

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

memorandum

DATE: 1 Dec 80

C-0659/JSW

25X1

REPLY TO
ATTN OF:

25X1

SUBJECT: Warning Working Group Discussion on the SWS Role in Warning

25X1

Thru:

TO: JS

1. At the 19 Sep 80 meeting the Warning Working Group discussed at some length the appropriate role of the SWS in warning. Specific recommendations as to the SWS role were not adopted. It was decided that a subworking group under the chairmanship of the A/NIO-W would be convened to further define the matter.

25X1

2. To prepare for this eventuality, this office has studied both the functional and organizational aspects of the SWS.

25X1

a. Functionally there appears to be a choice between four tasks upon which the SWS could focus. These tasks are; to serve as the Intelligence Community's "conscience" on Strategic Warning; provide synthesis of military, political and economic intelligence and its relationship to strategic warning; conduct research and strategic warning; develop procedures and provide a substantive focal point for the national warning system.

25X1

b. Organizationally the choices as to the most appropriate or beneficial applications of their talents point to either the continuance of their present semiautonomous mode or a more structured approach under the NIO/W.

25X1

3. First the functions:

25X1

a. To Serve as the Community "Conscience" with Regard to Strategic Warning. In this role the primary mission of the SWS would be to develop for the NIO/W alternate hypotheses on the course of major developments. This could mean speculation and carrying analysis further than available evidence can fully sustain. It could mean aggressive skepticism in the face of too comfortable and acceptance of conventional wisdom. This approach may be necessitated because important developments or larger implications of developments can be overlooked or not given adequate consideration in various publications--analytic presentation in those publications where there is no attention given to reasonable, but less likely, alternative short-term events.

25X1

(1) Advantages:

25X1

(a) Less popular or dissenting views surface to decisionmakers

25X1

(b) Decisionmakers get a complete picture

(c) Closer coordination between analytic elements

25X1

onds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
(REV. 7-76)
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
5010-112
* GPO : 1976 O - 567-941 (7-76)

CONFIDENTIAL

(d) A more structured and thought-out minority view 25X1

(2) Disadvantages: 25X1

(a) Possible confusion engendered among decisionmakers 25X1

(b) Could significantly detract from the majority view 25X1

(c) Will slow down the intelligence production process at a time when it can least afford it. 25X1

b. Provide Synthesis of Military, Political and Economic Intelligence and Its Relationship to Strategic Warning. There are two kinds of strategic warning: Recognition of developing situations that might lead to strategic confrontations (generally long term predictions), and analysis of indications within such a situation that help to measure an opponent's intentions and capabilities (considerably shorter term). 25X1

(1) Advantages: 25X1

(a) Long term analysis by a staff such as SWS would most certainly be a benefit to the Community as a whole and the I&W segment in particular. 25X1

(b) This type of analysis would provide a forum/structure for a truly long range warning estimate to be formulated. 25X1

(2) Disadvantages: 25X1

(a) The SWS is not structured to deal with short term warning problems and it is even questionable whether they have the expertise to address long term political and economic warning problems. 25X1

(b) As with recent attempts without proper guidance and in-depth analytic effort, the SWS may create more rather than less work and confusion. 25X1

c. Conduct Research on Strategic Warning. Under this mission it is envisioned that the SWS would become a warning think tank which would only work on substantive issues but also do futuristic work. 25X1

(1) Advantages 25X1

(a) Provide the intellectual viewpoint of warning 25X1

(b) Provide intelligence on a problem prior to it becoming a crisis.

(c) Provide an element within the Intelligence Community which would have time to do indepth warning analysis.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL(2) Disadvantages:

25X1

(a) SWS impact on immediate problems would be diminished

25X1

(b) With the current analytic overload, the expenditure of highly skilled analysts on altruistic problems is questionable.

d. Develop Procedures and Provide a Substantive Focal Point for the National Warning System. In this role it is envisioned ~~the SWS would devote~~ a portion of their effort in the development of the architecture of the US national I&W System. At the same time they would be the substantive focal point of the Intelligence Community for warning.

25X1

(1) Advantages:

25X1

(a) By developing procedures the SWS would be taking the first step towards formalizing a national I&W System.

25X1

(b) Their being the substantive focal point for warning would certainly expedite the flow of critical intelligence judgments to the key decisionmakers.

25X1

(c) With this dual role they could provide a central guidance mechanism for the numerous national level I&W products and systems.

25X1

(2) Disadvantages:

25X1

(a) There would have to be a redefinition of the SWS role so as to devote time to the procedural aspects of their new mission. This would definitely detract from their substantive inputs.

25X1

(b) There is a lack of I&W procedural experience on the present SWS staff and before it could be fully effective a training program for the staff would have to be implemented.

25X1

e. Conclusion. Of the four functions outlined above, the fourth would be the most beneficial to the entire Community. Under this function the SWS would contribute both procedurally and substantively, thus taking advantage of their expertise.

25X1

4. With regards to the location and chain of command, it appears beneficial to relocate them back to CIA headquarters and under the direct supervision of the NIO/W. In this position they could act as the coordinating element for the national level system. Their present semiautonomous mode appears at best confusing and detracts from their credibility. Also on the surface there seems to be very little coordination between them, DIA, and the Services. If there remains a concern to this latter point then one member of SWS can be left behind at DIA so as to coordinate directly with the DoD I&W System. Space would be provided in JSW.

25X1

James J. O'Brien
Lieutenant Colonel, USA
Deputy Assistant Director
for I&W Enhancement

CONFIDENTIAL