

THE DIRECTOR OF  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Council

31 October 1983

NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM : David Y. McManis  
NIO for Warning  
SUBJECT : CNO Comments

As I noted some time ago, I had sent a paper on warning and mobilization, which was prepared for the [ ] exercise, to several individuals including the CNO. We had discussed the relationship during my visit with him, and he preached much of our sermon to me. The attached response affirms his concern about warning and is very reassuring, insofar as it confirms once again our direction. He is also extremely interested in perception management. Both subjects would be worth discussing during your Wednesday lunch with Admiral Watkins.

  
D.Y. McManis

Attachment:  
As stated (h/w)

cc: C/NIC  
VC/NIC (Mr. Waterman)

STAT

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Distribution:

- Orig - DCI (w/att)
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CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

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
Dear Dave,

(C) Thank you for the recent letter that enclosed a most interesting draft paper on National Indications and Warning and its relationship to military readiness. You are right in the points you make, particularly with regard to the problem of ambiguity and warning. Our recent war games illustrate how critical ample warning and fast reaction are to the successful accomplishment of maritime objectives.

(C) Clearly, force readiness alterations and early intelligence estimates that Soviet forces have been placed in an increased readiness posture are essential. Information on readiness is not only critical in national policy formulation, but also the first element in support to our forces--warning is a force multiplier.

(C) I also agree that the warning, decision, and action cycle needs to be stimulated and exercised. We must, in measured steps, condition our adversaries by routinely exercising our force readiness system. As we discussed, Soviet perceptions are the crucial factor, and I believe it would be an excellent topic for discussion between the DCI and the Joint Chiefs.

Sincerely,

  
JAMES D. WATKINS  
Admiral, U.S. Navy

Mr. David Y. McManis  
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Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

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