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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council


NIC #01306-87/1
24 March 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: Frederick L. Wettering *[Signature]*
National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa (U)

A Warning and Forecast meeting on Sub-Saharan Africa was held on 17 March 1987. The attached report has not been coordinated with meeting participants but is being circulated to them. If they believe their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you.

[Signature]
Frederick L. Wettering

Attachment:
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NIC #01306-87
17 March 1987

WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

1. Intelligence community representatives discussed the following topics at our monthly warning meeting on 17 March.
2. Brief Items:
 - (1) Madagascar - Riots: The A/NIO/Africa led the discussion of riots and looting in Madagascar. There was consensus that:
 - Unhappy Malagasy students have been demonstrating off and on since December, but calm was restored once again last week. The students have been protesting government interference with the university system, arrests of student protesters, and food shortages. The Comite Unique des Etudiants (KIM) student group plans to continue until its demands are met, and the teachers are sympathetic. KIM is composed heavily of dissatisfied southeasterners; the government must deal cautiously with KIM because southeasterners also are heavily represented in the armed forces.
 - Possibly inspired by the student demonstrations, looters recently have been attacking homes and shops owned by Indians and Pakistanis in the provinces. The anti-Indian riots have affected five towns and perhaps six villages, but they appear to have burned themselves out for the moment.
 - Three political parties reportedly support the students, and a loose cooperation among the parties has been established. President Ratsiraka alleges that Libya and the opposition parties are responsible for the violence. Several anonymous pamphlets in support of the protests have been printed and distributed, and their source is unknown.
 - The government's strategy has been to try to keep the various unhappy elements separated, and the security forces have exercised restraint. The troops are thinly spread, however, and poor roads hinder redeployments. On the positive side, rice supplies are ample again, although some distribution problems persist. The Malagasy Foreign Minister recently said that he thinks "the corner has been turned."

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Warning Note: The situation has been the greatest challenge to President Ratsiraka since he took power in 1975. We do not expect more riots soon, but a resurgence certainly is possible. Whether violence flares again or not, Ratsiraka probably will take action. He may attempt to make a scapegoat of the Vonjy party while leaving MONIMA-K and MFM alone, and it is possible that one or two student leaders may soon disappear.

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(2) Liberia - Coup Plotting: INR led the discussion and suggested that Liberia is entering a new phase in which economics--not politics--will drive events and policies there. There was consensus that:

- Reports of coup plotting probably will continue, but President Doe seems secure over the next 30-90 days. Beyond that time frame, however, Doe has much to fear from the worsening economy. US efforts to influence economic policies in Liberia are a source of friction. For example, Doe has made a shambles of the economy, and the US has said so. Moreover, the 17 operational experts that the US is sending will not be enough to turn things around.
- NIO/Africa noted that there is a generational split emerging in Liberia, and he urged monitoring the spread of radicalism in Liberia. The old guard is becoming irrelevant, and there is a danger of a coalition forming among dissatisfied students and young radicals. In this atmosphere, there is a somewhat greater potential that Doe might turn to new external sources for support.
- INR suggested that Doe probably will try to extort funds from the foreign mining companies in Liberia before turning to more desperate measures such as seeking Bloc aid. Analysts judged that Doe is unlikely to reestablish relations with the USSR over the near term, although he may try the "Mobutu model" of juggling a variety of advisers and aid from East and West.
- DIA noted that some military officers are unhappy with the recently delivered Romanian vehicles and advisers. Thus the army might not go along with a decision by Doe to court Soviet Bloc potential suppliers.

Warning Note: The 17 US operational experts due to arrive soon in Liberia probably will be a further source of friction in US-Liberian relations. Doe is unlikely to turn to the East for new aid over the near term, but might do so at some point in the future.

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(3) Mozambique - Foreign Intervention: The A/NIO/Africa led the discussion of international aid to Maputo and the RENAMO insurgents, which concluded that:

- Soviet Bloc and Cuban military assistance probably will remain at modest levels for the near term. Soviet military deliveries dropped nearly 50 percent last year, probably because of the Mozambican armed forces' limited ability to absorb new equipment and because the Soviets want to avoid new costs in Mozambique. Mozambican pilots reportedly are training in the USSR on Sukhoi aircraft, but introduction of new Soviet aircraft in Mozambique is unlikely soon because such training usually takes years to complete. Meanwhile, Soviet roles in Mozambique may be changing somewhat. Soviet personnel may be providing more communications and intelligence support, and they are training elite or specialized Mozambican counterinsurgency units.
- African support for Maputo is increasing, but Tanzania and Malawi will find it difficult to maintain their commitments over the longer term. Zimbabwe recently carried out some limited offensives in the Zambezi River valley, but we expect its forces to resume a defensive posture nearer the Beira and Tete transportation routes soon. Tanzania has delivered 1200 or 1500 troops to Quelimane--more than most analysts expected--and a third battalion may be sent soon. A number of states have helped to transport the Tanzanian troops or promised to support them, but the deployment is diverting Tanzanian funds and thus jeopardizing Dar es Salaam's IMF agreement. Malawi [redacted] to protect a portion of the Nacala Railroad, but Lilongwe is wishful that RENAMO won't attack them.
- The United Kingdom is doubling its training of Mozambican Army officers, but the West remains unwilling to provide substantial military aid.
- Insurgent operations and South African aid probably have been disrupted, but the guerrillas have successfully evaded the Zimbabwean and government attacks and are likely to bounce back over the coming months. CIA noted that the security situation has improved somewhat, but that the government's gains probably are short-term.

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
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(4) Angola/Cuba - Cuban Troop Withdrawal: The NIO/Africa began the discussion by suggesting [redacted] that Angola is considering a partial Cuban troops withdrawal are mainly a disinformation effort by Luanda. The discussion produced consensus that:

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-- Several factors suggest [redacted] that the MPLA government wants a reduction of Cuban forces in Angola are an Angolan disinformation effort. Most [redacted] stem from Luanda, [redacted] Moreover, the MPLA's [redacted] last Party Congress reportedly decided to try to project a more reasonable image in order to undercut international support for UNITA. Finally, Luanda has not notified the US Government that it desires to dispatch some Cubans; it presumably would do so if its motive were to spur negotiations.

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-- On the other hand, INR suggested [redacted] might only indicate that Luanda and Havana are haggling over the price Angola must pay for the Cuban troops. [redacted] the Cuban troop strength in Angola appears to have increased gradually by about [redacted] over the last 15 months. [redacted]

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
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(5) Angola/South Africa - Military Developments: DIA presented the discussion [redacted] of Angolan airstrikes on South African or Namibian units, of an Angolan air incursion into Namibia, and of Angolan fighters scrambling against indications of a South African air penetration. There was consensus that:

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
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Warning Note: Whether [redacted] indicate new Angolan/Cuban aggressiveness or just South African posturing, the potential for new fighting, especially air related, has increased. South Africa's airpower advantage has been eroding over recent years, and it probably will do something in coming months to reassert it's superiority.

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3. Main Item: Chad - Turning Point Ahead. CIA led the discussion of Libyan, Chadian, and French preparations for increased fighting. There was consensus that:

- Libya continues to reinforce its forces in northern Chad, to carry out airstrikes and ground operations, and to prepare for an attempt to retake Fada. President Habre has sent more Chadian troops north and deployed them widely; the Chadians also are developing their own aerial resupply capability. France has reinforced its contingent in Chad and deployed its forces farther forward. Meanwhile, diplomatic initiatives by Sudan, Algeria, and Nigeria have been unsuccessful in getting peace talks started, but all three efforts are continuing.
- Analysts were no longer confident that Libya probably could win the expected fight for Fada. The Libyan forces have advantages in equipment and numbers of personnel, and they probably could take Fada under optimum conditions, but Habre's forces may adopt an aggressive defense and exploit Libyan errors to defeat them. Moreover, Libyan units are reluctant to fight, some are not obeying Qadhafi's orders, and the quality of Libyan manpower is poor. The US Army representative thought that a Libyan attack on Fada might fail, and the Air Force representative noted that Libyan aircraft have been ineffective in bombing Fada for three weeks.

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- Libyan movements toward Fada may indicate that the campaign has begun, and Chadian units have deployed to ambush Libyan convoys. However, we see no evidence that the Libyans have stockpiled ammunition at Ouadi Doum as we would expect, and Libyan forces in Sudan appear to have relaxed. France, meanwhile, has deployed helicopters with antiarmor missiles near the Chad-Sudan border in position to counter a Libyan incursion from Sudanese territory.

Warning Note: Habre's costs are likely to increase soon. Intensified fighting around Fada, Faya-Largeau, and/or Ouadi Doum is likely soon. Meanwhile, Libyan forces in the Tibesti area have been gaining experience at fighting the guerrillas and have begun to improve their tactics.

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SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

The following components were represented at the Sub-Saharan Africa warning meeting:

EXTERNAL:

DIA/DIO/Africa
DIA/DE-4
DIA/DB-8
Army/OACSI
Army/ITAC
Air Force
Marines
State/INR
NSA

INTERNAL:

DDI/ALA/AF
DDI/CRES
DDI/OGI
DDI/LDA
DDI/OIA
NPIC
DDO/AF

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