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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #5283-83/1
21 July 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM : [redacted]
Acting National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa [redacted]

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Community representatives and specialists met on 19 July 1983 with the Acting NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you. [redacted]

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Attachment
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WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

CHAD

CIA analysts began the discussion by observing that Habre apparently was taking time to consolidate his control in eastern Chad after recently capturing Biltine and Arada. Once having done so he probably will move against Faya Largeau on two fronts, from the south and the east. The NSC representative expressed the hope that Habre would not move prematurely and risk suffering a major defeat against the fixed and better armed position of the Libyan-backed Goukouni forces at Faya.

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CIA also noted that the outcome of the situation in Chad now hinges on the external support that is being provided to both sides.

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CIA analysts were encouraged that, despite earlier fears, southern and central Chad are quiet and thus not distracting Habre from his northern and eastern campaigns.

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WARNING NOTE

The fighting in Chad is likely to drag on with the chances increasing of more Libyan involvement as Habre moves north. To a large extent, the outcome of the fighting will depend on the relative staying power of Habre's and Goukouni's external suppliers.

ETHIOPIA-USSR

Discussion focused on indications of what may be a new phase in Ethiopian-Soviet relations, with Mengistu moving closer to the Soviet model in his efforts to restructure Ethiopian society and the Soviets, for their part, probing Mengistu to see how much they can gain from him in the way of access and facilities.

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in addition, more and more Soviet experts are being attached to the Ethiopian administrative structure.

The NSC representative speculated that Soviet actions toward Ethiopia may be part of a larger Soviet counteroffensive to head off the weakening

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positions of its major African client states -- Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique.

Turning to recent Somali claims of a major Ethiopian invasion, analysts agreed that the Somali government has exaggerated what may have been little more than low-level insurgent forays. These forays can be expected to occur at any time but do not presage, in the view of the intelligence community representatives, an upsurge in Ethiopian-Somali hostilities.

ANGOLA

Community analysts agree that UNITA activity in Angola is increasing but the situation is obscured by conflicting claims and counterclaims. Cuban forces do not appear to be meeting UNITA head-on but they do seem to be taking a somewhat more active role in supporting Angolan operations against the insurgents. Cuban casualties appear to have increased somewhat in recent months but may reflect increased UNITA targeting of Cubans rather than a new-found Cuban aggressiveness. Although UNITA is expanding its operations out of its traditional tribal areas, analysts do not believe that UNITA is prepared to hit fortified Angolan military positions in areas where it does not have local support.

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SNIPPETS

NIGERIA: The community agrees that the level of pre-election violence in Nigeria is less than might have been expected in view of the violence that preceded and accompanied the elections four years ago. Nevertheless, during the 5-week election period beginning on 6 August, the danger of escalating violence will be strong although the process itself probably will not be derailed.

GHANA: The DIO for Africa noted that Ghana will be facing a crisis by mid-August when it will run out of diesel fuel unless it finds new supplies.

ETHIOPIA: The DIO for Africa felt that the intelligence community needs better information on the Ethiopian military campaign against insurgents in Eritrea Province.

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