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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC-03194-88
18 October 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM:
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

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1. Intelligence Community representatives at the monthly warning meeting on 17 October reached consensus on the following issues.
2. Warning Notes.
 - There is little likelihood of renewed fighting between Chad and Libya in the Aozou region during the next 90 days, but an increase in Chadian military readiness by late December may increase slightly the chances that Chad would initiate fighting. Habre does not appear to face any significant domestic opposition or insurmountable discontent within the military. (paragraph 4)
 - The security situation in northern Uganda remains problematic. Although rebels have the upper hand in much of the countryside, they do not threaten the Museveni regime which appears committed to a military rather than political solution. (paragraph 5)
 - Progress in US-mediated talks among Angola, Cuba, and South Africa has slowed following the session on 6-8 October in New York, but all sides remain committed to a 1 November target date for an agreement and further negotiation is likely. FAPLA operations against UNITA in central Angola may become larger and will not necessarily be inhibited by the onset of the rainy season. Dos Santos' intentions regarding national reconciliation remain unclear and progress is likely to depend on reaching agreement in the regional talks. (paragraph 6)

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4. Chad: Developments at Home and Abroad. Introduced by CIA/ALA.

- Habre manages the military closely and is able to anticipate and forestall serious ethnic problems. He is likely to rein in his Toubou kinsmen to prevent Zaghawa discontent from building. Habre's worst problems with troop discontent in the north probably have ended with the rains, which had made resupply difficult. The pace of ground resupply has picked up but some shortages will persist. Delivery of a new C-130H in December will boost air resupply capability. A large number of Iraqi IL-76 flights recently have arrived in Chad with military materiel and other bulk supplies.
- Renewed fighting in the Aozou is unlikely. Habre does not want to be branded the aggressor in breaking the cease fire. Chad remains suspicious of Libya, but Habre is willing to continue political and diplomatic maneuvering with openings provided by Qadhafi and is under pressure from regional leaders and the French to test Libyan intentions. Habre would like a face-to-face meeting with Qadhafi--which other regional leaders may try to promote--but prospects are dim for significant change in the stalemated Aozou

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territorial dispute. DIA noted that the C-130, the Iraqi supplies, [redacted] will improve Chadian military capability by late December and may increase--albeit only slightly--the chances of new fighting in the north.

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- Chadian dissidents who arrived in Sudan from Libya are unlikely to be repatriated soon because of Habre's distrust. The way could be cleared for the dissidents' return if rebel leader Acheik agreed to reconcile with Habre, but personal animosities make this unlikely. Meanwhile, a party congress next month--open to all elements who reconcile to the Habre regime--and a revision of the constitution will shape the future political landscape in Chad and are providing an incentive for disparate Chadian factions to consider participating.

5. Uganda: Regime Prospects. Discussion led by DIA.

- Security remains problematic in northern Uganda, where government forces control the towns but rebels of three insurgent groups have the upper hand in the countryside. The rebels do not pose a threat to the regime, however, and recently have had to operate in smaller units to counter government pressure that has included effective use of its limited air inventory. Rains are causing a lull in fighting that may allow UPDA rebels to regroup after losing some support to a government peace initiative a few months ago. The peace agreement was not as successful as the Museveni regime had hoped, and the government is now committed to a military solution rather than political talks. There is no significant opposition to new laws that will be applied in areas troubled by the insurgents.

6. Angola/Namibia/South Africa: Status of Talks. The A/NIO/AF opened a discussion of developments in and implications of the US-mediated talks.

- State/INR commented that guarded optimism continues to characterize prospects for continued negotiation. All sides have remained committed to a 1 November target date. An agreement but not significant implementation is still possible by then. The South Africans have indicated support for the US-offered compromise proposal presented at New York, based on a 24 month withdrawal calendar for Cuban troops, but may be reluctant to conclude an agreement before their municipal elections on 26 October. The Cubans are sending mixed signals, publicly and privately.
- The African-led initiative for national reconciliation between the MPLA and UNITA is unlikely to go forward until a regional agreement is concluded or a date for signing one is set. Dos Santos' intentions remain unclear, and he may prefer a bilateral rather than group approach in dealing with regional leaders about UNITA.

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Savimbi may be having more trouble maintaining internal cohesion because of uncertainty over the regional talks and prospects for reconciliation. There have been no major defections to the government, however, and UNITA hardliners remain skeptical of any political deal with the MPLA.

- Meanwhile, Luanda has continued military action against UNITA in the central region around Munhango. The operation could become larger and would not necessarily be inhibited by the imminent onset of rains. There still are no signs of a buildup at Cuito Cuanavale that would precede an offensive against Mavinga. There appears to be internal debate in the South African Government over Cuban/Angolan intentions toward UNITA in the near term, but a consensus that an offensive against UNITA will occur in the next dry season. Cuban tactical groups recently were observed departing positions near the Cunene River in the southwest but their new positions are undetermined. They may be moving to higher ground in anticipation of the rains. There are fragmentary indications of FAPLA action against UNITA south of Caiundo in the central border region.




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