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## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #8152-83  
10 November 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Harry C. Cochran  
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SUBJECT : Soviet Intentions After INF Deployment

1. The Soviets have set the stage for their withdrawal from the Geneva INF talks, perhaps in late November, for implementation of the countermeasures they announced last May, and for a "revision" of their position in the START negotiations. This "revision," which may be preceded by a temporary recall of their START delegation, apparently will demand the inclusion of British and French missiles as well as the Pershing II's and GLCM's in a new definition of strategic weapons. Moscow's scenario for responding to the initial INF deployments probably rests on a calculation that serious efforts to explore prospects for mutually acceptable arms control agreements will be shelved by both superpowers at least until after the U.S. elections in November 1984.

2. The Soviets have virtually written off chances that Bonn, Rome, and London will be obliged by public pressures to press for a postponement of initial deployments. Soviet political strategy in the next three to six months, therefore, will concentrate on creating conditions that will confront West European governments with a choice between yielding to negative public reactions and curtailing further deployments, or facing potentially dangerous political polarization that will, at the very least, undermine their domestic authority. In the few weeks that remain before INF deployments begin, Moscow can be expected to advance new bargaining initiatives calculated to increase the political risks and costs to NATO governments of proceeding on schedule. Soviet objectives in manipulating the INF issue throughout the coming year will be to alienate West European public opinion from the U.S., deepen transatlantic divergences, erode the political base of incumbent NATO governments, and where possible work for their replacement by accommodationist cabinets, and discredit the Reagan Administration's arms control, defense, and foreign policies in a manner aimed at impairing the President's prospects for re-election.

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3. Despite the election victory of Chancellor Kohl's coalition last March and the subsequent failure of West European anti-nuclear and peace movements to force their governments to retreat from NATO's December 1979 "two-track decision" on INF, the Soviets have tenaciously held to their assumption that West European fears of nuclear war and concerns about U.S. intentions in arms control negotiations would eventually result either in policy changes or the weakening and replacement of governments committed to INF deployment. Andropov in his 28 September statement on Soviet-U.S. relations contrasted the "will of the majority of the population in West European countries" with the nefarious intentions of the U.S. and those European leaders who are "helping the implementation of the U.S. Administration's militarist plans." In his Pravda interview on 27 October, Andropov claimed that Washington's responsibility for the deadlock in the Geneva talks "is now clear...even to the most faithful U.S. allies, and only Bloc loyalty prevents them from acknowledging this openly." Georgiy Arbatov pontificated to Der Spiegel in late October that, "It is risky for politicians to ignore what is happening at the grass roots level." Old "German hand" N. Portugalov warned in Izvestia on 26 October that by proceeding with INF deployments, "West German leaders could undermine and indeed totally forfeit the national consensus," including the "fundamental consent of the majority of the country's population to the authorities' foreign policy, particularly on a vital issue like safeguarding security." Soviet media frequently call attention to West German opinion polls that show that over 70 percent oppose INF. Soviet initiatives such as Andropov's offer to reduce SS-20's to about 140 launchers in the western USSR, to freeze the number of SS-20's in eastern USSR, his pledge not to transfer these to the west, and his hint of concessions on NATO Forward Based Systems (FBS) were aimed primarily at influencing the outcome of the Social Democrats' party conference on INF in mid-November. The Soviets seem to believe that a clear SPD repudiation of INF will have a far-reaching impact on West European sentiment and encourage other socialist and labor parties to follow suit.

#### Soviet Pre-Deployment Initiatives

4. Soviet moves before mid-December will be tailored primarily to saddle the U.S. with sole responsibility for the deadlock at Geneva and to undercut the political base of West European governments committed to INF deployment.

--Andropov may sweeten his 27 October offer by revising the level of 140 SS-20 launchers downward to between 54 and 120 to bring the total number of SS-20 warheads closer to the combined British-French total of about 162;

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--Display "additional flexibility" on the FBS issue by making specific proposals regarding the number and types of nuclear-capable aircraft NATO and the USSR could maintain--a number Andropov said "could be substantially different from the range proposed by us previously;"

--Offer to begin immediate reductions of SS-4 missiles and move forward to mid-1984 Andropov's date for their complete elimination provided the U.S. agrees to a moratorium on INF deployments as long as the Geneva talks continue;

--Andropov letters to President Reagan and other heads of NATO governments detailing ostensible concessions, proposing a reciprocal moratorium on SS-20 and INF deployments and urging that NATO's "artificial deadline" be removed;

--Reiteration of Andropov's warning that "the appearance of new American missiles in Western Europe will make it impossible to continue the talks now being held in Geneva," coupled with ambiguous threats to extend the walkout to START and MBFR negotiations;

--Sharp reminders of the three Soviet countermeasures detailed in the Soviet government's statement last May: termination of the unilateral moratorium on deployment of SS-20's in the western USSR, deployment of "additional means" in Eastern Europe to counterbalance INF, and measures to enhance Soviet strike capabilities against U.S. territory;

--More explicit warnings about the consequences for Bonn's Ostpolitik and relations with East Germany, the USSR, and Eastern Europe, including renewed claims that INF will violate Bonn's treaties with Moscow and East Berlin in 1970-1971 and possibly damage West Berlin's welfare and security. Honecker warned Kohl in mid-October of a "new ice age" in relations between the two Germanies;

--Threats to increase Soviet and Warsaw Pact defense budgets and to deploy what the May statement described as "corresponding new strategic systems."

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Post-Deployment Initiatives

5. The Soviet walkout from the INF talks may occur before initial deployments begin. The Soviets might dramatize West Germany's crucial role by breaking off the talks immediately following the Bundestag debate on INF on 21 November. On the other hand, the Soviets may prefer to withhold their walkout until the first missiles are actually emplaced in West Germany. Moscow's timing probably will be strongly influenced by the outcome of the Social Democrats' conference on INF. The Soviet scenario will be orchestrated to magnify the expected negative public reactions in Western Europe to initial deployments, with the immediate aim of maximizing pressure on these governments to halt or curtail further deployments.

6. Moscow will move promptly to execute the three countermeasures announced last May:

--It probably will convey the impression that termination of the unilateral moratorium on SS-20 deployments in the western USSR will be followed by an open-ended expansion of the SS-20 force targeted on Western Europe. It seems possible that Moscow's priority interest in promoting a political rapprochement with China will lead the Soviets to declare that present SS-20 strength in eastern USSR will not be increased as long as "there are no substantial changes in the strategic situation in the Asian region," as Andropov put it on 27 October. He added that, "This means primarily that the U.S. does not deploy new medium-range nuclear means in regions from which they could reach the eastern part of the USSR's territory."

--SS-21, SS-22, and/or SS-23 missiles will be deployed promptly in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The Ministry of Defense announced on 24 October that preparations were under way to deploy "operational-tactical" missiles in the two countries as part of "planned countermeasures."

--The Soviets have practiced calculated ambiguity in discussing the third category of countermeasures--those affecting U.S. territory. This evasiveness may reflect uncertainty or even disagreement within the leadership in assessing probable U.S. reactions to a spectrum of options. This circumspection, however, may simply be a product of prudent concern to avoid telegraphing specific moves so far in advance. In dealing with what they perceive to be an

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unpredictable U.S. Administration, the Soviets obviously have strong incentives to preserve the advantage of surprise and to deny Washington the time and opportunity to take preemptive action. On the cautious, non-provocative end of the spectrum, the Soviets may confine their countermeasures against U.S. territory to moving SSBM patrol zones closer to the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. Higher-risk, potentially provocative options include the deployment off U.S. coasts of depressed trajectory submarine-launched ballistic missiles and cruise missiles on submarines and/or surface ships. Whatever measures the Soviets select, they probably will characterize them as "new systems" with the capability to place the U.S. under what General Nikolai Chervov has described as the "ten-minute threat" which he states the Pershing II's will pose to Moscow.

7. These three military countermeasures will be accompanied by a variety of political and economic initiatives designed to dramatize Moscow's repeated warnings that INF deployment will plunge the world into a dangerous arms race that, in Arbatov's words, "can be even worse than the Cold War." Andropov charged on 28 September that the Reagan Administration's plans to deploy "more and more new weapons systems" may "altogether fundamentally overturn notions of strategic stability and of the very possibility of effectively limiting and reducing nuclear arms."

8. Soviet measures to heighten fears in the West of a new Cold War are likely to include:

--Recall of Soviet delegations to START and MBFR to Moscow for indefinite "consultations;"

--Cosmetic increases in Soviet and Warsaw Pact defense budgets and ostentatious measures to strengthen the readiness postures of their armed forces;

--Initiatives aimed at deepening political polarization in West Germany, including at least token curtailment of contacts and trade between the two Germanies;

--Token or symbolic restrictions on East European political and economic contacts with the West;

--Ambiguous and noncommittal warnings that the new situation in Central Europe created by INF

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deployments cannot fail to affect West Berlin's security and welfare. It seems unlikely, however, that the Soviets and East Germans will actually take concrete steps that would jeopardize the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin.

9. In the Soviet scenario, military and political-economic countermeasures will provide the backdrop for a major initiative demanding a redefinition of the weapons systems covered by the START negotiations. The Soviets will not propose that the INF issue be combined with START and they will reject any Western initiative to integrate the two sets of negotiations. Andropov's blunt statement that INF deployment "will make it impossible to continue" the INF talks reflects Moscow's fundamental position that it will refuse to acknowledge that deployment of any Pershing II's and GLCM's is justified as a means of redressing an imbalance in intermediate range systems in Europe. Arbatov has dismissed the idea of combining INF and START as nothing more than a "variant attempt to compel us to accept American missiles and...to give them our blessing in one way or another."

10. The new Soviet proposal, which may be surfaced within a few weeks after the Soviets withdraw from the INF talks and apply their countermeasures, will redefine START in a way calculated to turn the tables on NATO by tacitly accepting British and French claims that their missiles constitute national strategic deterrents and, as such, are not covered by the INF negotiating framework. Using this same logic, the Soviets also will insist on defining Pershing II's and GLCM's as strategic weapons because of their capability to strike targets in the USSR. Under this definition, Moscow may claim that its intermediate range missiles deployed within the Soviet Union fall into the category of regional systems because they cannot reach U.S. territory.

11. The Soviet leaders, of course, would anticipate an immediate rejection of this proposal by the U.S. and its NATO allies. They would then counter by playing the "card" created by their countermeasures against U.S. territory. This "fallback" position would offer to include ballistic missile submarines and cruise missile ships and/or submarines stationed off U.S. coasts in a comprehensive package deal that would require major reductions or elimination of all INF weapons, British and French missiles, and FBS systems in exchange for reciprocal reductions or removal of the Soviet submarine/surface force off U.S. coasts. To "sweeten" this package, the Soviets at some point probably would magnanimously renew their offer to reduce the SS-20's targeted on Western Europe to a level equal to that of the combined British and French missile force and to eliminate completely their SS-4 missiles in 1984-85, as Andropov proposed on 27 October in exchange for a renunciation of INF deployment.

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Conclusions

12. This Soviet scenario combining military and political-economic countermeasures with new strategic arms control proposals will represent Moscow's most ambitious political warfare offensive against the West since the attempt to block West German rearmament and entry into NATO in the mid-1950's. The Soviets are confident that it will generate debilitating disarray and divisiveness in West European politics, widen transatlantic divergencies, and confront the U.S. with an unprecedented challenge to its leadership of the Western alliance.

13. The coming Soviet offensive also represents the culmination of strenuous efforts over the past three years to achieve two fundamental objectives. First, the Soviets are determined to nullify the threat INF deployments pose to their nuclear and conventional superiority in Europe and, as a consequence, to their capability to intervene militarily in Eastern Europe if necessary, and to deny NATO the capacity to capitalize on internal crises in the Bloc and to deter Soviet intervention to protect its strategic glacis. The Soviets have long viewed unchallenged hegemony in Eastern and Central Europe as the keystone of their internal security as well as their global status as a superpower. The campaign against INF therefore involves the highest geopolitical and strategic stakes in the entire Soviet global outlook and makes imperative the commitment of all the resources at their command to protect these vital interests.

14. Secondly, the Soviets have interpreted the Reagan Administration's foreign and defense policies as a serious challenge to their interests and pretensions as a superpower, and one that requires a decisive rebuff. In particular, the Soviets have been determined to defeat what they perceive to be the Administration's crucial challenge, namely, confronting them with an inescapable choice between agreeing to major reductions in Soviet strategic weapons or coping with a major American military buildup. The significance of the President's statements during the 1980 election campaign were not lost on the Soviet leaders. Given this definition by President Reagan of the key issue in Soviet-U.S. relations, the Soviets have seen INF both as a dangerous challenge to their global geopolitical position and as an opportunity to inflict a decisive rebuff on U.S. influence, prestige, and credibility.

15. The final countdown to INF deployment against the backdrop of Soviet-American recriminations over the shootdown of Flight 007 has brought Soviet policy to a crucial turning point. If the drive to block full INF deployment in the next few years fails, the Soviets genuinely fear that this defeat will result in an irreversible shift in the global balance of forces

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against them. If, on the other hand, the campaign succeeds in frustrating full deployment and in alienating Western Europe from the U.S., the Soviets believe this outcome will produce an unprecedented crisis in the Atlantic Alliance that will lead over the next decade to a decisive geopolitical realignment, drawing Western Europe gradually into greater political, economic, and security dependence on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

16. The outlook for the coming year therefore is for relentless Soviet political and military pressures on the Atlantic Alliance dominated by a protracted test of wills between the Soviet Union and the U.S. In this trial of strength and political stamina, the Reagan Administration has been assigned the role of the "heavy." Andropov's political strategy and stage-managing were clearly exposed in his ostentatious statement on 28 September assessing "the course pursued in international affairs by the current U.S. Administration." "If anyone," said Andropov, "has any illusions about the possibility of an evolution for the better in the present American Administration's policy, recent events have dispelled them once and for all. The Administration is going so far for the sake of achieving its imperial objectives that one cannot help doubting whether any restraints at all exist for Washington to prevent it from crossing a line before which any thinking person ought to stop." Soviet officials solemnly informed [redacted] in early October that this judgment was finally precipitated by the U.S. Administration's political exploitation of the Korean airliner tragedy, but was also the consequence of what the Soviet leaders see as a long history of American unwillingness to accept the changing "correlation of forces" in the world.

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