

11 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

SUBJECT : Structural Changes and Institutional Reforms

1. Over the past several months, many have engaged in discussion and thought (often more of the former than the latter) about structural or organizational changes in the intelligence community. The basic decisions may have already been made, hence several of the suggestions outlined below may have been overtaken by events; but I thought you might find these observations of some interest and use.

2. Structure should be keyed to function. The DCI has three major sets of continuing responsibilities -- clearly interrelated, but nonetheless both distinguishable and distinct:

a. Being the Government's senior substantive intelligence officer and advisor.

b. Being the Government's principal advisor on intelligence resources.

c. Managing the CIA.

3. Each of these three sets of responsibilities has its own complexities.

a. Being the fount of national intelligence is clearly the DCI's primary responsibility, since establishing such a fount was clearly the 80th Congress' primary objective in passing Section 102(d) of the National Security Act of 1947.\*

\*What Congress wanted was a mechanism through which all of the information available to the US Government bearing on national security problems (with a foreign dimension) could be collated and approved for release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000800020002-5 any cabinet department or military service.

-- The primacy of this set of responsibilities is further underlined by the fact that the DCI's other major responsibilities (advising on resource allocation and managing the CIA) really have to do with the mechanisms which enable him to discharge this function of being the Government's principal substantive intelligence officer and fount of national intelligence.

-- The DCI's broader substantive responsibilities logically evolved from this statutory base, including his present responsibilities for providing a broad range of current intelligence reports and assessments and for providing national estimates.

-- The key aspect of this set of responsibilities is the latter's national scope. As applied to intelligence, "national" has come to mean intelligence which draws on all information available to all components of the Government, is assessed by the best analytic talent available throughout the Government, and is presented to the President and his senior advisors with a reflection of significant dissenting judgments where the latter exist and are of material consequence.

-- Over the last year or so there has been a rising amount of debate over the extent of the DCI's responsibility for providing substantive intelligence support to the Congress. This added complexity, however, does not alter his clear obligation to provide support to the President and the NSC, or his primacy as the Government's principal foreign intelligence officer.

b. The resource "advisory" role was only implicitly adumbrated in the 1947 Act. It has evolved by pragmatic precedent and was explicitly stated in President Nixon's November 1971 letter. The precise dimensions of that role, however, and the DCI's degree of authority in resource matters are still vague, and disputed (especially in the Department of Defense).

SECRET

c. The CIA is an instrument set up to help the DCI discharge the responsibilities with which he was vested by statute.

-- Over time, it was given -- under the DCI's management -- certain other institutional responsibilities, notably the covert collection (espionage) function (a "service of common concern"), the covert action function (one of those "other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security" directed by the NSC), and certain responsibilities for the development and management of technical collection programs (ditto).

-- Despite the language of the 1947 and 1949 Acts and the pragmatic precedents of almost three decades, there is still some debate within the Executive Branch -- and within the Intelligence Community -- over what CIA is, and what it is not. In part, this debate is rooted in what may sound to to a layman like a philosophical conundrum: whether there is (or is not) a valid distinction between "national intelligence" and "non-departmental intelligence". CIA's production -- i.e., the published output of the DDI and parts of the DDS&T -- is clearly "non-departmental", since CIA is not under the control of any cabinet department. Many CIA analysts -- and managers -- would and do argue that, ergo, what CIA produces is national intelligence. This contention, however, is by no means universally accepted throughout the rest of the Intelligence Community or the Executive Branch, where it is argued (often stridently) that reports/assessments/appreciations/estimates are not national intelligence unless and until they reflect (and, in some cases, clearly identify) the views of all concerned components of the Intelligence Community, not just those of CIA.

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000800020002-5

-- This debate, in turn, is at the root of what some, indeed many (outside CIA), perceive as an inherent conflict of interest in the dual roles of the DCI (as his office is now structured) as the Government's senior substantive intelligence officer (the fount of national intelligence) and -- simultaneously -- the head of one of the Intelligence Community's analytic and production components, i.e., the CIA.

4. In addition to the three sets of continuing responsibilities outlined above, the DCI also has a fourth set of responsibilities which are latent or intermittent: providing intelligence support to national decision-making in times of crisis. These are clearly related to his continuing responsibilities, but have several special features.

-- They bring into sharp focus the ambiguities in the relationship between and responsibilities of (on the one hand) the DCI and (on the other) the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

-- They also bring the complex "national/tactical" question into sharp focus.

-- They give added intensity to the debate over the role and functions of the CIA.

5. The Present Structure. At present, the DCI is supported by a command structure which was developed during the tenure of your two immediate predecessors. It includes:

a. A Deputy DCI -- appointed by the President with the Senate's advice and consent -- who serves as Acting DCI in your absences, is the CIA member of the USIB, performs a variety of special missions and functions, but who (under present arrangements) is not really in the line of command.

b. Two staff Deputies to the DCI who assist him in the discharge of his two -- and it is important to remember that there are two -- sets of community

Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000800020002-5

responsibilities: substance (the D/DCI/NIO) and resources (the D/DCI/IC).

c. Four line Deputies -- DDS&T, DDI, DDO and DDA -- through whom the DCI runs the CIA.

6. The present system runs with the grain of the DCI's major responsibilities. It is not bad. Actually, it is fairly good. It does not -- nor can it -- alleviate the problems engendered by the DCI's limited and ambiguous authority (especially in the resource field); but apart from that, it has only one serious flaw: within it there is no overall, day-to-day manager of the CIA, other than the DCI himself. This, in turn,

-- Sets up a great drain on the DCI's time.

-- Compounds the perception of "conflict of interest" between the DCI's Community and Agency roles, noted above.

-- Creates an anomalous and often awkward situation: when the DCI is wearing his "Community" hat adjudicating Community disputes, the CIA has no single advocate to explain and defend its legitimate institutional equities.

7. The flaws in the present structure, however, could be quite easily remedied by either of two approaches:

a. Changing the present concept of the role of the DDCI, charging him with being the day-to-day manager of CIA (and letting him be it), or

b. Re-constituting and perhaps enhancing the now abolished position of Executive Director.

SECRET

8. The "Two Deputies" Approach. Another, superficially appealing way to go at the structural problem is to follow the "two deputies" approach: i.e., give the DCI one Deputy DCI to manage the CIA and another to handle the Community. I understand that this is the approach now being favored downtown; but before any final decisions are taken (if they have not already been made), careful consideration ought to be given to the fact that this approach would be likely to create more problems than it solves.

-- This is because the DCI does not have just one set of Community responsibilities, he has two: substance and resources.

-- In solving the "CIA problem" it would compound the "Community problem."

-- If the Community deputy were a civilian (especially a non-Defense Department civilian) there would be great -- and understandable -- concern within the DOD, the JCS and the military services that Defense's resource equities and requirements would not be properly understood or adequately protected.

-- Conversely, if the Community deputy were a serving military officer (or a civilian with a Defense Department background) there would be serious, again understandable, concern -- within other components of the Executive Branch, in the Congress, in the

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000800020002-5

public (and, for that matter, within CIA) about the objectivity of national intelligence production.

-- If the two Community responsibilities -- substance and resources -- are combined under a single deputy, one of them would be bound to suffer. Given the American fascination for the concrete and quantitative -- especially in light of the amounts of money involved -- said single Community deputy would almost inevitably be inclined to focus primarily on resources, which would probably soon come to drive substance. Hence, substance -- i.e., the responsibilities the DCI was primarily set up by statute to discharge -- would almost inevitably suffer.

-- The chances of serious friction between the two deputies would be great. Even in the unlikely event that both were always saints, there would be an inescapable pecking order problem: one would have to be Acting DCI on your absence, and he would be seen throughout the Government, Congress and public as being your principal Deputy. Giving primacy to the CIA Deputy would generate one set of unavoidable problems; giving primacy to the Community Deputy (especially if -- under this arrangement -- he was a military officer) would generate another.

8. Conclusion. In sum, I believe strongly that the two-deputy approach is a loser, almost guaranteed to create more problems than it solves. Others (including Bill Colby) may and do disagree, but I am convinced that the present, rather easily modified framework offers a much more promising line of approach within which you can fairly easily solve the "CIA problem" without compounding and complicating the Community one.



George A. Carver, Jr.  
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000800020002-5

SECRET

Book press conf.?  
USIB on Thursday  
Relationship to IC staff

- CFI + DCI Directors, no time limit
- NSCID's + DCID's existing, amended within 90 days
- Agency supplemental directors within 90 days.

Agency  
staff

- Restrictive operations / Morale, Internal  
Directives issued promptly.
  - Review HR's
  - Get reports from AG.

Agency IC?

Had for Agency spokesman - soon.  
OMB interest - Friday



*This was written before the  
White House option was proposed.*

1. The attached graphic is the one we submitted to Colby and he used to brief the President. You will remember I deliberately omitted the NIB and the production flow in order to avoid committing us to the NIO role that Colby would have insisted on. The pencilled additions show the way I think it ought to be.

2. Unfortunately, with George present at the Management Committee meeting that discussed our original proposal (18 December), the game went the other way. It contains a statement that "The NIO's would act as the DCI's staff for the NIB. The Board would be chaired by the DCI, with his Agency Deputy as CIA Member. The latter would serve as chairman in his absence." It is the concept of the NIO's as staff for the NIB that we must jettison, or at least blur enough to keep the NIO's out of the production line.


3. I see a use for a reconstituted NIO staff in three ways:

--As a substantive staff for the DCI, bridging collection and production, troubleshooting, etc. Half a dozen area-oriented officers would suffice.

--As a link between the substantive mechanism lodged in the NIB and the program management mechanism lodged in EXCOM. We are talking here inter alia about some humanized version of KIQ-KEP.

--As a mechanism for product review. These officers might well serve as the staff for EXCOM when it wears its NSCIC hat.

## OPTION IV MODIFIED



— OPERATIONAL CONTROL  
 - - - POLICY AND RESOURCE GUIDANCE

596256

**TOP SECRET SENSITIVE**  
 0000 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE  
 PRODUCTION

1. Divide between FIC and DCI/NIB on basis of directive modified by DCI's authority. FIC handles matters that are management-oriented (resources, programs, systems, etc), DCI/NIB handles matters that are substance-oriented (including such things as STIC, WSSIC, EIC, JAEIC). Deputy responsibilities divides the same way. This fits with Act: CIA to correlate and evaluate and perform services of common concern; management functions assigned to FIC were not envisaged in 1947.

2. Divide on basis of directive as it stands. FIC handles present responsibilities of USIB. In this case Community Deputy responsibilities must extend into field of DCI/NIB. Agency Deputy would, however, remain responsible for substantive matters. Could DDCI/C staff Committees and DDCI/A provide chair for substantive ones?


3. Divide as in 2, but make Community Deputy responsible for all Community matters including substantive ones. DDCI/A would then be confined strictly to Agency matters.

1. Divide between FIC and DCI/NIB on basis ~~of~~ FIC handles matters that are management-oriented (resources, programs, systems, etc), DCI/NIB handles matters that are substantive-oriented (including such things as STIC, WSSIC, LIC, JAEIC) Deputy responsibilities divide the same way. This fits with Act: CIA to coordinate + evaluate + perform services of common concern; management functions assigned to FIC were not envisaged in 1947


2. Divide on basis of director, as it stands, FIC handles present responsibilities of EXCOM + IRAC, DCI/NIB handles responsibilities of USIB. In this case Community Deputy responsibilities must extend into field of DCI/NIB. Could DDC/C Staff Committee ad DDCI/A provide chair for substantive ones? Agency Deputy would, however, remain responsible for substantive matters.

3. Divide as in 2, but make Community Deputy responsible for all Community matters includ; substantive ones. DDCI/A would then be confined strictly to Agency matters.





PRESIDENT



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (INTELLIGENCE)



— OPERATIONAL CONTROL

— POLICY & RESOURCE GUIDANCE

— NATIONAL INTEL PRODUCTION

Functions of IC Staff as ~~Secretary~~  
~~DCI as Chairman~~

+

1. AUSA as Secretary for EXCOM
2. Tasking of Collect
3. Development of programs
4. Development of budgets
- ~~5. Support Congress?~~


Functions of CIA as staff for NIB

1. AUSA as Secretary
2. Support of Congress
- ~~3. Provide primary input to national intell~~
4. Coordinate national intell

Functions of NIO's

1. Secretary staff for DCI
2. Link between NIB (secretariat)  
and EXCOM (programs)
3. Link between ~~and~~ products and  
Collect
4. Product Review

### OPTION IV MODIFIED





Substructure

EXCOM

NSCIC Working Group

IR+D Council

COMIBOX

SIGINT COMM

IHC

SC

HSC

NIB

EIC

GMAIC



JASIC

STIC

SALT

Comm in Exchanges?

STW Warning

25X1

25X1



To me, the present USIB committees (or the activities they represent) can be most easily and logically related to your Option IV (modified) diagram by separating them into three groups.

--The first group includes just two committees, the Security Committee and the Critical Collection Priorities Committee. I think these should both be associated directly with the EXCOM(I). EXCOM should face both these issues directly and without intermediary bodies. The Security Committee has been an emasculated body because it never has been able to engage the hierarchy of State and Defense directly. Now is an opportunity to put it in a position to do so, and it should have a senior membership. The CCPC is in my view a candidate for EXCOM association because it also needs to be able to get the most senior intelligence body to face up to critical gaps and the kinds of programs required to fill them.

--The second group would include those committees involved in coordination of community analysis and production on substantive problems. They include the EIC, SIC, WSSIC, and JAEIC. The forum for their tasking and their reports would logically fall into the chain of command of National Intelligence production, and I presume the National Intelligence Board with the DCI as Chairman would be the most reasonable reporting point.

--Finally, the committees for coordination of community collection and tasking would have a natural locus of activity through the DDCI(C) and the IC Staff mechanism and the policy and resource guidance arm of the DCI. These committees, or the activities they are involved in, include the Sigint Committee, Comirex, Human Sources Committee, Committee on Exchanges, ~~the Interagency Defector Committee~~, and--for the lack of a better place to put it--the Information Handling Committee.


*More  
PART of  
ABC*

I think that about exhausts the group of present committees. The particular committee names and organizations might usefully be reexamined and rationalized, but that is a problem you don't have to face at this point.


Of course, placement of these committees in a wiring diagram greatly oversimplifies the operational problems. Each of the committees is concerned with the interface (sorry, no better word comes easily) between collection problems and analytical problems, but I think the arrangement I spelled out above places the oversight responsibility in a sensible manner.


You asked me not to make a big production out of this. I didn't even ask for typing assistance.

*I have attached  
and ALTERNATE WIRING  
under EXCOM(I)*



25X1






NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (INTELLIGENCE)

Committees for Coordination of Community Collection Tasking and Exploitation:  
Sigint  
Comrex  
Human Sources  
Comm. on Exchanges  
Defector Comm.  
Info. Handling

Committees for Coordination of Community Analysis and Production:  
SIC, EIC, WSSIC, JAETC

OPERATIONAL CONTROL  
POLICY RESOURCE GUIDANCE  
NATIONAL INTL PRODUCTION



	Strong DCI	"Monolith"	"National/Departmental Balance"	"Collective Management"	Present	"Status Quo Plus"	Coordinator	Coordinator	Strong Defense
STRATEGY OPTIONS	Schlesinger Taylor NSC/OMB	I Rejected	II A II B II	-- Colby (Variant on IV)	NA -- --	-- I IV	II Rejected III	III III A	Rejected
ARRANGEMENTS FOR DCI	Office of DCI DCI's Resource Authority	DNI Controls National Programs	DGI/SEP DCIA Repts thru DGI Controls National Programs	DCI, 2 DEPS Advices on NFIP, Controls CIAP	DCI Advices on NFIP, Controls CIAP	DCI, 2 DEPS Advices on NFIP, Controls CIAP	DFI/SEP DCIA Repts thru DFI Advices on NFIP	DFI/SEP DCIA Repts thru DFI Advices on NFIP	*Dep Sec DCI None
CONTROL OF NATIONAL PROGRAMS	CIA OPS Resources NSA OPS Resources	DNI DNI DNI DNI DNI	DCIA DCI EXCOM DGI EXCOM DGI	DDCI DCI NSC EXCOM(1) DSD(1) NSC EXCOM(1) DSD(1)	DCI DCI EXCOM ASD(1) SEC DEF ASD(1)	EXGOM? DCI EXCOM DSD(1) EXCOM DSD(1)	DCIA DCIA EXCOM DSD(1) DSD(1) DSD(1)	DCIA DCIA EXCOM DSD(1) DSD(1) DSD(1)	DSD(1) DSD(1) DSD(1) DSD(1) DSD(1) DSD(1)
DISPOSITION OF CIA ELEMENTS	CIA Production CIA DDO CIA R&D	DNI DNI DNI	DCIA DCIA DCIA	DDCI DDCI DDCI	DCI DCI DCI	DDCI DDCI DDCI	DCIA DCIA ?	Dispersed DCIA ?	DSD(1) DSD(1) DSD(1)

\*Cairt assumes new Deputy Secretary of Defense assumes responsibilities of ASD(1)

**Secret**



25X1

# THE LOGIC OF THE USIB COMMITTEE STRUCTURE

PREPARED BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

**Secret**

DCI/IC 76-4108  
16 January 1976

Copy No 416

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000800020002-5

Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000800020002-5



**THE LOGIC OF THE  
USIB COMMITTEE STRUCTURE**

**SECRET**

## CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
PURPOSE .....	1
BACKGROUND .....	3
<b>Current Committee Structure</b> .....	3
<b>Recent Changes in Committee Structure</b> .....	4
COMMENTS ON COMMITTEE STRUCTURE .....	5
PROS .....	5
CONS .....	7
DISCUSSION OF POTENTIAL WEAKNESSES .....	8
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION .....	9

SECRET

SECRET

## THE LOGIC OF THE USIB COMMITTEE STRUCTURE

### PURPOSE

Most managers are mindful of the general disadvantages of any committee system, especially the potential for time and effort inefficiencies and the potential for compromise leading to soft judgments and weak recommendations. A cursory look at the 13 USIB Committees and their more than 50 subcommittees might prompt questions regarding their efficiency. This is particularly so in the historical context, given the ad hoc evolution of the committee structure over a period of many years. The purpose of this paper is to show that these considerations to the contrary, the USIB Committee structure today is a logical mechanism which provides effective professional support to the USIB and the DCI over the wide range of specialized intelligence subjects which they must consider.

## BACKGROUND

**Current Committee Structure:** The one informal (SALT Monitoring) and twelve formal USIB Committees are organized by subject matter or function. The memberships are generally composed of trained personnel with experience in the field represented by each committee. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] oversight of the committees is exercised by the D/DCI/IC. The current USIB Committees are:

a. *The Committee on Exchanges* ensures coordination of Intelligence Community interests in U.S. Government official exchanges and bilateral cooperative agreements, and in commercial visits and other related activities (commercial contacts) with nations designated by Department of State. Its concern is possible loss of U.S. technology resulting from foreign exchanges or agreements.

b. *Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX)* provides staff support to, and acts for, the USIB in development and implementation of national-level guidance for overhead imagery collection and exploitation. This means that COMIREX is the DCI's instrument to develop Community requirements to which national collection systems and NPIC are responsive.

c. *The Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC)* is a permanent study group responsive to requests submitted to it by the DCI. Its continued existence is currently under review since, for the most part, its functions have been taken over by the National Intelligence Officers and the Intelligence Community Staff. Recent activities include an update of a study on intelligence activities against narcotics and dangerous drugs; and a review of intelligence activities against North Korea.

d. *The Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC)* develops coordinated guidance for the collection of foreign economic intelligence for all relevant users in Washington, D.C.

e. *The Human Resources Committee (HRC)* advises and assists the DCI in the discharge of his responsibilities for the efficient allocation and effective use of Community resources for the collection of positive foreign intelligence information through human sources. Current emphasis is on increasing the contribution from non-intelligence agencies of the Government.

f. *Interagency Defector Committee (IDC)* advises on policy matters which affect the defector program. Its major activity is to assure that the U.S. Government identifies and fully exploits defectors who have information of intelligence, psychological or operational value. Recent emphasis has been placed on timely and orderly exploitation of the emigre flow from the USSR.

g. *Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC)* recommends national collection requirements, fosters interagency exchanges of information, and contributes to national intelligence. The JAEIC is also responsible for monitoring implementation of the provisions of Safeguard (d) of the Limited Test Ban Treaty on behalf of USIB. The ability of foreign

25X1

SECRET

countries to protect their nuclear weapons from theft or diversion is receiving current emphasis.

h. *Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee (STIC)* is to provide early warning of foreign S&T advances, whether indigenous or imported, which could affect significantly the national security or political or economic welfare of the U.S. Examples of such technology currently include Soviet high energy laser capabilities and Soviet buried antennas.

i. *The Security Committee* provides recommendations regarding security policies and procedures for the protection of foreign intelligence sources and methods. Current emphasis is on studies related to compartmentation and computer security questions.

j. *The SIGINT Committee* advises and assists in matters involving SIGINT including guidance for the overhead SIGINT programs, policies and procedures for the conduct of SIGINT arrangements with foreign governments, policies and procedures for the protection of SIGINT, and the preparation of SIGINT requirements and priorities.

k. *The Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence Committee (WSSIC)* is responsible for coordinating requirements and Intelligence Community production for foreign weapon and space systems. (Formerly the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, limited to foreign *missile* and space intelligence.)

l. *The Intelligence Information Handling Committee (IHC)* is responsible for facilitating the timely and coordinated handling of intelligence and intelligence information within the Intelligence Community and promoting the continuous improvement, integration and effective use of Community information handling resources.

m. *SALT Monitoring Group* is not a formal USIB Committee, but was created by USIB and is responsible to the DCI for guidance to and supervision of all intelligence monitoring activities required under the strategic arms limitations agreements with the USSR.

**Recent Changes in Committee Structure:** The objectives and performance of USIB Committees undergo periodic review as the dynamics of change impact Community requirements. Reflecting this, a substantial number of changes have taken place in the Committee structure in the last two years, as shown below:

a. *Committee on Exchanges (COMEX)* was established 9 May 1975 following extensive consideration by USIB of two major studies on this subject.

b. *Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC)*—the continued existence of the CCPC is currently under review since, for the most part, its functions have been taken over by the National Intelligence Officers.

c. *Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC)*—Since it was created in 1974, it has been a catalyst in the current expanded effort throughout much of the Government in the field of economic intelligence.

d. *The Human Resources Committee (HRC)* is a relatively new committee which was established on a trial basis in January 1973 and as a per-

SECRET

manent committee in June 1974. Its duties and responsibilities have been greatly expanded since that time. It also has assumed the functions of the Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee (IPC).

e. *The Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee (STIC)* is a successor committee to the Scientific Intelligence Committee. It is to concentrate exclusively on S&T intelligence and is no longer involved in weapons' intelligence.

f. *Security Committee* was given new responsibilities, a much broader charter, and a full-time chairman when a new DCID was approved in 1974. It also absorbed the functions of the old Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee.

g. *The SIGINT Committee*—following a major review of the SIGINT Committee by a Special Ad Hoc Group the committee was provided with a new DCID, broader responsibilities and additional staff support.

h. *Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence Committee (WSSIC)*—is a new committee established in January 1976. It has absorbed the weapons' intelligence responsibilities of the old Scientific Intelligence Committee and is now responsible for coordinating all requirements and Intelligence Community production for foreign weapons and space systems.

i. *Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC)* was subsumed within the Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence Committee (WSSIC) structure.

j. *Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee (IPC)* was taken over by the Human Resources Committee.

k. *National Intelligence Survey Committee* was disbanded 30 June 1974.

l. *Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee* has become a subcommittee of the Security Committee.

m. *Scientific Intelligence Committee* responsibilities were changed and evolved into the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee as of January 1976.

n. *Watch Committee* was disestablished 3 March 1975 and new and broader responsibilities in strategic warning were assumed by the Special Assistant to the DCI for Strategic Warning and his staff located in the Pentagon.

## COMMENTS ON COMMITTEE STRUCTURE

### PROS

It is obvious that the current USIB Committee structure is the product of an evolutionary process and that the structure itself has become institutionalized. This is not to say, however, that the structure is archaic, outmoded, inefficient or in any other way undesirable. The following comments demonstrate the strengths of the structure:

a. The USIB Committee structure responds to the stated needs of the USIB. The individual committees deal with problems which are of continuing

concern to the USIB. Standing committees and a substructure of subcommittees are more effective than ad hoc task group handling of problems which are continuing in nature.

b. The committee structure is dynamic. Committees are established, disbanded, or have their charters amended as the situation and the USIB needs warrant.

c. The Committee structure is relatively objective in that it provides a forum for representation of all elements of the Intelligence Community, with no one organization in a position to dominate. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] unlike the USIB, the services have full membership rather than observer status.

d. The Committee structure is not overly costly in manpower. Very few personnel are involved full-time with committee work,\* and in those few cases the committee is handling ongoing day-to-day problems which require constant attention. Most committee chairmen and participants are line officers with duty and experience relating directly to the committee subject matter. The line organizations are available as a source of part-time support to committee activities.

e. The USIB Committee structure makes a constructive contribution to the entire Community in addition to its support of the USIB and the DCI, as follows:

(1) The structure provides forums at which the various elements of the Community can present their views in the development of Community positions.

(2) The committees and their working groups become educational focal points for face-to-face exchange of Community views and information. They provide a unique outlet for discussion of parochial ideas or observations.

(3) The structure provides an alternate method of surfacing substantive ideas which merit DCI attention and which otherwise are subject to bureaucratic barriers.

(4) The structure provides for visibility of major issues through the USIB which can alert the DCI in advance of such issues surfacing at the policy levels of other agencies or departments.

f. The IC Staff exists to support the DCI in his Community leadership role. The IC Staff role vis-a-vis the USIB Committee structure assists management by:

(1) Preparing and/or coordinating annual Letters of Instruction from the DCI to committee chairmen. The IC Staff not only sets tasks for committees, but receives annual reports from each committee which are evaluative in nature and which form the basis for new Letters of Instruction.

\*Currently 65 full-time professional and 17 clerical employees. Of these 82, 51 support COMIREX alone.

(2) Periodic meetings of all committee chairmen with the DCI and the D/DCI/IC.

(3) Receiving monthly activity reports from each committee to the D/DCI/IC.

(4) Preparing and initially coordinating pertinent Director of Central Intelligence Directives before submission to the DCI and the USIB.

(5) Including key committee chairmen at daily IC Staff meetings (COMIREX, SIGINT, Human Resources, Security, and Intelligence Information Handling).

g. The USIB Committee structure provides:

(1) A flexible system for professional support to the DCI. In addition to the wide range of specialized subjects which committees can cover for the USIB, the committees can be tasked to support the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee as appropriate. Each committee chairman is available to the DCI to perform staff studies or other assignments which require a coordinated Community approach.

(2) A unique coordinating mechanism. Given the present structure of the Community, composed as it is of a group of autonomous agencies, there is no other Community-wide system for interagency coordination and information exchange.

(3) Functional continuity. Because such standing committees provide a more effective means of handling a wide variety of problems than would a series of ad hoc committees convened to deal with each new problem, substance continuity is built into the structure.

(4) A useful institutional history. As such, a backdrop exists against which new action items can be viewed from a perspective of precedent and for efficacy of previous treatment.

(5) An effective safeguard system for the DCI. The topical/functional structure complements the NIO structure to the extent that there is less likelihood that any substantive issue will escape the deserved attention of the DCI.

## CONS

No organizational structure is perfect and, indeed, the USIB Committee structure has had a number of charges leveled against its effectiveness. The following comments underscore the potential weaknesses of the system:

a. The USIB Committee structure includes inadequate safeguards against assignment of incompetent or unqualified representatives to the various committees. Ad hoc committees, for example, might enjoy the advantage of recruiting members based on known expertise.

b. The USIB Committee structure may not be truly representative of individual USIB agencies' interests since the preponderance of chairmen are drawn from CIA.



SECRET

c. Since committee matters are generally a part-time function for those involved, the system may fail to give maximum support to the DCI and the USIB.

d. Committee chairmen have no line authority over committee members, thus lacking the leverage of command necessary to ensure proper effort and high quality results.

e. In the absence of a continuing review of the USIB Committee structure, substantive issues can arise which are not within the charter of any existing committee and which can therefore elude proper handling through simple omission.

f. The USIB Committee structure provides for no formal systematic interaction among committees which can result in compartmented judgments and duplication of effort.

## DISCUSSION OF POTENTIAL WEAKNESSES

a. It has happened that unqualified people have been assigned to USIB committees from time to time. The major safeguard against this happening reposes in the USIB principals themselves and the degree of importance each one attaches to committee assignments. Offsetting this potential weakness is the careful selection of individual chairmen who, through their own qualifications, can ensure effective committee output. Since most committee chairmen perform part-time in their respective roles, a further safeguard exists in assigning a top caliber secretariat to each committee who can spend the needed time to do all the staff work connected with committee affairs.

b. Four committee chairmen are non-CIA, while the remainder are from CIA. Does this disproportionate number of CIA chairmen in any way compromise objectivity? Does *any* chairman exercise undue influence over his committee regardless of the agency which he represents? Committee chairmen generally are selected for the expertise which they bring to bear on committee subject matters and function primarily in line jobs related to committee affairs. By the nature of their work they have available to them an appreciation of all-source contributions germane to their respective committees. In some cases it is difficult to separate a chairman's committee work from his regular line duties. More often than not this serves the committee's advantage since the chairman is not totally dependent upon other committee members for information on the subject at hand. Additionally, the very nature of the CIA is such that its members are less likely to be influenced in areas such as weapons development by parochial interests. The structure provides for all USIB member agencies to be represented equally on all formal USIB committees and, in some cases, to have associate members or observers from non-USIB agencies. Although there have been exceptions, military personnel are not often named as committee chairmen because frequency of reassignment would tend to disrupt continuity of committee leadership.

c. Most committee matters are a part-time function for most committee members. It might be argued, therefore, that the system cannot provide maximum support to the USIB. The structure does, however, provide for *optimum* support to the USIB as subject matter might demand. Each com-

SECRET

mittee secretariat supplies needed continuity of operations and staff coordination. Each chairman supplies professional knowledge and staff support when needed. Full-time committee membership with full-time supporting staffs would create diseconomies of function and manpower.

d. The fact that committee chairmen have no command leverage over other committee members reflects the autonomy of the agencies which comprise the Community. It is a fact which cannot be dealt with from a structural point of view short of abandoning the Community concept. Any system which might replace the USIB Committee structure would encounter the identical problem, given the current Community organization.

e. It is possible for substantive issues to be ignored because they fail to fit the charter of any existing USIB committee. It is less likely today that this might occur than once was true because, as alluded to earlier, the NIO structure effectively complements the USIB committees. The geographic orientation of the former and the topical/functional orientation of the latter combine to form a net in which to catch issues of omission. This tends to force DCI and USIB attention to such matters, enabling them to be treated on an ad hoc basis.

f. It may be true that the USIB Committee structure provides for no formal systematic interaction among committees to the degree that lateral coordination exists in a traditional line-staff organization. This potential gap is filled, however, by DCID 1/3 which directs committee coordination in matters of overlapping concern, and by the separate committee DCID's which iterate that direction. Additionally, the annual Letters of Instruction to each committee may direct coordination with other specifically named committees. Beyond these measures, considerable informal coordination takes place among committees and the IC Staff monitors coordination by acting as focal point for preparation of LOI's and, indeed, by tasking the USIB Committees to perform studies and meet other requirements.

## CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

This paper is not intended to measure the relative value of each USIB committee, but to present the entire committee mechanism in a positive light, to show that there is logic to this supporting system. Many commonly desirable organizational characteristics are incorporated in the USIB Committee structure and several which are uniquely desirable. No serious weaknesses exist which defy explanation. It is likely that no other organizational system could replace the committee structure without objectionable trade-offs in manpower, objectivity, and effectiveness. The structure supports the DCI and the USIB as it is supposed to do while providing a mechanism through which issues can surface from below. The system works.

The weight of logic indicates that the USIB Committee structure should be retained so long as the USIB exists in its present form. The process of change is apparently an inherent part of the committee structure. It is important, therefore, that management of the USIB system include provisions for continuing review of the several committees and that such review enjoy a high management priority.

Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000800020002-5

**Secret**

**Secret**

Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000800020002-5