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
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
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

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SUMMARY

Indochina



The Political Situation: The Vietnamese government's authority continues to deteriorate.



Chief of Staff Hinh is openly bidding for a dictator's role.



▼ [redacted] ▼

Bao Dai is continuing his tactic of purchasing support among dubious individuals and war lord groups rather than attempting to reform his government and obtain mass support. [redacted]

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A spurious "separatist movement" is being revived in Cochinchina.

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The political atmosphere in Laos and Cambodia is marked by continuing nervousness regarding the Viet Minh's next move.

Geneva Conference

The third week of the conference ended with a speech by Soviet foreign minister Molotov which was apparently designed to move the Communist position on Indochina nearer to that of the French and to strengthen the Communist negotiating position. The Communists' tactics seem also to be aimed at winning time for the Viet Minh forces to press their military advantage and at frustrating American efforts to achieve collective security in South-east Asia.

The Communists also continued to support the claim to legitimacy of the Communist puppet governments in Laos and Cambodia.

While avoiding any action which seems likely to produce a deadlock at Geneva or to provide grounds for American or United Nations intervention, the Communists appear confident that the course of events in Indochina and France will work to their advantage. They seem to anticipate that the fighting will continue simultaneously with negotiations for some time.

Chinese Communist premier Chou En-Lai played a minor role, confined largely to supporting the proposals presented by Molotov and the Viet Minh. Chou gave British foreign secretary Eden the impression he would like to know whether the UN would admit the Communist Chinese "if they behaved themselves."

Vietnamese chief of staff Bao Dai stated that he was alarmed by the French proposals for an armistice.

France continued to insist on negotiations for an armistice agreement, with provisions for international controls before a cease-fire is arranged.

Britain continued to act as spokesman for the Western Allies in dealing with the Communist delegations.

Policies, Propaganda and Opinions

To these diverse and in part threatening stimuli, governments and private citizens back home reacted variously.

In Communist countries, the propaganda stentor spoke with a single brazen voice, as usual. China is the exponent of nonaggression and peaceful coexistence throughout Asia, the voice proclaimed. "Bellicose elements" in the United States were the villains it anathematized, and it promised to teach them "new lessons" if they insisted on having their "bullheaded way."

In the free world, the response, being free, was diversified.

In France, Premier Laniel convoked the High Council of National Defense to consider "Draconian measures," and the National Assembly created a commission to inquire into Indochina affairs. The council decided to send 30,000 reinforcements to Indochina in the "immediate future."

The position of the cabinet continued to be precarious. Remaining in office by virtue of only a two-vote Assembly majority on 13 May, the cabinet faced the likelihood of a new crisis "this week," in the judgment of Deputy Foreign Minister Schumann. There was reason, moreover, to suppose that the next premier might be Pierre Mendes-France, who favors abandonment of Indochina.

In West Germany, already chafing under delays in French action on EDC, the prospect of further postponements which the Indochina crisis threatened to impose on French policy decisions seemed all but intolerable. Chancellor Adenauer sent word to High Commissioner Conant that he doubted his ability to go on cooperating with the Western allies on the present basis for more than a few more months.

In Britain, Prime Minister Churchill reaffirmed London's hope for an "acceptable" and effectively guaranteed settlement in Indochina but reiterated that until such a settlement is clearly seen to be unobtainable, Britain will make no final decision committing itself on a Southeast Asia defense system. Meanwhile London continued its efforts to strengthen its ties with the three Asian members of the Commonwealth--India, Pakistan and Ceylon--and with Burma and Indonesia, and to win them over to Western policies.

In the smaller free nations, there was a tendency to wait for the great powers to agree on united policies. Most seemed well disposed toward the West, but some also seemed naive and at least a few sharply criticized the United States and France.

In India, Prime Minister Nehru suggested a loose union between North and South Korea and the setting up of an authority to discuss political problems later, and proposed that the same principle be applied in Indochina. He did not suggest how the basic differences on the two areas could be reconciled.

In Indonesia, "Foreign Ministry circles" said that the thing most needed for the achieving of peace was the abolition of French colonialism.


In Thailand, the government stood firm, as it had done from the first. Foreign Minister Prince Wan agreed in principle at Geneva to an American suggestion that Thailand revive its plan of a year ago to appeal to the UN against Communist aggression in Laos. The French strongly opposed this plan when it was first put forward and the Thais dropped it at the suggestion of the United States.



In South Korea, President Rhee was bitter over the American proposal for a Southeast Asia defense system from which he would be excluded. Rhee said that first the United States "stole his idea" for an alliance "and then left him out and included weak sisters and colonial powers," according to Ambassador Dean.

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


Political

The Vietnamese government's authority continues to deteriorate, [redacted]

[redacted] Chief of Staff Hinh, openly bidding for a dictator's role, told American officials several days ago that he had sent an ultimatum to Bao Dai demanding control of the Ministries of Defense and Interior.

Bao Dai is continuing his tactic of purchasing support among dubious individuals and war lord groups rather than attempting to reform his government and obtain mass support for the anti-Communist effort. [redacted]



French delegates at the Geneva conference doubt that Bao Dai's return to Vietnam would bring any immediate improvement in the political situation there. These officials add that they prefer that Bao Dai stay near Geneva--he is now in the nearby French resort town of Evian--otherwise the Vietnamese delegation would hold up decisions at every point while awaiting instructions from Bao Dai. Moreover, in Saigon, the French counselor to the Vietnamese vice president doubts that Bao Dai can take control of the political situation after five years of what he termed a deliberate French policy of keeping Bao Dai dissipated, corrupt, and dependent on bad advice.

A particularly serious threat to the maintenance of some semblance of life in the Vietnam government is the tentative revival of the Cochinchina separatist

"movement," which actually consists of a handful of unpopular and self-seeking opportunists in the south. The scheme is to set up a separate "Cochinchina Republic" with the backing of powerful French interests there. Former premier Tam, who was associated with an earlier and abortive French-backed Cochinchina government, admits that he favors such a scheme and has been urged by certain Frenchmen to undertake it. Such a maneuver would be regarded as treasonable by the vast majority of Vietnamese.

Rapid progress is being made in the negotiation of conventions supplementing the recently drafted French-Vietnamese treaties of independence and association, according to an official of the French Foreign Ministry. He expects the conventions to be concluded within a matter of weeks.

Wilfred Burchett, Communist newsman now in Geneva, states that Ho Chi Minh personally briefed him on 1 April on the situation at Dien Bien Phu. A recent consensus of several Frenchmen who are well informed on Indochinese matters agrees that Ho is still alive.

The political atmosphere in Laos and Cambodia is marked by continuing nervousness regarding the Viet Minh's next move. The government of Laos has stated it will appeal to the United Nations if the Viet Minh again invades in force. General Tiou Long, the new Cambodian commander in chief, has set about energetically reorganizing his armed forces. Tense French-Cambodian relations were further strained by the failure of the French to accord Tiou Long appropriate honors when he recently called on Navarre.

GENEVA CONFERENCE

Communist Position

Molotov's Speech: The third week of the Geneva conference ended with a speech by Soviet foreign minister Molotov on 14 May which was apparently designed to move the Communist position on Indochina closer to that of the French and to strengthen the Communists' negotiating position. The Communists' tactics at Geneva seem also to be aimed at winning time for the Viet Minh forces to press their military advantage, and at frustrating American-led collective security efforts in Southeast Asia.

In his speech Molotov acknowledged that Viet Minh plans for an Indochina settlement did not provide for "appropriate" international supervision and proposed that a neutral nations supervisory commission be created to assist the parties "in implementing the terms of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities." He also accepted "in principle" Bidault's proposal that the agreements reached at Geneva should be guaranteed by the nine participants in the conference. Molotov's amendments slightly modified the Viet Minh plan but did not essentially alter its fundamental provisions, which, if accepted, would open the way for the extension of Viet Minh authority over all of Indochina.

The neutral supervision proposal apparently applies only to a cease-fire agreement. Molotov, while not mentioning the Viet Minh rejection of foreign supervision of elections in the three states, did endorse the Viet Minh plan for the formation of local commissions to prepare for and conduct such elections.

Similarly, while accepting the proposal that the Geneva participants guarantee the agreements reached by the conference, Molotov rejected the French concept of individual guarantees and spoke only of consultations on "collective measures to ensure the implementation of the agreement." This arrangement would enable the Communist participants to paralyze the enforcement machinery and would place the non-Communist powers in a position of guaranteeing a situation which they could not control.

Molotov appeared deliberately to have left uncertain the exact relationship between a cease-fire and a political settlement. The Communists have thus far suggested that the two questions are inseparable, and Molotov specifically rejected an armistice along the lines proposed by Bidault, that is, a military settlement apart from a political settlement. Nevertheless, Molotov was careful not to close the door to the possibility of serious cease-fire negotiations without complete agreement on a political settlement.

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Molotov said that the task of the Geneva conference is "to secure an early cessation of hostilities" and at the same time to reach such an agreement as would "make it possible to satisfy the legitimate demands of the peoples of Indochina." He specified that the drawback of Bidault's formula was that it did not deal with political problems and asserted that it is impossible to separate the termination of the war from the solution of "at least some" problems of this nature.

Molotov's formulation was evidently intended as an inducement to the French to open cease-fire negotiations and at the same time as a warning that the French would have to accept some part of the Communist terms as the price for a cease-fire. The Communists can be expected to press for acceptance of their maximum demands as expressed in the Viet Minh proposal of 10 May. If these are not met, however, Molotov's proposal leaves room to maneuver the negotiations toward a cease-fire based on the status quo.

Molotov also warned that the creation of a "new aggressive bloc" and the establishment of American bases in Southeast Asia "cannot be regarded indifferently by those states whose security is affected" by such plans and by extended American intervention in Indochina. The American delegation in Geneva commented that Molotov, by linking such threats with an apparent disposition to negotiate, hopes to exploit the negotiations to act as a brake against American efforts to organize collective security in Southeast Asia. The delegation judged that the

Communists believe, by combining these diplomatic tactics with full exploitation of military possibilities in Indochina, they can thwart American defensive efforts, as it would be difficult to build collective security in an atmosphere of defeat.

The Communists further continued to attempt to strengthen their bargaining position by supporting the claims to legitimacy of the Communist puppet governments in Laos and Cambodia. Molotov stated that "one cannot limit the question of the situation in Indochina to developments in Vietnam" and one Soviet commentary stated that "Khmer" (Cambodia) and "Pathet Lao" (Laos) participation at Geneva was "indispensable." The Communists apparently believe this issue will be an effective bargaining counter, but they have not yet attempted to use it to block the conference.

While the Communists are avoiding any action which seems likely to produce a deadlock at Geneva or to provide the United States with ground for United Nations or American intervention, they appear confident that the course of events in Indochina and France will work to their advantage. They appear to anticipate that fighting will continue simultaneously with negotiations for some time. This line was reflected in a Viet Minh commentary which stated, "We still remember the Korean lesson which taught us that one could negotiate and fight at the same time and that for two years."

Chinese Communist Role: Premier Chou En-lai played a minor role in the conference, confined largely to supporting the proposals presented by the Viet Minh and by Molotov. He told Foreign Secretary Eden on 14 May that China wished to obtain recognition as a great power but "was not making this a condition for any settlement." While the term "UN" was never mentioned in the conversation, Eden inferred from Chou's remarks and general approach that he was asking obliquely whether the Chinese would be admitted to the UN if they behaved.

Viet Minh Role: Since the presentation of their 10 May armistice proposal at Geneva, the Viet Minh representatives seem to have retired, leaving their case to Molotov's sponsorship. Under Secretary Smith reported that on one occasion Molotov, looking at the Viet Minh

[REDACTED]

delegates, pointedly expressed his understanding that both the French and the Viet Minh would do everything to facilitate contacts in the field and at Geneva on the problem of evacuation of the Dien Bien Phu wounded, and the Viet Minh delegate nodded agreement to his statement.

Molotov on 15 May suggested direct French contact with the Viet Minh delegation at Geneva as well as field negotiations on the question of evacuation of wounded.

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Vietnamese Position

Bao Dai told Ambassador Heath on 16 May that he was alarmed by the French proposals for an armistice, that Vietnam should not be bound by these terms, and that Vietnam was willing to fight on to the end. He said he intended to approach the French government to determine whether French forces would continue to fight on alongside the Vietnam army.

Bao Dai also stated that an unspecified former minister of his had received a request for an interview from Phan Anh of the Viet Minh delegation, and that Bao Dai had encouraged this meeting, thinking that Phan Anh and other Viet Minh officials might want to defect to his government.

Cambodian and Laotian Positions

The Laotian and Cambodian representatives at Geneva have adopted the position that since they are the legal governments of their respective territories, there is no need to hold the elections called for in the Viet Minh proposal. At the 17 May session the Laotian delegate

stressed the importance of treating Laos and Cambodia separately in a working subcommittee of the conference and achieving a cease-fire as soon as possible.

French Position

France continues to maintain its original position demanding negotiations on an armistice agreement with internationally supervised controls set up before a cease-fire is arranged, but Bidault is continuing his efforts to keep the negotiations open, particularly on the immediate problem of evacuation of the wounded from Dien Bien Phu. In the restricted Indochina session on 17 May, he agreed with Molotov's suggestion that contact between delegations interested in this problem might be maintained at Geneva while the details of evacuation were worked out in the field. Bidault asked the Viet Minh delegate to designate a representative with whom France might pursue the problem.

British Position

As the Indochina conference moved into restricted sessions, Britain continued to serve as spokesman for the Western Allies in dealing with the Communist side. In his capacity as co-chairman of the conference, Foreign Secretary Eden on 16 May approached Chou En-lai on ways of hastening concrete negotiations, and suggested the restricted sessions. Eden also adverted to the dangers of Viet Minh insistence on "too much" in the way of Communist gains through an Indochina settlement, and reportedly also cautioned Chou about pushing the United States "too far."

SOVIET BLOC PROPAGANDA

Soviet Union

Molotov's speech on 14 May was given heavy coverage. Comment on the speech quoted Molotov's warning that the ending of hostilities in Indochina must not be turned into a cleverly arranged breathing space for one of the sides which wished to extend the war. The press and radio criticized Bidault's proposal as dealing only with conditions for a cease-fire, "leaving the burning problems of a political settlement to a distant and undetermined future," in the words of one commentator. "It is clear that the stopping of the prolonged war in Indochina cannot be separated from the settlement of at least a few problems of this type."

Moscow media also criticized American official sources for alleging that the USSR and Communist China were interfering in Indochina; this charge is designed to justify American intervention, Communist propaganda asserted.

Pravda correspondents writing from Geneva accused the West of conducting secret negotiations for an extension of the fighting at the very time that the first closed meetings at Geneva promised progress. Secretary of State Dulles' maneuvers against peace were the subject of most East European Satellite comment. The Americans are being frustrated by British opposition and by an awakened public opinion, this comment declared.

Soviet propaganda continued to emphasize the "legitimacy" of the three Communist governments in Indochina. Pravda asserted that the "people of Khmer consider the resistance government, headed by Son Ngok Min, their only legal government" and claimed that the "liberated regions" in Khmer now run in a wide belt from the border of southern Vietnam to the Khmer-Thai border. Another Pravda article--captioned "the people of Pathet Lao insist on their national rights"--asserted that the "liberated regions constitute more than half the country" and half the total population.

Communist China

Peiping's propaganda on Indochina has continued to portray China as the exponent of nonaggression and peaceful coexistence throughout Asia, a theme also stressed by Chou in his conversation with Eden. The Asian collective pact suggested by Chou on 28 April has received little propaganda play. Peiping has continued to attack the United States for "wrecking" the Geneva conference and has warned that if "bellicose elements" in the United States have their "bullheaded" way, they will be taught "telling lessons."

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FREE WORLD POLICIES AND OPINIONS

France

Following Laniel's two-vote victory in the vote of confidence on 13 May, the French National Assembly adopted a resolution creating a commission representing all non-Communist parliamentary groups to examine Indochinese affairs. At the same time, Laniel called a special meeting of the High Council of National Defense--a body including the President of the Republic and the heads of the key civil and military departments--in order to consider what the premier in his speech to the Assembly on 13 May had termed "Draconian measures."

The council decided at its meetings on 14 and 15 May to send 30,000 reinforcements to Indochina in the "immediate future" and to send Generals Ely, Salan, and Pellissier to Indochina on a fact-finding mission. The generals are to establish a new "high military council" to replace the Navarre Plan and to be ready for action if the Viet Minh renews extensive military operations.

Virtually all Paris press comment agreed that Laniel had merely won a temporary respite on 13 May. Popular Republican Deputy Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann admitted he expects a new question of confidence this week.

The French consul general in New York, anticipating that Laniel would be defeated in the vote of confidence on 13 May, expressed to an American representative at the UN that day the opinion that the government would probably be replaced by a cabinet under Radical Socialist Pierre Mendes-France, who favors total abandonment of Indochina. In Paris, Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, publisher of the French weekly "L'Express," told Ambassador Dillon on 11 May that a group of deputies representing all non-Communist political parties hoped to replace Laniel with a government headed by Mendes-France. Servan-Schreiber said Laniel would fall as soon as "the immediate problem of Hanoi" is settled.

Mendes-France's chances, which were not destroyed by Laniel's 13 May victory, will probably be determined by members of his own party. While most Radical Socialists supported the government in the 13 May vote of confidence, they seem to have made an effort to rally support for him as a successor to Laniel. Many reject his economic program, however, and would probably desert him in a showdown; hence his actual prospects are probably poorer than they appear.

If, as the French press is speculating, Laniel's fall will be delayed until a successor acceptable to a majority of the assembly deputies is arranged, the premier may be able to hold on for several weeks. It is doubtful, however, that he can continue for long to use Geneva as an excuse to prolong his tenure.

Great Britain

In a House of Commons statement on 17 May, Prime Minister Churchill reaffirmed Britain's hope for an "acceptable" and effectively guaranteed settlement in Indochina, but reiterated that until such a settlement is clearly seen to be unobtainable, Britain will make no "final decisions" committing itself on a Southeast Asia defense system. There is every indication that he has the full support of public opinion in this position.

Meanwhile, Britain continues to exploit the opportunity provided by the Geneva conference and the crisis in Indochina to strengthen relations with the three Asian Commonwealth members--India, Pakistan and Ceylon--and Burma and Indonesia, in the hope that they can be persuaded to adopt policies more closely aligned with those of the West. In particular, London wants them to accept responsibility for supervising and guaranteeing a possible Indochina settlement. Foreign Secretary Eden has sent new personal messages to the Indian, Pakistani, and Ceylonese prime ministers, cautioning them that the Viet Minh proposals at Geneva, if adopted, would surely result in the eventual absorption of the Associated States by Communist puppets.

The American embassy in London has been informed that Eden attaches great importance to such informal and personal contacts with Asian leaders. The current presence of Malcolm MacDonald in Rangoon at the same time as Madame Pandit is probably related to the British effort. MacDonald is British commissioner general for Southeast Asia.

West Germany

Already chafing under what is considered long-drawn-out French obstructionism on EDC, West Germany found all but intolerable--and dangerous--the still further delays which the Indochina crisis threatened to impose on French policy on this as on other issues.

Chancellor Adenauer sent word to American high commissioner Conant in Bonn that he was under increasing pressure from party leaders and public opinion as a result of political developments in France, lack of progress and the discouraging outlook for the Paris and Bonn agreements, and the growing confusion and uncertainty in the international situation. The chancellor said he doubted his ability to continue to hold the line with the Western Allies for more than a few months on the present basis of their relations with Germany. Current indications were that he would be forced to raise these questions with the Allies this summer.

Australia and New Zealand

Australian minister of external affairs Casey called publicly on 15 May for a meeting of the American, British, Australian, New Zealand and French chiefs of staff for the purpose of reviewing the situation in Southeast Asia. Without committing Australia to any course of action, because of pending elections, Casey stated that the only effective means of preventing Communist expansion in Southeast Asia was through a system of collective security. He stressed the necessity of obtaining the support of governments in the area.

New Zealand's minister of external affairs, Clifton Webb, expressed himself in almost identical terms on 13 May. There was an urgent need for a Southeast Asian alliance, he said, and his government had no objection to opening discussions immediately.

India

Prime Minister Nehru, opening a foreign affairs debate in parliament on 15 May, said that Asia's future depends on what happens in Indochina and Korea. He suggested a loose union of North and South Korea with an authority created to discuss political problems later and proposed that the same principle be applied to Indochina if and when a cease-fire goes into effect there. In neither case did Nehru suggest how the basic East-West differences on the two areas could be reconciled.

He also stated, for the first time publicly, that India would consider a role in promoting peace settlements in Indochina and Korea. India was not "angling" for an invitation to Geneva, he said, but if asked could not avoid going and would "act as we did in Korea."

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The Australian delegation in Geneva told Under Secretary Smith on 16 May that the Indians are worried about the possibility that France might withdraw precipitately from Indochina.

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The Indian press asserted that Eden's proposals for Indochina represent the first genuine attempt to find the greatest common measure of agreement and argued that the proposals put Communist sincerity to a supreme test. The

Times of India on 14 May featured a Geneva dispatch headlined "India likely to head armistice body--Five-nation supervision in Indochina--Red approval of plan foreseen."

Pakistan

Pakistan has agreed to participate in a supervisory arrangement for Indochina if all parties, including the Communists, agree on a settlement, according to the British acting high commissioner in Karachi. Pakistan apparently is not averse to contributing troops for this purpose.

Burma

The Burmese continue to show deep concern over developments in Indochina. In commenting on the fall of Dien Bien Phu, the general consensus in the Rangoon press was that American prestige had suffered. The tone of the comments was, however, unmistakably sympathetic to the defenders and there were frequent admonitions to the West to close ranks and stand firm against the Communists. The American embassy in Rangoon also discerned--between the lines--a grim understanding of what might conceivably happen to Burma.

A recent Reuters dispatch reports "sources close to the government" have stated that Burma would consider with "great sympathy" a request from the Geneva powers to help guarantee peace in Indochina. The American embassy interprets this to mean that the Burmese assume such a request would be endorsed by "both sides" and there would be no need to violate Burma's neutral foreign policy.

The embassy feels that Burma would take part in an Indochina settlement only in concert with other Asian countries. Nevertheless, this report is a further indication of growing Burmese concern over the establishment of Communist control in Indochina and suggests a significant departure from Burma's strictly "hands-off" policy.

Indonesia

Press and official comment on Indochina has dropped off sharply. "Foreign Ministry circles" are reported by the press to be hopeful that the fall of Dien Bien Phu will hasten a cease-fire. These circles also reiterate the government line that the most important factor in achieving peace is the abolition of French colonialism.

Official comment has been directed primarily against American proposals for a united front in Southeast Asia. Foreign Minister Sunario stated in a speech on 11 May that an "independent" foreign policy which led to the loss of freedom would be useless and that any Southeast Asian defense arrangement should be composed only of countries in the area in order to prevent the return of colonialism.

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Philippines

Molotov's speech of 13 May, in which he made much of the victorious march of communism, was widely criticized by the Philippine press and radio, particularly because it contradicted Malenkov's assertion that "coexistence" is feasible. The Soviet foreign minister's proposal for an all-Asian alliance was also ridiculed in view of the fact that Communist China and the USSR were the only imperialist countries threatening the free countries of Asia.

While there was appropriate praise for the defenders of Dien Bien Phu, the French were accused in the press of being laggard in the granting of independence to the Associated States and thereby confusing the issue of democracy versus tyranny. Manila editors also indicated concern over what they considered to be Western vacillation and warned that the acceptance of any "compromise" plan would result in turning Indochina over to the

Communists or lead to an even greater war. There has been a general air of expectancy, however, regarding the development of an American-led collective defensive arrangement.

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Thailand

Prince Wan, the Thai foreign minister, who is in Geneva, has agreed in principle to a suggestion by Under Secretary Smith that Thailand revive its plan of a year ago to appeal to the United Nations against Communist aggression in Laos. He felt that his government would also agree, although there might be some question as to timing and it may desire to wait until new incidents occur. The original Thai plan was strongly opposed by the French and dropped at the suggestion of the United States.

Meanwhile, both the Thai and Chinese press in Bangkok called for Western unity and for action rather than words.

Japan

In Japan the press interpreted Dulles' 11 May statement that the defense of Southeast Asia is possible even if Indochina falls as a change by the United States to a "more elastic" policy reflecting the influence of British opinion. The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun fears the statement will weaken the French negotiating position.

Although Indochina does not play a major part in Japanese trade, a Communist victory there would strengthen current demands from both conservatives and leftists

for an accommodation with the Peiping regime for economic reasons. French high commissioner Dejean, who was ambassador to Japan until 1953, believes that Communist domination of Vietnam would bring about a change in Japanese policy in the direction of a rapprochement with Peiping.

Korea

Press reports indicate that President Rhee, during his talks with Defense Secretary Wilson, again demanded the inclusion of South Korea and Nationalist China in any Southeast Asian defense alliance. Rhee has been extremely bitter about South Korea's exclusion and, according to Ambassador Dean, considers the United States "stole his idea and then left him out and included weak sisters and colonial powers."