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JOINT INTELLIGENCE INDICATIONS COMMITTEE

Report of Indications of Soviet-Communist Intentions

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From: 21 December 1950  
 To : 27 December 1950  
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
 Department of the Army  
 Washington 25, D.C.  
 28 December 1950

1. SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

- a. The Soviet armed forces in being are in an advanced stage of readiness for war and could initiate offensive operations with no additional warning. Military and political indications are that the Communists intend to insist upon a solution of problems of controversy strictly along lines which further Communist world objectives. There are no indications that the Soviets and their Communist allies in pursuing their major objectives intend to avoid future actions which might precipitate global hostilities.
- b. North Korean and Chinese Communist forces are making preparations for a large-scale offensive to the south in the near future. Chinese Communist statements are insistent that peace in the Far East is contingent on Western acceptance of their demands on Korea and Formosa and Chinese Communist representation in the U.N.
- c. The Chinese Communists may be preparing or actually have decided to extend "volunteer" support to the Viet Minh but a reorganization of the Viet Minh army may delay a major offensive unless the Chinese Communists intervene in the near future.
- d. There are indications of preparations for the strengthening of Soviet ground and air units in Germany, of increased Soviet and Satellite air defense measures and of the continuing improvement of the Satellite armed forces. Communist propaganda on West German rearmament and charges against Yugoslavia and Greece may be in preparation for military action in Europe but there are no conclusive indications of the probability of imminent hostilities in Europe.

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## 2. SUMMARY OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

- a. **KOREA.**---The build-up of enemy forces, including Chinese Communist, in the central part of the Korean Peninsula points to a large-scale coordinated Chinese Communist and North Korean offensive to the south. Some 650 combat aircraft, including 250 Soviet-controlled, and an additional 400 to 500 Soviet Air Force planes in the Dairen-Port Arthur area, might be available for an all-out Chinese Communist air effort. The Chinese Communists have rejected discussions to terminate hostilities in Korea except on condition that their unacceptable demands are first met by the West. The Communists may be attempting to establish an international principle that governments may avoid responsibility for aggression by the use of "volunteers."
- b. **CHINA.**---Increasing Chinese Communist military activities near Hong Kong and the termination of some Chinese Communist activities in Hong Kong may be in preparation for an attack on Hong Kong but there are no firm indications that such an attack is imminent. An increasing number of reports have stated that the Chinese Communists intend to invade Formosa during 1951 regardless of the presence of the U.S. 7th Fleet.
- c. **INDO-CHINA.**---The Chinese Communists are reportedly recruiting "volunteers" for service in Indo-China and there are continuing unconfirmed reports that three Chinese Communist armies are preparing to move into Indo-China in the near future. While Viet Minh movements continue to indicate preparations for a probable offensive in Tonkin, the offensive may be deferred pending the reported organization of divisions in the Viet Minh Army.
- d. **THAILAND.**---The Chinese Communists are giving increasing propaganda attention to Thailand. A "Free Thai" group reportedly has been organized and is being trained by the Viet Minh.
- e. **GERMANY.**---There is no clear indication of the extent of Soviet reinforcement of their forces in Germany but reports indicate that the U.S.S.R. may already have started a gradual strengthening of her forces in Germany and that existing units are now at greater strength than formerly. Additional airfields are to be rehabilitated in the Soviet Zone of Germany during 1951 and at least some of this construction is scheduled for completion by May. Certain Soviet fighter regiments may be brought up to T/E strength with jet aircraft in the near future.

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- f. **EASTERN EUROPE.**--The Soviets are reportedly requisitioning and renovating air raid shelters in Austria, Hungary is establishing an air defense program, and increased AAA has been noted around Moscow. There are indications that the Czech Army may have been increased in strength. The East German Alert Police are being formed into regimental type units and the organization is emerging as an army.
- g. **GENERAL.**--Soviet and Satellite propaganda continues to give major emphasis to the threat to peace resulting from plans for West German rearmament and some Soviet propaganda has intimated that there is a possibility of war despite Soviet efforts to prevent it. Anti-Tito propaganda has been increasing in the Satellite countries for several weeks and may indicate efforts to prepare the Satellite peoples for offensive action against Yugoslavia. Limited information indicates that the U.S.S.R. may be able to produce larger numbers of atomic bombs within the next few years than had been previously estimated.
3. **COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES.**--The Chinese Communists and North Koreans retain their capabilities for major offensive action in Korea. Chinese Communist capabilities for action in Indo-China and against Hong Kong have possibly increased. European Satellite capabilities continue to increase and there are indications of a gradual increase in Soviet ground and air capabilities in Germany.

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TAB "A"

REPORT OF INDICATIONS OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST INFORMATION

Proceedings of the Joint Intelligence Indications Committee  
27 December 1950

1. Indications of Intentions in the Far East

a. Communist military activity in Korea continues to indicate that preparations are under way for a large-scale offensive to the south, and Chinese Communist statements have reaffirmed that their objectives include not only Korea but also Formosa and admission to the United Nations.

- (1) Indications of a general enemy build-up in the central part of the Korean Peninsula point to an early large-scale offensive to the south. The presence of Chinese Communist units in the front lines north of Seoul indicates that Chinese Communist forces have been substituted for or integrated with North Korean forces in some forward areas. This movement, together with increasing indications of the coordination of Chinese Communist and North Korean operations and the subordination of North Korean units to Chinese Communist command, point to the likelihood of a coordinated Chinese Communist and North Korean offensive against U.N. positions. Observations have indicated small-scale movements of enemy forces southward from the Hamhung-Hungnam area but there is to date no firm evidence of a major redeployment of Chinese Communist forces from this area towards the 8th Army front. Communist probing thus far has been largely against the ROK forces on the right or eastern flank of the 8th Army. There are indications that the North Korean Army has been reorganized into a force in excess of 100,000, including 21 infantry divisions, 1 armored division and 3 infantry brigades. In addition, the Chinese Communists continue to possess the capability of substantial reinforcement of their forces in Korea, although no information has been received concerning any current or recent movements of additional Chinese Communist forces into Korea from Manchuria.
- (2) Available intelligence now indicates that there are some 650 combat aircraft available to the Chinese Communist Air Force, 250 of which are Soviet-controlled.

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In addition, there are an estimated 400 to 500 Soviet Air Force planes based in the Kwantung (Dairen-Port Arthur) area of Manchuria, which might be available in the event of an all-out Chinese Communist air effort. A recent unconfirmed report states that construction on Chefoo Airfield on the Shantung Peninsula is nearing completion, that the airfield now has 40 conventional and eight jet fighters, and that this field will be used as a base for air operations against Korea if such air support is necessary for a Communist victory.

- (3) The Chinese Communists have rejected U.N. overtures for negotiations leading to the cessation of hostilities in Korea, except on condition that the unacceptable demands of the Chinese Communists are first met by the West, particularly by the United States. Chinese propaganda and official statements insist that peace in the Far East is contingent upon the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, U.S. abandonment of its policy of defending Formosa, and recognition of the Chinese Communist Government as the representative of China in the U.N.
- (4) Soviet and Chinese Communist persistence in representing the Chinese Communist troops in Korea as volunteers may indicate that the Communists are endeavoring to establish an international principle that governments may divorce themselves from responsibility for military aggression or foreign intervention by describing the forces involved as "volunteers."

b. An increasing number of reports indicate that it is the Chinese Communist intention to invade Formosa during the first half of 1951. These reports of Chinese Communist plans state that the Formosa operation will be undertaken regardless of the presence of the U.S. 7th Fleet and that Soviet-operated aircraft may support the Chinese Communist operations. In connection with previous reports of the build-up of Chinese Communist air facilities in the Shanghai area, recent intelligence indicates that although air facilities in the Shanghai area are substantial, there has been a recent decrease in air activity there and the area does not at present serve as the chief operational center of the Chinese Communist Air Force.

c. There have been recent indications that the Chinese Communists are increasing their military activities in the area adjacent to Hong Kong. Reports have stated that: (1) additional elements of the Third Field Army are appearing in Kwangtung Province, resulting in a present increase in military strength although these units may

**TOP SECRET**

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be only replacements for others scheduled for withdrawal; (2) six important Chinese Communist agencies in Hong Kong have been instructed to terminate their operations by the end of February; (3) an order has been issued for the removal of all Chinese Communist supplies from Hong Kong by 2 January; and (4) Chinese Communist authorities have requisitioned all schools and churches along the Canton-Kowloon railroad. These developments may be in preparation for a direct attack on Hong Kong, but there continue to be no firm indications that such an attack is imminent.

d. There have been several recent indications that the Chinese Communists intend to extend the same type of "volunteer" support to the Viet Minh that they have given to the North Koreans. A Chinese Communist mission reportedly has been established at Lungchow to coordinate activities with the Viet Minh. Volunteers are now reportedly being enlisted in China for service in Indo-China and these "volunteers" may be given a distinctive uniform. Some 80 Soviet tanks, apparently destined for Indo-China, have allegedly been seen at Lungchow. Unconfirmed reports continue to state that the Chinese Communist 13th, 14th, and 15th Armies (located in Yunnan and Kwangsi) are preparing to move into Indo-China in the relatively near future, and two recent reports may provide some confirmation of this movement. The reported suspension of civilian air travel from Chungking to Kuming may indicate a movement of military personnel towards Indo-China, and a report that more than a hundred Chinese doctors and nurses have been sent to Hanning (the Sino-Viet Minh training base) may indicate that Chinese Communist troops are soon to be employed in Indo-China. While Viet Minh movements have continued to indicate preparations for a probable offensive in Tonkin, there is some possibility that the offensive has been deferred pending the reported organization of five or six divisions in the Viet Minh Army. Although such a reorganization might delay a purely Viet Minh offensive for several months, the commitment of Chinese Communist troops is possible at any time.

e. There are indications that the Chinese Communists are giving increasing attention to Thailand. A "Free Thai" movement has reportedly been organized and its members are being trained by the Viet Minh. Chinese Communist propaganda is stressing the danger of Thailand becoming a U.S. base for attacks against China.

f. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:

- (1) There are indications that North Korean and Chinese Communist forces are preparing for a large-scale offensive in the near future against U.S. 8th Army positions. Chinese Communist statements continue to stress that peace in the Far East is contingent on Western capitulation to their demands on

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Korea and Formosa and Chinese Communist representation in the U.N.

- (2) There are indications of increasing Chinese Communist military activity in the area adjacent to Hong Kong but no firm indications that a Chinese Communist attack is imminent.
- (3) There are increasing indications of Chinese Communist preparations for "volunteer" support of the Viet Minh, but a reorganization of the Viet Minh Army may delay a major offensive unless the Chinese Communists intervene in the near future.
- (4) Continuing Chinese Communist support of Communist movements in Southeast Asia is indicated by their increasing attention to Thailand.

## 2. Indications of Intentions in Europe and the Near East

a. In Germany, there is no further information on the Soviet rehabilitation of the Zossen/Wunsdorf barracks area south of Berlin or on the possibility of a major reinforcement of Germany in the near future. The most reasonable explanation for the reconstruction of these barracks, however, appears to be preparation for housing considerable numbers of additional Soviet troops which may soon arrive in Germany. Further information now appears to indicate that the previously reported Soviet order for the assembly of some 660 flat cars in Germany was probably for the purpose of transporting reparations shipments eastward, as nearly 200 flat cars carrying reparations have recently been observed moving eastward through Warsaw. Limited observations in the western U.S.S.R. have also not revealed any unusual rail traffic or activity suggestive of sudden or large-scale military movements, and marshalling yards in Brest-Litovsk, Smolensk and Moscow are not particularly full or busy. Other recent information, however, suggests that the U.S.S.R. may already have begun a gradual reinforcement of her forces in Germany and is making preparations to continue it. Available information (which may not be complete) on Soviet troop rotation in Germany since late September now indicates an excess of about 20,000 arrivals over departures, and as previously reported some 6,800 unidentified Soviet troops have already arrived in the Zossen/Wunsdorf barracks. Other recent reports as yet unconfirmed have indicated that preparations are being made to house some 15,000 additional Soviet troops at two Soviet garrisons near the Western zonal boundary, that some 20,000 Soviet armored troops have recently moved into quarters near Oranienburg (just north of Berlin), and that some troops arriving in Germany during the last few months have brought major items of equipment with them. It appears probable that, apart from any Soviet intention to bring new units into Germany, existing units are now at greater strength than during the summer.

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b. It now appears certain that further airfields are to be rehabilitated in the Soviet Zone of Germany during 1951. Various reports have indicated that six old airfields are to be enlarged and extended and that completion is to be achieved by 15 May 1951. Although this completion date would indicate some urgency, and the new program is in addition to the airfield construction program recently completed, there are no signs of immediate offensive activity by the Soviet Air Force in Europe. A normal seasonal decline in flying activity has been reported. The count of jet aircraft in the Soviet Zone of Germany is now 405 MIG-15's and 18 jet trainers, a slight increase over the previous month. Recent reported arrivals of additional crated jet aircraft suggest that certain fighter regiments in Germany may be brought up to T/E strength with jet aircraft in the near future.

c. There have been recent indications of increased air raid precautions throughout the Eastern European Satellites and the U.S.S.R. Hungary is reported to be working on a strengthened air defense program, including the establishment of an air defense organization and the renovation of air raid shelters. In Austria, the Soviets are reported to have requisitioned structures formerly used as air raid shelters in six towns in the Laxenburg-Hoodling area south of Vienna and to have ordered the Austrians to renovate air raid shelters within a 35-mile radius to the north of Vienna within the past month. AAA positions in the Moscow area have been increased and the known total now includes 32 positions of 8 guns each. Battery positions have been improved and partially dug in and training has been more active than in the past.

d. Reports of the past week continue to indicate the reorganization and expansion of the Satellite armed forces and increasing security measures in Eastern Europe. In Czechoslovakia, the troops recently moved into Western Bohemia are reportedly receiving prefabricated huts for winter quarters. There is some indication that the strength of the Czech Army may have increased from 120,000 to 138,000. An increased number of Soviet officers have been reported in Brno (in Moravia) which tends to support previous conjectures that a Soviet command or some sort of headquarters might be established in that city. In East Germany, the expected expansion and reorganization of the East German Alert Police is apparently well under way. The Alert units are reportedly being formed into 24 groups of about 1800 men approximating regimental combat teams in composition, and the over-all organization is beginning to take on the appearance of a national army and is losing its alleged identity as a security force. It is also reported that 8,000 of the Communist Free German Youth organization are being inducted into the Alert Police. If confirmed, this increase will raise the strength from 52,000 to 60,000. In Poland a large-scale purge of unreliable elements within the government and socialized agencies, which is reportedly to be followed by a job-freezing decree, will both increase the security of the regime and

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assure absolute control over practically every worker.

e. The following major trends were evident in Soviet and Communist propaganda during the weeks:

- (1) Soviet and Satellite propaganda continued to stress U.S. aggressive intentions, particularly emphasizing the Brussels Conference decisions which were described as a "conspiracy which presented an even more acute threat to peace than all Western actions since 1945." One propaganda trend noted in the Soviet-controlled Berlin press was a shift from emphasis on general U.S. plans for world conquest to stress on the danger of war in Europe as the result of West German rearmament. This shift has not apparently been paralleled in the Soviet press, but the usual generalizations on the overwhelming strength of the peace movement have been supplemented by articles intimating that there is a possibility of war despite Soviet efforts to prevent it. The U.S.S.R. is apparently seeking to convince its people that an attack can come from the West, and thus to justify as necessary any "defensive" action which they may undertake.

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Soviet propaganda to the effect that aggression against the Soviet bloc can result from German rearmament has been paralleled by articles alleging that the U.S. is rearming Japanese units for use in both Korea and Indo-China.

- (2) Peace propaganda continued to be strenuously emphasized in the Eastern European Satellites. Laws against "war-mongering" were passed in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, similar to those previously enacted in Hungary, Rumania and the German Democratic Republic.
- (3) Anti-Tito propaganda has been increasing in the Satellite countries over a period of several weeks and may indicate efforts to prepare the Satellite peoples psychologically for offensive action against Yugoslavia. Although the Yugoslav Government has not yet indicated concern over this propaganda, some Yugoslav representatives in other countries fear that it may be a preliminary to more serious action.

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
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- (4) Current Communist propaganda in the United States is primarily devoted to: emphasis on peace, demands for withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea and Formosa and for the recognition of Communist China, demands for the removal of General MacArthur and Secretary Acheson, and denunciation of the President's Proclamation of National Emergency and of West German rearmament. Communist leaders have urged the development of a broad coalition of labor organizations against war and have urged that Communists increase their infiltration of labor in an attempt to slow down production.

f. Unconventional Weapons. Limited information indicates that the Soviets had accumulated a supply of 30 atomic bombs by mid-1950, and that their supply will increase to 50 by mid-1951, to 120 by 1952, to 205 by 1953, and to 315 by 1954. The figures for 1952-1954 are higher than those previously indicated.

g. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:

- (1) There are indications of preparations for the strengthening of Soviet ground and air units in Germany, of increased air defense measures in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. and of the continuing increase of European Satellite military capabilities.
- (2) Communist propaganda emphasis on the consequences of West German rearmament, the growing threat to "peace," and charges against Yugoslavia and Greece may be in preparation for military action in Europe, but there are no conclusive indications of the probability of imminent hostilities in Europe.

  
JOHN WECKERLING  
Brigadier General, GSC  
Chairman, Joint Intelligence  
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