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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
12 October 1954

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TO Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT: Comment on Salisbury Series in New York Times,
Entitled "Russia Reviewed"

1. Generally speaking, when Mr. Salisbury is discussing some aspect of Soviet life which he has observed, or with which he has had intimate contact, such as living conditions in Moscow, the problem of censorship, or the amount of drunkenness and graft in the USSR, he is accurate and complete and does a commendable job of reporting. However, when he speculates on the more obscure areas of Soviet affairs, his reporting and interpretation, we believe, are tendentious and misleading. He appears to overstate the changes which have taken place in Russia in the many months since Stalin's death. He underplays many of those things in Soviet life which were harsh and cruel under Stalin, and which have remained unchanged under the new regime. Like many journalists writing on the Soviet Union, Mr. Salisbury picks the most spectacular interpretation for a given event in an effort to catch the reader's eye. In so doing he often stretches his evidence thin and thereby distorts what we believe to be the true picture of events.

2. We are in major agreement with Mr. Salisbury's comments on the new course in the Soviet Union (article 1, 19 Sept.); on the personalities of leading Soviet figures (article 5, 23 Sept.); on Moscow living conditions (article 6, 24 Sept.); on forced labor and living conditions in Siberia (articles 9 & 10 Sept.); on drunkenness, violence and graft (article 13, 1 Oct.); and on censorship (article 14, 2 Oct.) Within each of these articles, however, we find minor points of disagreement, either in emphasis, interpretation, or fact. In none of them has Mr. Salisbury uncovered any facts not heretofore known to us, with the exception of a few small items of limited intelligence value.

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3. We are in major disagreement with Mr. Salisbury's analysis of the events surrounding the 19th Party Congress and Stalin's death (article 2, 20 Sept.); his views on the

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DIA review(s) completed.

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role Beria played in the period immediately after Stalin's death (article 3, 21 Sept.); his views on Soviet foreign policy today and in the future (article 7, 25 Sept.); his views on the Soviet governments policy toward religion (article 11, 29 Sept.); and most important his interpretation of the role of the army in the day to day operation of the government since Stalin's death (article 4, 22 Sept.).

a. Mr. Salisbury believes that Stalin was murdered by his subordinates because the 19th Party Congress and the Doctor's Plot showed that Stalin was preparing to eliminate some or all of them, including Malenkov, from power. His interpretation of the 19th Party Congress is that Stalin was "shuffling the cards so that only he could know who would come out on top."

We believe that in the 19th Party Congress, although Stalin played a major role, Malenkov, through personnel appointments and by virtue of his delivery of the major speech on that occasion, clearly enhanced his position. We believe also that the Doctors' Plot was most probably directed against Beria and his supporters and that Malenkov was probably also involved in its inception. (Tab I)

b. Mr. Salisbury believes that Beria "held Moscow in the hollow of his pudgy hand" during the days immediately following Stalin's death, and that, at this time, he could have used force to become another dictator. Because he didn't, he lost his one opportunity and for this reason was later purged.

We feel that Mr. Salisbury offers a completely misleading picture here. The proof he adduces does not stand up on close scrutiny. In our view Beria, while he had gained strength by Stalin's death, was in no position to effect a palace coup at that time. Instead, he attempted in the four months following Stalin's death to cement his power in the MVD and use this as an instrument by which to seize power. His purge was a result of action taken by the other members of the ruling group when they became certain of his aims. (Tab II)

c. Mr. Salisbury appears to believe that the USSR today wishes to negotiate a formal accomodation with the US which would allow both nations to live in peace

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and prosperity by mutually agreeing to respect each other's interests. He feels that chief value Moscow places on improving relations with Britain and France is that "by this path it may ultimately arrive at the big show--negotiations between Russia and the US."

We believe that the tactics that the Soviet Union has been following in the Post-Stalin era are designed to split the Western coalition, isolate the US, and sow dissension so that it will be unnecessary either to negotiate a "formal accomodation" with the capitalist world or to make war upon it. We feel that the USSR's new-found "reasonableness" is an expedient directed toward the same end as Stalin's intransigence--world domination. When the Soviet leaders feel the "reasonableness" has outlived its usefulness, they will drop it for another tack. (Tab III)

d. Mr. Salisbury appears to believe that there is "no whip" behind the present Soviet campaign against religion. He states that churchgoers do not fear for their jobs and that hundreds and thousands of churches have been opened in the near past.

We believe that this is misleading and that the present campaign is a serious attempt by the leadership to mold the people into fit subjects for a communist regime. Communist party members are being expelled from the party if they are found participating in religious activities. Although churches were opened during the war, many, if not all, of those opened were again closed after the war. We have no information indicating reopening of churches on anything like the scale Salisbury claims. Mr. Salisbury, in this piece as in many of his others, distorts factual material to make it appear that the present Soviet leaders are bringing a fundamental change to the Soviet Union's social structure. This we feel, is a dangerous inaccuracy. (Tab IV)

e. Mr. Salisbury believes that from the moment of Stalin's death the army as a group, and particularly Marshal G. K. Zhukov, as an individual, have increased their power and are now playing a prominent role in the day to day operations of the government. He feels that they have a large role in the making of policy, and that their influence is one of moderation.

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We feel that this common interpretation of events since Stalin's death is a dangerous misconception. We interpret the facts as indicating an increase in prestige of the military in the Soviet Union, but not necessarily any enhanced influence over policy. We feel that the military arm of the Soviet government, like all other arms, is completely under the control of the Communist Party and takes its policy from the party. We believe that the last year and a half has seen a normalization of relations between the top political leadership and the military, that, as in western countries, the military is now being used in a staff advisory capacity in the formulation of policy and that this comparatively increased role has misled many to feel that the military dominates the country. We feel also that, in the absence of strong proof, it is a dangerous assumption to believe that the military is any more reasonable or moderate in its attitude toward the West than any other group in the Soviet Union. (Tab V)

4. Mr. Salisbury's technical article (No. 12 of 30 Sept. concerning atomic energy sites and Soviet airforce achievements) is wholly based on speculation. OSI regards the article as spotty, cursory, and inaccurate in some respects. Mr. Salisbury presents no new information on either subject in this article.

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TAB I

19th Party Congress and Stalin's Death

1. Mr. Salisbury states that: "It is by no means impossible that Stalin was murdered on or about March 5, 1953, by the group of his close associates who now run Russia."

Comment: We agree that Stalin's death is still "an open question," particularly since we are dependent on Soviet sources for this information. Salisbury though, slanting his presentation toward Stalin's murder, comes up with no new or solid evidence circumstantial or otherwise on this point. It is worth noting that the reported facts of Stalin's fatal illness are perfectly reasonable from a medical point of view. There are no discrepancies between the medical bulletins and the autopsy findings. There are no indications that either the diagnosis or the treatment was faulty, and the reports clearly reflect symptoms in existence for several years.

2. "The great role, the only important one at the Congress (October '52) was played by Stalin himself."

Comment: Although Stalin certainly monopolized the spotlight by publishing his "Economic Problems" a few days before the Congress convened, Malenkov's status was significantly enhanced by presenting the principal report of the Congress. We, therefore, could not agree that his role was reduced "to the customary level of party hackwork."

3. "The net effect of the party congress and the personnel changes was to give the impression that someone was deliberately shuffling the cards in such a way that only he (Stalin) would know who was to come out on top."

Comment: We believe that the entry of younger Party people such as Aristov, Andrianov, Ignatov, Pegov and Mikhailov to the top party echelon may well have reflected Stalin's decision to let Malenkov reinforce his position by having a new pro-Malenkov group added at the top.

4. In connection with the vigilance campaign in late 1952 and early 1953, "rumors circulated--nobody knew at the time which ones were true and which were false. There had been arrests in TASS, the news agency. The head of TASS, Nikolai Palgunov, a man known for years to be very close to Mr. Molotov, had vanished...Madame Molotov had disappeared." Other arrests in the Foreign Office, etc.

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Comment: While we were aware that Moscow was rife with rumors during the vigilance campaign, we were not informed as to the specific subject matter. With respect to the specific rumors cited above, however, we believe them to be false.

5. Beria--half Jewish.

Comment: We have been unsuccessful in verifying this contention.

6. Only Stalin knew who would survive the Doctors' Plot.

Comment: In the ultimate sense, since Stalin held supreme power, this is probably true. He could have turned the plot in any direction he wished. However, the manner in which the plot is treated in the article i.e. that Stalin ran the plot alone does not conform to our interpretation. We believe that Malenkov was probably also involved.

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TAB II

Beria's Role

1. Beria "held Russia in the hollow of his pudgy hand" at the time of Stalin's death. MVD troops had absolute control over Moscow from March 6 to 9, and Beria had absolute, unchallenged, personal control over the MVD.

Comment: These paragraphs give a completely misleading picture of Beria's power at this time. The reports of US military attaché personnel who surveyed the situation in the center of Moscow from 6 - 9 March 1953 do not substantiate the claim that MVD personnel were the only participants in the general movement of security patrols into the city after Stalin's death. The US Air Attaché, for example, states that "At most barricades there was a double or triple line of troops--at least one of militia and the others of army... Troops from all branches of service were seen: artillery, infantry, Soviet Air Force, etc." The use of army troops to help control the crowds is confirmed by the US Army Attaché.

The allegation that there are no army troops quartered in Moscow is wrong. At least one army rifle division and other elements are normally barracked in the city, and a cordon of militiamen would not be expected to immobilize them.

It is the responsibility of the militia to police the city; in time of crisis or celebration the Commandant of the City of Moscow (army) assumes overall charge, using troops of all services as needed. There is no reason to doubt that this established procedure was followed at the time of Stalin's death.

There is no reason to believe that the troops (both militia and military) were brought in for any purpose other than crowd control. The US Air and Navy Attachés concur that most police and troops were unarmed. The Army Attaché reported that the militia carried their pistols, while the Naval Attaché, who was close to several in the crowds, says they wore their holsters empty. None of our service attachés report seeing any tanks at all.

Furthermore, it seems most unlikely that Beria could establish unchallenged control over the MVD within a day or so before Stalin's death, and the fact that replacements in high MVD posts continued through June suggests that Beria

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was still in the process of consolidating his control of the MVD when he was purged. The very fact that Beria was so quietly removed suggests that his control of the MVD was severely limited even at the height of his power. S. N. Kruglov, MVD Chief under Stalin and deputy minister under Beria from March to June, remains as head of the MVD indicating that he did not back Beria.

Thus it is probably inaccurate to say that the MVD alone controlled Moscow and environs at the time of Stalin's death, and it is certainly incorrect to state that Beria held unchallenged control of the MVD at the time.

2. Flowing from knowledge of his power, Beria's speech sounded "condescending" toward Molotov and Malenkov, and Beria gave the impression he was speaking for the army as well as the police.

Comment: If this "condescension" was apparent in Beria's delivery, this was not noted or reported by the US Embassy in Moscow. While Beria mentioned the "glorious armed forces" of the USSR, he did not pay substantially more attention to this subject than did Malenkov or Molotov, and we do not see any implication in his speech that he was speaking for the army.

3. Beria was purged because "he was too big for the triumvirate, but not big enough to be dictator."

Comment: We substantially agree with this analysis, but feel that it was not the events of March 4-9, but Beria's maneuvering during the four months after Stalin's death--the appointment of personal henchmen to leading positions in the MVD, the manner in which the doctors' plot was reversed, the purge in Georgia, the Nationalities policy and removal of Melnikov--that convinced the ruling group that he was becoming too powerful to remain.

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TAB III

Foreign Policy

1. It is stated that the "one great obstacle to a successful Soviet policy in Europe" is the fact that "Moscow seems to be no more capable than the West of devising a really effective solution for the German problem." He holds that the "whole logic of the situation binds Russia's hands" because a Soviet withdrawal from East Germany would threaten Poland and set off a chain reaction that "might bring the whole jerry-built Eastern Soviet glacis tumbling down."

Comment: It is true that the controlling factor in Soviet policy toward Germany has been Moscow's unwillingness to make any concessions that would risk the loss of its hold on East Germany, and mainly for the reasons Salisbury suggests. However, the conclusion he draws from this situation--that Moscow's inability to devise "a really effective solution for the German problem" precludes "a successful Soviet policy in Europe"--is based on an inaccurate appraisal of the Soviet leaders' definition of the "German problem." Salisbury seems to assume that the Soviet leaders, if their hands were not bound, would like to compete with the West in devising a German settlement which would at once command the acceptance of the Western powers, dispose of the German problem, and fulfill Soviet objectives, or at least safeguard Soviet interests, with respect to the new German state.

It seems highly unlikely that the Soviet leaders have ever believed it would be possible to achieve such a "solution." Their view of the German problem is cast in entirely different terms. The USSR's basic immediate aim is to deny West Germany to Western defense. A rearmed West Germany closely bound to the Atlantic alliance, and serving as an advance base and possibly as the spearhead of combined Western military power, would pose a serious threat to the political and military security of the Soviet Orbit.

There were two principal ways for the Soviet leaders to approach this problem of forestalling the association of a rearmed West Germany with the Western alliance. The first was to offer the West Germans a more attractive alternative than Adenauer's policy of integration with the West. Under the conditions prevailing in this stage of the struggle for

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Germany, however, this could only have been accomplished by negotiating a German peace treaty and unification settlement with the three Western powers. This alternative was unacceptable because it would have placed the decision precisely on the ground of greatest Soviet weakness--the holding of genuinely free elections as the basic device and precondition for arranging a German settlement. The Soviet leaders recognized that they could not compete with the Western proposals offering a neat "solution" based on genuinely free elections. They were therefore both unable and unwilling to attempt to devise an acceptable "solution" in serious negotiations with the West as a means for blocking West Germany's integration in the Western defense system.

Moscow's other alternative was to erect an insurmountable barrier to Western plans for rearming and "integrating" West Germany by exploiting French and other Western European fears of resurgent military power and to encourage the French and other opponents of EDC to seek some alternative to the EDC policy. This second alternative has been the core of post-Stalin Soviet foreign policy and Moscow's confidence in its effectiveness has been buttressed by the belief that the non-Communist world is entering a period in which conflicts of interest among its separate national interests will sharply increase.

The Soviet leaders do not believe that it would be possible to negotiate a German settlement with the West even if this were desirable from their standpoint. In the present situation, Moscow has no choice but to continue its efforts to undermine the Adenauer government by reminding the Germans that the alignment of West Germany with the Atlantic alliance can only lead to an impasse and that the only hope of reunification lies in a direct approach to the USSR. The Soviet leaders probably believe that if they can prolong the stalemate on the questions of West German sovereignty, rearmament and integration, public support for Adenauer's policies in West Germany will rapidly decline and pressures will accumulate for a reorientation of German policy. Moscow's aim is to encourage the emergence of a government in Bonn favorably disposed to cooperate with the USSR.

If the Soviet leaders can be said to have a "solution" for the German problem, it is to be found in their efforts to discredit Adenauer's policies and to bring about a major reorientation in West German foreign policy. If Soviet diplomacy can accomplish these objectives, the way would then be opened for moving toward the distant "solution" which envisages not a great power agreement on a treaty settlement,

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but rather the formation of an all-German government, through East-West German negotiations, which would correspond to the Fierlinger-Gottwald government of 1945 in Czechoslovakia from which the Gottwald regime of 1948 emerged.

2. Salisbury contends that the new Soviet rulers, as one of their long-range objectives, hope that eventually "some kind of modus vivendi or means of living together with the US may be worked out." He suggests that the chief value Moscow places on improving relations with Britain and France is that "by this path it may ultimately arrive at the big show--negotiations between Russia and the US." "The new leaders," he argues, "feel that under suitable conditions" the US and the USSR could "insure each other peace and prosperity by mutually agreeing to respect each other's interests--at least for a time."

Comment: This is one of the most difficult issues on which to form reliable judgments of Soviet intentions. There is no convincing evidence to support the view that the new Soviet leaders are interested in reaching some sort of formal accommodation with the United States through negotiations. In fact, the weight of our evidence would seem to point to a very different conclusion. However, a distinction should be made between Moscow's interest in negotiating a formal global settlement with the United States, on the one hand, and establishing a kind of tacit modus vivendi for an indefinite period within the framework of a continuing cold war, on the other. Post-Stalin Soviet foreign policy has been generally directed toward this second course in the sense that Moscow has sought to remove the most dangerous sources of East-West conflict which carried a potential threat of expanding into a general war. The Soviet leaders' emphasis during the past year on relaxing international tensions and coexistence reflects their desire to reduce dangerous cold war pressures. But this does not mean that they are interested in negotiating a general accommodation with the United States which inevitably would involve obligations and commitments which would seriously circumscribe their future freedom of action.

The Malenkov regime has affirmed its adherence to Stalin's thesis that the elements of dissension and division within the non-Communist world are so great that they will render impossible any united military action of the western coalition against the Soviet Union and will eventually develop into situations in which the capitalist countries will make war against each other. In view of these trends, there is no need for the USSR either to make war against the capitalist world or to enter serious negotiations for a global

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settlement. Stalin stated that "wars between the capitalist countries are still inevitable" and declared that the view that the United States would be able to use its economic and military power to keep the West united against the Communist bloc took account only of "the surface of events."

These views which Stalin expressed in his Bolshevik article published on the eve of the nineteenth Party Congress in October 1952 were intended as a refutation of the arguments advanced by another faction within the Kremlin which had doubted the soundness of Stalin's policies and had challenged them. This dissident faction, which had argued that it was dangerous to depend on the internal break-up of capitalism and the outbreak of internecine struggle within the capitalist world, presumably contended that it was necessary either to prepare sooner or later to fight the western coalition or to come to some sort of accommodation with it. These arguments were overruled by Stalin's thesis which carried the implication that it is unnecessary either to negotiate with or to make war on the capitalist camp.

In his important policy speech to the Supreme Soviet on 8 August 1953, Malenkov stated this prevailing thesis in the following way: "If today, in conditions of tension in international relations, the North Atlantic bloc is rent by internal strife and contradictions, the lessening of this tension may lead to its disintegration." As long as the Malenkov regime continues to accept this thesis as the authoritative concept of its foreign policy, there would appear to be no reason to believe that, as Salisbury argues, "the new managers of the Soviet Union probably are willing to go farther than the old Generalissimo" toward reaching an understanding with the United States.

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TAB IV

RELIGION IN THE USSR

In general we agree with the account of the treatment of Jews in the Soviet Union, but not with his conclusion on religious policy.

1. "The Doctors who were arrested in the plot--with the exception of two who had committed suicide while being examined by the MVD...were released and publicly restored to their positions."

Comment: We cannot verify the contention that two of the doctors committed suicide, but it is true that the listing of doctors released did not include the names of two of the original nine. However, the embassy in Moscow believed that one of them might have died in 1951.

2. "The fact is that, since Stalin came to terms with the church as a wartime measure, it has regained strength by leaps and bounds. Hundreds, if not thousands, of orthodox churches have been reopened.....Each year the churches are more and more crowded."

Comment: It is well known that thousands of churches were reopened in the war years, but a large, though indeterminate, number were closed down again in the post-war period of repression. The information that church congregations continue to grow year by year, has been tacitly admitted, however, in the Soviet press and tends to confirm our belief that increased religious activity accounts to a considerable degree for the current anti-religious campaign.

3. "Under Soviet Law--and this law is being scrupulously observed despite the propaganda campaign against the church--if a community of believers,.....requests the government to provide it with a church the government is obligated to do so...Since 1945 the believers of one village after another all over Russia have applied to the government for church facilities and these requests have been filled."

Comment: It is true that such provisions are granted under Soviet law, but our information indicates that the government does not feel in any way obligated to abide by this law.

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4. "It is quite apparent that there is no whip behind the current (anti-religious) campaign. Side by side with attacks on religious superstitions Izvestia publishes ecclesiastical items--the movements of important church dignitaries in and out of the country....It is thus quite obvious to all Russians that no real danger is involved in going to church.

Comment: We believe that the facts presented here are not completely accurate but in fact, highly misleading. While it is true that Izvestia does publish ecclesiastical items it does so only rarely and they are completely overshadowed by the tremendous volume of anti-religious propaganda. That these few items are intended primarily as propaganda for foreign consumption is undoubtedly well understood by Soviet citizens. Further, the present campaign against religion cannot help but make churchgoers fear for their jobs. It is known, for instance, that Communist Party members are now being expelled from the party if found participating in religious activities.

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TAB V

The Role of the Army

1. "The influence of the Soviet Army in the day-to-day management of Soviet policy, and particularly the influence of the dominant group around Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov in the Army has greatly increased in the post-Stalin era."

Comment: We believe that Soviet policy originates in the Party Presidium and that it is effected and managed for the most part, in the Council of Ministers. In neither of these two groups has the military's proportionate strength been increased. While there may be indications that the Army has been receiving preferential treatment of late, there are absolutely no indications that the Army is assuming any policy-making prerogatives. In addition, we have no information to support the contention that Zhukov is enjoying the leadership of a "dominant group" within the Army.

2. "Shtemenko was Soviet Chief of the General Staff until about twelve days before the announcement of Stalin's fatal illness."

Comment: We are almost certain that Shtemenko was replaced in the fall of 1952, since he was reported in Germany off and on between then and February 1953.

3. "From the moment of the announcement of Stalin's death, the military "and this means the real military and not "political" military, such as Marshal Nikolai A. Bulganin, or old cronies of Stalin's like Marshals Kliment E. Voroshilov and Semyon M. Budenny) has played an important and prominent role in Soviet affairs.

"This was shown symbolically in the first picture published in Moscow after Stalin's death. It showed twelve men standing beside Stalin's bier--six in civilian clothes and six in uniform.

"If anyone in Moscow failed to get the significance of the picture, he could read in the announcement of the reorganization of the Government that Zhukov, whose name had been missing from the Soviet press since 1946 and who had himself been "exiled" from Moscow to the provincial military command of the Odessa region, had emerged from the shadows and, with a single stride, regained his old prominence."

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Comment: We believe that Soviet governmental leaders feared both internal disturbances and external pressures on the USSR at the time of Stalin's death. We believe they sought to emphasize the solidarity of the government, Party, people and military forces, to warn off any internal or external trouble-makers. Thus the return of Zhukov is interpreted as a calculated risk by the top leadership, bringing to prominence an extremely popular and able general.

We note, however, that Zhukov had not been completely hidden from view since 1946: in 1951, for example, he had been featured in the press accounts of Polish Liberation Day ceremonies. We interpret the picture showing the army men at Stalin's bier as part of the same effort to emphasize the solidarity and power of the USSR at a critical time, and note that two of the "army" men are the political marshals, Bulganin and Voroshilov.

We do not believe that the military exercised greater influence from the moment of Stalin's death. In fact, we believe that the return of Bulganin to direct control as minister, the merger of the services, and the shift in Political Directorate leadership represent efforts to insure political domination of the military. As a result, the military leaders were, at least outwardly, passive during the tense triumvirate period until June. They did not achieve greater influence until Beria's purge and after.

4. "Curiously, or perhaps not so curiously, there was another important military shift just a few days before the anti-Government Berlin riots of June 17 and the arrest of Beria on June 26.

"In this shift the tough, hard-bitten commander of the Sixty-second Army at Stalingrad, Army General Vassily I. Chuikov, was suddenly 'transferred to responsible work in the Ministry of Defense' from the post of Commander in Chief, Germany, which he had held for five years...

"He was replaced by an active young general named Grechko, a Ukrainian who had held the important Kiev command under the watchful eye of wise old Marshal Konev. A leading member of the Ukrainian branch of the Communist party, Grechko, while an Army man, was also a protege of Mr. Khrushchev."

Comment: We have no information to support the contention that Grechko was a protege of Khrushchev. Chuikov had been in Germany for five years and was due for transfer. The separation of Soviet military and political authority in East

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Germany at the end of May was an appropriate time for his replacement. We learned later that he had simply exchanged jobs with Grechko. Grechko's Party job in the Ukraine may have been given him because he was a Military District commander in the area. When Chuikov took over, he received a similar Party appointment.

5. "The importance of the military was further enhanced when the Moscow meeting was followed by a similar one in Beria's personal bailiwick in Georgia. Army General Antonov, a former Chief of Staff closely associated with Zhukov who had been quietly running the important Trans-Caucasus Command through one Georgian political upheaval after another, was the principal figure at this meeting. The meeting was notable for the absence of political and MVD generals, who usually crowded the platform of any party meeting in Georgia. Later it developed that most of these 'generals' had been arrested along with Beria."

Comment: The Georgia meeting occurred before the Defense Ministry meeting. It was a special meeting of the Trans-Caucasus Military District, and the absence of other than military personnel was normal. Further we have no information on Antonov's relation to Zhukov.

6. "In the months that followed, the role of the Army in the Government appeared to harden into a permanent and accustomed routine. It did not seem in Moscow that the Army or the Zhukov group, specifically, was seeking to dictate Government policy. Rather, it seemed to be holding a watching brief, but to be participating in discussion of both foreign and domestic policy."

"There is little doubt, for example, that the Army sought successfully to obtain modifications in foreign policy that tended to reduce the swollen commitments of the Stalin era and, in general, sought to lessen immediate possibilities of a shooting war..."

Comment: We have no evidence on the influence of the military leaders on foreign policy. Moreover, we feel that in the absence of strong evidence, it is extremely dangerous to assume that the point of view of Zhukov or of the professional military men as a group is any more or less reasonable as regards foreign policy than are other points of view in the USSR.

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7. Zhukov's toast to justice at the diplomatic reception on 7 November 1953 was a call "on the government to speed up the adjudication of Beria," and got results six weeks later.

Comment: We disagree with this interpretation and regard it as most implausible.

8. "The customary appeal to the electors was signed by twenty persons, the first five of them being Marshals of the Soviet Union--Budenny, Bulganin, Vasilevsky, Voroshilov and Zhukov. It was an accident of the Russian alphabet that the five marshals were listed first. But it was no accident that for the first time one-quarter of the names on the election list were those of military figures."

Comment: We still believe there is an important distinction between political generals and professional military leaders. We consider Bulganin to be a political general, Budenny and Voroshilov are older officers who are now more political than military figures, Vasilevsky and Zhukov are professional officers. Notice also that when the deputies were elected, 70 out of 1,347 were military officers, almost the same percentage (5%) as in the previous Supreme Soviet, elected four years before while Stalin was still alive.

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