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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #2209-83/1
25 March 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM : [redacted]
Acting National Intelligence Officer for Africa


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SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa [redacted]

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Community representatives and specialists met on 22 March 1983 with the Acting NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you.


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Attachment
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WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO AFRICA

Bill Eckert of Vice President Bush's staff and Fred Wettering of the National Security Council accompanied Vice President Bush to Africa last November and presented a brief overview of the trip to the Community representatives. A lively question and answer period followed. The trip went very well and was an excellent opportunity for African leaders to express their concerns and for the Vice President to reiterate and reinforce US policy objectives toward Africa. As might be expected, economic assistance was on the top of the agenda for most of the countries visited. The Vice President repeated the Administration's concern for Africa's economic development but reminded his African audiences that the US alone cannot solve Africa's problems through bilateral aid. He encouraged African leaders to make use of the wide array of economic resources available, including international financial institutions, but also emphasized the importance of Western private investment and the need to initiate economic reforms at home. [REDACTED]

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The Vice President also reaffirmed the Administration's desire for a settlement in Namibia and underscored its belief that a withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola remains a crucial element of US policy toward Namibia.

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CHAD

Military activity in Chad appears to have fallen off at least for the time being, and the focus has shifted for now to the political front as the Habre government prepares a campaign in the United Nations against the Libyan presence in the Aouzou Strip. Analysts are concerned, however, that Habre is not getting the external military assistance that he needs to counter the dissident forces in northern Chad. The Goukouni-led dissidents appear to be building their resources but have not yet undertaken aggressive actions. Although Habre now has some 3,000 troops in northern Chad, he does not have any defense capability against air attacks if air support is ever provided to the dissidents by the Libyans. Analysts do not expect the Habre government to fall anytime in the near future, but they warn that Habre's failure to establish his government's authority more firmly throughout the country, particularly in the South, and to secure economic assistance, may erode over the longer term the "winner" image that he projected when he seized the government last year. [REDACTED]

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ZIMBABWE

Considerable concern was expressed over the potentially serious internal security problems that are developing in the wake of the government's often heavy-handed military efforts to suppress dissidence in Matabeleland, the base of opposition leader Joshua Nkomo's popular support. Most analysts feared

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that there would be a continued and perhaps rising level of violence there in the next few months--possibly involving white civilians--even though the government's military operations appear to be winding down. [REDACTED]

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Key questions now are the future of Nkomo's Zimbabwe African Peoples Union party and whether or not Nkomo returns to Zimbabwe. DIA, supported by others, felt that Nkomo's return would sharpen tensions and that it would be better for the internal situation if he remained abroad. Analysts seemed to feel that this is what Mugabe prefers. With Nkomo abroad, Mugabe might then have more time to weaken ZAPU, as he moves gradually toward creating a one-party state. Concern was expressed that ZAPU loyalists, especially those who have deserted the army, might disburse to nearby countries such as Botswana, thereby creating unneeded tensions for Mugabe with his neighbors as he tries to cope with internal problems. [REDACTED]

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SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS NEIGHBORS

Analysts continue to keep close watch on South Africa's cat-and-mouse games with its neighbors. South Africa's aggressiveness has its neighbors off balance and, in the view of one CIA analyst, Pretoria can afford to rest on its laurels for awhile. Thus, barring some "spectacular" terrorist operation by the African National Congress inside South Africa, the South Africans may act with restraint, except, perhaps, toward Angola where military operations could begin at any time. Analysts expect that the South Africans will meet again soon with the Angolans but are doubtful that meaningful measures will be taken concerning a military disengagement in southern Angola. [REDACTED]

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UPPER VOLTA

Recent information suggests that Libyan involvement in Upper Volta may be developing. All of the representatives agreed that collection efforts should be increased to clarify what is still a somewhat murky situation. [REDACTED]

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SNIPPETS

-- Sudan continues to bear further watching for indications of North-South frictions. The North-South relationship appears to be deteriorating, and President Nimeiri does not seem to be managing this threatening problem as adeptly as he has in the past. [REDACTED]

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-- Coup rumors abound concerning the Comoros and Seychelles. [REDACTED]

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