



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
13 June 1953

State Department review completed

**SURVEY OF UNREST IN EASTERN EUROPE**



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DIA review(s) completed.

Popular unrest in Eastern Europe has increased significantly in recent weeks in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and East Germany, but not in the remaining Satellites. In Czechoslovakia the endemic unrest was brought to a climax by the drastic monetary reform and the end of rationing decreed on 30 May. Current food shortages appear to be the major source of dissatisfaction in Rumania. In East Germany, the pressure of the regime, now apparently slightly eased, to complete the basic satellization process appears to be the motivating factor. In the remainder of the Orbit unrest and dissatisfaction are continuous and widespread, but without a specific point of focus.

Worsening economic conditions for the consumer throughout the Orbit have served this spring to keep unrest at a high pitch. While these conditions appear to be temporary, any new failures in 1953 agricultural production would widen both the area and gravity of the discontent.

Expression of popular unrest is taking such varied forms as physical attacks on Communist officials, dissemination of anti-Communist leaflets, non-cooperation by peasants and workers, efforts of some church leaders to combat Communist influence on their congregations, and escape to the West. None of these activities is believed to be inspired by organized indigenous resistance movements, which no longer are known to exist in any Eastern European Satellite. In Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania and Albania, anti-regime activity has been carried out in some cases by small, isolated, self-contained bands in addition to more general spontaneous personal acts. On the other hand, active opposition to the regimes in Bulgaria, East Germany, and Hungary, where there are few indications of the existence of such bands, consists almost entirely of depredations by individuals.



Because of the efficient police apparatus, organized in each Satellite since the war, any manifestations of organized resistance can be effectively controlled and spontaneous out breaks of unrest contained and suppressed.

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ALBANIA

There have been no extraordinary instances of unrest in Albania since 1 March 1953, and the stringent security measures which were reliably reported after Stalin's death have subsequently been relaxed.

Reports of sporadic acts of resistance continue, but such acts are frequently committed under the direction of organizations based outside of the country. The indigenous bands occasionally reported in Northern Albania appear to be uncoordinated and seldom number more than four or five men. It is not possible to ascertain the degree to which the motivation behind their activities stems from nationalism, ideological opposition to the regime, or sheer brigandry.

There have been fairly frequent government denunciations of economic sabotage in both industry and agriculture, but these may be inspired as much by a need to explain unfilled norms and an appeal to vigilance as by actual sabotage. While there have been no reliable reports of large-scale industrial unrest, it is likely that the peasants will continue to resist onerous government exactions by whatever form of malingering they consider feasible.

Evidence emanating from the Albanian press, radio and refugee sources indicates that discontent among the Albanian peasantry is increasing. The requisitioning of farm produce by the government is currently at an all time high. On 19 May the Council of Ministers and the Workers' Party Central Committee jointly issued a decree obliging the peasants not only to make good the ambitious crop collection plan of 1953 ahead of schedule, but to deliver as well that part of the 1952 quota which they were unable to fulfill because of drought conditions. There is evidence that collectivization, which has not been vigorously pursued in Albania, is once more to be undertaken on an accelerated basis. On 24 April and again in May, Hoxha personally condemned the numerous recalcitrant peasants who were negligent in their duties toward the collectives. In 1947 some 50 percent of the Albanian peasants profited from the Communist land redistribution program. It has been estimated that over one quarter of this land has since been collectivized. The arbitrary and excessive crop collection practices of the Tirana government, accompanied by the renewed campaign of obligatory collectivization, are sources of important peasant discontent, greatly reducing if not cancelling out some of the peasants' initial attachment to the Hoxha regime.

The village families also appear resentful of the draining off of their young men for periods of from several weeks to months at a time in order to relieve --gratuitously --the acute manpower shortages at the various industrial enterprises.

The industrial workers continue to be the favored segment of Albanian society. While obliged to contribute "voluntary" overtime and subscribe to "voluntary" state loans, they enjoy more liberal rations of food and clothing, work under more healthful conditions, and are exalted in the propaganda. They are the favored, elite corps of socialism.

The loyalty of the army to the regime under duress is not assured, and there have been desertions of enlisted personnel and a very few officers; however, there is no reliable evidence of active resistance to the Hoxha regime. Barring overt outside interference, the Hoxha regime should retain authority over the security forces which are adequately dispersed to retain effective control over the country.

BULGARIA

There is almost no firm evidence of resistance in Bulgaria in the last few months and only general evidence of unrest. A few unconfirmed reports have been received of "accidents" which could possibly be attributed to sabotage.

[redacted] a general happiness and feeling of relief among the populace as a result of Stalin's (and to a lesser extent, Gottwald's) death, as well as a sense of apprehension among leading Communists. [redacted] specific instances of hostile inscriptions on walls, even in places normally considered Communist strongholds. On May Day, stringent security measures were enforced in Sofia, apparently as a result of the regime's estimate of popular unrest.

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[redacted] a tremendous wave of rumors was sweeping Sofia (and probably the rest of the country), particularly after the Soviet Union started its "peace campaign." Most prevalent were rumors of an amnesty, as well as of the return of about 2,000 Bulgarians who had been deported to the Soviet Union after the Communist regime took over. Other rumors concerned the possible replacement of Premier Chervenkov in order to effect a liberalization of the regime.

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[redacted] espionage, sabotage, and conspiracy trials have continued unabated, and have possibly increased, although no publicity has been given them by the regime. While word-of-mouth news of these trials could serve somewhat the same effect as an open propaganda campaign, in controlling the population, the lack of such a campaign suggests that they are not show trials, but rather are based upon actual unrest, resistance, sabotage and espionage. Two actual espionage trials [redacted] one of which involved clandestine espionage activity of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO). [redacted] the regime has uncovered various espionage organizations, some of which may have been operating as channels for the escape of refugees.

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Very few examples of overt peasant resistance have been received in the last year, but many peasants still maintain an attitude of opposition to collectivization and forced

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deliveries even though the government has mainly been consolidating rather than extending its socialization measures in the agricultural field for the last two years.

Evidence of concrete acts of resistance has been on the decline in Bulgaria over the past few years. However, there is some evidence that antiregime attitudes remain prevalent and manifest themselves in such things as slogan-writing and rumor-mongering whenever such events as the death of Stalin or the peace campaign occur.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The unrest which has been endemic in Czechoslovakia during the past several months was brought to a climax by the drastic monetary reform and the end of rationing decreed on 30 May.

The increasing tempo of Sovietization during 1952 incited popular disaffection, which was expressed primarily by means of widespread absenteeism, sporadic strikes and labor fluctuation in industrial areas, and a growing popular apathy to the communist program. The government's concern over the mood of the people is indirectly evidenced by the notable increase in security measures during the past year, and by the repeated attempts to convince the people of their general well being and the popularity of the Socialist program.

Recent events which have tended to aggravate unrest include the Slansky trial, which is believed to have been unpopular with a sizable segment of the population, and the deaths of Stalin and Gottwald, which may have tended to raise the hopes of the disillusioned Czechs. In January 1952, false rumors of an imminent currency reform caused a nationwide buying panic which worsened the economic condition of a large portion of the population. The withholding of the 1952 Christmas bonus caused demonstrations in industrial areas. A step-up in the collectivization program, increased work norms, shortages of food and consumer goods, a more stringent rationing program with a consequent lowering of living standards, an increased emphasis on security, and deportations from urban areas for the first time, all increased the latent unrest which was climaxed by the currency reform.

Word of the imminent monetary reform apparently leaked out about the middle of May and caused minor riots and a widespread buying panic. During the last week of May many retail stores were closed for "inventory" and the government took steps to reduce the amount of money in circulation. The 30 May decree which practically wiped out savings and effectively eliminated all freedom of economic action by the Czech people, stunned the population.

The American embassy in Prague has reported, and Czech government propaganda has confirmed, widespread confusion and some "antistate activities." These apparently consist primarily

of public demonstrations, a reluctance to accept the new currency, increased absenteeism, and possibly isolated cases of riot and sabotage in industrial areas. A large part of the population is demoralized, and even Communist Party members and industrial workers who previously were attracted to the regime have been disaffected by the latest measures.

The Czech regime has increased security precautions in Prague and Pilsen and probably in the other industrial centers by increasing the number of people's militia and police, who are patrolling in small groups with light automatic weapons, and by intensifying the work of Communist agitators among the population. However, there is no evidence that violence has occurred, or that martial law has actually been declared either in Pilsen or Moravska Ostrava as rumored.

Although the Czech population is probably more aroused than at any time since the Communist coup, lack of leadership makes open resistance unlikely. If any develops, the forces at the disposal of the government are fully adequate to suppress it. Individual members of the army, security forces and Communist mass organizations may have become disaffected by the recent measures.

[redacted] The security organizations, however, will undoubtedly remain loyal to the regime.

EAST GERMANY

Popular discontent in East Germany, where the vast majority of the people are opposed to the regime, is believed to have increased greatly during the past year. This situation accounts partly for the revision of government policies announced on 9 June. It is too early to assess the extent to which this revision will dissipate discontent.

Assuming that the flight of refugees to the West is a fairly accurate barometer of the general unrest in East Germany, antipathy toward the government and its policies may well be at its postwar peak. Although the flow of refugees into West Berlin fell off somewhat during the initial phases of the Soviet "peace offensive," recent statistics again reflect a record emigration, and West German officials believe that more than a half-million East Germans will escape from the Soviet occupation zone during the current year.

The prevailing East German antagonism toward Communism has been aggravated by government policies such as the following:

- (1) the threat of total isolation of the country from the West;
- (2) the collectivization of agriculture as an ultimate goal;
- (3) the increased exploitation of labor;
- (4) the expanded military program with its promise of enforced military service for most East German youths;
- (5) the harassment of the church with its total subjugation as the eventual objective;
- (6) the steady increase in internal surveillance accompanied by the invasion of private life;
- (7) continuing purges of communist and non-communist parties and organizations and a prevailing high level of political tension;
- (8) heavy emphasis on military and investment programs with consequent shortages in consumers' items;



- (9) insistence upon internal and external policies which make German unity seem only a remote possibility.

Current policy shifts seem to be directed at these sources of discontent, although their effectiveness is doubtful. Flight from the country remains the most active manifestation of widespread opposition to these policies. There is little evidence of organized resistance, and such possible centers of opposition to the regime as the non-communist parties have been largely intimidated. Probably the most important centers of organized discontent remain within the churches and in the ranks of labor. In the case of the former, the measures taken before 9 June against the churches and their organizations provoked a strong stand from the clergy which undoubtedly had the sympathy of the population at large. This was particularly the case in the attacks against the Protestant youth organizations, the Junge Gemeinden, which are now evidently to be tolerated. Instances of open defiance from the pulpit in support of the youth organizations had been reported. Church attendance continues high, and very few clergymen appear to be deserting their posts.

The high percentage of ordinary working men and skilled laborers among refugees confirms the frequent reports of dissatisfaction in this group. Sporadic protest strikes have also been reported, and their number is believed to be larger than can be substantiated. Probably the best clue to the strength of labor dissatisfaction is the generally conciliatory labor policy which the government has been compelled to follow. While most of the typical communist exploitative techniques have been applied in East Germany, many of these have been modified in order to avoid a repetition of the serious unrest which prevailed among workers in 1951.

Equally important but on a less organized basis is the general discontent among youth and agricultural groups. Difficulties faced by the regime in recruiting for the military, the unsuccessful experiment of the voluntary youth labor corps, the low morale among the paramilitary units, and the frequent reports of purges within such communist youth organizations as the FDJ may be indicative of the general attitude. In an effort to cope with dissatisfaction within the farm group, the revised policy will reportedly return land to the farmers who had fled to the West and are now willing to return.

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HUNGARY

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There have been few overt acts to indicate active resistance in Hungary during the last two months, but there are signs that the regime still considers that potentially dangerous discontent exists. On the other hand, there is some indication that morale has improved compared to the state close to despair reported last winter.

Special security precautions taken by the regime during the National Liberation Day (4 April) and May Day celebrations point to the fact that the government is not satisfied with the state of mind of the population. Large areas around the reviewing stand were barred to onlookers on these occasions, while participants in the May Day parade showed little enthusiasm.

There are signs that the government has inaugurated a campaign to remove potentially unreliable elements. More than a hundred members of the judiciary and several hundred workers at the high-priority Sztalinvaros Steel Works and on the Hungarian state railways reportedly have been purged.

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The southern areas along the Yugoslav frontier have been disturbed by a succession of border incidents.

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The existence of unrest among the agricultural classes is indicated by continued governmental pressure to secure fulfillment of work goals. Several "kulaks" have received heavy prison sentences recently for failure to work their land or for abandoning it. The long prison terms given the chairman and four members of a district council in a southern county for "opposition to collectivization" may indicate that local government officials sympathize with the peasants.

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The industrial working class has showed signs of apathy and cynicism rather than of active unrest. However, a slow-down was reported at the large Rakosi Engineering Works in

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Budapest.

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There has been evidence that the Hungarian youth is dissatisfied with Communist controls. The recent defection of two popular dancers gives support to this thesis.

POLAND

Overt resistance to the regime in Poland is negligible, but reports indicate that hostile feeling against the regime and against the Russians continues strong among the population, most of which is basically and unalterably anti-Russian. Nevertheless, due to the strong apparatus of control which has been established over a period of several years, the regime can suppress any organized manifestation of resistance.

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[redacted] resistance among the Polish population is mainly passive in nature, especially in industry and agriculture. With regard to industry, a recent speech by the minister of public security confirmed the fact that sporadic acts of sabotage are occurring in mines, factories and shipyards. In addition, some unrest was reported toward the end of 1952 among the labor force, as a result of increases in working hours and production norms, particularly in the mines and shipyards. This unrest, however, never represented a threat to the stability of the regime. The Communist government which has been stressing "increased vigilance" by the security forces against such activity, is fully able to control the situation.

The current heavy agricultural collectivization campaign is causing certain types of passive resistance, although there are no indications of any outbreaks of violence such as occurred several years ago. The regime itself is careful not to directly antagonize the peasants as it has done in the past. The peasantry, for its part, is resorting to no more violent actions than taking legalistic means to prevent the formation of producer cooperatives, or in some cases, breaking up meetings organized by Communist agitators to formalize the formation of collectives.

Following the death of Stalin, reports from Poland indicated an atmosphere of anticipation and expectation of a change. In the farcical demonstration and parade held in the streets of Warsaw on the occasion of Stalin's funeral, embassy

observers reported that not only was the attitude of the population marching in the parade not mournful, but gay folk songs and dances were performed on the side streets.

Aside from this feeling of relief and anticipation, the only reliable report of reaction following Stalin's death came from the Gdansk area in early March. Immediately following a reported skirmish between a small resistance band and security police at a railway station, and the ensuing escape of several prisoners, the American military attache reported observing a two-day manhunt in the area, in which all available armed forces were mobilized for the search.

The church continues to tread a cautious line in relation to the regime, although as recently as 4 June the Polish Primate, Cardinal Wyszynski, spoke out defiantly against it. In addition, the overwhelmingly Roman Catholic population of Poland continues to manifest its hostility toward the regime by work slow-downs, noncooperation in rural areas with the government's collectivization and resettlement programs, and most of all, by fervent religious demonstrations and mass attendance at church.

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RUMANIA

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The resentment of the Rumanian people toward the Communist regime and its Soviet sponsors has been aggravated in recent months by a serious food shortage. Considerable unrest was reported in May in Bucharest market places, and it can be assumed that conditions may be even more stringent in areas away from the capital.

One Western diplomat was mistaken for a local Communist official by irate Bucharest crowds who shouted, "Give us food." Surprisingly enough, even many peasants from the surrounding countryside were observed in Bucharest bread lines, and retail outlets were reportedly ordered to restrict sales of unrationed bread to local urban residents only. In the past week, there appears to have been some slight improvement in the food situation, with the appearance of early vegetable crops.

The shortage was due primarily to severe drought in the summer of 1952, but peasant unrest has been aggravated by the collection-as-usual program for agricultural produce and by steady continuation of the collectivization campaign.

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A measure, reported by the American legation, to force peasants to sell their surplus produce to trade cooperatives instead of in the free market will add to agricultural unrest.

Recent government decrees indicate that the regime is cognizant of popular dissatisfaction. An early May decree for improvement of the work of trade cooperatives was sharply critical - an admission that poor organization of distribution has greatly aggravated the ill effects of the drought.

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The decree on the agricultural collection plan for 1953 also seemed to ease up on measures of compulsion and made some allowances for extending surrender deadlines.

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In the cities, another step-up in work norms on 1 April has antagonized the workers, as have increased prices resulting from general shortages and unavailability of certain basic consumer goods.

Rumors of government hoarding and an impending currency reform - which caused some panic buying in April - reflect popular dissatisfaction.

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