17 April 1987

TALKING POINTS FOR THE ADDI

THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE


- 1. India and China are probably headed for a limited conflict this spring or summer over their border. During the past year each side has taken political and military steps the other considers provocative.
 - -- Beijing established a forward base in disputed territory on Wangdung Ridge last summer in response to the building of new Indian Army installations along the disputed border in the Eastern sector.
 - -- New Delhi in December voted statehood for Arunachal Pradesh, territory still under negotiation and claimed by Beijing.
- 2. The dispute in the east centers on the area overrun by China in 1962 and now the newly created Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh.
 - -- The Chinese recognize a line of control that lies south of the Wangdung Ridge and well to the south of the British-drawn McMahon line. In 1962 the Chinese unilaterally withdrew to positions 20 kilometers north of the line of control and warned New Delhi not to enter the buffer zone.
 - -- The Indians insist that the McMahon line defines their border and refuse to accept the Chinese claims stemming from the 1962 conflict.
- 3. The Chinese have turned aside Indian requests for new negotiations this spring and have told US officials that they have few options but to resume patrolling the disputed area.
 - -- Beijing's reference to new patrolling--and a lack of interest in immediate negotiations--suggests Beijing may choose to begin agressively patrolling Indian-controlled areas near the Chinese outpost on Wangdung Ridge to draw Indian troops into a provocation that China could use to portray India as the aggressor.
 - -- The departure of the Chinese Ambassador from New Delhi last week sends another signal of rising tensions,s but Beijing's plan to name a border expert as the next Ambassador indicates China eventually hopes for a negotiated settlement with New Delhi.
 - -- Indian Prime Minister Gandhi almost certainly would order an Indian military response to possible Chinese provocations before he agrees to talks. Gandhi cannot afford to preside over a repetition of India's loss to China in 1962 or even be seen as capitulating to Chinese pressure.

25X1

1

		•	•		•
•	•				
			• • •		
5.	India has the upper ha	and militari	y in the regi	on, but ulti	mately
_	India nas one apper m				
would	lose its advantage if	a conflict g	ew to general	war.	
would	l lose its advantage if	a conflict g	ew to general	war.	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
would	l lose its advantage if	a conflict g	rew to general	war.	
would	l lose its advantage if	a conflict g	rew to general	war.	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
would	l lose its advantage if	a conflict g	rew to general	war.	
would	lose its advantage if	a conflict g	ew to general	<u>war</u> .	
would	l lose its advantage if	a conflict g	rew to general	war.	
would	lose its advantage if	a conflict g	rew to general	war.	
Would	l lose its advantage if	a conflict gr	ew to general		any fonce of
would	Should a conflict es	calate, howe	ew to general	large milit	ary force of
would	Should a conflict es over 4 million men an	calate, howe	ew to general	large milit	uld allow
would	Should a conflict es	calate, howed 5,000 fightseveral from	ver, Beijing's ter and bomber t war along th	large milit aircraft wo	uld allow o-Indian





25X1

