


4 December 1975

Note to Dick Lehman:

Attached are a group of papers which were prepared in support of Hank. As you can see, most of the flow has been in the other direction.



INFORMATION

PROVISION OF ADVISORY SUPPORT TO THE  
U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

1. Three areas in which the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer (DCI) can utilize advisory support are in the areas of consumer guidance, resource allocation, and substantive production (which includes statements of requirements for collection).

2. Advisory boards or councils could be used for this support in the following manner:

a. A single council chaired by the DCI and composed of representatives of all the involved interests--consumers, program managers, collectors and producers. This council could replace the existing NSCIC, EXCOMs, IRAC and USIB.

PRO: -- Builds in checks and balances  
-- Provides for cross-program considerations  
-- Enables consumer participation with senior intelligence officers  
-- Links producers and consumers with resource decisions  
-- Provides a forum for development of inputs to Congress  
-- Puts a "focused handle" on the Community as a whole

CON: -- To represent all appropriate interests, would have to be unwieldy in size  
-- Agendas invariably would include items of interest to only part of the membership  
-- Active member participation would require sizeable staffing support in the separate organizations  
-- The council would require a large substructure and staffing element

b. Three councils or committees, one each for consumer guidance, resource allocation, and intelligence production/requirements, with the DCI as chairman of each. This would be much like the present structure, except that any strengthened authority of the DCI in the Executive Branch hierarchy would give the council membership more incentive to participate actively. The three councils would, in effect, represent a more active NSCIC, a stronger IRAC (with no competing EXCOMs), and a continuation of the USIB.

- PRO: -- Each council of a manageable size, and consist only of actively involved members  
-- Agendas would be of interest to all members  
-- Each member would have expertise to contribute to matters under consideration  
-- The direct DCI/member contact in a small forum would facilitate interchange of views  
-- Minimum disruption of the existing system
- CON: -- Problems would be addressed in relative isolation (e.g., resource matters in one council, consumer guidance in another).  
-- More demanding on DCI time than a single council

c. A single National Intelligence Policy Council or National Intelligence Advisory Board (which would serve as a board of directors for the DCI), supported by three subordinate boards or councils, one each for consumer guidance, for resource allocation recommendations and for production/requirements. This arrangement would be a combination of alternatives a and b described above, with these exceptions:

(1) The top council or board would be small in size and would not be intended to provide representation for all elements of the Intelligence Community or the "consumer community."

(2) The DCI would be chairman of the top board, but would not be involved personally with any of the three subordinate boards. Chairmen of each of these three boards might logically be Deputy DCI's.

- PRO: -- Builds in checks and balances  
-- Conserves DCI time  
-- Provides the DCI a board of directors of manageable size, supported by sub-groups of experts
- CON: -- Getting agreement on proper membership of a small "board of directors" could prove difficult  
-- Non-participation by DCI in subordinate boards could lower the level of representation, and consequent usefulness, of these boards

3. The ICS task group which addressed the foregoing has split views. The majority favors alternative c, and the minority (which includes me) alternative b. No one favored alternative a.

4. All of the foregoing comments are based on a concept that an effective DCI must have responsibilities both for substantive intelligence matters and for resource allocation control in the Community. The key, of course, is a clear definition of what these responsibilities are before judgments can be made as to the kind of supporting or advisory organization which the DCI will require.



Chief, Coordination Staff, ICS

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The concept of checks and balances in the Intelligence Community includes a negative aspect of limits to power (checks) and representation of interests (balances).

Within this concept it has been normal to include three or more representatives in committees or other organizations related to checks and balances on the ground that when only two elements are represented, a compromise accommodation may not adequately address the interests of the entire Community. Exceptions are bilateral agreement related to rather narrowly defined problem areas.

Checks and balances currently existing within the Intelligence Community, and suggested expansions thereof, are as shown below. It should be recognized that, with only one exception (NRO/EXCOM), the committees and boards involved operate on the basis that they are advisory to the DCI.

<u>Related to</u>	<u>Existing</u>	<u>Also needed?</u>
Resource allocation	IRAC NRO EXCOM	NSA EXCOM Human Source EXCOM
Collection Requirements	USIB SIGINT Cmte. USIB COMIREX USIB Human Resource Cmte.	
Production/Requirements Guidance	USIB NIOs/Organization Representatives USIB EIC USIB GMAIC USIB JAEIC USIB SCI	
Organization Inter-relationships	SECDEF/DCI NRO agreement CIA/FBI agreements	
Consumer Guidance	NSCIC NSCIC Working Group Economic Intel. Subcmte.	

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Relation of the existing checks and balances, or additional ones, to a newly designated senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer would be as follows:

a. If the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer is also the operating head of the CIA with resource authority comparable to that presently held by the DCI:

(1) No change in present checks and balances would be called for and new EXCOMS, such as for NSA and human resource collection, could be accommodated easily.

b. If the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer is not the operating head of the CIA, and does not have any approval authority with respect to budgets of the various elements of the Community (i.e., has only recommendation authority such as is now possessed by the DCI for organizations other than the CIA):

(1) The USIB and IRAC mechanisms could continue as at present, with the senior intelligence officer as chairman.

(2) The NRO EXCOM and other EXCOMS could continue as at present, with the senior intelligence officer as chairman and the operating head of CIA as one of the members.

c. If the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer is not the operating head of the CIA, but has decision authority on resources and estimates:

(1) The USIB and IRAC mechanisms could continue as at present with the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer serving as the Chairman of both IRAC and USIB.

(2) The NRO EXCOM, and other EXCOMS, would be advisory to the senior intelligence officer. He should not be a member, otherwise he would be surrendering his decision authority on the resources involved.

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The concept of a single EXCOM to replace the existing EXCOM arrangement and the USIB and the IRAC is an interesting one, but it poses several difficult problems.

a. To represent all of the important interests in collection, production and resource allocation it would have to be a rather large, perhaps a cumbersome, organization.

b. Unless it were clearly limited to an advisory role, the EXCOM would usurp the decision authority of the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer.

c. If it were entirely advisory in nature, there probably would be difficulty in obtaining appropriate high-level representation from the NSC Staff, DoD and OMB in particular.

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Intelligence Community Checks & Balances:  
A Framework for Discussion

Papers related to or addressing the organizational alternatives facing the intelligence community tend to very quickly devolve into advocacy of some single course of action. Alternatives may be presented--but the writer usually has one conclusion in mind. This is a natural enough tendency, especially since a change, while its form is unknown, appears inevitable. It is, however, sometimes useful to step back and, before plunging into a solution, attempt to establish a framework. Such a framework should permit us to judge the relative strengths and weaknesses of the options considered in terms of what we're trying to accomplish. The two necessary aspects of any such judgment with respect to the problem at hand are:

- the contribution of the DCI
- the built-in checks and balances provided.

The first aspect is every bit as important as the second and indeed deserves special consideration. To dismiss it lightly is to proceed to change for its own sake. But, it is the purpose of this paper to focus on the second aspect. In so doing, I urge that the first receive equal time elsewhere.

The idea of developing an organizational concept with built-in checks and balances springs from certain a priori assumptions:

- the organization and its environment are intended to reach some form of stable equilibrium over a fairly broad range of possible circumstances (and, as a corollary, the broader the range of circumstances, the more intricate the web of checks and balances needs to be);
- checks and balances connote both positive and negative mechanisms: checks are the limits on power to be exercised, balances the relative abilities of the several actors to represent ~~interest~~;  
*THE INTERESTS INVOLVED;*



- the need for checks and balances reflects a desire to manage organizational conflict in a constructive fashion;
- the effective use of checks and balances depends rather critically on the number of actors involved: with one there is no check or balance; two introduces constant confrontation, polarization and impasse, or powerful alliance; three permits the exercise of coalition, compromise, divergence of view; four has the same problems as two (although slightly more cumbersome); five or more becomes just plain unmanageable. So, although not a rigorous mathematical construction, checks and balances appear to operate best in a mode of three's.

With these assumptions, a conceptual hierarchy of checks and balances can be formulated. Such a hierarchy should answer several questions:

- are the checks and balances all encompassing without being unduly restrictive?
- do they produce or enable the right (or approximately right) equilibrium? And do they operate to continually bring the organization back to equilibrium under stress?
- do they operate to manage, or are they the source of conflict?
- do they operate to permit goal-directed and adaptive behavior?
- do they enable the community to operate consistently within the overall federal system?

It is this last point in particular that demands a hierarchy that operates at several levels.

1. Between the branches of the federal government  
(interbranch or functional)

<u>Executive</u>	<u>Congressional</u>	<u>Judicial</u>
-substance	-oversight	-application of
-management	-funding	the law
-organizational structure		-adjudication
-budget formulation		
-budget execution		

2. Within each branch (intrabranh or structural)

<u>Executive</u>	<u>Congressional</u>
• DoD	• House
• CIA	• Senate
• Other USIB members	• Joint Committees
• Non-USIB executive	
• PFIAB	
• NSC structure	
• 40 Committee	

3. Internal to the community

(See Seidel paper)

Formulating checks and balances to operate on the community in the context of the hierarchy described above will permit a more precise specification of what is needed. It also permits the specification and consideration of trades. For example: Under the current setup, the DCI encounters checks at virtually every turn in his community role except one--his relationship to CIA. If it becomes desirable to loosen his tie with the agency, it also becomes necessary to reduce the number of checks on him elsewhere if it is desirable to preserve his current level of impact. This can be done by strengthening his role in the structural sense (level 2) or in the functional sense (level 1)--or some combinations of the two. One might compensate for a proposed separation from the agency by giving him stronger powers in budget formulation, overall management and relationship to Congress (and consequently reducing those roles for those who now play them). Once done, it is useful to ask: Does this new set of strengths constitute in any sense an undesirably strong role? What other checks exist to limit? Do they exist or must they be created?

One thing seems evident--checks and balances will rarely grow through experience. They must be designed up front if they are to operate dynamically without introducing unwanted side effects--the situation we have now in some respects.

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An essential element of any effective system of checks and balances is the existence of a well defined arrangement for, and availability of, review and appeal to the highest authority.

Assumes that the DCI has full discretion and management responsibility. The Agency the extent of which

Checks and Balances: The Executive Committee (EXCOM) Concept and the DCI

The ultimate task of the EXCOM is resource decision and policy guidance to the subject manager(s). The process involves the preparation of proposals by the subject management and the staffing of issues and options for consideration of the EXCOM.

The membership of any EXCOM is the key to any consideration of the checks and balances present. The issue revolves around the question of the degree to which organizations which have a direct interest in, or are directly affected by, the EXCOM decision process are represented on the committee. For example, the current NRO EXCOM has two members, the DCI and the ASD/I. The de facto operating managers of the ~~XXXX~~ NRO are subordinate to each of the EXCOM members, e.g., the USAF organization through the chain to OSD and the ASD/I, and the CIA/DDS&T to the DCI.

In terms of direct interests involved in the outcome of the NRO EXCOM it is noted that NRO resources compete with other collection program resources both in terms of fiscal and budgetary matters and substantive efficiency and effectiveness. However, these organizations are not represented on the NRO EXCOM. The purpose of the NRO resources are substantive information gain and yet, some of the primary organizations concerned with this interest such as the State Department are also, not represented on the NRO EXCOM. In like manner, a case can also be made for NASA membership, if only ex officio status.

The point here is that a wider representation of organizational interests is likely to increase the scope of the decision process while at the same time increasing the checks and balances upon the involved membership. It can also be argued that the dual membership in the current NRO EXCOM tends to produce a polarization on issues along



be specifically tailored to the subject problem. For example, the interests and organizations involved in an EXCOM for foreign intelligence production resources and operations might appear quite different than that of an NSA or NRO EXCOM. This would tend to serve the concept of check and balances with a greater focus upon the pragmatic realities of "interest" representation. The MULTI-EXCOM approach also allows for continuity of the USIB role with an even greater emphasis of its role in production function primary concerns, e.g., production resources, consumer demands, and production requirements for collection.

One final point cannot be ignored. The separation of the DCI from CIA has been argued in many quarters. The primary point made is that the DCI who must lead and adjudicate matters of interest to the entire community should not have direct management over specific intelligence interests (CIAs) which are continuously at issue on the community level. The issue is clear, however, separation is an act which impinges in many places upon the current checks and balances of all of the organizations and institutions. For example, the DCI loses a very real base of organizational and community power if separated from CIA. CIA loses a very real element of power and protection of its interests. Gains for Defense and State interests appear evident. Thus, separation is not a pragmatic solution in and of itself, but one which must be accompanied by offsetting actions if major bureaucratic confrontations and dislocations are to be avoided. The objective is one of increasing the checks and balances and the efficiency and effectiveness of community operation, not necessarily one of changing the power balance or organizational interest and mission structure existent in the community.

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4 DEC 1975

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: National and Tactical Intelligence: Defining Terms

1. The discussion of issues associated with the interrelationship of national, departmental, and tactical intelligence is sometimes complicated by semantic confusion. Loose definitions of each may suffice in conversations among professionals. But outsiders need help when these terms are tossed about, and even professionals may find themselves perplexed or in simple disagreement about what these terms mean when tangible questions (concerning, for example, the allocation of resources) come into play. Thus, it would be useful to arrive at some common definitions which--even if they do not satisfy all the interests concerned and are to a degree arbitrary in their particulars--would start us all off with the same vocabulary.

2. National Intelligence: In the simplest and most olympian construct, national intelligence refers to information needed by the President and his principal advisors for the formulation of foreign and defense policies. For purposes of convenience, this definition should probably be refined. We would consider intelligence to be national in character if it meets three criteria: (1) it concerns matters which impinge on US interests abroad in such a way as to probably require the attention of senior US

policy makers; (2) it is disseminated, inter alia, to a national-level audience; and (3) it is produced (or processed) by a member of the Intelligence Community.\*

3. Departmental Intelligence: This is information produced within an intelligence component of a given department which is likely to be of major interest only to that department and/or which is intended for use within that department. It is not disseminated to a large national audience.\*\*

4. <sup>(OPERATIONAL)</sup>Tactical Intelligence: This is information, almost always of a purely military nature, which is of direct and primary (though usually not of exclusive) interest to <sup>OPERATIONAL</sup>~~tactical~~ commanders. <sup>OPERATIONAL</sup>~~Tactical~~ intelligence may serve as an important source of departmental and national intelligence.

\* Under this definition (and contrary to some opinion), national intelligence does not have to be coordinated intelligence. Further, under this definition, information from the Department of Agriculture which met criteria (1) and (2) would still not be called national intelligence; a "raw" report not assessed by an intelligence agency would be if it satisfied all three criteria, though more often than not national intelligence is "finished" (i.e., analyzed) intelligence.

\*\* INR's Afternoon Summary is a departmental intelligence publication. It may deal with matters of great importance and is produced by a member of the Community, but it is held within the Department of State. Defense Intelligence Notices, on the other hand, are sent to a sizeable national audience, are produced by a member of the Community, and frequently deal with subjects of national consequence, and thus are a form of national intelligence.



5. None of these definitions take into account the ways in which information is acquired, and this is a deliberate omission. National means of collection (e. g. , satellites) can acquire all three kinds of intelligence. Though less frequently, so too can departmental and tactical means of collection.

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INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONAL INTERESTS, DYNAMICS,  
AND THE CHECKS AND BALANCES

Many knowledgeable administrators and legislators believe that reform and change are essential in the organization and management of American intelligence. In analyzing the case for such reform, particular attention should be given to the mechanisms and procedures developed since World War II which provided some degree of stability to the activities and relationships of the bureaucratic baronies which compose the Intelligence Community. To some degree these mechanisms and procedures tended to establish natural bureaucratic power balances along with a system of checks and balances--some imposed by the highest executive level, but most resulting from bureaucratic agreements. In terms of formal documentation and as "rules of the game", the DCID's, Defense Directives on DIA, NSA, and NRO, and various CIA-DoD memoranda of agreement provide ample evidence. However, the realities of such arrangements can only be properly understood in the context of their historical development and the nature of the informal network and bureaucratic practices and precedents which co-exist with the de jure formalisms.

It can be argued that these mechanisms and procedures and the very balances they engendered have not been sufficiently dynamic to meet the changes wrought by the interaction of new technologies, environments, and decision making. Indeed, the fact that so many of these documents were promulgated years ago, have never been updated and do not truly reflect current realities would appear

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to support such a view. However, probably of more importance, is a questioning and analysis of the changes in the interests, influences, and missions of the organizations themselves in order to ascertain where real imbalances and discontinuities exist.

Historically, the foreign office and the military had controlled the collection means and intelligence products which officially explained to national leaders the nature of the external world and its threats. Following World War II the centralized and independent intelligence organization reporting through the DCI to the national leadership soon became a threat to both the intelligence power of the foreign office and the military. However, it was the exploitation of aerospace and communications technology by intelligence over the ensuing years which served to focus and technically centralize a greater part of the means to knowledge and which produced the greatest threat to departmental hegemony over national intelligence.

If changing technology shaped the magnitude of American intelligence, the changing nature of national decision making conclusively shaped its institutional and bureaucratic direction. The centralization and focusing of decisions in Washington, particularly the White House, which were formerly the province of the military or the foreign office placed an ever growing emphasis upon the DCI as the head of American intelligence.

Although CIA grew in power and prestige, it was the DoD and the military which dominated the American intelligence budget and the technical collection means which comprised the lion's share of that budget. However, the tendencies

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toward centralization caused by the new decision making modes and the new technology was also having its impact upon military service and command intelligence interests.

In Signal Intelligence, the National Security Agency, established by a Defense Directive in 1952, soon dominated an area of activity that was once the pride of the military services and its operating forces. Each move over the years tended to stress the national nature of our SIGINT activities as opposed to military war fighting needs. The military sought counterbalancing moves in strengthening direct support capabilities and withdrawing activities in the name of electronic warfare. By 1975, the House Appropriation Committee was hinting at withdrawing NSA from DoD and making it an independent national-level agency.

Non-SIGINT activities were further centralized in Defense with the establishment of DIA which tended to centralize military intelligence production activities and provide management control over many of the non-communication intelligence collection activities of the services.

In the field of aerospace intelligence activities, a keen technical competition developed between CIA and the military (primarily the Air Force). The result was NRO. Here again, centralization became inevitable because of the nature of the technology and its fiscal demands. The latter factor was primary in denying individual capabilities to single military services, commands, or other government agencies. Although de jure fiscal control for the NRO effort resides in DoD, the growth of CIA activities within the program became an endemic source of controversy

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spurred on by the ever tightening fiscal problems. The nature of the new real-time system technology and its control by CIA has only served to accentuate the problem.

The growth of CIA's role in national intelligence production, particularly in the military substantive area, and CIA domination of human covert collection activities have also served to increase the friction between departmental and national levels.

In recent years there has been a growing emphasis by the DoD and the military to reemphasize war fighting intelligence needs and contingencies and the potential role of "national" intelligence resources in meeting these needs. At the same time, the age of "Detente" and the demands of national policy levels are exacting ever increasing requirements for real-time crisis control information in support of war avoidance. Still another area of this problem is the growing controversy between NASA and the civil users of foreign and domestic imagery and multi-spectral data with Defense and the intelligence interests.

The quest for autonomy is a well understood phenomena of government organization, along with the resistance to policies which require senior officials to yield autonomy and work closely with another organization. American intelligence community organization in its USIB, IRAC, and ExCom structures is replete with examples of attempts to deal with this problem. However, the new technology (changed national decision modes, increased environmental interdependencies, and new fiscal and budgetary demands) have tended to polarize the conflicting bureaucratic interests. This condition has been severely exacerbated by the current investigations of intelligence and a questioning of the very foundations for intelligence operations in a democracy.

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Key to adequate checks and balances within the Intelligence Community is the interaction, management control, and oversight of CIA, NSA, and NRO. CIA and NSA are similar to the degree that they have both gained considerable autonomy over the past twenty years and have successfully resisted meaningful Community oversight and evaluation.

It was not until the formation of the IRAC in November 1971 that CIA resources were explicitly directed to be included in a Community review and evaluation of intelligence resources and their allocation. NSA resources and programs had been reviewed in the CCP Program Review exercises conducted by DDR&E since 1961, and later in the ASD(I) CDIP review.

However, the effectiveness of IRAC has been seriously questioned. If the letter of the November 1971 directive was met rather than its spirit, it is clear that organizational interests tended to conflict with directed behavior and the ability to ignore the spirit was built into the directive, as much by what it did as what it did not do.

IRAC was to create a meaningful review mechanism to allow the DCI to provide the President (and Congress) with a detailed review of the needs and performance of the Intelligence Community. CIA, NSA, NRO, and the ASD(I) all have interests which conflict with wholehearted support of IRAC or, in fact, with any measure which seeks to integrate review and evaluation of the individual programs under the DCI or anyone else.

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One of the Omissions of November 1971 which insured the ineffectiveness of IRAC was the failure to merge NRO EXCOM under the IRAC. This assured that any review of NRO resources (e.g., EXCOM decisions) by IRAC would be meaningless. The subsequent reduction of the EXCOM membership to only the DCI and the ASD/I has tended to polarize conflicts which are already built into the CIA/USAF quest for autonomy.

Realistically, the NRO EXCOM representation is something of an exclusive club which clearly has maintained its exclusivity and has not shared the resource decision process with agencies and departments whose interests (though clearly related) would tend to introduce different and possibly divergent elements into the decision process. For example, CIA, Air Force, and ASD/I would probably be appalled at the thought of an NRO EXCOM with members from State, NSA, NASA, and JCS. Yet the conflict of tradeoffs and future decisions involving social welfare and war avoidance capabilities clearly suggests that principal adversaries should participate in such forums and decisions.

A recent CIA study of community reorganization suggested that NSA (CCP) be subject to an EXCOM review in much the same fashion as the NRO. One notes with interest that the same study failed to subject CIA to the same review process.

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The point is that existing checks and balances at the community level are not uniform with respect to interests, participants, or equities. What is needed is not all embracing central authority but greater participation of interests and adversaries in meaningful decision forums. Real checks and balances will not be gained by subordinating NSA and NRO to CIA -- nor will they be gained by leaving NSA and NRO in a position to play the DCI against the Secretary of Defense and vice-versa with other vital interests such as those of the State Department clearly reduced to minor participation.

The real meaning of the separation of the DCI from CIA is the creation of a senior foreign intelligence officer who will be a positive force in managing and arbitrating the diverse interests of the functional intelligence bureaucracies and the related problems of the national, departmental and agency interests which they serve.

For example, the CIA reorganization paper recognized implicitly that CIA would lose authority and autonomy if the DCI were separated. Their answer was to absorb NRO within CIA and balance the NSA power by creating an EXCOM for NSA.

Behaviorally, we cannot expect CIA or any other intelligence agency or interest to regard the separation of the DCI in terms or options which will reduce the power, position, or relative autonomy of their current position. The November 1971 directive attempted to establish a corporate manager and still retain the checks and balances of the existent status quo. It did not work and could not work.



If the priorities and direction of the November 1971 directive as upheld by President Ford in October 1974 are still the same, it is evident that a more workable community arrangement is possible. However, if the options are to be realistic, organizational involvement in the decision process should be optimized so that organizational interests will have full expression and the potential for new checks and balances are increased with issues fully aired.

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COLDY TO NWC  
JSC

in assessing the Community's overall performance by spotting areas where corrective action needs to be taken. I also use the KEPS to formulate the resource allocation recommendations included in the annual National Foreign Intelligence Program budget.

The Future of the Intelligence Community

The changes directed by the President in 1971, and those that I have undertaken, are not, however, going to be sufficient. The nature and role of both the Intelligence Community in general and, especially, the powers and functions of the DCI, are in for a thorough revamping. If fundamental change could be at least contemplated in 1971, it is a central issue in 1975. Current political developments suggest that the National Security Act of 1947 will be rewritten, at least to some degree. I believe it should be. It is not an exaggeration to observe that we are fast approaching an historical moment and unique opportunity to charter the Intelligence Community to meet future needs for effective intelligence support. It may be another 25 years before events provide the President and Congress a comparable opportunity. So, I will conclude with what is supposed to be unheard of for an intelligence officer -- a bit of crystal ball gazing. I think we can at least suggest what kind of DCI we may have in the future.

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It is not hard to conceive of several variations of the role of the DCI, plus, of course, an almost infinite number of subvariations. I will discuss only the three most obvious -- or most likely -- possibilities, and point out what I personally see as the pros and cons of each one.

First, we could have an independent DCI attached to the Office of the President, or the National Security Council, with supervisory and direct management authority over CIA, NSA and the National Reconnaissance Office. This DCI would also have responsibility for production of national estimates, which would mean that the NIOs and IC Staff presumably would become the nucleus of the "independent DCI's" staff.

This variation would give the DCI greater access to the President, and make him indeed the senior spokesman for the Community as a whole. It would arm him with strong authority over three national agencies rather than only one, thus concentrating responsibility for national intelligence performance. It would also eliminate charges of favoritism among agencies, focus responsibility on national intelligence, and leave departmental intelligence to the departments. Finally, it would relegate most detailed administrative chores to the various agency heads -- CIA, NSA, and the National Reconnaissance Office.

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There would, of course, be some disadvantages to this variation, such as possible politicization through proximity to the President, as well as a weakening of the DCI's direct access to the analytic resources of the Community unless the NIOs and NIE production went with him. It certainly would establish a bureaucratic barrier to detailed control of sensitive CIA clandestine activities. It would also raise the possibility of "end runs" directly to the President by agency heads, and could create conflicts with State and Defense Department chiefs over intelligence assessments and activities of departments. Further, it would weaken the DCI's line authority over subordinate agencies, due to breadth of responsibilities, and have -- at first -- the unsettling effect of changing current Community structure.

Secondly, one can envisage a DCI of approximately the present standing, but with greater influence over NSA and the National Reconnaissance Office. This DCI could have two Deputies with appropriate staffs -- one for Community management, and one for direct management of CIA.

This variant would maintain and strengthen the present Community structure, while giving the DCI increased influence on and responsibility for all national intelli-

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gence programs, such as signals and satellite intelligence. He would also have direct responsibility for sensitive clandestine action. There would be minimum turbulence due to bureaucratic changes, and the tradition of independence of intelligence from departmental or White House pressures would be preserved, while providing a spokesman for Congressional review of all national intelligence. Conflict with department heads over departmental intelligence activities could be minimized, and only minor legislative modifications to the present intelligence structure would be needed.

On the debit side, however, the ambiguous responsibility of the DCI for departmental intelligence activities would still be with us, and he would still have responsibility for non-CIA budgets without full authority. Separation from the White House would limit feedback from the President and policy makers concerning intelligence requirements and policy needs. More important, the DCI's status as subordinate to the Secretaries of State and Defense would reduce the impact of intelligence judgments, and reduce his access to sensitive departmental activities and communications. Lastly, this variant would miss the opportunity to make a substantial reshuffling in intelligence. It would not refurbish the CIA image, or increase the DCI's authority over the Community.

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A third variation would reduce the DCI's role to direction of a CIA that had no responsibility for other departmental intelligence activities. Analysis and technical collection would be accomplished by other agencies, or even the NSC.

This would have the advantage of reducing the visibility of CIA -- in fact, the Agency might even be renamed -- while allowing it to continue clandestine activities. Attaching analytical elements to the NSC or other agencies would improve their direct access to and impact on policy concerns, while putting technical intelligence activities within Department of Defense management structure might increase efficiency. Coordination of clandestine activities with State Department policy could be improved by making CIA a subordinate agency to the Secretary of State, like AID and USIA already are. Lastly, there could be some reduction in the service and support structure developed for the present larger CIA.

This plan would, however, have some serious drawbacks. First, the dependence of the Intelligence Community on technology is increasing, not reducing, the need for centralized Community management. There would also be poorer coordination of national intelligence activities, and the objectivity of Estimates might be hard

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to maintain. CIA would lose its flexibility in operations, technology, analysis, and support to the government as a whole, while the morale and momentum of ongoing CIA cohesion would be destroyed. There would probably be some reduction in the independence of intelligence advice and assessments if the analytical functions of CIA were transferred to the NSC. If they were transferred to some of the other existing agencies, a myopic departmental analyses might replace the present broad interdisciplinary approach. Finally, there would be the costs -- monetary and emotional -- of a major bureaucratic upheaval.

I must stress that in offering these options I speak solely as the present Director of Central Intelligence. Since neither the Administration nor the Congress has yet made any formal proposal for the reorganization of the Intelligence Community, it would be manifestly inappropriate for me to express any personal preference for any of the possibilities I have just outlined.

But I can say that the role of the Intelligence Community in relation to national security policy is both extensive and important. It calls for a lot of hard work from the dedicated men and women who staff the various components of the Community. As has often been pointed

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out, our failures get wide publicity, and our successes frequently go unheralded. But every now and then we do get a "well done" from those who really count. I only hope that, whatever changes in the Community are in fact finally made, they will still permit the intelligence professionals to serve the President, the Congress, and the American people as well, or preferably better, than they have in the 28 years since the Intelligence Community was created.

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