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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #5137-80
18 July 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer
for Warning

SUBJECT : The Strategic Warning Staff

The Strategic Warning Staff is floundering.

1. The Personnel Situation: Despite your best efforts, the people problem has worsened.

-- There is no State representative. [redacted] can find no record at RMS of an agreement to provide State a slot in FY-81, nor can John Koehler remember any discussion of the subject. Carlucci's memo of 19 November 1979 to Bowdler made a plea for help, but did not mention providing a slot.

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-- According to my conversation with [redacted] on 7 July, NSA is having trouble identifying a body to replace [redacted] but will "keep trying." [redacted] has told Harry privately that NSA has no intention of replacing him.

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-- The Navy billet remains unfilled. (John Butts is relieving as DDNI, but I don't foresee a change).

-- The Marine Corps withdrew their support when Cox left.

-- The Army estimates six months or so before they can fill their (empty) slot.

What we have are a couple of DIA people, three CIA (counting the Director), and an Air Force officer.

2. The Record: In reviewing our old files, I discovered a few interesting points:

-- In September 1978, the DDCI, in a handwritten marginal note, favored placing the SWS under the

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NIO/W "for now", but advocated disbanding the SWS in favor of a small NIO/W staff if "SWS doesn't show more usefulness."

-- In your memo of 22 February 1979, to the DCI you predicted a "no better than 50-50 chance of success, even if we find the right leader. If we cannot attract the right people we should abolish forthwith rather than prolong the agency." "Again, speaking personally, I could live with a smaller elite staff at Langley...."

-- In the same paper, option C, approved by the DCI, reduced the SWS by two professionals and one clerical to be assigned to the NIO/W. The portion of the option which increased your staff to four professionals has never been implemented.

3. The Politics: Rumor has it that Tighe will depart the scene in November, no matter who wins the election. Thus we may be in a good position to institute change as a corollary to the transition. In any case, we should be giving some thought to the matter now.

4. A Companion Problem: In a substantive sense, Harry and I are spread too thin. Harry does a superb job in keeping up with finished product and looking out for our warning interests, but has no time to read raw traffic. When a crunch seems to be approaching, I turn on pertinent raw traffic flow through the Op Center, but we still have no one to follow up for us. We need at least two, maybe four, research assistants to whom we can turn for help.

5. Alternatives: Across the spectrum of what to do with the SWS, there exist a number of options.

- A. Do nothing, muddle through as we are now.
- B. Implement the remainder of the DCI's decision. Shift two SWS analysts out here, to assist us. We could, perhaps, bring one CIA and one DIA to retain more of a "Community" flavor.
- C. Bite the bullet and admit the SWS has not lived up to our expectations. Bring four people (two each DIA & CIA) out here, and disband the staff.

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
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6. Recommendations: The many additional options and suboptions, political sensitivities at DIA and the HPSCI, etc. would fill a book. Rather than expand this paper to the three pound size, I recommend that you, Hal, Harry, and I set aside an hour or so to discuss our options privately. Than we might consider tabling a paper with the Warning Working Group.

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Acting
National Intelligence Officer
for Warning



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