

**Page Denied**

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

### ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

<b>SUBJECT: (Optional)</b> Letter to Jeremy Stone				
<b>FROM:</b> William M. Baker Director, Public Affairs Office			<b>EXTENSION</b> NO. PAO 89-0010	<b>DATE</b> 11 January 1989
<b>TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)</b>	<b>DATE</b> RECEIVED      FORWARDED		<b>OFFICER'S INITIALS</b>	<b>COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)</b>
1.  ER	16	JAN 1989	<i>W</i>	Please make extra copy of entire package for me. Thank you  <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 20px; margin: 10px auto;"></div> Done 17 JAN 1989
2.				
3.  DDCI		175		
4.  ER		17	JAN 1989	
5.  PAO				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

STAT

STAT

STAT

STAT



*P-21A-1r*

**Page Denied**

Next 28 Page(s) In Document Denied

EX 30 3577X/25

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

November 16, 1988

[Redacted]

STAT

Dear [Redacted]:

STAT

Enclosed is a copy of the remarks the Deputy Director gave at the American Association for the Advancement of Science on the 14th of October. I hope you find them of interest.

Sincerely,

[Redacted]

STAT

[Redacted]

Office of the Deputy Director

STAT

Enclosure:  
As Stated

Distribution:

- 0 - Addressee
- 1 - ER
- 1 - DDCI Chrono



P-310-1R

**Page Denied**

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE  
COLLOQUIUM ON SCIENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY  
14 OCTOBER 1988

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND  
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY POLICY  
BY ROBERT M. GATES  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

INTRODUCTION

THE THEME OF CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN MUCH IN THE MEDIA IN RECENT MONTHS AS WE HAVE WATCHED THE EFFORTS OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TO MODERNIZE THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND CONSOLIDATE HIS POLITICAL POWER. KNOWLEDGE OF RUSSIAN WORDS SUCH AS "PERESTROIKA" AND "GLASNOST" HAS BECOME COMMONPLACE IN THE WEST. WITHOUT PARALLEL IN A GENERATION, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION HAVE CAPTURED THE INTEREST, AND IN SOME RESPECTS THE IMAGINATION, OF A WIDE AUDIENCE AROUND THE WORLD.

IT IS TYPICAL THAT WE IN THE WEST, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE UNITED STATES, WITH OUR FOCUS ON PERSONALITIES IN POLITICS, SHOULD FOCUS ON GORBACHEV'S PERSONNEL MOVES, WHO IS UP AND WHO IS DOWN, WHO IS IN AND WHO IS OUT. THUS THE SPECIAL ATTENTION FOCUSED ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM AND SUPREME SOVIET SESSION SOME TWO WEEKS AGO.

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

November 1, 1988



STAT

Dear Leo:

Thanks very much for your kind note. I enclose a copy of the full text. You will see that it is very similar to what you have seen in the past but was updated to include some more recent economic information and my views on the outcome of the Party Plenum.

Thanks again for your comments. Coming from you they are especially welcome.

Regards,



Robert M. Gates

Enclosure:  
As Stated

STAT

Washington, D.C. 20505

1 November 1988




Dear ,

Thanks for your note. I was on the West Coast for several days. I returned your call, but we were unable to make connections. I enclose a copy of both my speech to the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the Director's recent speech to the World Affairs Council here in Washington.

We have no real mailing list for speeches that we give so that they reach people automatically. I will try to be more attentive and send you copies of speeches by either of us that you might find of interest.

Regards,



Robert M. Gates  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosures:  
As Stated

*Good to talk to you today!*



STAT  
STAT



FD 08-7560V /S



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
Phone: (703) 351-2053

10 November 1988



STAT

Dear Mr. [Redacted]:

STAT

On behalf of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, I want to thank you for your kind words about his presentation before the American Association for the Advancement of Science Colloquium on Science, Arms Control and National Security on 14 October, and for your paper entitled, "Competitive Measures as a Substitute for War."

I have enclosed, for your information, a copy of the Deputy Director's remarks along with a Agency publication, The CIA Factbook, which I hope you will find informative.

Sincerely,



Public Affairs

STAT

Enclosure


STAT

P-310-IR

Executive Registry

88-3544X/21

STAT



STAT

October 17, 1988

Mr. Robert M. Gates  
Deputy Director CIA  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, DC 20502

Dear Mr. Gates:


Your recent speech as extracted by The New York Times on its front page dated October 15 may have represented your own or your staffs findings. It is unfortunate that speeches of this nature even if conceived by expert political economists are not helpful to anybody unless they are kept among professionals who must absolutely know your conclusions. Here are my reasons:

- o To turn around more than 50 years of a state owned, planned economy takes obviously more than 3 years. Even the British and the French have their problems to turn over state owned enterprises to the private sector having a relatively few years of ownership.
- o In the USSR, it is most likely necessary to change the attitude of more than 50 years of lack of economic incentives.
- o Your remarks wherever spoken or printed help the opposition of the present USSR regime. They point out the "proven" lack of success. At this stage the "effort" to change is all one can expect within such a short time frame.


STAT

ER —

*DOCI has seen.  
Just file in your system.  
No distribution necessary.*



*P-310-1R*



STAT  
STAT

Mr. Robert M. Gates  
Central Intelligence Agency  
October 17, 1988  
Page 2

- o Economic critique of this type has great political overtones. It might, therefore, be wiser to let those be said by the professionals of the state department rather than by the CIA.
- o In cases where you feel that your responsibility is at stake and you must speak out, it might be wise in the future to coordinate your comments with Secretary Shultz and his associates. It is who has the ultimate responsibility to observe and report accordingly to the Congress and the nation.

Sincerely yours,

STAT

WDZ/mn

cc: The Honorable George P. Shultz  
The Secretary of State  
2201 C Street, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20520

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26 :  
CIA-RDP91B01306R001400110001-4

STAT

**Page Denied**

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26 :  
CIA-RDP91B01306R001400110001-4

ER 88-3544/17

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

21 October 1988

NOTE FOR MAJOR

STAT

As you requested by telephone this morning, I am enclosing a copy of Mr. Gates' speech on 14 October on "Recent Developments in the Soviet Union and Implications for U.S. Security Policy."

O/DDCI

Enclosure

STAT



P-310-IR

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE  
COLLOQUIUM ON SCIENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY  
14 OCTOBER 1988

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND  
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY POLICY  
BY ROBERT M. GATES  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

INTRODUCTION

THE THEME OF CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN MUCH IN THE MEDIA IN RECENT MONTHS AS WE HAVE WATCHED THE EFFORTS OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TO MODERNIZE THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND CONSOLIDATE HIS POLITICAL POWER. KNOWLEDGE OF RUSSIAN WORDS SUCH AS "PERESTROIKA" AND "GLASNOST" HAS BECOME COMMONPLACE IN THE WEST. WITHOUT PARALLEL IN A GENERATION, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION HAVE CAPTURED THE INTEREST, AND IN SOME RESPECTS THE IMAGINATION, OF A WIDE AUDIENCE AROUND THE WORLD.

IT IS TYPICAL THAT WE IN THE WEST, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE UNITED STATES, WITH OUR FOCUS ON PERSONALITIES IN POLITICS, SHOULD FOCUS ON GORBACHEV'S PERSONNEL MOVES, WHO IS UP AND WHO IS DOWN, WHO IS IN AND WHO IS OUT. THUS THE SPECIAL ATTENTION FOCUSED ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM AND SUPREME SOVIET SESSION SOME TWO WEEKS AGO.

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

19 October 1988

TO: James Geer  
Assistant Director, Intelligence Division  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Per our conversation attached is the  
speech I gave last week on the Soviet Union.



Robert M. Gates

STAT



AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE  
COLLOQUIUM ON SCIENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY  
14 OCTOBER 1988

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND  
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY POLICY  
BY ROBERT M. GATES  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

INTRODUCTION

THE THEME OF CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN MUCH IN THE MEDIA IN RECENT MONTHS AS WE HAVE WATCHED THE EFFORTS OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TO MODERNIZE THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND CONSOLIDATE HIS POLITICAL POWER. KNOWLEDGE OF RUSSIAN WORDS SUCH AS "PERESTROIKA" AND "GLASNOST" HAS BECOME COMMONPLACE IN THE WEST. WITHOUT PARALLEL IN A GENERATION, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION HAVE CAPTURED THE INTEREST, AND IN SOME RESPECTS THE IMAGINATION, OF A WIDE AUDIENCE AROUND THE WORLD.

IT IS TYPICAL THAT WE IN THE WEST, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE UNITED STATES, WITH OUR FOCUS ON PERSONALITIES IN POLITICS, SHOULD FOCUS ON GORBACHEV'S PERSONNEL MOVES, WHO IS UP AND WHO IS DOWN, WHO IS IN AND WHO IS OUT. THUS THE SPECIAL ATTENTION FOCUSED ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM AND SUPREME SOVIET SESSION SOME TWO WEEKS AGO.



CIA-RDP91B01306R001400110001-4 Oct 88

TO: Ronald I. Spiers  
Under Secretary of State for

ROOM NO. 7207	BUILDING New State	Management
------------------	-----------------------	------------

REMARKS:

Per your phone request.

FROM: Deputy Director of Central

ROOM NO.	BUILDING Intelligence	EXTENSION
----------	--------------------------	-----------

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE  
COLLOQUIUM ON SCIENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY  
14 OCTOBER 1988

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND  
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY POLICY  
BY ROBERT M. GATES  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

INTRODUCTION

THE THEME OF CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN MUCH IN THE MEDIA IN RECENT MONTHS AS WE HAVE WATCHED THE EFFORTS OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TO MODERNIZE THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND CONSOLIDATE HIS POLITICAL POWER. KNOWLEDGE OF RUSSIAN WORDS SUCH AS "PERESTROIKA" AND "GLASNOST" HAS BECOME COMMONPLACE IN THE WEST. WITHOUT PARALLEL IN A GENERATION, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION HAVE CAPTURED THE INTEREST, AND IN SOME RESPECTS THE IMAGINATION, OF A WIDE AUDIENCE AROUND THE WORLD.

IT IS TYPICAL THAT WE IN THE WEST, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE UNITED STATES, WITH OUR FOCUS ON PERSONALITIES IN POLITICS, SHOULD FOCUS ON GORBACHEV'S PERSONNEL MOVES, WHO IS UP AND WHO IS DOWN, WHO IS IN AND WHO IS OUT. THUS THE SPECIAL ATTENTION FOCUSED ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM AND SUPREME SOVIET SESSION SOME TWO WEEKS AGO.



The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

October 19, 1988

Mr. James Lehrer

[Redacted]

STAT

Dear Jim:

I heard that you had an interesting discussion on your program by two Kremlinologists. I think Kremlinologists are like economists -- if you ask two of them for their views you will get three opinions. In any event, on a personal basis, I thought you might find the text of the speech I gave last week of interest. I neither expected nor wanted the publicity and obviously do not want to generate any more by sending you this. I just thought you might find it of personal interest inasmuch as the press accounts inevitably oversimplify.

I apologize for not writing sooner to tell you how much I enjoyed We Were Dreamers. Reading about those little Kansas towns like Valley Center as well as the Eaton Hotel really brought back memories -- including when Douglas was paved with bricks! I gave the book to my mother [Redacted] and it is becoming increasingly dog-eared as it is passed from reader to reader. (I know that doesn't do your royalty check any good.)

STAT

Sometime after the election, I would like to invite you out here for lunch both to reminisce more about Kansas and to talk about a world far removed from the time and place of We Were Dreamers.

Regards,

[Redacted]

STAT

Robert M. Gates



P-3101R

DDCI/RMGates [Redacted]

Distribution:

- 0 - Addressee, w/speech
- 1 - D/PAO
- 1 - ER
- 1 - DDCI Chrono

STAT

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE  
COLLOQUIUM ON SCIENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY  
14 OCTOBER 1988

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND  
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY POLICY  
BY ROBERT M. GATES  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

INTRODUCTION

THE THEME OF CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN MUCH IN THE MEDIA IN RECENT MONTHS AS WE HAVE WATCHED THE EFFORTS OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TO MODERNIZE THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND CONSOLIDATE HIS POLITICAL POWER. KNOWLEDGE OF RUSSIAN WORDS SUCH AS "PERESTROIKA" AND "GLASNOST" HAS BECOME COMMONPLACE IN THE WEST. WITHOUT PARALLEL IN A GENERATION, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION HAVE CAPTURED THE INTEREST, AND IN SOME RESPECTS THE IMAGINATION, OF A WIDE AUDIENCE AROUND THE WORLD.

IT IS TYPICAL THAT WE IN THE WEST, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE UNITED STATES, WITH OUR FOCUS ON PERSONALITIES IN POLITICS, SHOULD FOCUS ON GORBACHEV'S PERSONNEL MOVES, WHO IS UP AND WHO IS DOWN, WHO IS IN AND WHO IS OUT. THUS THE SPECIAL ATTENTION FOCUSED ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM AND SUPREME SOVIET SESSION SOME TWO WEEKS AGO.

**Page Denied**

Next 12 Page(s) In Document Denied

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

17 October 1988

NOTE TO: Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

Colin --

Last week, the head of Air Force Intelligence asked me to give the keynote address at a symposium they are having this Friday on the Soviet Union. They had Mac Toon lined up but he raised his price and they couldn't afford it. In response to a plea from General Wood, I agreed to stand in.

After the flap on the Soviet speech with the Secretary this morning, I have decided to deliver the attached comments on the implications for intelligence requirements of developments in the Soviet Union. It does not contain any of the elements of last Friday's speech that caused State heartburn and is focused virtually entirely on intelligence requirements.

I considered cancelling, but at this late date I believe that would create more of a stir than going and presenting what I believe will be a very non-controversial set of remarks. If you have any concerns with the attached draft, just call me. I have also sent a copy to Mike Armacost.



Robert M. Gates



STAT

Attachment:  
As Stated

P-310-IR

*Colin - I hope you realize that I neither expected nor wanted the <sup>news</sup> attention or <sup>the</sup> hassle with Shultz. I believe I have been very faithful in giving all of your speeches and articles in advance, in case someone had a problem. I've given that Soviet speech to you all two or three times since January and delivered it 7-8 times with no problem. Sorry to hear that it's a loss for you.*

Dist:  
0-Addressee  
1-DDCI  
1-ER

AIR FORCE SYMPOSIUM  
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION:  
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTELLIGENCE  
21 OCTOBER 1988

ROBERT M. GATES  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

AS YOU HEARD IN THIS CONFERENCE, CHANGES IN PERSONNEL AND POLICY IN THE SOVIET UNION ARE TAKING PLACE FAR FASTER THAN IMPLEMENTATION OF THOSE POLICIES AND REAL CHANGE IN THE SYSTEM. EVEN SO, WHILE ACTUAL STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN SOVIET UNION HAVE SO FAR BEEN MODEST, WHAT GORBACHEV ALREADY HAS SET IN MOTION REPRESENTS A POLITICAL EARTHQUAKE. HE IS PULLING ALL THE LEVERS OF CHANGE IN A SOCIETY AND CULTURE THAT HISTORICALLY HAS RESISTED CHANGE -- AND WHERE CHANGE USUALLY HAS BEEN VIOLENT AND WRENCHING. THE FORCES HE HAS UNLEASHED ARE POWERFUL, BUT SO ARE THE PEOPLE AND INSTITUTIONS HE HAS ANTAGONIZED -- THUS SETTING IN MOTION A TREMENDOUS POWER STRUGGLE AND PURGE NO LESS DRAMATIC FOR THE ABSENCE OF SHOW TRIALS AND TERROR.

INDEED, AFTER ALL OF THE TALK OF GLASNOST AND DEMOCRATIZATION, STALIN WOULD HAVE BEEN PROUD OF THE SMOOTHLY ORCHESTRATED 44-MINUTE SUPREME SOVIET SESSION IN WHICH PEOPLE WERE FIRED, RETIRED AND HIRED WITH NO DISSIDENTING VOTES AND 1500 DELEGATES VOTING AS ONE. THE SESSION WAS A POWER PLAY IN THE

ER 88-3544/10

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

17 October 1988

TO: The Honorable Michael H. Armacost  
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Mike --

The more I think about it the more I think cancelling the Air Force speech on Friday night at this late date would be a mistake and would attract comment that would not be helpful to anyone. I propose to deliver the attached speech on the implications for U.S. intelligence of developments in the Soviet Union. I delivered this speech at a conference at the Department ten days ago. It makes few judgments about what is going on in the Soviet Union and focuses almost entirely on the implications of developments in the USSR for U.S. intelligence requirements. As I mentioned on the phone, I am doing this speech on Friday as a favor to the Air Force after Mac Toon cancelled just last week. I understand there will be press there.

For what it is worth, I have no other speeches planned for some months. Also, having delivered last Friday's speech a half dozen times over many months, I did not expect the attention or want a flap.

Regards,



Robert M. Gates

Enclosure:  
As Stated

Dist:  
0-Addressee  
1-BDCI  
1-ER



P-310-IR



AIR FORCE SYMPOSIUM  
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION:  
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTELLIGENCE  
21 OCTOBER 1988

ROBERT M. GATES  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

AS YOU HEARD IN THIS CONFERENCE, CHANGES IN PERSONNEL AND POLICY IN THE SOVIET UNION ARE TAKING PLACE FAR FASTER THAN IMPLEMENTATION OF THOSE POLICIES AND REAL CHANGE IN THE SYSTEM. EVEN SO, WHILE ACTUAL STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN SOVIET UNION HAVE SO FAR BEEN MODEST, WHAT GORBACHEV ALREADY HAS SET IN MOTION REPRESENTS A POLITICAL EARTHQUAKE. HE IS PULLING ALL THE LEVERS OF CHANGE IN A SOCIETY AND CULTURE THAT HISTORICALLY HAS RESISTED CHANGE -- AND WHERE CHANGE USUALLY HAS BEEN VIOLENT AND WRENCHING. THE FORCES HE HAS UNLEASHED ARE POWERFUL, BUT SO ARE THE PEOPLE AND INSTITUTIONS HE HAS ANTAGONIZED -- THUS SETTING IN MOTION A TREMENDOUS POWER STRUGGLE AND PURGE NO LESS DRAMATIC FOR THE ABSENCE OF SHOW TRIALS AND TERROR.

INDEED, AFTER ALL OF THE TALK OF GLASNOST AND DEMOCRATIZATION, STALIN WOULD HAVE BEEN PROUD OF THE SMOOTHLY ORCHESTRATED 44-MINUTE SUPREME SOVIET SESSION IN WHICH PEOPLE WERE FIRED, RETIRED AND HIRED WITH NO DISSENTING VOTES AND 1500 DELEGATES VOTING AS ONE. THE SESSION WAS A POWER PLAY IN THE

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

17 October 1988

The Honorable Max M. Kampelman  
The Counselor to the Secretary of State  
Department of State  
Room 7250  
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Max:

At the Security Affairs Support Association (SASA) meeting last week, in our brief exchange you asked for a copy of my remarks. They are enclosed. I also enclose a copy of my remarks to the American Association for the Advancement of Science on Friday. I very much regret that the Secretary was so exercised and that others in the department may be unhappy. In describing the situation I said little that Gorbachev has not said. Furthermore, I believe that there was nothing in the speech contradictory to or detracting from the Administration's policy toward the USSR. I made clear that Gorbachev is very much in charge, that he is likely to be around for some time and that whether or not Perestroika is ultimately successful, he is interested in lowering tensions, pursuing arms control, and working out various international problems diplomatically. It is unfortunate that the press chose not to make some of those points even though they had the full text.

I would be interested in your remarks to SASA if you have an extra copy available.

Regards,



Robert M. Gates

Enclosures  
As Stated

Distribution:  
0-Addressee  
1-DDCI  
1-ER



P-310-IR

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE  
COLLOQUIUM ON SCIENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY  
14 OCTOBER 1988

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND  
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY POLICY  
BY ROBERT M. GATES  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

INTRODUCTION

THE THEME OF CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN MUCH IN THE MEDIA IN RECENT MONTHS AS WE HAVE WATCHED THE EFFORTS OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TO MODERNIZE THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND CONSOLIDATE HIS POLITICAL POWER. KNOWLEDGE OF RUSSIAN WORDS SUCH AS "PERESTROIKA" AND "GLASNOST" HAS BECOME COMMONPLACE IN THE WEST. WITHOUT PARALLEL IN A GENERATION, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION HAVE CAPTURED THE INTEREST, AND IN SOME RESPECTS THE IMAGINATION, OF A WIDE AUDIENCE AROUND THE WORLD.

IT IS TYPICAL THAT WE IN THE WEST, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE UNITED STATES, WITH OUR FOCUS ON PERSONALITIES IN POLITICS, SHOULD FOCUS ON GORBACHEV'S PERSONNEL MOVES, WHO IS UP AND WHO IS DOWN, WHO IS IN AND WHO IS OUT. THUS THE SPECIAL ATTENTION FOCUSED ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM AND SUPREME SOVIET SESSION SOME TWO WEEKS AGO.

SECURITY AFFAIRS SUPPORT ASSOCIATION  
FALL '88 SYMPOSIUM  
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION:  
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTELLIGENCE  
6 OCTOBER 1988

ROBERT M. GATES  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

AS YOU HEARD THIS MORNING, CHANGES IN PERSONNEL AND POLICY IN THE SOVIET UNION ARE TAKING PLACE FAR FASTER THAN IMPLEMENTATION OF THOSE POLICIES AND REAL CHANGE IN THE SYSTEM. EVEN SO, WHILE ACTUAL STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN SOVIET UNION HAVE SO FAR BEEN MODEST, WHAT GORBACHEV ALREADY HAS SET IN MOTION REPRESENTS A POLITICAL EARTHQUAKE. HE IS PULLING ALL THE LEVERS OF CHANGE IN A SOCIETY AND CULTURE THAT HISTORICALLY HAS RESISTED CHANGE -- AND WHERE CHANGE USUALLY HAS BEEN VIOLENT AND WRENCHING. THE FORCES HE HAS UNLEASHED ARE POWERFUL, BUT SO ARE THE PEOPLE AND INSTITUTIONS HE HAS ANTAGONIZED -- THUS SETTING IN MOTION A TREMENDOUS POWER STRUGGLE AND PURGE NO LESS DRAMATIC FOR THE ABSENCE OF SHOW TRIALS AND TERROR.

INDEED, AFTER ALL OF THE TALK OF GLASNOST AND DEMOCRATIZATION, STALIN WOULD HAVE BEEN PROUD OF THE SMOOTHLY ORCHESTRATED 44-MINUTE SUPREME SOVIET SESSION IN WHICH PEOPLE WERE FIRED, RETIRED AND HIRED WITH NO DISSENTING VOTES AND 1500 DELEGATES VOTING AS ONE. THE SESSION WAS A POWER PLAY IN THE

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

October 17, 1988

[Redacted]  
Dear [Redacted]

STAT

In a conversation with [Redacted] this morning, he mentioned your reaction to the New York Times story on my Soviet speech to the American Association for the Advancement of Science. I must say I was a bit surprised by State's reaction, inasmuch as I have given this same speech on a number of occasions in the last ten months and have provided the text to State -- and all with nary a peep from them. I certainly had not intended to "rock the boat". I enclose a copy of the speech along with the press coverage from both the Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times.

STAT

My invitation to lunch remains open, at your convenience whenever you are in Washington.

Regards,

[Redacted Signature]

STAT

Robert M. Gates

Enclosures:  
As Stated

Dist:  
0-Addressee  
1-DDCI  
1-ER



P-310-IR

# Gorbachev Faces 'Struggle' On Reforms, CIA's Gates Says

By R. Jeffrey Smith  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev faces a "continuing intense struggle over the pace and scope" of his domestic reforms despite his apparent consolidation of power at recent meetings of the Communist Party's Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet, a high-ranking U.S. intelligence official predicted yesterday.

Central Intelligence Agency deputy director Robert M. Gates said Gorbachev confronts a growing array of domestic and economic problems and could be ousted if opponents sense the Communist Party is "losing control" in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe.

Gates was not explicit, but his remark before a meeting sponsored by the American Association for the Advancement of Science was made at a time of popular unrest over economic and ethnic issues in Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and in the Soviet republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Estonia and Latvia.

In a rare public analysis of the Soviet Union's political turmoil, Gates disclosed that the CIA has counted roughly 600 "popular disturbances" inside the Soviet Union since early 1987, attributing nearly half to "ethnic issues."

In the past year, he added, "major nationalist demonstrations" have occurred in nine of the 15 Soviet republics, creating "justifiable" concern among the nation's more conservative leaders "about the potential for instability . . . created by any relaxation of political controls."

Gates said Gorbachev's aggressive pursuit of *glasnost*, or openness, has enabled him to "highlight problems . . . in order to mobilize society behind his campaigns." But he added that in so doing, Gorbachev also "set loose [political] forces that will be immensely difficult and painful to leash, as we are seeing" in the ethnic disputes.

Gates said "it is by no means certain—I would even say it is doubtful—that Gorbachev can in the end rejuvenate the [Soviet] system." Gates has tended toward pessimism in past public comments on Gorbachev's leadership, but his assessment yesterday seemed particularly dour.

Gorbachev's economic reforms to date "do not go nearly far enough" to enable the Soviets to match Western technological progress, Gates said, and are instead "causing serious disruptions and turbulence."

Discontent is growing over the "huge and growing" gap between official "pronouncement and implementation" of the reforms, he added.

Gates attributed the problems to the Politburo's unwillingness, so far, "to let go of the reins governing the economy," and said

that "trying to reshape the . . . economic structure gradually while leaving key problems of price reform and the government monopoly over goods until [later] . . . is like [making] a phased change from driving on the right-hand side of the road to the left."

Gates, a 17-year CIA veteran and Soviet specialist, observed that Gorbachev "showed real political muscle" at the Supreme Soviet's Oct. 1 meeting by obtaining swift approval for appointment of several supporters and proteges to the government's ruling Politburo "while removing most of the remaining holdovers" appointed by one of his conservative predecessors, Leonid Brezhnev.

"Stalin would have been proud of the smoothly orchestrated 44-minute . . . session in which people were fired, retired, demoted, and promoted with no dissent or even discussion and 1,500 delegates voting as one," Gates said.

Three Politburo members were sacked, and Foreign Minister and Supreme Soviet President Andrei Gromyko was retired and replaced by a younger Gorbachev ally, ideologist Vadim Medvedev.

But Gates said the meeting, called on short notice, also signaled Gorbachev's "vulnerability and his frustration at the lack of progress, bureaucratic obstructionism and opposition in the party to his programs and policies, and of the desperate situation facing the Soviet Union."

Gates tossed cold water on the view that the new appointments secured Gorbachev's absolute power, noting that the Soviet leader can now "probably count on only three or four" out of the 12 voting Politburo members "as being totally his men, consistently supportive across the board."

Overall, "this set goes to Gorbachev," Gates said, but "the match is far from over."

# Gorbachev Strong but Still Vulnerable, CIA Aide Says

By ROBERT C. TOTH, *Times Staff Writer*

WASHINGTON—In the first public intelligence assessment of the recent Kremlin shake-up, Deputy CIA Director Robert M. Gates said Friday that Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev demonstrated his power but also exposed his continuing vulnerability by shifting opponents and adding supporters to the Politburo.

According to Gates, the Soviet leader can count on only three or four sure votes for his reform effort on the 12-man Politburo even after what the CIA official called Gorbachev's "power play" earlier this month.

Gorbachev's two key opponents were moved into still-powerful positions on the Politburo, he failed to win a seat for an important protege and he was unable to remove a Ukrainian party boss who opposes him, Gates said. Thus, he concluded, "while this set goes to Gorbachev, the match is far from over."

Gates, addressing a colloquium on national security sponsored by the American Assn. for the Advancement of Science, portrayed Gorbachev as less of a clear winner than have State Department officials and some non-government experts.

Trained as a Soviet analyst, Gates has two roles: deputy chief of the Central Intelligence Agency and deputy director of the government-wide intelligence community, which encompasses the National Security Agency and the Pentagon's various intelligence agencies. His assessment of recent events in Moscow is believed to be a product of the entire intelligence community rather than of any one agency.

Gates said Gorbachev is risking instability within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe by relaxing political controls.

The CIA, he said, has "counted some 600 popular disturbances since early 1987, about half of them relating to ethnic issues." This year has seen "major nationalist demonstrations" in nine of the 15 Soviet republics, he said, including those in the three Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—as well as in Armenia and Azerbaijan.

In response to a question, Gates said that "the most immediate threat to Gorbachev soon would be an explosion in Eastern Europe" or the perception by Kremlin critics that Moscow is losing control in the republics around the Soviet periphery.

## Ukraine May Be Key

He said Gorbachev may be particularly fearful of unrest in the Ukraine, which is a major food producer with intense nationalist pride. The Ukrainian leader, Vladimir V. Shcherbitsky, is the only regional party boss still in office since the time of the Leonid I. Brezhnev.

"I think Gorbachev is afraid the Ukraine would go up in flames if he [Shcherbitsky] were taken off the Politburo," Gates said.

Nevertheless, Gorbachev has "declared war on the party apparatus," Gates said, as he has come to recognize it as the chief obstacle to his modernization and reform programs. He said Gorbachev's methods in pushing through personnel changes at party and parliamentary meetings two weeks ago smacked of old-time totalitarianism.

"After all the talk of *glasnost* [openness] and democratization, Stalin would have been proud of the smoothly orchestrated 44-minute Supreme Soviet session in which people were fired, retired, demoted and promoted with no dissent or even discussion and 1,500 delegates voting as one," Gates said.

"The session was a power play in the grand and traditional Soviet manner. While the session was a testimony to Gorbachev's power, the need for it also was a mark of his vulnerability and his frustration at the lack of progress, bureaucratic obstructionism and opposition in the party to his programs and policies—and of the desperate situation facing the Soviet Union."

Despite the political upheaval that Gorbachev has triggered, Gates said, he has made small and frequently ineffective economic changes.

"The war to change fundamentally the main pillars of the Stalinist economic system at this point is being lost," he said, with "little if any slowing in the downward spiral of the Soviet economy" over the last three years.

Growth in the Soviet gross national product fell to less than 1% last year from 4% in 1986 and will be only 2% to 3% this year, he said. Moreover, he added, Gorbachev needs annual growth of nearly 8% in both 1989 and 1990 to meet his five-year plan targets, and those goals are now "far beyond reach."

Under Gorbachev, he said, the Soviet budget deficit has soared to a level of about 7% of GNP, compared to a combined high of 3.5% for the U.S. state and federal budget deficits two years ago. He said the Soviets are borrowing roughly twice as much these days as the U.S. government is, although the accumulated U.S. federal debt is much higher.

But no cut in Soviet military spending is apparent, he said, adding that "at this point we see no slackening of Soviet weapons production or programs."

"Virtually all of their principal strategic weapons will be replaced with new, more sophisticated systems by the mid-1990s," he said, "and a new strategic bomber is being added to their arsenal for the first time in decades. As the rate of growth of our defense budget declines again, theirs continues to grow, albeit slowly."

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE  
COLLOQUIUM ON SCIENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY  
14 OCTOBER 1988

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND  
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY POLICY  
BY ROBERT M. GATES  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

INTRODUCTION

THE THEME OF CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN MUCH IN THE MEDIA IN RECENT MONTHS AS WE HAVE WATCHED THE EFFORTS OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TO MODERNIZE THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND CONSOLIDATE HIS POLITICAL POWER. KNOWLEDGE OF RUSSIAN WORDS SUCH AS "PERESTROIKA" AND "GLASNOST" HAS BECOME COMMONPLACE IN THE WEST. WITHOUT PARALLEL IN A GENERATION, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION HAVE CAPTURED THE INTEREST, AND IN SOME RESPECTS THE IMAGINATION, OF A WIDE AUDIENCE AROUND THE WORLD.

IT IS TYPICAL THAT WE IN THE WEST, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE UNITED STATES, WITH OUR FOCUS ON PERSONALITIES IN POLITICS, SHOULD FOCUS ON GORBACHEV'S PERSONNEL MOVES, WHO IS UP AND WHO IS DOWN, WHO IS IN AND WHO IS OUT. THUS THE SPECIAL ATTENTION FOCUSED ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM AND SUPREME SOVIET SESSION SOME TWO WEEKS AGO.



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

17 October 1988

TO: Col. Samuel J. Watson, III  
Deputy Assistant to the Vice President  
National Security Affairs

Per your request attached is the Soviet  
speech given by the Deputy Director on  
the 14th of October to the American Association  
for the Advancement of Science.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

O/DDCI

STAT

STAT

Distribution:

0-Addressee

1 - DDCI

~~1-ER~~



P-310-IR

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

17 October 1988

TO: The Honorable Michael H. Armacost  
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Mike --

Attached is a copy of the Soviet speech I delivered on Friday to the American Association for the Advancement of Science. You will see that apart from a couple of paragraphs on the recent Central Committee Plenum and some updating on the economy, this is essentially the same speech I have been giving since January -- copies of which I have sent over to you and the Secretary on several occasions.

Regards,



Robert M. Gates

STAT

Attachment:  
As Stated

*Please give a copy to the Secretary. Remind him that 90% of this text was in a speech text I sent you in January (in advance of the speech.)*

Distribution:

0-Addressee  
1 - DDCI  
~~1 - ER~~



*P-310-IR*

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

17 October 1988

TO: Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

Colin --

Attached is a copy of the Soviet speech I gave to the American Association for the Advancement of Science on Friday. As I told John Saturday morning, apart from a couple of paragraphs on the recent Party Plenum and some updating on the economy, it is the same speech I have been giving for ten months -- copies of which have been provided on several occasions to you, State and Frank. (I gave Frank a copy of this text about ten days ago and he said it was very much in line with what he's been saying.)

You will note that this speech, far from being an attack on Gorbachev -- or "writing him off", is in fact a recitation of the problems that he faces. (And, I might add, parallels what he himself has been saying.) It shouldn't create any problems for the Administration because, in my view, Administration policy is based on the realities set forth in the speech. If you have any concerns or questions, don't hesitate to call.

(By the way, the comments in the AFIO speech on Soviet intelligence operations I lifted verbatim from an earlier speech by the DCI.)

Regards,



Robert M. Gates

Attachments:

AAAS, dtd14Oct88  
AFIO, dtd15Oct88

Distribution:

0-Addressee  
1 - DDCI ~~CI-ER~~



P-310-TD

**Page Denied**

STAT

STAT

STAT

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE  
COLLOQUIUM ON SCIENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY  
14 OCTOBER 1988

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND  
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY POLICY

BY ROBERT M. GATES  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

INTRODUCTION

THE THEME OF CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN MUCH IN THE MEDIA IN RECENT MONTHS AS WE HAVE WATCHED THE EFFORTS OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TO MODERNIZE THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND CONSOLIDATE HIS POLITICAL POWER. KNOWLEDGE OF RUSSIAN WORDS SUCH AS "PERESTROIKA" AND "GLASNOST" HAS BECOME COMMONPLACE IN THE WEST. WITHOUT PARALLEL IN A GENERATION, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION HAVE CAPTURED THE INTEREST, AND IN SOME RESPECTS THE IMAGINATION, OF A WIDE AUDIENCE AROUND THE WORLD.

IT IS TYPICAL THAT WE IN THE WEST, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE UNITED STATES, WITH OUR FOCUS ON PERSONALITIES IN POLITICS, SHOULD FOCUS ON GORBACHEV'S PERSONNEL MOVES, WHO IS UP AND WHO IS DOWN, WHO IS IN AND WHO IS OUT. THUS THE SPECIAL ATTENTION FOCUSED ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM AND SUPREME SOVIET SESSION SOME TWO WEEKS AGO.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PAO 88-0345

Distribution:

- Orig. - DDCI
- 1 - ER
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - D/PAO
- 1 - PAO Registry
- 1 - PAO Ames
- 1 - MED(Subject)
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - DCI Security
- 1 - Jean

STAT

STAT

13 October 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: William M. Baker  
Director, Public Affairs Office

SUBJECT: Address of the American Association for the  
Advancement of Science

1. This is background information for your address of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Colloquium on Science, Arms Control and National Security on Friday, 14 October. The breakfast meeting will be from 8:00 a.m. - 9:15 a.m. at the Capital Hilton Hotel, 16th & K Streets, NW, Washington, D.C. Phone: 393-1000. Sharon Basso will attend the program.

2. Arrangements for Your Address of the AAAS Breakfast Meeting: You are asked to be at the Association's registration desk in the upper lobby on the second floor of the hotel at 7:45 a.m. Staff members will meet you and escort you to the Congressional Senate Room. Your host, Vice President of System Planning Corporation, Sidney N. Graybeal, will escort you to the head table. (See tab opposite for biography.) Breakfast will be served at 8:00 a.m. and your remarks on "Recent Developments in the Soviet Union and Implications for US Security Policy" are scheduled to begin at approximately 8:30 a.m. Mr. Graybeal will introduce you. The suggested format is 30 minutes of remarks followed by 15 minutes of questions and answers. A podium and microphone will be available near your table.

You will be seated with Mr. Graybeal and other members of the Committee on Science, Arms Control and National Security. (See tab opposite for list.) Since seating is not on an assigned basis, a head table seating list is not available. DCI Security will tape your remarks for the Agency's historical records. The meeting also will be taped by the Association for publication in their proceedings, and we will have an opportunity to review the proceedings prior to publication.

Audience: You can expect 200 - 250 scientists, academicians, and students. Approximately two-thirds of the audience will be representatives from high technology defense-related industries and DOD. Staffers from Senator Edward Kennedy's and Senator Tom Harkin's offices also will attend. Since members from the Soviet, Yugoslav, Czechoslovak, Bulgarian, Finnish, Canadian, Australian, and Brazilian embassies were invited you could expect diplomats from these countries to be in the audience.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



D-310-1R

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Media: Although the TV, radio and print press including members of the foreign press have been invited to attend the Colloquium, the Association does not know at this time who will cover your address. (See tab opposite for list of invited media and the press release.) According to the Association, reporters primarily from journals such as AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY will be present. TV coverage is not anticipated, but the VOICE OF AMERICA will attend. The media which will be seated with the rest of the audience may ask questions in the question and answer session but the Association said the reporters seldom participate.

Background: The AAAS founded in 1848 is the largest general scientific organization representing all fields of science. The organization has a budget of \$35,000,000 and a membership of 132,000 individuals and 300 scientific societies. The AAAS publishes the weekly journal SCIENCE. The Program on Science, Arms Control and National Security has the responsibility within the AAAS to develop and focus the scientific, technical, and organizational resources of the Association on effective approaches toward conflict resolution, control of nuclear weapons, and improvement of national security assets. (See background tab opposite for further information.)

The program for the third annual Colloquium on Science, Arms Control, and National Security is "Science and Security: Issues of Technology and Arms Control for the 1990s." In its first two years, the Colloquium has established itself as a major event in the scientific and defense policy communities.

Previous speakers have included

STAT



William M. Baker

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**

**ROUTING SLIP**

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OCA				
14	D/PAO	X			
15	D/PERS				
16	D/Ex Staff				
17					
18	<i>ER file</i>				
19					
20					
21					
22					

SUSPENSE \_\_\_\_\_

Date

Remarks

#14 Please handle as appropriate

ER 88-2569X/5

Executive Secretary

2 NOV 88

Date

STAT

3637 (10-81)



**Page Denied**

Next 15 Page(s) In Document Denied

STAT

Washington, D.C. 20505

7 October 1988

NOTE TO: Robert Blackwell, NIO/USSR  
Doug MacEachin, D/SOVA/DDI  
[redacted] DDI/SOVA  
[redacted] DDI/SOVA  
George Kolt, D/EURA/DDI

STAT

Thanks for your updates and suggestions on the speech. Attached is the revised version. I would appreciate any comments, corrections or disagreements. I call your attention especially to pages 1-6 and the last paragraph on page 10. I would appreciate your reaction by COB Tuesday, 11 October.

STAT

[redacted]  
Robert M. Gates

Attachment:  
As Stated



P-310-1R

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

7 October 1988

NOTE TO: The Secretary of Defense

Frank --

Attached is the Soviet speech I mentioned yesterday. While you may want to go through the whole thing, I think you will find pages 1-10 and 18-20 of greatest interest.



Robert M. Gates

STAT

Attachment:  
As Stated

STAT




P-310-1R

Washington, D.C. 20505

7 October 1988

NOTE TO: DDO  
C/SE/DDO

For your information.

  
Robert M. Gates

STAT

Attachment:  
AAAS Speech



P-310-1R

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE  
COLLOQUIUM ON SCIENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY  
14 OCTOBER 1988

THE GORBACHEV ERA: IMPLICATIONS FOR US STRATEGY  
BY ROBERT M. GATES  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

INTRODUCTION

THE THEME OF CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN MUCH IN THE MEDIA IN RECENT MONTHS AS WE HAVE WATCHED THE EFFORTS OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TO MODERNIZE THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND CONSOLIDATE HIS POLITICAL POWER. KNOWLEDGE OF RUSSIAN WORDS SUCH AS "PERESTROIKA" AND "GLASNOST" HAS BECOME COMMONPLACE IN THE WEST. WITHOUT PARALLEL IN A GENERATION, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION HAVE CAPTURED THE INTEREST, AND IN SOME CASES THE IMAGINATION, OF A WIDE AUDIENCE AROUND THE WORLD.

IT IS TYPICAL THAT WE IN THE WEST, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE UNITED STATES, WITH OUR FOCUS ON PERSONALITIES IN POLITICS, SHOULD FOCUS ON GORBACHEV'S PERSONNEL MOVES, WHO IS UP AND WHO IS DOWN, WHO IS IN AND WHO IS OUT. THUS THE SPECIAL ATTENTION FOCUSED ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM AND SUPREME SOVIET SESSION SOME TWO WEEKS AGO.

AFTER ALL OF THE TALK OF GLASNOST AND DEMOCRATIZATION, STALIN WOULD HAVE BEEN PROUD OF THE SMOOTHLY ORCHESTRATED 44 MINUTE SUPREME SOVIET SESSION IN WHICH PEOPLE WERE FIRED, RETIRED, HIRED, DEMOTED AND PROMOTED WITH NO DISSENT OR EVEN DISCUSSION AND 1500 DELEGATES VOTING AS ONE. THE SESSION WAS A POWER PLAY IN THE GRAND AND TRADITIONAL SOVIET MANNER. WHILE THE SESSION WAS TESTIMONY TO GORBACHEV'S POWER, THE NEED FOR IT ALSO WAS A MARK OF HIS VULNERABILITY AND HIS FRUSTRATION AT THE LACK OF PROGRESS, BUREAUCRATIC OBSTRUCTIONISM AND OPPOSITION IN THE PARTY TO HIS PROGRAMS AND POLICIES -- AND OF THE DESPERATE SITUATION FACING THE SOVIET UNION.

THIS MORNING I WOULD LIKE TO PUT ASIDE THE DISCUSSION OF PERSONALITIES AND RECENT PROMOTIONS AND DEMOTIONS IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND FOCUS INSTEAD ON WHAT IS GENUINELY IMPORTANT BOTH IN THE SOVIET UNION AND FOR THE WEST -- WHAT CHANGES ACTUALLY ARE TAKING PLACE IN THE SOVIET UNION AND HOW GORBACHEV IS DOING IN IMPLEMENTING HIS PROGRAM.

THE SELECTION OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AS GENERAL SECRETARY IN THE SPRING OF 1985 SIGNALLED THE POLITBURO'S RECOGNITION THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN DEEP TROUBLE -- ESPECIALLY ECONOMICALLY AND SPIRITUALLY -- TROUBLE THAT THEY RECOGNIZED WAS AFFECTING THEIR MILITARY POWER AND POSITION IN THE WORLD. DESPITE ENORMOUS RAW ECONOMIC POWER AND RESOURCES, INCLUDING A \$2 TRILLION A YEAR GNP, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP BY THE MID-1980S CONFRONTED A STEADILY WIDENING GAP WITH THE WEST AND JAPAN.

THESE TRENDS, TOGETHER WITH WESTERN MILITARY MODERNIZATION, TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH DEVELOPMENTS FORCED THE POLITBURO TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD NO LONGER RISK THE SUSPENDED ANIMATION OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS. THEY COALESCED AROUND AN IMAGINATIVE AND VIGOROUS LEADER WHOM THEY HOPED COULD REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY WITHOUT ALTERING THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE OR COMMUNIST PARTY.

#### STRENGTHENING THE LEADERSHIP AND HIS POSITION

THERE HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY STRONG SUPPORT IN THE POLITBURO SINCE 1985 FOR MODERNIZATION OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY. THIS REMAINS GORBACHEV'S GREATEST POLITICAL ASSET. EVEN SO, NEARLY EVERY STEP GORBACHEV SEEKS TO TAKE TOWARD STRUCTURAL ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL CHANGE HAS BEEN -- AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE -- A STRUGGLE. THE DEGREE OF SUPPORT IN THE POLITBURO FOR HIS INITIATIVES VARIES FROM ISSUE TO ISSUE. WHILE HIS POTENTIALLY FAR REACHING REFORM PROGRAM WAS APPROVED ENTHUSIASTICALLY AT THE PARTY CONFERENCE IN JUNE, WHEN GORBACHEV WENT ON VACATION IN AUGUST, CONSERVATIVES LED BY LIGACHEV AGAIN VOCALLY CRITICIZED ASPECTS OF THE PROGRAM.

GORBACHEV HAS NOW COUNTERATTACKED. HE HAS SHOWN REAL POLITICAL MUSCLE IN ADVANCING SEVERAL PROTEGES AND SUPPORTERS

WHILE REMOVING MOST OF THE REMAINING BREZHNEV HOLDOVERS. BUT EVEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS CLASSIC POLITICAL STROKE IN THE KREMLIN, THE LIMITS TO GORBACHEV'S POWER -- OR AT LEAST THE DEGREE OF RISK HE IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT -- ARE APPARENT. TWO SENIOR POLITBURO MEMBERS WHO PURPORTEDLY HAVE BEEN MAJOR OBSTACLES TO FAR-REACHING CHANGE -- LIGACHEV AND CHEBRIKOV -- REMAIN ON THE POLITBURO AND IN POWERFUL POSITIONS, ALTHOUGH WITH DIMINISHED CLOUT. MEANWHILE, GORBACHEV STILL HAS BEEN UNABLE TO PROMOTE ONE OF HIS MOST IMPORTANT PROTEGES, RAZUMOVSKIY. HE CAN COUNT ON ONLY 3 OR 4 OUT OF 12 POLITBURO MEMBERS AS BEING TOTALLY IN HIS CORNER. SO, WHILE WE MUST AWARD THIS SET TO GORBACHEV, THE MATCH IS FAR FROM OVER. IT IS CLEAR THAT FOR THE LONG TERM THERE WILL BE A CONTINUING INTENSE STRUGGLE OVER THE PACE AND SCOPE OF MODERNIZATION AND OVER POLITICAL POWER.

THE STRUGGLE WITHIN THE POLITBURO IS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT TO GORBACHEV BECAUSE OUTSIDE THE POLITBURO, SUPPORT FOR CHANGE -- AND ESPECIALLY FAR-REACHING CHANGE -- IS MUCH WEAKER. SENIOR LEVELS OF THE ECONOMIC BUREAUCRACY STAND TO LOSE THE MOST IF GORBACHEV MOVES TO DECENTRALIZE THE SYSTEM AND ARE IMPORTANT OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION OF HIS PROGRAM. WHILE MANY SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAUCRACIES UNDERSTAND THE CONNECTION BETWEEN A STRONG DEFENSE AND A HEALTHY ECONOMY, THEY ALSO ARE UNHAPPY WITH THE IDEA OF GREATER CONSTRAINTS ON DEFENSE SPENDING AND SKEPTICAL OF PROMISED



BENEFITS. OTHERS, FOR EXAMPLE THE KGB, ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR INSTABILITY AT HOME AND IN EASTERN EUROPE CREATED BY ANY RELAXATION OF POLITICAL CONTROLS. (INDEED, WE COUNT SOME 600 POPULAR DISTURBANCES SINCE EARLY 1987, ABOUT HALF OF THEM RELATING TO ETHNIC ISSUES. THERE HAVE BEEN MAJOR NATIONALIST DEMONSTRATIONS IN 9 OF THE 15 SOVIET REPUBLICS SINCE JANUARY.) THE SOVIET POPULATION SEEMS TO BE PASSIVELY SUPPORTIVE, BUT THEY HAVE SEEN CAMPAIGNS FOR CHANGE COME AND GO. THEY ARE SKEPTICAL THAT GORBACHEV'S EFFORTS WILL PRODUCE LASTING RESULTS OR EVEN IMMEDIATE PAYOFFS. THE INTELLIGENTSIA ARE PROBABLY THE ONLY GROUP THAT COMES CLOSE TO GIVING WHOLE-HEARTED SUPPORT -- A WEAK REED IN THE SOVIET UNION.

IT IS, HOWEVER, OPPOSITION WITHIN THE PARTY AND PARTICULARLY AT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND PARTY APPARATUS THAT HAS BECOME THE PRINCIPAL AND CRITICAL PROBLEM FOR GORBACHEV, AND THE TARGET OF HIS POLITICAL CAMPAIGN. ONE OF THE MAIN DEVELOPMENTS AT THE PARTY CONFERENCE IN JUNE, BEYOND APPROVAL OF HIS PROGRAM, WAS HIS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT THE PARTY ITSELF IS THE CHIEF OBSTACLE TO MODERNIZATION AND REFORM. HE TACITLY ADMITTED THAT HE HAS FAILED TO OVERCOME THAT OPPOSITION, AND HIS STRATEGY NOW SEEMS TO BE TO CIRCUMVENT THE PARTY BY STRENGTHENING THE SUPREME SOVIET AND ITS CHAIRMAN, TO TAKE THAT POSITION HIMSELF, AND THEN TO FORCE THROUGH HIS ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHANGES. HE HAS SECURED APPROVAL FOR A TIMETABLE TO DISMANTLE THE ECONOMIC APPARATUS OF THE PARTY AND THEREBY

SIGNIFICANTLY WEAKEN ITS CAPACITY TO INTERFERE IN THE DAY TO DAY MANAGEMENT OF THE ECONOMY.

IN SUM, GORBACHEV HAS DECLARED WAR ON THE PARTY APPARATUS MUCH AS STALIN DID IN THE LATE 1920S AND 1930S. THE DIFFERENCE IS THAT HIS ADVERSARIES WILL LOSE POWER, PRESTIGE AND THEIR JOBS, BUT NOT THEIR LIVES. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER HE CAN SO RADICALLY ALTER THE ROLE OF THE PARTY IN SOVIET LIFE AND WHETHER THE PARTY APPARAT WILL ALLOW ITSELF TO BE SO WEAKENED AND EVEN DISMANTLED. AND NO MATTER HOW MANY PERSONNEL OR ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES GORBACHEV MAKES, IF HE CANNOT MAKE HIS POLICIES WORK, IF HE CANNOT TURN AROUND THE ECONOMY, TODAY'S SUPPORTERS WILL AT SOME POINT BECOME TOMORROW'S ADVERSARIES.

#### MODERNIZATION OF THE ECONOMY

GORBACHEV NOW ADMITS THAT WHEN HE BECAME GENERAL SECRETARY HE UNDERESTIMATED THE SEVERITY OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AFFLICTING THE SOVIET UNION. AS GORBACHEV HAS SEEN THE DIMENSIONS OF THE CRISIS, HIS VIEWS OF WHAT IS NEEDED TO CORRECT THESE PROBLEMS HAVE MOVED TOWARD MORE RADICAL PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE.

TAKEN AS A WHOLE, THE REFORM MEASURES PUT IN PLACE IN GORBACHEV'S THREE YEAR TENURE ARE AN IMPRESSIVE PACKAGE.

NEVERTHELESS, THE REFORMS DO NOT GO NEARLY FAR ENOUGH. THE REFORM PACKAGE AS NOW CONSTITUTED IS A SET OF HALF MEASURES THAT LEAVES IN PLACE THE PILLARS OF SOCIALIST CENTRAL PLANNING. THE POLITBURO SIMPLY IS UNWILLING TO LET GO OF THE REINS GOVERNING THE ECONOMY. IT FEARS THAT IF ENTERPRISES AREN'T TOLD WHAT TO PRODUCE, THEY WILL MANUFACTURE THE WRONG ITEMS. WITH THE POLISH EXPERIENCE IN MIND, IT WORRIES THAT IF SUBSIDIES ON FOOD ARE REMOVED, CIVIL DISORDER WILL RESULT. AND IT HESITATES TO RELAX THE CONTROLS OVER PRICES BECAUSE IT THINKS THE OUTCOME WOULD BE RAPID AND PERVASIVE INFLATION.

BECAUSE OF INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS AND THE RETENTION OF SO MANY ELEMENTS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM, THE REFORMS, EVEN IF FULLY IMPLEMENTED BY 1991 AS INTENDED, WILL NOT CREATE THE DYNAMIC ECONOMIC MECHANISM THAT GORBACHEV SEEKS AS THE MEANS TO REDUCE OR CLOSE THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP WITH THE WEST. TO THE CONTRARY, AGGRESSIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF REFORMS IS CAUSING SERIOUS DISRUPTIONS AND TURBULENCE IN THE ECONOMY. SPECIFICALLY:

- SOVIET GNP GROWTH FELL TO ABOUT LESS THAN 1% IN 1987, DOWN FROM ALMOST 4% IN 1986, AND WILL BE ABOUT 2-3% THIS YEAR. GORBACHEV WOULD NEED NEARLY 8% GROWTH PER YEAR IN 1989 AND 1990 TO MEET THE FIVE YEAR PLAN TARGETS.

- IMPLEMENTATION OF GORBACHEV'S QUALITY CONTROL PROGRAM CAUSED MAJOR DISRUPTIONS IN PRODUCTION LAST YEAR, FORCING THE REGIME TO BACK OFF ITS ENFORCEMENT.
  
- NEW INITIATIVES IN ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT ARE CREATING CONFUSION AND APPREHENSION IN SOME QUARTERS, AND BUREAUCRATIC FOOT-DRAGGING AND OUTRIGHT RESISTANCE IN OTHERS.
  
- DESPITE CONSIDERABLE RHETORIC, WHAT HAS ACTUALLY BEEN DONE SO FAR HAS NOT GREATLY CHANGED THE SYSTEM OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVES THAT DISCOURAGE MANAGEMENT INNOVATION, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND PRIVATE INITIATIVE. FOR EXAMPLE, THREE YEARS AGO GORBACHEV CREATED A NEW ORGANIZATIONAL MECHANISM, THE INTERBRANCH SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COMPLEX, TO SPEARHEAD THE DEVELOPMENT OF CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES FOR INDUSTRIAL MODERNIZATION. THE 20-SOME COMPLEXES ARE PERFORMING DISMALLY, HAVING FAILED UTTERLY TO PRODUCE INCREASED VOLUME OR QUALITY OF NEW PRODUCTS OR TO SHORTEN THE R&D PROCESS.
  
- TRYING TO RESHAPE THE ENTIRE STALINIST ECONOMIC STRUCTURE GRADUALLY WHILE LEAVING KEY PROBLEMS OF PRICE REFORM AND THE GOVERNMENT MONOPOLY OVER GOODS UNTIL

LAST IS LIKE A PHASED CHANGE FROM DRIVING ON THE RIGHT HAND SIDE OF THE ROAD TO THE LEFT. THE RESULTS ARE LIKELY TO BE SIMILAR. TO ILLUSTRATE JUST HOW TOTALLY OUT OF KILTER THE SOVIET ECONOMY IS, CONSIDER THAT RENTS FOR HOUSING -- WHICH IS GENERALLY AWFUL -- HAVE NOT BEEN RAISED SINCE 1928; THE CURRENT PRICE OF BREAD WAS SET IN 1954, AND MEAT PRICES IN 1962. STATE SUBSIDIES ARE SO HUGE THAT IT IS CHEAPER FOR A PEASANT TO FEED HIS PIGS BREAD THAN TO GIVE THEM GRAIN.

-- UNDER GORBACHEV, THE DEFICIT IN THE SOVIET STATE BUDGET HAS SOARED TO THE POINT THAT IT IS NOW EQUAL TO ABOUT 7% OF GNP, ABOUT 66 BILLION RUBLES. BY WAY OF COMPARISON, THE COMBINED DEFICITS OF THE US STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS REACHED A HIGH OF 3 1/2% OF GNP TWO YEARS AGO.

FINALLY, FOR A MODERNIZATION DRIVE THAT DEPENDS IN SUBSTANTIAL MEASURE ON HARDER WORK, THERE ARE FEW REWARDS FOR SUCH WORK. BY PRINTING MONEY TO FINANCE THE BUDGET DEFICIT, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS ALLOWED INCOMES TO RISE SUBSTANTIALLY MORE THAN THE SUPPLY OF CONSUMER GOODS AND SERVICES. THE UNSATISFIED CONSUMER DEMAND IS REFLECTED IN EMPTY SHELVES, LONG LINES IN STATE STORES, AND RISING PRICES IN RETAIL MARKETS.

INDEED, STAGNATION ON THE CONSUMER SCENE AND RECOGNITION THAT PERESTROIKA CANNOT SUCCEED WITHOUT WORKER SUPPORT HAS PROMPTED THE LEADERSHIP TO UNDERTAKE A SERIES OF NEW POLICY INITIATIVES.

-- TARGETS HAVE BEEN RAISED FOR SPENDING ON HOUSING, EDUCATION, HEALTH, CONSUMER SERVICES, AND INVESTMENT IN THE LIGHT AND FOOD INDUSTRIES. THE SHIFT TOWARD GREATER PRIORITY FOR THE CONSUMER IN THE MIDDLE OF THE FIVE YEAR PLAN HAS BEEN AT THE EXPENSE OF HEAVY INDUSTRY, MODERNIZATION OF WHICH IS THE CRITICAL ENGINE FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH.

-- EVEN SO, THE POPULATION WON'T SEE MUCH CHANGE IN ITS LIVING STANDARDS IN THE SHORT TERM BECAUSE THESE INVESTMENTS WILL TAKE TIME TO SHOW RESULTS AND THE SHORTAGES OF HOUSING AND DECENT HEALTH CARE ARE SO LARGE.

THUS, WHILE IMPORTANT BATTLES HAVE BEEN WON IN PRINCIPLE, THE WAR TO CHANGE FUNDAMENTALLY THE MAIN PILLARS OF THE STALINIST ECONOMIC SYSTEM AT THIS POINT IS BEING LOST. THE GAP BETWEEN PRONOUNCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION IS HUGE, AND GROWING. IT IS THIS REALITY THAT LED TO THE JUNE PARTY CONFERENCE AND THE DRAMATIC PERSONNEL CHANGES TWO WEEKS AGO.

## POLITICAL REFORM

GORBACHEV'S PLANS FOR THE POLITICAL SYSTEM REMAIN LESS WELL-DEFINED THAN HIS ECONOMIC AGENDA. BUT AN IMPORTANT MILESTONE IN THE EVOLUTION OF HIS VIEWS WAS RECOGNITION THAT THE REVITALIZATION OF SOCIETY AND ECONOMY CAN SUCCEED ONLY IF THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL ARENA AS WELL. THE REGIME APPEARS TO BE MOVING ON AT LEAST THREE FRONTS TO CREATE THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IT SEEKS:

-- THE FIRST IS IDEOLOGY. GORBACHEV IS FRUSTRATED WITH THE STRAITJACKET OF INHERITED DOCTRINE THAT OPPONENTS OF CHANGE HAVE SOUGHT TO IMPOSE ON HIM. HE SEEKS TO EXPAND HIS ROOM TO MANEUVER BY AN INCREASINGLY OPEN ATTACK ON STAGNATION IN IDEOLOGY AND BY DEPICTING HIS OWN PROPOSALS AS AN EFFORT TO RETURN TO LENIN'S ORIGINAL INTENT AND EXPAND THE BOUNDS OF WHAT IS PERMISSIBLE UNDER SOCIALISM. HIS VERBAL CONTORTIONS IN EXPLAINING HOW GIVING PEASANTS A 50 YEAR FARM LEASE DOES NOT REPRESENT A RETREAT FROM SOCIALISM WERE, AT THE LEAST, IMAGINATIVE.

-- THE SECOND FRONT IS DEMOCRATIZATION. GORBACHEV'S CAMPAIGN FOR "DEMOCRATIZATION" IS DESIGNED TO

REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS. INITIALLY, THIS WAS MOSTLY RHETORIC. BUT, THE PARTY CONFERENCE WAS ITSELF AN EXTRAORDINARY POLITICAL HAPPENING, WITH A FREEDOM OF DEBATE AND EXPRESSION NOT SEEN IN THE SOVIET UNION SINCE THE REVOLUTION. MOREOVER, THE CONFERENCE APPROVED REMARKABLE PROPOSALS INCLUDING LIMITING THE TERMS OF OFFICE FOR PARTY OFFICIALS AND THE USE OF SECRET BALLOTS AND LISTING OF MULTIPLE CANDIDATES IN ELECTIONS. GORBACHEV APPARENTLY BELIEVES THAT WITHOUT SUCH REFORM, IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO BREAK THE RESISTANCE WITHIN THE PARTY TO HIS AGENDA. BY THE SAME TOKEN, AS HE DEMONSTRATED TWO WEEKS AGO, THE OLD METHODS REMAIN AVAILABLE WHEN MORE DEMOCRATIC MEANS SEEM UNLIKELY TO YIELD THE DESIRED RESULTS.

-- THE THIRD FRONT IS GLASNOST, OR OPENNESS. TIGHT CENTRAL CONTROLS OVER THE FLOW OF IDEAS AND INFORMATION LIE AT THE HEART OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM. REMARKS BY GORBACHEV AND HIS KEY ALLIES INDICATE THAT THE NEW LEADERSHIP BELIEVES THAT THIS APPROACH IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH AN INCREASINGLY WELL-EDUCATED SOCIETY, COMPLEX ECONOMY AND THE POLITICAL NEEDS OF THE MOMENT. I SEE OTHER MOTIVES AS WELL BEHIND GLASNOST, NOT LEAST OF WHICH IS USE OF AN APPARENT LIBERALIZING FORCE TO ACHIEVE SOME RATHER OLD-FASHIONED OBJECTIVES.



GLASNOST IS BEING USED TO CRITICIZE OFFICIALS  
GORBACHEV SEES AS HOSTILE AND TO PRESSURE THEM TO  
GET WITH THE PROGRAM.

IT IS BEING USED TO HIGHLIGHT PROBLEMS HE WANTS TO  
ATTACK -- SUCH AS ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG ABUSE,  
STALIN'S LEGACY, AND BUREAUCRATIC INERTIA -- IN  
ORDER TO MOBILIZE SOCIETY BEHIND HIS CAMPAIGNS.

HE HOPES TO USE THE ATMOSPHERE OF GREATER OPENNESS  
TO COOPT INTELLECTUALS AND PARTICULARLY ENGINEERS  
AND SCIENTISTS TO BE FULL PARTNERS IN THE ATTEMPT  
TO MODERNIZE THE ECONOMY -- TO OVERCOME THEIR  
CYNICISM.

IT ENABLES THE REGIME TO COMPETE WITH FOREIGN AND  
OTHER UNOFFICIAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION. SINCE THE  
POPULATION WILL HEAR ABOUT RIOTING IN KAZAKHSTAN  
AND ARMENIA AND THE DISASTER AT CHERNOBYL ANYWAY,  
GORBACHEV BELIEVES IT IS BEST TO PRINT THE NEWS AND  
PUT AN OFFICIAL SPIN ON IT.

FINALLY, HE INTENDS TO LEGITIMIZE BROADER  
DISCUSSION OF PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS THAN  
PERMITTED HERETOFORE IN ORDER TO BREAK THE BACK OF

DOMESTIC RESISTANCE AND INCREASE HIS ROOM FOR MANEUVER AT HOME. FURTHER, HE SEES THE EXPANSION OF POLITICAL DEBATE AS A NECESSARY STEP TO ACHIEVE HIS LONGER RANGE GOALS.

TO KEEP GLASNOST IN PERSPECTIVE, THERE HAS BEEN GROWING CRITICISM BY OTHERS IN THE POLITBURO THAT "OPENNESS" HAS GONE TOO FAR. GORBACHEV HIMSELF HAS CAUTIONED MEDIA OFFICIALS NOT TO GO TOO FAR LEST THEY UNDERMINE SOCIALIST VALUES OR CREATE A CLIMATE OF DISRESPECT FOR PARTY OFFICIALS. YET, GORBACHEV HAS SET LOOSE FORCES THAT WILL BE IMMENSELY DIFFICULT AND PAINFUL TO LEASH -- AS WE ARE SEEING IN ARMENIA, AZERBAIJAN, ESTONIA AND EVEN IN MOSCOW. THIS IS EVIDENT IN THE RECENT PASSAGE OF NEW LAWS THAT AGAIN CLAMP DOWN ON THE RIGHT TO DEMONSTRATE AND PROTEST.

IN SUM, WHILE GORBACHEV'S BOLD POLITICAL MOVES AND RADICAL RHETORIC HAVE SHAKEN THE SOVIET SYSTEM, HE HAS NOT YET REALLY CHANGED IT. THE ULTIMATE FATE OF HIS VISION OF REFORM WILL DEPEND ON HOW SUCCESSFUL HE IS IN PUSHING AHEAD WITH ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN THE FACE OF DESIGN FLAWS, ECONOMIC DISRUPTION, TREMENDOUS OPPOSITION AND, WORSE, APATHY. BUREAUCRATIC AS WELL AS POPULAR HOSTILITY IS GROWING AS DISRUPTION AND DISLOCATION BROUGHT ABOUT BY CHANGE RESULT IN ECONOMIC SETBACKS AND A WORSENING SITUATION FOR THE CONSUMER.

WHAT GORBACHEV IS SUCCESSFULLY CHANGING IS THE OFFICIALDOM OF THE PARTY AND STATE BUREAUCRACY. AS USUAL IN THE USSR, THE PURGE HAS BECOME THE VEHICLE FOR CONSOLIDATING AND ENHANCING PERSONAL POWER, AS WELL AS FOR IMPLEMENTING CHANGE.

IT IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN -- I WOULD EVEN SAY IT IS DOUBTFUL -- THAT HE CAN IN THE END PULL OFF REJUVENATION OF THE SYSTEM, BUT HE HAS DEMONSTRATED A WILLINGNESS TO RISK HIS POWER AND POSITION IN THE EFFORT. AS MUCH AS ANYTHING, THIS INDICATES HOW DESPERATE HE BELIEVES THE SOVIET PREDICAMENT REALLY IS. EVEN GORBACHEV ADMITS THE STRUGGLE WILL LAST FOR DECADES.

#### IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY AND FOR US STRATEGY

THERE SEEMS TO BE GENERAL AGREEMENT IN THE POLITBURO THAT, FOR NOW, ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION REQUIRES A MORE PREDICTABLE, IF NOT BENIGN, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. THE ELEMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY THAT SPRING FROM DOMESTIC ECONOMIC WEAKNESS ARE A MIX OF NEW INITIATIVES AND LONGSTANDING POLICIES. FIRST, GORBACHEV WANTS TO ESTABLISH A NEW AND FAR-REACHING DETENTE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE TO OBTAIN TECHNOLOGY, ENCOURAGE INVESTMENT AND TRADE, AND, ABOVE ALL, AVOID LARGE INCREASES IN MILITARY EXPENDITURES WHILE THE SOVIET ECONOMY IS REVIVED. GORBACHEV MUST SLOW OR STOP AMERICAN MILITARY MODERNIZATION THAT

THREATENS NOT ONLY SOVIET STRATEGIC GAINS OF THE LAST GENERATION BUT WHICH ALSO, IF CONTINUED, WILL FORCE THE USSR TO DEVOTE HUGE NEW RESOURCES TO THE MILITARY IN A HIGH TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION FOR WHICH THEY ARE ILL-EQUIPPED.

SECOND, A LESS VISIBLE BUT ENDURING ELEMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY -- EVEN UNDER GORBACHEV -- IS THE CONTINUING EXTRAORDINARY SCOPE AND SWEEP OF SOVIET MILITARY MODERNIZATION AND WEAPONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. AT THIS POINT WE SEE NO SLACKENING OF SOVIET WEAPONS PRODUCTION OR PROGRAMS. SOVIET RESEARCH ON NEW, EXOTIC WEAPONS CONTINUES APACE. VIRTUALLY ALL OF THEIR PRINCIPAL STRATEGIC WEAPONS WILL BE REPLACED WITH NEW, MORE SOPHISTICATED SYSTEMS BY THE MID-1990S, AND A NEW STRATEGIC BOMBER IS BEING ADDED TO THEIR ARSENAL FOR THE FIRST TIME IN DECADES. THEIR DEFENSES AGAINST US WEAPONS ARE BEING STEADILY IMPROVED, AS ARE THEIR CAPABILITIES FOR WAR-FIGHTING. AS THE RATE OF GROWTH OF OUR DEFENSE BUDGET DECLINES AGAIN, THEIRS CONTINUES TO GROW, ALBEIT SLOWLY.

THE THIRD ELEMENT OF GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY IS CONTINUED AGGRESSIVE PURSUIT OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND PROTECTION OF SOVIET CLIENTS IN THE THIRD WORLD. UNDER GORBACHEV, THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS PROVIDED NEARLY A BILLION DOLLARS IN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUA IN 1987; MORE THAN TWO BILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT WAS SENT TO VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIA LAST YEAR; AND MORE THAN

ONE AND A HALF BILLION DOLLARS IN MILITARY EQUIPMENT WAS SENT TO ANGOLA LAST YEAR -- TWICE THE 1985 LEVEL. AND, OF COURSE, CUBA GETS NEARLY SEVEN BILLION DOLLARS IN SOVIET SUPPORT EACH YEAR. AT A TIME OF ECONOMIC STRESS AT HOME, THESE COMMITMENTS SPEAK CLEARLY ABOUT SOVIET PRIORITIES.

AT THE SAME TIME THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD LIKE TO EASE THIS BURDEN AND WANTS TO RESOLVE SOME OF THE TROUBLING THIRD WORLD ISSUES THAT HAVE LED TO ADVERSE REACTIONS IN THE WEST AND IN ASIA. THE SOVIET RECOGNITION OF DEFEAT IN AFGHANISTAN IS THE MOST VIVID EXAMPLE. FACED WITH AN UNWINNABLE WAR, THE CURRENT KREMLIN LEADERSHIP REASSESSED THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ITS OWN BEHAVIOR AND CONCLUDED THAT SOVIET INTERESTS AT HOME AND ABROAD WERE BETTER SERVED BY LEAVING AFGHANISTAN. SIMILAR CALCULATIONS ALSO EXPLAIN THE APPARENTLY MORE CONSTRUCTIVE SOVIET APPROACH TOWARD CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS IN ANGOLA AND CAMBODIA. THIS TACTICAL FLEXIBILITY IN MY VIEW REFLECTS INCREASING POLITICAL SOPHISTICATION IN THE KREMLIN THAT -- FOR ALL ITS BENIGN APPEARANCE -- MAY BE AN EVEN GREATER CHALLENGE TO US INTERESTS IN THE YEARS AHEAD. SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN THIS AREA -- AS DEMONSTRATED IN GORBACHEV'S RECENT PROPOSAL TO TRADE CAM RANH BAY FOR OUR BASES IN THE PHILIPPINES -- REMAIN ADVERSARIAL AND SEEK TO DIMINISH US INFLUENCE.

THE FOURTH ELEMENT OF GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY IS NEW AND DYNAMIC DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES TO WEAKEN TIES BETWEEN THE US AND ITS WESTERN ALLIES, CHINA, JAPAN, AND THE THIRD WORLD; TO PORTRAY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AS COMMITTED TO ARMS CONTROL AND PEACE. WE CAN AND SHOULD EXPECT OTHER NEW AND BOLD INITIATIVES, PERHAPS INCLUDING UNILATERAL CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS THAT WILL SEVERELY TEST ALLIANCE COHESION. SIMILARLY, NEW INITIATIVES WITH CHINA AND PERHAPS ALSO JAPAN SEEM LIKELY IN AN EFFORT TO OVERCOME BILATERAL OBSTACLES TO IMPROVED RELATIONS AND TO EXPLOIT PROBLEMS BETWEEN THEM AND THE US.

IN THIS CONNECTION, I BELIEVE WE CAN ANTICIPATE FURTHER SIGNIFICANT SOVIET INITIATIVES FOR ARMS CONTROL -- SOME OF THEM AMBITIOUS AND UNREALISTIC, BUT VIRTUALLY ALL WITH ENORMOUS GLOBAL POLITICAL APPEAL. GORBACHEV IS PREPARED TO EXPLORE -- AND, I THINK, REACH -- SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN WEAPONS, BUT PAST SOVIET PRACTICE SUGGESTS HE WILL SEEK AGREEMENTS THAT PROTECT EXISTING SOVIET ADVANTAGES, LEAVE OPEN ALTERNATIVE AVENUES OF WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT, OFFER COMMENSURATE POLITICAL GAIN, OR TAKE ADVANTAGE OF US UNILATERAL RESTRAINT OR CONSTRAINTS (SUCH AS OUR UNWILLINGNESS IN THE 1970S TO COMPLETE AND KEEP A PERMITTED LIMITED ABM).

FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS THE BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR GORBACHEV, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO STRATEGIC WEAPONS, ARE PRIMARILY STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL, NOT ECONOMIC. IN TERMS OF POTENTIAL SAVINGS, STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS ACCOUNT FOR ONLY ABOUT 10 PERCENT OF THE SOVIET MILITARY BUDGET AND THE SOVIETS ALREADY HAVE MADE THE INVESTMENT NECESSARY FOR PRODUCTION OF THEIR STRATEGIC WEAPONS FORCE THROUGH THE MID-1990S. ONLY THROUGH SIGNIFICANT CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS COULD GORBACHEV BEGIN TO REALIZE ANY MAJOR ECONOMIC BENEFIT AND, TO A GREAT EXTENT, THIS WOULD BE YEARS IN THE FUTURE.

THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR GORBACHEV ARE EVIDENT. IT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO BRING DOWNWARD PRESSURE ON WESTERN DEFENSE BUDGETS, SLOW WESTERN MILITARY MODERNIZATION, WEAKEN RESOLVE TO COUNTER SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD, AND OPEN TO THE USSR NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS. ARMS CONTROL GIVES CREDENCE TO SOVIET CLAIMS OF THEIR BENIGN INTENTIONS AND MAKES THEM APPEAR TO BE A FAR MORE ATTRACTIVE PARTNER TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN POLITICAL, CULTURAL, AND ECONOMIC ARENAS.

ARMS CONTROL IS AN ATTRACTIVE PROPOSITION FROM GORBACHEV'S POINT OF VIEW FOR ITS STRATEGIC IMPACT AS WELL -- AS LONG AS ANY AGREEMENT INCORPORATES BASIC SOVIET POSITIONS: PERMITTING CONTINUED MODERNIZATION OF HEAVY ICBMS AND DEPLOYMENT OF MOBILE

ICBMS, PREVENTING THE UNITED STATES FROM DEPLOYING AN EFFECTIVE SPACE-BASED MISSILE DEFENSE, AND CONSTRAINING AIR AND SEA LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. FROM THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE, DEEP CUTS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WITH THESE PROVISOS, OFFER THE MEANS TO LIMIT THE GROWING NUMBER OF HARD-TARGET WEAPONS IN THE US ARSENAL AND TO CONSTRAIN US PROGRESS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADVANCED STRATEGIC DEFENSES. WHILE START OBVIOUSLY WOULD ALSO LIMIT SOVIET WEAPONS PROGRAMS, THEY PRESUMABLY BELIEVE THAT AN AGREEMENT THAT ENCOMPASSED THEIR BOTTOM-LINE POSITIONS WOULD, AT MINIMUM, NOT DEGRADE THEIR RELATIVE STRATEGIC POSTURE.

ARMS CONTROL AND OTHER NEW INITIATIVES ALSO ARE INTENDED TO BREAK SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OUT OF LONGSTANDING TACTICAL DEADENDS AND TO MAKE THE SOVIET UNION A MORE EFFECTIVE, FLEXIBLE AND VIGOROUS PLAYER THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THE RESULT IS LIKELY TO BE A SOVIET POLITICAL CHALLENGE TO THE US ABROAD THAT COULD POSE GREATER PROBLEMS FOR OUR INTERNATIONAL POSITION, ALLIANCES AND RELATIONSHIPS IN THE FUTURE THAN THE HERETOFORE ONE DIMENSIONAL SOVIET MILITARY CHALLENGE. WE MUST BE PREPARED FOR GREATER SOVIET FLEXIBILITY -- A NEW AND DISCONCERTING WILLINGNESS TO SAY YES TO SOME OLD AND NOT WELL EXAMINED US AND WESTERN PROPOSALS. CONSIDERABLE NEW THINKING, FLEXIBILITY AND POLITICAL AGILITY WILL BE NEEDED ON OUR OWN PART TO ANTICIPATE AND COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVES AND TO AVOID BEING OUTMANEUVERED AND PLACED ON THE DEFENSIVE.



## CONCLUSIONS

WHILE ACTUAL CHANGES IN THE ECONOMY OF THE SOVIET UNION SO FAR HAVE BEEN VERY SMALL AND FREQUENTLY NEGATIVE, WHAT GORBACHEV ALREADY SET IN MOTION REPRESENTS A POLITICAL EARTHQUAKE. HE IS PULLING ALL OF THE LEVERS OF CHANGE IN A SOCIETY AND CULTURE THAT HISTORICALLY HAS RESISTED CHANGE -- AND WHERE CHANGE USUALLY HAS BEEN VIOLENT AND WRENCHING. THE FORCES HE HAS UNLEASHED ARE POWERFUL BUT SO ARE THE PEOPLE AND INSTITUTIONS HE HAS ANTAGONIZED -- THUS SETTING IN MOTION A TREMENDOUS POWER STRUGGLE AND PURGE NO LESS DRAMATIC FOR THE ABSENCE OF SHOW TRIALS AND TERROR.

THE STRUGGLE IS ESSENTIALLY BETWEEN THOSE SEEKING TO PRESERVE THE STATUS QUO -- AND THEIR POWER IN IT -- AND GORBACHEV AND HIS ALLIES WHO SEEK TO REPLACE THOSE NOW IN POWER AND, IRONICALLY, TO TURN THE CLOCK BACK, BACK BEFORE STALINISM TO LENINISM. GORBACHEV SEEKS A SYSTEM IN WHICH SOME -- THOUGH CERTAINLY NOT ALL -- ELEMENTS OF THE STALINIST ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND BUREAUCRACY ARE ELIMINATED THUS OPENING THE WAY TO GREATER FLEXIBILITY AND INNOVATION AND THEREBY TO MODERNIZATION AND IMPROVED PERFORMANCE.

IN THE POLITICAL ARENA, GORBACHEV'S LENINISM MEANS THE CONTINUED POLITICAL MONOPOLY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, ITS ROLE

AS SOLE ARBITER OF THE NATIONAL AGENDA, ITS CONTROL OF ALL THE LEVERS OF POWER, AND ITS ULTIMATE AUTHORITY OVER ALL ASPECTS OF NATIONAL LIFE -- INCLUDING THE LAW. IT ALSO MEANS A MASSIVE PURGE OF THE PARTY AND GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY, NOW UNDERWAY. GORBACHEV'S OWN BOOK MAKES CLEAR THAT "DEMOCRATIZATION" SOVIET-STYLE DOES NOT MEAN MOVING THE USSR AWAY FROM MARXISM-Leninism. HIS ACTIONS IN SUPPRESSING THE DEMOCRATIC UNION AND OTHER SUCH EMBRYONIC OPPOSITION PARTIES PROVE THE POINT. THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY REMAINS UNTOUCHED AND UNTOUCHABLE.

WESTERNERS FOR CENTURIES HAVE HOPED REPEATEDLY THAT RUSSIAN ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL REFORM -- EVEN REVOLUTION -- SIGNALLED AN END TO DESPOTISM. REPEATEDLY SINCE 1917, THE WEST HAS HOPED THAT DOMESTIC CHANGES IN THE USSR WOULD LEAD TO CHANGES IN COMMUNIST COERCIVE RULE AT HOME AND AGGRESSIVENESS ABROAD. THESE HOPES, DASHED TIME AND AGAIN, HAVE BEEN REVIVED BY GORBACHEV'S AMBITIOUS DOMESTIC AGENDA, INNOVATIVE FOREIGN POLICY AND PERSONAL STYLE.

ENDURING CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET GOVERNANCE AT HOME AND POLICY ABROAD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT -- WHILE THE CHANGES UNDERWAY OFFER OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UNITED STATES AND FOR A RELAXATION OF TENSIONS -- GORBACHEV INTENDS IMPROVED SOVIET ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, GREATER POLITICAL VITALITY AT HOME, AND MORE DYNAMIC DIPLOMACY TO MAKE THE USSR A MORE COMPETITIVE AND

STRONGER ADVERSARY IN THE YEARS AHEAD. WE MUST NOT MISLEAD OURSELVES INTO BELIEVING OTHERWISE.

IN CONCLUSION, THE QUESTION I AM MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED IS WHETHER IT IS IN OUR INTEREST FOR GORBACHEV TO SUCCEED OR FAIL. THE FIRST THING WE MUST ADMIT IS THAT THERE IS LITTLE THAT THE UNITED STATES CAN DO TO INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME OF THE STRUGGLE GOING ON INSIDE THE SOVIET UNION. THAT SAID, WE SHOULD ASK OURSELVES IF WE WANT THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REVITALIZATION OF THE HISTORICAL AND CURRENT SOVIET SYSTEM. I THINK NOT.

WHAT WE DO SEEK IS A SOVIET UNION THAT IS PLURALISTIC INTERNALLY, NON-INTERVENTIONIST EXTERNALLY, OBSERVES BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS, CONTRIBUTES TO INTERNATIONAL STABILITY, AND A SOVIET UNION WHERE THESE CHANGES ARE MORE THAN A TEMPORARY EDICT FROM THE TOP AND ARE INDEPENDENT OF THE VIEWS, POWER AND DURABILITY OF A SINGLE INDIVIDUAL. WE CAN HOPE FOR SUCH CHANGE BUT ALL OF RUSSIAN AND SOVIET HISTORY CAUTIONS US TO BE SKEPTICAL AND CAUTIOUS.

WE CANNOT CLOSE OUR EYES TO MOMENTOUS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USSR, BUT WE SHOULD WATCH, WAIT, AND EVALUATE. AS LONGTIME SOVIET-WATCHER WILLIAM ODOM HAS SAID, WE SHOULD APPLAUD PERESTROIKA BUT NOT FINANCE IT. WE SHOULD NOT MAKE CONCESSIONS BASED ON HOPE AND POPULAR ENTHUSIASMS HERE OR PLEASING

PERSONALITIES AND ATMOSPHERIC OR SUPERFICIAL CHANGES THERE. WE SHOULD, HOWEVER, TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITIES WHERE THE TERMS ARE FAVORABLE TO US OR WHERE WE CAN BRING ABOUT DESIRABLE CHANGES IN SOVIET POLICIES -- WHETHER TO ADVANCE HUMAN RIGHTS, FREER EMIGRATION, STRATEGIC STABILITY, SOLUTIONS TO SOVIET GENERATED PROBLEMS SUCH AS AFGHANISTAN, OR EVEN EXPANDED BUSINESS TIES (IF THERE IS NO TRANSFER OF SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY). ABOVE ALL, WE MUST ESTABLISH REALISTIC CRITERIA BY WHICH WE CAN JUDGE IN THE COMING MONTHS AND YEARS WHETHER POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION GENUINELY IS RESHAPING THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SYSTEM -- OR WHETHER THE TOTALITARIAN STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET UNION, INCLUDING THE INSTRUMENTS OF CENTRAL CONTROL AND REPRESSION, ENDURES DISCREETLY IN THE SHADOWS, AVAILABLE AT THE BECKON OF GORBACHEV'S SUCCESSOR, OR EVEN FOR GORBACHEV.

THERE ARE MANY UNCERTAINTIES SURROUNDING THE SOVIET UNION TODAY, BUT ONE FACT IS APPARENT: WHETHER GORBACHEV SUCCEEDS, FAILS, OR JUST SURVIVES, A STILL LONG COMPETITION AND STRUGGLE WITH THE SOVIET UNION LIE BEFORE US. PRESERVING THE PEACE AND FOSTERING AN ENDURING RELAXATION OF TENSIONS DEPEND UPON SEEING THIS REALITY CLEARLY. KEEPING THIS LONG RANGE PERSPECTIVE -- AND AWARENESS OF THE OPPORTUNITIES -- WILL BE AN EXTRAORDINARY CHALLENGE FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**

**ROUTING SLIP**

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OCA				
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	D/Ex Staff				
17	NIO/USSR	X			
18	D/SOVA	X			
19	SOVA				
20	SOVA				
21					
22					

SUSPENSE 29 SEP 88  
Date

Remarks

**ER**

**STAT**

[Redacted Signature Box]

Executive Secretary

9 SEP 88  
Date

ER 88-3544

**STAT**

Executive Registry  
88-3544

9 September 1988

NOTE TO: Robert Blackwell, NIO/USSR  
Doug MacEachin, D/SOVA/DDI  
[redacted] DDI/SOVA STAT  
[redacted] DDI/SOVA  
FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence STAT

I have been asked to deliver a 14 October breakfast address on developments in the Soviet Union to the Colloquium on Science, Arms Control and National Security sponsored by the American Association for the Advancement of Science. I am afraid this means I must prevail on your good offices once again for an update of "The Soviet Speech". STAT  
STAT

Naturally, any suggestions or proposed changes will be welcome but, in particular, I would be interested in some additional language on the following:

- I would like to say something about the Soviets' fear to take risks on unemployment, inflation, price reform, etc.
- Also, what can we say about the Soviet budget deficit and printing money that you have written about. I would like to include something about the [redacted] (at least that is what I remember from the SOVA paper) and that this represents more than [redacted] Can I do that unclassified and, if so, how should I say it?

I appreciate your patience in doing this again. If, beyond specific comments, corrections, or additions, you have any broader points where with the passage of time the speech is becoming outdated, please let me know those also.

I would appreciate having your comments by the time I return from my [redacted] trip on 29 September. STAT

[redacted]  
Robert M. Gates  
STAT



P-310-1R

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE  
COLLOQUIUM ON SCIENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY  
14 OCTOBER 1988

THE GORBACHEV ERA: IMPLICATIONS FOR US STRATEGY  
BY ROBERT M. GATES  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

INTRODUCTION

THE SELECTION OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AS GENERAL SECRETARY IN THE SPRING OF 1985 SIGNALLED THE POLITBURO'S RECOGNITION THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN DEEP TROUBLE -- ESPECIALLY ECONOMICALLY AND SPIRITUALLY -- TROUBLE THAT THEY RECOGNIZED WOULD SOON BEGIN TO HAVE REAL EFFECT ON MILITARY POWER AND THEIR POSITION IN THE WORLD. DESPITE ENORMOUS RAW ECONOMIC POWER AND RESOURCES, INCLUDING A \$2 TRILLION A YEAR GNP, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP BY THE MID-1980S CONFRONTED A STEADILY WIDENING GAP WITH THE WEST AND JAPAN -- ECONOMICALLY, TECHNOLOGICALLY AND IN VIRTUALLY ALL AREAS OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE.

AS A RESULT OF THESE TRENDS, THE POLITBURO RECOGNIZED THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD NO LONGER RISK THE SUSPENDED ANIMATION OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS, AND COALESCED AROUND AN IMAGINATIVE AND VIGOROUS LEADER WHOM THEY HOPED COULD REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY WITHOUT ALTERING THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE OR COMMUNITY PARTY.

STRENGTHENING THE LEADERSHIP AND HIS POSITION

THERE IS STRONG SUPPORT IN THE POLITBURO FOR MODERNIZATION OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY. THIS REMAINS GORBACHEV'S GREATEST POLITICAL ASSET. EVEN SO, NEARLY EVERY STEP GORBACHEV SEEKS TO TAKE TOWARD STRUCTURAL ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL CHANGE IS A STRUGGLE, AND SUPPORT IN THE POLITBURO FOR HIS INITIATIVES SHIFTS CONSTANTLY. WHILE HIS REFORM PROGRAM WAS APPROVED ENTHUSIASTICALLY AT THE PARTY CONFERENCE IN JUNE, WHEN GORBACHEV WENT ON VACATION IN AUGUST, CONSERVATIVES LED BY LIGACHEV AGAIN VOCALLY CRITIZED ASPECTS OF THE PROGRAM. MOREOVER, CONTRARY TO EXPECTATIONS, THERE WERE NO SENIOR PERSONNEL CHANGES AT THE CONFERENCE OR IN ITS WAKE. IT IS CLEAR THAT, FOR THE LONG TERM, THERE WILL BE CONTINUING BATTLES OVER PACE AND SCOPE OF MODERNIZATION AND WHO HOLDS POLITICAL POWER. EVEN GORBACHEV ADMITS THE STRUGGLE WILL LAST DECADES.

THE STRUGGLE WITHIN THE POLITBURO IS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT TO GORBACHEV BECAUSE BELOW THE POLITBURO, SUPPORT FOR CHANGE -- AND ESPECIALLY FAR-REACHING CHANGE -- IS EVEN SHAKIER. OPPOSITION FROM THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND PARTY APPARATUS IS A CRITICAL PROBLEM FOR GORBACHEV. SENIOR LEVELS OF THE ECONOMIC BUREAUCRACY STAND TO LOSE THE MOST IF GORBACHEV MOVES TO DECENTRALIZE THE SYSTEM AND ARE IMPORTANT OBSTACLES TO



IMPLEMENTATION OF HIS PROGRAM. WHILE MANY SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAUCRACIES UNDERSTAND THE CONNECTION BETWEEN A STRONG DEFENSE AND A HEALTHY ECONOMY, THEY ALSO ARE UNHAPPY WITH THE IDEA OF GREATER CONSTRAINTS ON DEFENSE SPENDING AND SKEPTICAL OF PROMISED BENEFITS. OTHERS, FOR EXAMPLE THE KGB, ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR INSTABILITY AT HOME AND IN EASTERN EUROPE CREATED BY ANY RELAXATION OF POLITICAL CONTROLS. (INDEED, WE COUNT SOME 600 POPULAR DISTURBANCES SINCE EARLY 1987, ABOUT HALF OF THEM RELATING TO ETHNIC ISSUES. THERE HAVE BEEN MAJOR NATIONALIST DEMONSTRATIONS IN 9 OF THE 15 SOVIET REPUBLICS SINCE JANUARY.) THE SOVIET POPULATION SEEMS TO BE PASSIVELY SUPPORTIVE, BUT THEY HAVE SEEN CAMPAIGNS FOR CHANGE COME AND GO. THEY ARE SKEPTICAL THAT GORBACHEV'S EFFORTS WILL PRODUCE LASTING RESULTS OR EVEN IMMEDIATE PAYOFFS. THE INTELLIGENTSIA ARE PROBABLY THE ONLY GROUP THAT COMES CLOSE TO GIVING WHOLE-HEARTED SUPPORT -- A WEAK NEED TO BE SURE IN THE SOVIET UNION.

IT IS, HOWEVER, OPPOSITION WITHIN THE PARTY AND PARTICULARLY AT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND PARTY APPARATUS THAT HAS BECOME THE PRINCIPAL AND CRITICAL PROBLEM FOR GORBACHEV, AND THE TARGET OF HIS POLITICAL CAMPAIGN. ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS AT THE PARTY CONFERENCE IN JUNE, BEYOND APPROVAL OF HIS PROGRAM, WAS HIS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT THE PARTY ITSELF IS THE PRINCIPAL OBSTACLE TO MODERNIZATION AND REFORM. HE TACITLY ADMITTED THAT HE HAS FAILED TO OVERCOME THAT

OPPOSITION, AND HIS STRATEGY NOW SEEMS TO BE TO BYPASS THE PARTY BY STRENGTHENING THE SUPREME SOVIET AND ITS CHAIRMAN, TO TAKE THAT POSITION HIMSELF, AND THEN TO FORCE THROUGH HIS ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHANGES. HE HAS SECURED APPROVAL FOR A TIMETABLE TO DISMANTLE THE ECONOMIC APPARATUS OF THE PARTY AND THEREBY SIGNIFICANTLY WEAKEN ITS CAPACITY TO INTERFERE IN THE DAY TO DAY MANAGEMENT OF THE ECONOMY. IN SUM, GORBACHEV HAS DECLARED WAR ON THE PARTY APPARATUS MUCH AS STALIN DID IN THE LATE 1920S AND 1930S. THE SOLE DIFFERENCE IS THAT HIS ADVERSARIES WILL LOSE POWER, PRESTIGE AND THEIR JOBS, BUT NOT THEIR LIVES. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER HE CAN SO RADICALLY ALTER THE ROLE OF THE PARTY IN SOVIET LIFE AND WHETHER THE PARTY APPARAT WILL ALLOW ITSELF TO BE SO WEAKENED AND EVEN DISMANTLED.

#### MODERNIZATION OF THE ECONOMY

ALTHOUGH BY 1985 GORBACHEV HAD BEEN ON THE POLITBURO FOR SIX YEARS AND A CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER FOR 14 YEARS, HE NOW ADMITS THAT WHEN HE BECAME GENERAL SECRETARY HE UNDERESTIMATED THE SEVERITY OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AFFLICTING THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS NO EXAGGERATION TO DESCRIBE THE SOVIET ECONOMIC CONDITION AS DISASTROUS. AS GORBACHEV HAS SEEN THE DIMENSIONS OF THE CRISIS, HIS VIEWS OF WHAT IS NEEDED TO CORRECT THESE PROBLEMS HAVE MOVED TOWARD MORE RADICAL PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE.

TAKEN AS A WHOLE, THE REFORM MEASURES PUT IN PLACE IN GORBACHEV'S THREE YEAR TENURE ARE AN IMPRESSIVE PACKAGE. NEVERTHELESS, THE REFORMS DO NOT GO NEARLY FAR ENOUGH. THE REFORM PACKAGE AS NOW CONSTITUTED IS A SET OF HALF MEASURES THAT LEAVES IN PLACE THE PILLARS OF SOCIALIST CENTRAL PLANNING.

BECAUSE OF INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS AND THE RETENTION OF SO MANY ELEMENTS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM, EVEN IF FULLY IMPLEMENTED BY 1991 AS INTENDED, THE REFORMS WILL NOT CREATE THE DYNAMIC ECONOMIC MECHANISM THAT GORBACHEV SEEKS AS THE MEANS TO REDUCE OR CLOSE THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP WITH THE WEST. TO THE CONTRARY, AGGRESSIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF REFORMS IS CAUSING SERIOUS DISRUPTIONS AND TURBULENCE IN THE ECONOMY. SPECIFICALLY:

- SOVIET GNP GROWTH FELL TO ABOUT .5% IN 1987, DOWN FROM ALMOST 4% IN 1986, AND WILL BE ABOUT 2.25% THIS YEAR. HE WOULD NEED NEARLY 8% GROWTH TO MEET PLAN TARGETS.
- GORBACHEV'S QUALITY CONTROL PROGRAM IS DISRUPTING PRODUCTION.
- NEW INITIATIVES IN ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT ARE CREATING CONFUSION AND APPREHENSION IN SOME QUARTERS, AND BUREAUCRATIC FOOT-DRAGGING AND OUTRIGHT RESISTANCE IN OTHERS.

- DESPITE CONSIDERABLE RHETORIC, NONE OF THE PROPOSALS SO FAR GREATLY CHANGES THE SYSTEM OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVES THAT DISCOURAGE MANAGEMENT INNOVATION, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND PRIVATE INITIATIVE.
  
- A SHARP DECLINE IN SOVIET HARD CURRENCY EARNINGS (THE RESULT OF FALLING OIL PRICES AND THE DEPRECIATION OF THE DOLLAR) WILL LIMIT MUCH NEEDED SPECIALIZED IMPORTS FROM THE WEST.
  
- TRYING TO RESHAPE THE ENTIRE STALINIST ECONOMIC STRUCTURE GRADUALLY WHILE LEAVING KEY PROBLEMS OF PRICE REFORM AND THE GOVERNMENT MONOPOLY OVER GOODS UNTIL LAST IS LIKE A PHASED CHANGE FROM DRIVING ON THE RIGHT HAND SIDE OF THE ROAD TO THE LEFT -- TRUCKS FIRST, CARS LATER. THE RESULTS ARE LIKELY TO BE SIMILAR. TO ILLUSTRATE JUST HOW TOTALLY OUT OF KILTER THE SOVIET ECONOMY IS, CONSIDER THAT RENTS FOR HOUSING -- WHICH IS GENERALLY AWFUL HAVE NOT BEEN RAISED SINCE 1928; THE CURRENT PRICE OF BREAD WAS SET IN 1954; AND FOOD PRICES OVERALL IN 1962. STATE SUBSIDIES ARE SO HUGE THAT IT IS CHEAPER FOR A PEASANT TO FEED HIS PIGS BREAD THAN TO GIVE THEM GRAIN. (AND THE SOVIET PEOPLE KNOW ANY PRICE REFORM CAN ONLY HURT THEM.)

-- FINALLY, FOR A MODERNIZATION DRIVE THAT DEPENDS IN SUBSTANTIAL MEASURE ON HARDER WORK, THERE ARE FEW REWARDS FOR SUCH WORK. UNSATISFIED CONSUMER DEMAND IS REFLECTED IN CONTINUING LONG LINES IN STATE STORES AND RISING PRICES IN THE COLLECTIVE FARM MARKETS. INDEED, THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CONSUMER HAVE WORSENEDED STEADILY DURING GORBACHEV'S TENURE. AND HE OFFERS LITTLE HOPE OF SIGNIFICANT CHANGE FOR YEARS.

THUS, WHILE IMPORTANT BATTLES HAVE BEEN WON IN PRINCIPLE, THE WAR TO CHANGE FUNDAMENTALLY THE MAIN PILLARS OF THE STALINIST ECONOMIC SYSTEM REMAINS TO BE FOUGHT AND WON. THE GAP BETWEEN POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION IS HUGE, AND GROWING.

#### POLITICAL REFORM

GORBACHEV'S PLANS FOR THE POLITICAL SYSTEM REMAIN LESS WELL-DEFINED THAN HIS ECONOMIC AGENDA. BUT AN IMPORTANT MILESTONE IN THE EVOLUTION OF HIS VIEWS WAS RECOGNITION THAT THE REVITALIZATION OF SOCIETY AND ECONOMY CAN SUCCEED ONLY IF THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL ARENA AS WELL. THE REGIME APPEARS TO BE MOVING ON AT LEAST THREE FRONTS TO CREATE THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IT SEEKS:

- THE FIRST IS IDEOLOGY. GORBACHEV IS FRUSTRATED WITH THE STRAITJACKET OF INHERITED DOCTRINE THAT OPPONENTS OF CHANGE HAVE SOUGHT TO IMPOSE ON HIM. HE SEEKS TO EXPAND HIS ROOM TO MANEUVER BY AN INCREASINGLY OPEN ATTACK ON STAGNATION IN IDEOLOGY AND BY DEPICTING HIS OWN PROPOSALS AS AN EFFORT TO RETURN TO LENIN'S ORIGINAL INTENT AND EXPAND THE BOUNDS OF WHAT IS PERMISSABLE UNDER SOCIALISM.
  
- THE SECOND FRONT IS DEMOCRATIZATION. GORBACHEV'S CAMPAIGN FOR "DEMOCRATIZATION" IS DESIGNED TO REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS. INITIALLY, THIS WAS MOSTLY RHETORIC. BUT, THE PARTY CONFERENCE WAS ITSELF AN EXTRAORDINARY POLITICAL HAPPENING, WITH A FREEDOM OF DEBATE AND EXPRESSION NOT SEEN IN THE SOVIET UNION SINCE THE REVOLUTION. MOREOVER, THE CONFERENCE APPROVED REMARKABLE PROPOSALS INCLUDING LIMITING THE TERMS OF OFFICE FOR PARTY OFFICIALS AND THE USE OF SECRET BALLOTS AND LISTING OF MULTIPLE CANDIDATES IN ELECTIONS. GORBACHEV APPARENTLY BELIEVES THAT WITHOUT SUCH REFORM, IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO BREAK THE RESISTANCE WITHIN THE PARTY TO HIS AGENDA.

-- THE THIRD FRONT IS GLASNOST, OR OPENNESS. TIGHT CENTRAL CONTROLS OVER THE FLOW OF IDEAS AND INFORMATION LIE AT THE HEART OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM. REMARKS BY GORBACHEV AND HIS KEY ALLIES INDICATE THAT THE NEW LEADERSHIP BELIEVES THAT THIS APPROACH IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH AN INCREASINGLY WELL-EDUCATED SOCIETY, COMPLEX ECONOMY AND THE POLITICAL NEEDS OF THE MOMENT. I SEE OTHER MOTIVES AS WELL BEHIND GLASNOST, NOT LEAST OF WHICH IS USE OF AN APPARENT LIBERALIZING FORCE TO ACHIEVE SOME RATHER OLD-FASHIONED OBJECTIVES.

GLASNOST IS BEING USED TO CRITICIZE OFFICIALS GORBACHEV SEES AS HOSTILE AND TO PRESSURE THEM TO GET WITH THE PROGRAM.

IT IS BEING USED TO HIGHLIGHT PROBLEMS HE WANTS TO ATTACK -- SUCH AS ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG ABUSE, STALIN'S LEGACY, AND BUREAUCRATIC INERTIA -- IN ORDER TO MOBILIZE SOCIETY BEHIND HIS CAMPAIGNS.

HE HOPES TO USE THE ATMOSPHERE OF GREATER OPENNESS TO COOPT INTELLECTUALS AND PARTICULARLY ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS TO BE FULL PARTNERS IN THE ATTEMPT TO MODERNIZE THE ECONOMY -- TO OVERCOME THEIR CYNICISM.

IT ENABLES THE REGIME TO COMPETE WITH FOREIGN AND OTHER UNOFFICIAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION. SINCE THE POPULATION WILL HEAR ABOUT RIOTING IN KAZAKHSTAN AND ARMENIA AND THE DISASTER AT CHERNOBYL ANYWAY, GORBACHEV BELIEVES IT IS BEST TO PRINT THE NEWS AND PUT AN OFFICIAL SPIN ON IT.

FINALLY, HE INTENDS TO LEGITIMIZE BROADER DISCUSSION OF PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS THAN PERMITTED HERETOFORE IN ORDER TO BREAK THE BACK OF DOMESTIC RESISTANCE AND INCREASE HIS ROOM FOR MANEUVER AT HOME. FURTHER, HE SEES THE EXPANSION OF POLITICAL DEBATE AS A NECESSARY STEP TO ACHIEVE HIS LONGER RANGE GOALS.

TO KEEP GLASNOST IN PERSPECTIVE, THERE HAS BEEN GROWING CRITICISM BY OTHERS IN THE POLITBURO THAT "OPENNESS" HAS GONE TOO FAR. GORBACHEV HIMSELF HAS CAUTIONED MEDIA OFFICIALS NOT TO GO TOO FAR LEST THEY UNDERMINE SOCIALIST VALUES OR CREATE A CLIMATE OF DISRESPECT FOR PARTY OFFICIALS. YET, GORBACHEV HAS SET LOOSE FORCES THAT WILL BE IMMENSELY DIFFICULT AND PAINFUL TO LEASH -- AS MUST HAPPEN AT SOME POINT. THIS IS EVIDENT IN THE RECENT PASSAGE OF NEW LAWS THAT AGAIN CLAMP DOWN ON THE RIGHT TO DEMONSTRATE AND PROTEST.



WHILE GORBACHEV'S BOLD POLITICAL MOVES AND RADICAL RHETORIC HAVE SHAKEN THE SOVIET SYSTEM, HE HAS NOT YET REALLY CHANGED IT. THE ULTIMATE FATE OF HIS VISION OF REFORM WILL DEPEND ON HOW SUCCESSFUL HE IS IN PUSHING AHEAD WITH ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN THE FACE OF DESIGN FLAWS, ECONOMIC DISRUPTION, TREMENDOUS OPPOSITION AND, WORSE, APATHY. BUREAUCRATIC AS WELL AS POPULAR HOSTILITY IS LIKELY TO GROW AS DISRUPTION AND DISLOCATION BROUGHT ABOUT BY CHANGE RESULT IN ECONOMIC SETBACKS AND A WORSENING SITUATION FOR THE CONSUMER. WHAT GORBACHEV IS SUCCESSFULLY CHANGING IS THE OFFICIALDOM OF THE PARTY AND STATE BUREAUCRACY. ONCE AGAIN, THE PURGE HAS BECOME THE VEHICLE FOR CONSOLIDATING AND ENHANCING PERSONAL POWER, AS WELL AS FOR IMPLEMENTING CHANGE.

IT IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN -- I WOULD EVEN SAY IT IS DOUBTFUL -- THAT HE CAN IN THE END PULL OFF REJUVENATION OF THE SYSTEM, BUT HE HAS DEMONSTRATED A WILLINGNESS TO RISK HIS POWER AND POSITION IN THE EFFORT. AS MUCH AS ANYTHING, THIS INDICATES HOW DESPERATE HE BELIEVES THE SOVIET PREDICAMENT REALLY IS.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY AND FOR US STRATEGY

THERE SEEMS TO BE GENERAL AGREEMENT IN THE POLITBURO THAT, FOR NOW, ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION REQUIRES A MORE PREDICTABLE, IF NOT BENIGN, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. THE ELEMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY THAT SPRING FROM DOMESTIC ECONOMIC WEAKNESS ARE A MIX OF NEW INITIATIVES AND LONGSTANDING POLICIES. FIRST, GORBACHEV WANTS TO ESTABLISH A NEW AND FAR-REACHING DETENTE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE TO OBTAIN TECHNOLOGY, INVESTMENT, TRADE AND, ABOVE ALL, TO AVOID MAJOR NEW MILITARY EXPENDITURES WHILE THE SOVIET ECONOMY IS REVIVED. GORBACHEV MUST SLOW OR STOP AMERICAN MILITARY MODERNIZATION THAT THREATENS NOT ONLY SOVIET STRATEGIC GAINS OF THE LAST GENERATION BUT WHICH ALSO, IF CONTINUED, WILL FORCE THE USSR TO DEVOTE HUGE NEW RESOURCES TO THE MILITARY IN A HIGH TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION FOR WHICH THEY ARE ILL-EQUIPPED. THE SOVIETS KNOW THAT DETENTE IN THE EARLY 1970S CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY TO DOWNWARD PRESSURE ON WESTERN DEFENSE BUDGETS, SLOWED MILITARY MODERNIZATION, WEAKENED RESOLVE TO COUNTER SOVIET ADVANCES IN THE THIRD WORLD, AND OPENED TO THE USSR NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS.

SECOND, A LESS VISIBLE BUT ENDURING ELEMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY -- EVEN UNDER GORBACHEV -- IS THE CONTINUING EXTRAORDINARY SCOPE AND SWEEP OF SOVIET MILITARY MODERNIZATION

AND WEAPONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. UNDER THE GUISE OF ARCAINE MILITARY DOCTRINAL ISSUES SUCH AS "REASONABLE SUFFICIENCY" AND "DEFENSIVE DEFENSE," WE ARE SEEING A DEBATE OVER THE LEVEL OF RESOURCES DEDICATED TO THE MILITARY. BY AND LARGE IT IS A DEBATE PITTING CIVILIANS AGAINST THE MILITARY, WITH THE FORMER ARGUING THAT SOVIET SECURITY CAN BE ASSURED AT A LOWER LEVEL OF EXPENDITURE AND LOWER FORCE LEVELS AND THE MILITARY DISAGREEING. DESPITE THIS DEBATE, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE LEVELING OFF OR PERHAPS EVEN DECLINE IN SOVIET MILITARY SPENDING, AT THIS POINT WE SEE NO SLACKENING OF SOVIET WEAPONS PRODUCTION OR PROGRAMS. SOVIET RESEARCH ON NEW, EXOTIC WEAPONS SUCH AS LASERS AND THEIR OWN VERSION OF SDI CONTINUES APACE. VIRTUALLY ALL OF THEIR PRINCIPAL STRATEGIC WEAPONS WILL BE REPLACED WITH NEW, MORE SOPHISTICATED SYSTEMS BY THE MID-1990S, AND A NEW STRATEGIC BOMBER IS BEING ADDED TO THEIR ARSENAL FOR THE FIRST TIME IN DECADES. THEIR DEFENSES AGAINST US WEAPONS ARE BEING STEADILY IMPROVED, AS ARE THEIR CAPABILITIES FOR WAR-FIGHTING. AS OUR DEFENSE BUDGET DECLINES AGAIN, THEIRS CONTINUES TO GROW, ALBEIT SLOWLY.

THE THIRD ELEMENT OF GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY IS CONTINUED AGGRESSIVE PURSUIT OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND PROTECTION OF SOVIET CLIENTS IN THE THIRD WORLD. UNDER GORBACHEV, THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS PROVIDED MORE THAN A BILLION DOLLARS IN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUA IN 1987; MORE THAN TWO BILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT

WAS SENT TO VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIA LAST YEAR; AND MORE THAN ONE AND A HALF BILLION DOLLARS IN MILITARY EQUIPMENT WAS SENT TO ANGOLA LAST YEAR -- TWICE THE 1985 LEVEL. AND, OF COURSE, CUBA GETS NEARLY SEVEN BILLION DOLLARS IN SOVIET SUPPORT EACH YEAR. AT A TIME OF ECONOMIC STRESS AT HOME, THESE COMMITMENTS SPEAK CLEARLY ABOUT SOVIET PRIORITIES.

THE FOURTH ELEMENT OF GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY IS NEW AND DYNAMIC DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES TO WEAKEN TIES BETWEEN THE US AND ITS WESTERN ALLIES, CHINA, JAPAN, AND THE THIRD WORLD; TO PORTRAY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AS COMMITTED TO ARMS CONTROL AND PEACE; AND TO SUGGEST MOSCOW'S INTEREST IN DIPLOMATIC SOLUTIONS TO THIRD WORLD PROBLEMS. THE FOREMOST EXAMPLE OF THIS IS THE DECISION TO WITHDRAW FROM AFGHANISTAN. WE CAN AND SHOULD EXPECT OTHER NEW AND BOLD INITIATIVES, PERHAPS INCLUDING UNILATERAL CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS THAT WILL SEVERELY TEST ALLIANCE COHESION. SIMILARLY, NEW INITIATIVES WITH CHINA AND JAPAN SEEM LIKELY IN AN EFFORT TO OVERCOME BILATERAL OBSTACLES TO IMPROVED RELATIONS AND TO EXPLOIT PROBLEMS BETWEEN THEM AND THE US. AND, IN THE THIRD WORLD, THEY WILL SEEK TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ANY RELAXATION OF US VIGILANCE OR CONSTANCY.

IN THIS CONNECTION, I BELIEVE WE CAN ANTICIPATE FURTHER SIGNIFICANT SOVIET INITIATIVES FOR ARMS CONTROL -- SOME OF THEM AMBITIOUS AND UNREALISTIC, BUT VIRTUALLY ALL WITH ENORMOUS GLOBAL POLITICAL APPEAL. GORBACHEV IS PREPARED TO EXPLORE --

AND, I THINK, REACH -- SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN WEAPONS, BUT PAST SOVIET PRACTICE SUGGESTS HE WILL SEEK AGREEMENTS THAT PROTECT EXISTING SOVIET ADVANTAGES, LEAVE OPEN ALTERNATIVE AVENUES OF WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT, OFFER COMMENSURATE POLITICAL GAIN, OR TAKE ADVANTAGE OF US UNILATERAL RESTRAINT OR CONSTRAINTS (SUCH AS OUR UNWILLINGNESS IN THE 1970S TO BUILD A PERMITTED LIMITED ABM).

IN MY JUDGMENT, FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS THE BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR GORBACHEV, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO STRATEGIC WEAPONS, ARE PRIMARILY STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL, NOT ECONOMIC. HE DOES SEEK TO AVOID NEW, UNANTICIPATED COSTS THAT DEVELOPMENTS SUCH AS SDI MIGHT REQUIRE. THESE WOULD PROBABLY BE SUBSTANTIAL IN THE 1990S AND COULD WREAK HAVOC ON HIS ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION AGENDA. HOWEVER, IN TERMS OF POTENTIAL SAVINGS, STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS ACCOUNT FOR ONLY ABOUT 10 PERCENT OF THE SOVIET BUDGET. FEW OF THE PRODUCTION OR RESOURCE CAPABILITIES ARE TRANSFERABLE TO CIVILIAN PURPOSES AND THE SOVIETS ALREADY HAVE MADE THE INVESTMENT NECESSARY FOR PRODUCTION OF THEIR STRATEGIC WEAPONS FORCE THROUGH THE MID-1990S. ONLY THROUGH SIGNIFICANT CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS COULD GORBACHEV BEGIN TO REALIZE ANY MAJOR ECONOMIC BENEFIT AND, TO A GREAT EXTENT, THIS WOULD BE YEARS IN THE FUTURE.

THE POLITICAL BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR GORBACHEV ARE EVIDENT. AS I NOTED EARLIER, IT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO BRING DOWNWARD PRESSURE ON WESTERN DEFENSE BUDGETS, SLOW WESTERN MILITARY MODERNIZATION, WEAKEN RESOLVE TO COUNTER SOVIET ADVANCES IN THE THIRD WORLD, AND OPEN TO THE USSR NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS. ARMS CONTROL GIVES CREDENCE TO SOVIET CLAIMS OF THEIR BENIGN INTENTIONS AND MAKES THEM APPEAR TO BE A FAR MORE ATTRACTIVE PARTNER TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN POLITICAL, CULTURAL, AND ECONOMIC ARENAS.

ARMS CONTROL IS AN ATTRACTIVE PROPOSITION FROM GORBACHEV'S POINT OF VIEW FOR ITS STRATEGIC IMPACT AS WELL -- AS LONG AS ANY AGREEMENT INCORPORATES BASIC SOVIET POSITIONS: PERMITTING CONTINUED MODERNIZATION OF HEAVY ICBMS AND DEPLOYMENT OF MOBILE ICBMS, PREVENTING THE UNITED STATES FROM DEPLOYING AN EFFECTIVE SPACE-BASED MISSILE DEFENSE, AND CONSTRAINING AIR AND SEA LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. FROM THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE, DEEP CUTS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WITH THESE PROVISOS, OFFER THE MEANS TO LIMIT THE GROWING NUMBER OF HARD-TARGET WEAPONS IN THE US ARSENAL AND TO CONSTRAIN US PROGRESS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADVANCED STRATEGIC DEFENSES. WHILE START WOULD ALSO OBVIOUSLY LIMIT SOVIET WEAPONS PROGRAMS, THEY PRESUMABLY BELIEVE THAT AN AGREEMENT THAT ENCOMPASSED THEIR BOTTOM-LINE POSITIONS WOULD, AT MINIMUM, NOT DEGRADE THEIR RELATIVE STRATEGIC POSTURE.

ARMS CONTROL AND OTHER NEW INITIATIVES ALSO ARE INTENDED TO BREAK SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OUT OF LONGSTANDING TACTICAL DEADENDS AND TO MAKE THE SOVIET UNION A MORE EFFECTIVE, FLEXIBLE AND VIGOROUS PLAYER THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THE RESULT IS LIKELY TO BE A SOVIET POLITICAL CHALLENGE TO THE US ABROAD THAT COULD POSE GREATER PROBLEMS FOR OUR INTERNATIONAL POSITION, ALLIANCES AND RELATIONSHIPS IN THE FUTURE THAN THE HERETOFORE ONE DIMENSIONAL SOVIET MILITARY CHALLENGE. WE MUST BE PREPARED FOR GREATER SOVIET FLEXIBILITY -- A NEW AND DISCONCERTING WILLINGNESS TO SAY YES TO SOME OLD AND NOT WELL EXAMINED US AND WESTERN PROPOSALS. CONSIDERABLE NEW THINKING, FLEXIBILITY AND POLITICAL AGILITY WILL BE NEEDED ON OUR OWN PART TO ANTICIPATE AND COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVES AND TO AVOID BEING OUTMANEUVERED AND PLACED CONSISTENTLY ON THE DEFENSIVE.

### CONCLUSIONS

WHILE ACTUAL CHANGES IN THE ECONOMY OR POLITICAL LIFE OF THE SOVIET UNION SO FAR HAVE BEEN MODEST, WHAT GORBACHEV ALREADY HAS SET IN MOTION REPRESENTS A POLITICAL EARTHQUAKE. HE IS PULLING ALL OF THE LEVERS OF CHANGE IN A SOCIETY AND CULTURE THAT HISTORICALLY HAS RESISTED CHANGE -- AND WHERE CHANGE USUALLY HAS BEEN VIOLENT AND WRENCHING. THE FORCES HE HAS UNLEASHED ARE POWERFUL BUT SO ARE THE PEOPLE AND

INSTITUTIONS HE HAS ANTAGONIZED -- THUS SETTING IN MOTION A TREMENDOUS POWER STRUGGLE AND PURGE NO LESS DRAMATIC FOR THE ABSENCE OF SHOW TRIALS AND TERROR.

THE STRUGGLE IS ESSENTIALLY BETWEEN THOSE SEEKING TO PRESERVE THE STATUS QUO -- AND THEIR POWER IN IT -- AND GORBACHEV AND HIS ALLIES WHO SEEK TO REPLACE THOSE NOW IN POWER AND, IRONICALLY, TO TURN THE CLOCK BACK, BACK BEFORE STALINISM TO LENINISM. GORBACHEV SEEKS TO RESTORE IN THE USSR A SYSTEM IN WHICH SOME -- THOUGH CERTAINLY NOT ALL -- ELEMENTS OF THE STALINIST ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND BUREAUCRACY ARE ELIMINATED THUS OPENING THE WAY TO GREATER FLEXIBILITY AND INNOVATION AND THEREBY TO MODERNIZATION AND IMPROVED PERFORMANCE.

IN THE POLITICAL ARENA, GORBACHEV'S LENINISM MEANS THE CONTINUED POLITICAL MONOPOLY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, ITS ROLE AS SOLE ARBITER OF THE NATIONAL AGENDA, ITS CONTROL OF ALL THE LEVERS OF POWER, AND ITS ULTIMATE AUTHORITY OVER ALL ASPECTS OF NATIONAL LIFE -- INCLUDING THE LAW. IT ALSO MEANS A MASSIVE PURGE OF THE PARTY AND GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY, NOW UNDERWAY. GORBACHEV'S OWN BOOK MAKES CLEAR THAT "DEMOCRATIZATION" SOVIET-STYLE DOES NOT MEAN MOVING THE USSR AWAY FROM MARXISM-LENINISM AND ITS ESSENTIALLY TOTALITARIAN STRUCTURE. HIS ACTIONS IN SUPPRESSING THE DEMOCRATIC UNION AND OTHER SUCH EMBRYONIC OPPOSITION PARTIES PROVE THE POINT. THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY REMAINS UNTOUCHED AND UNTOUCHABLE.



WESTERNERS FOR CENTURIES HAVE HOPED REPEATEDLY THAT RUSSIAN ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL REFORM -- EVEN REVOLUTION -- SIGNALLED AN END TO DESPOTISM. REPEATEDLY SINCE 1917, THE WEST HAS HOPED THAT DOMESTIC CHANGES IN THE USSR WOULD LEAD TO CHANGES IN COMMUNIST COERCIVE RULE AT HOME AND AGGRESSIVENESS ABROAD. THESE HOPES, DASHED TIME AND AGAIN, HAVE BEEN REVIVED BY GORBACHEV'S AMBITIOUS DOMESTIC AGENDA, INNOVATIVE FOREIGN POLICY AND PERSONAL STYLE.

THE QUESTION HAS ARISEN AGAIN WHETHER GORBACHEV HAS SET IN MOTION FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES THAT REPRESENT A TURN FROM TRADITIONAL FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES OF OVERTURNING THE STATUS QUO IN THE WEST TO MORE PEACEFUL PURPOSES. THE QUESTION OF GORBACHEV'S LONGER RANGE INTENTIONS DOMINATES THE DEBATE IN THE WEST, AND, INTERESTLY, APPEARS ALSO TO BE A SUBJECT OF DEBATE IN THE SOVIET UNION. IN RECENT WEEKS THERE HAS BEEN AN EXCHANGE IN THE SOVIET PRESS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO ADDRESSING THIS VERY ISSUE. THE APPARENT LEADER OF THE CONSERVATIVES, LIGACHEV, HAS WRITTEN THAT THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT ABANDON A FOREIGN POLICY BASED ON CLASS INTEREST -- THAT IS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO BRING ABOUT REVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE WEST. AT THE SAME TIME, KHOVLEV AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE, HAVE ARGUED THAT IN THE NUCLEAR AGE THE SOVIET UNION CAN NO LONGER PURSUE A FOREIGN POLICY BASED ON THIS PREMISE BUT MUST ADOPT A MORE STABILIZING ROLE.

THERE IS A CHANCE -- A VERY SMALL ONE IN MY VIEW -- THAT GORBACHEV IS SETTING LOOSE FORCES THAT NEITHER HE NOR THE PARTY WILL BE ABLE TO CONTROL AND THAT, CONTRARY TO THEIR INTENTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS, ULTIMATELY MAY BRING A FUNDAMENTAL AND WELCOME TRANSFORMATION OF THE SOVIET UNION AT HOME AND ABROAD. AS WE HOPE THAT THIS REMOTE POSSIBILITY SOMEDAY COMES TO PASS, I WOULD ADVISE, IN OLIVER CROMWELL'S FAMOUS WORDS, THAT WE "TRUST IN GOD, BUT KEEP YOUR POWDER DRY."

ENDURING CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET GOVERNANCE AT HOME AND POLICY ABROAD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT -- WHILE THE CHANGES UNDERWAY OFFER OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UNITED STATES AND FOR A RELAXATION OF TENSIONS -- GORBACHEV INTENDS IMPROVED SOVIET ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, GREATER POLITICAL VITALITY AT HOME, AND MORE DYNAMIC DIPLOMACY TO MAKE THE USSR A MORE COMPETITIVE AND STRONGER ADVERSARY IN THE YEARS AHEAD. WE MUST NOT MISLEAD OURSELVES OR ALLOW OURSELVES TO BE MISLED INTO BELIEVING OTHERWISE.

IN CONCLUSION, THE QUESTION I AM MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED IS WHETHER IT IS IN OUR INTEREST FOR GORBACHEV TO SUCCEED OR FAIL. THE FIRST THING WE MUST ADMIT IS THAT THERE IS VERY LITTLE THAT THE UNITED STATES CAN DO TO INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME OF THE STRUGGLE GOING ON INSIDE THE SOVIET UNION. THAT SAID, WE SHOULD ASK OURSELVES IF WE WANT THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND

ECONOMIC REVITALIZATION OF THE HISTORICAL AND CURRENT SOVIET SYSTEM. I THINK NOT.

WHAT WE DO SEEK IS A SOVIET UNION THAT IS PLURALISTIC INTERNALLY, NON-INTERVENTIONIST EXTERNALLY, OBSERVES BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS, CONTRIBUTES TO INTERNATIONAL STABILITY, AND A SOVIET UNION WHERE THESE CHANGES ARE MORE THAN A TEMPORARY EDICT FROM THE TOP AND ARE INDEPENDENT OF THE VIEWS, POWER AND DURABILITY OF A SINGLE INDIVIDUAL. WE CAN HOPE FOR SUCH CHANGE BUT ALL OF RUSSIAN AND SOVIET HISTORY CAUTIONS US TO BE SKEPTICAL AND CAUTIOUS.

WE CANNOT CLOSE OUR EYES TO MOMENTOUS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USSR, BUT WE SHOULD WATCH, WAIT, AND EVALUATE. AS LONGTIME SOVIET-WATCHER WILLIAM ODOM HAS SAID, WE SHOULD APPLAUD PERESTROIKA BUT NOT FINANCE IT. WE SHOULD NOT MAKE CONCESSIONS BASED ON HOPE AND POPULAR ENTHUSIASMS HERE OR PLEASING PERSONALITIES AND ATMOSPHERIC OR SUPERFICIAL CHANGES THERE. WE SHOULD, HOWEVER, TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITIES WHERE THE TERMS ARE FAVORABLE TO US OR WHERE WE CAN BRING ABOUT DESIRABLE CHANGES IN SOVIET POLICIES -- WHETHER TO ADVANCE HUMAN RIGHTS, FREER EMIGRATION, STRATEGIC STABILITY, SOLUTIONS TO SOVIET GENERATED PROBLEMS SUCH AS AFGHANISTAN, OR EVEN EXPANDED BUSINESS TIES (IF THERE IS NO TRANSFER OF SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY). ABOVE ALL, WE MUST ESTABLISH REALISTIC CRITERIA BY WHICH WE CAN JUDGE IN THE COMING MONTHS AND YEARS WHETHER

POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION GENUINELY IS RESHAPING THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SYSTEM -- OR WHETHER THE TOTALITARIAN STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET UNION, INCLUDING THE INSTRUMENTS OF CENTRAL CONTROL AND REPRESSION, ENDURES DISCREETLY IN THE SHADOWS, AVAILABLE AT THE BECKON OF GORBACHEV'S SUCCESSOR, OR EVEN FOR GORBACHEV.

THERE ARE MANY UNCERTAINTIES SURROUNDING THE SOVIET UNION TODAY, BUT ONE FACT IS CLEAR: WHETHER GORBACHEV SUCCEEDS, FAILS, OR JUST SURVIVES, A STILL LONG COMPETITION AND STRUGGLE WITH THE SOVIET UNION LIE BEFORE US. SEEING THIS REALITY CLEARLY -- THE OPPORTUNITIES AS WELL AS THE DANGERS -- WILL BE AN EXTRAORDINARY CHALLENGE FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

Washington, D.C. 20505

12 October 1988

STAT

TO:

PAO

1016 Ames Bldg.

Per our conversation -- the attached  
is for your records.

STAT

Orig -- Addressee w/att

1 -- DDCI w/att

1 -- ER w/att

American  
Association  
for the Advancement of  
Science

1333 H STREET, NW, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005 (202)326-6490  
CABLE ADDRESS: ADVANCESCI

Program on Science, Arms Control & National Security

October 3, 1988

Mr. Robert Gates  
Deputy Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, DC 20505

Re: Recent Developments in the Soviet Union and  
Implications for U.S. Security Policy  
October 14, 8:00-9:15 a.m.  
Congressional/Senate Rooms

Dear Mr. Gates:

Thank you for agreeing to participate in the Third Annual AAAS Arms Control Colloquium, "Science and Security: Technology and Arms Control for the 1990s." The conference will be held on Thursday, October 13, and Friday, October 14, at the Capital Hilton Hotel at 16th and K Streets, N.W., Washington, D.C. You will be addressing the topic of "Recent Developments in the Soviet Union and Implications for U.S. Security Policy," on October 14, 8:00-9:15 a.m., in the Congressional/Senate Rooms. If possible, please try to arrive at your session room at least 10 minutes before the scheduled time to meet with the presider of the session.

Your address will begin at an appropriate time after the meal has been served, and should last between 20-30 minutes, leaving time for questions and answers afterwards.

Since all colloquium sessions will be taped for the proceedings, it would assist us greatly if you could provide a copy of your address or the talking points for your presentation. It is also possible that media representatives will be interested in obtaining copies of your address, and we will need a master copy for duplication and distribution.

If you have any questions about the colloquium, your hotel reservations or meal tickets, if you have any additional a-v needs, or need any further information, please contact Ray Orkwis at (202) 326-6490. Thank you.

Sincerely,

*W. Thomas Wander*

W. Thomas Wander  
Program Head



P-310-1R

**Third Annual AAAS Colloquium on Science, Arms Control, and National Security**

**Science and Security:  
Technology and Arms Control for the 1990s**

**13-14 October 1988**

**Thursday, 13 October**

---

8:00 a.m.	<i>Upper Lobby</i>	Presider: DICK CLARK, <i>Senior Fellow, Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies</i>
Registration		
9:00 a.m.	<i>Presidential Ballroom</i>	Speaker: The Honorable ALBERT GORE, JR., ( <i>D-Tenn.</i> ), <i>Senate Committee on Armed Services</i>
Welcome		2:00 p.m. <i>Presidential Ballroom</i>
ALVIN TRIVELPIECE, <i>Executive Officer, AAAS</i>		Plenary Session — <b>Deep Reductions in Strategic Offensive Nuclear Forces: Implications for Force Structure, Stability, and National Security</b>
9:10 a.m.	<i>Presidential Ballroom</i>	Moderator: ALTON FRYE, <i>Washington Director, Council on Foreign Relations</i>
Plenary Session — <b>The U.S. Defense Technology Base: Issues for the 1990s</b>		Speakers: RONALD LEHMAN, <i>Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, U.S. Department of Defense</i> ; MICHAEL MAY, <i>Associate Director, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory</i> ; BRENT SCOWCROFT, <i>Vice President, Kissinger Associates</i> ; JEREMY STONE, <i>President, Federation of American Scientists</i>
Moderator: ALVIN TRIVELPIECE, <i>AAAS</i>		
Speakers: JOHN DEUTCH, <i>Provost, Massachusetts Institute of Technology</i> ; JOHN ZYSMAN, <i>Co-Director, Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy</i> ; ALEXANDER FLAX, <i>Home Secretary, National Academy of Engineering</i>		
10:45 a.m.		4:30 p.m.
Break		Break
11:00 a.m.	<i>Presidential Ballroom</i>	4:45 p.m. <i>Presidential Ballroom</i>
Plenary Session — <b>Qualitative Factors in the Nuclear and Conventional Force Balance</b>		Open Forum — <b>Issues in Science, Arms Control, and National Security</b>
Moderator: SIDNEY GRAYBEAL, <i>Vice President, Center for Strategic Policy, System Planning Corporation</i>		Moderator: SIDNEY GRAYBEAL, <i>Vice President, System Planning Corporation; Chairman, AAAS Committee on Science, Arms Control, and National Security</i>
Speakers: JASPER WELCH, <i>Member, Board of Directors, Science Applications International Corporation</i> ; Sir RONALD MASON, <i>Professor of Chemical Physics, University of Sussex, England</i> ; CHARLES ZRAKET, <i>President, MITRE Corporation</i>		Colloquium panelists and members of the AAAS Committee on Science, Arms Control, and National Security
12:30 p.m.	<i>Congressional/Senate Rooms</i>	6:00 p.m. <i>Congressional/Senate Rooms</i>
Luncheon Address — <b>“A START Agreement and Beyond: Implications for American Nuclear Forces and Strategy”</b>		Reception
		All attendees invited. Wine, other beverages, and hors d'oeuvres. Hosted by AAAS.

Friday, 14 October

7:30 a.m.

*Upper Lobby*

Late Registration

11:00 a.m.

Break

8:00 a.m.

*Congressional/Senate Rooms*

Breakfast Address — **“Recent Developments in the Soviet Union and Implications for U.S. Security Policy”**

Presider: SIDNEY GRAYBEAL, *System Planning Corporation*

Speaker: ROBERT GATES, *Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency*

11:15 a.m.—12:45 p.m.

*Small Group Discussions — Block II*

*Federal Room A*

**Discussion 4 — Verifying Arms Control: Implementation of Major Agreements in the 1990s**

Moderator: MICHAEL KREPON, *Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*

9:15 a.m.

Break

Speakers: SALLY HORN, *Director, Verification Policy, Office of Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy, U.S. Department of Defense*; SIDNEY GRAYBEAL, *System Planning Corporation*

9:30–11:00 a.m.

*Small Group Discussions — Block I*

*Federal Room B*

*Federal Room A*

**Discussion 1 — European Security After INF**

Moderator: STANLEY SLOAN, *Specialist in U.S.—Alliance Relations, Congressional Research Service*

Speakers: JONATHAN DEAN, *Arms Control Adviser, Union of Concerned Scientists*; PETER LYDDON, *Assistant Director, Defence Policy, British Ministry of Defence*

**Discussion 5 — Strategic Defenses: Technology Advances and the ABM Treaty in the 1990s**

Moderator: THOMAS KARAS, *Senior Associate, Office of Technology Assessment*

Speakers: ASHTON CARTER, *Harvard University*; LOUIS MARQUET, *Director of Optics and Infrared Programs, Atlantic Aerospace Electronics Corporation*

*South American Rooms A&B*

*Federal Room B*

**Discussion 2 — Changing Soviet Military Doctrine and Its Impact on Force Structure and Arms Control**

Moderator: CYNTHIA ROBERTS, *Instructor, Political Science Department, Hunter College*

Speakers: RAYMOND GARTHOFF, *Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution*; PETER VIGOR, *Consultant, Soviet Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy*

**Discussion 6 — Nuclear Testing: Technical Requirements for and Implications of New Limits**

Moderator: GREGORY VANDER VINK, *Senior Analyst, Office of Technology Assessment*

Speakers: ROBERT BARKER, *Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), U.S. Department of Defense*; THOMAS COCHRAN, *Senior Staff Scientist, Natural Resources Defense Council*

*South American Rooms A & B*

**Discussion 3 — ASAT Weapons and Arms Control**

Moderator: ASHTON CARTER, *Associate Director, Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University*

Speakers: HENRY COOPER, *Chief Negotiator, Nuclear and Space Arms Talks, U.S. Department of State*; JOHN PIKE, *Associate Director, Space Policy, Federation of American Scientists*

1:00 p.m.

*Congressional/Senate Rooms*

**Closing Luncheon Address — “Scientists and Security: The Role of Science in Making National Security Policy”**

Presider: WILLIAM GOLDEN, *President, New York Academy of Sciences*

Speaker: WOLFGANG PANOFSKY, *Director Emeritus, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, Stanford University*

2:30 p.m.

Colloquium Adjourns



**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**

**ROUTING SLIP**

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OCA				
14	D/PAO	X			
15	D/PERS				
16	D/Ex Staff				
17	<i>[Handwritten Signature]</i>				
18					
19					
20					
21					
22					

SUSPENSE \_\_\_\_\_  
Date

Remarks

STAT

ER 88-2569X/3

*[Handwritten Signature]*  
Executive Secretary  
4 Oct '88  
Date

3637 (10-81)

88-2569X/3

American  
Association  
for the Advancement of  
Science

1333 H STREET, NW, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005 (202)326-6400  
CABLE ADDRESS: ADVANCESCI

Office of Communications

19 September 1988

Mr. Robert Gates  
Deputy Director, CIA  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Gates:

The Office of Communications of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) will maintain a newsroom throughout the upcoming Colloquium on Science, Arms Control, and National Security, 13 and 14 October. Based on past years, we anticipate quite a bit of press interest in the event.

To help reporters do a better job of covering the Colloquium, I would very much like to have a copy of the text of your address. Because we will not have access to copying facilities on site at the Capital Hilton, it would make our job easier if you could supply us with a copy of your paper in advance of the Colloquium so that we can copy it here. It should be sent to: Joan Wrather, Office of Communications, AAAS, 1333 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005.

If that is not possible, I would very much appreciate your having a copy of your paper brought to the press room at the Capital Hilton Hotel when you arrive at the Colloquium.

Thank you for your cooperation. If you have any questions, please call me at (202) 326-6440.

Sincerely,



Joan Wrather  
Senior Communications Associate

DCI  
EXEC  
REG

P.3101R

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for  
Release 2013/11/26 :

CIA-RDP91B01306R001400110001-4 <sup>AGENCY</sup>

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

29 August 1988

TO:

STAT

PAO

1016 Ames Bldg.

Received information from the AAAS  
function in October. For you to  
process. Thanks.

STAT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for  
Release 2013/11/26 :

CIA-RDP91B01306R001400110001-4

American  
Association  
for the Advancement of  
Science

1333 H STREET, NW, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005 (202)326-6490  
CABLE ADDRESS: ADVANCESSCI

Program on Science, Arms Control & National Security

August 23, 1988

Mr. Robert Gates  
Deputy Director, CIA  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Gates:

Your contribution to our annual Colloquium, "Science and Security: Issues of Technology and Arms Control for the 1990s," October 13-14, entitles you to a complimentary registration, including meals during the breakfast and two luncheon addresses. Enclosed you will find a blank registration form and a meal reservation form. If you have not done so already, please complete the registration form, and indicate whether you desire separate meal tickets. To make meal reservations, please indicate on the reply form all meals you plan to attend, and necessary dietary requirements, if any. The Capital Hilton Hotel will be able to accommodate specific dietary requests if notified in advance. Kindly return both forms to me and I will be glad to forward your registration form to our Meetings office.

If you are a speaker at our Colloquium, you also are entitled to complimentary hotel rooms. For lodging at the Capital Hilton, please complete the reservation form, and I will forward it to the hotel. Should you require any audio-visual equipment or assistance, please include a note on the meal reply form so that we may provide technical support for your presentation. I would appreciate it greatly if you would return both forms to me by September 12, to assure timely processing of your complimentary registration and meals. Meal tickets will be handed out at the Colloquium.

If you have any questions, or require any other assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me at 202-326-6495. We look forward to seeing you at our Colloquium in October.

Sincerely,

*Iris M. Whiting*

Iris M. Whiting

Enclosures



P-310-IR

# Science and Security: Technology and Arms Control for the 1990s

13-14 October 1988  
Capital Hilton Hotel ♦ Washington, DC

## Schedule of Events

---

### Thursday, October 13

- 8:00 a.m. REGISTRATION
- 9:00 a.m. PLENARY SESSION: **The U.S. Defense Technology Base: Issues for the 1990s.** Panelists: **John Deutch**, *Provost, Massachusetts Institute of Technology*; **John Zysman**, *Co-Director, Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy*; **Alexander Flax**, *President Emeritus, Institute for Defense Analysis.*
- 11:00 a.m. PLENARY SESSION: **Qualitative Factors in the Nuclear and Conventional Force Balance.** Panelists: **Jasper Welch**, *Member, Board of Directors, Science Applications International Corporation*; **Sir Ronald Mason**, *Professor of Chemical Physics, University of Sussex, England*; **Charles Zraket**, *President, MITRE Corporation.*
- 12:30 p.m. LUNCHEON ADDRESS: **A START Agreement and Beyond: Implications for American Nuclear Forces and Strategy.** Speaker: Member of Congress, to be announced.
- 2:00 p.m. PLENARY SESSION: **Deep Reductions in Strategic Offensive Nuclear Forces: Implications for Force Structure, Stability, and National Security.** Panelists: **Ronald Lehman**, *Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, U.S. Department of Defense*; **Michael May**, *Associate Director, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory*; **Brent Scowcroft**, *Vice Chairman, Kissinger Associates.*
- 4:45 p.m. OPEN FORUM: **Issues in Science, Arms Control, and National Security.** Colloquium panelists and members, AAAS Committee on Science, Arms Control & National Security.
- 6:00 p.m. RECEPTION

*Continued on back.*

## AAAS Science and Security Colloquium

October 13-14, 1988

Capital Hilton Hotel, Washington, D.C.

### Meal Reservation Form

Name:

Please check off below which meals you plan to attend:

**Thursday, October 13: Luncheon Address**

*A START Agreement and Beyond: Implications for American Nuclear Forces and Strategy*  
Senator Albert Gore

**Friday, October 14: Breakfast Address**

*The Future of U.S.-Soviet Relations*  
Robert Gates, Central Intelligence Agency

**Friday, October 14: Luncheon Address**

*Scientists and Security: The Role of Science in Making National Security Policy*  
Wolfgang Panofsky, Stanford University

Do you have specific dietary requirements? Please explain below:

For speakers only: Do you need audio-visual equipment or assistance? Please indicate below:

Advance Registration Form

# AAAS Science and Security Colloquium

13-14 October 1988 ♦ The Capital Hilton, Washington, DC

DA2

Please print or type

Name \_\_\_\_\_  
(last) (first and initial)

Affiliation \_\_\_\_\_

Mailing address \_\_\_\_\_  
(street and number)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(city) (state & zip) (telephone number)

Check one:  Check enclosed  VISA  MasterCard  
(no other credit cards accepted)

Credit card no. \_\_\_\_\_ Expiration date \_\_\_\_\_

Cardholder's signature \_\_\_\_\_

Check here if you need special services due to a handicap. We will contact you before the meeting.

■ **Publications:** All registrants receive an *Arms Control Reader* before or at the Colloquium and published *Proceedings* after the Colloquium.

■ **Registration materials** will be mailed to preregistrants in late September; however, for registrations received after 22 September, materials will be held at the AAAS Registration Desk in the hotel.

■ **Refund Policy:** Advance registration fees and meal ticket fees will be refunded after the Colloquium for cancellations received by 28 September. **No refunds will be made on cancellations received after this date.**

■ **Fees:**  Nonprofit rates apply to employees of government, academic, and nonprofit organizations.  Student rates apply only to full-time undergraduate and graduate students and retirees.

**Registration Fees**

Regular (with 3 meals) \$200 \$ \_\_\_\_\_

Regular (no meals) \$145 \_\_\_\_\_

Nonprofit<sup>1</sup> (with 3 meals) \$150 \_\_\_\_\_

Nonprofit<sup>1</sup> (no meals) \$ 95 \_\_\_\_\_

Student<sup>2</sup> (no meals) \$ 40 \_\_\_\_\_

**Separate Meal Tickets**

Lunch (13 October) \$ 25 \_\_\_\_\_

Breakfast (14 October) \$ 9 \_\_\_\_\_

Lunch (14 October) \$ 25 \_\_\_\_\_

**TOTAL AMOUNT:** \$ \_\_\_\_\_

Mail top half (registration form) to:  
 AAAS Science and Security  
 Colloquium Registration  
 1333 H Street, NW, Room 830  
 Washington, DC 20005

## Hotel Reservation ♦ The Capital Hilton

AAAS Science and Security Colloquium ♦ 13-14 October 1988

Reservations received after 22 September cannot be guaranteed.

Send confirmation to:

Name \_\_\_\_\_ Street \_\_\_\_\_

City \_\_\_\_\_ State \_\_\_\_\_ Zip \_\_\_\_\_ Telephone no. \_\_\_\_\_

Other occupants of room: Name \_\_\_\_\_ Name \_\_\_\_\_

Special housing needs due to handicap: \_\_\_\_\_

Room:  Single (\$118)\*  Double (\$138)\*  Twin (\$138)\* \*Add 10% DC sales tax and \$1 occupancy tax.

Arrival: Date \_\_\_\_\_ Time \_\_\_\_\_ Departure: Date \_\_\_\_\_ Time \_\_\_\_\_

Be sure to list definite arrival and departure times. Check-in time is 3:00 p.m.; check-out time is 12 noon.

Enclose separate check, made out to **The Capital Hilton**, for first night's room deposit or provide major credit card information.

Credit card name \_\_\_\_\_ Number \_\_\_\_\_ Expiration date \_\_\_\_\_

Cardholder's signature \_\_\_\_\_

Mail bottom half (hotel reservation form) to: Reservations, The Capital Hilton  
 16th & K Streets, NW, Washington, DC 20036

ER 2569X/1 88

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

10 August 1988

STAT

TO:   
Public Affairs Office  
1016 Ames Bldg.

Some information on the AAAS Colloquium  
that the Deputy is scheduled to address.

O/DDCI

STAT





## American Association for the Advancement of Science Program on Science, Arms Control, and National Security

---

Dear Colleague:

Over the last two years, the AAAS Colloquium on Science, Arms Control, and National Security has established itself as a major event in the scientific and defense policy communities. Some 400 government policymakers, top scientists, business leaders, educators, and interested citizens have met each year to examine how science and security interact. The 1988 colloquium, to be held 13-14 October at the Capital Hilton Hotel, will continue this tradition.

Confirmed panelists for 1988 include Ambassador Ronald Lehman, assistant secretary of defense for international security policy; Michael May, associate director, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; General Brent Scowcroft, vice president, Kissinger Associates; and Wolfgang Panofsky, director, High Energy Physics Laboratory, Stanford University.

As we enter into a new decade with a new presidential administration, many security issues are being debated. AAAS has the unique ability to examine the implications of those issues at the intersection of science and technology on the one hand and arms control and national security policy on the other.

Plenary sessions will focus on Reductions in Strategic Offensive Nuclear Forces, The U.S. Defense Technology Base in the 1990s, and Qualitative Factors in the Nuclear and Conventional Force Balance. Major addresses will cover The Future of U.S.-Soviet Relations, the implications of A START Agreement and Beyond for American forces and strategy, and The Role of Science in Making National Security Policy. Small group sessions will give you the opportunity to discuss the issues with panelists in a more informal setting. (See the complete program inside.)

Whether you are a policymaker, scientist, or concerned individual, you can place yourself at the forefront of the arms control and national security issues of the 1990s by participating in this important meeting. To register, please complete and return the form on page 3 of this brochure. For more information on the colloquium, contact Raymond Orkwis at the address below.

W. Thomas Wander  
*Program Head*  
*AAAS Program on Science, Arms Control, and National Security*

*P.S.* Once more, AAAS is pleased to offer free colloquium registrations to a limited number of educators in the fields of peace studies and conflict resolution, and national security and arms control policy. If you currently teach courses in these areas, cannot receive assistance from your program, and wish to be considered for such a scholarship, send a *current CV* and your *most recent course syllabus* to: "AAAS Arms Control Educational Assistance" at the address below.

1333 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20005 (202) 326-6490



*P-310-1R*

# Technology and Arms Control for the 1990s

## Schedule of 1988 Colloquium Events

### Thursday, October 13

*Plenary Session* — The U.S. Defense Technology Base: Issues for the 1990s

John Deutch, *MIT*; John Zysman, *Berkeley Roundtable*; additional panelist, *to be announced*

*Plenary Session* — Qualitative Factors in the Nuclear and Conventional Force Balance

Jasper Welch, *Science Applications International Corporation*; additional panelists, *to be announced*

*Luncheon Address* — A START Agreement and Beyond: Implications for American Nuclear Forces and Strategy

Member of Congress, *to be announced*

*Plenary Session* — Deep Reductions in Strategic Offensive Nuclear Forces: Implications for Force Structure, Stability, and National Security

Ronald Lehman, *U.S. Dept. of Defense*; Michael May, *Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory*; Brent Scowcroft, *Kissinger Associates*

*Open Forum* — Issues in Science, Arms Control, and National Security

Colloquium panelists and members, AAAS Committee on Science, Arms Control, and National Security

### Friday, October 14

*Breakfast Address* — The Future of U.S.-Soviet Relations

Robert Gates, *Central Intelligence Agency*

*Small Group Sessions* — Block I

European Security After INF

Jonathan Dean, *Union of Concerned Scientists*; Peter Lyddon, *UK Defense Policy Staff*

Changing Soviet Military Doctrine and Its Impact on Force Structure and Arms Control

Raymond Garthoff, *Brookings Institution*; additional panelist, *to be announced*

ASAT Weapons and Arms Control

John Pike, *Federation of American Scientists*; Henry Cooper, *U.S. Dept. of State*

*Small Group Discussions* — Block II

Verifying Arms Control: Implementation of Major Agreements in the 1990s

Sidney Graybeal, *System Planning Corporation*; additional panelist, *to be announced*

Strategic Defenses: Technology Advances and the ABM Treaty in the 1990s

Ashton Carter, *Harvard University*; Louis Marquet, *Atlantic Acrospace*

Nuclear Testing: Technical Requirements for and Implications of New Limits

Thomas Cochran, *Natural Resources Defense Council*; Robert Barker, *U.S. Dept. of Defense*

*Closing Luncheon Address* — Scientists and Security: The Role of Science in Making National Security Policy

Wolfgang Panofsky, *Stanford University*

Advance Registration Form

**AAAS Science and Security Colloquium**

13-14 October 1988 ♦ The Capital Hilton, Washington, DC

DA1

Please print or type

Name \_\_\_\_\_  
(last) (first and initial)

Affiliation \_\_\_\_\_

Mailing address \_\_\_\_\_  
(street and number)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(city) (state & zip) (telephone number)

Check one:  Check enclosed  VISA  MasterCard  
(no other credit cards accepted)

Credit card no. \_\_\_\_\_ Expiration date \_\_\_\_\_

Cardholder's signature \_\_\_\_\_

Check here if you need special services due to a handicap. We will contact you before the meeting.

■ **Publications:** All registrants receive an *Arms Control Reader* before or at the Colloquium and published *Proceedings* after the Colloquium.

■ **Registration materials** will be mailed to preregistrants in late September; however, for registrations received after 22 September, materials will be held at the AAAS Registration Desk in the hotel.

■ **Refund Policy:** Advance registration fees and meal ticket fees will be refunded after the Colloquium for cancellations received by 28 September. **No refunds will be made on cancellations received after this date.**

■ **Fees:**  Nonprofit rates apply to employees of government, academic, and nonprofit organizations.  Student rates apply only to full-time undergraduate and graduate students and retirees.

**Registration Fees**

Regular (with 3 meals) \$200 \$ \_\_\_\_\_

Regular (no meals) \$145 \_\_\_\_\_

Nonprofit<sup>1</sup> (with 3 meals) \$150 \_\_\_\_\_

Nonprofit<sup>1</sup> (no meals) \$ 95 \_\_\_\_\_

Student<sup>2</sup> (no meals) \$ 40 \_\_\_\_\_

**Separate Meal Tickets**

Lunch (13 October) \$ 25 \_\_\_\_\_

Breakfast (14 October) \$ 9 \_\_\_\_\_

Lunch (14 October) \$ 25 \_\_\_\_\_

**TOTAL AMOUNT:** \$ \_\_\_\_\_

Mail top half (registration form) to:  
 AAAS Science and Security  
 Colloquium Registration  
 1333 H Street, NW, Room 830  
 Washington, DC 20005

**Hotel Reservation ♦ The Capital Hilton**

AAAS Science and Security Colloquium ♦ 13-14 October 1988

Reservations received after 22 September cannot be guaranteed.

Send confirmation to:

Name \_\_\_\_\_ Street \_\_\_\_\_

City \_\_\_\_\_ State \_\_\_\_\_ Zip \_\_\_\_\_ Telephone no. \_\_\_\_\_

Other occupants of room: Name \_\_\_\_\_ Name \_\_\_\_\_

Special housing needs due to handicap: \_\_\_\_\_

Room:  Single (\$118)\*  Double (\$138)\*  Twin (\$138)\* \*Add 10% DC sales tax and \$1 occupancy tax.

Arrival: Date \_\_\_\_\_ Time \_\_\_\_\_ Departure: Date \_\_\_\_\_ Time \_\_\_\_\_

Be sure to list definite arrival and departure times. Check-in time is 3:00 p.m.; check-out time is 12 noon.

Enclose separate check, made out to **The Capital Hilton**, for first night's room deposit or provide major credit card information.

Credit card name \_\_\_\_\_ Number \_\_\_\_\_ Expiration date \_\_\_\_\_

Cardholder's signature \_\_\_\_\_

Mail bottom half (hotel reservation form) to: Reservations, The Capital Hilton  
 16th & K Streets, NW, Washington, DC 20036

Attend this timely forum  
to examine the implications of technology  
for arms control and U.S. security in the 1990s.

13-14 October 1988  
Capital Hilton Hotel  
Washington, DC


# Science and Security: Technology and Arms Control for the 1990s

Third Annual AAAS Colloquium on  
Science, Arms Control, and National Security

American Association for the Advancement of Science  
Program on Science, Arms Control, and National Security  
1333 H Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20005

<Address Correction Requested>

Non-Profit Org.  
U.S. Postage  
PAID  
Washington, DC  
Permit No. 7304



ROBERT M. DAVIS  
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ON SCIENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY  
WASHINGTON, DC 20005

Third Annual AAAS Arms Control Colloquium  
Technology and Arms Control for the 1990s

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**  
**ROUTING SLIP**

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OCA				
14	D/PAO	X			
15	D/PERS				
16	D/Ex Staff				
17					
18					
19					
20					
21					
22					

SUSPENSE \_\_\_\_\_  
Date

ER

Remarks

STAT

Executive Secretary

28 JUN 88

Date

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

STAT

STAT


28 June 1988

TO:   
Public Affairs Office

I'd like to turn this over to you. I have done some preliminary work. Mr. Gates has accepted (verbally) to speak to this group. We have changed the speaking time to Friday, 14 October (0800 - 0915). Have also mailed them a bio.

I informed the POC (Iris Whiting on 326-6495) that someone from our Public Affairs Office would be calling.

-- I did not speak to the substantive issue that Bob raised. Have left the hard things for you to do.



STAT

American  
Association  
for the Advancement of  
Science

1333 H STREET, NW., WASHINGTON, D.C., 20005 (202)326-6490  
CABLE ADDRESS: ADVANCESSI

Program on Science, Arms Control & National Security

June 14, 1988

Mr. Robert Gates  
Deputy Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505


Dear Mr. Gates:

On behalf of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, I am pleased to invite you to address our third annual Colloquium on Science, Arms Control, and National Security to be held October 13-14 at the Capital Hilton Hotel in Washington, D.C. The program is titled, "Science and Security: Issues of Technology and Arms Control for the 1990s."

Specifically, I am inviting you to deliver a major address, "The Future of U.S.-Soviet Relations." This will be a luncheon address on Thursday, October 13 (12:30-2:00 p.m.). Your remarks should run about 30-45 minutes and will be followed by a brief period for audience questions.

In its first two years, the Colloquium has established itself as a major event in the scientific and defense policy communities. Some 400 top scientists, government policymakers, business leaders, educators, and interested citizens have come to each day-and-a-half meeting to examine pressing issues at the intersection of science/technology and arms control/national security policy. The conference has successfully offered a range of expert analysis and opinion, including key Administration officials, such as Presidential Arms Control Advisor, Paul Nitze; SDIO Director, Lt. Gen. James Abrahamson; ACDA Director, Kenneth Adelman; and Science Advisor, William Graham, and other experts such as Les Aspin; Brent Scowcroft; William Perry; and Albert Carnesale. As a result, it has provided a broad and balanced examination of complex arms control and national security issues.

*S/PAD  
I will do - but can't  
talk directly about US-USSR  
talk about developments in  
USSR and implications for US.*



STAT

STAT  
ILLEGIB



*D-210-TR*

Mr. Gates  
page 2

The Colloquium on Science, Arms Control, and National Security is a significant event for those interested in the interplay of science and arms control/national security policy. The size (some 400 can be expected for your address) and quality of our audience and excellent media coverage should combine to provide you with an unusually effective platform to present your views on this timely and important topic.

I do hope your schedule will permit you to join us for this important meeting. On my behalf, a member of my staff will be calling you in the next few days to discuss the Colloquium further and to check on your availability in October.

Sincerely,



W. Thomas Wander  
Program Head

WTW/imw