

White House  
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22 April 1954

Mr. Arthur Minnich  
Executive Office of the President  
The White House  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Minnich:

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[Redacted]

has told me of the questions raised at today's

White House Staff briefing, and I believe the attached papers

may be of some assistance to you.

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[Large Redacted Area]

I feel that any short answer to such a complex question as EDC may well stand some amplification. If you agree, Governor Adams may be interested in seeing a more complete statement of EDC prospects also attached hereto.

HUNTINGTON D. SHELDON

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## THE OUTLOOK FOR EDC

Of the six signatories of the EDC treaty only the French and Italian governments have not yet ratified, and both the Laniel and Scelba governments seem intent on bringing EDC to a vote in their respective parliaments in the coming months. The crux of the remaining problem is whether either is capable of doing so without provoking a lengthy political crisis which would kill the treaty.

Most Frenchmen now accept the inevitability of German rearmament and there is probably a majority for EDC in the National Assembly. The government expects to meet the main ratification precondition by achieving a Saar settlement with Chancellor Adenauer before 18 May. This will be difficult to accomplish without American and British pressure. While the government plans to request the assembly's steering committee to schedule debate on EDC for 25 May, without definite assurance of a Saar settlement the committee may balk. In any event, ratification depends on the Socialist Party offsetting defections in the government parties caused by the growing anti-EDC campaign which was highlighted by the Marshal Juin affair. While Laniel and Bidault have been proceeding on the assumption that Mollet can obtain a disciplined vote by the Socialist assembly bloc, a majority of the Socialist deputies are on record objecting to the enforcement of party discipline on this issue.

When the assembly reconvenes on 4 May the Gaullists will attempt to postpone debate and might even bring about the government's downfall, with a resulting critical delay. A more serious threat would be a Communist offer at Geneva to end the Indochina war in exchange for French rejection of EDC. In any event, procedural delays and the desire to defer final action until the general tenor of the Geneva conference is evident are likely to postpone the debate until June.

The EDC draft treaty was presented to the Italian parliament on 6 April, but is expected to remain in committee for from four to six months in view of previous parliamentary business and the August recess. The government parties are solidly behind the treaty but are maintaining their precarious majority in both houses only with difficulty. Of the opposition parties, the Monarchists are currently vacillating, but may support EDC, particularly if there is a favorable Trieste settlement. Providing France ratifies the treaty, its eventual passage by the Italian parliament is likely, but by a thin margin.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
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Dec 31/54

27 JUL 1978  
THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION  
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THIS DOCUMENT.

Mr. A. W. Dulles

Dear Allen - I have

now read the first two copies  
of your "Critical Situations"  
a weekly report. I like the  
production, and think it should  
be helpful. Especially, I should  
think Goodpastor would find  
it useful with the P.

Happy New Year, with  
less critical situations

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*(Handwritten signature)*