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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

[Redacted]

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15 October 1975
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting on ASD/I Proposal for Tasking Collection Systems
in a Crisis Situation

1. I attended a meeting yesterday called by Mr. Hank Knoche to discuss the ASD/I proposal (see attachment) as part of his preparation for drafting a reply for Mr. Colby. Also present were Messrs. Walsh, [Redacted] Heyman, [Redacted] Chairman, SORS), [Redacted] (CPAD/IC Staff), and [Redacted] (SIGINT Committee Secretariat).

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2. A general discussion of the background to the ASD/I proposal uncovered the following: (a) Morton Goulder of ASD/I told [Redacted] that it was being made now because it was clear that the DoD, and specifically the NMCC, should be the focal point for tasking intelligence collection systems in a crisis situation; (b) [Redacted] of DIA told Mr. Knoche that even though the NMCC was the logical choice for this role, the ASD/I letter was intended to give the DCI the opportunity to have his say in the matter; (c) [Redacted] said that the proposal was the most recent representation of the long-standing view of the ASD/I that the Intelligence Community was not set up to function in a crisis, and especially to support military operational needs--something only the NMCC could do.

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3. [Redacted] position essentially was that a special committee or special arrangements are not needed. The real question is not the priorities of tasking collection systems, but their capacity. [Redacted]

[Redacted] he said the Community's response last week to the short-lived, potential "crisis" in Poland was an illustration of how the existing Community arrangements were

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effectively mobilized to cope with it. He observed that these arrangements were not fully understood by Community analysts and others, and that they sometimes included guidance provided by the WSAG (as was done, for example, during the October 1973 Middle East war). He concluded that the present USIB machinery was adequate, that the notion of "routine" USIB Committee action in a crisis was nonsense, and that what was needed was a mechanism to set collection priorities in which process the NMCC would be one--if not the most important--of the participants.

4. Mr. Knoche said he was not aware of any arrangements within the CIA that enabled analysts to forward what they might view as necessary collection guidance in a crisis situation. [redacted] said that an analytical task force was normally set up for intelligence production and that this mechanism typically was used for that purpose.

5. Mr. Walsh suggested that the DCI's reply must address the fundamental principle of who controls what and that it should make the following points: (a) some kind of "mechanism" is needed; (b) the NMCC does not appear to be it; (c) it's premature to say what is because the work of many study groups addressing this and related matters is still underway. Mr. Knoche and [redacted] will each draft a reply for the DCI's signature. I asked that the draft synthesis of this effort be made available for review by Mr. Carver. Mr. Knoche assured me that this would be done.

Attachment

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