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24 May 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: DCI/DDCI Meeting with Chairman Beilenson and Mr. Hyde of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) on 24 May 1989 [redacted]

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1. On Wednesday, 24 May 1989, the Monthly Meeting with Chairman Beilenson and Ranking Minority Member Hyde was held. In attendance were:

HPSCI: Anthony C. Beilenson, Chairman
Henry J. Hyde, Ranking Minority Member
Tom K. Latimer, Staff Director
Thomas R. Smeeton, Associate Counsel

CIA: William H. Webster, Director
Richard J. Kerr, Deputy Director
[redacted] Office of Congressional Affairs [redacted]

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2. The meeting began when Chairman Beilenson indicated that the Committee had been contacted by a disaffected former Agency employee [redacted]

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[redacted] Chairman Beilenson indicated he was bringing this to the Director's attention for information purposes only, but it is clear [redacted] is seeking help. [redacted] feels as though the Agency has mistreated him. The Director being unfamiliar with the matter has promised to give it his attention. [redacted]

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SUBJECT: DCI/DDCI Meeting with Chairman Beilenson and Mr. Hyde
of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence (HPSCI) on 12 April 1989



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SUBJECT: DCI/DDCI Meeting with Chairman Beilenson and Mr. Hyde of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) on 12 April 1989

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6. NRO

a. The Director brought up the next topic which as the status of the National Reconnaissance Office. The Director indicated that the study regarding the NRO's restructuring is due 30 June. He noted that in fact it had been essentially completed and drafts are being circulated. He said that Secretary of Defense Cheney and NRO Director Designee Fega know that the organization needs to be made stronger. The Director volunteered certain conclusions concerning the NRO:

(1) That there should be an EXCOM chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence and including the Director of the NRO.

(2) There must be a strong internal policy and analysis group.

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
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


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
SUBJECT: DCI/DDCI Meeting with Chairman Beilenson and Mr. Hyde
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
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


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SUBJECT: DCI/DDCI Meeting with Chairman Beilenson and Mr. Hyde of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) on 12 April 1989

10. Inspector General Issue

The Director touched upon the IG/McCurdy issue. He stated that he did not want the review of IG inspections to become a platform for everything we have done. He told the Chairman that Mr. McCurdy has been requested to pick one IG report and that it should be discussed further. Chairman Beilenson acknowledged the Agency's concern with producing IG inspection reports. (AIUO)



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Deputy Director of Legislation
Office of Congressional Affairs

OCA/LEG



(8 June 1989)

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23 MAY 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

FROM: E. Norbert Garrett
Director of Congressional Affairs

SUBJECT: Your Monthly Meeting with Chairman Beilenson
and Mr. Hyde

1. On Wednesday, 24 May 1989 at 4:30 p.m. you are scheduled to have your regular "monthly" meeting with Chairman Beilenson and Ranking Minority Member Hyde. Dick Kerr and  will accompany you. Tom Latimer and Tom Smeeton will be the attendees from the Committee staff. Your last meeting with the House Intelligence Committee leadership took place on 12 April 1989. Markup of the 1990 Intelligence Authorization Bill has now slipped until the first or second week of June so this will be your last scheduled meeting with the Committee leadership before markup.

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

2. We have attached talking points to cover the following subjects should you wish to discuss them:



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Status of the National Reconnaissance Office
Reorganization Review: There is a great deal of interest on the part of HPSCI Members concerning NRO reorganization and they would welcome your views.



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


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
3. As a result of discussions with the staff, we have included talking points for the following subjects should they be raised by either the Chairman or Mr. Hyde:



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Requests for the Public Release of Satellite

Imagery:



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Repeated Requests of the Agency to Prepare Classified Studies For Their Use and Unclassified Material for Public Release: There have recently been requests from Committee Members for the preparation of classified and unclassified studies. We cannot accept tasking from the Hill for intelligence product and we certainly must avoid requests to prepare documents for public release for partisan purposes.

Afghanistan:



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your background we have included a copy of an oped piece written by Chairman Beilenson which appeared in the New York Times on May 22.



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Pollard Case:



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
Although this is primarily a Justice Department and Naval Investigative Service matter, we have included some talking points which might be useful to you since they expect you, as the DCI, to be generally informed on such matters.

4. Committee Access to IG Reports: You may wish to take this opportunity to brief the Chairman and Mr. Hyde on the latest developments in Mr. McCurdy's attempts to get regular access, including staff, to IG reports.



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Attachments



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SUBJECT: Status of NRO Reorganization

-- I have talked with Secretary Cheney and the Director-Designate for the NRO, Marty Faga, and we agree that the management and organization of the NRO needs to be strengthened.

-- We agree on the following proposals:

- need for a strengthened executive committee chaired by the DCI to make program and policy decisions; Secretary of Defense would be represented and D/NRO would serve on the Committee;

- a strong internal planning and analysis organization [redacted] to provide assessment of collection requirements and means for meeting these requirements; and

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[redacted]

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-- A planning team will present the Secretary of Defense and me a detailed set of proposals in about a month. That report will have in it some things that Aldridge's original plan did not include, such as:

- details needed to implement organizational and staffing changes;

- input from the user community, including the military; and

- a more precise description of the missions and functions of a Planning Analysis Group.

[redacted]

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
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SUBJECT: Release of Satellite Imagery

-- I have been successful in strongly resisting release of overhead imagery to support a political issue.


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Classification Issues

Background: Recently on several occasions, HPSCI Members and staff took issue with the classification of certain intelligence analytical reports (most notably the National Intelligence Daily (NID)), asserting that some items appeared no different from publicly-available information. This, in turn, has led to charges of overclassification and to requests to declassify items for public use by Members.

The former is of concern and we have raised it with the Directorate of Intelligence. The latter could present real problems, due to the inherently burdensome nature of a declassification request.

We think the issue may stem from a misunderstanding on the part of some newer HPSCI Members as to why analytical items are classified.

In dealing with this issue, we suggest you make the following points.

°In light of concerns expressed by Members and staff, efforts have been made to verify the classification of NID items and to avoid overclassification.

°In looking at the classification of analytical items, however, some generic points must be noted:

°While intelligence analysis may appear similar to publicly-available information, the latter is speculative while the former has been confirmed through intelligence sources and methods. The intelligence information is protected to avoid jeopardizing the source or method involved.

°Certain time-sensitive analytical items, such as the NID, are written in advance using intelligence sources and methods to predict the outcome of events. This must be kept in mind when such items are read after-the-fact and the outcome matches the prediction. Again, confirmation/revelation that the prediction came from intelligence sources and methods could jeopardize those sources and methods.



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°Intelligence analysis is properly classified even though it may not, on its face, reveal intelligence sources and methods.

°On some topics, sources are so limited that any public linking of the topic with intelligence could jeopardize the source.

°The state of our knowledge on a topic obviously must be protected to avoid stimulating countermeasures.

°Certain topics are such that admission/confirmation of an intelligence interest could present foreign relations problems for the United States.

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Requests To Produce Unclassified Reports

Background: Recently, HPSCI staff asked us to produce short, unclassified reports on various foreign political and military topics, most notably on the question of whether the Soviet Union is abiding by its pledge to reduce aid to the Sandinistas.

We were told the reports were for public use, on a non-attributable basis, by HPSCI Members [redacted] [redacted] In some instances, the report's conclusion was suggested in advance.

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We believe this practice is an especially pernicious one that must be checked immediately. Our reason for being is, of course, to collect and analyze intelligence for the President and senior Executive Branch policy-makers. Moreover, writing to a predetermined conclusion smacks of "cooking the books", a charge we have long labored to avoid.

Obviously, these concerns are difficult to express directly under the circumstances. Moreover, the fact the reports may have been destined for [redacted] the subject even more delicate.

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In dealing with it, we suggest you make the following points. You may also wish to engage [redacted] in a more forceful one-on-one discussion should that opportunity arise.

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°We are pleased to provide our finished intelligence products and intelligence briefings to Members and staff as requested.

°I would like your assistance, though, in avoiding Committee staff requests for "tasking."

°Congressional "tasking" presents difficult issues:

°"Tasking" could "politicize" the Agency and the analytical process as partisan concerns are injected.

°"Tasking" could put us at odds with the Administration should we be asked to produce reports at odds with the Administration policy.

[redacted]
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°At some point, there would necessarily be a conflict between "taskings" from the two branches.

°On subjects where information is dependent on signals intelligence and overhead reconnaissance [redacted] [redacted] it is difficult to say much of anything unclassified. Anything said risks the intelligence sources and methods involved.

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°Suggesting a conclusion in advance only compounds the above problems and opens our analytical objectivity to suspicion. Having labored to retain that objectivity vis a vis efforts to have intelligence analysis support Executive Branch policies, we would not want to risk it otherwise.

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End Aid To the Afghan Rebels

By Anthony C. Beilenson

The Bush Administration missed an important opportunity to bring an end to U.S. involvement in Afghanistan when Secretary of State James Baker failed to pursue the subject during his visit to Moscow last week.

Supplying military aid to the Afghan rebels is no longer in our interest now that the Soviets have withdrawn. If the Bush Administration won't cut off this aid, then Congress must do it for the Administration.

The United States' original goal in arming the mujahedeen was crystal-clear: The Soviet Union had invaded this nonaligned, fiercely independent country, and we wanted to help the indigenous resistance forces oust the occupying army.

It was an instance where American intervention in the affairs of another nation was clearly the right thing to do.

To the surprise of many in the international community, our intervention worked. Ten years after the Soviet Army occupied Kabul, its troops have retreated across the northern border — a significant victory for the Afghan people and the United States.

But now that we have achieved our goal, we ought to get out of Afghanistan before our foreign policy success turns into a disaster.

By continuing to send weapons to the rebels, we are risking all the benefits we have gained, since the Afghans are beginning to turn their anger — once directed at the Soviets — toward the U.S. for helping to prolong the war and the killing in this war-weary nation.

Our continued intervention raises questions about who we are supporting, and why. The resistance has never been a unified political movement but rather a loose coalition of at least seven separate factions that often are paralyzed by infighting and squabbling.

By providing aid selectively to the bickering factions, the U.S. is undermining the rebels' struggling efforts to forge a consensus in military or political strategy — and stirring up a lot of anti-American sentiment in the process.

Moreover, some of the largest and best equipped factions are made up of Islamic fundamentalists whose goals for a new Afghanistan are in stark contrast with our own.

We may have been willing to ignore the ideology of the rebels while they were fighting the Soviets, but now that they are fighting only their own countrymen and are trying to form a new post-occupation government as well, we face an entirely different situation that demands a cutoff of our military aid.

Even if we were supporting factions that were clearly aligned with the U.S., it was never our goal to install a pro-American client government. Ultimately, of course, the U.S. would like to see a broad-based popular government in Kabul, with prospects for long-term stability and a friendly view toward American interests in southwest Asia. But we have no business telling the Afghans what kind of government they should establish.

Of course, U.S. aid to the mujahedeen is not the only issue. Soviet military support for President Najibullah's regime is also a serious obstacle to Afghan self-determination. Yet the Bush Administration remains unwilling to negotiate with the Soviets for a mutual cutoff of all military aid to Afghanistan.

So far, U.S. support for the resistance has been especially popular in Congress. But as the American people begin to realize that we are now mired in another country's messy, protracted civil war and are sending weapons to Islamic fundamentalists, Congressional support will certainly erode.

Before that happens, the Administration would be wise to seize the moment and announce a new U.S. proposal for an American-Soviet hands-off policy in Afghanistan.

The Washington Post _____
The New York Times A 17
The Washington Times _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The Christian Science Monitor _____
New York Daily News _____
USA Today _____
The Chicago Tribune _____

Date 22 MAY 1989

Military aid to the rebels was morally defensible and wisely supported by the international community.

It has been a success. Now let's take satisfaction in our achievement and gracefully retire, leaving the task of building a new government to the Afghan people.

Anthony C. Beilenson, Democrat of California, is chairman of the House's Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

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