




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TALKING POINTS - AFGHANISTAN  
10 JULY 1986

Afghanistan


Military Events

Combat activity in Afghanistan has intensified since late spring. Soviet and Afghan regime forces are seeking to consolidate control of key urban areas, curtail guerrilla resupply and infiltration activity, and respond to insurgent activities. The overall level of Soviet ground activity is well below that of the comparable period last year, however.

--Fighting has accelerated around the western city of Herat in recent weeks. 


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--The Soviets and Afghans are conducting a major operation in northern Afghanistan against guerrilla forces led by Panjsher Valley commander Masood. Initiated in mid-June, the offensive initially relied heavily on Soviet artillery and aircraft for the attacks on insurgent base camps. During the second phase of the offensive, Afghan infantry units have taken a more active role in the sweeps.


--The Soviets have significantly increased pressure on insurgents in the southeastern province of Qandahar. Around Qandahar city itself, the Soviets and Afghan regime forces have established three rings of security outposts to tighten their control of access to the city. 

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The Soviets and Afghans have also increased efforts to weaken Pakistani support for the insurgency.

--Cross-border violations by Soviet and Afghan aircraft have increased substantially this year. 

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
Despite the intensified military pressure on them, the guerrillas are still able to deny the Soviets and Afghan regime control of most of the country. 

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--The insurgents repeatedly ambush convoys and mine roads, forcing the commitment of extensive military resources by the Soviets and Afghans to protect those lines of communication. The insurgents are active in 27 of 29 provinces. 

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[Redacted]

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--The insurgent's anti-air efforts are also continuing. According to our estimates, Soviet aircraft losses are running at about the same level as last year, and regime losses have gone up considerably.

[Redacted]

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The Afghan Army has attempted to take a more aggressive and leading role against the insurgents this year, but the Soviet military is still the lynchpin of combat operations.

--The Afghan Army scored one of its few victories in overrunning the insurgent base camp at Zhawar Killi in April; however, it suffered heavy casualties. It also depended heavily on Soviet air and artillery support.

--Continuing high casualties and desertion rates continue to undercut the development of the Afghan Armed Forces which remains at less than 50 percent strength. Shortages of manpower apparently are forcing the army to shorten or postpone some planned operations. [Redacted]

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Political Situation

The replacement of Babrak Karmal as General Secretary of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan on 4 May is continuing to provoke dissension in the party and the army.

--Serious opposition to new leader Najibullah is evident in the ruling Parchami faction, and several hundred Babrak supporters have been arrested since the leadership changeover. Widespread opposition to Babrak's removal probably forced Najibullah to keep him on as Politburo member and President of the Revolutionary Council.

--Many party members are concerned about losing their posts or being arrested, as purges associated with Najibullah's advancement trickle down party ranks.

--Problems in the party probably precipitated the visit in late June of Soviet Central Committee Secretariat member Korniyenko, who probably urged restraint on Najibullah. [Redacted]

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The army leadership is also concerned about the Najibullah advancement and the possibility of further purges.

--Some units were put under Soviet control during the transition. Intelligence officers loyal to Babrak have been dismissed or arrested. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Najibullah's efforts to boost army strength by ending student draft deferments and forcibly conscripting youth are also likely to backfire.

--Public protests have already occurred in Kabul and antipathy to the government's conscription campaign may lead to increased refugee flight to Pakistan or new defections to the resistance.

--Even if the numbers increase, the absence of adequate training will mean the performance and reliability of new units will remain poor.

[Redacted]

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PAKISTAN

Junejo's Views toward Afghanistan

We believe that both Prime Minister Junejo and President Zia will continue to provide support to the resistance as long as US aid is not cut off or the Soviets do not put forward a withdrawal timetable offer Islamabad considers sufficiently close to its six-month stand. We also think it is possible that Pakistan will try to postpone the next round of Geneva talks scheduled for 30 July.

[Redacted]

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Prime Minister Junejo has always supported the current policy-- but he has also been concerned about the impact of the continued presence of the Afghan refugees.

--We believe Junejo currently is worried about Soviet-Afghan destabilization efforts in the North-West Frontier Province--part of an intensified effort to pressure Pakistan into an unfavorable agreement with Kabul to end the Afghan insurgency.

--Sabotage bombings have claimed some 500 casualties in more than 40 incidents between January and June.

--In our view, Junejo's fears have been compounded by the return of Benazir Bhutto and her campaign to unseat his government through her call for new party-based elections this fall.

[Redacted]

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Decisionmaking on Afghanistan

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[Redacted]

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We do not believe Junejo sees an alternative to encouraging the Soviets to leave Afghanistan by keeping up military pressure via the resistance. In our view, he is primarily concerned that Afghan policy not be politicized by actions that would stir up resentment toward the United States, which reporting by [Redacted] our missions in Pakistan indicates is running high.

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--Our Embassy in Islamabad reported that Junejo believes his government will fall if it is seen to be bowing to US pressure.

[Redacted]

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Relations with the Alliance and Views about a Settlement

Junejo almost certainly is anxious for an early settlement and shares Zia's frustration with the alliance's disunity, but we have no reason to suspect that his fundamental requirements for an agreement differ from Zia's--the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the return of the Afghan refugees.

--Junejo apparently does not play a guiding role in the negotiations and is not intimately involved in them.

--We have no reports of Junejo briefing the resistance on the talks [Redacted]

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In our view, both Zia and Junejo would reconsider policy toward Afghanistan if US assistance were cut off because of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.

--Domestic pressure to end support for the resistance would rise sharply; critics would charge that the United States lured Pakistan into a threatening position only to prove once again that it was an unreliable ally. Belt-tightening as a result of the aid cutoff would be readily supported by the Pakistani public.

--A quick peace agreement that gets the Soviets out of Afghanistan but does not address US concerns regarding a broadly-based government becomes much more likely; Islamabad probably would encourage the refugees to leave Pakistan by restricting humanitarian aid. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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