056
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT

3. SUMMARY: THE GDR AND THE SOVIET UNION PRESENTED HIGHLY INTRUSIVE SCENARIOS FOR OBSERVATION OF MAJOR AIR AND NAVAL EXERCISES, CALLING FOR OBSERVERS TO WATCH ACTIVITIES FROM SHIPS, AIRCRAFT, SHORE, AIR AND NAVAL BASES, AND AIR COMMAND POSTS. THE EAST'S EMPHASIS ON AIR AND NAVAL EXERCISES IS PART OF AN OVERALL STRATEGY TO RENEGOTIATE THE MANDATE TO INCLUDE INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. IN ADDITION, WE SUSPECT THAT THE WARSAW PACT IS AWARE OF WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF CERTAIN NNA'S TO REPLACE ON-SITE INSPECTION WITH AN EXPANDED OBSERVATION REGIME. THE SWEDES AND AUSTRIANS ALSO MADE SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT OBSERVATION REGIME. FRANCE STRESSED THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION. THE NETHERLANDS DISCUSSED THE DUAL PURPOSE OF OBSERVATION: TO JUDGE WHETHER AN ACTIVITY IS NON-THREATENING; AND TO CHECK WHETHER NOTIFICATION DATA CORRESPOND TO THE ACTUAL ACTIVITY. END SUMMARY.

4. SWEDISH MILREP (JOHANSSON) DELIVERED A SOMEWHAT DEFENSIVE SPEECH, NOTING THAT HIS GOVERNMENT'S INVITATION OF OBSERVERS TO ITS FEBRUARY VASTGRANS EXERCISE HAD BEEN INTENDED TO SHOW HOW SWEDEN BELIEVED OBSERVATION COULD BE CARRIED OUT ACCORDING TO THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT; IT HAD NOT BEEN PLANNED AS A SHOWPIECE OR AS A MUDEL FOR FUTURE OBSERVATION REGIMES. HE SAID THAT THE EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS WAS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT CSBM'S AND COULD SERVE AS AN IMPORTANT INSTRUMENT OF VERIFICATION (OF THE CONTENTS OF NOTIFICATIONS); IT MUST BE FURTHER DEVELOPED FOR THE LATTER PURPOSE WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING THE TRADITIONAL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING EFFECTS OF OBSERVATION. THIS CAN ONLY PARTLY BE ACHIEVED BY THE INVITATION AND PRESENCE OF OBSERVERS, HE SAID; IT IS ALSO NECESSARY TO HAVE ADEQUATE, IMPROVED, STANDARDIZED CONDITIONS FOR OBSERVERS. FOR EXAMPLE:

-- ALL PARTICIPATING STATES SHOULD RECEIVE INVITATIONS SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH NOTIFICATION OF AN ACTIVITY;

-- INVITED STATES SHOULD RESPOND WITHIN A FAIRLY SHORT TIME; HOWEVER, WHEN ALERTS ARE CONDUCTED, OBSERVATION PROCEDURES MUST BE DIFFERENT: THE U.S. STATEMENT OF LAST WEEK (REF A) WAS OF INTEREST TO THE SWEDISH DELEGATION;

-- INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE HOST COUNTRY SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED TO THE OBSERVERS' PROGRAM; TO FACILITATE THE OBSERVERS' PREPARATION, BASIC INFORMATION SHOULD BE

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PROVIDED WITH THE INVITATION REGARDING THE WHOLE ACTIVITY, E.G., MAPS, SKETCHES OF THE MOVEMENTS OF MAJOR UNITS;

-- SUCH EARLY INFO MUST BE FOLLOWED BY FURTHER DAILY DETAILED BRIEFINGS ON THE CURRENT SITUATION AND THAT FORESEEN BY THE RESPONSIBLE COMMANDERS OR DIRECTING STAFF.

5. THE SWEDISH REP POINTED OUT THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSAL CALLS FOR TWO OBSERVERS FROM EACH PARTICIPATING STATE AND SAID THAT, WHILE HIS DELEGATION DOESN'T OPPOSE IT, THIS MIGHT POSE PROBLEMS FOR SMALL COUNTRIES. HE SUGGESTED MAKING THE NUMBER OF OBSERVERS DEPENDENT ON THE SIZE OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY: TWO OBSERVERS COULD BE SENT TO A NORMAL-SIZED ACTIVITY (UNDER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, THIS WOULD INVOLVE AT LEAST 25,000 TROOPS); FOR A SMALLER, DIVISION-SIZED ACTIVITY, ONE OBSERVER MAY BE SUFFICIENT, WHILE LARGE-SCALE ACTIVITIES MAY REQUIRE MORE THAN TWO OBSERVERS. (BEGIN COMMENT: JOHANSSON MAY BE HINTING HERE OF SWEDISH FOCUS ON OBSERVATION AS A VERIFICATION MEASURE AS WELL AS POSSIBLE ACCEPTANCE OF NOTIFICATION AT DIVISION LEVEL. END COMMENT.)

6. OTHER AREAS WHERE IMPROVEMENT IS NEEDED, ACCORDING TO THE SWEDISH REP:

-- THE FREEDOM OF OBSERVERS TO CHOOSE THE AREA AND OBJECT OF OBSERVATION;

-- THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET COMMANDERS, STAFF OFFICERS AND TROOPS;

-- THE TIME SPAN OF THE OBSERVATION: A SHORT OBSERVATION PERIOD, COVERING ONLY ONE PHASE OF THE ACTIVITY, IS INSUFFICIENT WHEN A LARGE-SCALE ACTIVITY IS BEING CONDUCTED.

7. THE GDR (GRACZYNSKI) THEN INTRODUCED DETAILED MODALITIES FOR THE OBSERVATION OF MAJOR AIR EXERCISES (EASTERN WORKING GROUP DOCUMENT 2). OBSERVATION OF AIR EXERCISES COULD BE ORGANIZED ON THE BASIS OF DIFFERENT OBSERVATION MEASURES, E.G.:

-- ON AIRFIELDS/AIR BASES;  
 -- IN A VISUAL MANNER IN THE AREA OF THE EXERCISE;  
 -- IN AIR COMMAND POSTS, ON SCREENS OF RADAR MONITORING STATIONS;

-- THROUGH BRIEFINGS BY EXERCISE LEADERS.

8. ACCORDING TO GRACZYNSKI, OBSERVATION OF AIR EXERCISES WOULD BE CONDUCTED AS FOLLOWS:

-- THE HOST COUNTRY INVITES OBSERVERS TO THE AIR-BASE, AIRFIELD OR ANOTHER MILITARY FACILITY;

-- BEFORE THE START OF THE EXERCISE, THE EXERCISE COMMANDERS BRIEF OBSERVERS AND ANSWER THEIR QUESTIONS ON THE GOALS, THE CONTENT OF THE PLANNED ACTIVITY, THE CONCEPT AND PHASES OF THE ACTIVITY, THE TYPE OF TRAINING

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ACTIVITIES, AND THE WORKING REGIME OF THE OBSERVERS;

- AT THE AIRBASE/AIRFIELD, OBSERVERS CAN FAMILIARIZE THEMSELVES WITH THE MAIN TYPES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT EMPLOYED IN THE MANEUVER;
- AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MANEUVER, THE OBSERVATION OF AIR EXERCISES COULD TAKE PLACE FROM LAND, E.G., THE VISUAL OBSERVATION OF TAKEOFFS AND LANDINGS, ATTACKS ON GROUND TARGETS ON THE TARGET RANGE, AND ACTIONS OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN OVERCOMING THE AIR DEFENSE FORCES;
- AIR ACTIVITIES DON'T NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE OBSERVED AT AIR COMMANDS; THEY CAN BE OBSERVED ON SCREENS OF RADAR STATIONS NEAR THE AIR COMMAND AND BY STUDYING MAPS ON THE AIR SITUATION;
- OBSERVERS COULD MEET PERSONNEL OF TROOP ELEMENTS PARTICIPATING IN THE EXERCISE;
- OBSERVATION OF THE RETURN OF AIRCRAFT COULD BE ORGANIZED ON THE BASE/FIELD TO VERIFY THAT THE AIRCRAFT HAVE COMPLETED THEIR MISSIONS;
- TRANSPORT BY SEA OR RAIL OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM PERMANENT BASES COULD BE OBSERVED AT THE LOADING OR UNLOADING POINTS;

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- DIRECTORS OF THE MANEUVER COULD GIVE BRIEFINGS ON THE RESULTS.
- RELATIVELY BROAD OBSERVATION POSSIBILITIES COULD BE USED SO THAT OBSERVERS COULD JUDGE THE SCALE AND GOALS OF AIR FORCE ACTIVITIES.
- THESE OBSERVATION OPPORTUNITIES MUST NOT HURT THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE HOST COUNTRY. (COMMENT: THIS LAST CONDITION WAS NOT PART OF THE WRITTEN TEXT GIVEN TO THE USDEL; HOWEVER, THE BROAD INTERPRETATION THE WARSAW PACT COULD GIVE IT WHEN WARSAW PACT EXERCISES WERE INVOLVED PROVIDES THE EAST WITH AN EASY EXCUSE FOR NOT LIVING UP TO THE BROAD OBSERVATION MODALITIES SEEMINGLY PROPOSED IN THIS MEASURE. END COMMENT.)

9. TATARNIKOV (USSR) PRAISED THE GDR STATEMENT FOR DISCUSSING OBSERVATION NOT IN GENERAL TERMS, BUT IN TERMS OF SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES. HE NOTED THE DIFFICULTIES OF OBSERVING ANY KIND OF EXERCISE AND POINTED OUT THAT WHILE THE OBSERVERS TO THE SWEDISH EXERCISE VASTGRANS HAD BEEN IN A POSITION TO OBSERVE MANY KINDS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES, "CONDITIONS BEYOND OUR CONTROL," I.E., BAD WEATHER, HAD INTERFERED WITH OBSERVATION. TATARNIKOV THEN SPELLED OUT "SPECIFIC SCENARIOS" FOR OBSERVATION OF MAJOR NAVAL EXERCISES:

- OBSERVERS COULD BE RECEIVED BY THE COMMANDER OF A MAJOR NAVAL EXERCISE AT A NAVAL BASE OR A SPECIFIC POINT; HE COULD BRIEF THEM ON THE PURPOSE, THE KINDS OF ACTIVITIES AT VARIOUS STAGES, THE PARTICIPATING STATES, THE SHIPS, THE SHIP CLASSES, THE AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS, THE AREA AND COORDINATES OF THE EXERCISE,

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THE OBSERVERS' WORK REGIME AND FACILITIES AT THE OBSERVERS' DISPOSAL, THE VANTAGE POINT FROM WHICH THEY COULD OBSERVE;

-- AT THE NAVAL BASE, THE OBSERVERS COULD FAMILIARIZE THEMSELVES WITH THE SHIPS, THE OFFICERS AND MEN ON BOARD; THEY COULD OBSERVE VARIOUS SHIPS, MILITARY EQUIPMENT, THE EMBARCATION OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCES, THE LOADING OF AMMUNITION, CARGO, ETC.;

-- THEREAFTER, OBSERVATION OF NAVAL FORMATIONS COULD TAKE PLACE FROM THE FLAG SHIP OR FROM A VESSEL DESIGNATED SPECIFICALLY FOR OBSERVERS; INFORMATION WOULD HAVE TO BE RECEIVED PERIODICALLY AT SEA;

-- AT SEA THE OBSERVERS COULD OBSERVE THE ACTIVITIES OF SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT, AIRCRAFT FROM HELICOPTER CARRIERS AND PATROLLING AIRCRAFT WITHIN THE AREA OF THE EXERCISE;

-- FROM AIRCRAFT SPECIALLY DESIGNATED FOR OBSERVERS, THEY COULD OBSERVE THE FORMATION OF THE SHIPS INVOLVED IN THE EXERCISES; IN THE EXERCISE AREA THEY ALSO COULD OBSERVE THE MOVEMENTS OF SHIPS AND AIR ACTIVITIES; THUS, THEY WOULD HAVE AN IDEA OF THE PATTERN OF FORMATIONS OF SHIPS, AND COULD ESTABLISH THEIR STRENGTH, THEIR CLASS, WHETHER THE FORMATIONS ARE IN THE EXERCISE AREA; THEY ALSO COULD CHECK COMPLIANCE OF THE EXERCISE WITH THE NOTIFICATION;

-- AT THE NEXT STAGE, IF AMPHIBIOUS FORCES ARE TO BE LANDED, THE OBSERVERS COULD OBSERVE THIS FROM SHORE, CHECKING WHETHER THE SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN THE EXERCISE CORRESPOND TO THE NUMBERS IN THE NOTIFICATION;

-- AT THE END OF THE EXERCISE, OBSERVERS HAVE TO BE CONVINCED THAT THE SHIPS HAVE RETURNED TO THEIR PORT; THEREFORE, THE OBSERVERS COULD RETURN TO THE BASE AND THE COMMANDING OFFICER COULD GIVE THEM A BRIEFING REGARDING WHETHER THE PURPOSES OF THE EXERCISE HAVE BEEN FULFILLED;

-- OBSERVERS WOULD HAVE TO BE TRAINED;

-- THIS IS ONLY ONE POSSIBLE SCENARIO FOR OBSERVATION OF NAVAL EXERCISES; THIS IS NOT A MATTER OF DOGMA, BUT AN INVITATION TO DIALOGUE.

10. ITALY (SFARA) TOOK ISSUE WITH A RECENT COMPLAINT THAT THE WARSAW PACT'S FORTHCOMINGNESS REGARDING DETAILS ON OBSERVATIONS HAD NOT BEEN RECIPROCATED. SFARA SAID THAT BOTH NATO AND THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED (NNA) HAVE FROM USDEL CDE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: CSCE, PARM, PREL, CDE

SUBJECT: WORKING GROUP B, MAY 30, 1985

STRESSED THE NEED TO INVITE OBSERVERS TO ALL NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND THE NEED TO EXTEND INVITATIONS TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES. HE NOTED THAT NATO HAS INCLUDED IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED NAVAL AND AIR EXERCISES WHICH CORRESPOND TO THE MANDATE (THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH) AND

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ARE ADEQUATELY VERIFIABLE. THE ITALIAN REP POINTED OUT THAT OBSERVATION BACKED UP WITH ADEQUATE INFORMATION WOULD ESTABLISH CONFIDENCE.

11. AUSTRIA (LIKO) STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE FOR COUNTRIES WITHOUT ACCESS TO "HIGH MILITARY TECHNOLOGY" OF ELEMENTS OF VERIFICATION WHICH COULD EXIST IN THE CONTEXT OF OBSERVATION. WELL-ORGANIZED OBSERVATION MIGHT EVEN REDUCE THE REQUIREMENTS OF VERIFICATION, HE SAID, WHILE AN OBSERVATION REGIME WITH INADEQUATE CONDITIONS COULD REQUIRE ADDITIONAL VERIFICATION MEASURES. HE CALLED FOR STANDARDIZED CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD:

-- SET THE INVITATION PROCESS AS WELL AS INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS BEFORE, AT THE START OF AND DURING A MILITARY ACTIVITY;

-- PROVIDE THAT INVITATIONS WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY ORDER OF BATTLE INFORMATION AND GOOD LAND MAPS;

-- EXTEND THE DURATION OF OBSERVATION.

12. FRANCE (MERIC) STRESSED THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION. HE SAID THAT AN INSPECTION CALLS FOR SURVEYING, MONITORING AND CHECKING, WHILE THE ROLE OF AN OBSERVER IS TO WATCH ATTENTIVELY, TO EVALUATE WHETHER A MILITARY ACTIVITY IS THREATENING OR NOT AND TO MAKE A STATEMENT OF HIS CONCLUSIONS. HE ARGUED THAT THE INTENTIONS OF STATES WOULD BE EASIER TO JUDGE IF OBSERVERS WERE PROVIDED INFORMATION ON THE DESIGNATION OF THE DIVISIONS ENGAGED IN MANEUVERS AND AN EXACT DEFINITION (GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES) OF THE MANEUVER ZONE.

13. THE NETHERLANDS (VAN DER GRAAF) ALSO ADDRESSED THE ISSUE OF THE PURPOSE OF OBSERVATION, NOTING THAT IT IS TWOFOLD:

-- TO SEE WHETHER A MILITARY ACTIVITY IS NON-THREATENING;

-- TO CHECK WHETHER NOTIFICATION DATA CORRESPOND TO THE ACTUAL ACTIVITY.

14. THE DUTCH MILREP INSISTED THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR AFFECTING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OBSERVATION IS THE RIGHT TO OBSERVE THE WHOLE ACTIVITY.

15. COMMENT: WHILE IT IS GOOD TO SEE DETAILED DISCUSSIONS IN THE WORKING GROUP ON OBSERVATION, WE CANNOT ACCEPT SOME OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF STATEMENTS BY THE EAST (EXPANDING THE ZONE), AND EVEN BY THE NNA (REPLACING ON-SITE INSPECTION WITH AN IMPROVED OBSERVATION REGIME). WE ARE HEARTENED TO SEE THE EAST AND NNA SUPPORTING THE DUAL TASKS OF OBSERVATION WHICH THE DUTCH MILREP (AND A POLISH STATEMENT LAST WEEK - REF B) DESCRIBED. WE SUSPECT, HOWEVER, THAT THE EAST IS NOT UNAWARE OF THE WILLINGNESS OF CERTAIN NNA DELEGATIONS TO REPLACE ON-SITE INSPECTION WITH AN EXPANDED OBSERVATION REGIME. MOREOVER, THE WARSAW PACT, WITH ITS EMPHASIS ON

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AIR AND NAVAL EXERCISES, CLEARLY IS TRYING TO EXPAND THE MADRID MANDATE'S DEFINITION OF THE ZONE OUT INTO THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE. WE NOTE THAT THEY RESERVE THEIR MOST DARING "SCENARIOS" OF OBSERVATION MODALITIES FOR THEIR AIR AND NAVAL MEASURES. IF OUR EARLY CONCLUSIONS ARE CORRECT, THE THRESHOLDS SUGGESTED IN THE EAST'S WORKING DOCUMENTS ARE SUFFICIENTLY HIGH TO OBVIATE THE NEED FOR EASTERN NOTIFICATIONS, THUS ALLOWING THEM TO APPEAR QUITE GENEROUS. THIS SEEMS TO BE A RATHER CLEVER TACTICAL PLOY VIS-A-VIS ATTITUDES IN THE WORKING GROUPS. NEVERTHELESS, THEY AFFORD THE WEST SOME OPPORTUNITIES TO TURN MUCH OF THIS NEW EASTERN OPENNESS TO OUR ADVANTAGE IN TERMS OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH AND ISSUES OF INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION. END COMMENT.

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English interpretation  
Netherlands delegationTatarnikov statementObservation30 May 1985

Mr. Chairman,

It is with great attention that I listened to the statement made by the representative of the German Democratic Republic on specific questions of the work and tasks of observers at major military manoeuvres.

I think the statement made by him is a very interesting one and I do think that we should repeat this matter because observation is a specific matter applied to a very specific form of activity. We are not talking about observation in general we are talking about observation of specific activities and since among the distinguished representatives here there have been questions and there were doubts expressed as to the difficulties of observing airforce activities, naval activities and there were questions raised by the distinguished representative of Austria, General Liko and I for my part I would like to dwell on some of these specific questions and specific scenarios which call for certain action and observation part of the observer in connection with major naval manoeuvres. This is the kind of activity which would be a step into something new because the observers on the naval fleets have not been resorted to or ever used before. But there is a certain practice established in friendly entry into foreign ports of naval ships in friendly countries.

The Swedish population is often admitted on to the naval ships and they talk to the sailors, to the officers. This is an element of observation after all I'd like to say. This is the green that is sown in the field that may come up with broader matters. But I think that there might be difficulties and difficulties not only occurring with regard to observation of naval manoeuvres or airforce manoeuvres but I think also landforces too. After all after the Västgräns exercise which we have observed which was excellently organised by the Swedish military

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where we were in a position to observe many kinds of military activities but conditions which were beyond our control sometimes caused considerable difficulties. I think that we all came to this conclusion. Therefore I don't need to dwell at length on this and therefore let us consider the kind of scenario involving naval manoeuvres. Here the observer can be received by the command or the person in command of a major naval manoeuvre at a naval base or at some specific point and that would be the first stage and thereafter the work of the observers can be carried out at sea to observe the action of the fleet, of the ships and aviation or let us say airforce. This could be carried out also on board or from an aircraft or on board of a ship. Then also we could have observers on land, along the coast and where we have amphibious forces landing with the action of aircraft in connection with air troopers and the observation can be carried out at bases to which naval ships return after manoeuvres. Well, the kind of scenarios that I was having in mind would appear most particularly like this on greater detail and on an appointed place the invited observers would be convened and the commanding officer, well acquainted with the situation and the manoeuvres, would have to speak to these observers. He would then as a commanding officer carry out a briefing in the course of which he would acquaint the invited observers with the purpose of the manoeuvres and its major concept and he would describe the kind of military activities at the various stages in such activities and also would describe or mention and numerate the participating states, the ships, classes of ships, the aircraft and helicopters. He would then specify the area and coordinates of the manoeuvres.

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and he would also declare to the observers in which way they will be expected to work and what means they will have at their disposal for observation, from where they will observe and he could answer any questions that may arise and be asked by the observers. At the naval base the observers could acquaint themselves and have personal contacts with the ships, officers and men.

Here the observers would be able to observe various ships, the military hardware involved in the naval manoeuvres. Here they could also observe the embarkation of amphibious forces, also loading of ammunition, cargo etc. This could, of course, be carried out at the first stage of the observation at the base. Thereafter the observers could also observe the naval formations from the flagship or from some vessel specially appointed for this and information would have to be periodically receiveable and received while at sea the observers could observe the activities of ships, aircraft and also aircraft from the aircarriers of helicopters and also patrolling aircraft within the area of manoeuvres. With aircraft especially designated for or allocated for this the observers could observe the formation of the ships involved in the manoeuvres. In the area of manoeuvres they also could observe the movements of ships, air activities and would have a certain idea of the pattern of formation of ships. They could establish their strength, their class and they could therefore check off against the information in the notification. They could also decide whether such naval formations are within the area of manoeuvres. At the next stage, if amphibious forces are to be landed, the observers could observe this from land, from the coast. The observers could also note that the ships and aircraft involved in the manoeuvres would correspond to the numbers declared in the notification. This is particularly significant towards the end of the manoeuvres and in conclusion, as a group of observers has to be convinced that the ships returned to their port the personnel returns to base and a briefing has to be carried out in conclusion where the commanding officer gives a brief a kind of information with regard to

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the purposes of the manoeuvres having been fulfilled.

This is of course, Mr. Chairman, only one of the scenarios as possible with regard to observation of naval forces in manoeuvres. Naturally, we are ready to consider some details and further details with regard to this measure, together with the other representatives present here. This approach considers the realities of major manoeuvres on sea and of course the observers have to have a specific preparation for this, would have to be trained but this is not a matter of dogma, but this is an invitation to a dialogue.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

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SUBJECT: U.S.-SOVIET DEPUTIES/MILREPS WORKING LUNCH,  
- MAY 30, 1985

1. CDE VI - 062
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT

3. SUMMARY. AT THE U.S.' INVITATION, THE DEPUTIES AND MILREPS OF THE U.S. AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS MET FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE AMBASSADORS GRINEVSKY AND GOODBY AGREED THAT SUCH CONTACTS WOULD ENCOURAGE A MORE DETAILED, SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF ISSUES THAN IS POSSIBLE IN THE WORKING GROUPS. WHILE THE SOVIETS, PARTICULARLY GENERAL TATARNIKOV, WERE VERY WARY OF THIS FIRST INTENSIVE DISCUSSION WITH THEIR U.S. COUNTERPARTS, THEY RESPONDED NONETHELESS TO U.S. DELS' QUESTIONS, PROVIDING SOME DETAILS ON THE SOVIET POSITION ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE, VERIFICATION AND ON THE EASTERN NOTIFICATION PARAMETERS FOR AIR AND NAVAL EXERCISES. THEY ALSO AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO HOST THE NEXT MEETING AND GENERAL TATARNIKOV OFFERED TO PASS TO US AN INFORMAL LIST OF ISSUES WHICH THE SOVIETS WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS AT THE NEXT BILATERAL MEETING. END SUMMARY.

4. AT THE U.S.' INVITATION, THE DEPUTIES AND MILREPS OF THE U.S. AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS MET FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE AMBASSADORS GRINEVSKY AND GOODBY AGREED THAT SUCH CONTACTS WOULD ENCOURAGE A MORE DETAILED, SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF ISSUES THAN IS POSSIBLE IN THE WORKING GROUPS. PRESENT AT THE LUNCH WERE:

- U.S.	-	USSR
LYNN HANSEN	-	IVAN ROZANOV
MAJ.GEN. JONAS BLANK	-	GEN.MAJ. VICTOR TATARNIKOV
HARLAN STRAUSS	-	COL. IVAN BOGDANOV
PRISCILLA GALASSI	-	YEVGENIY VOLK

5. DISCUSSION FIRST FOCUSED ON THE SOVIET POSITION ON INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION. ROZANOV NOTED THAT MANY QUESTIONS ARISE IN WORKING GROUP A ON WEDNESDAY (INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION) WHICH CANNOT BE ANSWERED IN THAT GROUP BECAUSE THEY PERTAIN TO VERIFICATION OF MEASURES BEING DISCUSSED IN WORKING GROUP B. HE SUGGESTED STUDYING WHAT COULD BE SELECTED FROM SC.1 MEASURES 1 AND 5 (INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION) TO BE INTEGRATED IN THE DISCUSSION OF MILITARY ISSUES IN WORKING GROUP B.

6. HANSEN NOTED THAT THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE EASTERN WORKING DOCUMENT ON NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR LAND EXERCISES IS ALMOST ENTIRELY COVERED IN HELSINKI FINAL ACT OBLIGATIONS. HE THEN ASKED FOR AN EXPLANATION OF THE FINAL SENTENCE IN THE EAST'S WORKING DOCUMENT ON NOTIFICATION WHICH, BY CALLING FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, PARTICULARLY ON COMPOSITION OF FORCES INVOLVED, SEEMED TO INDICATE EASTERN FLEXIBILITY

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ON PROVIDING MORE INFORMATION. TATARNIKOV EXPLAINED THAT INFORMATION EXCHANGED DURING NOTIFICATION WILL CONFORM TO THE LIST PROVIDED IN THE WORKING DOCUMENT; HOWEVER, DEPENDING ON THE CHARACTER OF THE EXERCISE, E.G., IF THERE ARE AMPHIBIOUS COMPONENTS, OR IF PARATROOPERS ARE TRANSFERRED, ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WOULD ACCOMPANY THE REGULAR LIST.

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7. HANSEN THEN ASKED TATARNIKOV WHETHER, IF AGREEMENT ON NOTIFICATION PARAMETERS WERE REACHED, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD CONSIDER PROVIDING INFORMATION ON THE STRUCTURE OF TROOPS AND ON WHERE THEY COME FROM. TATARNIKOV DANCED ALL AROUND THIS QUESTION WITHOUT EVER ANSWERING IT. FIRST, HE SAID THAT WHEN THE SOVIETS TALK ABOUT INFORMATION EXCHANGE, THEY MEAN INFORMATION IN THE CONTEXT OF NOTIFICATION. HE PROVIDED EXAMPLES: WHEN NOTIFYING LARGE-SCALE GROUND FORCE EXERCISES, ONE TYPE OF INFORMATION WOULD ACCOMPANY IT; IN THE CASE OF AIR EXERCISES THE INFORMATION EXCHANGED WOULD BE DIFFERENT; AND IT WOULD DIFFER AGAIN IN THE CASE OF NOTIFICATION OF AIR EXERCISES. WHEN PRESSED, HE SAID THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD PROVIDE INFORMATION ON WHERE FORCES ARE FROM (THE REGION) AS WELL AS THE PURPOSE OF THE EXERCISE. WHEN HANSEN'S QUESTIONS BECAME MORE SPECIFIC ON DIVISION DESIGNATION AND LOCATION OF SOVIET EXERCISES IN THE BALTIC MILITARY DISTRICT, ROZANOV CAME TO TATARNIKOV'S RESCUE, QUESTIONING THE NEED FOR THE 35 PARTICIPANTS OF THE CDE TO KNOW DIVISION DESIGNATIONS AND LOCATIONS. HANSEN ARGUED THAT WHEN DISCUSSING VERIFICATION WHICH CORRESPONDS TO THE CONTENT OF CSBM'S, ALL COUNTRIES SHOULD PARTICIPATE.

8. TATARNIKOV THEN DREW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN HELSINKI MEASURES AND THE "NEW" APPROACH SET FORTH IN THE EASTERN WORKING DOCUMENTS. HE SAID THAT THE USSR UNDER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT CBM'S ALREADY PROVIDES NOTIFICATION INFORMATION ON THE TROOPS OF THE BALTIC MILITARY DISTRICT, THE AVIATION AND NAVAL FORCES WHICH PARTICIPATE AND SHOWS THE COMPOSITION OF GROUND, AIR, AND NAVAL FORCES. THE NEW EASTERN MEASURES WOULD APPLY IN CASES WHEN UNITS AND SUB-UNITS WHICH EXCEED THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD ARE MOVED FROM OTHER AREAS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE SOVIET GENERAL ADDED, IF A DIVISION WERE TRANSFERRED FROM THE SOVIET FAR EAST OR FROM THE CONTINENTAL U.S. TO THE AREA OF THE EXERCISE, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOTIFY OR REQUIRE NOTIFICATION, INCLUDING INFORMATION ON WHERE IT WAS TRANSFERRED TO AND FROM.

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9. TATARNIKOV INDICATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS IN ITS POCKET A SET OF VERIFICATION MEASURES WHICH IS ADEQUATE FOR EACH MEASURE AND WHICH IT WILL TABLE AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME. HE SAID THAT WHEN THE CONFERENCE

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DETERMINES THE RANGE OF CSBM'S, E.G., NOTIFICATION OF GROUND, AIR, AND NAVAL EXERCISES, IT WILL DETERMINE WHAT ADEQUATE VERIFICATION SHOULD BE.

10. GENERAL BLANK POINTED OUT THAT THE MADRID MANDATE REQUIRES VERIFICATION OF ALL NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO HAVE PRACTICAL VERIFICATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES IN THE ZONE. THE ONLY OBJECTIVE AND REALISTIC VERIFICATION REGIME WE COULD ENVISAGE WOULD REQUIRE OBSERVERS IN COMBAT CONTROL CENTERS DURING THE WHOLE EXERCISE. HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT AIR FORCE EXERCISES DO NOT TAKE PLACE IN LIMITED AREAS, BUT OVER THOUSANDS OF MILES AND INVOLVE MANY RADAR STATIONS AND COMBAT CONTROL CENTERS.

11. TATARNIKOV ARGUED THAT VERIFICATION, WHICH WAS APPLIED EQUALLY TO SOVIET AND U.S. TROOPS IN THE ZONE WOULD BE "UNBALANCED" DUE TO THE DIFFERENCE IN THE NUMBER OF DIVISIONS STATIONED IN EUROPE BY THE TWO COUNTRIES, I.E., FOUR U.S. DIVISIONS AND A SIGNIFICANTLY LARGER, UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF SOVIET DIVISIONS. HANSEN COUNTERED THAT THE FOUR U.S. DIVISIONS IN EUROPE WERE NOT THE ISSUE, BUT RATHER THE EAST-WEST BALANCE IN THE LARGER EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK. HE POINTED OUT THAT IN THIS FRAMEWORK IT IS THE SOVIETS WHO INSIST THERE IS ROUGH BALANCE.

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12. HANSEN THEN TURNED TO THE EASTERN PARAMETERS FOR AIR AND NAVAL EXERCISES, ASKING HOW AND WHY THOSE SPECIFIC NUMBERS (200 AIRCRAFT FOR AIR EXERCISES AND 30 SHIPS AND 100 AIRCRAFT FOR NAVAL EXERCISES) HAD BEEN CHOSEN. TATARNIKOV STRESSED THAT THE THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR AIR EXERCISES CALLS FOR 200 AIRCRAFT IN THE AIR SIMULTANEOUSLY. ADMITTING THAT AIR EXERCISES LARGE ENOUGH TO TRIGGER NOTIFICATION RARELY OCCUR, NONETHELESS, HE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE GOOD TO NOTIFY MASSIVE NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT TAKING OFF AND FLYING IN THE DIRECTION OF EUROPE. THE SOVIET GENERAL SAID THAT MODERN NAVAL ACTIVITIES DO NOT INVOLVE JUST SHIPS, BUT ALSO AIRCRAFT; WITHOUT THE LATTER, THE FORMER WOULD BE VERY VULNERABLE. HE INDICATED THAT BY AIRCRAFT, THE SOVIETS MEAN AIRCRAFT CARRIER AVIATION, SEA-BASED AVIATION, SHORE-BASED AVIATION, AND SHIPBOARD AVIATION. HE ADDED THAT IF NAVAL EXERCISES WERE TO TAKE PLACE IN THE BALTIC, LAND-BASED ARMY AVIATION ALSO WOULD BE COUNTED. NAVAL FORCES WOULD INCLUDE AVIATION ON HELICOPTER CARRIERS PLUS SHORE-BASED AVIATION AND PATROL PLANES. THE SOVIET GENERAL INDICATED THAT WHILE HELICOPTERS WOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN THE AIRCRAFT THRESHOLD FOR NAVAL EXERCISES, INFORMATION ON HELICOPTERS WOULD BE EXCHANGED DURING NOTIFICATION. HE CONCLUDED BY ASSERTING THAT 100 AIRCRAFT OCCASIONALLY DO PARTICIPATE IN NAVAL EXERCISES.

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13. COMMENT: REPEATED SOVIET EVASIONS OF DIRECT U.S. QUESTIONS ON WHETHER THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON THE DESIGNATIONS AND LOCATIONS OF SOVIET DIVISIONS PARTICIPATING IN NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE NO INTEREST IN, OR FLEXIBILITY ON, THE EXCHANGE OF SUCH INFORMATION. WHILE THE SOVIETS, PARTICULARLY GENERAL TATARNIKOV, WERE VERY WARY OF THIS FIRST INTENSIVE DISCUSSION WITH THEIR U.S. COUNTERPARTS, THEY AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO HOST THE NEXT MEETING. TATARNIKOV APPROACHED THE U.S. DEPUTY AFTER THE LUNCH AND VOLUNTEERED TO PASS TO US AN INFORMAL LIST OF ISSUES WHICH THE SOVIETS WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS AT THE NEXT MEETING.  
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SUBJECT: CDE NATO CAUCUS MAY 30, 1985  
 REF: A) STOCKHOLM 3908 B) STOCKHOLM 3942 C) STATE 164036

1. CDE VI - 049
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. SUMMARY: THE FRG REPORTED THAT IT WOULD TABLE ITS MEASURE 2 PROTOTYPE AT THE MAY 30 MEETING OF WORKING GROUP A. U.S. DEPUTY HANSEN, ON INSTRUCTIONS (REF C), STATED THAT THE U.S. WOULD PREFER THAT NO ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS BE TABLED NOW AND COULD NOT IN ANY CASE ENDORSE THE PRESENTATION OF ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS, OTHER THAN THE FRG MEASURE 2 PAPER, UNLESS IT WAS CONFIDENT THAT MEASURES 1 THROUGH 5 OF THE NATO PACKAGE WERE COVERED AND THAT TACTICS FOR TABLING SUCH PAPERS WERE AGREED UPON. DELEGATIONS REPORTED ON THE STATUS OF PAPERS COVERING MEASURES 3, 4, AND 5. GREECE DEBATED THE EFFICACY OF TABLING ANY PAPERS, SINCE THE WEST HAS NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED NUF OR THE THREE EASTERN NOTIFICATION PROPOSALS WHICH THE EAST REGARDS AS A QUID PRO QUO FOR DIRECTING THEIR COMMENT ON CONCRETE CSBM'S. VARIOUS DELEGATIONS STRONGLY DISAGREED WITH THIS CHARACTERIZATION. THE CAUCUS AGREED TO DISCUSS NEXT TIME THE TWO ISSUES RAISED BY THE FRENCH IN PLENARY ON INFORMAL WORKING GROUP STRUCTURES AS WELL AS ADJOURNMENT DATES IN MID-1986 FOR THE STOCKHOLM PORTION OF CDE. END SUMMARY.

4. ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS--U.S. AND FRG: DREHER (FRG) REPORTED THAT THE FRG WOULD TABLE ITS MEASURE 2 (FORECASTS) PROTOTYPE PAPER AT THE AFTERNOON WORKING GROUP A MEETING OF MAY 30 (SEE SEPTEL). HE NOTED THAT THE FRG PAPER NOW CONFORMS TO THE U.S. DRAFT MEASURE 2 PROTOTYPE AND CONTAINS NO IDENTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE UNITS. U.S. DEPUTY HANSEN STATED, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM WASHINGTON (REF C), THAT THE U.S. COULD NOT ENDORSE THE PRESENTATION OF ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS ON THE NATO PACKAGE'S MEASURES, OTHER THAN THE FRG MEASURE 2 PAPER, UNLESS IT WAS CONFIDENT THAT PAPERS WILL BE AVAILABLE ON MEASURES 1 THROUGH 5 OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED. HANSEN NOTED THAT PAPERS ON MEASURES 1 AND 5 (INFORMATION/ VERIFICATION) HAVE PROVEN TO BE THE MOST DIFFICULT. IN VIEW OF CAUCUS DECISIONS ON THE FRG MEASURE 2 PAPER (REF B), THE U.S. WOULD NOT WITHDRAW CONSENSUS ON PRESENTATION OF THE FRG PAPER ON A NATIONAL BASIS. HOWEVER, THE U.S. POSITION IS NOT TO INTRODUCE ANY ADDITIONAL ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS UNTIL DISCUSSION AND AGREEMENT ON TACTICS FOR TABLING THEM IS COMPLETED. HANSEN NOTED THAT THE U.S. CONTINUES TO SUPPORT THE NOTION OF ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS TO MAINTAIN THE CONFERENCE'S FOCUS ON SC.1/AMPLIFIED. HOWEVER, IT COULD BE A MISTAKE TACTICALLY TO TABLE ONLY TWO OR THREE PAPERS AND NOT THE REST. HANSEN CONCLUDED BY INSISTING

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THAT THE CAUCUS ADDRESS THIS ISSUE IN GREATER DETAIL AT SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS, AS PREVIOUSLY SUGGESTED BY AMBASSADORS GOODBY AND EDES (UK) (REFS A AND B), BEFORE DELEGATIONS PROCEED WITH TABLING NEW NATIONAL PAPERS BEYOND THE FRG PROTOTYPE. (COMMENT: STATEMENTS MADE ON MAY 23 AND MAY 28 BY AMBASSADORS GOODBY AND EDES RECOMMEND THAT THE CAUCUS DELAY TABLING ITS PAPERS UNTIL A THOROUGH REVIEW OF THE TACTICAL APPROACH WITH ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS CAN BE MADE, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH PROTOTYPES ALREADY UNDER REVIEW AND THOSE STILL BEING DEVELOPED. THE CAUCUS CONSENSUS AT THESE MEETINGS WAS TO ALLOW THE FRG TO PROCEED WITH TABLING ITS MEASURE 2 PAPER AND TO ASSESS CAREFULLY ALL SUBSEQUENT ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS. END COMMENT.)

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5. ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS--OTHER MEASURES: MACKLEY (UK) STATED THAT THE BRITISH MEASURE 3 (NOTIFICATION) PAPER IS BEING CHANGED TO INCORPORATE COMMENTS FROM THE MILITARY ADVISERS' GROUP (TEXT SENT SEPTEL). HE MADE NO MENTION OF THE STATUS OF THE BRITISH MEASURE 1 (INFORMATION) PAPER. DELWORTH (CANADA) AGREED WITH U.S. DEPUTY HANSEN'S STATEMENT ON DELAYING THE REMAINDER OF THE ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS AND NOTED THAT HIS DELEGATION WAS HAVING GREAT DIFFICULTY IN PRODUCING A USEFUL MEASURE 5 (VERIFICATION) PAPER. HE SAID A PAPER MAY BE READY IN A MATTER OF DAYS FOR CAUCUS DISCUSSION. GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) REPORTED THAT HIS DELEGATION'S MEASURE 4 (OBSERVATION) PAPER WOULD BE READY SHORTLY. ROSENTHAL (DENMARK) STATED THAT THE DANISH PAPER ON AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES WAS UNDER REVIEW IN COPENHAGEN. HE NOTED THAT A NEW DANISH PAPER WOULD STILL COVER MORE THAN ONE MEASURE OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED AND THUS MAY NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE CAUCUS AS AN ILLUSTRATIVE PAPER. BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) FIRMLY AGREED WITH THE U.S. POSITION. HE RESTATED HIS LACK OF ENTHUSIASM FOR THE WHOLE PROCESS OF PREPARING ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS WHILE NOTING THAT HE WAS NOT OPPOSED TO THE FRG TABLING OF ITS MEASURE 2 PAPER. HOWEVER, BUWALDA STRONGLY URGED THAT THE UTILITY OF TABLING THE REST OF THE PAPERS BE ADDRESSED AND THE TACTICS BE REVIEWED BEFORE PROCEEDING FURTHER. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DAY, ALLENDESALAZAR (SPAIN), SUMMARIZED CAUCUS CONSENSUS TO DELAY TABLING NEW PAPERS UNTIL THE ISSUE OF TACTICS HAS BEEN RESOLVED.

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6. ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS AND THE EAST: PAPADAKIS (GREECE) ASKED WHY THE CAUCUS WAS PROCEEDING WITH TABLING ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS WHEN THE EAST HAS STATED THAT IT WILL NOT DISCUSS THEM UNLESS THE WEST ADDRESSES THE THREE EASTERN NOTIFICATION MEASURES (ON MAJOR

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GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL EXERCISES) AS WELL AS THE FORM AND CONTENT OF A NUF PRINCIPLE. MEVIK (NORWAY), DREHER (FRG), GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE), AND BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) STRONGLY DIFFERED WITH THE GREEK VIEW. THEY NOTED THAT NUF HAS BEEN ADDRESSED THROUGHOUT THE LAST SESSION AS WELL AS IN THIS ONE. MOREOVER, AMBASSADOR GOODBY'S PLENARY STATEMENT OF MAY 24 WAS CITED AS THE DEFINITIVE WORD ON THE CONTENT, FORM AND BASIS FOR REAFFIRMING THE NUF PRINCIPLE; THE BALL IS NOW IN THE EASTERN COURT. WITH RESPECT TO THE THREE EASTERN NOTIFICATION MEASURES, THE FRG PLENARY STATEMENT OF MAY 24 PROVIDED AN INITIAL WESTERN RESPONSE, THEY SAID. IN ADDITION, THE CAUCUS MUST AWAIT THE ANALYSIS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS BY THE MILITARY ADVISERS' GROUP BEFORE SPECIFIC STATEMENTS COULD BE MADE. FINALLY, THEY NOTED, ANY CAUCUS DECISIONS ON ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS SHOULD BE TAKEN INDEPENDENT OF EASTERN ACTIONS. PAPADAKIS MAINTAINED HIS VIEW THAT THE WEST HAS PRODUCED NO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ON NUF BEYOND A REAFFIRMATION. BUWALDA CLOSED THE DEBATE BY REFERRING AGAIN TO THE GOODBY PLENARY STATEMENT AND NOTING THAT FINAL DETAILS REGARDING WESTERN RECUNFIRMATION OF NUF ARE AN END-GAME EXERCISE.

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7. CONTACTS: PAPADAKIS (GREECE) REPORTED THAT GRINEVSKY SEES THE WEST IN A WAITING MODE UNTIL THE RESULTS FROM OTTAWA BECOME APPARENT. ACCORDING TO PAPADAKIS, GRINEVSKY BELIEVES POSITIVE RESULTS IN OTTAWA WILL LEAD TO A PUSH FOR MOVING WORK AHEAD IN STOCKHOLM; NEGATIVE RESULTS IN OTTAWA WILL PROVOKE THE WEST TO CREATE OBSTACLES AT CDE. (COMMENT: AT THE MENTION OF GRINEVSKY'S REFERENCE TO OTTAWA, DELWORTH OF CANADA BROKE IN WITH A COMPLAINT THAT "THIS PUBLIC DEBATE ABOUT LINKAGE IS BEING USED AGAINST US." U.S. DEPUTY HANSEN POINTED OUT THAT "THE EAST WILL USE ANY TACTIC THEY CAN AGAINST US," AND REITERATED THE U.S. POSITION THAT WHILE WE DO NOT CLAIM FORMAL LINKAGE BETWEEN THE MEETINGS, THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ALL FACETS OF CSCE IS A REALITY THAT THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO UPHOLD. END COMMENT.) PAPADAKIS ALSO REPORTED THAT THE HUNGARIAN AMBASSADOR, SZIGETI, REGARDED THE GOODBY PLENARY STATEMENT ON MAJOR NICHOLSON AS WELL AS THE GUNDERSEN WORKING GROUP A STATEMENT ON AFGHANISTAN AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS (SEPTEL) AS A CHANGE IN WESTERN BEHAVIOR FOR THE WORSE. THE RESULT, SZIGETI TOLD PAPADAKIS, COULD BE MORE EASTERN POLEMICS. HANSEN NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS BEGAN THE EXCHANGE IN THE MAY 24 PLENARY WITH EROFEEV'S STATEMENT ON THE ALLEGED U.S. CHEMICAL WEAPONS THREAT. HANSEN ADDED THAT HE BELIEVED EROFEEV WAS NOW WILLING TO LET THE ISSUE REST AND NOT BE RAISED AGAIN IN PLENARY.

8. OTHER BUSINESS: MEVIK (NORWAY) ASKED AGAIN THAT THE NEXT CAUCUS CONSIDER THE TWO QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE

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FRENCH IN THEIR MAY 24 PLENARY STATEMENT ON INFORMAL  
WORKING GROUP STRUCTURES AND ADJOURNMENT DATES FOR THE  
STOCKHOLM PORTION OF CDE IN MID-1986 (REFTEL B). THERE  
WAS CONSENSUS TO DISCUSS THESE QUESTIONS AT THE NEXT  
MEETING ON TUESDAY, JUNE 4. (COMMENT: THE FRENCH HAVE  
INDICATED PRIVATELY THAT THEY MAY RAISE THESE ISSUES IN  
BRUSSELS AS WELL. END COMMENT.)  
END

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SUBJECT: CDE: MEASURE ONE

REFS: A. STOCKHOLM 3908, B. STOCKHOLM 3942,  
C. STOCKHOLM 3808, D. USNATO 7048 (1984), E. STATE 164036,  
F. USNATO 5918 (1984), G. USNATO 6688 (1984),  
H. USNATO 6975 (1984)

1. CDE VI - 52.

2. C- ENTIRE TEXT.

3. SUMMARY. IN RESPONSE TO INSTRUCTIONS REF E, DELEGATION WILL WITHHOLD CONSENSUS WITHIN CAUCUS REGARDING TABLING OF ADDITIONAL NATIONAL PAPERS UNTIL THERE IS ASSURANCE THAT PAPERS ON MEASURES 1 THROUGH 5 CAN BE TABLED. REGARDING MEASURE 1, WE UNDERSTAND FROM REF E THAT WASHINGTON'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATO COMPROMISE DIFFERS FROM THAT OF THE TURKS (AND OTHER ALLIES IN THE CAUCUS HERE). SOME OF THE BACKGROUND IS REVIEWED BELOW IN ORDER TO INDICATE WHY THE TURKS HAVE THEIR INTERPRETATION. A MORE COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATING RECORD WILL BE SENT SEPTEL. IN ANY EVENT, THE NATO UNDERSTANDING DOES REQUIRE CAUCUS CONSENSUS BEFORE NATIONAL PREFERENCES CAN BE OFFERED AND THE TURKS HAVE REJECTED THE US MEASURE 1 PROTOTYPE. MOST OTHER ALLIES WOULD SUPPORT THE TURKS. WE THEREFORE FACE THE PROBLEM OF WHETHER TO TABLE THE PROTOTYPE OVER TURKISH AND ALLIED OBJECTIONS, RISKING A US-TURKISH BILATERAL PROBLEM. PENDING FURTHER WASHINGTON GUIDANCE, WE WILL DELAY INTRODUCING THE PROTOTYPE INTO THE CAUCUS. END SUMMARY.

4. AS REPORTED IN REF A, US DELEGATION SUPPORTED FRG DECISION TO PRESENT MEASURE 2 PAPER (TEXT SEPTEL) AS A NATIONAL PRESENTATION. THIS WAS DONE IN WORKING GROUP A ON MAY 30. REFS A AND B REPORT EXHORTATIONS BY AMBASSADORS GOODBY AND EDES (UK) TO AGAIN EVALUATE COMMON NATO APPROACH TO THE TABLING OF WHAT ARE ESSENTIALLY NATIONAL PAPERS.

USDEL STATEMENT IN MAY 30 CAUCUS ENSURES THAT NO ADDITIONAL PAPERS WILL BE PRESENTED UNLESS WE ARE ABLE TO DEVISE SUITABLE PAPERS FOR ALL MEASURES. AS REPORTED SEPTEL, ENTHUSIASM IN THE CAUCUS IS WANING FOR THIS EXERCISE IN ITS CURRENT FORM.

5. THE TURKISH INTERPRETATION OF THE MEASURE 1 COMPROMISE REACHED IN NATO DIFFERS SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THAT REPORTED IN REF E. BACK IN AUGUST 1984, THROUGH THE AUSPICES OF THE TURKISH DELEGATION HERE (BOLUKBASI) WORKING WITH THE US DELEGATION, ANKARA HAD AGREED TO THE US FORMULATION PRESENTED TO THE CSBM WG IN REF F. BELGIAN AND DUTCH OBJECTIONS TO WHAT THEY BELIEVE WAS AN UNSATISFACTORY COMPROMISE CONVINCED ANKARA THAT THE COMPROMISE WORKED OUT BY THE US AND TURKISH

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DELEGATIONS WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED BY THE ALLIANCE AND APPEARS TO HAVE OFFENDED TURKISH SENSITIVITIES VIS-A-VIS THEIR LOYALTY TO A COMMON ALLIANCE POSITION. THIS REOPENED THE ISSUE IN ANKARA, LEADING TO US/BELGIAN/TURKISH DISCUSSIONS AT EVERE DURING WHICH THE TURKS INDICATED THEY NO LONGER SUPPORTED THE ORIGINAL US COMPROMISE, AND RESULTING IN A NEW COMPROMISE TO THE EFFECT THAT THE US COULD, IN BILATERAL CONVERSATIONS OUTSIDE THE PLENARY, MAKE KNOWN ITS NATIONAL POSITION ON BRIGADES/REGIMENTS, IF QUESTIONED BY THE EAST. THESE DISCUSSIONS ARE REPORTED IN NATO OFFICIAL/INFORMAL TO USDEL STOCKHOLM AND IN REF G. ACCORDING TO PARA 4, REF G IT IS THIS APPROACH WHICH HAS BEEN RECORDED IN THE FINAL PACKAGE. SUBSEQUENTLY, ANKARA REJECTED PART OF THIS COMPROMISE, AND ANOTHER FORMULATION WAS DEvised AT EVERE (REPORTED IN REF H). THE EVERE FORMULATION WAS FURTHER CHANGED BY ANKARA AND BECAME THE FINAL AGREEMENT (PARA 3, REF D). THIS NEGOTIATING HISTORY IS THE BASIS FOR THE TURKISH UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATO COMPROMISE FINALLY REACHED IN OCTOBER 1984, I.E., THAT DELEGATIONS COULD STATE THEIR NATIONAL PREFERENCE IN BILATERAL CONVERSATIONS ON AN INFORMAL BASIS, NOT IN THE CONFERENCE ITSELF. THE KEY WORDS ARE "INFORMAL BASIS" WHICH WAS UNDERSTOOD TO MEAN OUTSIDE THE PLENARY WHICH WAS THE ONLY CONFERENCE MEETING AT THE TIME. MOREOVER, THE FINAL AGREEMENT REFLECTED IN CM(84)2 4TH REVISION STIPULATES THAT THE NATIONAL UNDERSTANDINGS SHOULD BE PUT FORWARD ONLY IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS BY THE EAST OR NNA. AT LEAST IN TURKISH EYES, THIS ALSO HAS ITS ORIGIN IN THE INFORMAL US/BELGIAN/TURK COMPROMISE MENTIONED ABOVE IN REF G. THIS IS ALSO SEEN BY THE TURKS AS PRECLUDING THE SUBMISSION OF NATIONAL POSITIONS IN THE FORUM OF WORKING PAPERS.

6. AS REPORTED IN REF C, AMBASSADOR GOODBY CONDUCTED CONSULTATIONS WITH TURKISH AMBASSADOR IN STOCKHOLM CONCERNING US MEASURE 1 PROTOTYPE. TURKISH AMBASSADOR SENT THE PAPER TO ANKARA FOR COMMENT AND RECEIVED STRONG NEGATIVE REPLY. MEMBER OF TURKISH DELEGATION (BOLUKBASI) EXPRESSED IRRITATION AND INDIGNATION THAT US WOULD AGAIN RAISE MEASURE 1 ISSUE IN LIGHT OF ANKARA'S INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENT REACHED IN NATO LAST YEAR, REPORTED IN REF G. (AS A RESULT OF TURKISH AMBASSADOR OZGUL'S RECENT HEART ATTACK, BOLUKBASI IS ACTING HEAD OF TURKISH DELEGATION.)

7. GIVEN NATO AGREEMENT AS IT IS UNDERSTOOD BY DELEGATIONS IN STOCKHOLM AND STRONG TURKISH

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OBJECTIONS, DELEGATION NOTED IN REF C ITS VIEW THAT TO CONSIDER THE MEASURE 1 PROTOTYPE A PURELY NATIONAL PAPER AND TABLE IT DESPITE TURKISH OBJECTIONS WOULD NOT BE IN THE BEST OVERALL INTERESTS OF THE US. BASED UPON ANKARA'S RESPONSE TO US MEASURE 1 PROTOTYPE PAPER, WE COULD EXPECT TURKISH DELEGATION (BOLUKBASI) AT THE MINIMUM TO WITHHOLD CONSENSUS, WHICH THE OTHER ALLIES WOULD PROBABLY NOT QUESTION AND THUS CREATING A US-TURKISH STANDOFF IN THE CAUCUS -- WHICH WOULD QUICKLY LEAK TO THE CONFERENCE. BASED ON TURKISH DELEGATION COMMENTS, ONE OUGHT TO CONSIDER THE EFFECT ON ANKARA, ESPECIALLY ON THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF, WHICH MIGHT SEE THIS AS A POLITICAL SIGNAL CONCERNING US-TURKISH BILATERAL RELATIONS.

8. RECOMMENDATION. IN LIGHT OF THE AFOREMENTIONED, RECOMMEND THAT WASHINGTON REVIEW MEASURE ONE ISSUE IN VIEW OF INFORMATION REVIEWED ABOVE. WE WILL DELAY SUBMISSION OF US MEASURE ONE PROTOTYPE TO THE NATO CAUCUS PENDING FURTHER WASHINGTON GUIDANCE.  
END

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SUBJECT: TURKISH RESERVATIONS REGARDING TABLING OF  
- MEASURE ONE PROTOTYPE

REF: STATE 164036

1. CDE VI-060 - CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. IN THIS MESSAGE I SUGGEST THAT WE RAISE IN ANKARA THE "INFORMATION" ISSUE. END SUMMARY.
3. I SHARE WASHINGTON'S DESIRE, REFLECTED AGAIN IN THE REFERENCED INSTRUCTION, TO HAVE PROTOTYPE MEASURE ONE TABLED, PARTICULARLY SINCE I REGARD THE TABLING OF ALL THE PLANNED PAPERS IN THE SERIES AS AN IMPORTANT, AND STILL USEFUL DEVICE FOR HOLDING THE SPOTLIGHT ON NATO'S PROPOSALS. SINCE THE PROTOTYPE IS AN INFORMAL NATIONAL PAPER, I HAD HOPED THAT THE TURKS WOULD DISASSOCIATE THEMSELVES FROM THE PAPER IN THE NATO CAUCUS BUT, IN THE END, ACCEPT THAT THE U.S. COULD TRY TO AGGRESSIVELY SELL MEASURE ONE. PERHAPS THIS MAY STILL BE POSSIBLE. THE OBJECTION CONVEYED TO ME BY THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR, HOWEVER, WAS ABSOLUTE AND OBVIOUSLY THE RESULT OF A CATEGORICAL REFUSAL BY ANKARA TO INTERPRET THE TABLING OF ANY U.S. NATIONAL PAPER IN THE CDE AS AN "INFORMAL" OR "NON-COMMITTAL" ACT. THE TURKISH DELEGATION HERE HAS  
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NO FLEXIBILITY IN THE MATTER. I ADVISED THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR THAT I WOULD REPORT THE SITUATION TO WASHINGTON AND, IN THE MEANTIME, TAKE NO ACTIONS WHICH WOULD PUBLICLY EXPOSE THE SPLIT. I WANT TO STRESS THAT IN MY CONVERSATIONS WITH THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR (WHO IS NOW HOSPITALIZED WITH A HEART ATTACK), HE HAS MADE REFERENCE ONLY TO THE FOOTNOTE TO MEASURE ONE CONTAINED IN CM 84 (2) (FOURTH REVISION) AND SIMPLY ARGUED THAT INTRODUCING A PAPER SUCH AS I RECOMMENDED COULD NOT POSSIBLY BE NON-COMMITTAL AND INFORMAL.
4. SINCE "COORDINATION", AS REQUIRED BY THE AGREED FOOTNOTE, AND AS I UNDERSTAND THE TERM IN THE NATO CONTEXT, WAS CLEARLY OUT OF THE QUESTION, I CONCLUDED THAT WE COULD NOT INTRODUCE THE TEXT OF PROTOTYPE MEASURE ONE INTO THE NATO CAUCUS WITHOUT CREATING A FRUITLESS, AND PROBABLY BITTER DISPUTE, AMONG THE ALLIES. NOR DID MY PREVIOUS EXCHANGES WITH WASHINGTON ON THIS SUBJECT ENCOURAGE ME TO THINK THAT THIS IS THE WAY I SHOULD DEAL WITH THE TURKS.
5. MY REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN STOCKHOLM 3808 SUGGESTED THREE BASIC OPTIONS WITH PROS AND CONS. WASHINGTON'S GUIDANCE (REFTEL) ACCEPTED ONE OF THE CONS I LISTED, NAMELY THAT FAILURE TO INTRODUCE PROTOTYPE MEASURE ONE, AS IS, COULD WEAKEN MY CASE FOR SECURING INFORMATION ON BRIGADE-LEVEL FORCES. THE INSTRUCTION RESOLVED THE DILEMMA WITH THE TURKS BY ASKING THAT I INTRODUCE PROTOTYPE MEASURE ONE IN THE CAUCUS AND REPORT BACK. SINCE THE OUTCOME OF THAT COURSE OF ACTION WAS ALREADY APPARENT, WE TOOK THE ALTERNATIVE OFFERED IN THE

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INSTRUCTION AND SPOKE IN THE NATO CAUCUS OF MAY 30 AGAINST TABLING ANY FURTHER PROTOTYPE PAPERS.

6. AT THIS POINT, AN OBVIOUS COURSE OF ACTION IS TO ACCEPT WITH REGRET THAT THE TABLING OF PROTOTYPE PAPERS WILL HAVE DESTRUCTIVE CONSEQUENCES AND THAT THE MATTER SHOULD BE DROPPED AS QUIETLY AS POSSIBLE. WE STARTED DOWN THAT ROAD IN THE NATO CAUCUS OF MAY 30. PERHAPS THIS IS ALSO THE WISEST COURSE OF ACTION SINCE POSTPONED PROBLEMS SOMETIMES SOLVE THEMSELVES, BUT I DO NOT THINK THIS IS TRUE IN THIS INSTANCE.

7. I RELUCTANTLY CONCLUDE THAT WASHINGTON SHOULD ASK AMBASSADOR STRAUSSZ-HUPE TO TAKE UP THIS MATTER IN ANKARA. THE PROBLEM HAS BEEN FESTERING FOR SOME TIME AND POSTPONING THE ISSUE HAS BROUGHT US EVER CLOSER TO AN OPEN AND ACRIMONIOUS SPLIT WITH THE TURKS. THE TIME IS NEVER RIGHT FOR HAVING IT OUT WITH A KEY ALLY, AND NOW IS PROBABLY AS BAD A TIME AS ANY. I REGRET ADDING ANOTHER ITEM TO EMBASSY ANKARA'S AGENDA BUT I THINK IT IS TIME TO ASSESS OUR PRIORITIES. WE CAN CONTINUE TO DUCK THE ISSUE OF BRIGADE-LEVEL FORCES FOR THE SAKE OF PEACE IN THE ALLIANCE, BUT I AM CONCERNED THAT EQUIVOCATING ON THE ISSUE IS BEGINNING TO AFFECT OUR ABILITY TO ARGUE EFFECTIVELY FOR OTHER ELEMENTS IN OUR PACKAGE. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE SOVIETS ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE SITUATION, INCIDENTALLY, SINCE THE GENERAL ISSUE HAS BEEN PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE FOR THE PAST YEAR. THE POINTS TO BE REGISTERED WITH THE TURKS WILL BE AS APPARENT IN WASHINGTON AND ANKARA AS THEY ARE HERE BUT, IF DESIRED, I WILL BE HAPPY TO PROVIDE THEM.

8. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR AN EARLY REACTION TO THIS MESSAGE.  
END

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SUBJECT: CDE PLENARY, MAY 31, 1985

1. CDE VI - 057

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. SUMMARY. WHAT BEGAN AS A FAIRLY HARMONIOUS PLENARY SESSION WAS ENDED WITH ACRIMONIOUS CHARGES FROM THE SOVIET DELEGATION THAT THE U.S. DELEGATION, IN PARTICULAR, IS SANDBAGGING DISCUSSION ON NUF. PORTUGAL UNDERLINED THE PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE NATO PACKAGE; HUNGARY ATTEMPTED TO JUSTIFY WARSAW PACT EXPANSION OF THE MANDATE ZONE OF APPLICABILITY TO INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. END SUMMARY.

4. AMBASSADOR CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL) OPENED THE PLENARY BY DEFINING CONFIDENCE, IN CSCE TERMS, AS TELLING OTHERS "WHAT WE LOOK LIKE, WHAT WE INTEND TO DO, AND ALLOWING OTHERS TO ASSESS OUR INTENTIONS." HE MAINTAINED THAT THE RISK OF WAR IN EUROPE EMANATES PRIMARILY FROM THE WRONG ASSESSMENT BY ONE STATE OF ANOTHER'S INTENTIONS DUE TO A LACK OF RELIABLE INFORMATION. HE DECLARED THAT THE MEASURES IN THE NATO PACKAGE PROVIDE THE MOST VIABLE PROCEDURE FOR PRODUCING THIS INFORMATION, ACHIEVING PROPER ASSESSMENT, AND ULTIMATELY "ENHANCING TRUST AMONG US".

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5. IN A THOUGHTFUL, BUT TROUBLING, STATEMENT WHICH MAY PRESAGE THE EAST'S APPROACH ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES, AMBASSADOR SZIGETI OF HUNGARY ATTEMPTED TO JUSTIFY THE EAST'S PROPOSALS ON NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES ON THE BASIS THAT "EUROPE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN SIMPLE GEOGRAPHIC TERMS, BUT AS A POTENTIAL AREA OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION WHERE . . . TWO ALLIANCES FACE EACH OTHER. HE CONTENDED THAT TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES IN NAVAL AND AIR CAPABILITIES HAVE MADE THEM INSEPARABLE FROM THE REST OF THE MILITARY BALANCE (SIC) IN EUROPE AND THE "SECURITY PERCEPTIONS OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES." AFTER DEFENDING THE EAST'S PROPOSALS ON NOTIFICATION THRESHOLDS AS A REASONABLE MIDDLE GROUND, SZIGETI TURNED TO CONSTRAINTS, CALLING FOR "SOPHISTICATION AND FLEXIBILITY" IN DEALING WITH ASYMMETRY, RATHER THAN SEEKING "PRECISELY EQUAL NUMBERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES" IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. (BEGIN COMMENT: IN HIS OPENING PARAGRAPH, SZIGETI CALLED FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON POLITICAL, MILITARY, AND "CONSTRAINT-TYPE MEASURES ON AN EQUAL FOOTING AND IN A BALANCED MANNER," SUGGESTING FUTURE EASTERN MISCHIEF ON THE "EQUAL TREATMENT" FRONT. END COMMENT.) SZIGETI CLOSED WITH A CALL FOR A BUSINESSLIKE AND CALM ATMOSPHERE AT CDE, "ABSTAINING FROM RAISING CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES WHICH DO NOT BELONG ON THE AGENDA." (BEGIN COMMENT: THIS WAS PROBABLY A REFERENCE TO AMBASSADOR GOODBY'S STATEMENT ON THE NICHOLSON KILLING IN THE MAY 24 PLENARY, AND/OR THE U.S. STATEMENT ON CW ON MAY 28. END COMMENT.)

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6. SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY FOLLOWED WITH AN ATTACK DIRECTED AGAINST THE U.S. DELEGATION FOR ALLEGEDLY REFUSING TO DISCUSS NON-USE OF FORCE IN RETURN FOR EASTERN CONSIDERATION OF "CONCRETE MILITARY MEASURES" (SEPTEL). STRIPPED OF THE VERBIAGE, GRINEVSKY'S CLAIM WAS THAT THE U.S. DELEGATION'S STANCE AT CDE DOES NOT REFLECT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATED WILLINGNESS (STRASBOURG ADDRESS, AND STATEMENT PRIOR TO OPENING OF SIXTH ROUND) TO DISCUSS THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ON NON-USE OF FORCE IN THE CONTEXT OF AN AGREEMENT ON CONCRETE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. GRINEVSKY REFERRED TO STATEMENTS BY AMBASSADOR GOODBY ON MAY 20 AND MAY 24 AS EXAMPLES OF U.S. UNWILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS NUF, SINCE THEY DID NOT ADDRESS THE CONTENT AND FORM OF NUF, AND CHARGED THAT THE AMBASSADOR'S PRESS STATEMENT IN BRUSSELS (USIS, MAY 10) ON THE APPLICABILITY OF NUF TO ALL TYPES OF ARMAMENTS REPRESENTED A DOUBLE STANDARD, "ONE FOR THE PUBLIC AND THE OTHER FOR THIS CONFERENCE".

7. U.S. DEP HANSEN REPLIED TO GRINEVSKY BY REMINDING HIM THAT THE CDE NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVED 35 SOVEREIGN AND INDEPENDENT STATES, THIS IS NOT A BILATERAL FORUM, AND THAT CHARGES AGAINST ONE DELEGATION WERE OUT OF PLACE. WITH REGARD TO THE SUBSTANCE OF GRINEVSKY'S COMPLAINT, HANSEN REJECTED THE ASSERTION THAT THE U.S. WAS REFUSING TO DISCUSS NON-USE OF FORCE AND QUOTED SEVERAL INSTANCES TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE U.S. HAD PRESENTED ITS POSITION ON THE SUBSTANCE OF NUF ISSUES BOTH IN PLENARY AND IN WG A. HE THEN QUOTED PORTIONS OF AMBASSADOR GOODBY'S MAY 24 INTERVENTION, WHERE THE AMBASSADOR HAD QUOTED IRISH AMBASSADOR O'BROIN'S STATEMENT: "THE ISSUE IS NOT WHETHER TO REINFORCE THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE, BUT HOW BEST TO DO IT . . . ."

8. GRINEVSKY RETURNED WITH A RIGHT-OF-REPLY CALLING THE US POSITION ON NUF "THEATER OF THE ABSURD" AND REITERATING HIS CHARGE THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE SOVIET NUF PROPOSAL HAS NOT BEEN REFLECTED IN US DELEGATION STATEMENTS IN THE CONFERENCE.

9. COMMENT: GRINEVSKY'S SPEECH AND RIGHT-OF-REPLY REPRESENT THE MAIN LINE OF SOVIET TACTICS FOR THE CURRENT SESSION, I.E. BLAMING THE WEST, PARTICULARLY THE US, FOR HOLDING UP PROGRESS BY REFUSING TO PRESENT DETAILED IDEAS ON NUF IN RESPONSE TO EASTERN TABLING OF IDEAS ON "MILITARY-TECHNICAL" CSBM'S. AS STATED IN HANSEN REMARKS IN PARA 7, USDEL HAS PRESENTED VIEWS ON NUF AS FAR AS WE CONSIDER APPROPRIATE AT THIS TIME. WE WILL CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION MUST FOCUS ON THE CONTENT OF CONCRETE CSBM'S. AS FOR THE POINTED (AND MISLEADING) REFERENCES TO AMBASSADOR GOODBY, WE BELIEVE SUCH PERSONAL ATTACKS UNDERCUT GRINEVSKY'S OWN POSITION WITHOUT DAMAGING THE US POSITION ON NUF OR OTHER ISSUES.

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OTHER DELEGATIONS KNOW THE RECORD OF US STATEMENTS, IN  
THE CONFERENCE AND IN OTHER FORUMS, AND REALIZE  
THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WHAT WE SAY IN ONE PLACE  
COMPARED TO WHAT WE SAY IN ANOTHER. END COMMENT.  
END

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SUBJECT: CDE: TEXT OF STATEMENT GIVEN BY OLEG A. GRINEVSKY, MAY 31, 1985

1. CDE VI - 053.

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT BY OLEG A. GRINEVSKY, USSR AMBASSADOR AT LARGE IN TODAY'S PLENARY. BEGIN TEXT:

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MR. CHAIRMAN, IN THE STATEMENTS MADE BY MANY DELEGATIONS HERE AT THE CONFERENCE IT HAS BEEN OBSERVED ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION THAT THE WORLD IS GOING THROUGH DIFFICULT TIMES. FOR REASONS WE HAVE REPEATEDLY STATED THE EXPECTATIONS THAT THE PEOPLES JUSTLY HAD FOR THE PROCESS OF POSITIVE CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, STARTED IN THE 70S DUE TO THE EFFORTS MADE BY MANY COUNTRIES, HAVE NEVER BEEN REALIZED. THIS PROCESS HAS BEEN REPLACED BY CONFRONTATION WHOSE PHILOSOPHY IS SPURRING THE ALREADY TOO-FAR-GONE ARMS RACE. FOR ITS PART, THE ARMS BUILD-UP AIMED AT UPSETTING THE EXISTING MILITARY AND STRATEGIC PARITY GIVES, IN CERTAIN QUARTERS, DANGEROUS RISE TO INCLINATION TO RESORT TO AGGRESSIVE METHODS AND DEVICES IN FOREIGN POLICY. THIS VICIOUS CIRCLE - CONFRONTATION - ARMS RACE - CONFRONTATION CAN AND MUST BE BROKEN. HUMAN CIVILIZATION SIMPLY HAS NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE.

. THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IS AMONG THOSE INTERNATIONAL FORUMS DESIGNED TO FACILITATE THE BREAKING OF THIS DANGEROUS CIRCLE OF EVENTS. THE CONCLUSION OF A TREATY ON THE NON-USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACEFUL RELATIONS AS PROPOSED BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES COULD PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THIS RESPECT. ITS CONCLUSION WOULD SYMBOLIZE THE CONCENTRATED WILL OF THE EUROPEAN STATES, USA AND CANADA TO PURSUE THE COURSE AIMED AT CONSOLIDATING THE FOUNDATIONS OF PEACEFUL COOPERATION AMONG OUR COUNTRIES.

. WHAT IS NEEDED IN NUCLEAR AGE, WITH ALL ITS DANGERS, IS A POLITICAL THINKING WHICH WOULD CORRESPOND TO THE REALITIES OF THAT AGE. SUCH CONCEPTS AS "POWER POLITICS", "DETERRENCE" AND "ACHIEVEMENT OF MILITARY SUPERIORITY" MUST GIVE WAY TO NON-USE OF FORCE, CONFIDENCE, MUTUAL REGARD FOR THE SECURITY INTERESTS. THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES ARE AIMED AT ATTAINING PRECISELY THESE OBJECTIVES.

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. THE ELABORATION OF POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL GUARANTEES OF THE SECURITY OF STATES, WHICH WOULD PROCEED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH REACHING AGREEMENT ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE MILITARY FIELD, WOULD LAY DOWN THE BASIS FOUNDATIONS FOR RESOLVING THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AS WELL AS CREATE CONDITIONS FOR FURTHERING THE PROCESS INITIATED BY THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE THUS PROMOTING THE EFFORTS

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OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE.

. AS WE SEE IT, THE CONFERENCE HAS IN GENERAL SUPPORTED THE CONCEPT THAT POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY HAVE TO BE MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY, THAT STEPS OF A POLITICAL NATURE HAVE TO BE COMBINED WITH CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE MILITARY FIELD. THIS HAS BEEN CLEARLY STATED IN THE DOCUMENT PRESENTED BY THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES AND IN THEIR INTERVENTIONS. THIS WAS ALSO POINTED OUT IN PARTICULAR BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS, MR. DE RUITER WHO NOTED THAT ONE COMPONENT OF CONFERENCE'S RESULTS SHOULD BE AGREEMENT ON NON-USE OF FORCE. UNFORTUNATELY, THE PREVIOUS SESSIONS OF CONFERENCE DID NOT SEE ANY FURTHER CONCRETE ELABORATION OF THESE AND OTHER SIMILAR STATEMENTS MADE BY NATO COUNTRIES.

. WE EXPECTED, AS DID MANY NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED DELEGATIONS, THAT THE PRESENT SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE WOULD BECOME A TURNING-POINT AND THAT NATO COUNTRIES WOULD PROCEED TO A BUSINESS-LIKE AND SUBSTANTIVE EXAMINATION OF THE QUESTION OF NON-USE OF FORCE. A MONTH HAS ALMOST PASSED SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE SESSION. BUT HAS THIS BEEN THE CASE? LET US TURN TO FACTS.

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 . AT THE JOINT MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUPS HELD ON MAY 20 THE DISTINGUISHED U.S. REPRESENTATIVE AMBASSADOR GOODBY MADE A STATEMENT. IT HAS TO BE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HIS REMARKS SOUNDED BUSINESSLIKE AND CONTAINED NO ATTEMPTS TO BRUSH ASIDE A NUMBER OF SERIOUS MILITARY PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE TO BE RESOLVED. HE DID NOT GLOSS OVER THE EXISTING DIFFERENCES WHICH HAVE TO BE WORKED ON IN ORDER TO BE OVERCOME, HE DID NOT PRESENT THE SITUATION AS IF THE WHOLE CONFERENCE APPLAUDED TO THE NATO COUNTRIES' PROPOSALS AS IT WAS DONE, FOR EXAMPLE, BY THE DISTINGUISHED HEAD OF THE UK DELEGATION WHO SPOKE AT THE SAME MEETING.

. THE STATEMENT OF THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE, HOWEVER, CONTAINED A STRIKING PECULIARITY. THOUGH, AS HE SAID, HIS REMARKS DEALT WITH QUESTIONS REGARDED BY THE U.S. DELEGATION AS "KEY" QUESTIONS, HE COMPLETELY BY-PASSED THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, INCLUDING THOSE RELATING TO NON-USE OF FORCE.

. A ONE-SIDED APPROACH LIKE THAT IS PUZZLING. IT IS EVEN MORE SO, FOR THIS STATEMENT WAS PRONOUNCED LITERALLY IN THE WAKE OF THE STATEMENT MADE BY PRESIDENT REAGAN IN STRASBOURG WHERE HE SAID - LEST THERE BE IDLE TALK - I QUOTE HIM VERBATIM: "THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ON NON-USE OF FORCE IN THE CONTEXT OF SOVIET AGREEMENT TO CONCRETE

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CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES". THIS SAME STATEMENT WAS REITERATED IN THE ADDRESS BY THE U.S. PRESIDENT TO THE U.S. DELEGATION BEFORE ITS DEPARTURE MAY 13 LAST.

. IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ARE PREPARED NOT ONLY TO NEGOTIATE BUT ALSO TO ELABORATE CONCRETE MILITARY MEASURES WHICH, COMBINED WITH RELEVANT POLITICAL PROPOSALS, WOULD LEAD TO THE STRENGTHENING OF CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE. OUR PROPOSAL TO THIS EFFECT IS SET FORTH IN THE DOCUMENT, KNOWN AS SC.4, SUBMITTED TO THE CONFERENCE AS FAR BACK AS ON MAY 8, 1984. DISPLAYING FLEXIBILITY AND ACCOMMODATING THE WISHES OF OUR PARTNERS BOTH FROM THE NON-ALIGNED AND NATO COUNTRIES, WE HAVE SUBMITTED MORE DETAILED PROPOSALS INCLUDING THOSE ON MILITARY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES.

. OF COURSE, THE U.S. DELEGATION MAY LIKE OUR PROPOSALS OR NOT. IT MAY CONSIDER THE LIMITATION AND NOTIFICATION THRESHOLDS OF MILITARY MANEUVERS AS EXCESSIVELY HIGH OR, ON THE CONTRARY, EXCESSIVELY LOW. FINALLY, IT HAS THE RIGHT TO CONSIDER OTHER CONCRETE PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN THOSE DOCUMENTS AS SUFFICIENT OR INSUFFICIENT. THIS IS ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHT AS WELL AS THE RIGHT OF ALL OTHER DELEGATIONS AT THE NEGOTIATIONS. STILL, THESE PROPOSALS ARE QUITE CONCRETE AND THEY ARE ON THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.

. WHY THEN DOES THE U.S. DELEGATION KEEP SILENCE AS REGARDS THE QUESTION OF NON-USE OF FORCE? FRANKLY SPEAKING, MR. CHAIRMAN, WE HELD CONSULTATIONS AND DECIDED TO SEE HOW THE SITUATION WOULD FURTHER DEVELOP. MAY BE STILL IN ITS WORK THE U.S. DELEGATION WILL DISPLAY WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN CONSTRUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS.

. THE NEXT STATEMENT OF THE DISTINGUISHED U.S. REPRESENTATIVE WAS NOT LATE IN COMING. IT WAS DELIVERED ON MAY 24. SO WHAT?

. HONESTLY, IT HAS DISAPPOINTED US. ALTHOUGH IT CONTAINED OUTLINES OF A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT AND "THE BASIC BUILDING BLOCKS" WHICH COULD BECOME A SUBJECT FOR NEGOTIATION, YET, THE RENOUNCATION OF THE USE OF FORCE WAS MENTIONED CASUALLY, IN PASSING.

. FIRST, IT WAS REITERATED FOR THE HUNDRETH TIME THAT THE U.S. DELEGATION IS IN FAVOUR OF REINFORCING THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE "THROUGH ADDITIONAL PRACTICAL OBLIGATIONS". WHICH MEANS, IN OTHER WORDS, THAT THE U.S. DELEGATION VIEWS THE MERE ADOPTION OF THE MILITARY MEASURES OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AS THE REINFORCEMENT OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE.

. SECOND, WE WERE INFORMED THAT THIS PRINCIPLE SHOULD NOT DEPART FROM THE PRINCIPLE AS EXPRESSED BY THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. AS TO SPELLING IT OUT FOR SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES, THIS, THEY

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SAY, IS REDUNDANT.

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 . WHAT HAVE WE LEFT TO DO AFTER ALL THAT WAS SAID BY THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE? ARE WE SUPPOSED TO REPEAT ALL THAT WAS ALREADY WRITTEN DOWN IN THE UN CHARTER AND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND CONGRATULATE EACH OTHER ON THE VICTORY SCORED IN THE DOMAIN OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING? IS THAT THE WAY WE HAVE TO UNDERSTAND THE U.S. POSITION?

. BUT WHAT CAN A MERE REPETITION LIKE THAT GIVE IN REAL TERMS? WHO NEEDS IT AND WHAT FOR? RARE ARE THE OCCASIONS WHEN IT BEFALLS ME TO AGREE WITH MY FRIEND CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE AMBASSADOR DELWORTH, BUT IN THIS CASE I CANNOT BUT SHARE HIS VIEWPOINT: "IF THE OBJECT WERE SIMPLY TO REPEAT THE PRINCIPLE, THE EFFORT WOULD BE POINTLESS".

. FINALLY, NOW ALL THIS SHOULD BE HARMONIZED WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENT ON THE U.S. PREPAREDNESS TO DISCUSS THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ON NON-USE OF FORCE. IN FACT, OUR PROPOSALS SPEAK NOT OF REAFFIRMING THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE BUT OF DEVELOPING AND SPECIFYING IT AND MAKING IT BINDING TO A MAXIMUM DEGREE. WHY THEN DOES THE U.S. DELEGATION - IN SPITE OF WHAT PRESIDENT REAGAN SAID - EVADE DISCUSSING THESE PROPOSALS?

. MAY I REMIND: THE SOVIET UNION AND SOCIALIST COUNTRIES PROPOSED - AS ONE OF THE KEY PROVISIONS - AN OBLIGATION NOT TO BE THE FIRST TO USE EITHER NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL ARMS, NOT TO USE MILITARY FORCE AT ALL. IS THE UNITED STATES NOW PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS PROPOSAL? IF THE ANSWER IS "YES", THEN WHY DON'T THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE U.S. DELEGATION WANT EVEN TO HEAR ABOUT THIS PROPOSAL IN THE WORKING GROUP?

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 . WE HAVE NOTICED THAT MR. GOODBY - THOUGH IT WAS DONE OUTSIDE THIS CONFERENCE - SAID TO JOURNALISTS IN BRUSSELS - AND I QUOTE THE USIS BULLETIN OF MAY 10 LAST: "IF WE GO INTO THIS NON-USE OF FORCE, NON-USE OF FORCE APPLIES TO ALL TYPES OF ARMAMENTS, INCLUDING NUCLEAR. WE DON'T EXCLUDE ANY TYPES OF ARMS WHEN WE TALK ABOUT NON-USE OF FORCE". WELL, THE STATEMENT IS CLEAR ENOUGH.

. WE HAVE A SERIOUS QUESTION IN THIS CONNECTION: IS THE U.S. DELEGATION PREPARED TO CONFIRM THOSE WORDS HERE, AT THIS CONFERENCE, OR PRESENT THAT STATEMENT AS A FORMULA FOR CONCRETE NEGOTIATIONS ON NON-USE OF FORCE? OR DOES THE U.S. SIDE HAVE A DOUBLE STANDARD: ONE FOR THE PUBLIC AND THE OTHER FOR THIS CONFERENCE?

. WE ARE SAYING THIS, MR. CHAIRMAN, NOT FOR THE SAKE OF POLEMICS BUT IN ORDER TO FIND OUT HOW THINGS STAND. WE HAVE ARRIVED HERE TO ENGAGE IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS AND NOT TO PLAY NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS WHY WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE A CLEAR ANSWER TO THE QUESTIONS RAISED. CAN YOU

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THINK OF ANY BETTER PLACE THAN THIS CONFERENCE WHERE THE U.S. DELEGATION IS PROVIDED WITH THE BEST OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN WHAT EXACTLY THE UNITED STATES HAS IN MIND IN TERMS OF FORM AND CONTENT WHEN IT TALKS ABOUT NON-USE OF FORCE. THIS WILL DEFINITELY FACILITATE THE PRODUCTIVE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE.

. THE SOVIET UNION HAS THE FIRM WILL TO WORK FOR PEACE, DETENTE AND STRENGTHENING OF CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE. THE USSR TRANSLATES THIS WILL INTO CONSTRUCTIVE INITIATIVES AND CLEAR PROPOSALS WHICH LEAVE NO ROOM FOR CONTRADICTORY INTERPRETATIONS. IT IS PRECISELY IN THIS SPIRIT THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS ACTING AT ALL THE NEGOTIATIONS NOW UNDERWAY - IN GENEVA, STOCKHOLM AND VIENNA. THIS HAS BEEN STATED CRYSTAL CLEAR THE OTHER DAY BY MIKHAIL S. GORBACHEV, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU.

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. I WOULD LIKE TO ESPECIALLY DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THE CONFERENCE TO WHAT HE STATED IN HIS SPEECH ON MAY 29 LAST. THE SOVIET UNION, HE SAID, IS IN FAVOUR OF AN EARLY BEGINNING OF SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN STOCKHOLM AND ELABORATION OF APPROPRIATE DOCUMENTS THERE.  
"APPARENTLY, IT IS NECESSARY TO BE MORE BOLD IN THE SEARCH FOR THE KIND OF AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD COMBINE MAJOR MEASURES OF POLITICAL NATURE AND MUTALLY ACCEPTABLE CONCRETE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE MILITARY AREA."

. THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT WE CALL UPON THE CONFERENCE TO DO.  
END TEXT.

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*Delegation of the Hungarian People's Republic  
CFE - CDE  
Stockholm*

CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY!

S T A T E M E N T

by

Ambassador Károly Szigeti

Head of the Hungarian Delegation

to the

Conference on Confidence- and Security-building

Measures and Disarmament in Europe

Stockholm, May 31, 1985

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Mr. Chairman,

In my statement today I should like to make some observations about the proposals submitted on the notification of ground, air and naval force activities. Before doing so, let me recall that the position of Hungary is, as stated at preceding sessions, that the priority given by us to political type of confidence-building measures in no way implies that we are not interested in the elaboration of meaningful military measures, including constraints. We hold that all the different kinds of measures have their proper place and significance in the combination of agreements to be reached at this Conference. This delegation continues to be ready to promote the negotiations on political, military and constraint type measures on an equal footing and in a balanced manner.

Mr. Chairman,

As I noted on an earlier occasion the Western proposals before us focus on conventional ground forces. Their sponsors expressed the view that the most likely risks of military confrontation in the zone of application come from the potential clash of ground forces.

Whether or not we felt it justified or legitimate, the Western preoccupation with conventional ground forces has been recognized as a part of Western perceptions of security and that of their approach to confidence-building. We have been ready to address it at the Stockholm Conference and elsewhere. We are willing

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to alleviate or dispel it by agreeing on substantial and balanced confidence- and security-building measures.

The proposal submitted by Czechoslovakia on the notification of major manoeuvres of ground forces which is supported by this delegation as well is an additional proof of this willingness. What we are asking for, in turn, is more openness and responsiveness to our security concerns and our proposals designed to pursue them. The need for equal respect for the security interests of all participating states is stipulated in the mandate. In the context of a conference on military security, Europe should not be considered in simple geographic terms, but rather as a potential area of military confrontation where the bulk of forces of the two alliances face each other, an area which should be defined according to its coherence in terms of its military conditions and the corresponding security perceptions of the participating states. Accordingly, a meaningful system or set of military type CSBMs to be elaborated by this Conference must not fail to cover major elements of the military balance and, at the level of perceptions, it should respond to the security concerns of all participating states, both neutral and allied.

We support the proposal submitted by the Soviet Union on the notification of major naval manoeuvres. As experts stated, naval power has become an increasingly important component of the military balance. Technological developments and recent deployment plans suggest that the expected number, range and accuracy of weapons carried by naval vessels will, in the next few years, substantially increase their ability to attack targets on land.

The naval component in general and large-scale independent naval

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activities in particular cannot be separated from rest of the military balance in Europe.

The same applies to air forces and major independent aerial manoeuvres. Being one of the sponsors of the proposal on the notification of major air force manoeuvres, submitted by the German Democratic Republic first I should like to thank to those previous speakers who have taken note of it for recognizing our intention to facilitate our negotiations on military issues as well. We feel discouraged, however, by listening to the first reactions by Western delegations to the substance of the proposal.

The common argument advanced against it is, similarly to the notification of naval manoeuvres, that in the western view it is not compatible with the mandate. There is an important disagreement between us regarding how the measures to be agreed upon should apply to the adjoining sea and ocean areas and the air space over it. I do not want to take up this issue now, in the context of notification of aerial activities, since I do not feel it relevant to our proposal.

Independent air force manoeuvres we seek to include in the notification regime used to be conducted from air bases located within the whole of Europe on the territory of the European participating states. They are conducted, partly or entirely, in the air space of those participating states. Thus, considerations related to the adjoining sea area and air space do not apply to the core of the proposal whether or not some of these manoeuvres extend to the adjoining air space beyond national jurisdiction.

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As for air forces themselves, nothing in the mandate supports the interpretation that those military activities taking place within the whole of Europe the participating states will agree to notify at this Conference can only be ground force activities, while other activities are covered only if conducted jointly with ground troop manoeuvres. The term ground or land forces does not appear in the text of the mandate.

As for military significance, our experts in Working Group B provided ample explanation of the capabilities of modern air forces in initiating and supporting military operations. At this point we need some sense of proportion. Those who argue that out-of garrison activities of several thousands ground troops could be relevant to the security of other states will certainly not deny the military significance of the coordinated activities of 200 airplanes which occur sometimes several minutes' flight-time from the territory of other participating states.

Some of the western military experts believe that air force manoeuvres may cause difficulties in terms of adequate verification. This is an important issue which should, in due course, be considered carefully on the basis of the content of agreement. All the more so, because we will face it in the context of combined ground and air force manoeuvres as well. It would be perhaps early to discuss it here and now, since the agreement on the substance of the proposal has not yet begin to take shape.

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Mr. Chairman,

In assessing the expected confidence-building effect of the different proposals on notification we need again a sense of proportion. It is the entire range of international political and military conduct of states which shapes or undermines confidence rather than notification of small-scale military training activities. In a military environment decisively shaped by the nuclear confrontation in Europe measures confined essentially to conventional land forces, in and by themselves, would not be of much help in generating mutual confidence and creating an atmosphere more conducive to meaningful arms limitation talks.

As for the activities to be notified, we have to concentrate our attention to those activities of ground, air and naval forces which, by their nature and size affect security in Europe and may cause concern for other participating states regarding their objectives. The widely shared view is that the purpose of notification and observation is to demonstrate, and to give evidence of, the non-aggressive intention behind the activity in question.

The thresholds triggering notification proposed by us are, in our view, low enough to include all those activities that may appear ambiguous regarding their purpose. On the other hand, the claim to notify and observe small-scale activities that are irrelevant to security considerations would impose meaningless burden on the participating states without sensible impact on the risks of military confrontation and interstate relations.

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Mr. Chairman,

This delegation shares the view that the agreements to emerge from this stage of the Conference should have an impact on the established pattern of military activities and build operational barriers against the use of force. Constraint type measures are particularly suitable for this purpose since the limitation of the size of major manoeuvres would inhibit large concentration of forces sufficient for surprise attack under the guise of a routine peacetime manoeuvre. I do not believe that a set of CSBMs which would allow the further growth of the size of military manoeuvres within and around the whole of Europe could meet the objectives set by our mandate.

Western delegations stressed that constraint measures should have an equal impact on both alliances and emphasized the need for taking into account differences in geography, force postures, etc. What made us thinking is the fact that the requirement of a carefully balanced effect of CSBMs has been emphasized in the context of constraints only. But this is not my point. The impact of constraint on major manoeuvres cannot be assessed by simply comparing their respective number. Large-scale exercises conducted, though less frequently, by our alliance, has been an important means of training of our forces as well. The underlying issue, I believe, is the notion of balance to be applied to our negotiations.

Disarmament diplomacy, with its inclination to examine microscopically the balance of agreement under consideration, has often had difficulties in accomodating the quest for precisely equal numbers, rights and duties with asymmetries in force postures,

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geography and other relevant factors. In the case of CSBMs in Europe, nevertheless, the search for a perfect and at least partly quantifiable balance at each and every measure is, first, unjustified, second, it could make our work here hopelessly complicated.

Our asymmetries can only be managed with a somewhat more sophisticated and flexible perception of the balance of our agreements than the one applied to constraint measures by the West. The relevant part of the mandate states that the CSBMs should be elaborated "On the basis of equality of rights, balance and reciprocity, equal respect for the security interests of the participating states and of their respective obligation concerning confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe...".

This definition of the balance provides us a sufficiently precise and comprehensive standard for assessing whether or not individual measures and, more importantly, the combination of agreements to emerge from the Stockholm Conference would be balanced enough.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me make a brief remark about the climate surrounding our activities. Meaningful negotiations can only be conducted in a businesslike and calm atmosphere, free of confrontation, rhetoric exchanges, abstaining from raising controversial issues which do not belong to the agenda. During our deliberations so far we have managed to preserve the businesslike climate of the conference, by having been able to handle the apparent differences in our approaches and proposals in a relaxed manner, with due respect for each others' position. This atmosphere belongs

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to those common assets of ours we can rely upon while continuing our search for areas of potential consensus.

This delegation hopes that the sense of responsibility for the successful outcome of the conference and sustained self-restraint in handling controversial issues will continue to prevail and heated exchanges will not hinder early progress in our negotiations.

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SUBJECT: CDE WEEKLY WRAP-UP, MAY 28-31, 1985

REF: A) STOCKHOLM 3827, B) STOCKHOLM 4045,  
 - C) STOCKHOLM 4053, D) STOCKHOLM 4043,  
 - E) STOCKHOLM 3988. F) STOCKHOLM 4046,  
 - G) STOCKHOLM 4038, H) STOCKHOLM 3942,  
 - I) STOCKHOLM 3915

1. CDE VI - 059
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT

3. SUMMARY: THE EAST CAME OUT IN FORCE THIS WEEK, USING AN EFFECTIVE GOOD GUY -- AND NOT SO EFFECTIVE BAD GUY -- ROUTINE TO SOFTEN UP THE NEUTRALS AND EVEN SOME OF OUR ALLIES. IN WORKING GROUP B MEETINGS ON NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION, THE EAST SHOWED ITS "FORTHCOMINGNESS IN AREAS OF GREATEST INTEREST TO THE WEST" BY LAYING OUT DETAILED DESCRIPTIONS OF HOW OBSERVATION OF NAVAL AND AIR EXERCISES COULD BE CONDUCTED. A HUNGARIAN PLENARY STATEMENT PROVIDED USEFUL HINTS OF FUTURE EASTERN LINES OF ATTACK. IN HIS PLENARY STATEMENT, THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR LAMBASTED THE U.S. DELEGATION FOR NOT ADDRESSING NUF IN A WAY HE CONSIDERS APPROPRIATE IN LIGHT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DUBLIN SPEECH ON NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF) AND IN VIEW OF EASTERN WORKING PAPERS ON CSBM'S. THE U.S. REPLIED IN WORKING GROUP A TO THE SOVIET UNION'S TENDENTIOUS PLENARY STATEMENT LAST WEEK ATTACKING U.S. CHEMICAL WEAPONS POLICY BY SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON U.S. CW POLICY AND POINTING TO THE EXTENSIVE SOVIET CW PROGRAM. THE MADRID MANDATE AND THE DEFINITION OF THE ZONE CAME UNDER CONCERTED ATTACK FROM THE EAST -- AND FROM THE MALTESE, WHO INTERPRETED THE MANDATE AS COVERING ALL NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. VIRTUALLY SILENT AGAIN THIS WEEK, THE NNA APPARENTLY ARE STILL EMBROILED IN THEIR EFFORTS TO AGREE ON A MORE DETAILED COMMON POSITION -- NNA LEGAL EXPERTS WILL VISIT STOCKHOLM JUNE 3-7 TO DISCUSS NON-USE OF FORCE. NATO'S ENERGIES, MEANWHILE, WERE EXPENDED ON A SERIES OF INTERNAL DEBATES WHICH HAS DETRACTED FROM THE EFFORT PUT INTO WORKING GROUPS. END SUMMARY.

4. THE EAST: AT THE BEGINNING OF THE ROUND, AFTER HUDDLING AMONG THEMSELVES, THE EAST INTRODUCED SOME DETAILS FOR NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION CSBM'S IN AN APPARENT ATTEMPT TO APPEAR FORTHCOMING AND CONSTRUCTIVE IN ITS APPROACH HERE, WHILE BLAMING THE WEST, THE U.S., AND AMBASSADOR GOODBY BY NAME, FOR LACK OF PROGRESS IN THE CONFERENCE. EASTERN DELEGATES THIS WEEK HAVE BEEN SPREADING THIS NEW WARSAW PACT PARTY LINE: THE EAST HAS HELD UP ITS HALF OF THE NEGOTIATING BARGAIN BY ADDRESSING THE "AREAS OF GREATEST INTEREST TO THE WEST" (I.E., CONCRETE CSBM'S); NOW IT IS UP TO THE WEST TO BE EQUALLY "FORTHCOMING" ON NON-USE OF FORCE AND CONSTRAINTS. FOR

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EXAMPLE, ONE WEEK AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF THREE EASTERN NOTIFICATION WORKING PAPERS ON MAY 21 (REF A), THE USSR AND THE GDR PRESENTED DETAILED SCENARIOS DESCRIBING HOW OBSERVATION OF NAVAL AND AIR EXERCISES COULD BE CONDUCTED (SEPTEL). AT THE SAME TIME, IN THE EAST'S OPENING SALVO, THE SOVIET PLENARY STATEMENT MAY 31 (REF B), DELIVERED IN VINTAGE GRINEVSKY STYLE ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW, CALLED THE U.S. DELEGATION'S NON-USE OF FORCE POSITION "THEATRE OF THE ABSURD." GRINEVSKY CHARGED, MOREOVER, THAT THE U.S. POSITION IN THE CONFERENCE DID NOT REFLECT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATED DESIRE IN DUBLIN, IN STRASBOURG AND IN HIS STATEMENT BEFORE THE OPENING OF THIS ROUND, TO DISCUSS THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ON NON-USE OF FORCE IN THE CONTEXT OF SOVIET AGREEMENT TO CONCRETE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES.

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5. WESTERN JOURNALISTS HAVE TOLD US THAT GRINEVSKY COMPLAINED AFTER THE PLENARY THAT THE "CAPITALIST PRESS" WAS IGNORING THE SOVIET POSITIONS IN THE CDE. WHEN A SWEDISH CORRESPONDENT SAID GRINEVSKY HAD BEEN "MISINFORMED," GRINEVSKY SAID ("IRRITABLY", ACCORDING TO THE SWEDS), "PROVE IT." GRINEVSKY'S CRITICISM OF THE WESTERN MEDIA PROBABLY REFLECTS BOTH SOVIET IRRITATION THAT THEIR EARLIER PROPAGANDA APPROACH DID NOT CATCH ON WITH WESTERN MEDIA (OR PUBLIC OPINION) AND A SOVIET ATTEMPT TO STIMULATE THE PRESS TO REPORT ON THE "NEW SOVIET IMAGE" AS FLEXIBLE NEGOTIATORS SEEKING SERIOUS PROGRESS AT THE CDE.

6. WHILE THE SOVIET PLENARY STATEMENT MADE MORE WAVES, HUNGARIAN AMBASSADOR SZIGETI'S STATEMENT MAY WELL PROVE TO BE MORE IMPORTANT, BY PROVIDING SOME USEFUL HINTS OF FUTURE EASTERN LINES OF ATTACK (SEPTEL), TO WIT:

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-- WHILE UP UNTIL NOW THE EAST HAS INSISTED FIRST ON EQUAL TREATMENT AND THEN ON PARALLEL PROGRESS IN THE TWO WORKING GROUPS, I.E., ON "POLITICAL" AND "MILITARY-TECHNICAL" MEASURES, THE HUNGARIANS CALLED FOR "NEGOTIATIONS ON POLITICAL, MILITARY AND CONSTRAINT TYPE MEASURES ON AN EQUAL FOOTING AND IN A BALANCED MANNER." WHILE THE EAST DOES NOT HAVE A SERIOUS CONSTRAINT ON THEIR OWN, THEY HAVE BEEN PUSHING THE CONCEPT FOR TACTICAL REASONS -- TO GARNER NNA SUPPORT AND ISOLATE THE WEST.

-- SZIGETI'S TWO REFERENCES TO "A COMBINATION OF AGREEMENTS" SIGNALLED THAT THE EAST HAS NOT SIGNED ON TO THE WESTERN REQUIREMENT FOR A SINGLE AGREEMENT.

-- HE ATTACKED NATO'S EMPHASIS ON GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES ON TWO FRONTS: FIRST, HE SAID IT WAS A PART OF WESTERN PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY WHICH WAS NOT SHARED BY OTHERS; AND, SECOND, HE SAID THE WESTERN APPROACH WAS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH THE MANDATE WHICH, HE CLAIMED, DOES

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NOT MENTION GROUND FORCES EXPLICITLY.

-- THE HUNGARIAN DELEGATE ALSO SAID THAT EUROPE SHOULD NOT BE DEFINED IN GEOGRAPHIC TERMS, BUT RATHER STRATEGICALLY, AND THAT CSBM'S MUST NOT FAIL TO COVER MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE MILITARY BALANCE, I.E., INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES.

-- HE AVOIDED DISCUSSING HOW THE EASTERN NOTIFICATION MEASURES WOULD BE VERIFIED "SINCE THE AGREEMENT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PROPOSAL HAS NOT YET BEGUN TO TAKE SHAPE." THIS FOLLOWS THE SEQUENTIAL APPROACH TAKEN BY THE EAST OF LATE TO NEGOTIATE CSBM'S FIRST AND THEN TO ADD ADEQUATE VERIFICATION.

-- FINALLY, REFERRING TO CONSTRAINTS, HE HINTED THAT THE SEARCH FOR A "PERFECTLY" BALANCED MEASURE WAS UNJUSTIFIED AND WOULD COMPLICATE WORK AT THE CDE.

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7. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE EASTERN NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION POSITIONS ARE AIMED AT EXTENDING THE CDE ZONE OF APPLICATION TO INCLUDE INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR EXERCISES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE. THE SOVIETS ARE ALSO USING EXPANDED OBSERVATION TO APPEAR TO BE FORTHCOMING ON VERIFICATION. OUR PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT THE THRESHOLDS ARE SO HIGH THAT FEW, IF ANY, EASTERN EXERCISES WOULD BE CAPTURED AND THE OBSERVATION MODALITIES ARE SO INTRUSIVE -- CALLING FOR OBSERVERS AT AIR AND NAVAL BASES, ON SHIPS, IN AIRCRAFT, AT AIR COMMAND POSTS, AND AT RADAR MONITORING STATIONS -- THAT THE EAST WOULD BE THE FIRST TO REJECT THEM IF IT LOOKED AS IF THEY MIGHT BECOME PART OF A FINAL AGREEMENT (REF C). WE SUSPECT THAT THEIR MOTIVES FOR INTRODUCING DETAILED OBSERVATION MODALITIES ON NAVAL AND AIR EXERCISES (AND FOR IGNORING GROUND FORCE EXERCISES) ARE TWOFOLD: 1) TO EXTEND THE MANDATE'S ZONE, AND 2) TO SET UP A NEGOTIATING SITUATION WHICH IS MORE FAVORABLE FOR THEM, I.E., WHERE THEY CAN COUNTERBALANCE GROUND FORCES MEASURES WHICH THE WEST WANTS WITH MEASURES (ON INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR EXERCISES IN THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE) WHICH THEY KNOW NATO WILL REJECT. THUS, THEIR AIR AND NAVAL MEASURES BOTH SERVE AS BARGAINING CHIPS AND ENABLE THE SOVIETS TO SAY THEY ARE WILLING TO TALK TECHNICALLY ABOUT CONCRETE MEASURES.

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8. IN ANY CASE, THE GDR DECLARATION THAT OBSERVATION MUST NOT HARM THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE HOST COUNTRY PROVIDES A CONVENIENT ESCAPE CLAUSE WHICH NEUTRALIZES ALL OF THE POTENTIALLY FAVORABLE "POSSIBILITIES" THE GDR SUGGESTED FOR OBSERVATION. WE EXPECT THE EAST TO APPLY THIS CLAUSE LIBERALLY, GIVEN THE EAST'S PENCHANT FOR SECRECY AND ITS ALL-INCLUSIVE CONCEPT OF SECURITY. A MEASURE OF THE TRUE EASTERN ATTITUDE TOWARDS THEIR OWN OBSERVATION MEASURES LIES IN THEIR FAILURE, SO FAR,

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EITHER TO SPELL OUT AN OBSERVATION REGIME FOR THEIR GROUND FORCES EXERCISES OR TO DISTRIBUTE THE SOVIET PAPER ON OBSERVATION OF NAVAL EXERCISES. NONETHELESS, APPARENT EASTERN WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE DETAILED INFORMATION ON NOTIFICATION AND EXPANDED OBSERVATION APPEALS TO A NUMBER OF NNA. EVEN SOME OF OUR ALLIES ARE LOSING SIGHT OF THE WESTERN PACKAGE WHICH SHOULD BE THE FOCUS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS THIS SESSION. THE SOVIETS, OF COURSE, ARE SEEKING TO SHIFT THE DISCUSSION OF CONCRETE MEASURES FROM THE WESTERN PACKAGE TO THE SKEWED EASTERN DEFINITION OF CONCRETE CSBM'S. THE WARSAW PACT HAS NOT MOVED AN INCH TOWARD THE WEST'S POSITION; THIS HAS NOT PREVENTED THEM FROM TAKING CREDIT FOR THEIR "FLEXIBILITY," HOWEVER, AND FROM PRESSURING THE WEST TO BE EQUALLY FORTHCOMING ON NUF. THIS PRESSURE HAS HAD SOME EFFECT AMONG THE NNA AND EVEN SOME OF OUR ALLIES.

9. U.S.-SOVIET CONTACTS: AT U.S. INVITATION, THE DEPUTIES AND MILREPS OF THE U.S. AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS MET FOR THE FIRST TIME (REPORTED SEPTEL) SINCE AMBASSADORS GRINEVSKY AND GOODBY AGREED THAT SUCH CONTACTS WOULD ENCOURAGE A MORE DETAILED, SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF ISSUES THAN IS POSSIBLE IN THE WORKING GROUPS. AT THE LUNCH REPEATED SOVIET EVASIONS OF DIRECT U.S. QUESTIONS ON WHETHER THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON THE DESIGNATIONS AND LOCATIONS OF SOVIET DIVISIONS PARTICIPATING IN NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE NO INTEREST IN OR FLEXIBILITY ON THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, INDEPENDENT OF NOTIFICATION, ON THE STRUCTURE AND LOCATION OF GROUND FORCES AND LAND-BASED AIR FORCES. GENERAL TATARNIKOV, WHEN PRESSED, SAID THAT INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION, I.E., GENERAL AREA, OF FORCES INVOLVED IN A NOTIFIED EXERCISE MIGHT ACCOMPANY NOTIFICATION. ACKNOWLEDGING FOR THE FIRST TIME THAT EACH OF THE THREE EASTERN NOTIFICATION PAPERS HAS "A SET OF VERIFICATION MEASURES WHICH IS ADEQUATE FOR EACH MEASURE," THE SOVIET GENERAL SAID THAT HIS DELEGATION HAD NOT SPOKEN ON VERIFICATION SINCE "ADEQUATE VERIFICATION" WOULD BE DETERMINED WHEN THE CONFERENCE DETERMINES THE RANGE OF THE CSBM'S. WHILE THE SOVIETS, PARTICULARLY THE GENERAL, WERE ON THEIR GUARD DURING THIS FIRST INTENSIVE DISCUSSION WITH THEIR U.S. COUNTERPARTS, THEY AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO HOST THE NEXT MEETING AND GENERAL TATARNIKOV OFFERED TO PASS TO US AN INFORMAL LIST OF ISSUES THE SOVIETS WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS AT THE NEXT MEETING.

10. IN PRIVATE, U.S.-SOVIET WORKING RELATIONS WERE BUSINESSLIKE, IF NOT OVERLY PRODUCTIVE. IN PUBLIC, THE U.S. AND SOVIETS SQUARED OFF ON A NUMBER OF SUBJECTS. IN WORKING GROUP A THE U.S. RESPONDED TO A TENDENTIOUS

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SOVIET ATTACK ON U.S. CW POLICY ON MAY 24 (REF F) BY SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON U.S. CW POLICY AND BY ELABORATING ON THE IMPORTANT ROLE CHEMICAL WEAPONS PLAY IN SOVIET MILITARY PLANNING AND TRAINING. THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE REPLIED IN KIND. AS USUAL, THE U.S.-SOVIET EXCHANGE MADE A NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS NERVOUS, EVEN PROMPTING THE HUNGARIAN AMBASSADOR IN HIS MAY 31 PLENARY STATEMENT TO EXPRESS HOPE THAT "HEATED EXCHANGES WILL NOT HINDER EARLY PROGRESS IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS" (SEPTTEL).

11. THE NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED: VIRTUALLY SILENT AGAIN THIS WEEK, THE NNA APPARENTLY ARE STILL EMBROILED IN THEIR INTERNAL NEGOTIATIONS OF MORE DETAILED COMMON POSITIONS -- NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WERE NEAR COMPLETION WHEN THE SWEDES DERAILED THE PROCESS BY INTRODUCING NEW PAPERS AT THE MILREPS' MEETING IN VIENNA DURING THE LAST RECESS. THE NNA, NONETHELESS, ARE PRESSING FORWARD. THE FINNS HAVE TOLD US THAT NNA LEGAL EXPERTS WILL VISIT STOCKHOLM (JUNE 3-7) TO DISCUSS NON-USE OF FORCE. THE CYPRIOT AMBASSADOR, AUTHOR OF THE ONLY COMPREHENSIVE NNA TREATMENT OF NUF, IS THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN NNA NUF POSITION. WE CONTINUE TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH HIM. INDICATIONS ARE HE WILL NOT RPT NOT INTRODUCE ANY DECLARATION THIS SESSION.

12. THE MALTESE AMBASSADOR TOOK ADVANTAGE OF NNA INDECISIVENESS TO LAY DOWN YET ANOTHER MARKER OF HIS DELEGATION'S NETTLESOME PREOCCUPATION WITH MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY (REF E). IMPLICITLY REJECTING THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, HE INTERPRETED THE MANDATE TO COVER ALL NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND CALLED FOR AN EXTENSION OF NATO'S "OUT-OF-GARRISON" APPROACH TO INCLUDE "OUT-OF-BASE" ACTIVITIES OF NAVAL FORCES. WHILE THESE DEMANDS ARE SEEN AS EXTREME STARTING POSITIONS NOT TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY, THEY NONETHELESS FOLLOW THE PATTERN OF MALTESE BEHAVIOR AT MADRID AND REMIND US OF THE DISRUPTIVE ROLE THE MALTESE MAY CHOOSE TO PLAY DURING THE END GAME.

13. ONLY THE SWEDES AND THE AUSTRIANS DELIVERED DETAILED WORKING GROUP STATEMENTS, AND THEY CHOSE THE PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE: OBSERVATION (SEPTTEL). BOTH SUPPORTED AN IMPROVED, STANDARDIZED REGIME WHICH WOULD COVER THE WHOLE PERIOD OF AN EXERCISE. WHILE THE SWEDES SEEM TO SUPPORT AN EXPANDED OBSERVATION REGIME AS A MEANS OF DEALING WITH MOST VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS, THE AUSTRIANS ACKNOWLEDGE THAT EVEN A WELL-ORGANIZED OBSERVATION SYSTEM WILL HAVE TO BE SUPPLEMENTED WITH EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION.

14. NATO: NATO'S ENERGIES, MEANWHILE, WERE EXPENDED ON A SERIES OF INTERNAL DEBATES WHICH HAS DETRACTED FROM

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THE EFFORT PUT INTO WORKING GROUPS. AFTER A LONG AND, AT TIMES, ACRIMONIOUS DEBATE, THE FRG INSISTED ON INTRODUCING ITS WORKING PAPER ON ANNUAL FORECASTS IN WORKING GROUP A (REF F). THE U.S. ARGUED STRONGLY THAT TABLING PAPERS ON SOME BUT NOT ALL FIVE OF THE MEASURES WOULD FLAG ATTENTION TO OUR INTERNAL DISPUTE, A DILEMMA WHICH THE EAST COULD WELL EXPLOIT. THEREFORE, CONSENSUS FINALLY WAS ACHIEVED ON THE NEED TO DEVELOP OVERALL TACTICS BEFORE TABLING ANY ADDITIONAL PAPERS (REF G). WHILE WE HAVE SUCCEEDED SO FAR IN FOCUSING ON SUBSTANCE AND AVOIDING THE PROCEDURAL QUAGMIRE, PERSISTENT FRENCH REQUESTS THAT THE CAUCUS ADDRESS BOTH THE ADJOURNMENT DATE FOR THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND NATO'S POSITION ON THE INFORMAL WORK STRUCTURE, WHICH MUST BE REVIEWED THIS SESSION, HAVE PLACED THESE TWO CONTENTIOUS ISSUES ON THE CAUCUS'S AGENDA (REF H).

15. AS REPORTED EARLIER, LEAKS IN THE NATO CAUCUS HAVE BECOME A REAL PROBLEM, E.G., REF I; THIS WEEK THE PROBLEM WENT ONE STEP FURTHER, ACCORDING TO AMBASSADOR EDES, WHO TOLD THE CAUCUS THAT A UK NATIONAL PAPER ON CONSTRAINTS, WHICH HAD NOT BEEN FORMALLY TABLED IN THE CAUCUS OR REVIEWED BY THE MILAD GROUP, HAD BEEN HANDED OVER TO THE MNA. ANOTHER TROUBLESOME NOTE WAS STRUCK BY THE GREEK AMBASSADOR IN THE MAY 30 CAUCUS (REF G) WHEN HE ASKED WHY NATO PLANNED TO TABLE MORE ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS WHEN THE EAST HAS TOLD US THAT IT WILL NOT DISCUSS THEM UNLESS WE ADDRESS THEIR MEASURES (NUF, THREE EASTERN WORKING DOCUMENTS). PAPADAKIS WAS NOT DISSUADED FROM THIS WORRISOME APPROACH BY STRONG CAUCUS REACTION THAT WE INDEED HAD BEEN DISCUSSING THE EAST'S PROPOSALS, ESPECIALLY NUF, AND THAT WE SHOULD NOT PREDICATE OUR OWN ACTIONS ON WARSAW PACT THREATS.

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16. OTTAWA HUMAN RIGHTS EXPERTS MEETING: THE SOVIETS AND THEIR WARSAW PACT SOUL BROTHERS, THE BULGARIANS, ARE TAKING THE LEAD IN SPREADING THE WORD THAT THE WEST IS IN A WAITING MODE PENDING THE OUTCOME OF THE OTTAWA MEETING. WE HAVE BEEN CAREFUL TO AVOID FORMALLY LINKING PROGRESS IN OTTAWA WITH PROGRESS IN STOCKHOLM, WHILE POINTING OUT THAT BOTH ARE INTEGRAL PARTS OF THE OVERALL CSCE PROCESS AND THAT A POSITIVE OUTCOME AT ONE FORUM CAN ONLY HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT ON THE OTHER.  
END

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SUBJECT: WORKING GROUP AB MEETING, JUNE 3, 1985

1. CDE VI - 061
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT

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3. BEGIN SUMMARY. AT THE JUNE 3 WORKING GROUP A B MEETING, THE EAST (POLAND, GDR) CONTINUED ITS ATTACK ON NATO TREATMENT OF NUF AND CONSTRAINTS, ARGUING THAT NATO -- AND THE U.S. IN PARTICULAR -- HAS NOT SATISFACTORILY CLARIFIED ITS POSITION ON THESE ISSUES. DELWORTH RESPONDED TO GRINEVSKY'S (USSR) MAY 31 "MISUNDERSTANDING" OF CANADA'S POSITION ON NUF. CITRON (FRG), NOTING GDR REFERENCES TO HIS MAY 24 SPEECH, POINTED OUT THE CONTRAST BETWEEN THE EARLY TABLING OF THE COMPLETE NATO PACKAGE AND THE EAST'S PIECEMEAL ELABORATION OF ITS PROPOSALS. RESPONDING TO KONARSKI'S (POLAND) NUF COMMENTS, PORTUGAL ASKED WHETHER THE EAST HAS MODIFIED ITS POSITION ON NUF FOLLOWING THE TABLING OF SC.6; KONARSKI REPLIED THAT THE EAST HAS INDEED GIVEN SEVERAL INDICATIONS FOLLOWING THE TABLING OF SC.6 VIS-A-VIS ITS FLEXIBILITY ON A NUF AGREEMENT. ONCE AGAIN TAKING UP ITS "SEARCH FOR A COMMON PACKAGE" THEME, ROMANIA SUGGESTED A ROAD TO SYSTEMATIC NEGOTIATIONS. THE NETHERLANDS JUSTIFIED MEASURE 1 AND 5 OF SC.1 AS SEPARATE MEASURES. THE LONE NNA SPEAKER, LOIBL (AUSTRIA), SUGGESTED AS FOOD FOR THOUGHT TWO POSSIBLE CHANGES TO THE WORKING STRUCTURE. END SUMMARY

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4. AMBASSADOR KONARSKI (POLAND) LED AN AGGRESSIVE EASTERN ATTACK ON NATO THROUGH HIS ANALYSIS OF PROGRESS ON NUF, "TECHNICAL-MILITARY" MEASURES, AND ADAPTATION OF THE WORKING STRUCTURE:
- A. NUF: HE CHARACTERIZED NATO'S POSITION ON NUF AS HAVING EVOLVED FROM ONE OF "AMBIGUOUS NEGATION," TO "AMBIGUOUS HESITATION," TO "AMBIGUOUS APPROVAL." NOTING THE "IRRATIONALLY TOO SLOW" WESTERN EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT VIS-A-VIS NUF, HE STRESSED THE NEED FOR CLARITY AT THIS STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE. KONARSKI SPECIFIED THAT SIMPLE REAFFIRMATION OF NUF, OR ITS "EXPRESSION THROUGH MEASURES," WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE EAST. FINALLY, HE CHALLENGED THE WEST TO "GET RID OF AMBIGUITIES" BY PRESENTING EXPLICITLY ITS POSITION ON NUF.
- B. "TECHNICAL-MILITARY MEASURES": KONARSKI PRAISED THE EAST FOR TABLING ITS THREE NOTIFICATION WORKING DOCUMENTS, WHICH HE CLAIMS DEMONSTRATE THAT THE EAST IS WILLING TO ACCOMMODATE WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS. SC.1, ON THE OTHER HAND, HE CRITICIZED AS THE "DEVELOPED FORM OF THE WEST'S SECURITY INTERESTS" -- A PACKAGE WHICH DOES NOT CONSIDER THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL PARTICIPANTS.
- C. WORKING STRUCTURE: KONARSKI CLAIMED THAT POLAND HAS "ONE OR TWO PROPOSALS" IT COULD SUBMIT IN THE PROCESS OF

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REVIEWING THE EXISTING WORKING STRUCTURE. HOWEVER, HE SAID, POLAND HAS CONCLUDED THAT WE DO NOT NEED NEW PROPOSALS ON THIS ISSUE. HE OUTLINED TWO PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS: 1) THE EXISTING STRUCTURE IS NO DOUBT USEFUL AND WILL AGAIN BE NEEDED IN THE FUTURE, AND 2) INFORMAL SOLUTIONS AND ARRANGEMENTS REQUIRE INFORMAL DECISIONS.

5. AMBASSADOR BUHRING (GDR) CONTINUED THE EAST'S HAMMERING ON THE NATO POSITIONS ON CONSTRAINTS AND NUF. HE SOUNDED THE EAST'S WARNING THAT WE ARE "NOW IN THE STAGE WHERE WE HAVE TO BE CLEAR ON WHAT IS NEGOTIABLE." THUS, HE ASKED, WHAT IS THE NATO POSITION ON CONSTRAINTS? AND, "IS THE U.S. READY TO NEGOTIATE CONSTRAINTS? TURNING TO NUF, HE CLAIMED IT IS "HIGH TIME" NATO EXPLAIN WHAT IT MEANS ON THIS ISSUE. SPECIFICALLY, HE ASKED FOR AN EXPLANATION OF CITRON'S (FRG) MAY 24 CALL FOR AN "ALL-ENCOMPASSING REAFFIRMATION" OF NUF, AND HE ALSO CHALLENGED CITRON TO EXPLAIN HIS VIEWS ON POLITICAL MEASURES AND CONSTRAINTS. THE GDR AMBASSADOR ALSO CRITICIZED THE "FALSE IMPRESSION" HE SAID WAS REGISTERED BY USDEP IN THE MAY 24 ISSUE OF "FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE," WHICH QUOTED USDEP AS HAVING SAID THAT THE EAST HAS ENDEAVORED TO LIMIT THE CONFERENCE EXCLUSIVELY TO POLITICAL DECLARATIONS.

(BEGIN COMMENT: FOLLOWING THE EXAMPLE SET BY GRINEVSKY'S MAY 31 PLENARY STATEMENT, THE EAST APPEARS DETERMINED TO APPLY PRESSURE ON NATO -- AND SPECIFICALLY THE U.S. -- TO TABLE NATO "PAPERS" ON NUF AND CONSTRAINTS. IN SO DOING, THEY PRESUMABLY ARE HOPING TO EXPLOIT ANY WEAK LINKS IN NATO'S ARMOR AND TURN ATTENTION TO THEIR "REASONABLE" APPROACH TO THE CONFERENCE. THE RECENT SERIES OF POINTED ATTACKS ON THE U.S. DELEGATION IS EVIDENCE OF THIS TACTICAL GAME PLAN. ANOTHER INDICATION OF THIS PLAN IS AN INTENSIFICATION OF EASTERN INFORMAL CONTACTS WITH NNA AND OTHER NATO PARTICIPANTS. FINALLY, THE EAST'S GRATUITOUS PRAISE OF ITS OWN NOTIFICATION DOCUMENTS SEEMS DESIGNED TO MAKE THE POINT THAT NATO IS THE OBSTRUCTIONIST TO PROGRESS IN CDE. END COMMENT)

6. AMBASSADOR CITRON (FRG) RESPONDED TO BUHRING'S REFERENCE TO HIS STATEMENT. HE CONTRASTED THE EAST'S PIECEMEAL -- AND LONG AWAITED -- TABLING OF ITS PROPOSALS WITH NATO'S EARLY INTRODUCTION AND FULLY DEVELOPED ELABORATION OF ITS PACKAGE.

7. CITING GRINEVSKY'S MAY 31 "SERIOUS MISUNDERSTANDING" OF CANADA'S POSITION ON NUF, AMBASSADOR DELWORTH CLARIFIED HIS DELEGATION'S THINKING BY REVIEWING THREE REQUIREMENTS VIS-A-VIS NUF: 1) A TREATY IS NOT THE APPROPRIATE FORM, 2) ANY LANGUAGE ADOPTED FOR NUF MUST NOT UNDERMINE THE UN CHARTER AND HELSINKI FINAL ACT, AND 3) REAFFIRMATION OF NUF MUST BE COMBINED WITH CONCRETE

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CSBM'S, I.E., AN "ORGANIC FUSION."

8. AMBASSADOR CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL) DIRECTED A QUESTION TO KONARSKI BASED ON EASTERN EVOLUTION OF ITS NUF POSITION: IS THE EAST'S EVOLUTION ON NUF EXPRESSED BY SC.4 AND SC.6, OR IS THERE MORE? KONARSKI REPLIED THAT, FOLLOWING THE TABLING OF SC.6, A "NUMBER OF POINTS HAVE BEEN RAISED" WHICH INDICATE THE EAST'S WILLINGNESS TO "REPLACE THE FORMULA BY ANOTHER" IF NECESSARY, A FORMULA WHICH TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL PARTICIPANTS. (BEGIN COMMENT: KONARSKI "SEEMED TO" IMPLY THAT THE EAST IS WILLING TO DROP DISCUSSION OF THE FORM OF A NUF COMMITMENT IN EXCHANGE FOR NATO WILLINGNESS TO ENTER INTO SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS ON NUF. END COMMENT)

9. AMBASSADOR BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) JUSTIFIED THE INFORMATION (MEASURE 1) AND VERIFICATION (MEASURE 5) MEASURES OF SC.1 AS SEPARATE MEASURES. HE ARGUED THAT THEY CANNOT BE SEEN IN ISOLATION FROM THE OTHER MEASURES OF SC.1. BUWALDA REJECTED THE EAST'S ARGUMENT THAT INFORMATION MUST BE GIVEN IN THE CONTEXT OF NOTIFICATION, STRESSING THAT MEASURE 1 HAS IN MIND A "GENERAL PICTURE" FROM WHICH THE PIECES OF INFORMATION PROVIDED IN OTHER MEASURES CAN BE EVALUATED. REGARDING VERIFICATION, THE DUTCH AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED THAT VERIFICATION AND INSPECTION MUST BE CONSIDERED IN PRINCIPLE -- NOT A PURPOSE IN ITSELF -- BUT AS AN INTEGRATED ELEMENT OF THE PACKAGE. THUS, HE SAID, ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF VERIFICATION SHOULD INCLUDE GROUND INSPECTION AS WELL AS NON-INTERFERENCE IN NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. HE ADDED THAT NTM IS "WIDER THAN SATELLITES" -- THAT ALL STATES HAVE SOME FORM OF NTM, HOWEVER INADEQUATE, TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE.

10. AMBASSADOR CETERCHI (ROMANIA) ADDED YET ANOTHER STATEMENT TO THE ROMANIAN SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND. HE CALLED ON THE CONFERENCE TO ADOPT A BALANCED, SUBSTANTIVE "COMMON PACKAGE" IN CONFORMITY TO THE MADRID MANDATE. THIS PACKAGE, HE STRESSED, SHOULD CONSIST OF MEASURES OF PRIORITY TO ALL AND SHOULD, THEREFORE, BE APPRECIATED AS A "WHOLE." HE IMPLIED THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD LOOK BEYOND THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS OF THE PACKAGE IN ORDER TO AGREE ON SOMETHING WHICH MEETS THE SECURITY CONCERNS OF EACH PARTICIPANT. TO FACILITATE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A "SINGLE SET OF INTERDEPENDENT MEASURES" WITH A POSSIBILITY OF CONSENSUS, CETERCHI PROPOSED THAT WE: 1) DRAW UP ELEMENTS AND THE FRAMEWORK OF AN AGREEMENT, 2) CONCENTRATE EFFORTS ON THE CONTENT OF MEASURES WHICH WILL HELP REACH CONSENSUS, 3) PROCEED TO NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD A TEXT FOR A FINAL AGREEMENT, WHILE KEEPING ALL PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE, AND 4) GUIDE THE WORKING GROUPS TO BRING POSITIONS CLOSER TOGETHER.

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SUBORDINATE IN-DEPTH DISCUSSION TO THE TASK OF WIDENING CONSENSUS. THE ROMANIAN AMBASSADOR ALSO NOTED THAT THERE WERE DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THE ROMANIAN AIDE-MEMOIRE AND THE PROPOSALS OF SC.2, AND EXPLAINED THAT THE AIDE-MEMOIRE REPRESENTS A SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS, WHEREAS SC.2 IS CONSISTENT WITH THE ROMANIAN NATIONAL POSITION.

11. NOTING THAT THE CONTENTS OF A COMMON PACKAGE ARE NOT YET SO READILY RECOGNIZABLE, AMBASSADOR LOIBL (AUSTRIA) OFFERED "FOOD FOR THOUGHT" ON POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS TO THE WORKING STRUCTURE TO BE CONSIDERED DURING ITS REVIEW: 1) DELEGATIONS WISHING TO TAKE THE FLOOR DURING WORKING GROUP MEETINGS SHOULD SPECIFY BEFORE HAND WHAT THEY WILL SPEAK ABOUT; THIS WILL ENABLE OTHERS TO PREPARE; AND 2) WE SHOULD AGREE ON WHICH CONCRETE POINTS COVERED IN THE DISCUSSION SHOULD BE DEALT WITH DURING THE NEXT WORKING GROUP MEETING. (BEGIN COMMENT: LOIBL'S SUGGESTIONS MAY HAVE SOME MERIT ALTHOUGH PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION MAY BE DIFFICULT. END

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SUBJECT: CDE: U.S.-MALTA BILATERAL

REF: A) STOCKHOLM 3987, B) STOCKHOLM 1237

1. CDE VI - 090

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT

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3. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR GOODBY AND U.S. CDE DELOFF (STOFFER) MET WITH MALTESE AMBASSADOR VICTOR CAMILLERI AND HIS AIDE, MARIO BUTTIGIEG, ON MONDAY, JUNE 3, TO REVIEW CONSTRAINTS, NUF, AND PROCEDURAL ISSUES.

4. MALTA ON CONSTRAINTS: CAMILLERI NOTED THAT CONSTRAINTS, IN PRINCIPLE, NEED NOT BE INCLUDED IN A FIRST-PHASE AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THE NNA GOAL, AND MALTA'S, IS TO FIND A CONSTRAINTS WHICH WOULD LESSEN THE DANGER OF SURPRISE ATTACK. HE ADMITTED THAT NATO'S MEASURE 2 (FORECASIS) HELPS SOMEWHAT IN THE THREAT ASSESSMENT OF A POTENTIAL SURPRISE ATTACK; HOWEVER, THE EGYPTIAN MANEUVERS IN THE SINAI PENINSULA PRIOR TO THE 1973 YOM KIPPUR WAR CAST DOUBT ON THE CONSTRAINING EFFECTS OF MEASURES REQUIRING PRENOTIFICATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES. CAMILLERI SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS A CONSTRAINT COULD BE FOUND THAT LIMITS THE DEPLOYMENT OF CERTAIN EQUIPMENT, ON THE SIZE AND TYPE OF MANEUVERS IN SENSITIVE AREAS, SUCH AS BORDER REGIONS.

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5. U.S. ON CONSTRAINTS: AMBASSADOR GOODBY NOTED THAT NATO HAS NEVER RULED OUT A CONSTRAINTS MEASURE IF A BALANCED ONE COULD BE FOUND THAT FAVORED THE DEFENSE OVER THE OFFENSE AND THAT APPLIED IN ITS EFFECTS TO ALL 35 NATIONS EQUALLY. NATO, HE NOTED, HAS NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO FIND ONE. ADVOCATES VARIOUSLY DESCRIBE THE OBJECTIVE OF CONSTRAINTS AS A MEANS TO REDUCE THE CHANCES OF SURPRISE ATTACK AND POLITICAL INTIMIDATION, AND TO FUNCTION AS A BRIDGE BETWEEN STABILIZING CONCRETE CSBM'S AND DISARMAMENT. IT IS DIFFICULT TO FIND A MEASURE THAT MEETS ALL THESE CRITERIA. FOR EXAMPLE, GOODBY SAID, RELATIVELY LARGE NUMBERS OF TROOPS ARE NEEDED FOR SURPRISE ATTACK, WHILE FAIRLY SMALL NUMBERS ARE ABLE TO ENGAGE IN POLITICAL INTIMIDATION. THE PRIMARY NEED NOW, HE EMPHASIZED, IS TO BE CLEARER ON THE PURPOSE OF CONSTRAINTS. GOODBY EXPLAINED WHY SOME OF THE CAMILLERI IDEAS ON EQUIPMENT AND MANEUVER CONSTRAINTS IN CERTAIN AREAS WOULD BE ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO IMPLEMENT AND VERIFY, BE UNEQUAL IN ITS APPLICATION TO NATO, AND BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE MANDATE'S REQUIREMENT TO APPLY TO THE WHOLE OF EUROPE. GOODBY CONCLUDED THAT CONSTRAINTS ARE COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE AND NEED MORE TIME THAN THE YEAR LEFT IN THE CONFERENCE JUST TO HANDLE ALL THE DETAILED ISSUES ALREADY ON THE TABLE. CONSEQUENTLY, CONSTRAINTS MAY HAVE TO BE SHELVED.

6. MALTA SEEKS CONSTRAINT PRINCIPLE: CAMILLERI NOTED THAT HE UNDERSTANDS THE GENERAL AND SPECIFIC PROBLEMS

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GOODBY HAD RAISED WITH RESPECT TO CONSTRAINTS. NEVERTHELESS, MALTA'S INTEREST IS IN LOWERING THE INTENSITY OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND LESSENING THE EXTENT OF POLITICAL INTIMIDATION. CAMILLERI STATED THAT HIS AIM IS TO INTRODUCE THE CONCEPT AT THIS STAGE OF THE WORK IN ORDER TO SECURE AS A FINAL OUTCOME IN STOCKHOLM ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSTRAINTS FOR FUTURE WORK.

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7. MALTA ON NUF: CAMILLERI STATED THAT NUF IS A POLITICAL ISSUE AND THAT MORE IS NEEDED FROM THE WEST THAN A SIMPLE REAFFIRMATION. THE EAST WANTS DETAILED COMMITMENTS CONSISTENT WITH, BUT STRONGER THAN, THE LANGUAGE FOUND IN THE UN CHARTER AND HELSINKI FINAL ACT. CAMILLERI INDICATED THAT THE EAST STILL INCLUDES NUF IN ITS NUF PRINCIPLE. GOODBY INTERRUPTED AT THIS POINT TO STATE CATEGORICALLY THAT THERE WOULD BE ABSOLUTELY NO LATITUDE FROM THE U.S. OR NATO ON THAT ISSUE. CAMILLERI RECOGNIZED THAT LONG-HELD POSITION, BUT NOTED THAT NUF IS A MAJOR EASTERN ISSUE. CAMILLERI CONCLUDED AMBIGUOUSLY BY SAYING THAT HE WAS NOT CLEAR HOW MALTA COULD HELP ON THE NUF ISSUE.

8. U.S. ON NUF: GOODBY BEGAN WITH THE NUF ISSUE AND EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD TOLD GRINEVSKY AND OTHERS IN MOSCOW IN APRIL, 1984, THAT THERE WAS NO LATITUDE ON THIS ISSUE WHATEVER FROM THE U.S. ON NUF, GOODBY SAID, THE PRINCIPLE APPLIES TO ALL KINDS OF WEAPONS. IF ONE WERE TO BEGIN LISTING WEAPONS AND LEAVE SOME OUT, IT WOULD IMPLY THE USE OF THAT TYPE OF FORCE IS SANCTIONED. GOODBY NOTED THAT GRINEVSKY IS FULLY AWARE OF THE POSITION. THE SOVIETS, GOODBY SAID, ARE ATTEMPTING TO APPLY NUF TO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS. THE U.S. LEGAL VIEW IS THAT NUF ALREADY APPLIES TO THOSE AREAS UNDER THE UN CHARTER AND NUMEROUS OTHER LEGAL INSTRUMENTS. THUS, GOODBY SUMMED UP, IT WOULD BE POLITICALLY AND LEGALLY UNSOUND TO UNDERSCORE THE APPLICATIONS OF NUF WITH RESPECT TO EITHER SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES OR SPECIFIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS. CONSEQUENTLY, NATO COULD ONLY SUPPORT THE PRINCIPLE OF NUF USING LANGUAGE FROM THE UN CHARTER AND HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

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9. U.S. ON PROCEDURAL MATTERS: ON ADJOURNMENT, GOODBY FELT IT WOULD BE REASONABLE TO CONCLUDE THE CONFERENCE BY MID-1986. HE COULD NOT SEE THE CONFERENCE CONTINUING THROUGH VIENNA, SINCE CDE IS A SUBORDINATE BODY. ON WORKING PROCEDURES, GOODBY NOTED THAT IT WAS NOT AN ARBITRARY MATTER OF THE CALENDAR. IF SIGNIFICANT SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION TAKES PLACE WHICH MERITS MOVING TO DRAFTING, THEN DRAFTING GROUPS COULD BE ESTABLISHED AT THAT TIME, PERHAPS THE FALL. HOWEVER, THE CONFERENCE SHOULD NOT RUSH INTO DRAFTING IF IT IS NOT WARRANTED.

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CURRENTLY, THE POSITIONS OF PARTICIPANTS ARE STILL FAR APART, EVEN ON THE ISSUE OF NOTIFICATION, WHICH NEARLY ALL THE 35 STATES AGREE SHOULD BECOME PART OF A FINAL AGREEMENT. A FRAMEWORK ON PRINCIPLES IS NEEDED BEFORE DRAFTING COULD BEGIN, HE CONCLUDED. CAMILLERI FIRMLY AGREED AND HOPED TO MEET AGAIN TO DISCUSS MALTA'S AMPLIFICATION OF ITS SC.5 PROPOSAL.  
END

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SUBJECT: CDE - REPORT OF WORKING GROUP A MEETING,  
- JUNE 4, 1985

1. CDE VI - 70.

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT

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3. BEGIN SUMMARY: EASTERN REPS OFFERED A VAGUE DEFENSE OF THE MERITS OF THE PROVISION IN SC.6 FOR EMERGENCY CONSULTATIONS IN CRISES (CZECHOSLOVAKIA); THEY RESPONDED TO EARLIER WESTERN CRITICISM OF THE EAST'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS-FREE ZONES (NWFZ'S) PROPOSALS (BULGARIA); THEY ATTEMPTED TO SPLIT THE FRG FROM ITS WESTERN ALLIES ON NUF (USSR); AND THEY CONTENDED THAT ARTICLE 13 OF THE UN CHARTER SUPPORTS A REGIONAL CODIFICATION OF NUF AT THE CDE. THE FRG SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON ITS NUF POSITION, AND THE CYPRIOT AMBASSADOR, WHO REFERS TO HIMSELF AS AN INTERNATIONAL LAWYER, AUTHORITATIVELY DISPUTED THE CLAIM THAT ARTICLE 13 IS RELEVANT TO THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE BY NOTING THAT ONLY THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY COULD AUTHORIZE AND BRING INTO EFFECT A REGIONAL CODIFICATION OF NUF. THE SOVIET DELEGATE WAS CLEARLY TAKEN ABACK AND COULD NOT EFFECTIVELY RESPOND TO THE CYPRIOT. ON THE WHOLE, THE EAST AVOIDED THE POLEMICS AND PERSONALIZED REMARKS CHARACTERISTIC OF ITS RECENT INTERVENTIONS. END SUMMARY..

4. CZECHOSLOVAK DELEGATE (SKOBA) ARGUED THAT PARA 8 (CONSULTATIONS IN CRISES) OF SC.6 WOULD REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION THROUGH MISCALCULATION AND WOULD GUARANTEE COMPLIANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF NUF. HE CLAIMED THAT MANY STATES, INCLUDING NATO AND WARSAW PACT MEMBER STATES, NOW HAVE BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR, AND INDEED SUPPORT, COMMITMENTS TO RESORT TO SUCH CONSULTATIONS. IMPLEMENTATION OF PARA 8 OF SC.6, HE CONCLUDED, WOULD REQUIRE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MULTILATERAL SYSTEM AND THE REQUISITE STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES COULD BE ADAPTED FROM OUR EXPERIENCE IN THE CSCE PROCESS. (BEGIN COMMENT: THE VAGUENESS OF THE CZECH STATEMENT RAISES THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE EASTERN CONCEPT OF CRISIS COMMUNICATION IS NOT WELL DEVELOPED. END COMMENT.)

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5. FRG DELEGATE (DREHER) RESPONDED TO SOVIET CLAIMS OF MAY 21 THAT ONLY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES THUS FAR HAD EXPRESSED INTEREST IN NUF. HE ARGUED THAT THE FRG DELEGATION HAD COME TO STOCKHOLM PREPARED TO STRENGTHEN THE PRINCIPLE OF NUF WITH CONCRETE AND VERIFIABLE MEASURES. HE ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT THE FRG DELEGATION HAD SPOKEN EXTENSIVELY ON NUF; HE CITED UNIVERSAL RECOGNITION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NUF AS A BASIS FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND AVERRED THAT ALL CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS ARE READY TO REINFORCE THIS PRINCIPLE. THE BASIC QUESTION, HE ADDED, WAS: SHOULD NUF BE REINFORCED

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BY WORDS OR BY DEEDS I.E., CONCRETE CSBM'S? HE URGED THAT IT BE DONE THROUGH THE NEGOTIATION OF CONCRETE MEASURES AND ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION.

6. BULGARIAN REP (GOTEV) ADDRESSED FRG QUESTIONS OF LAST WEEK REGARDING GUARANTEES AND VERIFIABILITY OF NWFZ'S. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE INVOLVED NUCLEAR STATES UNDERTAKE TO DEVELOP APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS AND VERIFICATION PROCEDURES. HE APPLAUDED THE USSR AS THE ONLY NUCLEAR POWER THAT HAS DECLARED ITS READINESS TO MAKE THE REQUISITE COMMITMENT. GOTEV CLAIMED THAT A KEY WAY TO ENSURE AGAINST NUCLEAR STRIKES AGAINST TARGETS IN DESIGNATED NUCLEAR-FREE AREAS WOULD BE TO KEEP NUCLEAR WEAPONS OUT OF THESE AREAS SINCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD ATTRACT STRIKES. GOTEV ALLUDED TO THE 1968 NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO AS USEFUL VEHICLES FOR CREATING NWFZ'S. UK REP (FREEMAN) INTERVENED BRIEFLY TO STATE THAT CREATION OF NWFZ'S WAS NOT WITHIN THE CONFERENCE MANDATE, BUT WENT ON TO WELCOME THE BULGARIAN'S REMARKS CONCERNING VERIFICATION; FREEMAN EXPRESSED A DESIRE FOR A FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSION ON VERIFICATION.

7. SOVIET SPOKESMAN (RAKHMANINOV) ATTEMPTED TO ESTABLISH EVIDENCE OF FRG SUPPORT FOR THE SEPARATE NATURE OF A NUF COMMITMENT, I.E., A COMMITMENT NOT ORGANICALLY LINKED WITH CSBM'S. HE QUOTED A 1984 STATEMENT BY FOREIGN MINISTER HANS GENSCHER. ACCORDING TO RAKHMANINOV, GENSCHER ALLOWED THAT A REAFFIRMATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NUF SHOULD NOT BE ORGANICALLY FUSED WITH THE ADOPTION OF CONCRETE CSBM'S. HE CLAIMED AMBASSADOR CITRON, IN CONTRAST, HAD MOVED AWAY FROM THIS LINE BY ARGUING THAT A NEW REAFFIRMATION OF NUF SHOULD BE LINKED TO CONCRETE CSBM'S. RAKHMANINOV WENT ON TO ARGUE THAT ARTICLE 13 OF THE UN CHARTER PROVIDED THE BASIS FOR A LEGAL CODIFICATION OF A NUF COMMITMENT AND THAT THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT ALLOWED FOR TREATIES WITHIN THE CSCE PROCESS.

8. FRG DELEGATE DREHER PUT THE GENSCHER QUOTATION IN ITS PROPER CONTEXT AND STATED HIS DELEGATION'S POSITION CLEARLY: A REAFFIRMATION OF NUF, EVEN A FORMAL ONE, WITHOUT SUFFICIENT CONCRETE VERIFIABLE CSBM'S, WOULD NOT BE JUSTIFIED.

9. IN A POLITE, BUT TOUGH PUT-DOWN OF DISTORTED SOVIET INTERPRETATIONS OF THE UN CHARTER AND THE HFA, CYPRIOT AMBASSADOR (PAPADOPOULOS) POINTED OUT THAT THE CONFERENCE HAD NOT BEEN CONVENED BY THE UN AND THAT WE ARE NOT HERE TO CODIFY A NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW. MOREOVER, HE CONTENDED THAT ARTICLE 13 IS NOT RELEVANT TO THE DISCUSSIONS HERE AND THAT ARTICLE 13 ALLOWS ONLY THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO CODIFY REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL LEGAL EXPRESSIONS OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE. HE ADDED THAT

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THE HFA AND MADRID MANDATE DO NOT PROVIDE FOR TREATIES ARISING FROM THE CSCE PROCESS.

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10. A SOMEWHAT CHAGRINED RAKHMANINOV THANKED THE FRG DELEGATE FOR HIS RESPONSE AND, ADDRESSING THE CYPRIOT'S REMARKS, ASSERTED LAMELY THAT ARTICLE 13 WAS INDEED OF DIRECT RELEVANCE TO OUR WORK HERE. HE SAID, NEVERTHELESS, THAT THE FRG AND CYPRIOT COMMENTS HAD GIVEN THE WORKING GROUP "FOOD FOR THOUGHT."  
END

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SUBJECT: CDE: REPORT OF WORKING GROUP B, JUNE 4

1. CDE VI - 069.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: WORKING GROUP B MEETING ON NOTIFICATION WAS LARGELY DEVOTED TO A DISCUSSION OF NOTIFICATION OF "MOVEMENTS" AS OPPOSED TO "MANEUVERS". FOLLOWING A U.S. INTERVENTION ARGUING THE ADVANTAGES OF THE WEST'S OUT-OF-GARRISON (OOG) CONCEPT, SOVIET REP ATTEMPTED TO JUSTIFY CONTINUING THE HELSINKI DISTINCTION BY ARGUING THAT MOVEMENTS, SUCH AS MOVEMENTS OF RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCES, HAVE A SPECIAL MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE AND ARE A SIGNAL OF DANGER. SOVIET REP ALSO AGAIN REJECTED THE WEST'S OOG CONCEPT. (SUMMARIZED IN PARA 4 BELOW). OTHER EASTERN AND WESTERN INTERVENTIONS WERE ROUTINE. (SUMMARIZED IN PARA 5 BELOW). END SUMMARY.
4. U.S. REP (HANSEN) DISTRIBUTED THE RUSSIAN TEXT OF THE DEFINITION FOR "GARRISON" WHICH U.S. HAD PRESENTED A WEEK PREVIOUSLY. HE USED THE OCCASION TO NOTE DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS WITH THE USE OF "MANEUVER" VERSUS "MOVEMENT". HE QUOTED, FOR EXAMPLE, THE DEFINITION OF "MANEUVER" FROM JCS PUB 1 WHICH GAVE THREE DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS. SOVIET REP ATTEMPTED TO JUSTIFY DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN "MANEUVER" AND "MOVEMENT", ARGUING THAT THE MOVEMENT OF TROOPS HAS A MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE, IN TERMS OF PURPOSE AND NUMBER OF TROOPS, DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF MANEUVERS. HE ARGUED THAT TROOP MOVEMENTS WERE MADE FOR THE PURPOSE OF INCREASING FORCE CONCENTRATIONS IN SPECIFIC AREAS (AND PRESUMABLY, THOUGH THE SOVIET REP DID NOT EXPLICITLY SAY IT, FOR SPECIFIC REASONS). HE CLAIMED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IN RECENT YEARS, THERE HAS BEEN A TREND TO USE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCES, WHICH ARE HIGHLY-MOBILE, FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT TO VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD "TO SOLVE CERTAIN POLITICAL/MILITARY PROBLEMS". SOVIET REP ARGUED THAT SUCH MOVEMENTS WERE A "SIGNAL OF DANGER" AND SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO SEPARATE NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION. SOVIET REP REJECTED THE WEST'S CONCEPT OF OOG ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH NOTIFICATION OF AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS, UNLESS IT IS CHANGED TO AN "OUT-OF-BASE" CONCEPT.
5. IN OTHER INTERVENTIONS AND DISCUSSION, HUNGARIAN AND BULGARIAN REPS GAVE ROUTINE STATEMENTS IN DEFENSE OF NOTIFYING ALL AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS ABOVE THE PROPOSED THRESHOLDS. THE ITALIAN REP GAVE A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE EASTERN PAPER ON NOTIFICATION OF LAND MANEUVERS, CALLING PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE LOOPHOLE PROVIDED BY THE EAST'S PROVISION FOR NOTIFICATION OF SOME MANEUVERS "AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME". U.S. REP (HANSEN) DIRECTED CRITICAL QUESTIONS AT EASTERN REPS: HOW MANY MORE EASTERN GROUND FORCE MANEUVERS WOULD BE NOTIFIED UNDER THE 20,000 THRESHOLD; HOW MANY EASTERN AIR OR

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NAVAL MANEUVERS WOULD HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED IN LAST 5 YEARS UNDER THEIR PROPOSALS? RESPONDING TO THE FIRST QUESTION, HUNGARIAN REP STATED THAT THE PROPOSED THRESHOLD FOR AIR FORCE MANEUVERS WAS BASED ON AN ANALYSIS OF NATO PRACTICES. HE SAID IT WAS FOR NATO AUTHORITIES TO ANALYZE WTO PRACTICES. THE FRENCH REP ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIETS NOW ACCEPTED OBLIGATORY NOTIFICATION OF GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES; SOVIET REP RESPONDED THAT THE EAST WOULD NOT AGREE TO OBLIGATORY NOTIFICATION UNTIL THERE WAS AGREEMENT, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION.  
END

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SUBJECT: CDE/NATO CAUCUS, JUNE 4, 1985

REF: A) STUCKHOLM 4136, B) STOCKHOLM 4135,

- C) STOCKHOLM 4038, D) STOCKHOLM 3832,

- E) STOCKHOLM 4137

1. CDE VI - 065

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT

3. SUMMARY: THE CAUCUS DISCUSSED THE WEST'S POSITION FOLLOWING EASTERN INTRODUCTION OF ITS THREE NOTIFICATION PAPERS AND OBSERVATION MODALITIES. MOST FELT THAT NATO WAS IN A SOUND TACTICAL POSITION EVEN THOUGH THE EAST HAD TAKEN THE INITIATIVE ON CSBMS. INTEREST IN PRESSING AHEAD WITH NATO NATIONAL "PROTOTYPE" PAPERS CONTINUED, WITH THE BRITISH SAYING THEY HOPED TO GIVE THE CAUCUS A DRAFT NEXT WEEK. AMBASSADOR GOODBY REPEATED WASHINGTON'S VIEW THAT THE ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS MUST COVER MEASURES 1 TO 5, AND AGAIN SUGGESTED THAT THE WHOLE EXERCISE BE CAREFULLY RECONSIDERED. THE CAUCUS CHASTISED THE FRENCH DEL FOR RAISING PROCEDURAL ISSUES PREMATURELY. CIARRAPICO (ITALY) REPORTED ON A MAY 22 LUNCH WITH GRINEVSKY, WHO STATED HIS INTEREST FIRST IN SEEING THE NNA BREAK THE STAGNATION AT THE CONFERENCE BY CHAIRING "COFFEE GROUPS" AND SECOND IN HAVING THE WEST RESPOND ON NUF WITH GREATER PRECISION. THE BONN BRAINSTORMING SESSION WILL BE HELD SEPTEMBER 4-5. END SUMMARY.

4. WARSAW PACT TACTICS AND IMPLICATIONS: TO INITIATE THE DISCUSSION, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DAY, EDES (UK), NOTED THAT THE WEST MAY NOT NOW BE IN AS GOOD A POSITION AS IN THE LAST ROUND, SINCE THE WARSAW PACT HAS PLAYED ITS HAND SO WELL OVER THE LAST TWO WEEKS. EDES POINTED TO THE EAST'S THREE NOTIFICATION PAPERS AND THEIR APPARENT FORTHCOMING POSITIONS ON OBSERVATION MODALITIES (REF A) AS EXAMPLES. CITRON (FRG), BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS), MEVIK (NORWAY), AND GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) WERE MORE OPTIMISTIC THAT THE NATO PACKAGE WOULD REMAIN THE FOCUS OF SUBSTANTIVE DEBATE. THEY SUGGESTED THAT THE EAST'S "BLUFF" ON OBSERVATION PROVIDED OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE WEST TO EXPLOIT AND THAT EASTERN TACTICS COULD BE EXPOSED BY APPLYING THE PARAMETERS OF THEIR OWN NOTIFICATION MEASURES TO PAST EASTERN EXERCISES. BUWALDA WARNED AGAINST ACTING HASTILY IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET MOVES AND OPINED THAT THE REAL SOVIET TACTIC MAY BE TO DRIVE WEDGES IN THE ALLIANCE AND TO PROMPT UNPLANNED AND UNCOORDINATED SUBSTANTIVE REACTIONS. GASCHIGNARD AGREED, POINTING TO GRINEVSKY'S REMARKS IN THE MAY 31 PLENARY (REF B) WHICH APPEARED TO BE DESIGNED TO SEPARATE THE U.S. FROM EUROPE AND THE U.S. DELEGATION FROM WASHINGTON. .. AMBASSADOR GOODBY AGREED WITH CITRON AND THE OTHERS THAT THE WEST'S POSITION IS STILL GOOD AND SUBSTANTIVELY

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NOT DEPENDENT ON THE TABLING OF MORE PAPERS. GOODBY NOTED THAT ASPECTS OF THE EAST'S POSITION ON OBSERVATION MIGHT BE POCKETED, ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO OBTAIN MUCH CREDIT. ESSENTIALLY, THE SOVIETS WERE ONLY EXPLAINING THEIR OWN SC.4 PROPOSALS, THEN DEMANDING A REWARD FROM THE WEST IN THE FORM OF NUF. HE SAID THE EASTERN PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN CONSPICUOUSLY DEVOID OF INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION PROVISIONS, AND HAVE AVOIDED ANY REAL ADVANCES IN NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF LAND ACTIVITIES. GOODBY RECOMMENDED THESE ARGUMENTS SHOULD BE USED TO EXPOSE SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE PLENARY AND AB MEETINGS. EDES SUMMED UP CAUCUS SENTIMENT BY RECOMMENDING AGGRESSIVE PROBING OF THE EAST'S NEW PROPOSALS AND STANDING FIRM ON THE SUBSTANCE OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED.

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6. ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS: GASCHIGNARD PROMISED AGAIN TO CIRCULATE A PAPER NEXT WEEK ON MEASURE 4 (OBSERVATION) WHILE DELWORTH (CANADA) REPORTED GREAT DIFFICULTIES WITH THE MEASURE 5 (VERIFICATION) PAPER. EDES (UK) STATED THAT THE MEASURE 3 (NOTIFICATION) PAPER WAS READY TO BE SENT AROUND, BUT THE MEASURE 1 (INFORMATION) PAPER STILL HAS UNIQUE PROBLEMS. (COMMENT: WE HAVE URGED UK DEL PRIVATELY TO DEFER THIS. THEIR INITIAL VIEW IS THAT THEIR MEASURE 1 PAPER WOULD ONLY ILLUSTRATE A NATO POSITION ALREADY ON THE TABLE.) EDES, AS CHAIRMAN, REMINDED THE CAUCUS THAT CONSENSUS WOULD BE NEEDED TO MOVE FORWARD. MEVIK (NORWAY) URGED THAT ACTION BE TAKEN ON A MEASURE 1 PAPER. CITRUM, LESS SENSITIVE THAN USUAL, STATED OUTRIGHT THAT THERE IS A PROBLEM IN THE ALLIANCE ON MEASURE 1. AMBASSADOR GOODBY REPEATED WHAT U.S. DEPUTY HANSEN HAD SAID AT THE MAY 30 CAUCUS (REF C), THAT WASHINGTON COULD NOT ENDORSE THE TABLING OF JUST ONE OR TWO PAPERS BUT ONLY A SET OF PRESENTATIONS COVERING MEASURES 1 THROUGH 5. MOREOVER, GOODBY ADDED, HE HAD INCREASING PERSONAL DOUBTS WHETHER SUCH PAPERS ARE A USEFUL ROAD TO FOLLOW, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH HAVE ARISEN AS WE EXAMINE HOW TO PRESENT SOME ASPECTS OF THE NATO PACKAGE IN ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS. GOODBY CONCLUDED THAT MORE EXTENSIVE THINKING WOULD BE NEEDED ON THE PACKAGE. CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL) SECONDED GOODBY'S REMARKS. FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE WAS SCHEDULED FOR NEXT WEEK.

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7. PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS: MEVIK (NORWAY), WHO TWICE HAD REQUESTED CAUCUS CONSIDERATION OF FRENCH VIEWS EXPRESSED AT THE MAY 24 PLENARY (REF D) ON WORKING PROCEDURES AND ADJOURNMENT DATES, NOTED HIS INTEREST IN SECURING HARMONIZATION OF ALLIANCE POSITIONS ON THE TWO SUBJECTS. WITH RESPECT TO ADJOURNMENT DATES, MEVIK STATED THAT THE TRADEMARK OF THE CSCE PROCESS HAS BEEN TO MISS TARGET

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DATES. THEREFORE, A MID-1986 DATE AS SUGGESTED BY FRANCE COULD BECOME A SOURCE FOR RECRIMINATIONS WITHIN THE CONFERENCE AND BY THE MEDIA, UNDERSCORING DIVISIONS IN THE ALLIANCE. THE REAL DEADLINE, HE SAID, WAS NOVEMBER 4, WHEN VIENNA BEGINS. MOREOVER, THE ENTIRE DISCUSSION OF DATES IS PREMATURE, SINCE THE 1986 CALENDAR OF WORK WILL BE BASED ON SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS MADE IN 1985, WHICH, IN TURN, WILL DETERMINE A LIKELY TARGET DATE. WITH RESPECT TO WORKING PROCEDURES, MEVIK ALSO FELT DISCUSSION WAS PREMATURE. NONETHELESS, HE BELIEVED INFORMAL GROUPS COULD START MEETING IN THE NEXT ROUND, BEGINNING WITH ONE OR EVEN FIVE GROUPS WITH NEUTRAL COORDINATORS. DELWORTH (CANADA) ENDORSED MEVIK'S REMARKS AND ADDED THAT TACTICALLY IT IS NOT HELPFUL TO ANNOUNCE BEFOREHAND WHAT KIND OF INFORMAL WORKING GROUP STRUCTURE IS DESIRED, PARTICULARLY IF ENOUGH SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS HAS NOT BEEN MADE TO JUSTIFY NEW WORKING PROCEDURES. SIMILARLY, HE NOTED, IF A SPECIFIC TARGET DATE IS DESIRED OR EVEN SET, IT COULD CREATE NEGOTIATING PROBLEMS. DELWORTH STATED THAT OTTAWA FEELS STRONGLY AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE THAT NO DEADLINE SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED; RATHER, THE KEY IS TO GET RESULTS EVEN IF THAT MEANT CONTINUING INTO OCTOBER OF 1986. CITRON (FRG) SUPPORTED MEVIK AND DELWORTH WITH REGARD TO ADJOURNMENT DATES, BUT PROPOSED CONSIDERING THE RETENTION OF THE PRESENT WORKING GROUP STRUCTURE TO THE END OF THE NEXT ROUND, MEETING INFORMALLY WITH COORDINATORS IN THE FALL IF PROGRESS HAS BEEN ACHIEVED. CITRON ALSO ENDORSED IDEAS RAISED BY LOIBL (AUSTRIA) IN THE JUNE 3 AB MEETING (REF E) THAT INFORMAL GROUPS COULD CONCENTRATE ON AGREED UPON SUBJECTS FOR SEVERAL SESSIONS.

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8. PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS (II): BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) JOINED HIS BRETHREN IN CRITICIZING THE UNILATERAL FRENCH PLENARY STATEMENT ON WORKING PROCEDURES AND ADJOURNMENT DATES, NOTING THAT JULY WAS UNREALISTIC, WHILE SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER WOULD BE BETTER FOR ADJOURNING. CUTILEIRO (PORTUGAL) CONDEMNED THE WHOLE DISCUSSION OF PROCEDURES, WHEREAS CIARRAPICO (ITALY) STATED A FIRM PREFERENCE FOR JUST TWO INFORMAL WORKING GROUPS. STANDAERT (BELGIUM), AGREEING WITH BUWALDA, OPINED THAT THE SWEDES AND FINNS ARE INTERESTED IN COORDINATOR ROLES. GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) ROUNDED OUT DEBATE BY FUNDAMENTALLY DISAGREEING WITH HIS COLLEAGUES. HE NOTED THE INFORMAL WORKING GROUP IDEA HAS BEEN IN THE AIR FOR A LONG TIME; IT WAS NOT PREMATURE TO DISCUSS WORKING PROCEDURES, SINCE THE DECEMBER AGREEMENT ON WORKING GROUPS CALLS FOR A REVIEW OF STRUCTURE AT THE END OF THIS SESSION. ON ADJOURNMENT, THOUGH HE USED "SUMMER" IN HIS PLENARY STATEMENT AND "JULY" IN CAUCUS DISCUSSIONS LAST ROUND, GASCHIGNARD NOTED "SUMMER" LASTS UNTIL LATE SEPTEMBER. THE FRENCH

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IDEA IS TO STOP CDE BEFORE THE PREPARATORY CONFERENCE FOR VIENNA GETS UNDERWAY. THE SOVIETS, HE NOTED, WANT TO UNBALANCE THE CSCE PROCESS AND CONTINUE CDE THROUGH VIENNA. THEIR AIM IS TO PUSH THE SECURITY BASKET BY MOVING TO STAGE 2 AT VIENNA AND THEREBY ACCORD SECURITY MORE IMPORTANCE THAN IT DESERVES. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DAY, EDES (UK), WARNED THAT FURTHER THINKING AND REVIEW IS NEEDED VERY SOON ON THESE ISSUES IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN ALLIED COHESION AND AVOID PRESENTING DIFFERING NATIONAL POSITIONS. THERE WAS AGREEMENT TO REFRAIN FROM DISCUSSION OUTSIDE THE CAUCUS ON THESE TWO SUBJECTS UNTIL AN ALLIANCE POSITION IS AGREED UPON.

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9. CONTACTS: STANDAERT (BELGIUM) REPORTED ON THE QUAKER-SPONSORED CDE SEMINAR HELD MAY 31-JUNE 2, WHICH BROUGHT TOGETHER CDE AMBASSADORS AND REPRESENTATIVES WITH ACADEMICS. STANDAERT NOTED THE REMARKS MADE BY SOVIET ACADEMIC, MIHAIL GUERASSEV, FROM THE INSTITUTE ON USA AND CANADA IN MOSCOW, WERE EXTREMELY POLEMICAL, UNBALANCED, AND ULTIMATELY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. GUERASSEV, STANDAERT SAID, CRUDELY BLAMED THE U.S. FOR UNILATERALLY SPURRING THE ARMS RACE, WHILE HE CREDITED THE USSR WITH WORKING ASSIDUOUSLY FOR PEACE. STANDAERT FELT THE NNA WERE ESPECIALLY DISDAINFUL OF THE SOVIET'S PRESENTATION. JONATHAN ALFORD OF THE LONDON IISS MADE AN INTERESTING CONTRIBUTION; ALFORD'S MESSAGE WAS CLEAR -- NATO'S OBJECTIVES SHOULD BE SIMPLE AND LIMITED, SEEKING THE MINIMUM NEEDED TO BUILD CONFIDENCE RATHER THAN THE MAXIMUM, WHICH HE ASCRIBES TO THE CURRENT NATO APPROACH. STANDAERT CONCLUDED THAT THE ACCENT OF DISCUSSION WAS ON NUF AND CONCRETE CSBM'S. CIARRAPICO (ITALY) REPORTED ON A MAY 22 LUNCH WITH GRINEVSKY WHICH THE LATTER INITIATED. (COMMENT: CIARRAPICO HAD BEEN IN ROME FOR NEARLY A WEEK FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH GRINEVSKY. END COMMENT.) GRINEVSKY SAW NO REAL PROGRESS COMING AND SAID HE WAS WAITING FOR THE NNA, ACTING AS MEDIATORS IN "COFFEE GROUPS," TO MOVE THE CONFERENCE OUT OF WHAT HE CALLED "ITS PRESENT STAGNATION." CIARRAPICO ADDED THAT GRINEVSKY BELIEVED GROWING DIFFICULTIES IN GENEVA WOULD CREATE POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL REPERCUSSIONS WHICH AN AGREEMENT AT CDE COULD AMELIORATE BY IMPROVING THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL CLIMATE. GRINEVSKY NOTED THAT THE WEST HAD TO BE FORTHCOMING IN RESPONSE TO THE EAST'S DEMONSTRATION OF GOOD WILL WITH ITS THREE NOTIFICATION PROPOSALS. MOREOVER, ACCORDING TO CIARRAPICO, GRINEVSKY TOLD HIM THAT A SIMPLE REAFFIRMATION OF NUF USING UN CHARTER AND HELSINKI LANGUAGE WAS INADEQUATE TO SATISFY SOVIET DEMANDS ON THE ISSUE. FOR EXAMPLE, GRINEVSKY SUGGESTED THAT THE WEST COULD DEVELOP LANGUAGE ON A COMMITMENT NOT TO USE WEAPONS OF ANY KIND, EXCEPT IN SELF-DEFENSE, AS A MORE DETAILED EXPRESSION OF THE NUF

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10. OTHER BUSINESS: AMBASSADOR GOODBY FOLLOWED UP ON CITRON'S (FRG) MENTIONING OF THE IDEA RAISED BY LOIBL (AUSTRIA) (REF E) TO IDENTIFY IN ADVANCE THE TOPICS TO BE ADDRESSED IN WORKING GROUPS. GOODBY NOTED THIS APPROACH SHOULD BE GIVEN CLOSE ATTENTION. CITRON AFFIRMED THAT THE BONN BRAINSTORMING SESSION WOULD BE HELD SEPTEMBER 4-5 AND BE FOLLOWED BY THE NAC CONSULTATION IN BRUSSELS ON SEPTEMBER 6. EDES (UK) SUGGESTED THAT FUTURE BRAINSTORMING SESSIONS MAY BE MORE PRODUCTIVE IF HELD AT THE END OF A ROUND RATHER THAN AT THE END OF AN INTERSESSION PERIOD.
  11. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DAY SET THE NEXT CAUCUS MEETING FOR THURSDAY, JUNE 6, WITH THE U.S. CHAIRING.
- END

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SUBJECT: WORKING GROUP A, JUNE 6, 1985

1. CDE VI - 084

2. C - ENTIRE CONTENT

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3. SUMMARY: THE NETHERLANDS REP REJECTED AN EARLIER SOVIET STATEMENT THAT THERE IS NO GEOGRAPHIC ASYMMETRY BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT AND THEN CRITICALLY ADDRESSED THE ROMANIAN "GEOGRAPHIC CONSTRAINTS" MEASURE AND THE NNA MEASURE LIMITING OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES. THE GDR ASKED POINTED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE U.S. AND NATO POSITION ON CONSTRAINTS. HUNGARY NOTED THAT FOUR OF THE FIVE FORMAL CONFERENCE PROPOSALS SUPPORT THE CONCEPT OF CONSTRAINTS. AUSTRIA AND SWEDEN WELCOMED THE DISCUSSION OF CONSTRAINTS, BUT NOTED THAT THE ISSUES WERE DELICATE, DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX. ACCUSING NATO OF HAVING AN OFFENSIVE DOCTRINE WHILE CLAIMING THAT SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE IS PURELY DEFENSIVE, THE USSR CONCLUDED THAT IT IS IN EVERYONE'S INTEREST TO LIMIT THE SCALE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES. END SUMMARY.

4. VAN DER GRAAF (NETHERLANDS) CHALLENGED TATARNIKOV'S PREVIOUS ASSERTION THAT THERE WERE NO ASYMMETRIES, GEOGRAPHIC OR OTHERWISE, BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT. IN RESPONSE TO YUGOSLAV AND ROMANIAN COMPLAINTS LAST WEEK THAT THE WEST HAD FAILED TO ADDRESS THE CONSTRAINTS IN SC.2 AND SC.3, THE DUTCH MILREP SAID THAT THE ROMANIAN "GEOGRAPHICAL CONSTRAINTS" MEASURE DID NOT APPLY EQUALLY TO THE TWO ALLIANCES. HE POINTED OUT THAT SOVIET TACTICAL THINKING IS DOMINATED BY SURPRISE AND RAPID ATTACK WHEREAS NATO TACTICS ARE BASED ON "FORWARD DEFENSE." THEREFORE, THE GEOGRAPHIC CONSTRAINT PROPOSED IN SC.2 IS UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE IT WOULD PRECLUDE THE USE OF NATO TERRITORY IN THE CENTRAL REGION FOR EXERCISES AND WOULD UNDERMINE THE TACTIC OF "FORWARD DEFENSE." VAN DER GRAAF REJECTED CONSTRAINTS ON TROOPS AS WELL AS AREAS FOR THE CONDUCT OF SUSTAINED OPERATIONS AS SUGGESTED BY THE NNA'S IN SC.3 FOR THE SAME REASON. IN ADDITION, HE SAID, IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO DESIGNATE CERTAIN MILITARY EQUIPMENT AS PURELY OFFENSIVE, SINCE IN MANY CASES IT ALSO IS VITAL FOR DEFENSE. MOREOVER, A CONSTRAINT MEASURE ON OFFENSIVE EQUIPMENT WOULD REQUIRE FAR MORE INTRUSIVE VERIFICATION MEANS THAN HAS UP TO NOW BEEN SUGGESTED.

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5. GRACZYNSKI (GDR) ASKED THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:
- HOW CAN THE U.S. SUGGEST THAT CONSTRAINTS DO
  - NOT CORRESPOND TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE
  - MANDATE?
  - WHY DOES THE ALLIANCE NOT SUGGEST PARAMETERS OF
  - ITS OWN?
  - HAS THE U.S. GIVEN UP ON FINDING A SATISFACTORY
  - CONSTRAINT?

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6. KOVACS (HUNGARY) PUSHED FOR A LIMIT ON THE SCALE OF A MILITARY ACTIVITY, ARGUING THAT THE GREATER THE SCALE OF A MANEUVER, THE LOWER THE LIKELIHOOD OF DETERMINING ITS REAL INTENT OR PURPOSE. SINCE FOUR OF FIVE PROPOSALS SUPPORT A CONSTRAINT WHICH COULD REDUCE THE LEVEL OF CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE, A CEILING OF 40,000 TROOPS, INCLUDING NAVAL AND AIR FORCES, TAKES ON INCREASED SIGNIFICANCE, HE CONCLUDED.

7. LIKO (AUSTRIA), PLEASSED THAT ALL CONSTRAINT PROPOSALS ARE BEING ADDRESSED, ACKNOWLEDGED, NEVERTHELESS, THAT THE CONSTRAINT ISSUE IS NOT ONLY DELICATE, BUT DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX. HE DESCRIBED VAN DER GRAAF AS TAKING A "DEVIL'S ADVOCATE" APPROACH TO CONSTRAINTS. THE SWEDISH REP ASSOCIATED HIMSELF WITH GENERAL LIKO'S REMARKS, WELCOMING THE DIALOGUE ON CONSTRAINTS AND THANKING THE DUTCH REP FOR ADDRESSING SC.2 AND SC.3 MEASURES.

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8. TATARNIKOV (USSR), "UNCONVINCED" BY VAN DER GRAAF'S ARGUMENTS, STATED THAT THE WARSAW PACT ALSO IS REQUIRED TO ASSUME A DEFENSIVE POSTURE ALONG THE SAME BORDERS AND ARGUED THAT NATO HAS ADVANTAGES IN HUMAN AND ECONOMIC RESOURCES. IN ADDITION, HE NOTED, THE WARSAW PACT IS SURROUNDED BY MILITARY BASES. THE SOVIET GENERAL REFERRED TO GENERAL ROGERS' FOLLOW-ON FORCES ATTACK (FOFA) CONCEPT AS AN OFFENSIVE CONCEPT REQUIRING "DEFENSE IN THE DEEP HINTERLAND OF COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW PACT." TATARNIKOV CLAIMED THAT SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE IS PURELY DEFENSIVE BUT, IF THE SOVIET UNION IS SUBJECT TO ATTACK, SOVIET DOCTRINE DICTATES THAT SOVIET REACTION BE SWIFT AND DECISIVE. HE CONCLUDED, THEREFORE, THAT IT WAS IN EVERYONE'S INTEREST TO LIMIT THE SCOPE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES.

10. POUDE (FRANCE) CRITICIZED THE RECENT DISCUSSIONS ON CONSTRAINTS, POINTING OUT THAT THE CDE IS NOT AN ALLIANCE-TO-ALLIANCE CONFERENCE. FURTHERMORE, HE ASKED RHETORICALLY, IF WE ARE TO TREAT IT AS SUCH, WHY CONTINUE WITH THE CSCE PROCESS?  
END

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SUBJECT: CDE: REPORT OF WORKING GROUP B, JUNE 6

1. CDE VI - 89.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: WORKING GROUP B MEETING ON OBSERVATION WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY IRISH STATEMENT WHICH DISCUSSED THE INFORMATION REQUIRED TO ALLOW OBSERVERS TO JUDGE WHETHER AN ACTIVITY WAS CARRIED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NOTIFICATION, AND INDICATED THE NEED FOR OBSERVERS TO VIEW THE ACTIVITY FROM BEGINNING TO END (SUMMARIZED IN PARA 4 BELOW). POLISH REP ARGUED THAT OBSERVERS NEED ONLY BE INVITED TO OBSERVE THE "MAIN EPISODES" OF AN ACTIVITY (SUMMARIZED IN PARA 5 BELOW). THE FRG CRITICIZED THE INADEQUATE CZECH NOTIFICATION OF DRUZHBA 85 AND PARTICULARLY THE LACK OF INVITATION OF OBSERVERS, AND CALLED FOR THE MANDATORY INVITATION OF OBSERVERS. DENMARK NOTED THE DIFFERENT TRAINING PATTERNS OF NATO AND THE WTO AS REGARDS AIR AND NAVAL FORCES, AND QUESTIONED THE FEASIBILITY OF OBSERVING LARGE-SCALE MANEUVERS SUCH AS ARE CONDUCTED BY NATO. THE U.S. QUESTIONED APPARENT EASTERN "FORTHCOMINGNESS" REGARDING THE OBSERVATION OF AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES, GIVEN EASTERN CLAIMS THAT THE MORE LIMITED MEASURES OF SC.1 AMOUNT TO ESPIONAGE. THE SOVIETS RESPONDED THAT OBSERVATION OF SUCH MANEUVERS WAS FEASIBLE WITHOUT BEING INTRUSIVE (U.S. AND SOVIET REMARKS ARE SUMMARIZED IN PARA 6 BELOW). END SUMMARY.
4. IRISH REP MADE ANOTHER HELPFUL AND COMPREHENSIVE INTERVENTION ON OBSERVATION, DECLARING THERE WAS NO REASON WHY DISCUSSION OF THE CONDITIONS OF WHAT ACTIVITIES ARE TO BE NOTIFIED, THAT OBSERVATION SHOULD BE MANDATORY FOR ALL NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES, AND THAT INVITATIONS SHOULD BE ISSUED TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES WITHOUT EXCEPTION. IRISH REP NOTED THAT CERTAIN INFORMATION MUST BE AVAILABLE TO OBSERVERS IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO PREPARE THEMSELVES FOR THE OBSERVATION ACTIVITY. SUCH INFORMATION SHOULD, AT A MINIMUM, INCLUDE: THE STRUCTURE OF THE FORCES PARTICIPATING IN THE ACTIVITY; WHETHER OR NOT AIR/NAVAL SUPPORT IS INVOLVED; THE PURPOSE OF THE ACTIVITY; WHETHER OR NOT AMMUNITION IS CARRIED; LOCATION OF THE ACTIVITY; AND TIMEFRAME. HE AGREED THAT THERE ARE TWO TASKS FOR OBSERVERS: TO CONFIRM THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE NOTIFICATION, AND TO ENSURE THEMSELVES OF THE NON-THREATENING NATURE OF THE ACTIVITY. SINCE THERE IS NO EASY WAY TO CONFIRM THE MILITARY STRUCTURE OF FORCES PARTICIPATING IN AN ACTIVITY, OBSERVERS SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO SEE THE ASSEMBLY OF TROOPS IN ASSEMBLY AREAS, RECEIVE BRIEFINGS BY SENIOR OFFICIERS, AND VISIT MAJOR FIRE-SUPPORT ELEMENTS INVOLVED, IN ORDER TO GAIN A REASONABLY ACCURATE VIEW OF THE ACTIVITY. IRISH REP EMPHASIZED THAT TO MEET THESE TWO TASKS, OBSERVERS

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SHOULD SEE THE ACTIVITY FROM BEGINNING TO END AND SHOULD LIVE IN FIELD CONDITIONS IN ORDER TO OBSERVE THE ACTIVITY 24 HOURS A DAY.

5. POLISH REP ATTEMPTED TO ANSWER A PREVIOUS SWISS QUESTION REGARDING THE CRITERIA OBSERVERS SHOULD USE FOR DETERMINING THE NON-THREATENING NATURE OF AN ACTIVITY. THE POLISH REP SUGGESTED THAT THE FACT OF NOTIFICATION AND THE FACT OF THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS WOULD BE TWO IMMEDIATE INDICATORS OF PEACEFUL INTENT. BEYOND THAT, IT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT FOR OBSERVERS TO BE PERMITTED TO SEE THE "MAIN EPISODES" OF AN ACTIVITY, AS DETERMINED BY THE HOST STATE. HE SAID THAT THE IDEA THAT OBSERVERS SHOULD BE PRESENT FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE END OF AN ACTIVITY REQUIRED FURTHER CLARIFICATION. HE NOTED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT SOMETIMES THE TRANSFER OR MOVEMENT OF TROOPS FROM OUTSIDE TO THE AREA OF THE MANEUVER IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE OFFICIAL TIMEFRAME OF THE MANEUVER (COMMENT: HE IMPLIED THAT SUCH PRIOR TRANSFER OF TROOPS MUST ALSO BE OBSERVED. END COMMENT) HE CONCLUDED THAT WHILE THERE SEEMED TO BE AGREEMENT ON PRINCIPLES, THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE DISAGREEMENT ON DETAILS OF OBSERVATION AND CALLED FOR DETAILED DISCUSSION OF OBSERVATION AND AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS. SWISS REP DISAGREED WITH THE POLISH POSITION, ARGUING THAT NOT ANY TYPE NOTIFICATION WOULD GIVE ASSURANCE OF PEACEFUL INTENT, BUT ONLY A NOTIFICATION WHICH WAS SUBSTANTIVE IN CONTENT. HE DID NOT DISAGREE WITH THE POLISH VIEW THAT "MAIN EPISODES" OF AN ACTIVITY SHOULD BE OBSERVED, BUT ARGUED THAT THIS DEPENDED ON THE DEFINITION OF "MAIN EPISODES" AND, IN ANY CASE, COULD NOT AMOUNT TO MERELY PRE-ARRANGED DEMONSTRATIONS.

6. U.S. REP (GEN. BLANK) EXPRESSED SURPRISE AT THE "FORTHCOMINGNESS" OF THE EASTERN DELEGATIONS REGARDING OBSERVATION OF AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF EASTERN CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE SC.1 MEASURES AS AMOUNTING TO ESPIONAGE. HE NOTED THAT THE EAST WAS SUGGESTING THAT OBSERVERS BE PERMITTED TO VISIT AIR BASES AND CONTROL CENTERS, AND ASKED WHY THE EAST WAS AT THE SAME TIME UNWILLING TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION OF AIR BASES. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE GDR SHOULD FOLLOW THE EXAMPLE OF SWEDEN WITH THE VASTGRANS EXERCISE, AND INVITE THE CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS TO OBSERVE AN AIR MANEUVER. THE SOVIET REP, IN RESPONSE, SUGGESTED THAT THE WEST "SHOULD NOT LOOK A GIFT HORSE IN THE MOUTH." HE CLARIFIED THAT THE EAST WAS NOT SUGGESTING OBSERVERS AT COMMAND POSTS OR UNDERGROUND BUNKERS OR OTHER VITAL NERVE CENTERS. RATHER, THEY SHOULD BE PERMITTED AT MILITARY BASES, THE TOWNS WHERE THE BASES ARE LOCATED, AND AT RADAR STATIONS WHERE THEY COULD FOLLOW THE ACTIVITY ON DISPLAY SCREENS. REGARDING LARGE-SCALE NAVAL MANEUVERS, THE SOVIET REP AGREED THAT

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OBSERVERS MAY NOT BE ABLE TO VIEW THE ENTIRE ACTIVITY.  
BUT, HE ARGUED, OBSERVERS COULD COVER THE ENTIRE AREA OF  
A NAVAL MANEUVER IF, FOR EXAMPLE, A SHIP WERE ALLOCATED  
TO THEM FOR THAT PURPOSE AND THAT SHIP WERE PART OF THE  
MILITARY FORMATION. WHILE OBSERVERS COULD NOT SEE  
EVERYTHING THAT WENT ON, THEY COULD SEE ENOUGH TO REACH  
JUDGMENT AS TO THE NON-THREATENING NATURE OF THE  
ACTIVITY, JUST AS IN THE EXAMPLE OF VASTGRANS, WHERE IT  
WAS EVIDENT THAT OBSERVERS COULD NOT SEE EVERYTHING THAT  
WENT ON IN THE GROUND FORCE MANEUVER.  
END

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SUBJECT: CDE - NATO CAUCUS OF JUNE 6, 1985

REF: A) STOCKHOLM 4198, B) STOCKHOLM 4038

1. CDE VI - 073
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT

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3. SUMMARY: FRANCE DISTRIBUTED ITS MEASURE 4 (OBSERVATION) PROTOTYPE PAPER AND EXPRESSED A STRONG DESIRE TO TABLE IT NEXT WEEK. THE U.S. AND NETHERLANDS REASSERTED THAT THEY COULD NOT ENDORSE THE TABLING OF JUST ONE OR TWO PAPERS, BUT ONLY A SET OF PRESENTATIONS COVERING MEASURES 1 THROUGH 5, AND ONLY IF THE CAUCUS REACHES AN UNDERSTANDING ON HOW TO TABLE THEM. U.S. DEPUTY HANSEN PROVIDED A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE EASTERN NOTIFICATION PAPERS AND RECOMMENDED DEVELOPING A SYNOPTIC COMPARISON OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT LANGUAGE, MEASURE 3 OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED, AND THE EASTERN PROPOSALS. THE CAUCUS' INITIAL REACTION SEEMED FAVORABLE TO USING SUCH COMPARISONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH APPLYING THE EAST'S OBSERVATION MODALITIES TO GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES IN ORDER TO EXPOSE THE EAST'S POSITION AND TO REFOCUS CONFERENCE ATTENTION ON THE NATO PACKAGE. HOWEVER, SOME DELEGATIONS REQUESTED TIME TO CONSIDER THIS APPROACH. END SUMMARY.

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4. ILLUSTRATIVE PAPERS: GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) DISTRIBUTED THE FRENCH MEASURE 4 (OBSERVATION) PROTOTYPE PAPER (IN FRENCH) AND EXPRESSED A STRONG DESIRE TO TABLE IT AT THE JUNE 13 WORKING GROUP B MEETING AS A NATIONAL PRESENTATION (TEXT SENT SEPARATELY). BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) LAID DOWN A FIRM REMINDER THAT BOTH THE U.S. AND THE NETHERLANDS HAVE REPEATEDLY SAID (REFS A AND B) THAT THEY COULD NOT ENDORSE THE TABLING OF JUST ONE OR TWO PAPERS BUT ONLY A SET OF PRESENTATIONS COVERING MEASURES 1 THROUGH 5 AND ONLY IF THE CAUCUS REACHES AN UNDERSTANDING ON HOW TO TABLE THEM. BUWALDA URGED THAT THE FRENCH PAPER BE GIVEN TO THE MILITARY ADVISERS' GROUP FOR EXPEDITIOUS REVIEW AND SUBSEQUENTLY BE BROUGHT BEFORE THE CAUCUS FOR CONSIDERATION. EDES (UK) NOTED THAT MILREP WORK ON THE THREE EASTERN NOTIFICATION PAPERS WOULD RETAIN PRIORITY ATTENTION. (COMMENT: GASCHIGNARD GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE AGREED ONLY RELUCTANTLY TO THE PROPOSED HANDLING OF THE FRENCH MEASURE 4 PAPER. HE WAS NONCOMMITTAL ON U.S. AND DUTCH VIEWS CONCERNING THE NEED TO HAVE PAPERS READY ON MEASURES 1 TO 5 OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED BEFORE TABLING ANY ADDITIONAL PROTOTYPE PAPERS. END COMMENT.)

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5. WARSAW PACT TACTICS: U.S. DEPUTY HANSEN OFFERED PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENTS OF THE THREE EASTERN NOTIFICATION PAPERS. WITH RESPECT TO THE EASTERN GROUND NOTIFICATION PAPERS, HE NOTED THAT IT REPEATS ALMOST VERBATIM LANGUAGE

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FROM THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND DIFFERS ONLY IN THE THRESHOLD LEVEL (20,000 MEN) AND THE NOTIFICATION PERIOD (30 DAYS). THE AIR NOTIFICATION PAPER CONTAINS PARAMETERS (200 PLANES) THAT EVEN TATARNIKOV (USSR) AFFIRMED PRIVATELY WOULD ALMOST NEVER APPLY TO WARSAW PACT MANEUVERS. ON NAVAL NOTIFICATIONS, THE AIR/NAVAL THRESHOLD (100 PLANES, 30 SHIPS) IS PRACTICALLY NEVER MET BY THE EAST, ALTHOUGH TATARNIKOV CLAIMED A WARSAW PACT EXERCISE WOULD HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED LAST APRIL. HANSEN ARGUED THAT SOVIET OBJECTIVES ARE TO COMPEL THE WEST TO DISCUSS THEIR SUBJECTS BY ARGUING THAT THE EAST CLAIMS IT HAS NOW FULFILLED ITS PART OF THE BARGAIN AS SUGGESTED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN IN DUBLIN AND STRASBOURG. MOREOVER, HANSEN STATED, THE EAST IS ATTEMPTING TO ESTABLISH THE PRINCIPLE OF A STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF EUROPE, WHICH HAS THE EFFECT OF EXTENDING THE ZONE, RATHER THAN ACCEPT THE MANDATE'S GEOGRAPHIC DEFINITION. HE NOTED THE NEED TO EXPOSE SOVIET MOTIVES AS WELL AS THE LACK OF SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT IN THE EASTERN PROPOSALS. ONE WAY, HE SUGGESTED, MIGHT BE TO PREPARE A COMPARATIVE MATRIX WITH COLUMNS SHOWING FINAL ACT LANGUAGE, MEASURE 3 OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED, AND LANGUAGE FROM THE EASTERN GROUND NOTIFICATION MEASURE. THE SAME MIGHT BE DONE WITH THE EASTERN AIR AND NAVAL PAPERS. IN ADDITION, HE CONCLUDED, A COMPARATIVE MATRIX COULD BE MADE SHOWING INFORMATION EXCHANGED UNDER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, MEASURE 1 OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED, AND THE THREE EASTERN PROPOSALS.

6. WARSAW PACT TACTICS (II): EDES (UK), ANSTIS (CANADA), AND CITRON (FRG) ENDORSED BOTH HANSEN'S ANALYSIS AND SUGGESTED TACTICAL RESPONSE TO THE EAST. CITRON NOTED THAT SYNOPTICAL PAPERS MAY ONLY BE ONE ASPECT OF DEALING WITH THE EASTERN PAPERS; POINTS COULD ALSO BE MADE THROUGH INTERVENTIONS IN WORKING GROUPS AS WELL, HE SAID. HANSEN AGREED AND POINTED OUT THAT THE EAST HAS DISCUSSED INTRUSIVE OBSERVATION MODALITIES WITH IMPUNITY IN THE APPROPRIATE WORKING GROUPS BECAUSE THEY KNOW THEIR NOTIFICATION MEASURES WOULD NEVER APPLY TO THEM. THE WEST, HE RECOMMENDED, NEEDS TO DEVELOP A WAY TO EXTEND THE INTRUSIVE MODALITIES, SUGGESTED BY THE EAST FOR AIR AND NAVAL EXERCISES, TO OBSERVATION OF GROUND ACTIVITIES. BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) WARNED AGAINST FALLING INTO THE TRAP OF APPEARING RECEPTIVE TO THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE EASTERN NOTIFICATION MEASURES OR IMPLYING THAT THE WEST IS WILLING TO AMALGAMATE MEASURES 1 AND 3 OF THE NATO PACKAGE. HE AND OTHERS SUGGESTED TAKING TIME TO CONSIDER THE IDEAS RAISED. EDES CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT TATARNIKOV MENTIONED A FUTURE EASTERN PAPER ON TRANSITS. EDES WONDERED WHETHER ANY NATO PREPLANNING COULD BE DONE. SEVERAL DELEGATIONS RECOMMENDED THAT THE U.S. TAKE THE

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LEAD, WHILE CITRON AND HANSEN REPLIED THAT IT WAS NOT A U.S. PROBLEM, BUT AN ALLIANCE ONE.

7. CONTACTS: CITRON (FRG), EDES (UK), AND GASCHIGNARD (FRANCE) REPORTED ON MEETINGS WITH BUHRING (GDR), WHO FELT IT WAS PREMATURE TO CONSIDER CHANGING THE WORKING GROUP STRUCTURE. BUHRING NOTED THAT HE WAS ALSO OPPOSED TO ACCEPTING THE DECEMBER AGREEMENT WHICH ESTABLISHED WORKING GROUPS AND NOTED THE ISSUE WAS DECIDED OVER HIS HEAD, I.E., BY GRINEVSKY. THE U.S. DEPUTY REPORTED THAT BOZOVIC (YUGOSLAVIA) FEELS THE "MINIMUM" HE COULD ACCEPT ON CONSTRAINTS WOULD BE AN OBLIGATION TO DISCUSS THEM AFTER VIENNA.

8. OTHER BUSINESS: CITRON (FRG), REFERRING TO THE WORK UNDERWAY IN THE COMBINED MILITARY ADVISERS/DEPUTIES GROUPS ON ANOMALIES IN THE NATO PACKAGE, RECOMMENDED THAT ONLY A LIMITED NUMBER OF ITEMS (TWO OR THREE) BE SENT TO BRUSSELS FOR RESOLUTION; THE REST, HE SAID, COULD BE HANDLED IN STOCKHOLM.

9. THE NEXT CAUCUS MEETING WAS SET FOR TUESDAY, JUNE 11.  
END

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SUBJECT: TEXT OF FRENCH MEASURE 4 PAPER

1. CDE VI - 088
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT
3. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE FRENCH ILLUSTRATIVE PAPER ON MEASURE 4. THE PAPER IS NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION BY CDE MILREPS. THE QUESTION OF TABLING WILL BE DISCUSSED IN FUTURE CAUCUSES.
4. BEGIN TEXT.

THE SIXTEEN PARTICIPATING STATES SPONSORING DOCUMENT SC.1 PROPOSED INTER ALIA THAT ANY PARTICIPATING STATE CONDUCTING A MILITARY ACTIVITY (HOST STATE) SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO INVITE OBSERVERS FROM THE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES NOT TAKING PART IN THAT ACTIVITY. OBSERVATION OF NOTIFIED MILITARY ACTIVITIES WOULD BE THE RULE. ALERT ACTIVITIES WOULD BE OBSERVED IF THEY HAD A DURATION OF MORE THAN 48 HOURS, BUT ONLY 36 HOURS AFTER THEIR COMMENCEMENT AND PROVIDING, OF COURSE, THAT THEY SATISFIED THE OTHER CRITERIA (THRESHOLDS, OUT-OF-GARRISON ACTIVITY).

OBSERVERS WOULD HAVE A STATUS THAT REMAINS TO BE DEFINED (THE DELEGATION WILL REVERT TO THIS POINT IN DUE COURSE). THE "HOST" COUNTRY WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING SUITABLE ARRANGEMENTS TO ENABLE THE OBSERVERS TO FOLLOW THE EXECUTION OF THE ACTIVITY AND, THROUGH THE INDICATIONS PROVIDED BY THE OBSERVATION OF ITS DIFFERENT PHASES, SATISFY THEMSELVES OF ITS CONFORMITY WITH THE NOTIFICATION AND OF ITS NON-THREATENING CHARACTER.

THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENT ATTEMPTS TO GIVE A CONCRETE ILLUSTRATION OF THE CONTRIBUTION MADE BY THESE NEW PROVISIONS, WHICH ARE "EFFECTIVE AND CONCRETE" AND "DESIGNED TO MAKE PROGRESS IN STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY..." IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE ADOPTED AT MADRID BY THE 35 PARTICIPATING STATES.

ILLUSTRATION OF MEASURE 4, "OBSERVATION"

CASE OF THE FRENCH NATIONAL MANOEUVRE "DOUBS 84"  
(THE NUMBERING OF THE PARAGRAPHS REFERS TO DOCUMENT SC.1/AMPLIFIED)

1. NOT APPLICABLE: ONLY FRENCH FORCES PARTICIPATED IN DOUBS 84.
2. THE OTHER 34 STATES PARTICIPATING IN THE CSCE WOULD HAVE BEEN INVITED TO SEND OBSERVERS.
3. THE DOUBS 84 MANOEUVRE WAS SCHEDULED TO BEGIN ON 8 SEPTEMBER (START OF THE OUT-OF-GARRISON DEPLOYMENT OF THE TROOPS CONCERNED) AND TO END ON 14 SEPTEMBER (COMPLETION OF THE RETURN TO GARRISONS). OBSERVATION WOULD HAVE BEEN ARRANGED THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD.
4. NO ALERT PHASE WAS SCHEDULED.
5. A MAXIMUM OF 68 OBSERVERS WOULD HAVE BEEN EXPECTED.
6. (NO DATA AT THIS STAGE)
7. (NO DATA AT THIS STAGE)
8. (NOT APPLICABLE: CF. PARA 1)

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9. THE OBSERVERS WOULD HAVE BEEN ACCOMMODATED IN THE MESSES OF GARRISONS LOCATED WITHIN THE PERIMETER OF THE MANOEUVRE (EPINAL, BESANCON, DIJON...).

10. THE DISTANCES BETWEEN GARRISON AND MANOEUVRE PERIMETER DID NOT EXCEED 150 KM.

- THE AREA OF MANOEUVRE MEASURED APPROXIMATELY 150 KM AT ITS GREATEST EXTENSION.

- TRANSPORTATION WOULD THEREFORE HAVE BEEN BY COACH. ARRANGEMENTS WOULD ALSO HAVE BEEN MADE FOR A HELICOPTER FLIGHT LASTING ROUGHLY ONE HOUR AND AFFORDING A VIEW OF THE ENTIRE DEPLOYMENT WITHIN THE MANOEUVRE PERIMETER. THE INITIAL RENDEZVOUS FOR OBSERVERS WOULD HAVE BEEN:

- REIMS, FOR HALF THE OBSERVERS, WHO WOULD HAVE BEEN INVITED TO WITNESS THE EMBARKATION OF THE 10TH ARMoured DIVISION TOWARDS THE MANOEUVRE PERIMETER (BY RAIL);

- NANCY, FOR THE OTHER HALF OF THE OBSERVERS, INVITED TO WITNESS THE DEPARTURE, ALSO BY RAIL, OF THE 4TH ARMoured DIVISION.

- (THE 7TH ARMoured DIVISION, THE THIRD MAJOR FORMATION PARTICIPATING IN THE MANOEUVRE, WAS ALREADY STATIONED WITHIN THE MANOEUVRE PERIMETER.)

11. THE OBSERVERS WOULD HAVE HAD THE USE OF TELEPHONES, ACCESSIBLE EVERY EVENING (AT THE "DIRECTION-ANIMATION" COMMAND POST OF THE EXERCISE AND AT THEIR BILLETS).

12. A) I) THE OBSERVERS WOULD HAVE BEEN GUIDED BY ACCOMPANYING OFFICERS WITH SOLE AUTHORITY TO DECIDE THE ITINERARIES.

- II) THE OBSERVERS WOULD HAVE HAD THE USE OF INDIVIDUAL FIELD GLASSES, FRENCH ARMY ISSUE (MAGNIFICATION 8/50), TO THE EXCLUSION OF ANY PERSONAL EQUIPMENT (OTHER FIELD GLASSES, CAMERAS ...) AND OF ANY ANNOTATED MAP.

- III) A GENERAL BRIEFING ON THE EXERCISE WOULD HAVE BEEN PROVIDED FOR THE OBSERVERS ON THE MORNING OF 10 SEPTEMBER, THE FIRST DAY OF THE TACTICAL PART OF THE EXERCISE, AT THE "DIRECTION-ANIMATION" COMMAND POST.

- IV) CONTINUITY IN FOLLOWING THE ACTIVITY AND DIRECT OBSERVATION OF ALL THE FORMATIONS TAKING PART IN IT WOULD HAVE BEEN ENSURED AS FOLLOWS:

- -ON EACH DAY OF THE TACTICAL PHASE OF THE EXERCISE (10, 11 AND 12 SEPTEMBER): PRESENTATION OF TWO SPECIFIC OPERATIONS (FOR EXAMPLE A CROSSING, A TANK COUNTER-ATTACK, AN ANTI-TANK AMBUSH BY A COMPANY, AN ARTILLERY BARRAGE, AN AERIAL SUPPORT ACTION, AN EMPLOYMENT OF LOGISTIC RESOURCES ...) AND, AT THE END OF THE DAY, A BRIEFING AT THE "DIRECTION-ANIMATION" COMMAND POST.

- - AT MIDDAY ON 10 AND 11 SEPTEMBER, VISIT TO A REGIMENTAL COMMAND POST (LUNCHEON).

- - A HELICOPTER FLIGHT OF APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR, TO IDENTIFY THE PRINCIPAL FORMATIONS TAKING

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## PART.

- (NIGHT OPERATIONS, REDUCED IN ORDER TO LIMIT INCONVENIENCE TO THE CIVILIAN POPULATION, WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN OBSERVED.)

- V) DURING VISITS TO THE "DIRECTION-ANIMATION" OR REGIMENTAL COMMAND POSTS, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN FACILITIES FOR CONTACTS BETWEEN OBSERVERS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL TAKING PART IN THE MANOEUVRE.

B) I) DURING THE "LAUNCHING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS" PHASE OF THE EXERCISE (8 AND 9 SEPTEMBER), THE TWO GROUPS OF OBSERVERS MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 10 WOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE THE EMBARKATION OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE TWO DIVISIONS STATIONED ROUND REIMS AND NANCY (4 TO 5 RAILWAY STATIONS PER DIVISION) AND TO BE PRESENT AT THE VARIOUS PRESS CONFERENCES AND OTHER PUBLIC RELATIONS ACTIVITIES.

- THEY WOULD THEN HAVE BEEN CONVEYED TO THE MANOEUVRE ZONE BY COACH OR RAIL. COMPARABLE FACILITIES WOULD HAVE BEEN PROVIDED FOR THEM ON 13 AND 14 SEPTEMBER, DURING THE PHASE INVOLVING THE RETURN TO GARRISON OF THE FORMATIONS CONCERNED. THE OBSERVATION WOULD HAVE ENDED WITH THE DISEMBARKATION OF THOSE FORMATIONS AT THE RAILWAY STATIONS NEAREST THEIR GARRISONS.

- II)

- III) NOT APPLICABLE IN THE SPECIFIC CASE CONCERNED

- IV)

THESE PROVISIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SC.1/AMPLIFIED ARE DISTINCTLY MORE FAVOURABLE THAN THOSE WHICH WERE IN FACT APPLIED ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS.

THE OBSERVERS INVITED - DRAWN IN FACT NOT FROM ALL THE 35 COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE CDE BUT ONLY FROM A PORTION OF THEM - DID NOT HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF A BIRD'S EYE VIEW OF THE MANOEUVRES AND WERE TRANSPORTED DIRECTLY FROM PARIS, WITH A CORRESPONDING REDUCTION IN THE DURATION OF THE OBSERVATION ON THE DAY THAT HAD BEEN SET ASIDE FOR THEM.

WE WISH TO STRESS THROUGH THIS EXAMPLE HOW MUCH OBSERVATION WOULD GAIN BY COMPARISON WITH THE EXISTING "DE FACTO" PRACTICE. END TEXT.

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SUBJECT: FRENCH MOTIVATIONS FOR NEW CDE PAPER

REF: STOCKHOLM 03317

1. CDE VI - 81.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: FRENCH DELEGATION MEMBERS POUDADE (DEPUTY HEAD) AND SMESSOW DISCUSSED FRENCH PAPER PRESENTED TO SELECTED DELEGATIONS AT NATO AND IN STOCKHOLM WITH US DEPUTY HANSEN. THEY ASSERTED THAT THE 16 MUST DEVELOP A CONSTRAINTS MEASURE TO SATISFY THE TACTICAL NEED IN THE CDE; OTHERWISE, THE NNA WOULD TEAM WITH THE EAST TO SUPPORT A MEASURE TO LIMIT NATO EXERCISES IN SOME MANNER. FRENCH APPEAR LESS THAN ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT INVITING OBSERVERS TO ALL NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES AND SEEM MORE RESTRICTIVE THAN OTHER ALLIES ON WHAT OBSERVERS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO DO. FRENCH ALSO SEE MERIT IN REPACKAGING SC-1/AMPLIFIED BY ASSIGNING THE SUBSTANCE OF MEASURE 1 TO MEASURES 2 AND 3, BUT VOICED THE VIEW THAT THIS MIGHT BE BETTER LEFT TO THE END GAME. END SUMMARY
4. POUDADE EXPLAINED THAT PARIS HAS SUBMITTED ITS IDEAS ON A DYNAMIC READING OF THE PACKAGE TO THE FRG, U.K., AND U.S. BOTH IN BRUSSELS AND IN STOCKHOLM IN ORDER TO ASCERTAIN THE VIEWS OF THE THREE ON THE ADVISABILITY OF "TUNING THE PACKAGE" FOR CDE. THESE VIEWS WILL DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE PAPER WILL BE PRESENTED TO THE 16 IN BRUSSELS. HE CLAIMED THAT THE FRENCH ARE NOT WEDDED TO THE IDEAS EXPLAINED IN THEIR PAPER AND SUGGESTED THAT THE PAPER MIGHT BE FURTHER COMBINED WITH BRITISH IDEAS (REFTEL).
5. PARIS BELIEVES THAT, IN LIGHT OF THEIR PERCEPTION OF THE CURRENT STATE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IT WOULD BE WISE TO CONSIDER ABANDONING MEASURE 1 (INFORMATION) AS A SEPARATE MEASURE AND SPLITTING ITS SUBSTANCE BETWEEN MEASURES 2 (ANNUAL CALENDAR) AND 3 (NOTIFICATION). THEY WOULD LIKE TO INTRODUCE THEIR IDEAS TO THE 16 SOMETIME IN THE AUTUMN WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF REACHING A DECISION BY END OF THE YEAR. PRELIMINARY REACTIONS BY OTHERS, NOTABLY THE BRITISH, IS THAT THIS EFFORT IS PREMATURE. HANSEN WAS POINTEDLY NEGATIVE REGARDING BOTH TIMING AND SUBSTANCE. POUDADE OPINED THAT ABANDONING MEASURE 1 AS A SEPARATE MEASURE MIGHT BE AN IDEA BEST LEFT TO THE ENDGAME.
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6. ACCORDING TO POUDADE, A SIGNIFICANT ASPECT OF THE APPROACH TAKEN BY PARIS IS TO DO AWAY WITH THE REQUIREMENT FOR OBSERVERS AT SMALLER SCALE EXERCISES. THE FRENCH MILITARY, HE EXPLAINED, HAS A FAIRLY RELATIVELY RESTRICTIVE VIEW REGARDING THE WHOLE OBSERVER PRACTICE. THIS IS ILLUSTRATED BY THE DRAFT WORKING PAPER ON MEASURE 4, INTRODUCED INTO THE NATO CAUCUS BY THE FRENCH ON 6 JUNE IN STOCKHOLM. IN FACT, THE FRENCH DELEGATION HAD BEEN RELUCTANT TO TURN ITS MEASURE 4

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PAPER OVER TO THE MILITARY ADVISORS' GROUP FOR REVIEW BECAUSE THE GROUP WOULD SEE IT AS A MINIMALIST PAPER AND URGE IMPROVEMENTS TO MAKE IT MORE FORTHCOMING, AN OUTCOME WHICH THE FRENCH MILITARY WOULD FIND UNACCEPTABLE.

7. READING BETWEEN THE LINES OF WHAT POUDADE SAID, IT APPEARS THAT FRANCE WANTS TO REINTRODUCE THE CONCEPT OF CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS AND DOWNPLAY THE CONCEPT THAT INSPECTION COULD BE THE ROUTINE RIGHT OF ANY STATE BASED ON A QUOTA SYSTEM. THIS IS EXPRESSED IN FRENCH PAPER THROUGH THE NOTION OF CREATING THE POSSIBILITY FOR INSPECTION OUTSIDE THE QUOTA.

8. IN CONTRAST TO THE SOMETIMES CONFUSING NATURE OF POUDADE'S STATEMENTS REGARDING THE PAPER THEY HAVE PRESENTED TO THREE ALLIES (PARTIALLY BECAUSE WE WERE WORKING FROM A FRENCH LANGUAGE VERSION), HIS EXPLANATION OF PARIS THINKING ON THE CDE CUTOFF DATE WAS CLEAR. PARIS BELIEVES THE STOCKHOLM MEETING MUST END BEFORE THE START OF THE PREPARATORY MEETING IN SEPTEMBER 1986 FOR VIENNA IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE CDE DOES NOT HAVE A LIFE OF ITS OWN, BUT IS A SUBSIDIARY MEETING OF THE CSCE. CONTINUING STOCKHOLM AFTER ANY PART OF THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING HAS BEGUN WOULD, IN THE FRENCH VIEW, GIVE THE INDEPENDENT STATUS TO THE CDE WHICH THE SOVIETS DESIRE. END

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SUBJECT: UK PAPER ON MEASURE 4

1. CDE VI - 076
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF UK PAPER ON SC-1/AMPLIFIED MEASURE 3. THE BRITISH CONSIDER IT TO BE IN FINAL FORM BUT NATO CAUCUS HAS NOT GIVEN FINAL OK FOR TABLING.
4. BEGIN TEXT:

THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT ILLUSTRATES A NOTIFICATION OF A MILITARY ACTIVITY UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF MEASURE 3 OF CSCE/SC.1 (AMPLIFIED) WHICH, UNDER THE TERMS OF THAT MEASURE, WOULD HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED 45 DAYS BEFORE THE START OF THE EXERCISE.

THE UNITED KINGDOM COMMITMENT TO NATO REQUIRES IT TO HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO REINFORCE TROOPS IN EUROPE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM. THIS CAPABILITY IS TESTED EVERY 4-5 YEARS. THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT NOTIFIED EXERCISE LIONHEART '84 (COMPROMISING EXERCISES FULL FLOW AND SPEARPOINT '84). THE PRECEDING SIMILAR EXERCISE WAS CRUSADER IN 1980. THE NEXT IS SCHEDULED FOR 1989.

(A) DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTIVITY IN THE ZONE, INCLUDING, IF APPLICABLE, THE NAME OF THE EXERCISE.

EXERCISE LIONHEART IS A REINFORCEMENT AND FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE CONSISTING OF EXERCISE FULL FLOW (REINFORCEMENT PHASE) AND EXERCISE SPEARPOINT '84 (FIELD TRAINING PHASE).

(B) THE NAME OF THE HEADQUARTERS CONDUCTING THE ACTIVITY.

HQ BRITISH ARMY OF THE RHINE.

(C) THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF THE ACTIVITY, INCLUDING THE RELATION OF THE ACTIVITY TO THAT OF ANY OTHER MILITARY ACTIVITY FOR WHICH NOTIFICATION IS GIVEN UNDER THIS MEASURE.

TO EXERCISE AND DEMONSTRATE THE UNITED KINGDOM'S ABILITY TO REINFORCE TROOPS IN EUROPE. REGULAR TROOPS, TERRITORIAL ARMY AND RESERVISTS WILL MOVE TO THE CONTINENT AND SUBSEQUENTLY JOIN BRITISH ARMY OF THE RHINE FOR FIELD TRAINING EXERCISES. LIONHEART WILL BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE ANNUAL SERIES OF AUTUMN EXERCISES (WHICH WOULD BE SEPARATELY NOTIFIED) AND TROOPS FROM SEVERAL ALLIED NATIONS WILL BE JOINING THE FIELD TRAINING EXERCISES. THE EXERCISE WILL DEMONSTRATE THE UNITED KINGDOM'S COMMITMENT TO NATO'S FORWARD DEFENCE AND DETERRENT POLICY GENERALLY.

(D) THE DATES AND DURATION OF THE DIFFERENT PHASES OF THE ACTIVITY IN THE ZONE, INCLUDING THE BEGINNING OF OUT-OF GARRISON DEPLOYMENT, THE ACTIVE EXERCISE PHASE IF APPLICABLE, AND THE RECOVERY PHASE DURING WHICH TROOPS ARE RETURNED TO NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATIONS, IF THE RECOVERY PHASE IS TO OCCUR IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ACTIVITY.

LIONHEART - 3 SEPTEMBER - 5 OCTOBER

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FULL FLOW - 3 SEPTEMBER - 5 OCTOBER  
 SPEARPOINT - 17-29 SEPTEMBER  
 REGULAR FORCES WILL BEGIN OUT-OF-GARRISON DEPLOYMENT ON  
 3 SEPTEMBER.  
 TERRITORIAL ARMY UNITS WILL BEGIN REINFORCEMENT ON 14  
 SEPTEMBER.  
 RESERVISTS WILL PARTICIPATE BETWEEN 15 AND 23 SEPTEMBER.  
 ACTIVE EXERCISE PHASE 14-27 SEPTEMBER.  
 RECOVERY PHASE 27 SEPTEMBER - 5 OCTOBER. TERRITORIAL  
 ARMY UNITS WILL RETURN TO THE UNITED KINGDOM BY 28  
 SEPTEMBER. REGULAR FORCES RETURN TO GARRISON BY 5  
 OCTOBER.

(E) THE NAMES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES ENGAGED IN  
 THE ACTIVITY.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, UNITED STATES, NETHERLANDS,  
 UNITED KINGDOM.

(F) BOUNDARIES OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL AREA IN THE ZONE  
 WHERE THE ACTIVITY WILL TAKE PLACE, INCLUDING A MAP  
 TRACE OR GEOGRAPHIC CO-ORDINATES.

NORTH RHINE/WESTPHALIA AND LOWER SAXONY. AREA OF  
 MUNSTER MCO557, OSNABRUCK MC3592, HANNOVER ND5004,  
 HELMSTEDT PC3788, BRAUNLAGE PC1132, SCHLOSS NEUHAUS  
 MC8032, UNNA MCU612. UTM GRID REFERENCES. MAP ATTACHED.

(G) THE NUMBER OF TROOPS TO INCLUDE AMPHIBIOUS AND  
 AIRBORNE TROOPS, DIRECTING STAFF AND UMPIRES ENGAGED.  
 IF MORE THAN ONE PARTICIPATING STATE ENGAGES IN THE  
 ACTIVITY THEN THE NUMBER OF TROOPS STAFF AND UMPIRES FOR  
 EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL BE SPECIFIED.

ELEMENTS OF 1 (BRITISH) CORPS INCLUDING TWO ARMoured AND  
 ONE INFANTRY DIVISION, TOGETHER WITH ELEMENTS OF FEDERAL  
 GERMAN, NETHERLANDS AND UNITED STATES ARMoured DIVISIONS.  
 BREAKDOWN

	EXERCISE PERSONNEL	CONTROL, UMPIRES AND DAMAGE CONTROL PERSONNEL
UK	103,000	15,800
FRG	6,300	-
NL	3,500	-
USA	3,400	-
-	116,200	15,800

TOTAL STRENGTH 132,000

(H) THE DESIGNATION OF THE GROUND FORCE DIVISIONS  
 ENGAGED IN THE ACTIVITY.

1 (BRITISH) CORPS - 2 INFANTRY DIVISION,  
 3 ARMoured DIVISION, 4 ARMoured DIVISION.

(I) THE TYPE OF OTHER FORCES INVOLVED IN THE ACTIVITY,  
 INCLUDING GROUND-BASED TACTICAL AIR FORCES AND NAVAL  
 SHIP-TO-SHORE COMBAT FORCES, IE., THOSE EXECUTING  
 AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, AIR SUPPORT OF GROUND TROOPS OR  
 SHIP-TO-SHORE GUNNERY, IF PART OF A MILITARY ACTIVITY IN  
 THE ZONE.

GROUND BASED TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT PROVIDED BY 2ND ALLIED

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TACTICAL AIR FORCE.

(J) CLARIFYING INFORMATION IF THE ACTIVITY IS ONE WHICH NO FORECAST WAS MADE PURSUANT TO MEASURE 2 OF THIS DOCUMENT OR IF THE ACTIVITY IS ONE FOR WHICH A FORECAST WAS MADE BUT THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE FORECAST HAS BEEN CHANGED.

THIS ACTIVITY WOULD HAVE BEEN FORECAST ON 15 NOVEMBER THE PRECEDING YEAR IN THE ANNUAL FORECAST REQUIRED UNDER MEASURE 2 OF CSCE/SC.1/AMPLIFIED). END TEXT.

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