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Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

Intelligence Council

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26 September 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Charles E. Allen
National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism

SUBJECT: Terrorism Warning and Forecast Report

Representatives of the Intelligence Community met on 19 September 1986 to review the following issues: terrorism in Nicaragua and Honduras; recap of Pan Am 73 hijacking and Istanbul massacre, 15 May Organization, Libyan-sponsored terrorism, CBW terrorism, and terrorism-related imagery highlights. Attached is my report.

Charles E. Allen
Charles E. Allen

Attachment
As stated



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Discussion Items

1. Terrorism in Nicaragua and Honduras

DIA presented an excellent overview of the terrorist organizations, their objectives, and targets. The primary Sandinista objective is survival of the revolution. Because of continued US funding for the anti-Sandinistas, it is almost certain that Sandinista rebel leaders are contacting radical associates, including Hondurans, making contingency plans, and assessing the capability of various groups to carry out subversive acts including acts of terrorism. Because the Sandinistas know that the US will hold them responsible for anti-US activity, they will be cautious in target selection. The most likely targets will be those involved in supporting the US anti-Sandinista efforts and only as a last resort will they target US assets directly. DIA believes the Sandinistas have a well thought out and tightly controlled policy towards sponsorship of terrorism.

Honduran radical groups share several common characteristics: chronic debilitating factionalism, lack of popular support, ineptness, maintenance of ties with Cuba and Nicaragua, and all are violently anti-American. All Honduran groups have suffered serious setbacks in recent years. Before they initiate major terrorist actions, we should see some of the following indicators: training, robberies, or kidnapping for extortion. Probable targets include anti-Sandinistas in Honduras; Honduran individuals and facilities supporting anti-Sandinista activities, and as a last resort, direct US targets. DIA believes that factionalism among the radical groups precludes sustained terrorist activity. Cuba provides some funding for Honduran groups. While we do not see an immediate Sandinista threat directed against US forces, we cannot rule out action by some radical group seeking to attract attention from a potential sponsor. There are many US targets in Honduras from which to choose.

2. Pan Am 73 Hijacking

CIA reviewed the status of our assessment of the identity of the hijackers. [redacted]

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[redacted] To date, there is no clear evidence of who sponsored this attack. [redacted]

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[redacted] Al-Turki, the alleged Libyan arrested by the Pakistanis, claims to have had a support role, providing weapons to the others after they arrived. It is a common practice [redacted] to use a resident agent as a cut out; al-Turki may have played that role. The extent of Libyan involvement is still unresolved. There is a fair likelihood of hostage taking or another hijacking as an attempt to secure release of the imprisoned hijackers.

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3. Istanbul Massacre

CIA reviewed the state of investigation. The attack left 22 killed, six seriously injured, and scores wounded. There is no smoking gun to indite any group, although it strongly resembles prior ANO attacks in Vienna, Rome, and Brussels. The attack was well planned and organized. [redacted] believe the

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terrorists were in Istanbul at least two weeks prior to the attack and that [redacted] smuggled in via diplomatic pouch. While the use of suicide belts by these terrorists and two of the Pan Am 73 hijackers appears to be a new element in Palestinian terrorism, we recall that suicide belts were used by Palestinian terrorists in attacks on Israeli kibbutzim some years ago. It is not clear that the Istanbul attackers deliberately detonated the belts.

4. 15 May Organization

INR addressed the question of whether the 15 May Organization was back in business, possibly with a new leader. While the group was relatively quiescent beginning in mid-1984, 15 May-type devices began to appear in late 1985 attacks. We considered the possibility the group itself was defunct but sharing its technology. The arrest by Morocco in August of four Arabs with 15 May-type devices added a new wrinkle to the issue. The suspect terrorists alleged loyalty to Col. Hawari, a top PLO security official and close confidant of Arafat. The roles of Hawari and another 15 May operative, Abu Zuhajr, in directing recent attacks are not clear.

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5. Update on Libya



CIA noted that since mid-summer, we have seen increasing signs of confidence on the part of Qadhafi. His operatives have begun to travel and are heading to vulnerable locations. We have reports of arms shipments being transferred. In some areas Libyans have been given a carte blanche to attack Americans if the United States should again attack Libya; this may be a worldwide order. All of this coincides with an increasingly strident Qadhafi.

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CIA concludes that Libyan operatives are actively seeking targets and the US is high on its list. We expect terrorist attacks in the not too distant future.

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7. CBW Terrorist Threat

CIA reviewed the evidence that terrorist groups may be looking towards use of chemical or biological materials as new weapons of terror. The briefer previewed the Key Judgments of an SNIE on the subject. Coordination on the draft is scheduled for 1 October.

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