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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #02692-87

26 June 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution

FROM: Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia

SUBJECT: East Asia Warning and Forecast Meeting - 17 June 1987

1. Attached is my report to the DCI based on our meeting held on 22 April 1987. Please let me know if there are any significant amendments, additions, or corrections.

2. Next month's Warning and Forecast Meeting will be held Wednesday, 22 July 1987 at 1400 hours in Room 7E62, CIA Headquarters. Recommendations for discussion/warning topics should be forwarded to this office by COB 13 July 1987.

3. It is essential that you telephone your attendance intentions to [redacted] and have your clearances verified to us by your security office by NOON, 21 July 1987. Attendees from outside agencies are advised to arrive early to avoid parking problems created by construction work. Please enter the compound through Gate 1, the Route 123 entrance.

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Carl Ford
Carl W. Ford, Jr.

Attachment

[redacted] 17 June 1987 Warning Report

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

26 June 1987

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia

SUBJECT: 17 June 1987 East Asia Warning and Forecast Report

1. Representatives from the Intelligence Community met on 17 June 1987 to discuss unusual mobilization activity in North Korea resulting from the issuance of Supreme Commander's Order 002. (North Korea has at least five levels of Supreme Commander's Orders that deal with levels of preparation for war. The higher the number, the closer North Korea is to a wartime footing.)

[redacted] Since

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April 1987, several steps resulting from Order 002 have been undertaken:

- The Ministry of Peoples Armed Forces (MPAF) has taken over administrative control of at least three counties.
- The MPAF has been given priority in the supply of foodstuffs, and there has been a renewed emphasis on wartime grain stockpiles despite an apparent nationwide food shortage.
- Land previously farmed by the military has been turned over to civilian farmers.
- Fishing vessels have been transferred to the military. [redacted]

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2. Most analysts agreed that, to date, the main thrust of the mobilization appears to be a militarization of the economy designed to spur production--particularly in the agricultural area--and to eliminate non-productive elements. No shift in emphasis in the industrial sector, including defense industries has been noted. [redacted]

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
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3. Although the analysts at the meeting agreed that these efforts are, by themselves, not threatening, all agreed that a successful effort to improve productivity and overall economic performance would enhance the North's overall warmaking ability should they decide to make a military move against the South. Over the past few years, the ground forces already have been redeployed to facilities nearer to the DMZ; recently, the Air Force and Navy have undergone reorganizations. A successful economic mobilization will add another element to long-term war planning. Missing, however, are key indicators of more hostile intent, such as an increase in military training--especially out of cycle training--and a move to mobilize the reserves.

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4. Although not directly tied to the current instability in the South--Order 002 was issued in April--an effective mobilization of the economy will put the North in a better position to take advantage of any further breakdown of order in the South. While the US' resolve to defend South Korea acts as a significant deterrence against an invasion by the North, the current political unrest, and its potential to continue through the run up to the 1988 Seoul Olympics, could tempt the North to take steps which lead to hostilities. Analysts at the meeting believe that the period between now and December--before a planned increased US presence in 1988--will be critical.

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Carl W. Ford, Jr.
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