


CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

1 April 1976

Mr. Ramsey Forbush

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Dear Mr. Forbush:

Helene Boatner has been kind enough to show me your thoughts on how National Intelligence should be produced. As you may know, I have a responsibility to reexamine the system and make changes if I think them necessary. Since I am approaching the problem cold, the views of those who, like yourself, have been deeply involved and understand what is required are especially valuable.

You might be interested to know that I had lunch a few weeks ago with several of your ONE colleagues, including Sherman Kent and John Huizenga. They and a number of others have urged me, as you have, to reestablish an advisory board. I have not yet decided to do so, but the arguments in favor are strong and you have reinforced them.

Again, many thanks for your suggestions. Please feel free to write again. I would like to stay in touch with our distinguished alumni.

Sincerely,


George Bush



Dick Lehman.

1. Dick please review
2. Please draft
a short note
to him from me
of thanks!

G B

MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]

Special Asst. to DCI

Handwritten: 76-7157/1

Attached is another input to the "what to do about national intelligence" problem. It was sent to me by Ramsey Forbush. Ramsey, as you may recall, was the last head of ONE (during the months between Huizenga's retirement and abolition of ONE) and the first head of OPR. Between retirement and moving to Santa Fe, he headed the OTR-sponsored team that did the study on "CIA Intelligence Support for Foreign and National Security Policy Making." This one is for you to pass on to the DCI if you think he'd be interested. I am sending a copy to Dick Lehman

[redacted] (ATE)
-15 Mar76

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REORGANIZING TO IMPROVE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Recent Congressional cavortings aside, it is a fact that the performance of CIA and the Intelligence Community in the preparation of National Intelligence has been extremely uneven during the past few years. Improvement is both possible and necessary; it must stem principally from organizational change. For only if there is a more potent and skillful directing body can National Intelligence become more responsive to the needs of key policy makers, more supportive of their difficult tasks, and more anticipatory of emerging problems which they will have to face in the future.

A new Office for the Production of National Intelligence should be established, absorbing the effective practitioners among present National Intelligence Officers and taking on certain functions now sketchily handled by the Intelligence Community Staff (which should be appropriately reduced in size). This new office should be headed by a distinguished expert on international affairs who would report directly to the DCI and, at the same time, maintain close working relationships with the various intelligence production shops in the Community. The office itself would be relatively small but would command the best talent obtainable.

Responsibilities would include:

1. Preparation of National Intelligence Estimates of high quality and perceptiveness;
2. Intimate contact with policy makers and the provision of National Intelligence relevant to their concerns;
3. Looking ahead, independently, so as to identify and focus attention upon new international problems before they have fully emerged;
4. Regular review of the intelligence products of Community elements and the selection of the best for special attention by policy makers; periodic advice to the DCI on enhancing performance, eliminating duplication, etc.

The main components of the new office would be:

1. Its director and a senior advisory panel of 8 or 10 distinguished intelligence figures who would take the lead in assuring the quality of National Estimates, exercising the independent anticipatory role, and overseeing the process of broad review;
2. A liaison staff of perhaps a dozen who would keep up regular, frequent contact with policy makers, making sure that National Intelligence was effectively transmitted -- and responsive as well as responsible;
3. A permanent substantive staff of 20 or 25 middle-grade intelligence officers, most of whom would be area specialists, and all of whom would be selected for perceptiveness of mind, for drafting talents, and for a bent toward predictive intelligence;
4. A changing cadre of highly specialized experts, seconded from other production offices in the Community for such periods as required to prepare particular National Intelligence Estimates or to carry through other projects of outstanding importance.

An office thus designed would be small enough to hold bureaucratic problems to a minimum so as to devote all its energies to the challenging assignments it would face. It would have the strength to do a superior job -- not only through the prowess and imagination of its own people, but also through its ability to call upon the very best resources available anywhere in the Intelligence Community.

It could, I am convinced, do much to overcome some of the most glaring weaknesses in present intelligence performance.


Ramsey Forbush

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

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[redacted]

DATE)
--15 Mar76

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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