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ANALYSIS OF  
THE SOVIET "PEACE CAMPAIGN"

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**SUMMARY**

The recent Soviet conciliatory moves and Communist proposals on Korea suggest that the new leaders in Moscow have adopted a new tactical line and have modified their short-range policies. These moves are aimed at relaxing international tensions and reducing American vigilance and preparedness in order to attain a greater field for Soviet maneuver.

There have been no changes, however, in the basic Soviet strategic objectives of consolidating the Soviet Orbit and isolating and weakening the US. The new regime has probably concluded that the disadvantages of a continuation of the Korean war outweigh the advantages and that a Korean truce will remove an embarrassing obstacle to the effectiveness of their "peace offensive."

The need of the new Soviet regime to reassign top responsibilities and its desire to revise some internal policies probably will contribute to a continuation of the "peace offensive." However, internal considerations do not appear at present to have been the primary determinant of the current tactical shift.

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**INTERPRETATION OF RECENT EVENTS AND SPECULATION ON  
FUTURE SOVIET ACTIONS**

The recent series of Soviet moves and the Communist proposals on Korea suggest that the new leaders in Moscow have decided to revise their tactical line and their short-range policies. This does not mean, however, that there has been any change in their basic strategic objectives. This decision to alter tactics was probably based on the strategic estimate of the current position of the Soviet Orbit held for some time by the present determiners of Soviet policy. It reflects an awareness that the previous foreign policies and tactics had proved to be unproductive and that their impact on the Soviet domestic scene had been disadvantageous.

The fundamental lines of Soviet objectives, now as well as during the last years of Stalin's life, are governed by the recognition that the present frontiers of the Soviet Orbit probably can not be significantly extended and that at least certain sectors of that frontier can not be made invulnerable to Western pressure as long as American power remains committed to blocking the attainment of basic Soviet objectives. According to this "calculation of the relation of forces," the security of the Orbit and the prospects for future extensions of Soviet power and influence depend on the degree to which the Soviet Union can achieve, by whatever means, the withdrawal of American power from its present global commitments and the weakening of our allies' dependence on and confidence in our support and guarantees.

The policies and tactics which Stalin developed to achieve his overall objectives of weakening and disrupting the non-Communist coalition while building up the economic and military strength of the Orbit were designed to isolate the United States from its allies, particularly the members of NATO. These policies and tactics were officially sanctioned by the 19th Congress of the CPSU in October 1952. The Congress served as an occasion for a restatement of the plan of action which, in its main lines, had already been part of the international Communist program for many months.

Communist propaganda and tactics attempted to substitute the United States for Nazi Germany as the major enemy. The Communists in every area of the world concentrated on exploiting all those issues which divide, or might tend to divide, the US from its World War II allies and from its former enemies, Germany and Japan.

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Soviet propaganda aimed at Western Europe attempted to eliminate fears of Soviet aggression. There were constant assertions that the Soviet Union did not fear war with the West and that it expected affairs in Europe to reach an equilibrium between East and West. A warning was given that Moscow would regard all those in the "American camp" as enemies, but that it would be willing to maintain friendly relations with any power which would break away from US "domination." Stalin told Nenni that there would be a long cold war lasting at least 15 years, that the USSR would make no concessions to the US either in Europe or Asia, but that there would be no hot war in Europe.

Stalin apparently hoped by these tactics to persuade America's allies to exert strong pressure on the US Government to make concessions to Soviet demands. By prolonging the deadlock on the prisoner-of-war issue in Korea, after agreement had been reached on so many other points, the Communists sought to arouse public opinion in the West to such an extent that the UN Command would be compelled to abandon its stand on the principle of voluntary repatriation. They may also have expected that the frustration and anxiety generated by a war of attrition would eventually drive the United States into making extreme efforts to force a military decision which would antagonize allied and "neutralist" opinion and would produce a serious cleavage within the non-Communist world.

All these moves were intended to encourage America's allies to challenge US leadership and to pursue their separate and conflicting interests. Soviet pressure on Western Europe in the latter part of 1952 was greatly reduced. In mid-February 1953, the US Embassy in Moscow observed that Soviet foreign policy had been "negative and relatively inactive" in recent months and that the Soviet leaders apparently considered it unnecessary to intervene more decisively in Europe in view of the evidences of Western disunity.

While applying these varied policies and tactics in the attempt to dissolve the Western coalition, Stalin seemed to believe that it was either unnecessary or impossible to enter into serious negotiations with the US on cold war issues. He apparently had supreme confidence both in his own ability to control the forces he had set in motion and in the unchallengeable power of the armed forces of the Soviet Union. In addition, such factors as his concern for personal prestige and the rigidity of his views regarding the capitalist world may have influenced his decisions. In his 17 February interview with the Indian Ambassador, Stalin complained about the

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difficulty of dealing with the Americans. Indian Peace Prize-winner Kitchlew, who also had an audience with Stalin on 17 February, reported that Stalin believed that President Eisenhower's hands were tied by the capitalists around him. British Commonwealth representatives in Moscow remarked at this time on Stalin's apparent obsession that capitalism was blocking world peace.

Whatever may have been Stalin's real beliefs or motives, the failure of his attempts to produce a cleavage in the Western world by prolonging the fighting in Korea was impressively demonstrated by the overwhelming approval which the UN gave to the Indian Resolution on 3 December.

The recent moves in the Communist "peace offensive" suggest that with the passing of Stalin, the new leadership is now free to act on its assumption that the two main policy lines followed under Stalin's regime had clashed at many points. The attempts to isolate the US by relaxing pressure on Western Europe while doing everything possible to discredit US intentions and policies proved to be ineffective. Recent tactical shifts probably reflect an awareness that as long as Western European and Asian allies can depend on a continuation of vigorous US leadership and military and economic assistance, the non-Communist coalition will be able to resist Communist pressures.

In view of the failure of previous tactics, Moscow apparently has decided that the time has arrived for an important revision in its approach to the non-Communist world. These recent moves seem to indicate that the new leaders are now ready to approach the US directly, that they have identified American power and resolution as the crucial factors which must be negated in order to prepare the conditions for achieving strategic success.

The Soviet leaders certainly recognize that an end to the fighting in Korea is the indispensable condition for reopening negotiations with the US and its major allies. Molotov's 1 April statement supporting the Chinese proposals for Korea also suggests that the USSR is seeking a full dress UN debate on the Korean question and other Far Eastern issues likely to create dissension among the Western Powers and to split Asian nations away from the United States. While it is probable that the current negotiations will result in a cessation of hostilities in Korea, this will not affect the basic power position of the USSR in the Far East, and a definitive settlement of the Korean question can be expected to be postponed indefinitely.

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The Communist concessions on Korea are likely to be the only major concessions the new leadership in Moscow will feel compelled to make at this time. While the Kremlin may offer to settle minor East-West issues where no direct or vital Soviet interests are involved, it will make no concessions which might threaten the security or power position of the Orbit.

There have been no decisive changes in the relative capabilities and vulnerabilities of the Soviet Orbit which would impel Moscow to consider negotiating a general settlement with the West. The recent moves in Korea were intended to go only far enough to remove the most conspicuous source of conflict between East and West and to relieve Soviet policies and tactics of an embarrassing and disadvantageous obstacle to the effectiveness of the "peace offensive." The Korean concessions will not significantly alter the momentum and orientation of Soviet policies and tactics elsewhere in the world, because they are firmly rooted in continuing and concrete Soviet interests and objectives.

The long-range nature of these objectives was reflected in Vyshinski's 9 April speech to the UN Political Committee in which he called for a halt to Western rearmament, a ban on atomic weapons, the reduction in the armed strength of the Five Great Powers by one-third, the dissolution of NATO, the abandonment of the Schuman Plan and EDC, and an end to plans for the rearming of West Germany. (The only new element Vyshinski introduced was the omission of the original demand for the return of all POWs to their homeland, reflecting the only decisive change in current Soviet policies.)

The Kremlin is unlikely to follow up the Korean truce with a basic concession affecting its power position in Europe. Since World War II the Soviet Union has consolidated its political and military control in Eastern and in much of Central Europe and has maintained its military predominance over the rest of the Continent. The Soviet leaders are unlikely to withdraw from the present frontiers of the Orbit until they become convinced that the Western powers are prepared to apply military power against those frontiers so great as to make likely a defeat of the USSR in war. Only then would the Soviet leaders prefer a peaceful withdrawal from their present advanced positions to military defeat. However, the Kremlin probably considers that Western Europe will not be able, for the foreseeable future, either alone or with the support of American arms and forces, to match or seriously challenge Soviet power on land.

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The new Moscow regime may expect to regain a considerable area of diplomatic maneuverability in Europe following the end of fighting in Korea. They may elect to negotiate on such important unsettled questions as the German and Austrian peace treaties and the Trieste issue; they will probably continue the "peace" offensive, and may make further conciliatory gestures toward Western Europe such as offers for expanded trade agreements and a general easing of tension in Berlin and Vienna. The Kremlin could use diplomatic and propaganda pressures for a four-power conference on all unsettled issues in Europe. Minor concessions could be made with the hope of relaxing tensions in Europe and thereby bringing about a slow-down in Western defense.

It is not anticipated that the USSR would make any concessions that would entail the loss of its hold on East Germany. The strategic position of Eastern Germany between the USSR and Eastern Europe, as well as its industrial and military contribution to the Orbit is too great to relinquish. The East German army, moreover, has not reached a state where it could take over Soviet commitments in that area, nor is it likely that it could be trusted to remain loyal to Moscow.

The Soviet Union could not accept a reunification of Germany on Western terms. Moscow cannot allow the power of a unified and independent Germany to be added to the combined strength of the Western coalition. Neither the USSR nor the Western coalition could accept the complete absorption of a unified Germany into the other's camp because this could lead to a decisive shift in the balance of world military and industrial power.

Moscow will probably continue its efforts to undermine the Adenauer Government by reminding the Germans that the alignment of West Germany with the NATO countries can only lead to an impasse and that the only hope of reunification is to attempt to negotiate directly with the USSR. Moscow probably hopes to encourage the emergence of a government in Bonn favorably disposed to cooperate with the USSR by repeatedly insisting that the integration of West Germany with the West will seal the permanent division of Germany. By reminding the Germans of this dilemma, Moscow will also be able to reduce the value of any contribution West Germany might make to Western defense and will accentuate Western fears regarding German intentions.

Moscow could meet Western demands for negotiating an Austrian Peace Treaty by not insisting on its demand for the

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withdrawal of the abbreviated treaty as a basis of discussion. Although the stakes are not as high in Austria as in Germany, it is unlikely that the Kremlin would sign an Austrian treaty. This would involve the withdrawal of Soviet troops from an advanced position, the loss of an important economic stronghold, and the removal of the legal pretext for maintaining troops in Hungary and Rumania.

Without making any concessions, the USSR could propose a conference to settle the Trieste issue. It could go further, however, by adhering to the now outmoded 1948 Tripartite Declaration which called for the return of Trieste to Italy. The Trieste maneuver would serve a two-fold purpose of appearing conciliatory to world opinion while at the same time embarrassing the Western powers in their relations with Italy and Yugoslavia.

The conclusion of hostilities in Korea will not necessarily lead either to a general peace settlement in the Far East or to a transfer of Chinese Communist military forces to new ventures in Southeast Asia. In the latter region the shift on Korea will not have any immediate effects on Communist activities, with the exception of the Viet Minh forces in Indochina. Communist activities in South and Southeast Asia will continue to be oriented along "united front" lines, concentrating on primarily political forms of action.

There is little likelihood of serious friction in the next few years between Moscow and Peiping. Their alliance will continue to rest on such joint objectives as the elimination of Western power and influence from the Far East and the eventual absorption of "colonial" Asia in the Communist Orbit. Both partners are anxious to achieve a withdrawal of Western military power from the Pacific and to block the resurgence of Japanese military and economic strength. Moscow regards Communist China as a valuable ally against the US and Japan, as a territorial base for advancing Communism into East Asia, and as a major political and psychological asset. Peiping, in turn, regards the USSR as its protector against possible US and Japanese military action which might threaten the security of the Communist regime and as an indispensable source of economic and military assistance.

After the conclusion of an armistice agreement, the lines which now divide the Korean peninsula are likely to remain firmly established. The immediate objective of the Communist powers will be to induce a withdrawal of Western military forces from South Korea. Their policies and tactics probably

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will include a reversion to pre-June 1950 appeals for peaceful reunification, combined with tactics of infiltration and subversion aimed at undermining the stability and resistance capabilities of South Korea.

The primary target of Communist pressure in the Far East may now shift to Japan where the impact of a Korean peace will have immediate economic and political repercussions. Japanese Communists will exploit labor unrest, promote pressure for increased trade with the Communist mainland, and will encourage elements of all political complexions which favor a greater degree of "independence" from the US.

It would seem to be to the advantage of Moscow and Peiping to delay the conclusion of a formal peace treaty with Japan and the establishment of diplomatic relations until the effects of the expected reduction in UN military spending in Japan have been felt. Japan faces very serious economic adjustments and her ability to resist extreme Communist demands may be greatly reduced by economic difficulties and consequent political instability.

In the Middle East, Soviet policy in recent months has been relatively inactive. Moscow has promising opportunities to exploit, through the local Communist parties, the prevailing anti-foreign and anti-Israeli sentiment throughout the Near and Middle East. It is conceivable that Moscow may make an entirely new overture to Iran by suggesting that a new treaty of friendship, along the lines of their 1921 agreement, be signed. Mossadeq may find himself in such a perilous position that he would be disposed to accept such an offer.

The recent conciliatory moves by Moscow and Peiping thus form a more subtle and flexible approach which, the Kremlin hopes will have far-reaching adverse effects on Western strength and unity.

A good theoretical foundation for such an approach exists in the post-war controversy within the Soviet hierarchy over Varga's insistence that the capitalist world can engage in intelligent planning and avoid internecine struggle once it is convinced that its whole social system is at stake. The recent conciliatory Kremlin gestures, coupled with an apparent similarity between Malenkov's and Varga's attitudes toward Marxist theory, would suggest that the present Soviet rulers have been in serious disagreement with Stalin's policies for several years and that their approach reflects a different concept of the capitalist world than that held by Stalin.

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Accordingly, the task of Soviet diplomacy is to remove the suspicions and fears in the non-Communist world regarding Soviet intentions and to arouse a sense of security which would undermine Western rearmament programs and produce economic and political difficulties.

The new Soviet leaders will probably place greater confidence in the steady build-up of the industrial and military strength of the Soviet Orbit rather than in provocative and indecisive adventures abroad. In their view, the cumulative power of the Soviet Orbit will in the long-run, turn the balance of world power against the West and open the way for achieving world Communism.

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**APPENDIX I**

**Definitions and Application of Terms used  
in this Analysis**

The following tentative definitions were drafted in an attempt to avoid semantic confusion in preparing this interpretive paper on current Soviet moves and intentions.

**GOAL:** The ultimate objective to be achieved; the inflexible and fundamental end. In this case, a world Communist society under Russian domination.

**FOREIGN POLICY** refers to the complex and dynamic course that a nation follows in relation to other states. It includes all the elements that form the substance of a state's foreign relations, such as objectives, estimates, strategies, tactics, specific policies designed to attain specific ends, commitments, and ideological preconceptions.

**STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES:** Long-range, but not immutable ends which remain constant within a given period but which may differ as they are determined according to prevailing circumstances in different areas of the world.

**STRATEGIC ESTIMATE:** The personal or collective views of the leader or leaders regarding the current position of the Soviet Orbit in terms of its relative capabilities and vulnerabilities in relation to the world situation. This estimate governs the range of alternatives open to Soviet leaders for achieving their strategic objectives.

**POLICIES** are specific courses of action designed to achieve strategic objectives. Policies are always governed by the current strategic estimate. Since policies are developed in relation to actual situations and current problems, there is a greater degree of flexibility in the formulation and application of policies than in the establishment of objectives.

**TACTICS** are concerned with the application of specific policies to actual situations. Tactics may vary from one place to another and from one time to another and can change a number of times during a given stage in the pursuit of a given strategic objective.

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**SOVIET ORBIT:** Includes the USSR, the European Satellites and East Germany, Communist China, and North Korea.

**FOREIGN COMMUNIST PARTIES:** Communist parties in countries outside the Soviet Orbit.

**Application of Definitions to Soviet Foreign Policy, 1949 - 1952**

**GOAL:** Throughout the post-war years, as always, the goal or ultimate objective is assumed to remain constant -- a world Communist society under Russian domination.

**STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES:**

1. The consolidation and defense of the Soviet Orbit.
2. The neutralization of US military power, particularly American superiority in atomic weapons.
3. The weakening and disruption of the Western coalition and the isolation of the US from its allies.
4. The reduction and ultimate elimination of Western, particularly US, power and influence in Asia and the Far East.
5. The achievement of Communist control of, or a major voice in, Asian governments.

**STRATEGIC ESTIMATE:** Further attempts to extend the frontiers of the Soviet Orbit and to overthrow Western-oriented governments in Europe would probably be blocked following the failure of Communist tactics, particularly in France and Italy, and the success of American counteraction during 1947-1949.

In Asia, however, new opportunities were opened by the victory of the Chinese Communists, the withdrawal of Western military power, and the improvement of local Communist military capabilities.

**POLICIES AND TACTICS:** Soviet policies aimed at neutralizing American military power: demands for a ban on atomic weapons and an immediate reduction in armed forces by one-third; opposition to NATO, MEDO and ANZUS, US bases on the periphery of the Orbit, and defense arrangements with Japan.

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In Europe, Soviet policies were directed toward reducing the effectiveness of American economic and military assistance programs, obstructing plans for European integration and the rearmament of Western Germany. Tactics included such devices as the Stockholm Petition, signed by millions throughout the world, which would brand the first nation to use the atomic bomb as an aggressor; World Peace Congress demands for a Five-Power Peace Pact; propaganda designed to undermine cooperation of allied governments with US objectives and policies; the Berlin Blockade aimed at eliminating the last outpost of Western influence in the Soviet Zone.

By 1949, Communist policies and tactics in Asia had shifted from emphasis on primarily political forms of action to armed struggle. This shift was motivated mainly by the victory of the Chinese Communists and by the withdrawal of Western military power from Asia. The Communist program now called for Communist control of armed "liberation movements". The attack on South Korea was an attempt to eliminate the last outpost of American influence on the North Asian mainland and to seize a strong position from which to apply pressure against Japan.

By mid-1951, the armed "liberation movements" in Asia were either stalemated or suffering reverses. In apparent recognition of the failure of these tactics, from mid-1951 to mid-1952, the Asian "liberation movements," except that of the Viet Minh, changed their tactics to emphasize political forms of action. The most notable step in this emerging trend was the Communist bid in June 1951 for truce talks in Korea.

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APPENDIX II

Assumptions Used in This Analysis

We assume that: 1. Stalin had unchallenged control of Kremlin policy decisions. If discussion arose about a decision, it ended when Stalin decided one way or the other.

2. Within top ranks there was disagreement as to policies and tactics to be used in both foreign and internal affairs, but no disagreement on strategic objectives.

3. These disagreements were between Stalin with the possible support of others who felt that Soviet policies and tactics despite their contradictory nature would succeed, and the present determiners of Soviet policy who are attempting to erase such contradictions.

4. While it is possible that there is a power struggle in the Kremlin (see Appendix III) the speed, consistency, and thoroughness of present policy decisions suggest that despite such a struggle there is at least temporary agreement on the basic shift in policies and tactics. The need to reassign top responsibilities because of the major reorganization undertaken after Stalin's death will incline the new regime toward a continuation of this shift. Since there is no positive evidence which clearly identifies the views which the various top leaders hold, it would be impossible to speculate as to what influence a resolution of this struggle may have on the future course of Soviet foreign policy.

5. The need of the new regime to consolidate its power within the Soviet Orbit is not the primary determinant of the current shift in policy and tactics. This shift, however, will have the result of allowing time for the new regime to consolidate.

6. Any Soviet fears of the new Washington administration; its emphasis on a more aggressive foreign policy, and its moves on the international scene are not a primary determinant in the Soviet's basic shift.

7. Developments in Sino-Soviet relations were not decisive influences on the tactical shift in Korea. The prompt actions taken by the new regime with regard to Communist China reflect the high priority of the Sino-Soviet alliance

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in Moscow's thinking, but they do not necessarily indicate that there was serious friction between China and the USSR which required immediate attention. There is no reason to assume that disagreements existed over the estimate that the disadvantages of continuing the Korean war outweighed the advantages and that the interests of both the USSR and China would be best served by ending the fighting.

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APPENDIX III

Speculation on Possible Alignments in an Internal  
Struggle for Power

There is much speculation that the basic tactical shift in Soviet foreign policy is motivated by an internal power struggle. Militating against the idea that an internal power struggle is the cause of Moscow's present foreign policy moves is the speed, thoroughness, and consistency of the Kremlin's conciliatory campaign, which suggests that there is unanimity or agreement within the top levels of Soviet leadership.

On the other hand, the unexplained "release" of Malenkov from the Secretariat, the cessation of a blatant propaganda buildup of Malenkov which was begun early after Stalin's death, and the reversal of the "doctors' plot" all point to a readjustment on the top levels which might be the result of a power struggle or the early signs of such a development.

Among speculations as to possible power alignments in a power struggle there are four possible and most popular divisions: a) Malenkov vs. Beria, b) Malenkov, Beria vs. others, c) Anti-Stalinist vs. Stalinist, d) Army vs. Party. Data arguing pro and con on each of these speculations follows:

(a) Malenkov vs. Beria:

PRO: 1/ While Stalin was alive and the succession was in doubt it was logical that these two powerful figures would turn against one another and that after Stalin's death, because of the totalitarian make-up of the Soviet regime, each would attempt to subvert the power of the other to make himself most powerful.

2/ The original "doctors' plot" was a move by Malenkov to reduce Beria's power and prestige through the analogy that Beria was still responsible for MGB affairs. Malenkov has been infiltrating his followers into positions of power within the MGB, witness S. D. Ignatiev as head and possibly others throughout the organization, and concurrently ousting Beria men such as Abakumov.

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3/ The reversal of the "doctors' plot" was a move on the part of Beria to oust Malenkov-protege Ignatiev and to turn the plot against Malenkov.

4/ The unexplained "release" of Malenkov from the Secretariat was an indication that his power was not absolute and was now waning and that this in some way could be tied to Beria's influence.

5/ The cessation of a blatant propaganda build-up of Malenkov was likewise an indication that this power was waning, and that this too could be tied to Beria.

CON: 1/ The first point above is logical only if the assumption is accepted that the top hierarchy in a totalitarian regime must necessarily be at odds, that they must constantly be attempting to undermine each other's authority and prestige. Opposed to this concept are many reports that Malenkov and Beria were closely allied in their attitudes and views, that they were friends who opposed what has been termed the "Old Bolsheviks" in the Politburo, and that they moved against Zhdanov together at the time that he was clearly slated for succession. There are reports that Malenkov and Beria operated during the war to keep Zhdanov in Leningrad while they remained in Moscow and that they engineered him out of Leningrad just before the siege was lifted and a Russian victory in that area was assured.

2/ On the second point, Beria has had nothing overtly to do with the MGB since 1943 when it was separated from the MVD. It appears that Beria took over the atomic energy program and that the MGB, as a security organization, was made independent. This was necessary because the task of handling the vitally important atomic energy program required more time than could be given to the dual function of economic organizations which the MVD included and the security apparatus. Following the 1943 separation, the MVD lost to the MGB the militia, border guards and other policing functions, leaving the MVD purely an economic organization with most of its activities possibly directed toward the development of atomic energy.

Reducing the doctors' plot to a scheme of Malenkov's to get Beria leaves out of the picture the possibility of its being a major policy decision taken to advance the vigilance campaign and the anti-Zionist campaign which

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culminated in the break in relations with Israel. The "plot" may have been a decision as to how best to advance the above drives based on a real suspicion concerning international Jewish organizations and Western espionage, with no one on a high level implicated.

Further speculation about the doctors' plot could include the possibility that it was a move by Stalin to eliminate Beria as he had Yezhov and Yagoda. It may even have been designed to implicate both Malenkov and Beria against whom Stalin was turning perhaps under the influence of old Bolsheviks such as Molotov. It is also possible that Stalin, ailing and growing senile, was convinced by someone, perhaps his personal secretary Poskrebeshv, with army backing, that the Kremlin doctors were being used by Malenkov and Beria in a plot to murder him. Of some possible significance is the fact that Poskrebeshv, who had written eulogies to Stalin on his 60th and 70th birthday and who would be expected to appear in some capacity at Stalin's funeral, has not been seen or identified since the 19th Party Congress last October.

3/ This point of course depends upon the truth of the speculation that the original plot was Malenkov's attempt to get Beria. But further we have the fact that if Beria was at first implicated in the accusation that the MGB had been derelict in its duty to uncover the plot by the analogy that he was presumably responsible for its affairs, he is again implicated when it turns out that the MGB had been more than lax, had, in fact, actually been acting illegally, at the behest of an adventurer. Ignatiev was implicated because he had not correctly supervised his inferiors and had been hoodwinked. Was the man responsible for MGB affairs on the Presidium level also hoodwinked, and is he also to be held responsible for not correctly carrying out his supervisory functions?

Just as the original plot can be explained by an internal and foreign policy decision or by Stalin's instigation against Malenkov and Beria or Beria alone, so its reversal can be the result of the repudiation of the now obsolete internal and foreign policy which has occurred or the result of Stalin's death and therefore the removal of the instigator of the plot.

4/and 5/ It must also be explained why Beria was advanced to the second position in the hierarchy ahead of Molotov at a time when it appeared that Malenkov's

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power was great, if Malenkov had been working to undermine Beria's power and had succeeded in placing the MGB under his own men. If Malenkov had succeeded in removing this base of Beria's power, where does Beria now get the ability to cause a waning in what at first appeared as remarkable strength on Malenkov's part? Furthermore, Beria had elevated Malenkov to the "talented pupil of Lenin and comrade-in-arms of Stalin" at the funeral oration and during the Supreme Soviet meeting, while Molotov pointedly did not refer to Malenkov at all.

(b) Malenkov and Beria -- vs. others:

PRO: 1/ Malenkov and Beria are reportedly close friends and have supported each other in their rise against such men as Zhdanov. (see above)

2/ Beria at the funeral made a pointed reference to Malenkov as new leader.

3/ Beria at the 15 March Supreme Soviet meeting did the same.

4/ At the time of the reorganization of Party and Government immediately following Stalin's death Beria was accorded the Number 2 position ahead of Molotov who had always had this while Stalin was alive.

CON: 1/ Malenkov and Beria are in basic conflict. (see above)

(c) Anti-Stalinists vs. Stalinists:

PRO: 1/ The new regime has repudiated many of the basic changes made at the time of the 19th Party Congress when, presumably, Stalin was still alive. They have made basic changes in the Soviet Union's foreign policy, which presumably represented Stalin's views.

2/ In the last few weeks there has been no mention of Stalin's name or economic theses in authoritative editorials of the central press; and the 1936 constitution, always previously denoted "Stalinist," was not so denoted in its last citation.

3/ If the Malenkov release from the Secretariat and the Ignatiev affair reflect a power struggle, this struggle may be between those men who believed Stalin to be

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too old and set in his ways and who wished to be more realistic, and those who adhere to Stalin's own interpretation of things.

CON: 1/ If the Stalinists were powerful enough to oust Malenkov from the Secretariat, thereby reducing his power, we should have seen some change in the treatment of Stalin himself, or some indication that the line would be reverting to a more anti-"realists" one.

(c) Army vs. Party:

PRO: 1/ When the "doctors' plot" broke, the prospective victims who were still alive were all regular Army men. This may have indicated that the Army, tired of or bitter about party interference in military affairs, decided to implicate the MGB in a plot which would reduce its influence. Shcherbakov and Zhdanov both of whom had Army ranks, and supposedly were murdered by the doctors, were reportedly closely allied with the Army.

2/ Zhukov's recall to Moscow and high position immediately after Stalin's death is a recognition of the power position of the Army and represents the Army's bid for top leadership.

CON: 1/ This requires that the Army had someone high up in party organizations (in this case, necessarily in the Party Presidium) powerful enough to convince Stalin that he should move against the party itself and thereby build up the Army's strength vis-a-vis the party. The evidence is much against Stalin or anyone high in party circles agreeing to such a move. It could be contrary to the whole matrix of Soviet power. Available evidence from the Party Congress and since indicates that the Party was increasing its control over other organizations, not relaxing it.

2/ There is a good deal of evidence that Zhukov's disgrace after the war was due to Stalin's personal dislike for him and for the immense popularity which he had built up. It is also reported that Zhukov was in agreement with Malenkov against the Zhdanov concept of increasing pressure on the West as a basic Soviet policy. With Stalin's death, Zhukov's return to eminence can be explained by his popularity with the people thereby giving the new regime more popularity and by agreement with Malenkov on basic policy.

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