

**THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

**National Intelligence Council**

19 August 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR : Acting Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH :  National Intelligence Officer for Warning

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FROM :  Assistant National Intelligence Officer for East Asia

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SUBJECT : East Asia Warning Assessment

Community representatives discussed the following topics at the 17 August Warning Meeting.

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II. Regional Developments

A. Korea -- the Seoul IPU Conference

CIA reported that South Korea can be expected to uncover a greater percentage of North Korea infiltration attempts prior to the 2 October Interparliamentary Union Conference because of its increased defense posture and more aggressive search operations. Seoul's continuing concern over Pyongyang's intention to disrupt the conference may be seen in President Chun's consideration of a plan to declare a "semi-alert," and in media calls for "swift retaliation" to incidents provoked by the North.

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Pyongyang appears to be resigned to the fact that the conference will occur as scheduled, and therefore will not risk damaging its standing with nonaligned nations by openly disruptive acts.

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B. North and South Korean Relations with China

[redacted] CIA summarized recent contacts between Pyongyang, Beijing, and Seoul. Chinese steps to regularize contacts with Seoul have included: measures to ensure that the South will treat hijackers in accord with international protocols and attempts to sensitize the North to more frequent contacts with international delegations. Beijing's own policies regarding international conferences are expected to be keyed to the South's treatment of the May hijackers of a Chinese civil airliner.

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Since the hijacking incident, Seoul appears to have changed tactics in regard to relations with Pyongyang and Beijing. The South is no longer viewed as over-eager to compromise on principles, and has not encouraged allies to raise the issue of cross-recognition.

C. Burma

[redacted] CIA reviewed political implications of recent cabinet changes and reported that the removal of general Tin Oo is thought to be related to his obvious attempts to assume greater authority. Chairman Ne Win, who is viewed as favoring a leadership coalition as a successor to his government, is thought to believe that General Tin Oo would be an unacceptable addition to such a coalition. Tin Oo is not expected to reassume any position of major consequence in the future, but may be allowed to advise Chairman Ne Win. Although recent reports indicate that the Soviets may feel that Tin Oo's ouster was in their best interests, participants did not believe that Burma is now more pro-Soviet. Government policies are expected to remain unchanged.

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E. President Reagan's November Trip to East Asia

Bob Randolph of State reported that trip support requests to date focus primarily on policy issues and that only minimal tasking has thus far been levied on the Community. Preparatory visits to countries on the President's agenda by senior White House officials began in June, and will include follow-ups this month, in September, and two additional trips planned for early November. [REDACTED] support requested by the White House will include input from appropriate Ambassadors and will be tailored for the President in a new format.

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III. Interagency Work -- The Assistant NIO reported on the status of Estimates currently in production and reviewed a list of new titles under consideration. [REDACTED]

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