

NIO/W

4 January 1984

NOTE FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM : David Y. McManis
NIO for Warning

SUBJECT : Enhanced Warning Report

Bob

In response to your guidance, I have drafted the following strawman which I think is feasible. Whatever we do should be evolutionary, and I want to be careful of biting off more than we can chew.

As I mentioned, I'm off to the Pacific until the end of the month but, if you agree, suggest that work up a few sample articles and a "warning list" for consideration by you when I return. Let us know where you agree and disagree with the possible candidate subjects, or if you have some other possibilities.

D.Y. McManis
D.Y. McManis

Attachment:
Memo

*will hold off on further -
distro pending your review.*

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

4 January 1984

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM : David Y. McManis
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

SUBJECT : Enhanced Monthly Warning and Forecast Report

1. GOAL: To enhance the Monthly Warning and Forecast Report with independent analyses, drawing heavily on the doctrine being developed under the National Intelligence Officer for Warning. The product should be aimed at NFIB principals and selected Cabinet officers.
2. DISCUSSION: As currently constituted the Office of the NIO/W is able to monitor only a small flow of intelligence traffic each day. This has permitted some focused attention on potential threat situations, but in no way should be considered a realistic worldwide monitoring capability. Where possible we have looked to current events to illustrate specific doctrinal points, e.g., the problem of "perception" in dealing with the defensive buildup in Cuba.
3. To enhance the monthly report an attempt should be made to provide a service that is unique and not just another competitive analysis. Care should also be exercised not to do something that in some way might relieve line elements of responsibility for warning. There is a requirement to elicit more community participation but this should be done without setting up yet another working group. There may be some reason for consideration of closer coordination with the Watch Report.
4. PROPOSAL: With minimal staff augmentation, the following approach to an enhanced Monthly Warning Report is suggested.
5. First, as we are beginning to do, emphasis should be placed on the reports of the other NIO's selecting those elements of their reports which have specific warning significance. Selection is made partially on the basis of what has been heard by NWS in the Monthly Warning Meetings, not just the content of the report. NIO/W should also stimulate the other NIO's to address the implications of their warning reports. Too often the

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reader is left with the question, "Well, what does that really portend?"

6. Secondly, one or two articles from the Warning Staff could be included, which would have as their primary goal the stimulation of non-traditional thinking about warning problems. These could be of several varied types.

--Evaluation of specific warning problems from a unique methodological perspective. One example with some currency would be a generic examination of the terrorism problem emphasizing the need to evaluate the threat against the background of a psychological-sociological understanding of the terrorist or his organization. Another, which is now being included in work by NIO/LA, would have been the importance of Cuban perceptions of the U.S. as a threat in evaluating their defensive buildup.

--Should unusual situations be identified through indicator analysis performed by OGI in support to the Quarterly Political Instability report or out of the Worldwide Indications Monitoring System, they could be highlighted if believed to be more than near-term, short-lived phenomena.



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--Some NIEs, intelligence assessments and, occasionally, the JIC and JIO assessments have warning judgments of more than usual import. When this is the case, these could be highlighted and perhaps given some unique perspective.

7. To reiterate, these analyses should be complimentary to other efforts and not competitive. Where we feel strongly about a development we believe it more appropriate to work through the responsible target NIO.

8. Finally, we might wish to consider a short list of future warning concerns. This could in part be generated through the mechanisms of the Weekly Watch Committee meetings. Insofar as possible, these should reflect not just our views but those of responsible parties throughout the community. Such a list today would consider, inter alia, Philippine stability; the potential

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for terrorism in South Korea, with the Pope's Visit, the Asian Games and the Olympics coming up over the next four years; the DELTA submarine-under-polar-ice threat; developing instability in Mexico; Saudi instability (long term); deterioration of Warsaw Pact cohesiveness. The article would hopefully capture some of the minority views.

9. In sum, I think it possible to evolve the Monthly Warning and Forecast report into a product which really could serve to stimulate both the intelligence community and also, more importantly, the policy community. If it were done properly, it could also be used in the development of long-term planning objectives.



David Y. McManis

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4 January 1984

SUBJECT: Enhanced Monthly Warning and Forecast Report

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