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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Officers

26 May 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Bowie

SUBJECT: PRM-11 Draft

Attached is my suggested revision to the portion of the PRM-11 draft (pp 22-23) dealing with "Arms Control Monitoring and Verification." I proposed that this section be included in the PRM in order to call attention to two issues: (1) DCI's responsibilities in monitoring arms control agreement, and (2) Intelligence Community's relationship with ACDA.

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Attachment

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Proposed Revision to "Arms Control Monitoring and Verification" Portion of PRM-11 Draft (pp 22-23):

Arms Control Monitoring and Verification: Since the early 1960s, arms control has been an institutionalized aspect of US foreign policy. Accumulating agreements, ongoing negotiations, and consideration of new arms control options within the US Government have added new responsibilities to the Intelligence Community.

In general, the task of collecting and producing intelligence for arms control planning and for monitoring compliance with agreements is shared throughout most of the Intelligence Community. Major technical collection systems are relied on heavily for this purpose, and their role is recognized as legitimate by both the US and the USSR under the term "national technical means" of verification. Other collectors contribute materially to the total intelligence picture relative to the activities limited by treaties. Most intelligence agencies of the Community have a general or specialized interest in substantive intelligence issues in arms control planning and in monitoring compliance with agreements. CIA, DIA, the Services, and INR are concerned with a broad range of arms control topics. ERDA has special interests in the areas of nuclear test bans and non-proliferation.

The role of the DCI in monitoring compliance with arms agreements arises from his several functions as advisor to the President, producer of national intelligence, and source of leadership on Community collection and resource management. Although the DCI has been given a prominent role in the monitoring of strategic arms limitation agreements, his responsibilities and authority

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for monitoring all arms control agreements should be made explicit. The DCI is typically called upon to provide the President, the NSC and, as appropriate, the Congress with his assessment of the capabilities of intelligence to monitor arms agreements. Moreover, the DCI and other Community managers must consider the needs of arms control in developing future intelligence collection capabilities.

The DCI is not a final authority on verification. All members of the NSC have the ability and the responsibility to develop their own views on verification issues. Moreover, the President and the Secretary of State in the past have reserved the right to reach a final judgment, as a political matter, as to whether a foreign state has violated a formal agreement.

The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is required to advise the Secretary of State, the President, the NSC, and the Congress on arms control matters including the verifiability of agreements. The Senate recently has considered a law obliging the Director of ACDA to report to Congress on the verifiability of each proposal for arms control agreements submitted to and by the US, and on the numbers of people engaged throughout the Government (including the Intelligence Community) on verification matters.

ACDA has a strong interest in all intelligence bearing on arms control, but it lacks a self-standing competence outside intelligence to monitor arms agreements. ACDA has found its formal involvement in Community affairs inadequate to its needs. In the area of verification, it sees itself as more than one of many customers, and finds the interface provided by State's INR to be insufficient. ACDA has sought more direct involvement in Community production,

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in current collection strategies, and in program and resource management bearing on verification. One step ACDA has proposed has been formal membership in the NFIB and on appropriate DCI committees.

In view of ACDA's statutory obligations in the verification area, the question continually arises as to the proper relationship between the Intelligence Community and ACDA. This needs to be addressed and clearly defined. Past DCIs have resisted formal affiliation by ACDA with the Intelligence Community in the belief that only intelligence collectors and producers should be so affiliated and that less formal producer-consumer relationships should satisfy ACDA's needs. Currently, the Intelligence Community treats ACDA as a major consumer of intelligence separate from the Department of State, and DCI committee chairmen have been encouraged to invite ACDA observers to participate in committee deliberations on subjects of special interest to ACDA.

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