

S E C R E T

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

1 September 1983

National Intelligence Council


Dr. Richard S. Beal
Special Assistant to the President
Room 303
Old Executive Office Building

Dear Richard,

It has been some time since we have discussed the more abstract issues of warning, having focussed our attention on support to the CMF from the other centers in town. However, now that the CMF mission is getting sorted out, and with an added emphasis coming from continuity of government activities, we should perhaps return to some of the more critical issues. Because of our dealings with you, Ben Lewis, the military operators, and many others on issues of mobilization and readiness, we have discovered and are attempting to articulate the very strong relationship between warning and mobilization. It is a most complex relationship because of the inherent ambiguity in warning; but the hard requirement to make decisions early enough in an escalating crisis to be able to take actions to avoid or ameliorate the threatened harm dictates the need to strengthen the relationship.

I am enclosing a draft which could serve as the basis for discussion. It was prepared for a different audience but is equally applicable to your environment. The thrust of this version is military preparedness but, through the magic of word processing, it can be issued in a civil preparedness version.


Sincerely,



David Y. McManis
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

Enclosure

P.S. We should also review the shoot-down,
when the excitement stops.



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SUBJECT: Letter to Dr. Richard Beal

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