

19 April 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA

:

[Redacted Box]

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FROM

:

Edward W. Proctor  
Acting CIA Member, USIB

SUBJECT

:

Comments on Proposed DCID No. 1/19

1. This is in response to the request for comments on the proposed DCID 1/19 circulated at the USIB Meeting of 15 April 1976.

2. As Acting CIA Member of USIB, I have one serious problem with the proposal: the designation of the Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community as the Vice Chairman of the new National Foreign Intelligence Board.

3. A review of the function of the NFIB clearly shows that the Board is to deal almost exclusively with the substance of intelligence. It is to coordinate national intelligence; improve relations with consumers; establish substantive requirements, priorities and objectives; provide operational guidance for collection systems; deal with the protection of sources and methods; and develop policies regarding liaison with foreign governments. None of these responsibilities is the primary concern of the Community Deputy. Below the level of the DCI himself, all are the primary concerns of the CIA and other production and collection elements.

4. If the Community Deputy is the Vice Chairman, there are some very practical considerations. First, the proposed staffing pattern for the Intelligence Community Staff does not provide for a staff to provide substantive support to the Community Deputy on the

*should not be staff for this - what does it mean?*

functions enumerated in the proposed DCID. If he is to draw his support from his staff, then it would have to be expanded greatly and would duplicate capabilities which already exist in other parts of the Community. If he is not to draw on his staff for this support, the question remains as to how this will be done and where it will come from.

NOTE: Your attention is directed to the fact that the staff of the DCI is to be expanded.

5. Furthermore, there is the question of how wide a scope of activity any Community Deputy will be able to handle. His primary responsibilities are clearly concerned with tasks like the allocation of resources, preparation of the budget and proposals for large and costly new projects. Even if the procedures for these tasks were fully developed and had been operating for several years, these tasks would be very demanding. But as things stand now, he has to develop these procedures and implement them. He should not be diverted to other kinds of tasks.

6. In terms of the congruence of the functions of the Board and the primary responsibilities of his position, the logic of the situation would be to designate the CIA Deputy as the Vice Chairman of the NFIB. There would be no need for any special arrangements or increased staffing, if the CIA Deputy is the Vice Chairman.

7. On this basis, the Acting CIA Member of USIB, with the full agreement of the four Deputy Directors of CIA, recommends that the Deputy to the DCI for CIA be designated the Vice Chairman of USIB.

[Redacted Signature]

Edward W. Proctor

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- 1 - Mr. Lehman
- 1 - DDI Chrono
- 1 - DDI DCID file

*I believe it can be handled by having CIA Deputy act for DCI on int'l. production matter - USIB - already done by [Redacted]*

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 Routing Slip

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5	DDI		X		
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7	DDO		X		
8	D/DCI/IC		X		
9	D/DCI/NIO		X		
10	GC				
11	LC				
12	IG				
13	Compt				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/S				
16	DTR				
17	Asst/DCI				
18	AO/DCI				
19	<i>D. Lehman</i>		X		
20	<i>I. Knoche</i>		X		
21	SA/DCI		X		
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Remarks:

See DCI Notes.

*R. C. Evans*  
 Executive Secretary

20 Apr 76

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1	Director		
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<b>CONCURRENCE</b>		<b>INFORMATION</b>	<b>SIGNATURE</b>
<b>Remarks:</b>			
<p style="font-size: 1.2em; font-family: cursive;">Dan-Hank-Dick</p> <p style="font-size: 1.2em; font-family: cursive;">I do not visualize a separate staff or an expanded staff for the vice-chairman's responsibilities</p> <p style="font-size: 2em; font-family: cursive;">CS</p>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
<b>FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.</b>			<b>DATE</b>
Acting CIA Member, USIB			19 April
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Remarks:  
 8: For comment and preparation of a reply for the Director's signature.

05 APR 1976

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION AT THE USIB FOLLOW-ON CONFERENCE, 5 APRIL

Title of the Group

USIB

- ✓ National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB)
- Something else

Functions of the Board

- ✓ Comparable to the present USIB
- Production review only
- ✓ Addition of consumer interface

Membership of the Board

- ✓ As at present
- As at present, with NRO added
- As at present plus military intelligence chiefs as full members
- Very restricted (CIA, DIA, INR - the production elements)

Vice chairmanship of the Board

D/DCI/IC or DDCI/CIA

Designation of committees

- ✓ USIB Committees (or committees of what title the board has)
- DCI committees

Committee structure

As at present  
Add a committee of Inspector Generals (to respond to Oversight Board)  
Disestablish the CCPC

Committee supervision

All committees monitored by D/DCI/IC  
Some committees located in DCI office and outside D/DCI/ overview  
(IG and Security Committees have been suggested)

Location of the secretariat

In the ICS  
In the office of the DCI



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OPTIONS FOR USIB REORGANIZATION

Introduction

There is a consensus among USIB members and observers that a USIB-like board is both desirable and necessary. The following options and discussion of more radical approaches to USIB organization, e.g., approaches requiring more basic organizational changes, were prepared after careful review of comments by USIB principals and a preliminary meeting with the DCI on the subject.

The purpose of this paper is to provide the Director and his immediate advisors with further guidance on this issue. The subject of USIB reorganization has been tentatively scheduled for the USIB agenda on 8 April 1976.

The two options presented, Option I, "The Modified USIB Option", and Option II, "The Two Board Option", are conservative approaches to USIB reorganization requiring only minor changes in organization and/or the current procedures of USIB.

The discussion of more radical approaches to USIB reorganization is not offered in an optional context. This is not because the organizational ideas possess any less validity than the more conservative options; it is because the more radical approaches will require more detailed organizational development and implementation planning should any of them be chosen for further consideration.

An examination of the USIB reorganization issue also raises the question of the necessity for any reorganization at the present time.

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Unless the Director feels it is imperative for policy reasons to provide a "new look" to DCI affairs in this area sooner rather than later, there appears to be good reasons to defer any major actions. These good reasons involve:

- a. the organization and stabilization of CFI procedures;
- b. the organization of the national production mechanism;
- c. the reorganization of the IC Staff;
- d. the DOD intelligence reorganization;
- e. the organization of the Office of the DCI.

In view of these factors and the flexibility of the current USIB structure to review and/or advise on any matter of likely concern to the DCI or of mutual concern to the members, the position recommended in this paper is to defer any action and continue with the current arrangement or implement Option I.

#### Traditional Approaches to Reorganization

Each of the options presented below are designed to cope with the five primary functions which need to be served by the Board or Boards which replace USIB. These are as follows:

- a. Coordination of the National Intelligence Production Effort

The DCI needs an advisory group of Community members to review and coordinate on major substantive national intelligence products and output activities. This includes national estimates, selected interagency studies, and the information flow and dialogue on the Intelligence Community's warning and crisis network (e.g., alert memorandums).

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b. Substantive Requirements and Priorities Generation

The DCI requires a mechanism for the initial statement and prioritization of substantive requirements to serve as guidance to intelligence production and collection operations and planning. At the present time the KIQs, DCI Perspectives, and DCID 1/2 Attachment serve this function. All are currently subject to USIB review.

c. Collection Systems Requirements Coordination and Operational Guidance

Each collection organization must expand, translate, and reprioritize substantive requirements based upon operational variables to achieve the most effective information return. Under the USIB, the COMIREX, SIGINT Committee, and Human Resources Committee were charged with this function pursuant to USIB guidance and review. Additional functions in this area have to do with arrangements with foreign governments for intelligence purposes, which is a DCI responsibility.

d. Producer/Consumer Relationships and Consumer Research and Assessment

Executive Order 11905 stressed the need for more formal Community action in this respect and assigned the DCI the specific responsibility of consulting with the users and producers of intelligence to ensure the timeliness, relevancy, and quality of the intelligence product.

e. Protection of Sources and Methods and Other Support Functions

The DCI requires an advisory group of senior Intelligence Community members to coordinate appropriate programs developed to

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properly protect intelligence sources, methods, and analytical procedures. With the heavy emphasis to downgrade and declassify intelligence information consistent with Executive Order No. 11652 for wider dissemination, functions and procedures to ensure the protection of sources and methods must be constantly researched to ensure proper implementation of both activities.

Additional support functions such as take place in the information Handling Committee and the Committee on Exchanges are also currently reviewed by USIB, and their continued review is envisioned in the options.

#### Membership

The alternatives for membership in any reorganized USIB structure should be designed to provide the broadest participation by members of the Intelligence Community. Although each of the options provided suggests a specific membership preference which was judged preferable in the case of that option, other membership alternatives can be applied.

For example, the view can be taken that membership of a single USIB-like committee should consist of all of those organizations designated as being part of the Intelligence Community in Section I of Executive Order 11905. Another alternative suggests that the current membership and participant practices of the USIB be maintained. Other alternatives suggest a select permanent membership such as CIA, DIA, and State with all others having membership in an "on call" basis participating only when items of direct interest to those agencies are involved. (All of the current USIB members and observers would most certainly object to the latter alternative.)

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Committee Reorientation

In the two options presented for USIB reorganization, the present committees would continue to function. They have been renamed DCI Committees in order to emphasize the need for flexibility with respect to their tasking for a wide variety of Community support purposes, including the CFI and the national production mechanism.

Although such committees as WSSIC, JAEIC, EIC, and STIC are often referred to as "production" committees, their chairmen are quick to point out that their activities cover all five of the functions discussed above. To a lesser degree the same can be said of the "collection" committees, SIGINT, COMIREX, and HRC. The remaining committees, CCPC, IHC, COMEX, and Security have more specialized support responsibilities. The DCI's memorandum of 28 January 1974 recognized the necessity to coordinate the workload and priorities of these committees and assigned the D/DCI/IC with this responsibility. Such coordination will continue to be a necessity if the flexibility and effectiveness of these committees is to be maintained.

A general reorganization of the committee structure is not considered in this paper. Since 1972, the Security Committee, STIC, WSSIC, SIGINT, COMIREX, and EIC have all undergone reorganization of various sorts. It is expected that the DCI Committees will continue to undergo such changes as the DCI and Community management environment necessitates.

Option I: The Modified USIB Option

Option I creates a National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) chaired by the DCI and recommends that all Community members participate as Board members.

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The NFIB will be responsible for:

- a. final coordination and review of the national intelligence product;
- b. coordination and review of national substantive requirements and their priorities, e.g., KIQs, DCI Perspectives, Attachment to DCID 1/2;
- c. review of collection system requirements and operational tasking guidance;
- d. review of Community policies and activities with respect to protection of sources and methods, and other Community support functions;
- e. planning and conducting designated meetings on consumer problems with the various agency and departmental members addressing the consumer views of those agencies and departments;
- f. all other items of mutual interest to the Intelligence Community which the DCI may desire to have brought before the Board or which may be recommended to him by Board principals.

With the exception of the formal statement of the responsibility in item e. above, the Option I organization would differ from the current USIB only in the change of name and the addition of the military services and the NRO as members.

The pros of Option I are:

- Retains a single board of all Community members providing a forum where mutual problems can be discussed.
- Provides continuity in the coordination of national production and the mechanism for working out dissents and disagreements.

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- Provides minimum disruption of USIB mechanism and procedures.
- Provides new impetus for consumer research and assessment.

The cons of Option I are:

- Has the appearance of little or no change from USIB, abolished in Executive Order.


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OPTION I

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- Function 1. Coordination of the National Intelligence Production Effort
- Function 2. Substantive Requirements Generation and Priorities
- Function 3. Collection Systems Requirements Coordination and Operational Guidance
- Function 4. Producer/Consumer Relationships and Assessments
- Function 5. Protection of Sources and Methods and Other Support Functions

Option II: The Two Board Option

Option II creates two national intelligence boards under the chairmanship of the DCI.

The National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) would be responsible for:

- a. final coordination and review of the national intelligence product;
- b. review of collection system requirements and operational tasking guidance;
- c. review of Community policies and activities with respect to protection of sources and methods and other Community support functions.

All Community members would participate as members of the NFIB.

The National Intelligence Review Board (NIRB) would be responsible for:

- a. coordination and review of substantive requirements and priorities, e.g., KIQs, DCI Perspectives, Attachment to DCID 1/2;
- b. review and assessment of producer/consumer relationships.

The NIRB would have three permanent members, the production chiefs of CIA, DIA, and INR, with an on-call participating membership of other members of the Intelligence Community plus additional agencies and departments such as ACDA, whose participation would from time to time be appropriate.

The purposes of the dual board arrangement in Option II are:

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- a. to emphasize the importance of the consumer/producer relationship and the assessment problem;
- b. to tie the above function directly to the generation of national substantive requirements, both current and planned, and their priorities;
- c. to broaden the participation in the NIRB to include other important consumers outside of the Community;
- d. to limit meeting participation of the NIRB to participants who have a direct interest in the subject matter under discussion.

The pros of Option II are:

- Provides a board of all Community members for coordination and review of all primary substantive and support matters of Community interest.
- Provides a more specialized board with broader but selective participation to concentrate on producer/consumer relationships and the coordination and review of national substantive needs.

The cons of Option II are:

- The dual board increases meeting load of DCI.
- The dual board will tend to increase staffing requirements.
- Membership arrangements in the NIRB are likely to be opposed by NFIB members.

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More Radical Approaches to USIB Reorganization

Most radical approaches to USIB reorganization tend to take on the form of greater functional specialization with respect to the matters being advised upon and/or reviewed. These types of approaches also tend to allow for more specialized membership arrangements related to the form of specialization.

A. One approach suggests the creation of a special board or steering group (associated or non-associated with a USIB-like board) devoted to the concerns of whatever form the national production mechanism takes.

One variation of the above arrangement includes the responsibility for consumer assessment and substantive requirements generation in the same board (e.g., the function of NIRB in Option II above).

Another variation of the production board suggests the division of the substantively oriented board into political, military, and economic panels. This approach tends to be criticized for greater disciplinary division where the demand is for greater interdisciplinary concerns.

Another variation suggests a dedicated committee structure composed of geographically oriented committees headed by the NIO for that area. Such committees would serve to coordinate NIO activities related to production and requirements.

B. Another approach suggests the creation of dual boards; one board devoted to national foreign intelligence operational matters -- production and collection operational requirements, as well as the generation and prioritization of current national substantive requirements. The second board would be devoted to the generation and

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prioritization of national foreign intelligence planning requirements and their translation into a planning base for programming operations and new investment in a budget-year-plus-five fashion. This second board, it is argued, would serve to tie the substantive concerns to the matters of primary CFI concern, and would bring the Community members closer to playing a meaningful cross-program role in the CFI input, thereby compensating for single manager inputs to CFI and potential IC Staff domination of cross-program matters.

C. One radical approach tends toward greater non-specialization of the board. It argues that the board structure should not be confused by sub-boards, committees, and steering groups. It points out that the current committee structure predated current trends in the Intelligence Community Staff, national production mechanism, and the CFI. Thus, it argues for: a single, authoritative and active board with the Director and members more directly in control of agenda and meeting frequency; abolition of the production committees and the incorporation of their activities in the new national production mechanism; greater reliance on the Intelligence Community Staff and "normalization" of day-to-day Community coordination and administration; and, recognition that an ax is essential if outdated bureaucracy is not to be prolonged.

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