

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Breakfast with Senators Danforth and Glenn on 6 February

FROM:

John L. Helgerson
Director of Congressional Affairs

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

02 FEB 1989

25X1

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

1.	DATE	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
Executive Registry	02 FEB 1989	<i>W</i>	
2.			
Executive Director		copy	
4.			
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence		copy	
6.			
Director of Central Intelligence	2 Feb. 2/89	<i>✓</i>	
8.			
Return to D/OCA			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

FORM 1-79 **610** USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS



B-808-1R

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

OCA 89-0271

02 FEB 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

FROM: John L. Helgerson
Director of Congressional Affairs

SUBJECT: Breakfast with Senators Danforth and Glenn [redacted]

25X1

1. You will host Senators John Danforth (R., MO) and John Glenn (D., OH) for breakfast at 8:30 AM on Monday 6 February. Each is a new Member of the Senate Intelligence Committee. Biographic information is attached. Dick Kerr, [redacted] Evan Hineman and I will join you. [redacted]

25X1

2. This breakfast is our initiative. It is intended to serve as a low key get acquainted session with the new Intelligence Committee Members. You may wish to welcome the Members to the intelligence world and discuss your views about our relations with the Congress. Each of the Deputies could briefly discuss their Directorate's missions and any key issues we will be bringing to the Committee in the next few months. Perhaps the more important part of the breakfast would be to provide the Senators with an opportunity to ask questions about the Agency, the Intelligence Community or issues of interest to them. [redacted]

25X1

John Danforth

5. Senator Danforth has not been particularly active in foreign affairs or intelligence matters. He does have a deep personal interest in Cambodia stemming from his 1979 trip to the Thai-Cambodian border. We have briefed him on Cambodian political developments. He was interested in prospects for Khmer Rouge involvement in the Cambodian government. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted]

[redacted]

DCI
EXEC
REG STAT

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

25X1

B-808-15

John Glenn

6. Senator Glenn has been a longtime consumer of Agency products and very active in both intelligence and foreign affairs. He has often stopped at this building on his way to the Senate to read our products or receive briefings. He is particularly interested in strategic arms monitoring and nuclear proliferation issues. As Chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee he sponsored legislation to authorize General Accounting Office audits of CIA programs. That bill was not enacted. We understand he does not plan to bring it up again this year.

25X1

25X1

John U. Helgerson

SECRET

25X1

SUBJECT: Breakfast with Senators D:Amato, Danforth and Glenn

OCA/Senate [redacted] (1 Feb 89)

25X1

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee

1 - DDCI designate

1 - ExDIR

1 - ER

1 - A/DDO

1 - D/DS&T

1 - D/OCA

1 - OCA Record

1 [redacted] Chrono

25X1

John C. Danforth (R)

Of Newburg — Elected 1976

Born: Sept. 5, 1936, St. Louis, Mo.
Education: Princeton U., A.B. 1958; Yale U., B.D.,
LL.B. 1963.
Occupation: Lawyer; clergyman.
Family: Wife, Sally Dobson; five children.
Religion: Episcopalian.
Political Career: Mo. Attorney General, 1969-77; Re-
publican nominee for U.S. Senate, 1970.
Capitol Office: 497 Russell Bldg. 20510; 224-6154.

Missouri - Senior Senator



In Washington: Danforth has earned a considerable amount of respect and goodwill over a decade in the Senate, but he called some of it into question with an unusual performance on the 1986 tax bill that quite a few of his colleagues are still at a loss to understand.

The problem was not that he opposed the conference version of the tax revision bill — so did 22 of his colleagues, few of whom offered as cogent and detailed a set of reasons for their opposition as he did during an eloquent, afternoon-long speech just before the final vote on the measure.

Nor, for that matter, would many senators have found cause for resentment in the fact that he had switched from backing the legislation in the Finance Committee, where he was one of a small group of members who helped Chairman Bob Packwood put the bill together, to opposing the final compromise with the House. The conference committee defeats he had experienced on provisions important to Missouri interests — notably, a tax accounting change harmful to McDonnell Douglas and other major defense contractors in the state — would have been enough to make many members withdraw their support.

It was the manner in which Danforth both supported and opposed the bill that proved disturbing. In both cases, he took a strongly moralistic approach that seemed to suggest that anyone who disagreed with his views was corrupt or dangerous.

The measure Danforth called "the most significant tax reform bill in decades" a few months later became "a very bad bill [that] runs the risk of severe economic damage in the future." Some of his colleagues suspected that Danforth was using a tone of righteous indignation to cover his pique at losing out on his home-state concerns.

Danforth's attitude towards the conference process with the House seemed either disingen-

uous or strikingly naive for so experienced a legislator. Although he had participated in dozens of House-Senate conferences, arranged deals with other legislators and worked out compromises with the House, he seemed personally outraged that the Senate accepted some key House provisions and that agreements were made privately between Packwood and House Ways and Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski.

Danforth left the impression that he had entered the conference thinking the Senate bill would somehow emerge untouched. Beyond that, many of the arguments he offered against the conference report could have been made just as well against the original bill, which Danforth had praised in generous terms. As eloquent as Danforth proved to be, he left more than a few senators wondering what was really on his mind.

In the end, of course, Danforth's attack on the bill may earn him a measure of vindication, should the economy turn sour as a result of the tax restructuring. The essence of his argument was that the measure's combination of business tax increases with personal tax cuts would foster immediate consumption at the expense of long-term investment in the economy.

Danforth was active on a wide variety of fronts in the 99th Congress. Perhaps his most visible was as chairman of the Finance Trade Subcommittee. In the surge of congressional concern over the spiraling international trade deficit, he was the leading GOP voice in the Senate seeking a middle ground between the Reagan administration's strict free-trade policy and the increasing appeal of protectionism.

An advocate of free trade when he arrived in the Senate, Danforth grew increasingly concerned over the importation of vast numbers of Japanese autos and the weakening of American

John C. Danforth, R-Mo.

auto manufacturers, some of crucial economic importance to Missouri. At the beginning of the 97th Congress, he and Texas Democrat Lloyd Bentsen introduced legislation to limit the number of autos imported from Japan; it was one of the reasons the Japanese agreed to impose their own voluntary limits.

In the 98th Congress, he helped push through a "reciprocity" measure strengthening the administration's hand in trade negotiations with other countries without imposing strict barriers on imports. By 1985, though, Danforth was angry enough with the Japanese to call for sterner actions. Bitterly criticizing Japan's restrictive trade policies, he proposed a bill to require restraints on imports from Japan if that country did not remove barriers to the sale of American-made goods. Approved by the Finance Committee, the bill signaled the first wave of tough trade sentiment to move through the Senate that year.

But some of the most popular efforts to impose legislative restrictions on imports did not win Danforth's support. He argued against proposals, such as the textile-import quota bill, that singled out specific U.S. industries for protection. Instead, he favored a "generic" approach, under which the basic procedures for resolving trade problems would be strengthened through negotiations among trading partners.

At the same time, Danforth was sharply critical of Reagan's trade stance. He blasted the president for refusing to provide import protections for the hard-hit domestic shoe industry, calling Reagan's decision "a disaster for U.S. trade policy." Danforth said the administration "tends to define anything that walks as protectionism."

Meanwhile, Danforth was serving as chairman of the Commerce Committee, where he had a rocky two years. While he scored some successes, he encountered serious problems on several of the major bills to come before his committee.

Danforth brought a more positive attitude towards federal regulation to the chairmanship than did Packwood, his Commerce predecessor. He had strongly opposed, for example, Packwood's efforts in 1984 to loosen federal broadcasting laws that require radio and television stations to air contrasting views.

Danforth's reluctance to abandon regulation was most apparent on the issue of auto safety. Over the years, he had come into conflict with both the Reagan administration and the auto industry, both of which had tried to reduce federal regulation. He once accused a Reagan-appointed highway safety official of

wanting to "search and destroy" auto safety.

In the 98th Congress, Danforth pushed through legislation increasing regulation of trucks and buses, and pressuring states to curb drunken driving by raising their legal drinking age to 21. He added to that record as chairman, sponsoring a successful bill to set national licensing standards for truck and bus drivers and toughen penalties against drug- and alcohol-related driving convictions.

Danforth made less progress, however, in his efforts to settle the contentious issue of product liability. After the Commerce panel deadlocked in 1985 over legislation to set federal standards for lawsuits on defective products, he proposed a compromise measure aimed at encouraging out-of-court settlements of liability claims. A key feature of his plan called for a \$250,000 limit on awards for pain and suffering in cases in which the plaintiff rejected a pretrial offer from the defendant.

A sharply divided Commerce Committee approved Danforth's bill. But the bill did not reach the floor for months, and when it finally was called up it fell victim to the threat of a filibuster. Danforth was, however, able to secure final passage of a bill making it easier for small businesses and non-profit institutions to join together to provide their own liability insurance.

Danforth also ran into problems with the proposed sale of the CONRAIL system to private enterprise. Working with the administration, he pushed through the Senate a bill allowing sale of the system to the Norfolk Southern railroad. House opposition blocked the idea, however, and Congress eventually agreed to permit sale of Conrail stock to the public.

Danforth's background as an ordained Episcopal priest makes him even more distinctive in the Senate than the snow-white patch he has had in the front of his hair all his adult life. But he makes a conscious effort to play down his unique status. "The people of Missouri elected me to be their senator, not their pastor," he says.

Some of Danforth's legislative efforts reflect the humanitarian and moral ideals that led him into the ministry. Deeply concerned about world hunger, he helped win \$150 million in emergency food aid for Africa after touring the drought-ravaged continent early in 1984. He also has been active in pushing the Reagan administration to step up the pace of nuclear arms reduction talks with the Soviet Union. "The possibility that a nuclear holocaust could occur has become the most important moral issue in human history," he has said.

At Home: A former Wall Street lawyer and Ralston-Purina heir hardly seems the type to represent a state whose political hero is Harry S. Truman, champion of the common folk.

Danforth's pedigree was no hindrance in his early political career; he won his first election in 1968 as an outsider, a young insurgent vowing to rid the state attorney general's office of deadwood that had collected during a succession of Democratic administrations.

But after eight years in state office and six more in Washington, Danforth by 1982 was striking many Missouri voters not as a reformer but as a wealthy man distant from their economic concerns. That is why he was nearly ambushed by a clever liberal Democrat who sold herself as a populist under the slogan "Give 'em hell, Harriett."

Well into the election year, Democrats were embarrassed by their failure to find a well-known candidate to challenge Danforth. The entry of state Sen. Harriett Woods brought little cheer to party leaders. She had gained valuable media exposure representing a liberal St. Louis County constituency, but offered a record of questionable appeal to rural and conservative voters and to business interests the Democrats needed to compete with Danforth's campaign spending. Woods supported legalized abortion and opposed efforts to prohibit use of busing as a tool to desegregate schools.

But Woods managed to portray herself as an average working person and hit Danforth as an aristocrat who supported cuts in health care, social services and education. As the only female Democratic candidate for the Senate in 1982, Woods became a priority for women's groups.

Danforth's fund-raising advantage over Woods was more than 2-to-1. But his money and excellent organization were offset by Woods' most important asset: desire. Voters were impressed with her enthusiastic dawn-to-midnight campaigning, while Danforth gave the impression he was not really hungry to be re-elected. More than once, he lamented that the campaign was making it difficult for him to watch the baseball playoffs.

But Danforth's strategy changed abruptly Oct. 15, when the *St. Louis Globe-Democrat's* poll showed the race deadlocked. Less than a month earlier, the newspaper's poll had given Danforth a comfortable lead.

Danforth went on the attack. He called Woods a liberal throwback to an era of discredited Democratic tax-and-spend practices and accused her of demagoguery for portraying the

Missouri - Senior Senator

Republican Party as a menace to Social Security without offering any constructive suggestions of her own. He brought up abortion and busing, topics he had avoided earlier in the campaign.

The shift to a negative campaign had the desired effect. Some conservative Democrats took a second look at Woods and lost their enthusiasm, and complacent Republicans were jolted into realizing that a high GOP turnout would be necessary to keep the seat out of Democratic hands.

Danforth prevailed with slightly less than 51 percent of the vote. Woods won where Democrats usually fare well in Missouri — St. Louis, Kansas City and the majority of rural counties — but in each of those areas, her liberalism cost her just enough votes to enable Danforth to escape.

Despite his 1982 struggle, however, Danforth still enjoys the reputation of being the founder of the modern-day Missouri GOP. Elected state attorney general in 1968 in his political debut, Danforth became the first Republican in 22 years to win statewide office. He lured bright young lawyers to the attorney general's office — among them Christopher S. "Kit" Bond, elected as Missouri's junior senator in 1986 after two non-consecutive terms as governor, and John Ashcroft, who was elected to replace Bond as governor. Danforth also developed a reputation as a protector of consumers and the environment.

In 1970 Danforth was the GOP's only hope to dislodge Democratic Sen. Stuart Symington, who was seeking a fourth term. In an expensive campaign that introduced Missouri to modern media-oriented politics, Danforth won 48 percent of the vote. Two years later, he returned as attorney general by over 450,000 votes, and awaited his next Senate chance.

It came, as expected, when Symington decided to retire in 1976. Democrats appeared to seize the momentum by nominating U.S. Rep. Jerry Litton, described by a state political expert as "one of the most exciting political personalities to come along in years." But Democratic enthusiasm was tragically brief. Litton died in a primary-night plane crash, and Danforth was suddenly the favorite in a contest that had been looking bleak for him.

The state Democratic committee chose as its replacement former Gov. Warren Hearnes, whose courthouse-style administration had been the focus of Danforth's campaign attacks in 1968. Hearnes had finished a poor second to Litton in the primary. Against Litton, Danforth would have had a difficult contest; against Hearnes, he won easily.

John C. Danforth, R-Mo.

Committees

Commerce, Science and Transportation (Ranking)
National Ocean Policy Study (ranking).
Budget (9th of 11 Republicans)
Finance (4th of 9 Republicans)
International Trade (ranking): International Debt, Taxation and Debt Management.

Elections

1982 General
John C. Danforth (R) 784,876 (51%)
Harriett Woods (D) 758,629 (49%)
1982 Primary
John C. Danforth (R) 217,162 (74%)
Mel Hancock (R) 61,378 (21%)
Previous Winning Percentage: 1976 (57%)

Campaign Finance

Year	Receipts	Receipts from PACs	Expenditures
1982			
Danforth (R)	\$1,766,934	\$572,658 (32%)	\$1,806,350
Woods (D)	\$1,194,854	\$265,151 (22%)	\$1,193,966

Voting Studies

Year	Presidential Support		Party Unity		Conservative Coalition	
	S	O	S	O	S	O
1986	80	20	77	21	82	17
1985	81	17	77	20	70	20
1984	86	13	55	15	83	17
1983	80	16	72	27	64	32
1982	71	19	72	21	76	18
1981	85	13	54	15	83	16

S = Support O = Opposition

Key Votes

Produce MX missiles (1985) Y
Weaken gun control laws (1985) Y
Reject school prayer (1985) Y
Limit textile imports (1985) N
Amend Constitution to require balanced budget (1986) Y
Aid Nicaraguan contras (1986) Y
Block chemical weapons production (1986) Y
Impose sanctions on South Africa (1986) Y

Interest Group Ratings

Year	ADA	ACU	AFL-CIO	CCUS
1986	30	57	33	61
1985	15	65	19	75
1984	35	66	27	63
1983	40	32	13	53
1982	40	50	23	52
1981	25	73	17	89

Ohio - Senior Senator

John Glenn (D)

Of Columbus — Elected 1974

Born: July 18, 1921, Cambridge, Ohio.
Education: Muskingum College, B.S. 1962.
Military Career: Marine Corps, 1942-65.
Occupation: Astronaut; soft drink company executive.
Family: Wife, Anna Margaret Castor; two children.
Religion: Presbyterian.
Political Career: Sought Democratic nomination for U.S. Senate. 1970; sought Democratic nomination for president. 1984.
Capitol Office: 503 Hart Bldg. 20510; 224-3353.



In Washington: When he took over as chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee at the start of the 100th Congress, Glenn decided it might be necessary to expand the panel's workload beyond its traditionally small agenda. But in keeping with his personality and style, he warned against expanding it too far. "The problem," he said, "is to make sure you don't have too many balls in the air."

That is a problem Glenn has never had to worry about in his own Senate career. He has spent more than a decade focusing on a handful — a very small handful — of issues with the single-minded intensity he displayed as a military pilot and astronaut earlier in life.

The preoccupation of Glenn's career, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to other nations, is an unquestionably important goal shared by most of his fellow senators. But Glenn has pursued it to the frequent exclusion of other issues, both foreign and domestic, that would round out a comprehensive Senate record. He is the polar opposite of the typically ambitious legislator struggling to get his finger into every pie. Colleagues who admire Glenn's character and dedication wonder whether he might have accomplished more if he had not been so narrowly focused.

To a great extent, Glenn's career has been restricted because that is the way his mind works. He is not a man who takes readily to new concepts, or easily shifts his tactics in mid-course if circumstances warrant. But once he gets an idea into his head, he sticks to it with an unbending tenacity.

The obstacles posed by Glenn's style were evident in his 1984 presidential campaign. Advertised for months as the main competitor to Walter F. Mondale for the Democratic nomination, he made weak showings in a succession of primaries and caucuses and quickly dropped out of the race. Poor at public speaking and

unable to draw much audience attention, Glenn found himself portrayed increasingly often as the astronaut candidate — something that only weakened his credibility.

Glenn has been no more exciting on the Senate floor than he was in his presidential campaign. His tendency to read speeches in full — even when no one is listening — can drive his colleagues to distraction.

He is no horse-trader. When he is seeking to muster support for an amendment, he merely explains the facts and hopes they will prove persuasive. Often that is not enough.

Glenn is the acknowledged expert in Congress on the nuclear non-proliferation issue and the author of key laws designed to prevent the United States from being the source of nuclear weapons capabilities.

In 1976, Glenn successfully pushed an amendment prohibiting U.S. aid to countries that exported or imported nuclear reprocessing equipment or materials — technology that can be diverted into nuclear weapons production. He was the chief sponsor and floor manager of the 1978 act that placed controls on the U.S. export of nuclear materials.

Glenn's anti-proliferation efforts have brought him into frequent conflict with the Reagan administration. He has sought to block foreign aid to nations not complying with international efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons. In 1981, Glenn persuaded the Senate to approve a provision threatening to cut off aid to India or Pakistan if either detonated a nuclear device. "If we can't draw the line there, then we are incapable of ever drawing the line anywhere," he said. The Senate agreed 51-45.

Glenn kept up his efforts in 1984, winning initial Foreign Relations Committee approval of an amendment barring military aid to Pakistan unless the president certified it was not

John Glenn, D-Ohio

trying to develop nuclear weapons. Under heavy pressure from the administration, however, the committee later switched and approved a much less stringent substitute — spurring an uncharacteristic outburst from Glenn, who denounced it for “waffling, knuckling under and giving in” to the administration.

The next year, Glenn took on the administration's proposal to sell nuclear-power materials to China. Although the resolution approving the sale called for efforts to prevent the Chinese from transferring nuclear weapons technology to other countries, Glenn argued that more protections were needed. The Senate approved his amendment requiring the president to certify that all nuclear exports to China were covered by international standards ensuring peaceful use. But the administration quickly mounted an all-out effort against the provision, and it was dropped in conference.

At the start of the 99th Congress, Glenn opted to leave the Foreign Relations Committee, where he had spent his whole Senate career, for Armed Services. He seemed eager to move beyond nuclear proliferation issues to broader questions of global defense.

Over most of his career, Glenn has tilted to the hawkish side on national security matters. “No one has ever accused me of being soft on the Soviets,” he says. But he has disagreed with much of Reagan's arms buildup.

In 1982, for example, Glenn offered a floor amendment to stop development of the MX missile. He argued instead for a smaller missile that could be hauled around on trucks using civilian highways — an argument that had serious political drawbacks. His amendment was rejected 65-29.

When the Reagan administration proposed selling AWACS radar planes to Saudi Arabia, Glenn was willing to listen to the idea that the Saudis needed advance warning protection for their oil fields. But he insisted that the planes should be delivered only on the condition that American personnel accompany Saudi pilots on their missions — an idea that reflected his concern over the possible loss of U.S. technology to other countries. It was unacceptable to the Saudis, and Glenn voted against the sale.

Glenn has backed the administration on some key weapons systems, however. He is an ardent advocate of the B-1 bomber, working in the 99th Congress to add funds to make possible continued production of the plane in case proposed development of a radar-evading “stealth” bomber proved unfeasible. Glenn also has supported “binary” chemical weapons.

Glenn's love for detail played an even more important role in the debate over the SALT II

treaty. He became the foremost Senate expert on “verification,” the procedures for monitoring Soviet compliance with the treaty.

While the Carter administration prepared to bring the treaty before the Senate, Glenn was holed up in the archives of the Intelligence Committee, studying the extreme complexities of the verification problem. After the fall of the Shah and the consequent loss of U.S. monitoring stations in Iran, Glenn decided that adequate verification was impossible, and the treaty unacceptable — a position that nearly drove the Carter White House to despair. With the onset of the Reagan administration, however, Glenn warmed to SALT II and to further arms control efforts.

At Home: Not long after he became a national hero as the first American to orbit the earth, Glenn returned to Ohio to challenge 74-year-old Sen. Stephen M. Young in the 1964 Democratic primary. His space career had brought him into close contact with the Kennedys, and he was influenced by them to make his political career as a Democrat. But he did not get very far in 1964. A bathroom fall injured his inner ear, and he had to drop out.

Following that, Glenn's political energies subsided. Instead of attending party functions, he immersed himself in business interests. He served on the boards of Royal Crown Cola and the Questor Corp.; oversaw four Holiday Inn franchises he partly owned, lectured and filmed television documentaries.

In 1970, with Young retiring, Glenn decided to run for the seat, competing for the Democratic nomination against Howard M. Metzenbaum, then a millionaire businessman and labor lawyer. Initially a strong favorite, Glenn found that his frequent absences from Ohio over the preceding six years had hurt him politically, giving him the image of an outsider among state Democrats. Metzenbaum had the support of the party establishment and a superb and well-financed campaign organization.

Through saturation television advertising, Metzenbaum erased his anonymity. And Glenn, whose celebrity status was bringing out large crowds, was overly confident. On primary day, Glenn carried 75 of the state's 88 counties but was badly beaten in the urban areas. He lost the nomination by 13,442 votes.

Metzenbaum was beaten himself in the general election by Republican Robert A. Taft Jr. Three years later, however, he made it to the Senate as an appointee, chosen by Democratic Gov. John J. Gilligan to fill a vacancy. Metzenbaum immediately began campaigning for a full term in his own right, and Glenn decided to challenge him for the nomination.

John Glenn, D-Ohio

The Metzenbaum appointment outraged Glenn, and gave him an issue during their rematch in the 1974 primary. Glenn rejected Gilligan's offer to be his running mate as lieutenant governor and denounced the governor as a "boss" who practiced "machine politics."

The underdog Glenn of 1974 proved to be much tougher than the favored Glenn of 1970. With a reputation of impeccable integrity in a year dominated by Watergate, he pointed to Metzenbaum's long legal battle with the Internal Revenue Service, although Metzenbaum had never been charged with any wrongdoing. A Metzenbaum countercharge — that Glenn didn't pay a state levy on his securities for one year — failed to halt Glenn's momentum.

This time, Glenn did much better in Metzenbaum's base of Cuyahoga County (Cleveland). Coupled with his customary strength in rural areas, this allowed him to achieve a 91,000-vote primary victory.

In the fall, Glenn crushed a weak Republican opponent, Cleveland Mayor Ralph J. Perk, who was disorganized and underfinanced. Six years later, he had only nominal opposition for a second term.

In 1986, Glenn drew a slightly stiffer challenge from GOP Rep. Thomas N. Kindness, a

better-financed and more aggressive opponent than the sacrificial lambs the GOP had offered against Glenn before. Kindness pounded away at what he saw as Glenn's main weakness — a lingering multimillion-dollar debt from his unsuccessful 1984 presidential campaign.

Glenn had worked hard to mend fences with Ohio voters in the wake of his failed White House bid, making dozens of appearances across the state in 1984 to boost both the Democratic ticket and his own political stock. But he was unable to erase the debt, which included \$1.9 million worth of loans from four Ohio banks. (Glenn did not reach an agreement with the Federal Election Commission on paying off the debt until 1987.) Kindness maintained that Glenn received preferential treatment from the banks, which the average Ohioan would not get. But Kindness was unable to drive home the point. Not well known outside his conservative southwest Ohio district, he lacked the money to mount a statewide media blitz that might have shaken Glenn's image.

Kindness lost in a landslide, although he did have the consolation of carrying nearly a dozen counties. None of Glenn's previous GOP challengers had carried more than one.

Committees

- Governmental Affairs (Chairman)**
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.
- Armed Services (8th of 11 Democrats)**
Manpower and Personnel (chairman); Conventional Forces and Alliance Defense; Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence.
- Special Aging (2nd of 10 Democrats)**

Campaign Finance

1986	Receipts	Receipts from PACs		Expenditures
Glenn (D)	\$2,088,191	\$637,186	(31%)	\$1,319,026
Kindness (R)	\$664,227	\$172,648	(26%)	\$657,908

Voting Studies

Year	Presidential Support		Party Unity		Conservative Coalition	
	S	O	S	O	S	O
1986	42	52	74	23	29	70
1985	42	56	79	18	42	57
1984	39	43	55	25	28	51
1983	39	35	57	12	20	52
1982	35	45	67	17	26	51
1981	53	42	74	21	34	66

S = Support O = Opposition

Elections

1986 General		
John Glenn (D)	1,949,208	(62%)
Thomas N. Kindness (R)	1,171,893	(38%)
1986 Primary		
John Glenn (D)	678,171	(88%)
Don Scott (D)	96,309	(12%)
Previous Winning Percentages: 1980 (69%) 1974 (65%)		

Key Votes

Produce MX missiles (1985)	N
Weaken gun control laws (1985)	Y
Reject school prayer (1985)	Y
Limit textile imports (1985)	Y
Amend Constitution to require balanced budget (1986)	N
Aid Nicaraguan contras (1986)	N
Block chemical weapons production (1986)	N
Impose sanctions on South Africa (1986)	Y

Interest Group Ratings

Year	ADA	ACU	AFL-CIO	CCUS
1986	65	30	87	44
1985	75	27	86	34
1984	65	5	67	38
1983	65	16	93	31
1982	70	28	87	55
1981	80	7	68	44