

TOP SECRET

AD HOC IAC COMMITTEE (WATCH)

Transcript of Meeting Held in Director's
Conference Room, Administration Building
Central Intelligence Agency, on 18 December 1953

Mr. Huntington D. Sheldon
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. William C. Trueheart, Office of the Special Assistant,
Intelligence, Department of State

Mr. Sam McKee, G-2, Department of the Army
(Substitute for Brigadier General John M. Willems)

Captain D. T. Eller (USN), Assistant Head, Intelligence
Branch, ONI, Department of the Navy

Brigadier General Millard Lewis, Deputy Director Intelli-
gence, Headquarters USAF, United States Air Force

Dr. Charles H. Reichardt, Intelligence Division, Atomic
Energy Commission

Colonel Neil M. Wallace, Joint Intelligence Group, The
Joint Staff (Substitute for Captain E. T. Layton)

Mr. Meffert W. Kuhrtz, Special Agent, Liaison Section,
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

Colonel George R. Hundt, United States Air Force

Mr. Samuel S. Rockwell, United States Air Force

25X1A

██████████ Office of Current Intel-
ligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Acting Secretary

25X1A

██████████ Reporter

Document No. <u>5</u>
No Change in Class. <input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> Declassified
Class. Changed to: TS S (C)
Next Review Date: <u>1989</u>
Auth.: HR 70-3
Date: <u>11/9/80</u>

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

MR. SHELDON: I think we had a little mistake in circulating the last Minutes. We had a page missing and failure in numbering. Has that been corrected?

25X1A

[REDACTED] Yes, sir.

MR. SHELDON: On the basis of the final Minutes, are there any changes anybody wishes to suggest?

COLONEL WALLACE: Sir, I have one on page 5, the fifth line from the top, the second word. It is the first full word. It has "Committee than". I think it is simply a typographical error.

MR. SHELDON: Page 5, what paragraph?

COLONEL WALLACE: The top paragraph, the fifth line from the top, under Captain Layton's statement. It says "the Watch Committee than the Watch Committee." It should be "then the Watch Committee".

MR. SHELDON: Yes, "then".

COLONEL WALLACE: And then on the last page in the final line of Captain Layton's statement I would like to insert the word "and a command structure of the JCS". Now it reads "and a command of the JCS". I would like to insert that wording "command structure".

MR. SHELDON: That is most appropriate, good. Are there any other corrections that anybody wishes to make? If not we will consider the Minutes approved as circulated and as amended at this meeting.

Millard, we were hoping perhaps you might have a solution to this paramilitary definition. Have you had any success along those lines?

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, I will tell you what I found. The success -- degree of success -- I think it a question . . . but I will tell you what I did find. I found that the word paramilitary as generally used is a very narrow word, and combining it with military, as we have in two places, one in the Mission and then another in paragraph 2, to make the term military and paramilitary, I find that the combination of those two is inadequate to express what I believe is our concern.

Now I approached this thing this way. After getting that general impression that the term military and paramilitary was inadequate, I asked why and got

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

into the various things which I believe are pretty cleanly our concern. There were some fuzzy ones which may or may not be, but I got into the things which I really think may very well be our concern and which, I think, will undoubtedly show up in the Factor List, for instance, and I came to this conclusion that in the first place, let's say, that we have various types of hostile actions. The first type, of course, is pretty clean. That is military action in the traditional sense and which should be, for example, a mobilization, or movements, or operations of the regular military forces which are in general based on Soviet orbit territory. Then there might very well be military support action which is pretty hard to very clearly put with any other category types which I am going to give you, but it is a matter of opinion, but an example of that is this one which we heard about on the television and the press today, for example, of delivery of atomic weapons, or BW agents by covert means into the United States or areas which are not under Soviet control.

I am contrasting here now something which I think is important as a differentiation, the differentiation being the Soviets not only wage war with their strictly regular military forces on their side, but they, of course, wage war at the same time -- we can call it irregular war if you want to -- on our side in support, direct or indirect support, of the military actions, and this one here of what you might call the second type might be called military support action by Communist operators. It might be any nationality or organizational ties which would be undertaken to enhance, supplement, or substitute for military action, including, as I said, the clandestine delivery of atomic weapons, BW agents, or even the operating of electronic devices such as guidance systems to guide their aircraft into targets, see, so there is another type of hostile action which I think we would be quite interested in from an imminence of hostilities standpoint. Now I have just for convenience labeled that "Military Support Action".

Now paramilitary is another one, but in trying to find out what paramilitary seems to mean to most people, it apparently means mostly operations

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

by guerrilla and partisan forces. It could mean some other things if you broaden it, but I think that maybe that is the meaning to most people.

MR. SHELDON: The normal concept of it.

GENERAL LEWIS: Yes, to most people, and then I think there is another fourth type of action which you could call, for instance, subversive actions, and there are a number of different kinds of subversive actions, and, of course, whether you would put these things under "Subversive" or not depends upon your definition of subversive, but subversive actions might be strikes in key factories. They might even be mass strikes, sabotage, mutiny, terror, plans to assassinate key military and political figures, even military rebellions which were not paramilitary. Any of these things would be capable of producing military, economic, or political crises, so my conclusion is that our term military and paramilitary if you use those two words the way they are generally understood do not cover the waterfront, that is, the pure waterfront, what I think is pretty cleanly of our interest, and so my reaction would be, therefore, that we ought to first in these two places where under B. in Mission and under C. in Functions . . . I think that we ought to give serious consideration to broadening the statements Military and Paramilitary. There are several ways you could do it, but I would suggest we consider either adding "or other hostile actions", which would pick up these other things which aren't covered in "military or paramilitary", or maybe you would prefer just to use the term "hostile actions" in the first place as covering all of these things.

MR. SHELDON: In lieu of paramilitary?

GENERAL LEWIS: In lieu of military and paramilitary. In other words, you could be less definitive by using the general term "hostile actions", or you could add "or other hostile actions to the military and paramilitary". Do I make myself clear?

Now in any case I feel that we ought to have sooner or later, and maybe now is not the best time, but I think we ought to have as an appendix say . . . you don't care what you label it, but I think we ought to have some definitions, a definition of what this military, paramilitary, and other hostile actions

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

encompasses because I just don't think that the words are adequate now. They are not clearly enough understood as to what we are talking about, and I think --

MR. SHELDON: With the amount of time we have taken to try to define them.

GENERAL LEWIS: Yes, I think that is exactly the point, so I am in complete sympathy with all of you folks who have wrestled with this problem, and my explanation of it is the words and the understanding of the words are not adequate, so the only thing I see to do is to spell it out.

COLONEL WALLACE: Just thinking right off the cuff here, I wonder if we could use the phrase "indications of hostile action" which would cover a pretty broad front as I see it then? We have the traditional indicators we might look for, and then these other things you have indicated. It sounds to me as if we just label them as "indications of hostile action".

MR. TRUEHEART: I wonder if it would be in order to put this particular point on ice until after we have drawn up our Indicator List? I still can't help feeling that you are thinking of the Indicator List rather than the ultimate mission of the Committee. That is, the things the Committee should be looking for encompass many things other than military and paramilitary acts, but they are looking at those things as ultimately as indicators of military aggression.

GENERAL LEWIS: I see what you mean. As a matter of fact, I had the same discussion at great length with my own people. There is a very direct relationship as far as I am concerned, direct relationship between what our statement of mission is and the Indications List. There is no question about it, but what we seem to be trying to do here is to define the scope of this thing, you see, by the words military and paramilitary. Now is that right?

MR. SHELDON: I would agree with that. In other words, I think we have all said right along here that what we want is the longest lead time of warning against an eventual hostile act, and then the question is: How do you operate your mechanism to bring that about? And there is a concept of

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

that being part of the indications; however, your mission still must be broad enough so that when you come to write your indicators -- your list of indicators -- you don't have to throw out a whole bunch of indicators because they are not pertinent to your mission, and there is where the difficulty lies.

GENERAL LEWIS: Right, so assuming we all agree that there is a direct relationship between the Indications List and the Statement of Mission.

MR. SHELDON: They have to be tied in together.

GENERAL LEWIS: I don't think there is any question.

MR. TRUEHEART: There is a relationship; there is no question about that.

GENERAL LEWIS: And aren't we trying to define the scope -- to delineate the scope -- when we state the mission? I think we are. If we all agree that we are, then I think you have to make that statement large enough to be sure that you don't do as he said, that you don't limit yourself or give the impression of limiting yourself later, and what I have just tried to point out here is that I am very sure now that the two words "military" and "paramilitary" are too limiting for what we all seem to be clearly talking about.

MR. TRUEHEART: I would be glad to see an alternative suggested, but I am very worried about this thing being too broad. For example, to take the old case of Guatemala, I take it that it is not the responsibility of this Committee to warn the U.S. of a Communist coup in Guatemala. I think that any indications of a Communist coup in Guatemala should be taken into consideration by the Committee as an indication of Soviet military or paramilitary action in prospect, but that is the kind of distinction I am trying to make. I don't believe that this definition here will adversely limit the indications which will be considered by the Watch Committee, but if you make it broader I think you will diffuse their attention altogether too much.

GENERAL LEWIS: That doesn't worry me in the least.

MR. SHELDON: You just said they have to look at it anyway.

MR. TRUEHEART: Well, but they are going to look at those indications as bearing on Soviet intentions, and it won't be their primary responsibility to warn of a coming coup in Guatemala.

~~TOP SECRET~~

GENERAL LEWIS: Now haven't you taken care of your concern by saying that this relates to imminence of hostilities? I think you have. I think that you have checked that by tying it to imminence of hostilities.

MR. TRUEHEART: As long as it remains tied to that. As I say, I am glad to consider any kind of a change to this military or paramilitary, but I just wanted to make clear what would worry me about changes in it, that it might go too far in the other direction and get us away from imminence of hostilities if you like.

GENERAL LEWIS: All right, I will tell you frankly what my concern is. My concern is we won't go quite far enough, and yet I don't want to go too far either. I am not interested in these people doing anything that doesn't relate to imminence of hostilities, but I think there is a serious possibility, and it may have actually existed in the past, a tendency to be limiting, and I don't think we want it. I think we want to be sure that we have tied in all of the things which are of direct concern or even indirect concern to imminence of hostilities.

MR. TRUEHEART: I agree with that.

GENERAL LEWIS: Right, and that is my intent, and yet we don't want it wide open. Now to get back to your other suggestion of waiting, I would be very happy to wait because I think that we all are probably going to feel better about a number of these things, as I have said before, after you take a look at the Indications List. I know when you get to arguing about Indications Lists, as I have experienced myself now for about five years, that there is going to be a twilight zone there of controversy as to what is and what isn't, but I think that there if you take the slightly liberal approach that it is a little bit healthier than taking the narrow approach, you see, in the interest of being sure that you don't miss something that is not readily recognizable as important but turns out to be important, you see.

MR. TRUEHEART: I would be extremely liberal on the List and less so on the Mission, but anyway that, I think, it would be really helpful if we could hold this until we have had a look at our Indicator List and see just what

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

needs to be done, if anything, to this to encompass --

MR. SHELDON: I am not quite persuaded that is the right attack on this thing because actually the preparation of the Indications List should be made in the light of the agreed mission, and it seems to me that until you have an agreed mission and the function spelled out, as we have tried to spell them, that the Terms of Reference of those trying to agree on an Indications List isn't firm.

MR. TRUEHEART: It certainly is that kind of a ham and egg situation.

DR. REICHARDT: We seem to be going back to what we had before. Anyway in the first drafts of Functions we had "hostile action", and then we changed this to "military or paramilitary action which would jeopardize the security of the United States . . ."

MR. SHELDON: Well, the reason for that was a fear quite widely voiced in the Committee that it might tend to diffuse the forces that were available to the watch function.

DR. REICHARDT: That is right.

MR. SHELDON: And I personally did not subscribe to that; however, I was perfectly willing if the rest of the Committee wanted to write these words in, I was willing to accept those words, but it has always seemed to me that the word "paramilitary" was too limiting also. It did not encompass for my money the introduction of by clandestine means of things that would do us some real harm, including BW, atomic weapons, and all the rest of the bag of tricks, but I was perfectly willing to accept these words provided we could get a definition which brought into or encompassed the watch function in the manner that I just suggested. And that is what we have been wrestling about here. I am perfectly willing to buy the "hostile acts" phrase, but I didn't feel that the Committee as a whole was prepared to buy a phrase quite as broad as that, and then we turned around and tried to define "paramilitary" in a broader way, and we reached at a point the suggestion that turning it around say "in the context of this paper this includes action concerned with clandestine," etc., etc. In other words, that was simply an elaboration of

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

the word "paramilitary", and everybody felt that the word "paramilitary" was a little too limiting, and I would agree entirely with Millard's expose of the word "paramilitary".

DR. REICHARDT: That is right. I just throw out as an idea as to whether it is easier to broaden a term by definition or to limit a term by definition and which would be the best. In other words, if we used again --

MR. SHELDON: Use the word "hostile action" and then define that in a more narrow way?

DR. REICHARDT: I mean we consider hostile action, giving us then a loophole, realizing human frailty.

MR. SHELDON: Maybe that is a means of attack on the problem.

COLONEL WALLACE: Could I make a statement, Mr. Chairman?

MR. SHELDON: Surely.

COLONEL WALLACE: In reading this it seems to me that paragraph b starts very generally, and then it gets narrowed down by the use of the word "military or paramilitary" in the last part of it. If it were to read as it now does up until "exploitation", then you could say "by any Soviet/ Communist action which would jeopardize." That would leave it broad on both ends then.

MR. TRUEHEART: It certainly would.

GENERAL LEWIS: Yes, but you see certain of us who are worried about it being too broad, and for those who are worried about it, what we have tried to do is to try and get words that would cut it off, and the words don't exist I am convinced of it. In other words, the English language and the words that are understood in the English language are not sharp enough to cut this thing off that way. Therefore, I concluded that you are going to have to either add "or other hostile actions" in here or else just leave it "hostile actions", and then you would have to define what you are talking about in order to set your fence around this thing, you see, so the thing doesn't get out of hand.

MR. TRUEHEART: With all reservations, and in a lot of your statements you are convinced the English language can't do this. Would you take a look

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

at that original definition that the Chairman gave us on paramilitary, the one that began "armed activities aside from operations of recognized military forces". We struck out that.

MR. SHELDON: Well, we bottled on the word "armed".

MR. TRUEHEART: Wait I am proposing a revision of that to see whether this might encompass everything you had in mind, and we suggested this before, but we didn't really give it much consideration. Strike "armed activities" and put in "acts of violence, aside from . . ." and right on through the way it was.

MR. MCKEE: They might not necessarily be acts of violence though. It may be some --

MR. SHELDON: That was the argument we reached before.

MR. MCKEE: I wonder whether it is desirable to use the word "hostile" because it could so easily be misunderstood. There is a tendency, I think, to regard, especially used in this particular connection, the word "hostile" or "hostilities" as relating to armed forces. For instance, we speak of Soviet/Communist intentions to initiate hostilities, so that when you get down below and when you speak of hostile action, that could seemingly imply again the employment of armed forces in some way, and I wonder if this couldn't be handled without having it open up too many flood gates by adding a couple more adjectives, by saying, "military or paramilitary action, clandestine or revolutionary action". Of course, the last is a very broad thing, but, after all, that is at the basis of the whole Soviet campaign worldwide. The Soviets are dedicated to a world revolution, and, of course, any action which they initiate could be regarded as a definite action along those lines, could be harmful to our interests, could be preliminary to something, and is something that perhaps we should observe.

MR. SHELDON: I think that is a good deal along the lines of what you were really getting to.

GENERAL LEWIS: I think we all have the same idea, but here is the thing I am reasonably sure of now is that there is not enough meeting of minds on what some of these words mean to simply use them without saying what they

TOP SECRET

mean, and I think one possible approach is here. I have here some copies of a possible definition. I think probably we could use this in two ways.

(1) Just to see for ourselves that there is no set word that means certain things, and I think that is pretty clear. I don't think there is any doubt about it. Here is subversive action, and I bet you all have a definition of subversive action, but still I think we are all generally talking about the same things, but the labels you put on them are not the same. That is the reason why I say I think we have to eventually come to some sort of a clear statement of what we are really talking about.

The most liberal way you could do that would be to lean on the Indications List later as to what you think should be considered, you see, make this broad here now and then lean on the Indications List to cover it. If that is too liberal, then I would say it ought to be defined. Now here is . . . I would like to pass these out for the benefit of you folks, and, as I say, I think one use of this is just to show the inaccuracy of words, and the second is to try to come to a conclusion as to whether or not these things are generally what we are talking about. Then if you do have a meeting of minds that this is what we are talking about, and there may be some others, then I think that will at least have a meeting of minds as to the general coverage involved, you see, even though we still don't have the words to label.

MR. SHELDON: Well, what that really means to me is that we should add an adjective in b and then state that Appendix A, or whatever you want to call it, defines what we intend to mean by these words.

GENERAL LEWIS: Yes.

MR. SHELDON: That rather than cluttering up the main paper with a definition.

GENERAL LEWIS: I wouldn't put the definition in the main paper. I would put it as an appendix, but to broaden b and c I think that we either ought to replace these words with "hostile actions" or --

MR. SHELDON: And then define them in an appendix.

TOP SECRET

GENERAL LEWIS: And then put an asterisk and say, "the hostile actions are defined in the appendix," or add the words "or other actions" or "other hostile actions". I would be happy to add "or other actions", but I think some of you would prefer to be more limiting than that and put the "hostile" in there.

MR. SHELDON: And then define those in an appendix. Would that technique appeal to the members of the Committee?

GENERAL LEWIS: Might I suggest that you look this thing over and see if you agree generally that these are the things, not maybe all of them, but these are things which you consider to be of concern, the imminence of hostilities.

MR. MCKEE: I must confess I still am a little troubled by the possibility of repetition, and where you have repetition that always leads to uncertainty thereafter, meaning by that that your first function is a, is very definitely the employment of armed forces in hostilities, and then if you use the word "hostile action" again, that would also encompass the employment of armed forces, and it seems to me that some statement should be found which would not repeat what has been stated already. That may be a quibble, but this is certainly an illustration of how difficult it is to reach agreement on the meaning of words, and thinking ahead through the years when all of these persons sitting around this table may be gone, and they will be trying to get at exactly what was meant here, it could create difficulties.

GENERAL LEWIS: I think there is less possibility of difficulty if you define what it was you intended it to mean, spell it out.

MR. MCKEE: I am simply pointing it out, the repetition in it, that you say you have functions, and you state specifically the function in a, is crystal clear, and then you get to the function b, and you drag in a repetition of what has been in a, and I still feel that that could lead to confusion.

GENERAL LEWIS: You are suggesting taking out military and paramilitary?

MR. MCKEE: I think perhaps that is true. No, not necessarily for this reason that the first is hostile action against us or our allies. For

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

instance, there is such a thing as military action which might not be against either ourselves or our allies and yet could be a preliminary movement of further action which would be very inimical to us.

GENERAL LEWIS: Yes, in the second case, in 2, I wouldn't put the word "hostile" in there. I would put "or other actions".

MR. MCKEE: I realize I am quibbling, but I am simply fearful that it could lead to trouble later if the idea of hostility is repeated there.

GENERAL LEWIS: I would leave the word "hostile" out. In the Mission statement I would put "or other hostile action", but down in the Function statement I would say "or other action".

DR. REICHARDT: Delete "military or paramilitary" and put an asterisk after "action", and in the Functions after b say "by other Soviet/Communist action". Again putting an asterisk after "action" and putting out at the end . . . defining action in the Appendix to limit it. In other words, it would be a very broad . . .

MR. MCKEE: Is it desirable to bind the work of the Committee too much? It would seem that the Watch Committee has always got to be left with some power to interpret the events which it must analyze.

GENERAL LEWIS: You are not talking to the right fellow about this because I am very interested in this thing being as broad as it is necessary to do the 100% job. Some of the other gentlemen here are interested in being sure that this thing is limited, you see.

MR. MCKEE: Well, I can perceive the desirability of not converting it into a Committee which considers all intelligence of interest to the welfare of the United States, but also it does seem to me to be a mistake to bind the objects of interest of the Committee, either a Statement of Mission, the Functions, or the Indications, since I think we all realize that it is practically impossible to anticipate all the situations that might arise which would probably be the concern of the Committee.

MR. SHELDON: I couldn't agree with your statement more, but that is one of the nubs of the noncomplete unanimity in the Committee, and we have been willing to accept certain limiting phrases simply to go forward with this

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

problem and trying to get it solved.

CAPTAIN ELLER: Mr. Chairman, I feel that in our discussions the people have been pretty close together. General Lewis recommended that when we got to the Indications List that we would begin to see more clearly whether our mission covered or was beyond what we intended, and I really have felt from the beginning that regardless of just how we phrased it, since there are so many different interpretations of the various words, that the plan, the paragraph C, the function is "to develop and operate on a current and continuing basis an Indications Intelligence Plan", and that plan or part of that plan presumably will be the Indicator List, or will have an Annex as an Indicator List. I felt all along that really is the key to what the Watch Committee . . . how it will actually perform its duties. As we discussed the other day in connection with the Secretariat when it first came up, should we consider personnel limitations, or should we consider the duties of the group, it became apparent that you would have to consider a little of each.

I think here again it probably would be profitable to go ahead recognizing that we may have to come back and modify the Mission in order to either enlarge or decrease the number of indicators that we might want to view. In other words, I believe we are close enough together to go ahead and work through and come back and modify as it would later develop.

MR. SHELDON: Who do you conceive of as being the group that would actually write the Intelligence Plan?

CAPTAIN ELLER: I think it was mentioned earlier by someone here that we would have a subcommittee. I hadn't given it enough thought to offer any constructive suggestion.

MR. SHELDON: Of course, there is the other technique of accomplishing that, and that is if one could agree on the mission, and the functions, and the constitution of the Working Group in the Center that it might be the first responsibility of the Working Group to produce that plan. I mean that is a possible way of attacking this job.

TOP SECRET

MR. TRUEHEART: But I think it goes without saying that that group can't possibly produce any plans unless we give them here some guidelines.

MR. SHELDON: That is the point. It is a question of which is the cart and which is the horse here, and if we say that we can't really write the Mission and Functions until the Intelligence Plan has been produced, then you can't have anybody but a subcommittee of this Committee draft the Intelligence Plan, whereas if we could agree to the Missions and Functions in this Committee, then it would be quite appropriate from my view to have the Working Group Members as a drafting team come up and present to this Committee the Intelligence Plan. It is just a question of how you want to work this thing.

And they are going to find themselves perhaps in about the same position we find ourselves in if we say, "Look, sharpen your pencils and come up with an Intelligence Plan". They are going to say, "Well, we want the specific Terms of Reference, what is the Mission and what is the Function," and then you are simply chasing your tail.

MR. TRUEHEART: I had thought we were in close agreement on this thing, but I am not at all sure we are.

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, that is the reason why I am suggesting this, that whether you agree totally on this piece of paper, I am suggesting that we ought to get some sort of a reading on whether we are far apart or generally together on the things that go in there, things that go to the different types of actions, the different types of actions no matter what you call them, but is this generally what we are talking about? If it is then I think that we are ready to proceed, and we will just have to do something about the term "military and paramilitary" sooner or later because it certainly to me is inadequate, and I wouldn't be happy with it anymore, but whether we do something now or later about the term, I still think we ought to know here now generally whether we are close together on such things, such hostile actions, or whether we are far apart. If we are far apart, then I think maybe we better resolve that one and get closer together before we proceed at all because maybe we are not talking about the same general size of this thing,

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

you see, the scope.

MR. SHELDON: I think you are quite right, Millard. That is why I would prefer not to skip this at this time. I think we want to continue focusing our attention on the scope, and the easiest way to carry forward on that for my money is to address ourselves as an exercise to this paper, and then we can determine whether we are 90 degrees away from one another or whether pretty close alignment, and if it meets with the others' wishes, I think we might well take a few minutes out to study this paper and then discuss it openly and see where we stand on it.

GENERAL LEWIS: I don't think we need to agree on this thing in detail. I don't want anybody to agree with a title here because I know you have got your own. You have probably got entirely different titles or headings for some of these things, but if we are talking about the same general things, types of hostile actions, then I think that we are fairly close together. If we are not, then we better see about it right here.

MR. SHELDON: I think that is right. Let's take a little time out and study this thing.

25X1B

25X1B

DR. REICHARDT:


25X1B

MR. SHELDON:

TOP SECRET

25X1B

TOP SECRET




MR. TRUEHEART: Exactly mine.

25X1B

MR. SHELDON: That would be my personal feeling of it.

25X1B MR. MCKEE:



MR. SHELDON: There again tying it back and reading it in the light of possible eventual military activities against us.

MR. REICHARDT: Right.

MR. SHELDON: And secondarily I would answer you in a different context, that is, in an economic context. I had a long discussion since the last meeting with the ONE Board on this question of estimating and the relationship between the estimators and the watch function, and it was perfectly clear to me that part of the watch function, I believe, should be to try to develop long-range economic indicators which might reflect an ultimate hostile act, but that in the reports of the Watch Committee until you had reached a conclusion that and had got the experience that a given series of economic moves then portended a hostile act, it would not be reported as an indicator of imminent hostilities, you see. In other words, they were fearful -- ONE was fearful -- that the Watch function might in some sense impinge on their own estimative functions, and I have pointed out that the watch reports had been assiduously written to avoid that function, but I did point out to them that if and when the watch function gained the experience over a long period of time perhaps of being able to read an economic indicator as something that portended a hostile act, we would then have added something to the general security of the country, but until that had occurred, until that

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

experience had been developed, it would not in any sense impinge on their functions. Now would anybody disagree with that general concept?

MR. TRUEHEART: I think that is dead right.

MR. SHELDON: So I will answer you in two parts.

DR. REICHARDT: The difficulty is in really assessing this on a relative time scale as far as the Watch Committee function.

MR. SHELDON: There is no experience developed today to say whether a series of economic pool shots indicates imminence of hostilities or not. We haven't reached that stage of development, and maybe we never will, but it seems to me we should try.

25X1C

GENERAL LEWIS: I think you will. As a matter of fact, [REDACTED]

25X1C

[REDACTED] Yet the farther in time you go from one or two days into weeks, into maybe a matter of two or three months of warning, the fuzzier these things, and the more difficult they are.

DR. REICHARDT: That is right.

GENERAL LEWIS: You see, and the more you have to study them, and yet I think it is entirely possible to get this warning business, as I said before, into a matter of maybe two or three months, but it is going to take a terrific terrific effort in digging and getting information, and studying it, and there is no way that this can be done uniservicewise. It has got to be done together, and it may actually result in some special studies having to be made by somebody or other at the direction of the IAC to try and develop some of these nebulous things. I wouldn't expect this Center to do such studying, no.

MR. SHELDON: I would agree with that.

GENERAL LEWIS: No, the Center shouldn't do the studying.

MR. SHELDON: They can initiate the studying.

GENERAL LEWIS: They might initiate it or recommend it.

DR. REICHARDT: Getting back to my point, or my question, two or three months to me is imminent action. I mean long-range I am thinking of, more than several years, and I am wondering if part of our difficulty in this

TOP SECRET

doesn't stem from the fact that things we are trying not to watch, and not to worry about, I mean not to include in the definitions of actions, are those things which, well, we know that certain actions toward world domination, etc., and the Watch Committee isn't worried about examining this general text, and whether we can somehow . . . I haven't given it the thought. The question was raised in looking over General Lewis' question here because in the first part there the term "hostile actions . . . includes actions of all types which may be undertaken by enemy forces, organizations and individuals aimed at affecting directly or indirectly and in a substantial manner, the security of the United States." 25X1B

25X1B

MR. SHELDON: Well, in addressing myself to this paper, there is just one thing that I personally miss in it, and that is . . . it would suit me if were to add after the word "individuals" in the third line "in support of its military strategy". That concept to me is not clearly brought out in that context, is not made clear, and if those words were added there and possibly at the tail end repeated again, it would come nearer my concept of what we were striving to accomplish here.

COLONEL WALLACE: Would you repeat those words again, Mr. Chairman?

MR. SHELDON: "in support of its military strategy" after the word "individuals" in the third line of 1. Otherwise I think we have the water front, Millard.

GENERAL LEWIS: I am not so sure we have. You don't have what you all were discussing: A reorientation of the economic. Where is that? That is not in here. You might read it between the lines, but in my case I think this demonstrates what I am trying to give you today. Here is the fact that there is no question in my mind we are just going to have to have pretty clear understanding of just what we are talking about.

MR. TRUEHEART: Can I make a try at that, another? The Watch Committee


TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Report now consists of a summary of current indications and a set of conclusions. What we are talking about here as I see it is what should be contained in these conclusions because that is what it says to develop from this information, the conclusions as to the following. Now as I recall the present Watch Report concludes usually something like this. (1) There are no indications of a resumption of hostilities in Korea. There are no indications that the Chinese Communists are planning to attack anything. There are no indications that the USSR is planning to initiate hostilities with its own forces in the immediate future. That is about all it says in the conclusions, and that is the guts of it. What a reader of that report ought to be able to do is turn to those conclusions and read those and know whether any action was required. He will read the rest for his general information, but the prime watch function is in drawing up those conclusions, and that is what they will stand or fall on if there is anything adverse happens.

Now whatever we put in b here I feel the Watch Committee is going to have to make a specific statement in its conclusions each week. Now if we take the definition that General Lewis has provided here, does this mean,

25X1B



Now I take it that any of the kinds of actions mentioned in this whole paper might well be contained in the body of the report as indications leading up to the conclusions that you draw with respect to hostile action by the Soviet bloc, but I don't take it that they would be responsible for drawing conclusions with respect to each one of these kinds of eventualities. To put it another way, if there is a general strike in France next week, I don't think anybody can call the Watch Committee to account for not having predicted it. If the Russians attack, and as a part of their plan they have brought on a general strike in France, and the Watch Committee didn't see this as an indication of possible attack by the Soviet Union, then I think they would be

TOP SECRET

very much at fault. Do I make myself clear?

MR. SHELDON: Yes.

MR. TRUEHEART: I think it is largely the same kind of point you were talking about on the economic thing. So it might help to look at this paragraph 2 as the outline of the Conclusion Section of the Watch Committee Report and think of it in those terms.

MR. MCKEE: Bill, I am not sure that in a Watch Committee Report it would be necessary to break it down quite to the extent that you stated. For instance, that could all be lumped instead of spelling out every conceivable activity which could jeopardize our security. It could all be summed up that there are no other indications of Soviet/Communist actions which could jeopardize the security of the United States and let it go at that.

MR. TRUEHEART: Gentlemen, I would hate to see the Watch Committee draw any such conclusions as that because that would be, in my opinion, in order to draw that conclusion, they would have to be carrying out virtually all the functions of all the intelligence agencies in Washington.

MR. MCKEE: You first seem to think that they have to have it line after line, and I am simply suggesting that they can lump them. As the desirability of reporting that way, I would say that I don't know, but it does seem that in the present system of reporting there is very definitely the implication that there are no other known indications of any actions which could be hostile to the United States. You deal with the indications which you have, and you leave out a consideration of what you have not, I suppose.

MR. TRUEHEART: I am not talking about indications. I am talking about just what they are drawing -- conclusions -- with respect to --

MR. MCKEE: Oh, excuse me, I thought you used the word "indications" here.

MR. TRUEHEART: As I said, the body of the report contains all manner of things, but the Watch Committee draws its conclusions only with respect to initiation of hostilities really by the bloc at the present time. It covers the water front. It covers strikes; it covers the propaganda of the Soviet

orbit; it covers all kinds of things that are indicators, but in the end it concludes there are no indications that the Soviet Union is planning to initiate hostilities with its own forces in the immediate future.

MR. MCKEE: That is because the mission of the Watch Committee at present is very explicit, and, therefore, it comes to grips --

MR. TRUEHEART: Yes --

MR. MCKEE: As I listen to this discussion I wonder if what is here under 2, a of Functions may be somewhere in the Mission too with respect to intentions to initiate hostilities in these three respects, if that isn't chiefly the mission of the Watch Committee, and what is being discussed is these other activities for b are really indications of the intentions which are set forth in a, that they are not our concern except insofar as they point towards this possible initiation of hostilities.

MR. TRUEHEART: I would be happy to see b dropped altogether as far as that goes.

MR. MCKEE: Because all of those activities, for instance, which have been mentioned in connection with b are invariably included in all lists of indications of either long- or short-range preparations for hostilities. It seems to me they are indications of the thing in which we are primarily interested.

DR. REICHARDT: Wasn't part of this raised? For instance, the Watch Committee always looks at the situation in Indo-China. As I recollect, some of this was raised on the basis that we were wondering . . . there was always a question as to whether Indo-China should be specifically in the Conclusions, or whether some reference to Indo-China should be in the Conclusions, which it is not at the present time on the basis of the present Terms of Reference. It was just a question of perhaps Indo-China is not really important, but it might at some particular time become a situation which would.

MR. SHELDON: Well, there is a very live question, however, which has to be considered, and that is whether or not Chinese Communist forces may be employed to assist Ho Chi Minh and his Viet Minh activities directly.

TOP SECRET

MR. MCKEE: Chuck, coming back to the present mission, which is that of dealing with indications of intentions to initiated hostile action -- Soviet/ Communist intentions of hostile action -- you have already had the hostile action initiated in Indo-China, and the question has been raised in the past in the Watch Committee as to how far it should review and analyze current operations involving the Communists in any part of the world, and there have been some members of the Committee who have raised the question of the correctness of that. For instance, at one time operations in Korea were followed very closely by the Committee, and some persons wondered just how that squared with the mission of the Committee to detect these intentions of hostile action. There was no doubt that the hostile action was a fact.

COLONEL WALLACE: Well, I think what we were particularly looking for there was whether they would be stepped up to a much greater scale or not too. We had this long period of a year or so without much going on, and we were always concerned whether there would be a major effort made which would catch us off balance and perhaps be a prelude to driving us out of Korea. That was the burning concern of everybody responsible for security and welfare of the United States, and we wondered whether it should gravitate, particularly to the Watch Committee.

MR. TRUEHEART: Well, I have agreed that present 2,a is requiring the Watch Committee to draw some conclusions each week with respect to whether the Viet Minh is going to launch this attack on the Delta, for example. They discuss that, but they don't put it in their conclusions today, but I would say it was included under 2,a,2 -- "Soviet/Communist intentions to initiate hostilities against the U.S. allies or their forces" and that, therefore, you would have a conclusion on the Indo-China thing.

DR. REICHARDT: Right, well, Indo-China is probably a bad point, but we would leave it out if we cut it down to 2,a strictly. We would leave out some area, and I am lost right now to think of one . . . well, no, let us say something happens in the Belgian Congo which is of very much importance to my organization.

TOP SECRET

MR. KUHRTZ: Take British Guiana right now.

DR. REICHARDT: It is not covered in 1, 2, or 3.

MR. TRUEHEART: It is very important, and there are a lot of things terribly important the Watch Committee is not responsible for.

DR. REICHARDT: I thought the feeling that was being developed in the Committee earlier was some of these we should leave for consideration, and something like b was put in there as an additional little thing.

MR. SHELDON: That is why b is in there.

DR. REICHARDT: That is right, and so now we are taking it out again without providing a substitute.

MR. SHELDON: I don't think we are taking it out, no.

DR. REICHARDT: No, we are considering the fact as to whether we should consider those things again, you see, and --

MR. SHELDON: Just for those very good reasons. Well, let's return to the issue that is before us here now. I take it, Bill, you have expressed yourself as feeling that this is perhaps a little too broad?

MR. TRUEHEART: I think it is not a bit too broad if you are talking about indicators. I think if you are talking about conclusions or the ultimate objective of the Committee, then it is too broad, yes.

GENERAL LEWIS: The ultimate objective?

MR. TRUEHEART: Objective of the Committee which, as I see it, is imminence of hostilities.

GENERAL LEWIS: On these things?

MR. TRUEHEART: These are indicators all of them which must be considered in arriving at a conclusion as to whether or not hostilities are imminent.

GENERAL LEWIS: Right.

MR. TRUEHEART: But it is not the function of the Committee in my view to report on the imminence of these things, if you follow me.

GENERAL LEWIS: Without any relation to imminence of hostilities?

MR. TRUEHEART: Right.

GENERAL LEWIS: But we have tied in this, as I see it, the fact that we

TOP SECRET

are talking about imminence of hostilities.

MR. TRUEHEART: If that is made clear, then I don't have any quarrel with these things.

GENERAL LEWIS: That is what I am thinking about, and if it isn't clear, let's make it clear, but I am thinking about imminence of hostilities in connection with these things.

MR. SHELDON: That is right; that is my understanding. That is the context in which I attack this paper.

MR. TRUEHEART: Yes, but the way this would fit it in, seems to me is this. The Watch Committee analyzes information and is developing conclusions as to 2,a, all of those things in 2,a, and then 2,b, you see, in effect specifically includes the following types of hostile actions, so I would say the Watch Committee had to develop under this a conclusion as to whether mass strikes of Communist instigation were in prospect anywhere in the world, and I don't think they have to do that.

MR. SHELDON: That is not what your Function says. Your Function says an act, let's call that mass strikes, "susceptible of exploitation by Soviet/ Communist military or paramilitary action" -- as we now have it written -- "which would jeopardize the security of the United States." That doesn't in any way as I read it make it incumbent on the Watch Report to include an estimate as to whether there is going to be a mass strike in Italy or France tomorrow.

MR. TRUEHEART: No, well, I will buy 2,b as it is written. I am satisfied with 2,b.

MR. SHELDON: Yes, but I don't think that forces the Watch Report to contain a crystal gaze into a mass strike next week in France.

MR. TRUEHEART: I don't think it does either, and, as I say, I am satisfied with 2,b.

GENERAL LEWIS: The thing that is concerning you is this isn't clearly enough labeled -- imminence of hostilities?

MR. TRUEHEART: Yes.

GENERAL LEWIS: All right, then I think we ought to look at the piece of

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

paper, the consolidation of the whole business, to see whether or not the imminence of hostilities label is on it in such a way that someone could get outside of the imminence of hostilities field and do something separately because that wouldn't be my intent at all.

MR. KUERTZ: Pardon me for breaking in, General. Before you go into that I would like to explore Bill's point just a little further and see if this is in line with your thinking. I don't know for sure in my own mind, and I would like to clarify it. The imminence of these indicators, we will call them, is the agency's responsibility. In other words, they are responsible for considering the raw material to determine whether they are imminent, leading towards hostile action. Once that is determined by the agency, then it is a matter of calling it to the attention of the watch structure, or do you mean for the watch structure to have in its files all the raw material going back which may not indicate imminence of these towards hostile action, but once that is raised by the agency who reviews the raw material, the watch structure should have all of that background to also consider it along with the Agency responsible for it?

MR. TRUEHEART: Well, that I think is a separate question of how the Committee operates and specifically how the Center operates, whether they have raw information themselves or whether they get it through only when given to them by the Agency is a separate question which we were going to come to today, but it looks like we are not making it.

DR. REICHARDT: Well, I --

MR. TRUEHEART: This is purely a pretty abstract question really of just what answers the Committee is supposed to provide each week or however often it meets.

MR. KUERTZ: Maybe I am going around it the back way, but I will withdraw it then until we can come up with something rather than hold this point we are working on at the moment.

MR. TRUEHEART: Let's take Oak Ridge, for example. I think that would be a mighty significant indicator, a strike at Oak Ridge, but I don't think it is up to the Atomic Energy Commission to tell them a strike is coming off at

TOP SECRET

GENERAL LEWIS: I certainly had no idea that they would.

MR. TRUEHEART: Then we are in complete agreement. I think we have to be careful we don't put something in here which leads the Watch Committee to think they are being looked to for that kind of thing.

GENERAL LEWIS: I think it would be mighty presumptuous if they did.

COLONEL WALLACE: The expression up here, the first part of 2 -- "to develop therefrom the conclusions" -- covered the point we had in mind. We might consider this and develop therefrom the conclusion as to whether it was or was not a preliminary to hostilities, and it wouldn't be beyond our shoulder in the Watch Committee to predict such strikes or some other events. That is the way I understand it.

MR. TRUEHEART: I am just afraid if we aren't careful in this b, if we get it into all kinds of things that are not military or paramilitary that we will be by that fact imposing such responsibility on the Watch Committee.

MR. KUHERTZ: I agree with you. That has been concerning me.

MR. SHELDON: In other words, the question does "a Soviet/Communist intentions to initiate hostilities" also govern b? That is really what is bothering us, isn't it?

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, maybe so, but I think that the statement in 2 is not clearly labeled as imminence of hostilities. In other words, if something in words in 2 made it clear that the things below were tied to imminence of hostilities -- of course, the whole paper is about imminence of hostilities and warning, you see, but now if you want to pin it down some more, then I think we could put some words right in here that would make it very clear that we are talking about imminence of hostilities. Would that do it?

MR. TRUEHEART: Well, I think it would.

MR. SHELDON: Let's try that because certainly that is the intent. Heavens, there is no question on that score.

MR. TRUEHEART: I hope it is nothing but a semantic difficulty.

MR. SHELDON: I think it is. I think that is what it is.

MR. TRUEHEART: You can see why I am concerned that you could diffuse this thing hopelessly.

MR. SHELDON: My immediate attack on this paper was to put it back in the context of military strategy. Our thinking is the same, I think.

MR. TRUEHEART: Yes.

COLONEL WALLACE: May I pose something here? Would the inclusion of b up in that Preamble to 2 itself do it? It would be a little weird wording here, but it leads off "to analyze and evaluate information . . . and to develop therefrom the conclusions as to" these, and then 1, 2, 3 under a.

GENERAL LEWIS: I didn't quite get that.

COLONEL WALLACE: This one 27 November.

MR. MCKEE: He is raising the question as to whether or not b is not inherent in that first statement.

COLONEL WALLACE: Yes, it is among the things we examine, and from all of that determine the 1, 2, 3 items under a you see there.

MR. MCKEE: It is information on these activities which we are discussing which are of pertinence to this first and primary objective.

MR. TRUEHEART: I think historically what we are trying to get at in b is something which would enable us to discuss something like Trieste.

DR. REICHARDT: Yes.

MR. TRUEHEART: And I am afraid that wouldn't be possible if you didn't have something like b.

MR. SHELDON: I think Millard's suggestion that we clearly label the imminence of hostilities aspect of this thing in 2 would come nearest to solving the problem at this time. Have you got any words that you would like to propose that will open the road block?

GENERAL LEWIS: Not that won't do violence to what we already have. You can either put words in there, or you can refer back to b, but really what we are seeking is something which would be a substitute for the words "imminence of hostilities" which aren't particularly good words. As a matter of fact, there aren't any other good substitutes for those few words. You might tie it to the accomplishment of the mission stated in B above, pin it down, but that is awkward. I think whatever we want to put goes after

"furnished by the IAC Agencies", and then describe --

MR. SHELDON: With respect to imminence --

GENERAL LEWIS: With respect to, or on so and so.

MR. SHELDON: Relating to imminence of --

GENERAL LEWIS: Relating to would be fine.

MR. SHELDON: That would pin point that.

GENERAL LEWIS: Yes.

MR. SHELDON: Why don't we try that out on the piano, something like "relating to imminence of hostilities"?

MR. TRUEHEART: How is this going to fit in?

MR. SHELDON: Well, we are just suggesting tentatively that we look at this on the basis of after the word "Agencies" in the second line of 2 we insert "relating to imminence of hostilities".

GENERAL LEWIS: I can think of nothing better at the moment.

MR. SHELDON: And tentatively let's try that out on the piano. Does that help you, Bill, on that?

MR. TRUEHEART: Let's see, that comes in the Preamble, and "relating to" modifies "information" and "intelligence"?

MR. SHELDON: Yes.

MR. TRUEHEART: And then what do you do about b?

MR. SHELDON: Nothing.

MR. TRUEHEART: You leave b like it is?

GENERAL LEWIS: You have labeled everything under the heading of paragraph 2 as relating to imminence of hostilities, and I thought that was what you were interested in doing.

MR. SHELDON: Your a and b is governed by that tag.

MR. TRUEHEART: Does that mean you would then accept military or paramilitary down in b?

MR. SHELDON: No, no, no, no.

MR. TRUEHEART: That is still --

MR. SHELDON: This is to try to help you over the hurdle of this paper, see.

MR. TRUEHEART: Where does this paper fit in at this point?

MR. SHELDON: We are trying to be sure that we know what we are all talking about when we use given phrases, and presumably we would revert later on to the possibility of inserting military, paramilitary, military support action or subversive action in your mission, you see, and then have an appendix which elaborated on those words. That is what we are trying to do here.

The question that General Lewis raised was whether if we were to put those two additional adjectives or labels in the mission we would have one mind as to approximately what we meant by those words, and he presented this paper to indicate what he meant by those words. Query: Are we in unison or are we at a tangent?

MR. TRUEHEART: Well, I would like to see a little more how it goes along. Offhand I am inclined --

MR. SHELDON: Tentatively let's do it this way. The Mission then would presumably at some point read "to provide earliest possible warning to U. S. Government of military, paramilitary, military support and subversive action" or words to that effect.

MR. TRUEHEART: Where is this thing in the Mission?

MR. SHELDON: Mission?

MR. TRUEHEART: You are back up to Mission?

MR. SHELDON: Back in B.

GENERAL LEWIS: You have to make the change in two places.

MR. SHELDON: That is the first place the change is made.

GENERAL LEWIS: Remember we discussed the fact you couldn't just make the change down in paragraph 2,C. You have to make it in B as well.

MR. TRUEHEART: And how would that read, the Mission, now?

MR. SHELDON: "To provide earliest possible warning to the United States Government of military, paramilitary, military support and subversive action" or words to that effect. And then you would have that noted as being elaborated and defined in the appendix, the appendix being something in the light of this paper something which would be represented by a paper of this sort.

TOP SECRET

MR. TRUEHEART: Offhand it seems to me if you put that in the Mission you have really thrown it wide open to --

MR. SHELDON: No, because --

GENERAL LEWIS: You are limited by imminence of hostilities.

DR. REICHARDT: You still have to indicate your imminence in the Mission.

MR. TRUEHEART: Yes, where would you put imminence of hostilities in the Mission?

MR. SHELDON: The Mission is to provide earliest possible warning, and then the question is How do you do that? And you do it by putting a lot of requirements and having a lot of material come in, and analyze it, but that material is directed towards the imminence of hostilities, and then you turn around, and after you have looked at all of that material, which deals with, we hope, the imminence of hostilities aspect of information and intelligence, you then examine it in the light of whether that material indicates or does not indicate the possibility of hostilities being initiated against 1, 2, 3 under a.

GENERAL LEWIS: You see, your limiting factor in your Mission statement is "endangers the security of the United States".

MR. TRUEHEART: Yes, and that phrase is not very limiting to me.

DR. REICHARDT: No, you still have to have imminence in there.

MR. TRUEHEART: I think that would include your strike at Oak Ridge right down -- I mean I think if you put that in the mission, endangering anything . . . what was it? . . . subversive . . . endangering the security of the United States . . . I think you would be right smack into strikes in key facilities in the U.S., for example.

GENERAL LEWIS: Remember when we talked about the mission we said we were going to make a general statement in the mission and not try to spell it out in detail in that one statement, but we would spell out what we were talking about under Functions.

MR. SHELDON: That is just what we have done.

GENERAL LEWIS: That is just exactly what we have done. We were spelling

TOP SECRET

out what we were talking about, but now we have come to the fact we can't spell it out enough because military and paramilitary aren't good enough words, so we have to go farther than that. We have to go to an appendix and start what we are talking about, but it is unfortunate, but I think that is just the way it is.

MR. SHELDON: You see the words that are put down here are really operating guidelines, as I would understand these definitions, to assist the Working Group and the Watch Committee in deciding what "indicators" they will discuss and deal with and subsequently reach conclusions on.

I don't think we are apart on the philosophy at all as I remembered the Committee. It is a question of saying it in a manner that reflects that concept.

Mr. Dulles intends to get the blessing of the NSC on this whole program. There is no question about that.

DR. REICHARDT: I am still worried, as I think Bill is, that we don't have an "imminence" phrase again in the Mission. "The earliest possible warning" doesn't . . . I mean that just says that we have warned people earlier; it doesn't say of what getting back to the question I raised earlier.

MR. SHELDON: Yes, we do say what; we say of military or paramilitary.

DR. REICHARDT: Right.

MR. TRUEHEART: And what else?

MR. SHELDON: Well, then we are talking about adding the phrase "sub-
versive and military support action".

25X1B

25X1B DR. REICHARDT:

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, actually what he is saying, "which endangers the security of the United States", doesn't mean imminence of hostilities to him, you see.

MR. SHELDON: Yes, of course, it does mean that to me, but there we are; it is a semantic problem.

DR. REICHARDT: It is a semantic problem really, and I am afraid that someone reading this, you see, can forget about the imminence part of it because espionage no matter how that endangers the security of the United States --

MR. TRUEHEART: To look back at this very good Preamble which seems to set the tone at least of what I think would be the Mission of the Committee: "Recognizing the implications of a surprise attack on the United States".

MR. SHELDON: That immediately spells out imminence.

MR. TRUEHEART: Yes, that somehow or other I almost would like to see put down as the Mission of this Committee.

GENERAL LEWIS: Except I don't like the word "surprise". Never have from the time I looked at it because you are talking about 24 or 48 hours instead of this one, two weeks, or maybe a month or so that we are, you see, so "surprise" is too narrow in time, you see.

MR. SHELDON: What would happen if we put in "imminent attack" there?

GENERAL LEWIS: We will get to that eventually, but I think all of this just shows the inadequacy of words, and also that if you make something general it is going to be open to interpretation, so what are we trying to do? We are trying to make that general and still specific at the same time, and the two just don't go along together very well, you see, and they just aren't . . . they don't go hand in hand.

MR. SHELDON: Well, let's get back to this other paper again here. Let me ask this question. If the context of imminence of hostilities is adequately reflected in the paper as a whole, would then the definitions as posed by General Lewis meet with your favor as a whole?

MR. KUHERTZ: Well, I would certainly have to go along with that statement, sure.

DR. REICHARDT: I think so.

MR. SHELDON: That is the whole intent here that the context of this paper should reflect imminence of hostility, but it should reflect the context of the military strategy of the opposing forces. Then with that in mind,

insuring that we reflect that adequately in the paper, then are these definitions broadly speaking in tune with your concept of it?

MR. TRUEHEART: Except I don't think they are broad enough.

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, that is one thing I would like to ask. Now I would very much appreciate since, of course, we have only been working on this thing a week, and without getting into an argument about whether you call it -- put it under one heading or another -- I mean there we get into endless arguments about what is the label you put on it, but generally I would like with regard to the types of actions if you all will get your people to challenge this and see if we have included generally all the types of actions. Then I think that we can refine this paper over a period of time from week to week so it probably will reflect pretty nearly all the things that we generally have in mind in connection with this activity. I have never seen anything exactly like this before and approaching it from the standpoint of types of actions, and I think maybe it might be constructive.

MR. SHELDON: It is unquestionably constructive in addition to which it is going to assist in the developing of the Indicator List because it is again a guideline to that.

GENERAL LEWIS: And I am sure that you all can make substantial contributions to the improvement of it. Of course, it may be that we ought to rearrange what goes under what and under some other label, but I think that is beside the point at the moment. The point is generally have we included all the types of action that we are concerned with here and under "imminence of hostilities".

MR. TRUEHEART: In general it leaves out all the political and military kinds of things that you would want on an Indicator List, political and economic kind of things that you want on an Indicator List. That is why I think it is important we address this either as an Indicator List or something else.

MR. SHELDON: Well, that raised the question as to whether or not we want to try to define the word "military" in addition to defining the gray areas of subversive act or a military support action.

MR. TRUEHEART: Have you ever looked at any of the Indicator Lists that have been drawn up in the past for the Watch Committee and previous --

GENERAL LEWIS: Pardon me, say that again.

MR. TRUEHEART: Have you looked at any of the old Indicator Lists that were drawn up for the Watch Committee and predecessors?

GENERAL LEWIS: Here?

MR. TRUEHEART: Here in Washington, yes.

25X1C

25X1C

GENERAL LEWIS: We used . . . in the revision of the lists in Europe, we used all the ones we could get our hands on, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] They have a list, the first one which I saw in 1949, but I am not intimately familiar with the one here.

Well, I had two others that I didn't include because they were too controversial, and they are fuzzy. They are not as clean, and they are hard to describe, but one of them is political warfare action.

MR. TRUEHEART: Well --

GENERAL LEWIS: And another one is what you might call a form of psychological warfare action, but those . . . when you begin to talk about psychological, it is so fuzzy to start with, and then when you try to define exactly what you are talking about under it, it is so muddy that you see nothing clear at all, but I didn't include these two because I thought we wanted to be perfectly clean on what we were talking about, but I have been too clean now, you see. I have been so clean that I haven't made you happy.

MR. TRUEHEART: Well, if you are talking about an Indicator List, yes, you have been too clean, but if you are talking about the Mission of the Watch Committee, you have been as dirty as hell.

GENERAL LEWIS: You see, I think the thing that we haven't convinced you yet is that there has to be a very direct relationship between the Statement of Mission and your Indicator List. I don't see how you can separate the two because actually what you use as indicators you are going to depend upon what you state in the Mission as the scope, you see.

MR. TRUEHEART: Well --

GENERAL LEWIS: I think it is inseparable.

MR. TRUEHEART: Certainly the Indicator List is going to depend upon what you say in the scope, but I think all of these things would be included in the Indicator List. Given the present scope, the present version of the scope, all the things you have here and many others would be included in the Indicator List, given the scope now set forth or set forth before this discussion today. If you use this as the scope, the Indicator List for this scope would be unmanageable in my opinion.

MR. MCKEE: And also there are some omissions, one of which you mentioned, particularly political developments and psychological warfare developments. For instance, in retrospect it would seem that the action which led to the invasion of Poland by Germany was the consummation of a treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union seven days before the invasion. That was the tip-off of the invasion and not the part of the treaty that was made public to the world that seems to make a green light, but the secret provision made it clear as crystal what was going to happen.

May I ask a question with respect to this sheet of definitions?

MR. SHELDON: Surely.

MR. MCKEE: Am I correct in understanding that these are definitions of words which are going to appear under Functions in paragraph 2, b, and also in the Mission, and I am not sure of the words which it is intended to insert, and I want to be able to tell General Willems that, and I am not quite sure I understand which words are to be inserted, or is that something to come later?

MR. SHELDON: We are looking for the right words. As Millard says, he is not positive that the labels he has put under 2, a, b, c, d are the final word in what should be included.

MR. MCKEE: I see, this is something in illustration of the principle.

MR. SHELDON: The Committee is open for suggestions as to what words should be put in under the Mission and under paragraph 2 which then would be defined.

MR. MCKEE: Right, in order not --

MR. SHELDON: In an agreed manner and be subject to an appendix which would be the clarification and the guidelines for the operation of the Committee when they were examining and wondering just what those words meant.

MR. MCKEE: In the course of our discussion then not even tentative conclusions have been reached as to which words they would be?

MR. SHELDON: No; in other words, the next meeting would start out in effect by "Let's see what the best words are that can do the trick for us."

GENERAL LEWIS: So far we have discussed three possibilities, and let's summarize here -- three possibilities. You could replace all of these words with a general statement such as "hostile actions" or "actions". You could get generally the same effect by adding in the case of the Mission statement "or other hostile actions", and in the case of the 2,b, whatever it is, you would add "or other actions". Or you could try and get an agreement on these titles here and put all those titles in there as he suggested, which I think would be more difficult because actually all I am trying to do without establishing a precedent or any sort of specific definitions is to tell people in general what the scope of this thing is, you see, and there are going to be guidelines because this isn't going to include all the examples. This is going to say generally the types of action we are thinking about, are this type, and this type, and this type, and this type, and here are some examples under each, but I think that will be a good enough guide to generally define the scope, you see, to outline the scope of this whole affair, and that will certainly be open to interpretation. I don't think there is any way in the world short of the Indicator List that you can outline in specific detail, and even then you won't because the Indicator List will be subject . . . Each indicator is subject to a great many subject indicators, you see, so this is just an attempt to generalize the type of actions that we are thinking about as being a part of this entire function.

MR. SHELDON: Yes, we have a minor time problem here. This room has to be used for another purpose at 12:30, and I think this is perhaps a good stopping place. I think everybody understands what the problem is, and I guess

we will all try to do a little homework before your next meeting in the early part of January. And this time I can wish you a Happy Christmas and Merry New Year.

GENERAL LEWIS: Might I ask that you attempt . . . would you care to do this . . . would you attempt to put another subparagraph or two under this to take care of the things that you would be concerned with -- the type of actions that you would be concerned with -- such as political and economic or possibly psychological?

MR. TRUEHEART: Well --

GENERAL LEWIS: So that we can get on with the development of the types of actions?

MR. TRUEHEART: Well, I --

GENERAL LEWIS: I think you are the best qualified because --

MR. TRUEHEART: I could do that, and I think substantially it is all done in the form of our Indicator List, but I really am . . . I must have a mental block on this. I can't see these as Functions, or as Mission, or as a Statement of Mission of the Watch Committee.

MR. SHELDON: It is not intended as that. There is a misunderstanding here. This is a clarification of a broad statement; in other words, if we were to take one attack on the problem and simply say "hostile acts" or "acts in general", you then have to define that so that you don't have the entire water front covered without some form of guidelines and definition, and this is intended as the compartmentation of an elaboration of the definition "hostile act".

MR. TRUEHEART: Well, if it is hostile acts, then I wouldn't want to include, for example, under this breaking off diplomatic relations. I don't think it is up to the Watch Committee to report on the imminence of the breaking of relations between the Soviet Union and --

GENERAL LEWIS: They wouldn't, but they would take cognizance of that if it pertained to imminence of hostilities.

MR. TRUEHEART: Yes.

GENERAL LEWIS: Right.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR. TRUEHEART: Which means it is an indicator.

MR. SHELDON: I think the difficulty here that we are having lies in how you are going to use this information or whether it is incumbent upon the Watch Committee to report on or to be responsible for foreseeing, and that is not the intent at all. It can't be. We are talking about tools that you are going to use.

MR. TRUEHEART: Yes.

MR. SHELDON: Indicators are tools, sure, but you still have to have a definition which gives you the scope of the watch function, and that is all we are trying to arrive at.

MR. TRUEHEART: Well, I will certainly do some homework on it and try to come up with something. I am not sure that I . . . I would just want to add two paragraphs to this.

CAPTAIN ELLER: One point I think might tie in on the subject. The word "indication" is not in the Mission as it is now drawn up, and we all agree that that is the Mission, is the study of indications, but we don't have it in the Mission. Now it would fit in there, "indications of military or paramilitary action", and I really think sooner or later that we will want to put it in there, but it is a little puzzling to me as to just exactly how the thing will work out without that word in there.

MR. KUERTZ: That is a good point.

CAPTAIN ELLER: I think everyone agrees that is one of the key words we are discussing, and when we leave it out we run into all kinds of bottlenecks I am afraid.

MR. SHELDON: I think that is a good thought. We are all having a hell of a lot of trouble with words. That is our big problem.

DR. REICHARDT: We have developed a little better what we tried to indicate in the first paragraph of the Mission, and perhaps if we all sit down and hit it, one of us may come up with a draft, and --

MR. SHELDON: We all ought to do some homework, I am sure. Thank you all very much, gentlemen.

TOP SECRET

(There being no further business to come before the Committee,
the meeting adjourned at 12:30 P.M.)