

26 March 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: George A. Carver, Jr.
D/DCI/NIO

STAT FROM

: [REDACTED]
NIO, [REDACTED]

SUBJECT : Comments on Dick Lehman's Paper

I have galloped through Dick's paper in between putting the finishing touches on an Estimate, telling a Branch chief in detail what was wrong with his analyst's second draft of a paper I commissioned, and going off to do battle on a NSSM analysis of which I deeply disapprove. I have not commented on points where you and John have already made points with which I agree. Nor have I paused to be thoughtful or even tactful. But perhaps one or two of these quick reactions may be helpful.

- p. 3 - not any more systematic - that is the whole point. Most surveys of "consumer acceptance" are bureaucratic exercises and produce responses that, even when they are not merely polite, are too generalized to be useful. The NIO is in touch at least with the Assistant Secretary (Country Director level consumer) in ways that clarify what they want and create a somewhat greater prospect that Intelligence will be able to provide it.
- p. 4 - Point re Production - Smooth and literate texts etc. - It seems hard for people who have not been continuously engaged in the estimative process to understand that it really is an interagency one. What comes out under blue covers frequently bears very little relation to the original draft however smooth and literate. Whether it is the latter depends less on the original draft than on the mix achieved between committee formulations -- always cumbersome -- and the ability of the literate people around the table (there are always a few) to translate these formulations into English rapidly and persuasively.

- 2 -

- p. 5 - I don't understand the "who is responsible". I had always thought that whatever the procedures by which Estimates were written, the ultimate judgment on their "internal" and "external" adequacies was made by USIB under the leadership of the DCI. To be sure, this is cumbersome because it is interagency but that's what Estimates are.
- p. 10 - Obvious answer to second sentence is that division of functions and number of NIOs needs rethinking from time to time. Some areas may need to be divided up; others consolidated. Some to be sure can't be and then as in case you need two deputies. STA
- p. 14 - Office Chief Review - I don't think this is such a bad idea. Much depends on the calibre and interests of the Office Chief. Maurice Ernst has on occasion held up papers I have commissioned in order to review them himself. I am delighted when he does so; he stimulates new thoughts and improves the paper. My own view -- based to be sure largely on what I have received in my own area but also on what I read that comes out of this Agency alone -- is that the review for substance and analysis provided at the Branch level and above is often far less rigorous than it should be.
- p. 16 - If OCI analysts were more busy analyzing and less busy summarizing, it would take them much less time to produce better-quality estimate drafts.
- pp. 16, 17 - Why does OCI have to become an Office of National Intelligence in order to give its analysts more training in how to analyze and less reason to think that their most important mission in life is to summarize the traffic with reasonable frequency.

The burning and recurring question that comes to my mind as I read this paper is - what is a generalist? Surely with so much emphasis on how much a generalist could do for us, there ought to be some definition of what he is. Or isn't all this generalist stuff a red herring?

SECRET

26 March 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NIO

SUBJECT: Comments on Dick Lehman's Paper
Concerning National Intelligence
Production

1. It seems to me that the NIO could relinquish the responsibility for managing national intelligence production provided he retains the authority to recommend subjects for national production, and to review the final paper to ensure that it is objective and responsive to the needs of Washington's decisionmakers.

2. Only the NIO is in regular contact with collectors and analysts from all agencies, with decisionmakers, and with the DCI who, in turn, is in touch with the President, the Secretary of State and other top-level policymakers. Thus, combined with his specialized knowledge, the NIO is uniquely qualified to ascertain current and long-range needs of consumers, to make sure that collection and production is responsive to these needs, to assess the quality of performance of collectors and analysts, and to serve as the DCI's substantive expert in his assigned field.

3. I do feel that if national production is relegated to analysts in the DDI, INR, and DIA, those analysts should receive specialized training in the production of estimative intelligence. This would involve setting up a new course in OTR which could perhaps be taught by former members of the ONE.

4. While on the subject of analysts, I think that much current intelligence could qualify as national intelligence if the author were to relate the significance of a foreign development on US national interests. Too often, analysis relates an event to its effect on elements of the country concerned or on neighboring countries -- rather than its



25X

SECRET

SECRET

effect on US unemployment, the supply of critical materials to the US, US commitments under existing treaties, negotiations with a foreign power, or the availability of illicit narcotics in the US.



Acting National Intelligence Officer
for Latin America

25X

SECRET

SECRET

25X

26 March 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NIO

SUBJECT : Comments on Dick Lehman's 23 March Draft
Regarding National Intelligence Production

I have four general comments and three or four specific ones.

General Comments


1. As a whole, this paper pays little attention to the fact that basically we face a people problem. If one is after superior analytic intelligence (and not just bureaucratic smoothness) one needs superior analysts working in superior conditions with superior inducements. This was the original philosophy of ONE and for many years it worked. Inevitably, those not included will charge "elitism." That is the price you pay, and considering what's at stake -- if we believe what we say about the importance of quality intelligence -- then the price is not very high. Certainly it is not as high as implied by the frequent expressions of concern over it in Dick's paper.
2. A related point. One of ONE's best, and least acknowledged, roles was as a school of analysis. Most ONE staffers (promising young officers when recruited) really learned their trade in on-the-job training in a rigorous school from critical colleagues both within the office, the community, and the many distinguished academic consultants who were pleased to associate with that office. Alumni of that school are still manning key positions all over the government. (This includes Scowcroft's deputy, a recent head of DIA, two of the Deputy Directors of the Agency, and many of the staff of the NIO complex.) There is no comparable training system at work now. Hence, we are living on capital and not replacing it.
3. Here and there this paper reflects the assumption that NIOs in fact enjoy the authority to commandeer analytic resources in competition with line managers. NIO needs have, in my experience, been better served than one might have anticipated in the nature of the relationship, but they have not been as well served as implied here. And for perfectly obvious reasons. Neither in the Agency and certainly not in the Community do they have clear authority and direct-response assets commensurate with

25X

SECRET

25X

SECRET



25X

their responsibilities. Bill Colby's repeated explicit support for the system enabled it to work, but unless this is constantly reiterated by the Director, it bogs down.

4. Any discussion of this subject should acknowledge that the ad hoc nature of the present system has been commensurate with the unique style of foreign policy and national security management during the past few years. On the high likelihood that we are approaching the end of one era (no matter who wins in November), and the historical probability that the next era will be quite different in style and procedure, planning for the future should free itself to some extent from criteria relevant only to the recent past.

More Specific Comments

1. Top of Page 11. Whether or not one could find examples of this "nice to have" kind of paper or not, I am more impressed with the opposite phenomenon. By that, I mean instances in which offices have scratched around for papers they would like to do, found a mild consumer "no objection," launched the papers, and then found themselves so engaged in that project that they did not have time for more pressing problems turned up by the NIO or someone else.

2. Page 23, Paragraph 21. In all modesty, there have been a number of times in the past two years and a number of issues on which the NIO/WE has played a major coordinating role which I do not believe could have handily been done by the line officers. This includes three or four NIEs


25X



3. Page 23, Paragraph 22. I would suggest that the major disadvantage to model two is not "uncertainty" about the linkages. As I read the model, it is practically guaranteed that they would not work efficiently.

4. Page 24, Paragraph 25. The last two sentences are obiter dicta of questionable validity. I am not sure that "the maturing of line analysts" is enough of a general reality to warrant the alleged consensus, and while OCI has many excellent analysts, it remains hard to secure their services for the time required or give them the incentive they need for first-class work when their money is still made in the current intelligence business. And OPR of course continues to resist the idea of working on estimates, even though many of its analysts would like to do so.

25X



National Intelligence Officer
for Western Europe

SECRET

