

S E C R E T

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

NIC #8814-83  
7 December 1983

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted] OTE/IT/AT 25X1

FROM : [redacted] 25X1  
Assistant National Intelligence Officer  
for Warning

SUBJECT : Military Analysis Course (MAC) - 1

1. The attached outline is sent to you for use with the "Introduction to Indications and Warning" Block of MAC-1. We are pleased that you plan to increase the time allotted for that block to one hour and thirty minutes. That period will allow sufficient time for the discussion that will probably follow the presentation.

I look forward to participating in this part of the course as well as the seminar that follows the next day.

Attachment:  
As stated (h/w)

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OUTLINE OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR WARNING  
BRIEFING ON THE NATIONAL WARNING SYSTEM

- I. Introductory overview
  - A. Importance of perceptions
    - 1. Views of government/intelligence
    - 2. Historical bias
  - B. Oct '73 Middle East War - a warning failure
  - C. Today's capabilities to warn
  - D. Technology problems for warning
  - E. Warning the critical element for preparedness
    - 1. Analysis
    - 2. Ambiguity
    - 3. Early judgments for multiple options
    - 4. The approach to warning
- II. Warning definitions
  - A. Definitions critical to understand the task
    - 1. Iterative process over time
    - 2. Focus on decision makers
  - B. Strategic and tactical warning definitions
    - 1. Too narrow
    - 2. Focus too late in the cycle
  - C. Warning of a developing political or economic crisis
  - D. Warning of war
  - E. Warning of attack
  - F. Acceptance of warning by decision makers
- III. National Warning Structure
  - A. National Level
    - 1. DCI, NIC, NIO's
    - 2. Operations and Intelligence Centers
      - a. Functions
      - b. Informal network

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- B. Field Level
    - 1. Collection, analysis, reporting
    - 2. Communications interface
  - C. Warning Vehicles
    - 1. Formal products
    - 2. Committees/Meetings
    - 3. Informal net
  - D. Role of NIO/Warning
    - 1. Responsibilities
    - 2. Tasks
- IV. Warning Methodology
- A. The Warning Cycle
    - 1. Recognition
    - 2. Validation
    - 3. Definition
    - 4. Communication
    - 5. Evaluation
    - 6. Action
  - B. Warning Outcomes
    - 1. Success
      - a. Increase in options
      - b. Reasonable basis for action
    - 2. Failure
      - a. Systemic failure
      - b. False alarms
    - 3. Near Misses
      - a. Recognition leads to action
      - b. Communication develops future vigilance
    - 4. Correctness vs. useful intelligence
  - C. Repeated Warnings
    - 1. Gradually developing harm
    - 2. Sustaining sensitivity
  - D. Consensus and "mainstreaming"
  - E. Alternative views
- V. Some Problems in Warning
- A. Analysis and near-real-time collection

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1. State of the Art
  - a. What made an expert?
  - b. How far have we come?
2. Implication of our technology
  - a. Data processing vs. analysis
  - b. Information glut and data bases
3. Automation solutions and analysis and warning

B. Managing warning

VI. Warning application

- A. Early warning, ambiguity and opportunity to act
- B. Emphasis on options before military response

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