



### ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Things to Include in Estimative Products

**FROM:**

Fritz W. Ermarth  
Chairman, NIC

EXTENSION

NO.

NIC #00947/89

DATE

12 September 1989

STAT

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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FORWARDED

~~DDCI~~ 9/14 TRK

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The Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC 00947/89  
12 September 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR: All NIOs  
D/AG  
SRP  
NIC/PO

FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth  
Chairman, National Intelligence Council

Subject: Things to Include in Estimative Products

Although we have talked about the need for these elements, I want to emphasize the necessity of including the following in estimative products:

A Retrospective Assessment

Every product on a subject that is not brand-spanking new ought to say something about what has changed since the topic was last looked at and, especially, where if anywhere earlier judgments were off the mark. This does not have to be elaborate; it should not be defensive. Frequently a brief comment in the scope note will handle the job. In complicated estimates, comments throughout the text are in order and may deserve summarizing in a "what has changed" box.

Alternative Scenarios

When we are estimating the future, alternative outcomes or scenarios are obligatory even when there is strong consensus within the Community as to the most likely course of events. In my experience, the single-outcome estimate does two kinds of damage. First, it denies the reader our feel for the shape of uncertainty, forcing him to supply his own alternatives without our help. Second, it undermines our credibility and leaves the impression that we seek safety in group dogma. Alternatives should be real possibilities, thoughtfully developed, not strawmen deliberately designed to make the most likely prognosis look overwhelmingly persuasive. Depending on subject

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P. 20018  
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Subject: Things to Include in Estimative Products

matter, ranges of outcomes for quantitative values or times for some predicted event may be appropriate. Or the "conditional alternative" may fill the bill, i.e., if factor "X" is more important than we believe likely, then scenario "B" becomes more likely.

Information/Collection Gaps and Implications

Before the reps disband, the NIO should assemble their collective sense of information gaps and implications for collection and analysis. It is repeatedly claimed that this is delicate because it implies a performance report on collectors or analytic shops. Nevertheless, pulling together such judgments is, I believe, one of the most important things we can do to help Community program managers. We may want to work out a uniform product or format for codifying these judgments. For the present, I recommend simply a memo for the record, written by the NIO, codifying the views of the coordinating team without attribution (except where an agency wishes to be identified). These would be distributed within the Intelligence Community; occasionally they may be important enough to discuss at NFIB.

  
Fritz W. Ermarth

CC: DDCI

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**  
**ROUTING SLIP**

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC		X		
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OCA				
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	D/Ex Staff				
17	SRP		X		
18	AO/DCI		X		
19	Counsel/DCI		X		
20					
21					
22					

SUSPENSE \_\_\_\_\_

Date

Remarks

ER 89-1772/2

*HS*  
Executive Secretary

14 Jul 89

Date

3637 (10-81)

88

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14 Jul 89

STAT

Any further instructions to C/NIC or SRP?

DCI note was to get C/NIC comments and then implement.

- No

STAT

STAT

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**  
**ROUTING SLIP**

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC		X		
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OCA				
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	D/Ex Staff				
17	SRP		X		
18	AO/DCI		X		
19	Counsel/DCI		X		
20					
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SUSPENSE \_\_\_\_\_

Date

Remarks



ER 89-1772/2

  
Executive Secretary

14 Jul 89

Date

3637 (10-81)

ER 89-1772/2

13 July 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR: Senior Review Panel  
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT: Recommendations on National Intelligence Estimates

1. I have reviewed the recommendations regarding national intelligence estimates contained in your 27 April 1989 memo to the DDCI and found them to be excellent. I have asked the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council to follow up on your suggestions.

2. In addition, I want to commend you on your ongoing contributions to the national intelligence estimate production process. You have a keen grasp of what will be relevant for the readers of our estimates, and I rely heavily on your frank and cogent comments on the drafts and terms of reference. I am continually impressed that a panel of only six people has such breadth and depth of knowledge and that it can provide such detailed comments on such a large and diverse number of estimates. The Senior Review Panel is an extremely valuable contributor to the quality of our national intelligence products.

3. Thank you for your excellent work. I look forward to reading your review of the Agency's reporting on China.



William H. Webster

DECL OADR

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DCI  
EXEC  
REG

S E C R E T



### ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

**SUBJECT:** (Optional)

Recent Changes in NIC Products

-00738-

**FROM:** David D. Gries  
Vice Chairman, NIC

EXTENSION

NO. NIC 0073-89

DATE 7 July 1989

STAT

**TO:** (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

RECEIVED      FORWARDED

1. C/NIC

10 July 89 [Signature]

2. ER

10 JUL 1989 [Signature]

3. DDCI

7/11 - 7/14 [Signature]

3 and 4: No action is required.

4. DCI

11 July 7/2 [Signature]

Nice job Dave - the handbook is helpful & to the point.

5. VC/NIC

[Nice job, Dave - this handbook is helpful and to the point.]

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P-200-14



Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Executive Secretariat

10 Jul 89

STAT

Re SRP - quickly came up with attached,  
may have couple of other papers tomorrow.  
Later portion is McMahon's and Casey's  
PAR on Amb Leonhart - gives a flavor  
for their respect for SRP, and records  
show that Mr. Casey met with the  
Panel and individual members <sup>SEVERAL TIMES</sup> during  
his tenure as DCI.

7 Jul from Gries is a thick package,  
you might want to see that one.

STAT

The Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC 00738-89  
7 July 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: David D. Gries  
Vice Chairman

SUBJECT: Recent Changes in NIC Products

Dick Kerr suggested that we alert you to recent changes in the presentation and management of NIC products. ~~Some of these changes originate with the NIC; others originate with Dick Kerr and the Senior Review Panel (SRP). All have the aim of making it easier for senior policymakers to grasp our message.~~


~~At Tab A are examples of Executive Briefs. We are indebted to Hugh Montgomery of the SRP for this idea. The Intelligence Community often needs to produce brief, policy-oriented papers on very short notice. The Executive Brief is now the vehicle. These briefs represent the views of the Intelligence Community, but are not formally coordinated--thus allowing fast turnaround.~~

At Tab B are several recent "White Covers" in which the Key Judgments include graphics. This change comes under the heading of modernizing our product.

At Tab C are examples of the use of bullets (see the clipped pages) compressing the message of an entire product into four or five short sentences. Placement of the bullets before the Key Judgments is designed to focus the reader's attention. We are indebted to Dick Kerr for this idea. Feedback from customers has been good.

At Tab D is a memo alerting NIOs to the availability of part-time editors to work on NIC Estimates. The editor's task is to improve presentation, structure and style. Among recent Estimates that have benefited from the work of these editors are the Israeli Estimate, the West German Estimate, and the Estimate on the Soviet Navy.

At Tab E is a copy of a handbook I recently prepared for managers and drafters of Estimates.

  
David D. Gries

Attachments:  
As stated

cc: Senior Review Panel



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CONFIDENTIAL

Executive Registry

86- 4090

9 September 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Senior Review Panel

FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Retrospective Evaluations

1. Two and a half years ago, as Chairman, National Intelligence Council, I asked the SRP to take on as one of its responsibilities the evaluation of earlier estimates to see how well they stood the test of time. The SRP, having done an earlier review of a dozen historical estimates for the DCI, responded to my request positively and did an evaluation of estimates prepared in the first six months of 1982 and in the first six months of 1983. This evaluation was very useful to the DCI and to me.

25X1

2. Unfortunately, because the SRP was so shorthanded for an extended time, this effort lapsed. Now that the Panel is back at strength, I believe it would be useful to resume these evaluations. I am uncertain whether the earlier approach of addressing all the estimates during a given period of time is the most useful. For example, another approach would be to review estimates on specific substantive areas of importance over a period of two or three years, e.g., the Philippines, Soviet matters, the Middle East, etc. A drawback of this approach is that it would cover a much smaller number of estimates.


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3. I would appreciate the Panel's discussing this and making a recommendation to the Director and me on how it would propose to carry out these retrospective evaluations.

25X1

  
Robert M. Gates

cc: DCI  
Acting, C/NIC



Executive Registry
86- 2655

10 June 1986

NOTE TO: Acting Chairman, National Intelligence Council  
Senior Review Panel

FROM: Deputy Director for Central Intelligence

1. The Director just finished reading an NIE with which he had a number of problems and **agreed heartily with SRP comments**. What he did not realize was that the estimate had already been substantially revised to take into account SRP comments. This is not the first time he has had to read documents twice because of this confusion of paper.

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2. Henceforth, the NIO should provide the SRP with a draft estimate, the SRP should prepare a memorandum for the Director with their comments on the draft, and the NIO should make appropriate revisions to the draft and prepare a note for the DCI and me on which SRP suggestions were accommodated and which were not -- and why. The revised draft estimate, the SRP comments and the NIO response should all be forwarded together to the Director and Deputy Director. In some cases, it may be worthwhile to include the initial draft examined by the SRP so that we can see the problems they were concerned about even if they have been corrected by the NIO.

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Robert M. Gates

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20505

NIC 00738-89  
7 July 1989

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: David D. Gries  
Vice Chairman

SUBJECT: Recent Changes in NIC Products

Dick Kerr suggested that we alert you to recent changes in the presentation and management of NIC products. Some of these changes originate with the NIC; others originate with Dick Kerr and the Senior Review Panel (SRP). All have the aim of making it easier for senior policymakers to grasp our message.

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*David D. Gries*  
David D. Gries

Attachments:  
As stated

cc: Senior Review Panel

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DCI-  
EXEC  
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X-ref: L-773-1R

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The Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC 00680/89  
16 June 1989

**EXECUTIVE BRIEF**

**ETHIOPIA'S PRESIDENT MENGISTU: THE MORNING AFTER**

- o For the moment, having cowed his opponents and purged the officer corps, Mengistu is secure in power following last month's coup attempt.
- o But his military has been seriously weakened, and setbacks at the hands of northern rebels coupled with economic woes and popular discontent may well prove his undoing in the longer run.
- o The Eritrean rebels are unlikely to relieve the pressure on him by accepting his offer to talk; even if they do, peace prospects are dim.
- o The Soviets will continue to provide military aid while urging him to negotiate a settlement in Eritrea and improve relations with the West, especially the US, whose participation Moscow seeks in a peace effort.
- o Mengistu will make a show of complying without, however, compromising his ambitions for military victory in the north.

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This Executive Brief was produced by the National Intelligence Officer for Africa. It reflects the judgments of Intelligence Community analysts presented at a meeting on ..... 9 June 1989.

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## ETHIOPIA'S PRESIDENT MENGISTU: THE MORNING AFTER

### Mengistu's Survivability

For the time being, Mengistu seems stronger politically than before last month's aborted putsch by senior military officers. His East German trained security forces and the Presidential Guard proved their effectiveness -- the coup leaders are all dead, under detention, or in hiding -- and he quickly made wholesale changes in the officer corps, replacing professionals with loyalists.

Nonetheless, Mengistu's respite will be short. The problems that plague Ethiopia are worsening rapidly:

- Militarily, the regime is now much more vulnerable to initiatives by the rebels in Eritrea and Tigre. Atop the turmoil and demoralization within the armed forces caused by the coup attempt, Mengistu has imposed new senior officers who are politically reliable but have little or no qualification for conducting military operations.
- Economically, immediate pressures stem from an acute shortage of foreign exchange. More fundamentally, the economy has been drained by Mengistu's war effort and contorted by his statist policies. Exports, productivity, and per capita income are declining, and the regime can squeeze few more resources from the population.
- Psychologically, war-weariness combined with fear has left the general populace even more cynical than before. When it

appeared the coup might succeed, many Ethiopians welcomed it. Since then, in contrast to customary passivity in most segments of the population, student demonstrators have openly defied and ridiculed Mengistu.

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Any would-be challenger will no doubt draw lessons from the aborted coup: to succeed in overthrowing him, Mengistu would have to be killed, his security forces neutralized, and Ethiopian nationalism taken squarely into account.

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Last month's plotters mistakenly assumed that, once they struck an arrangement with the Eritrean rebels, they would receive wider support within the military. But most military officers are as nationalistic as Mengistu and would be reluctant to make fundamental concessions to the rebels.

### Prospects for War and Peace

The Ethiopian military establishment is in disarray. Up to 500 officers are in detention, some have been executed, and defections among those not under arrest will likely increase. The air force is resentful, justifiably mistrusted by Mengistu, and largely out of action. While we expect Mengistu to refrain from large scale retribution, the damage to morale from political interference may further devastate military capabilities.

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The countrywide campaign to dragoon teenagers into service persists despite past debacles from ill-trained recruits who cut and ran. Last month's attempt against Mengistu was motivated in part by disgust with this practice.

Seasonal rains have begun, further favoring the guerillas. We expect the two main groups -- the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the smaller Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF)-- to resume the coordinated operations that have had telling effect in recent months. They will probe for weaknesses rather than launch frontal attacks that might coalesce government forces. Lines of communication linking Eritrea to the south are likely targets.

EPLF leaders no doubt calculate that time is on their side and that they have no interest in lifting pressures on Mengistu by accepting his recent "unconditional" offer to negotiate a settlement.

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Even should talks get underway, they would have little chance of success because neither side is willing to compromise on the ultimate status of Eritrea -- the EPLF wants independence, while Mengistu will offer only limited autonomy at best.

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The EPLF might consider a formula for loose confederation, but probably not while Mengistu is still in charge. For his part, the seriousness with which Mengistu made his recent offer is not yet clear. Tactical imperatives favored pleasing foreign audiences -- particularly the Soviets -- and buying time. An indicator of deeper motivation would be abandonment of the regime's "lowlands" initiative, a year-long

effort to divide Eritreans under the guise of selective "autonomy." The TPLF has sought to upstage Mengistu by agreeing to talk, but he is unlikely to accept its preconditions.

### Moscow's Burdensome Client

To Mengistu's displeasure, the Soviets stood on the sidelines during the coup attempt. They seem to have been prepared to let him fall and deal with a successor. But they are unlikely to deliberately undermine him. We expect Moscow to honor the current military assistance agreement until it expires in 1991, after which arms aid will be pared down as part of the worldwide Soviet cost-cutting effort. On the other hand, the 2,000 or so Cuban troops in Ethiopia may well begin departing much sooner, perhaps in the coming months -- their basic mission, deterring Somali aggression, being no longer relevant.

The Soviets are in a quandry in dealing with Mengistu. On one hand, they have lost patience with his quest for a military solution to the Eritrean rebellion and his mismanagement of the economy. On the other, they seem unwilling to exercise leverage over him by constricting the flow of vital military aid. They will carefully watch his pursuit of the latest offer to negotiate. Anxious to reduce burdens without the appearance of abandoning their client, they will also seek opportunities to enlist US participation in "cooperative" or "parallel" efforts to find a settlement.

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**Relations with the US****Mengistu wants to improve relations with the US despite suspicions --**

[redacted]

that Washington had a hand in last month's events. Western economic assistance is essential for salvaging his economy, and he fears sanctions proposed in Congress that would pinch Ethiopian coffee exports -- the main foreign exchange earner. He also (mistakenly) believes that the US enjoys influence over the Eritreans and their Arab backers. To woo Washington and general Western goodwill, he will avoid provocative steps such as the "red terror" of 1977, the vengeful response to an earlier challenge to his rule.

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But Mengistu will stubbornly resist compromising on matters of most importance to the West. The far-reaching reforms necessary for reversing Ethiopia's downward economic slide would undermine his political control mechanisms and violate his collectivist vision. Moreover, the immediate pressure to negotiate a northern settlement has been alleviated now that he has announced his offer. He can turn his attention to preparing for rebel initiatives on the battlefield, rebuilding the military, and pursuing -- illusory -- victory.

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC 00600-89  
30 May 1989

**EXECUTIVE BRIEF**

**HOW VULNERABLE IS GORBACHEV?**

- o With the removal of the "dead souls" from the Central Committee, Gorbachev has enhanced his ability to push reforms more aggressively and made it harder for his more orthodox opponents to remove him.
- o But the continuing bad news on the economy, the assertiveness of various nationalities, and the assault on the party apparatus during the recent elections have created serious frictions within the regime and could eventually lead to a major challenge to his position as well as his policies.
- o The intelligence agencies disagree over the probability of such a challenge during the next three or four years and also over the appropriate degree of confidence to attach to such assessments.
  - NIO/USSR, State/INR, DIA, and NSA, noting Gorbachev's recent political successes and continuing ability to push significant initiatives at home and abroad, are reasonably confident that his odds of remaining in power during this period are good (70-80 percent).
  - CIA/SOVA holds that the problems in the country are so serious and the political situation is so volatile that no judgment can be made with much confidence. It sees only a 50-50 chance of Gorbachev's surviving unless he retreats significantly from his reform policies.

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This Executive Brief reflects the views of the Intelligence Community expressed at a warning meeting held 23 May 1989. It was drafted by the National Intelligence Officer for the Soviet Union and informally coordinated within the Community.



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SECRET

**HOW VULNERABLE IS GORBACHEV?**

There is substantial agreement among the Intelligence Community agencies on most issues related to the Soviet leadership.

Most analysts agree, for example, that Gorbachev turned the recent elections to his favor and strengthened his position with the removal of the "dead souls" from the Central Committee at the April Plenum.

These changes show considerable ability to control the Politburo, make a move against him more difficult, and will help him push the reforms more aggressively.

There is a growing disparity, however, between Gorbachev's power to make personnel changes and his ability to demonstrate that his policies are making things better. Compromises on economic policy are very evident and more radical reforms have been put on hold.

The party apparatus is under challenge; nationality unrest is increasing and potentially could threaten the system; and economic policies have failed to improve the economy or the consumer's lot.

As a result, tensions within the regime and society have risen and could produce a challenge to Gorbachev's position as well as his policies.

There is a significant disagreement among agencies, however, on the probability of such a challenge over the next three to four years and the degree of confidence to place in such assessments.

**NIO/USSR, State/INR, DIA, NSA, and some analysts from various agencies acknowledge that uncertainties are greater now but are reasonably confident that the odds of Gorbachev remaining in power over this period are good (70-80 percent).**

-- They point to Gorbachev's political skills and the weakness of the opposition, the results of the Fall and April plenums, the continuing effort to press political reform, and the ability to push significant initiatives in foreign and security policy.

-- While acknowledging political risks inherent in some reform policies and the more volatile political and social environment in the USSR, they judge that these problems will likely be manageable and don't expect a crisis sufficient to cause Gorbachev's removal in this time frame.

-- They believe that support for change at home (evident in the elections) and Gorbachev's foreign policy successes have substantially increased the stakes and cost of a challenge and made one less likely.

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**Alternatively, CIA/SOVA and other analysts believe the political situation is now so volatile that no judgment about Gorbachev's position beyond the next few months can be made with any confidence.**

- While recognizing Gorbachev's strength and skill, they see an intensification of the leadership struggle and resistance to his policies becoming more open and threatening.
- The threats to order unleashed by Gorbachev's reforms along with the seeming intractability of the economic problems confronting the country are in their view creating a very unpredictable environment in which events could readily spin out of control and give Gorbachev's more orthodox opponents the upper hand.
- While not arguing that such an attack will necessarily happen, they believe the conditions are right and the threat is already great. They see only a 50-50 chance of Gorbachev's surviving unless he retreats significantly from his reform policies.

#### Indicators

These two views reflect different perspectives on what and how evidence should be weighed and evaluated.

Those who hold a more upbeat assessment of Gorbachev's prospects consider the broader setting of leadership politics today, but rely more on indicators of power in the Kremlin--ability to make personnel changes, trends in

policy, the exercise of responsibility--as well as foreign policy accomplishments and domestic policy initiatives as the keys to assessing staying power. Had Gorbachev not scored dramatic successes last fall and more recently, Gorbachev's prospects would not look so solid to this group.

The other view is shaped more by the greater volatility of the political and social scene now than in the past, the mounting domestic criticism of Gorbachev's policies, the failure to show positive results from his program, and the lessons of Khrushchev's ouster. While agreeing that Gorbachev scored a major victory in May, they focus more on the unpredictable and risky environment his policies have created.

In effect, the more dramatic nature of change and the turmoil it has created have fractured somewhat the earlier consensus on how best to judge Gorbachev's prospects. Thus, short of Gorbachev's removal or noticeable decline in power indicators, this disagreement will likely persist.

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# Soviet Naval Strategy and Programs Toward the 21st Century

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National Intelligence Estimate

Key Judgments

*These Key Judgments represent the views of the Director of Central Intelligence with the advice and assistance of the US Intelligence Community.*

LOGGED

**Top Secret**

NIE 11-15-89W

June 1989

Copy 33

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**Soviet Naval Strategy and  
Programs Toward the  
21st Century**

25X1

- *We expect Gorbachev to cut spending on the Navy. These cuts will produce significant changes in Navy procurement and force structure, but not in missions or strategy.*
- *The Soviet Navy's emphasis on strategic strike and the defeat of enemy naval forces will continue.*
- *Integration of naval, land, and air forces into combined-arms operations under the concept of the Theater Strategic Operation will improve.*
- *The Soviets will actively pursue naval arms control in an effort to erode the US maritime advantage, conserve resources, and achieve some political and propaganda benefit.*

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# The Impact of US-Backed Counternarcotics Programs on Andean Cocaine Countries

25X1

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum

Key Judgments

*Information available as of 10 May 1989 was used in the preparation of this Memorandum, approved for publication on that date by the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council.*

Secret

NI IIM 89-10001W  
May 1989

Copy 43

Secret







25X1

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## The Impact of US-Backed Counternarcotics Programs on Andean Cocaine Countries



25X1

- *US-backed counternarcotics efforts, despite modest successes, have not significantly disrupted cocaine production and distribution from Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru.*  25X1
- *A cutoff of US counternarcotics assistance would lead to even more cocaine production and would cause current counternarcotics programs to lose what momentum they now have.*  25X1
- *No Andean government is likely to install more effective counternarcotics programs without massive, sustained US assistance.*  25X1
- *Such measures as extradition of nationals or the widespread use of herbicides will lead to increased danger for US personnel in the region.*  25X1

Secret

Director of Central Intelligence

Secret

25X1



# Israel and the Palestinians: Prospects for the Uprising and the Peace Process

25X1

National Intelligence Estimate

Key Judgments

*These Key Judgments represent the views  
of the Director of Central Intelligence  
with the advice and assistance of the  
US Intelligence Community.*

Secret

NIE 35-89W  
June 1989

Copy 14

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## Israel and the Palestinians: Prospects for the Uprising and the Peace Process

25X1

- *We see no sign of a fundamental breakthrough in the peace process in the next year. The uprising will become more vicious and violent, unless Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza see progress toward ending the Israeli occupation.*
- *Nonetheless, the recent Israeli initiative, PLO flexibility, and a more constructive Soviet role have created some chance for incremental change and opportunities for US diplomacy.*
- *The Shamir government is under no significant pressure from Israelis to go beyond its recent election initiative; strong outside pressure on Israel and the PLO probably would be needed to bring about elections.*
- *PLO moderation will persist in the next year; the PLO also will demand a role in negotiating a final settlement but might make significant concessions on initial Israeli-Palestinian talks.*
- *If the peace process is not advanced, we expect more terrorism and Arab pressure on the United States in the next two to three years.*

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Director of  
Central  
Intelligence

**Secret**



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# The Impact of US-Backed Counternarcotics Programs on Andean Cocaine Countries



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Interagency Intelligence Memorandum

**Secret**

NI IIM 89-10001  
May 1989

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DIRECTOR OF  
**Central  
Intelligence**

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**NI IIM 89-10001**

# **The Impact of US-Backed Counternarcotics Programs on Andean Cocaine Countries**

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*Information available as of 10 May 1989 was used  
in the preparation of this Memorandum.*

*The following intelligence organizations participated  
in the preparation of this Memorandum:*

The Central Intelligence Agency  
The Defense Intelligence Agency  
The National Security Agency  
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

*also participating:*

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,  
Department of the Army  
The Office of Intelligence, the Drug Enforcement Administration  
The Office of Intelligence, the US Customs Service

*This Memorandum was approved for publication by the  
Chairman, National Intelligence Council.*

**Secret**  
May 1989

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D  
NIC

26 June 1989

MEMORANDUM: All NIOs

FROM: David D. Gries  
Vice Chairman

As many of you are aware, the Analytic Group has available a number of experienced part-time editors to help you with the language, writing and presentation of your draft estimates. I urge you to avail yourselves of their services. [redacted] is their supervisor; he is the man to contact.

STAT

[redacted] is the former editor of Problems of Communism. He also teaches a course on the Soviet Union at George Washington University. [redacted] is an excellent editor and writer as well as a very good critic.

STAT

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Phil Stoddard was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in INR. He has very strong editing skills, including a knack for pulling the main points out of murky prose. Phil has worked on Executive Briefs and Estimates for Marten van Heuven, Larry Budge, and Jack O'Donnell.

[redacted] is a retired DO officer who was [redacted] among other senior jobs. [redacted] is an outstanding writer. Earlier in his career he wrote Estimates for the Office of National Estimates.

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[redacted] another retired DO Officer, was [redacted] and member of the Editorial Board for Studies in Intelligence. [redacted] is an accomplished writer and editor.

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Dave Blee has undertaken writing tasks for Murat Natirboff for the last several years. Retired from the DO, he held several [redacted] and division and staff chief jobs, most recently, [redacted]. Dave is a fine writer.

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Not all these officers are available all the time and many are limited in the amount of time they can work. But our expectation is that one of them should be available when needed. I believe that Martin, Larry, and Jack will confirm that these editors are most useful when the draft first arrives on your desk. I urge you to make use of them, working through [redacted]. Meanwhile, [redacted] are available for drafting and rewriting as in the past. Our part-time editors generally are not available for those more time consuming tasks.

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David D. Gries

cc: C/NIC

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# ATTENTION ALL ESTIMATORS

February 1989

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### ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Recommendations from the Senior Review Panel on NIEs

FROM:  Fritz W. Ermarth Chairman, NIC	EXTENSION NO.  NIC #00583-89	DATE  23 May 1989
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TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		

1. <i>W</i> DDCI <i>24 MAY 1989</i>		<i>5/30</i>	<i>AK</i>	<p style="font-size: 2em; font-family: cursive;">OK - let's go forward</p>
2.				
3. DCI	<i>31 May</i>	<i>2/c</i>	<i>✓</i>	
4.				
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10.				
11. Fritz W. Ermarth C/NIC 7E47 HQS				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

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is a very quick, estimative, and Community product, written by the NIO but chopped by the Community, on a hot policy topic. We've already done a few (see an example at TAB B). To make this work the NIO must be a good thinker, a good writer, and a good substantive leader of his community clientele. He must also know the policy issues well. We agree that longer term projects, including most estimates, tend to take too long. But we do find that, when the customer imposes a deadline, we can usually meet it. That indicates NIO leadership can tighten up schedules where needed.

As regards NIE format, we agree with the SRP that we must make skillful use of the scope note (or a brief footnote) to explain assumptions and purposes. We also agree that "after action" assessments can be useful in some cases (see below). On a related matter, we plan to do more in identifying collection gaps when doing estimates. Community components are sensitive about this because it constitutes a "report card" on collectors, so we need to keep results within the family. We disagree with the SRP on the need for bibliographies in NIEs; that is more appropriate to the research products of the Community's agencies.

We also disagree with the SRP's characterizing the big military estimates as not really estimative. Their nature -- and burden, alas -- is that they are very estimative on so many issues that they look like encyclopedias. Many DCIs and NIOs have tried to change this art form over the past 20 years, but we keep coming back to what we have as the best -- or least worst -- way of doing a permanent line of business. The NIEs on Soviet military forces are nothing like the old National Intelligence Surveys (NIS), which were really detailed country studies with no estimative content. We would recommend against reviving the NIS, and, should they be revived, against the NIC doing them.

Finally, I would like to make a recommendation of my own. I believe the SRP could very usefully be tasked to undertake fairly long-term "after action" studies of our analytical record on major intelligence topics, not just in NIEs but in published research and analysis and current intelligence reporting of national importance. Where a substantial amount of spade work is called for, qualified analysts could be detailed to support the SRP but shielded against retaliation if the results of their work are disquieting to the home office. A number of topics for such a performance review suggest themselves:

Did we anticipate the radicalism of Gorbachev's reform strategy? If not, why not? Are we analytically, intellectually geared up for its effects?

*Water cooler  
This is  
an element  
that does this  
for the DI +  
IC staff  
I think  
SRP could  
get some  
input  
from  
the  
staff*

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #00583-89  
23 May 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth  
Chairman

SUBJECT: Recommendations from the Senior Review Panel  
on National Intelligence Estimates

I appreciate the opportunity to review the comments and recommendations on NIEs that the SRP sent you last month (TAB A). I and the NIOs, who also reviewed the SRP's memo, find most of them sound and promising, even though familiar.

We have been working hard to achieve brevity, and have made progress in the last year or so. Excepting the big military estimates, NIEs now average about 17 pages with 2.5 pages of Key Judgments. I think we may be approaching a brevity limit for most estimates unless we exclude the reasoning behind essential judgments, which I believe would be counterproductive in another direction. To help the busiest readers, we have lately added a new element: a distillation of Key Judgments in headline/bullet form at the beginning of each estimate.

Graphics are a major help to all estimates. We have actually increased our reliance on graphics greatly in recent years, even in political estimates. To do more, we probably need to bring a graphics specialist into the NIC; we now rely totally on CPAS, which serves us nobly, but not solely.

The roles of NIOs vary quite a bit because their responsibilities vary. In the future, I plan to give more stress to collegiality within the NIC in estimate preparation. I have also concluded that we need a senior, full-time editor to polish drafts before they leave the NIOs hands.

The SRP made a number of comments that fall under the heading of timeliness and policy relevance. We simply have to assure these qualities or we are not worth our pay. In tune with the SRP's suggestion, we've upgraded the "sense of the community" memo to the level of the "NIC Executive Brief." The aim here

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is a very quick, estimative, and Community product, written by the NIO but chopped by the Community, on a hot policy topic. We've already done a few (see an example at TAB B). To make this work the NIO must be a good thinker, a good writer, and a good substantive leader of his community clientele. He must also know the policy issues well. We agree that longer term projects, including most estimates, tend to take too long. But we do find that, when the customer imposes a deadline, we can usually meet it. That indicates NIO leadership can tighten up schedules where needed.

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Did we underestimate the staying power of Najibullah, Noriega, Deng Tsiao-ping? If so, why?

Have we done well or poorly in anticipating the behavior of the Khomeini regime?

I realize that "track record" review of this kind is often objectionable to those reviewed. Still it seems odd that we formally review, inspect, audit, and monitor just about every aspect of our work except our product. The SRP -- which we know as a thoughtful friend of our work -- could do the whole Intelligence Community a service by judiciously stepping into this gap.



Fritz W. Ermarth

Attachments:  
As stated

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NIC #00583-89  
23 May 1989

SUBJECT: Recommendations from the Senior Review Panel  
on National Intelligence Estimates

DCI/C/NIC:FWErmarth:bha(23May89)



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- 5 - SRP
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ER-89-1772

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

27 April 1989

Senior Review Panel

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Senior Review Panel

SUBJECT: ~~Thoughts on the Intelligence Production Process~~

1. We are most appreciative of your visit yesterday, and welcomed the stimulating conversation which ensued. We were particularly pleased to share some of our mutual concerns on the intelligence production process. We very much ~~look forward to periodic opportunities in the near future to explore with you ways in which our Panel might be helpful to you.~~

2. As an initial effort, we thought it might be useful to you to recapitulate briefly some of the subjects yesterday's conversation touched upon together with a few quick reactions which may be worth further thought as we pursue the "guidelines" project.

a. Length of Estimates. We start and return to our conviction that most Estimates are simply too long for their intended readership. Even the Key Judgments not infrequently exceed the tolerable length of a terse, tightly-reasoned Estimate. Any arbitrary restrictions must contemplate exceptions, but we think it ~~might be a useful experiment to establish for the general run of political and economic Estimates a maximum length both for the Key Judgments and the text of the Estimate itself.~~ (We would of course exempt the traditional mainly military Estimates, such as those in the 11- series, which are more reference tools than Estimates as such.)

b. The Role of the NIOs. Our recent experience with Estimate drafts confirms our impression of substantial unevenness in both substance and style. A more active role

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SUBJECT: Thoughts on the Intelligence Production Process

by the NIO's in the pre-coordination drafting process--and more frequent collegial reviews inside the NIC--might help to smooth out some of the rougher spots.

c. New-Art-Form. Recognizing the difficulty of capturing and holding the attention of busy policymakers, we think there might be appreciable advantage in devising a new art form designed primarily, but not exclusively, for that limited audience. Its hallmarks should be brevity and very quick reaction. We shall be commenting further on this concept, but offer as a tentative title for what we have in mind "National Intelligence Executive Brief."

*substantive reply  
- copy note*

d. NIE-Format. We believe that two former--and one irregularly employed--elements of the NIE deserve renewed consideration. Specifically, there was substantial utility in the inclusion of a selective bibliography and a succinct list of key intelligence gaps. And the use of a Scope Note defining both the aim and the special characteristics of the Estimate might well be made mandatory. Along with these published passages, we think new consideration should be given to reviving an in-house Estimate post-mortem or brief "after-action" report by the managing NIO as a guide both to subsequent collection efforts and future updatings.

*- replies*

e. Graphics. One of the Agency's special strengths is its production of superb graphics: succinct, informative, and attention-getting. DDI publications are light years ahead of NIC hard covers. The National Estimates should clearly expand use of all forms of graphics to sharpen impact, promote readability, and reduce text to manageable proportions. We see considerable merit in including graphics in Key Judgments.

f. NIE-Production Cycle. It appears to us that the time between conception and production for both scheduled and non-scheduled papers is growing longer by a factor of months. Recognizing that the drafting and coordination phases can be time-consuming, we nonetheless suggest that tighter managerial direction of the entire cycle should be able to reduce the time required by a significant factor.

g. SNIEs. Relatedly, NIC's quick response capability is visibly weakening. The SNIEs have by and large lost their special punch and appeal and have become virtually indistinguishable from the general run of non-scheduled production. If the title and original purpose for which SNIEs were designed are to be meaningful, we believe that more rigorously enforced time and space limitations need to be established and enforced to restore their "special"

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SUBJECT: Thoughts on the Intelligence Production Process

character. (The scope of these restrictions would need to take into account the acceptability of the new art form mentioned in paragraph 2.c., above.)

h. The NIS Concept. Lacking the traditional NIS reference volumes, NIE's have come to include helpful but nonessential background material which could better be made available to the consumer in some other form. While we do not espouse resuscitation of the NIS format as such, we do believe that there should be a better way to build up a reference library of background materials for use by staffs and analysts, thereby obviating the necessity for inclusion of such information in the text of the NIEs. Possibly the greatest benefit from such an approach would be to restore the "estimative" element of Estimates by reducing the temptation to take the easier path of including much historical and backward-looking material. Similarly, we wonder if periodic reference NIEs such as those in the "11-" series might not more appropriately be published under some other rubric.

i. The NID. We agree that the revised format of the NID has much appeal in its present form, but we offer one additional refinement which could easily be incorporated: expansion of the table of contents marginally by including under each heading a brief summary of the contents and conclusions of the article in question.


3. You will recognize that we have attempted to encapsulate the highlights of our discussion. We will wish to consider them further, separately and collectively, and would of course be pleased to discuss any of them in more consecutive detail at your convenience. Again, we greatly look forward to working closely with you in every way in which we can be supportive of you and the DCI.



William Leonhart



John B. McPherson



Hugh Montgomery



John D. Wilson

SUBJECT: Thoughts on the Intelligence Production Process

ODCI/SRP:thelma

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC 00545-89  
15 May 1989



EXECUTIVE BRIEF

EFFECTS OF FURTHER US ECONOMIC SANCTIONS  
AGAINST PANAMA

- Further US economic sanctions will not cause Noriega's ouster.
- The costs to Panama of additional US sanctions would be much smaller than those that Noriega has already survived.
- A trade embargo and financial restrictions would mainly affect Panama's private sector and US firms, not the regime.
- The longer such sanctions last, the greater the long-term reduction in the US economic position in Panama.

---

This Executive Brief reflects contributions and views of the Intelligence Community at a meeting on 12 May 1989. It responds to a request by Deane Hoffmann, Senior Director, International Economic Affairs, National Security Council. It is based upon analysis done by [redacted] with contributions from [redacted] South America-Caribbean Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis/CIA.

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## EFFECTS OF FURTHER ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST PANAMA

### Trade Embargo

An embargo that simply prohibited trade between the United States and Panama, without otherwise restricting transactions by US companies or citizens there, would depress private business activity by as much as 7 percent during the first month or two.\* After new suppliers of imports and new markets for exports were located, however, the effects would be much less, down to perhaps 3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) over the course of a year if the sanctions continued that long.

In 1988, Panama's exports to the United States were \$297 million, mainly bananas and seafood. At least half of the exports could be redirected to other markets almost immediately. Petroleum exports, mainly for the refueling of ships transiting the Canal, would not be affected. Imports from the United States, worth \$633 million in 1988, consist almost entirely of goods that could be obtained elsewhere, though at somewhat higher prices. Petroleum stocks and alternative supplies are ample.

Other nations, especially those in Latin America, are unlikely to support a US embargo. Instead, they would step in to supplant US trade. Import restrictions would, however, be costly to US firms in Panama that depend on supplies from the United States, and many of them would leave Panama if they expected the embargo to last more than a few months.

### Financial Restrictions

Currently, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) prohibits (with several exceptions) cash payments to the Noriega regime from the US government or US citizens. There are several alternatives for additional prohibitions of financial transactions. Prohibiting US firms in Panama from any transactions there would impose costs that might total 1 to 3 percent of GNP over and above the costs of a trade embargo. US investment in Panama totals \$1.5 billion, most of it in petroleum pipelines and refining, agriculture, fishing, and banking. Were such restrictions imposed, US operations could be run by Panama or replaced by foreign firms. The impact on Panama's economy depends on how quickly this replacement occurs, as well as on how much business confidence deteriorates.

\* GDP is expected to decline by about five percent in 1989 in the absence of additional sanctions. The figures given here and elsewhere are in addition to the decline already projected.

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The most comprehensive move of barring all transactions between US persons, including the US Government, and any Panamanian entity would be tantamount to removing the US presence. While this would have a substantial economic impact on Panama--possibly cutting GDP by more than 10 percent -- it would pose serious problems for the United States. For example:

- US SOUTHCOM would need entirely new supply networks.
- Operation of the Canal would become difficult if not impossible.

Closing the loopholes in existing regulations would make them more effective. It would, for example, prohibit US firms from giving discounts to the Panamanian Government to circumvent the prohibition of paying taxes in cash. Such measures would deny the regime an additional \$4 million per month.

#### Noriega's Control Not Threatened

Unlike the IEEPA sanctions, which directly reduce the Panamanian Government's revenues, new sanctions on trade and finance would primarily affect private firms and households. Government revenues would decline by only about \$2 million per month from the current average take of about \$50 million. PDF businesses would not be much affected. Moreover, Noriega would probably be able to continue to insulate key elements of the military from the ill effects of Panama's economic problems.

Considering that Noriega has already weathered the repercussions of a much larger economic shock -- a 20-percent decline in GDP last year -- he should be able to ride out any problems caused by the direct impact of such additional measures. Indeed, the regime might actually be able to benefit by taking over abandoned US enterprises.

Thus, the effectiveness of these policies in stimulating or contributing to Noriega's ouster would depend mainly on the reactions of the Panamanian opposition. That is difficult to foresee amidst the turmoil caused by the election debacle. We judge that additional financial sanctions would not by themselves stimulate a popular uprising against Noriega. They would, however, contribute to the pressure generated by the other diplomatic and military steps taken by Washington. Politically, added sanctions would be a manifestation to the PDF of US seriousness of purpose and as such would be potentially most effective when coordinated with other measures in a short-term strategy to bring about Noriega's departure.

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Longer Term Effects

The major impact of additional sanctions would be felt during the first month or two; as the Panamanian economy adjusted, their cost to Panama would gradually diminish. If additional economic sanctions were enacted, but Noriega nevertheless held on to power, it would be difficult to justify removing them. (This is particularly true of the existing IEEPA sanctions, because of the large sums that have accumulated in the escrow accounts that would then be paid to Panama.) The longer trade and financial sanctions were to last, the greater would be the long-term reduction in the US economic position in Panama.

Economic sanctions that fall largely on the middle class would, over time, induce the exodus of people who have been the backbone of the opposition to Noriega and are vital to an eventual economic recovery. Over an extended period added sanctions could become a political liability because their economic impact would fall heaviest on an opposition that is already ambivalent about the continuation of current US sanctions.

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**ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP**

Date 11 MAY 1988

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)

1. Deputy Director

Initials

Date

*[Handwritten initials]*

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2.

3.

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Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

**REMARKS**

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FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)

Senior Review Panel

Room No.—Bldg.

Phone No.

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89-1772/1

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

11 May 1989

Senior Review Panel

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Guidelines for the Production of National Intelligence

REFERENCE: SRP Memorandum of 27 April 1989

1. In your recent meeting with us, you asked that we send you our thoughts on the adequacy of current guidelines for the national intelligence production process. Our referenced memorandum described certain aids to the readability of estimates which, together with the views which follow, we would like to reaffirm. In the interim we have conducted a thorough review of the genesis and evolution of published instructions pertinent to this subject. As you know, the most recent version of the guidelines was approved by the NFIB on 24 September 1987 and issued over the signature of the Acting Chairman of the NIC on 30 September 1987. We append a copy of this document for your convenience.

2. We have analyzed these guidelines in the light of predecessor instructions on the same subject and of subsequent and current practice. We think that the 1987 guidelines retain a number of strong and valid features, particularly:

- a clear presentation of the types of interagency intelligence products, preparation times, approval procedures, and, most significantly, acceptable lengths.

(NIE: text 10-20 pages; Key Judgments 1-4 pages--SNIE and SIIM: text less than 10 pages; Key Judgments not more than 2 pages)

- an emphatic stress on ensuring both the integrity and objectivity of the intelligence process and the independence of the Intelligence Community from policy community pressures.
- protection of alternative view and dissent procedures.

CL BY \_\_\_\_\_ Signers  
 DICE \_\_\_\_\_ OADR  
 DESIGNED FROM \_\_\_\_\_

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SUBJECT: Guidelines for the Production of National Intelligence

We conclude that, with the exception noted in paragraph 4.b. below, the 1987 guidelines continue to provide clear and practical parameters for the preparation of national intelligence products, provided that they are honored more in the observance than in the breach.

3. We come to this view for three additional reasons: (a) reaffirmation of the 1987 guidelines would be less unsettling and procedurally more economic than attempting a major revision for marginal improvements; (b) the NIC has made, and continues to make, significant improvements in conforming its production to the 1987 prescriptions; the primary need now seems to us not revision of ground rules but compliance with the guidelines which NFIB has formally approved; (c) enforcement of the 1987 stipulations on product length would be unprecedented, a major accomplishment for present Community leadership, and a notable service to its policy consumers.

4. Our review prompts us as well to offer two further suggestions:

a. If the 1987 guidelines meet with your approval, we believe it would be helpful for NFIB to reissue them over your name or that of the DCI as a reflection of current policy for all participants in the Estimate production process. Internally, you might also wish to underline the need for closer observance of the specific provisions of the guidelines, pointing out that exceptions to them will require your approval prior to moving ahead.

b. Our parallel look at the average length of time required to complete even SNIIEs leads us to propose that you recommend to the NFIB the creation of a new art form which, for the sake of convenience, we have called the "National Intelligence Executive Brief" (NIEB). This new format would be designed to restore the immediacy and timeliness the early SNIIEs once enjoyed. The proposed NIEB would be characterized by the following attributes:

(1) It would consist of a maximum of three pages in length, with a summary paragraph or introduction.

(2) It should be completed, including necessary coordination, within a maximum of 36 to 48 hours and approved by the DCI.

(3) It would be prepared only in response to critical developments requiring the immediate attention


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SUBJECT: Guidelines for the Production of National Intelligence


of the policymakers at the most senior level. (If this additional publication is approved, the 1987 guidelines will require corresponding modification.)


5. If these suggestions seem to you to have initial merit, we would be happy to discuss them further, to explore with you their possible relationship with the proposed new review process, and to assist in any way toward their implementation.

  
William Leonhart

  
John B. McPherson

  
Hugh Montgomery

  
Richard L. Walker

  
John D. Wilson

Attachment

ODCI/SRP:thelma

Distribution:

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- 1 - SRP (Amb. Leonhart)
- 1 - SRP (Gen. McPherson)

CONFIDENTIAL

30 September 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board Principals  
FROM: H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.  
Acting Chairman, National Intelligence Council  
SUBJECT: Guidelines for Interagency Intelligence Production

The Guidelines for Interagency Intelligence Production, as approved and amended at NFIB on 24 September 1987, are attached for your information. These Guidelines replace a similar document issued by DCI William Casey on 27 July 1981. Please disseminate to the appropriate elements of your organization.

  
H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.

Attachment:  
As stated

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30 September 1987

GUIDELINES FOR INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

This Notice replaces the 27 July 1981 DCI guidelines for interagency production of national intelligence.

Purpose

These guidelines are intended to strengthen the Intelligence Community's capacity to support the DCI in producing national intelligence responsive to the needs of senior consumers while assuring the objectivity and integrity of the process. The system must be able to anticipate and respond quickly to foreign trends and developments that create new requirements for estimative intelligence products. These will be formulated primarily with a view to assisting senior policymakers at the NSC and Cabinet level, although they normally will have wider application and receive wider distribution. These products will be predominantly estimative and usually will address a limited number of policy relevant key questions. They should generally be short and focused; accordingly they should contain no more factual and historical detail than necessary to provide context for the findings, judgments, and projections.

Types of Interagency Intelligence ProductsNational Intelligence Estimate (NIE)

The NIE provides the most authoritative judgments of the Intelligence Community on subjects of highest policy concern to the United States. Judgments and projections will be derived from the most comprehensive intelligence data and research available but will be presented in a concise form. The main text will develop the analyses and estimative judgments over the period of the NIE, evaluating alternative scenarios where appropriate, and identifying indicators associated with alternative scenarios.

The time projection for a NIE usually will be in terms of years. For most NIEs the preferred length is in the range of 10 to 20 pages with background data and detailed discussion carried in annexes. The Key Judgments should be proportionately brief, in the range of one to four pages. An Executive Summary, following the Key Judgments, should be considered in the case of unusually complex or detailed papers. The time allocated for preparation of the NIE will generally be in terms of months although it may be required within weeks on occasion. The nomination of topics, the formulation of concept papers and terms of reference, and the review and coordination process through NFIB discussion will be more deliberate and thorough than for other interagency products.

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Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE)

While the SNIE shares many of the characteristics of the NIE, it differs from the latter in several significant ways. The SNIE addresses more specific and urgent problems; urgency is the dominant of these two criteria. The SNIE is an unscheduled interagency intelligence product while the NIE is scheduled and listed in the annual production plan. The time projection for a SNIE usually will be in terms of weeks or months. The preferred length of a SNIE is less than 10 pages, with very limited background data or description. Key Judgments of SNIEs should be very brief and normally not exceed two pages. The time allocated for preparation is days to weeks. The nomination of topics, the formulation of Concept Papers and Terms of Reference, and the coordination process will be accelerated.

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (IIM)

The IIM will address problems of high policy concern to the United States, although not the highest concerns where the NIE is more appropriate. The IIM provides an Intelligence Community assessment of data and events, with a considerable amount of evidential or methodological detail, and usually will be estimative. It is the appropriate interagency product when the primary objective is a Community judgment on factual matter.

There is no set time horizon for the factual determinations or the estimates made in the IIM. There are no prescriptions for length or format beyond succinctness appropriate to the subject requiring Community judgments. The Key Judgments, and Executive Summary where appropriate, should be proportionately brief. An IIM usually will be prepared over a period of months. The process of nominating topics, formulating Concept Papers and Terms of Reference, and the review and coordination will be deliberate and thorough without sacrificing timeliness. The product usually will be coordinated at the senior working level and approved by the Chairman, National Intelligence Council.

Special Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (SIIM)

The SIIM has much the same relationship to the IIM that the SNIE has to the NIE. While the IIM usually is scheduled, the SIIM is an unscheduled interagency intelligence product. It provides an assessment of data and events and usually will provide a near term projection of the immediate situation. The preferred length of a SIIM usually is less than 10 pages; the key judgments should not exceed two pages. The time projection for a SIIM usually is weeks to months. The process for nomination of SIIM topics and the SIIM coordination process will be accelerated. The SIIM usually will be coordinated at the senior working level and approved by the Chairman, National Intelligence Council.

Memorandum to Holders (M/H)

Any of the interagency intelligence products may be amended by a M/H if changes in intelligence information or analysis justify a modification but the changes are not extensive enough to justify a new product. The procedures followed will be the same as for the basic documents they amend.

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The Interagency Process

Topics for interagency intelligence products may be suggested by any senior officer in the intelligence or policy communities. A request may be made directly to the Director Central Intelligence or the appropriate National Intelligence Officer or to them through departmental channels.

The NIO is responsible for advising the DCI on the policy relevance, importance, and utility of the topics nominated for interagency production. The utility of the product for the policy community should be clearly demonstrated, the requirement for an Intelligence Community judgment should be justified. The NIO must assist the Intelligence Community in limiting its formal interagency intelligence production to a clearly articulated need-to-do basis vice a nice-to-do approach. Topics of general interest but not meeting NIE/SNIE criteria might be more suitable for an IIM or SIIM, or might better be addressed by single agency production. The NIO recommendation is critical in reducing the time demands on NFIB principals and focusing the resources of the interagency process on the most important topics.

The DCI is the approving authority for initiating interagency intelligence products. Some topics will be approved following NFIB consultation on the annual interagency production plan. Others will be proposed as the need arises and approved following such formal or informal NFIB consultation as appropriate.

The appropriate National Intelligence Officer will manage the production of the interagency product on behalf of the DCI. The NIO is responsible to the DCI to ensure maximum Intelligence Community participation in the production, balancing the requirements for timeliness and thoroughness. The NIO, in consultation with the representatives of the NFIB principals, will modify the attached production checklist to fit the circumstances.

The NIO will as a rule prepare a draft Concept Paper and Terms of Reference in consultation with NFIB representatives and policy officers. Policy community participation is especially important here to ensure relevance of the final product. The Concept Paper, incorporating Key Questions, and the Terms of Reference then will be approved in draft by the DCI and will be the basis to proceed.

The draft Concept Papers and TORs for scheduled NIEs and IIMs then should be furnished to NFIB principals for their review and subsequent coordination by their representatives. For SNIE's and SIIMs, this review and coordination will be accelerated, depending on the urgency of the paper.

The NIO will consult with NFIB representatives on designating drafters and contributors. The NFIB principals should relieve drafters of regular duties to the maximum extent possible until their special assignments to the estimate have been fulfilled. Participants in developing and coordinating the draft should be aware of policy community concerns, drawing upon its expertise when appropriate, but NFIB principals must ensure that the integrity and objectivity of the intelligence process are maintained. To

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this end, the NIO and the NFIB representatives must ensure Intelligence Community independence from policy community pressures or participation in the drafting and coordination processes. The DCI usually will review draft texts of estimates at the time they are submitted to NFIB representatives for coordination to confirm that the paper and its Key Judgments meet the criteria established by the Concept Paper and Terms of Reference. He will reserve his decision on the estimate until after he receives recommendations from NFIB.

The NFIB representatives should have sufficient delegated authority to agree to changes in the text at the coordination meeting such that, except in the most unusual circumstances, they will be supported by their agencies. Changes submitted after coordination usually will be reviewed by the representatives before sending the text to the NFIB principals. For scheduled NIEs, NFIB agencies should have 10 working days to review final drafts prior to the NFIB meeting. For SNIes, agencies should have five working days to review final drafts, except for the most time-sensitive estimates. Final coordination by NFIB principals may be by telephone vote, without benefit of an NFIB meeting whenever timeliness dictates or other factors indicate this as a preferable option.

Alternative views usually should be succinctly stated in the body of the estimate with a concise statement of the reason for the views, but the NIO must not let the discussion of alternative views distract from the logical flow of the estimate.

Attachment: Summary Production Checklist

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## SUMMARY PRODUCTION CHECKLIST

## I. TOPIC INITIATION

- |   |    |  |
|---|----|--|
| <p>A. SCHEDULED ANNUAL PRODUCTION OR<br/>(most NIEs and IIMs, no<br/>SNIEs or SIIMs)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. NIO annually solicits or anticipates requirements from intelligence and policy communities</li> <li>2. NIC incorporates requirement(s) in production plan and seeks NFIB review and DCI approval</li> <li>3. NIO initiates work to meet projected completion date</li> </ol> | OR | <p>B. OUT-OF-CYCLE PROPOSAL<br/>(all SNIEs and SIIMs, some<br/>NIEs and IIMs)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. NIO continually receives or anticipates new requirements from intelligence and policy communities</li> <li>2. NIO reviews new requirements with NIC and community contacts on an accelerated basis for proposed SNIEs and SIIMs</li> <li>3. To seek approval for NIE or IIM, go to step I.A.2. For SNIE or SIIM, go to step II.B.1.</li> </ol> |
|---|----|--|

## II. CONCEPT PAPER (CP) and TERMS OF REFERENCE (TOR) DEVELOPMENT

- |   |    |  |
|---|----|--|
| <p>A. NORMAL TRACK<br/>(all NIEs and IIMs)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. NIO develops CP and TOR in consultation with Community</li> <li>2. NIO seeks DCI endorsement on CP and TOR</li> <li>3. NIO seeks NFIB rep coordination on CP and TOR</li> <li>4. NIO distributes coordinated CP and TOR to DCI and NFIB</li> </ol> | OR | <p>B. FAST TRACK<br/>(all SNIEs and SIIMs)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. NIO develops CP (and time permitting TOR) in consultation with Community on accelerated basis</li> <li>2. NIO seeks accelerated DCI endorsement of CP (and TOR)</li> <li>3. NIO seeks accelerated NFIB rep coordination on CP (and TOR)</li> <li>4. NIO distributes coordinated CP (and TOR) to DCI and NFIB</li> </ol> |
|---|----|--|

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III. DRAFT DEVELOPMENT

A. NORMAL TRACK

OR

B. FAST TRACK

1. NIO works with drafter to produce pre-coordination draft
2. NIO provides draft to DCI while simultaneously seeking NFIB rep coordination on draft

1. NIO works with drafter to produce pre-coordination draft on an accelerated basis
2. NIO provides draft to DCI while simultaneously seeking accelerated NFIB rep coordination on draft

IV. APPROVAL AND PUBLICATION

A. NORMAL TRACK

OR

B. FAST TRACK

1. NIO distributes coordinated draft to DCI and NFIB principals for consideration
2. IIMs approved and published by C/NIC unless DCI calls NFIB meeting
3. NIEs discussed and approved at NFIB meeting unless telephone vote is called

1. NIO distributes coordinated draft to DCI and NFIB principals for consideration
2. SIIM approved and published by C/NIC unless DCI calls NFIB meeting
3. SNIEs discussed and approved at NFIB meeting unless telephone vote is called

END OF TRANSMISSION

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27 APR 1989

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**REMARKS**

1-t-2  
 I asked the SHP for their thoughts & advice on the estimates. They came up with some useful ideas.

*DK*



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FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post) Senior Review Panel	Room No.—Bldg.
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ER 89-1772

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

27 April 1989

Senior Review Panel

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: ~~Senior Review Panel~~

SUBJECT: ~~Thoughts on the Intelligence Production Process~~

1. We are most appreciative of your visit yesterday, and welcomed the stimulating conversation which ensued. We were particularly pleased to share some of our mutual concerns on the intelligence production process. We very much ~~look forward to periodic opportunities in the near future to explore with you ways in which our Panel might be helpful to you.~~

2. As an initial effort, we thought it might be useful to you to recapitulate briefly some of the subjects yesterday's conversation touched upon together with a few quick reactions which may be worth further thought as we pursue the "guidelines" project.

a. Length of Estimates. We start and return to our conviction that most Estimates are simply too long for their intended readership. Even the Key Judgments not infrequently exceed the tolerable length of a terse, tightly-reasoned Estimate. Any arbitrary restrictions must contemplate exceptions, but we think it ~~might be a useful experiment to establish for the general run of political and economic Estimates a maximum length both for the Key Judgments and the text of the Estimate itself.~~ (We would of course exempt the traditional mainly military Estimates, such as those in the 11-series, which are more reference tools than Estimates as such.)

b. The Role of the NIOs. Our recent experience with Estimate drafts confirms our impression of substantial unevenness in both substance and style. A more active role

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SUBJECT: Thoughts on the Intelligence Production Process

by the NIO's in the pre-coordination drafting process--and more frequent collegial reviews inside the NIC--might help to smooth out some of the rougher spots.

c. ~~New Art Form~~. Recognizing the difficulty of capturing and holding the attention of busy policymakers, we think there might be appreciable advantage in devising a new art form designed primarily, but not exclusively, for that limited audience. Its hallmarks should be brevity and very quick reaction. We shall be commenting further on this concept, but offer as a tentative title for what we have in mind "National Intelligence Executive Brief."

d. ~~NIE Format~~. We believe that two former--and one irregularly employed--elements of the NIE deserve renewed consideration. Specifically, there was substantial utility in the inclusion of a selective bibliography and a succinct list of key intelligence gaps. And the use of a Scope Note defining both the aim and the special characteristics of the Estimate might well be made mandatory. Along with these published passages, we think new consideration should be given to reviving an in-house Estimate post-mortem or brief "after-action" report by the managing NIO as a guide both to subsequent collection efforts and future updatings.

e. ~~Graphics~~. One of the Agency's special strengths is its production of superb graphics: succinct, informative, and attention-getting. DDI publications are light years ahead of NIC hard covers. The National Estimates should clearly expand use of all forms of graphics to sharpen impact, promote readability, and reduce text to manageable proportions. We see considerable merit in including graphics in Key Judgments.

f. ~~NIE Production Cycle~~. It appears to us that the time between conception and production for both scheduled and non-scheduled papers is growing longer by a factor of months. Recognizing that the drafting and coordination phases can be time-consuming, we nonetheless suggest that tighter managerial direction of the entire cycle should be able to reduce the time required by a significant factor.

g. ~~SNI-ES~~. Relatedly, NIC's quick response capability is visibly weakening. The SNI-ES have by and large lost their special punch and appeal and have become virtually indistinguishable from the general run of non-scheduled production. If the title and original purpose for which SNI-ES were designed are to be meaningful, we believe that more rigorously enforced time and space limitations need to be established and enforced to restore their "special"

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character. (The scope of these restrictions would need to take into account the acceptability of the new art form mentioned in paragraph 2.c., above.)

h. ~~The NIS Concept~~. Lacking the traditional NIS reference volumes, NIE's have come to include helpful but nonessential background material which could better be made available to the consumer in some other form. While we do not espouse resuscitation of the NIS format as such, we do believe that there should be a better way to build up a reference library of background materials for use by staffs and analysts, thereby obviating the necessity for inclusion of such information in the text of the NIEs. Possibly the greatest benefit from such an approach would be to restore the "estimative" element of Estimates by reducing the temptation to take the easier path of including much historical and backward-looking material. Similarly, we wonder if periodic reference NIEs such as those in the "11-" series might not more appropriately be published under some other rubric.

i. ~~The NID~~: We agree that the revised format of the NID has much appeal in its present form, but we offer one additional refinement which could easily be incorporated: expansion of the table of contents marginally by including under each heading a brief summary of the contents and conclusions of the article in question.


3. You will recognize that we have attempted to encapsulate the highlights of our discussion. We will wish to consider them further, separately and collectively, and would of course be pleased to discuss any of them in more consecutive detail at your convenience. Again, we greatly look forward to working closely with you in every way in which we can be supportive of you and the DCI.



William Leonhart



John B. McPherson



Hugh Montgomery



John D. Wilson



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SUBJECT: Thoughts on the Intelligence Production Process

ODCI/SRP:thelma

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*X/S*  
 Executive Secretary  
 14 Sep 89  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
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Washington, D.C. 20505

14 September 1989

NOTE TO:

STAT

SUBJECT: Typescript on Yel'tsin

Your typescript, The USSR's Boris Yel'tsin: Larger than Life was very well received at the White House. It arrived just before the meeting with Yel'tsin and participants felt it was right on the mark. Your description of his characteristics, his approach and ego were perfect.

I would like to add my compliments to those of General Scowcroft and Robert Gates at the National Security Council in preparing a timely and informative typescript. A job well done.

Richard J. Kerr  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence



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