

The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

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25 February 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Charles E. Allen
National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism
SUBJECT: Terrorism Warning and Forecast Report

Representatives of the Intelligence Community met on 20 February to discuss the following issues: threat from the Somali National Movement; the radical Palestinian Colonel Hāwari Apparatus; implications of the Hammadi arrests; and placement of FAA special security teams. Attached is my report.



Charles E. Allen

Attachment:
As stated

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Warning Report - Terrorism

Discussion Items

1. Threat posed by the Somali National Movement (SNM)

Because of the recent kidnaping of French medical relief personnel by SNM rebels, we considered it advisable to assess the threat this group poses to US interests in the region. This tribal rebel group, consisting of about 2,000-3,000 armed troops was formed about six years ago. It receives extensive training, equipment, and support from the Ethiopian government and operates from Ethiopian bases. It also receives extensive support from sympathizers overseas. It normally conducts operations in small groups, targeting Somali government security and political officials in the north.

Traditionally, the group has tended to stay away from foreign nationals and to assure the US that its citizens would not be harmed. However, lack of central SNM control over its field units means that Westerners, especially those involved in relief operations in the northern refugee camps, will be at some risk. That risk is judged moderate to low at the present time.

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2. Colonel Hawari Apparatus

Community analysts provided an extensive review of the activities attributed to the Hawari Apparatus. Despite reports of his house arrest, Colonel Hawari's status appears not to have changed. CIA analysts believe Hawari operations can be grouped into two distinct categories: anti-Syrian operations (conducted primarily from his Baghdad office) and "May-15 type" operations (anti-US activities conducted principally from his Tunis office).

Both categories of operations reflect Hawari's close ties with Iraq. Retrospective analysis of anti-US terrorist activities indicates that Iraq may have been involved in anti-US operations, conducted by Hawari operatives since 1984. The major question is: Is Hawari a contract operative for Iraq? Given his close relationship with PLO leader Arafat, we speculate that Arafat knows of and approves of Hawari operations. Because the PLO owes many debts to Iraq, it is not unlikely that Hawari would be tasked by Arafat to conduct operations on Iraq's behalf.

An INR analyst countered this hypothesis. While agreeing that Iraq probably knew of Hawari's activities, he fails to see the evidence and motives for Iraq to support these activities. He believes Arafat probably knew of and may have authorized the anti-US operations, most likely to reingratiate himself with PLO hardliners. Other INR analysts challenged this view.

The lessons to be drawn are that Iraq never shut down 15 May activities. Using Hawari provided Iraq plausible denial. The US may have been deceived into believing that Iraq was no longer sponsoring international terrorism, leading us to remove it from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.

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3. Implications of the Hammadi arrests. A CIA representative reviewed Bonn's options on handling the Hammadi problem. Above all, we believe Bonn is seeking to postpone any decision and buy time in which to attempt to secure release of the German hostages in Beirut. Essentially, there are three options:

- o Extradite (not likely as long as hostages are held)
- o Swap for hostages (not politically palatable in Germany or to the US)
- o Hold and try in Germany (appears to be leading option)

Under the Hague Convention Germany can try Hammadi for the TWA 847 hijacking or else they must extradite him to the US.

CIA and INR representatives next discussed the implications of the arrests and threat of increased Hizballah terrorist activity in retaliation. They agree that the Hammadi clan likely was responsible for kidnaping the German hostages but they are probably now in the hands of Hizballah elements. Abd al-Hadi Hammadi, brother of the two arrested in West Germany, is an Hizballah security official. The kidnaping of the Beirut University College (BUC) professors was probably in retaliation for US pressure on Germany for extradition of Mohammad Hammadi.

The kidnapers' decision not to carry out the threatened execution was probably a result of:

- o fear of US military retaliation
- o Hammadi losing control over the German hostages
- o Syria or Iran's entre into the negotiations.

The security situation in Beirut is not favorable to the hostages. The hostage takers/holders must look for ways to increase pressure on the West. Likely options include:

- o take more hostages
- o hijack an aircraft -

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- o undertake terrorist operations in West Germany or against German and US targets abroad.

On the other hand, Hizballah may be in no hurry to resolve the hostage problem. They are focused on survival in the Lebanese camps war which may dampen planning for terrorist operations. On the whole, we believe the risk of Hizballah retaliatory activities remains high.


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4. FAA Special Security Teams Placement

In response to the threatened retaliation following the arrest of the Hammadi brothers, the Federal Aviation Agency dispatched special security teams to selected airports to bolster security for US carriers and to assure that the airports are meeting ICAO standards. The airports at which these teams are located are listed on the attached document. Also listed as selected foreign airports frequently serviced by US carriers.

FAA intends to keep teams at foreign ports at least through the next month. It solicits input from the Intelligence Community regarding the most appropriate placement of these teams, based on the highest threat.



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Airports in Europe, Africa, Middle East, and South Asia Serviced by
Scheduled U.S. Air Carriers

Amsterdam	Manchester
Athens	Manila
Bangkok	Milan
Berlin	Moscow
Bombay	Munich
Brussels	Nairobi
Budapest	Nice
Cairo	Nuremburg
Copenhagen	Oslo
Delhi	Paris
Dubrovnik	Prague
Dusseldorf	Riyadh
Frankfurt	Rome
Geneva	Shannon
Glasgow	Singapore
Hamburg	Stockholm
Helsinki	Stuttgart
Istanbul	Tel Aviv
Karachi	Vienna
Lisbon	Warsaw
London	Zagreb
Madrid	Zurich

Airports with FAA Ground Security Assistance Teams

Athens
Bombay
Cairo
Delhi
Frankfurt
Madrid
Paris
Rome

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Army
Damy
Damy
Army INSCOM
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