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# MARINE SECURITY GUARD SYSTEM AT DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS ABROAD

## HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

DEFENSE POLICY PANEL

AND THE

MILITARY PERSONNEL AND  
COMPENSATION SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARINGS HELD

APRIL 3, JULY 23, 28, 29, AND AUGUST 5, 1987

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## **MARINE SECURITY GUARD SYSTEM AT DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS ABROAD**

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
DEFENSE POLICY PANEL AND THE MILITARY PERSONNEL AND COMPENSATION SUBCOMMITTEE,

*Washington, DC, Friday, April 3, 1987.*

The panel and subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Les Aspin (chairman of the panel) presiding.

### **OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LES ASPIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WISCONSIN, CHAIRMAN, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL**

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order.

Today, we are taking a look into the Marine Security Guard System at diplomatic missions abroad. This hearing is intended to give members an overview of the MSG system, how the guards are selected, trained and supervised, plus some history of the MSG.

I have also asked the witnesses to be prepared to present some background and statistics on past disciplinary problems in the MSG; what kinds of problems they have had, how frequently, and what has been done about them.

Let me say at the outset that the recent Moscow incidents involving the Marine Guards are not a specific topic of this hearing. The Moscow incidents are the subject of ongoing investigations with some criminal charges already preferred.

It is not appropriate to deal with ongoing investigations in an open hearing. Furthermore, our witnesses are not directly responsible for the investigations and should not be put in a position where they have to speculate on the facts at issue.

Members can ask any question they like, but the witnesses do have the option of declining to answer if it does get into the investigation area.

That still leaves us with a lot of ground to cover since questions have been raised as to whether the Security Guard mission is best handled by the Marine Corps.

Our witnesses today are Maj. Gen. Carl E. Mundy, Jr., Director of the Operations Division, Headquarters Marine Corps; Col. Carmine Del Grosso, Commanding Officer of the Marine Security Guard Battalion at Quantico; and Donald Ness of the State Department. Mr. Ness is Director of the Office of Overseas Security Programs.

This is a joint hearing of the Defense Policy Panel and the Military Personnel and Compensation Subcommittee. Before I turn the

floor over to our witnesses, I would like to call on Mrs. Byron, who chairs the Personnel Subcommittee, and the ranking minority members for their comments.

Mrs. Byron.

**STATEMENT OF HON. BEVERLY B. BYRON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MARYLAND, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY PERSONNEL AND COMPENSATION SUBCOMMITTEE**

Mrs. BYRON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Marine Corps was formally given the guard mission at our Embassies after World War II. I find that it has been a long time since we have looked at the Marine Security Guard System, and I think it is appropriate that we do so now, not simply because of the painful incident in Moscow and the recent loss of four Marine guards in El Salvador, but because I think we have gone too long without posing questions.

I come to these hearings with a very open mind, and I don't know whether the most reasonable method for providing security is through the Marine Corps or through the use of other means. I do know that there are a lot of young Marines being sent a long way from home in areas where it is sometimes difficult to adjust.

I also know that there is no way the security of our Embassies can be guarded unless we are willing to put in several battalions, and I don't think that is our intent.

Unfortunately, all Marine Guards can't serve in London, Paris or Rome. I know that the relationship between the Marines and local personnel in these locations is very good. Often there are problems, extreme loneliness, drinking problems. I would like to have this put into a proper perspective and hope that these hearings will accomplish an overall view of our Marine security and use of Marine security guards.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Let me turn the hearing over to our witnesses for any opening statements that they might have.

General, do you want to begin?

**STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. CARL E. MUNDY, JR., DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS DIVISION, HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS, ACCOMPANIED BY COL. CARMINE J. DEL GROSSO, COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE MARINE SECURITY GUARD BATTALION, QUANTICO, VA; AND DONALD L. NESS, OFFICE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF OVERSEAS SECURITY PROGRAMS, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

General MUNDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate being here today, and I have a statement for the record which you have been provided copies of, and I ask that it be inserted in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be inserted at this point in the record.

General MUNDY. My statement is intentionally brief, intended to cover those aspects in your letter that you sent Secretary Weinberger in announcing these hearings.

I will read some of it to you. As you have identified, Mr. Chairman, as the Director of Operations at the Marine Headquarters, I am responsible, among other things, for staff oversight of Marine security forces in general, and included in that is the Marine security guard Battalion.

So, that is my function here. Accompanying me, as you indicated are Colonel Del Grosso, who commands the Marine Security Guard Battalion, and Mr. Ness, to take questions that would be directed more properly to the State Department.

In response to your request, today I will present to you, as you have highlighted, an overview of Marine Security Guard operations, to include some history of the Marine Security Guard program; and the selection, training and supervision of Marine Security Guards.

The revelation of the disturbing allegations of malfeasance of duty by some of our MSG's at the U.S. Embassy at Moscow is of great concern to the Marine Corps.

At the direction of the Secretary of Defense, we are, in coordination with the Department of State and the Naval Security and Investigative Command, conducting an extensive investigation into the circumstances of the case.

I would like to thank the chairman for recognizing the sensitivity of this investigation by establishing the ground rules concerning discussion of these matters. We sincerely appreciate, Mr. Chairman, your understanding that we are limited in what we should say publicly under these circumstances, so thank you for that.

Concurrently, the Marine Corps is reviewing the Marine Security Guard policies and procedures. If there were weaknesses in areas we are responsible for, we will identify and correct them. As you are also aware, the State Department has also announced its intent to conduct a broad assessment of security procedures.

As to the origins of the Marine Security Guard program, I believe that you are basically familiar with that. It goes back several years to a time when the State Department looked at their practice of hiring civilian guards and decided to request the use of military personnel.

Section 562 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 authorized the Secretary of the Navy to assign enlisted members of the Naval Service to serve as custodians at Embassies, legations and consulates under the supervision of the principal officer.

In 1956, this authorization was incorporated into Title 10 of the U.S. Code as section 5983. Marines were first assigned to this duty in 1949, following a 15 December 1948 formal signing of a memorandum of agreement between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Navy.

That memorandum of agreement has been updated several times, the most recent update having been signed this past December by the Secretary of State and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. That is the historical overview.

From the standpoint of the size of the Marine Security Guard Battalion, as has appeared several times in the press thus far, there are presently over 1,300 Marine Security Guards assigned to 140 locations worldwide.



The Security Guard Battalion commanded by Colonel Del Grosso and the Security Guard school, which he also runs, is located at Quantico.

The Marines serve in MSG Detachments which are administered by five MSG Company field grade commanders: Company A in Frankfurt, West Germany; Company B in Casablanca, Morocco; Company C in Manila, Republic of the Philippines; Company D in Panama City, Panama; and Company F in Nairobi, Kenya.

An MSG detachment has a staff noncommissioned officer as its commander and varies in its size from five watch standers in our smallest detachments to 36 watch standers at our Embassy in Paris, France.

Marines must volunteer for the MSG program. Applicants are screened for Marine Security Guard duty by the Commanding Officer, who uses a criteria checklist promulgated by Marine Corps order. We have included a copy of that in the statement.

Marines must be Lance Corporals, pay grade E-3 or above, with a good record of service. In actuality, about 50 percent of those who apply are already NCO's, usually corporals or sergeants.

They must be American citizens and possess a current national agency check. Sergeants and below must agree to remain unmarried because Marines live dormitory style while on post, working up to 50 hours a week, often at night and on weekends in a rotating guard shift.

Normally, this arrangement ensures the availability of MSG's for reaction to emergencies from the Marine House and normally facilitates rapid transfer of personnel to support short-term diplomatic security requirements at other locations. We do that frequently.

A background investigation is conducted by the Defense Investigative Service on each Marine Security Guard. This investigation is initiated before the Marine transfers to the MSG school in Quantico. During the screening interview by the field commander, the disciplinary record of the Marine is reviewed and his service record is examined for any indication of financial irresponsibility, or indication of inability to function in this demanding situation.

A copy of that criteria is attached.

The most important element in the screening process, of course, is the Commander's evaluation of the performance of the Marine. He must have performed very well during this period of service in order to be selected and assigned.

After that screening is done, he is nominated to Headquarters Marine Corps, and he is approved by Headquarters Marine Corps and assigned to the Marine Security Guard school.

As for training, Marine Security Guards attend a 6-week course at Quantico prior to assignment to duty overseas. Detachment Commanders receive an additional two weeks of training. The training is rigorous and the screening is continuous, with 27 percent of the prospective Marine Security Guards and 31 percent of the prospective Detachment Commanders returned to their parent commands for failing to successfully measure up to the demanding requirements for course completion.

Lack of maturity, insufficient leadership ability and failure to keep an acceptable academic average are frequent causes for failure at MSG school.

The curriculum for the Marine Security Guard school is determined jointly by the Diplomatic Security Service of the Department of State and Marine Security Guard Battalion.

The curriculum is reviewed and updated annually. The Diplomatic Security Service provides professional security officers to instruct some specific security subjects and the functioning of a diplomatic mission overseas.

The 6-week school for Marine Security Guards contains 350 hours of instruction designed to prepare a Marine for duty at our diplomatic facilities overseas.

You have seen the figure quoted, 254 hours. That is accurate in terms that that is time in the classroom. There is additional time for physical fitness, preparation of uniforms and those sorts of things that add on the additional, time, totaling to 350 hours.

The Marine Security Guard students receive about 70 hours of instruction on performing security functions and coping with a foreign environment. Specific classes include: Conduct in a Foreign Environment, Reporting Contacts by Hostile Agents, Deterring Hostile Intelligence Subversion, Classified Material Procedures, Conducting Security Inspections and Briefings on Soviet Bloc Countries.

Sixty percent of the program of instruction is given by MSG personnel. 30 percent of this instruction is taught by Department of State instructors. The additional 10 percent of the instruction is presented by persons from other agencies.

The remaining instruction focuses on the physical security aspects of Marine Security Guard duty, such as marksmanship skills, personal protective measures and operating security-related equipment.

This training is extensive in order that Marines become familiar with the Department of State security equipment and procedures and well-versed and highly skilled in the application of deadly force.

The program of instruction for MSG school is attached.

With regard to assignment, once trained, Marine Security Guards are assigned to one diplomatic post for roughly 15 months, and then to a second post for a like period. This 30-month split tour arrangement provides relief from the hardships associated with rigorous duty and assignment to isolated posts or those with restrictive environments.

The same split-tour policy applies to MSG Detachment Commanders, except that because of the desire for more continuity in these billets and the additional costs associated with moving families, those Marines are assigned for approximately 18-month tours at each post.

The Department of State-Marine Corps memorandum of understanding on the operation of the MSG program—we have also attached a copy, and I believe you have had reference to that—was signed, as mentioned, most recently by the Secretary of State and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

It specifies the terms and relationships under which Marine Corps personnel are utilized in the Department of State's security program overseas. It also provides a statement of the responsibil-

ities of the Department of State and the Marine Corps in support of the program.

The MOU states that the primary mission of Marine Security Guards is to provide security services to Embassies, legations and consulates under the direction of the Chief of Mission. These services include protection of classified and administratively controlled material and equipment, U.S. personnel, and property within the premises of that mission.

In performing these duties, the Marines are prepared to execute instructions for the protection of foreign service posts and their personnel in emergency situations. They will include special protection services under certain circumstances for the Chief of Diplomatic Mission.

Within the Department of State, the Director of the Diplomatic Security Service is responsible for all operational aspects of the Marine Security Guard Detachments, and through his professional security officers in the field, he determines the specific requirements for each post.

Associate Directors for Security are the senior security representatives of the Diplomatic Security Service. Our five MSG Commanders worldwide coordinate directly with the Associate Directors for Security.

At each post, acting in behalf of the Chief of Mission, Regional or Post Security Officers prescribe local guard requirements, coordinate them with the Marine Detachment Commander and operationally supervise the performance of the Marines in the execution of those duties.

The Regional or Post Security Officers write the guard orders which contain the detailed instructions and directions for the Marines.

The Detachment Commander of the Marines responds directly to the Security Officer in the performance of these duties. The RSO or PSO is the immediate supervisor of the MSG Detachment at the mission.

The Commanding Officer of the Marine Security Guard Battalion screens, trains, posts and administers the Marines assigned to the program. Through his subordinate company commanders, he is responsible for maintaining Marine Corps standards and retains disciplinary authority over his Marines.

With regard to good order and discipline, approximately one out of 11 MSG's receive some form of disciplinary action. However, the majority of disciplinary problems are due to minor infractions and result in nonjudicial punishment by the company commander.

More serious cases are handled by Colonel Del Grosso. Almost all of these are removed from the program, and that amounts to about 5 percent of the Marine Security Guards in the program in a given year.

This percentage of disciplinary action is statistically consistent with the Marine Corps as a whole. While it might seem reasonable to expect Marines who have been carefully screened would have fewer disciplinary problems, we attribute the MSG rate to the demanding aspects of the duty and to our insistence upon the highest standards of performance.

Mr. Chairman, in your letter, you asked that we address the matter of alternatives to the Marine Corps role in guarding diplomatic missions.

We believe this question would more appropriately be directed to the Department of State. The Marine Corps has not undertaken a specific examination of alternatives to the Security Guard mission. By this, I mean looking at alternatives other than the use of Marines at these particular posts. We are tasked to do it, and we perform the mission.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, Madam Chairman, and other distinguished members, the foregoing is an overview of the Marine Security Guard Program. I hope it has been useful in broadening your understanding of the Marine Corps' role in security of Foreign Service posts.

We know you have a number of questions concerning the matters discussed, and I and those with me are prepared to respond to them.

Thank you.

**PREPARED STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. CARL E. MUNDY, JR.**

Mr. Chairman, Madam Chairman and distinguished members of the Defense Policy Panel and Military Personnel and Compensation Subcommittee:

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. As Director of Operations at Marine Corps Headquarters, I am responsible, among other things, for staff oversight of Marine Corps Security Forces, including the Marine Security Guard Battalion. Accompanying me today is Colonel Sean Del Grosso, the Commanding Officer of that Battalion. Appearing with Colonel Del Grosso and me to assist in answering questions you may have concerning matters under the cognizance of the Department of State is the Director of the Office of Overseas Security Programs, Mr. Don Ness.

In response to your request of the Secretary of Defense, I will present to you today, an overview of Marine Security Guard operations to include some history of the Marine Security Guard program; and the selection, training and supervision of Marine Security Guards.

The revelation of the disturbing allegations of malfeasance of duty by some of our MSGs at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow is of great concern to the Marine Corps. At the direction of the Secretary of Defense, we are, in coordination with the Department of State and the Naval Security and Investigative Command, conducting an extensive investigation into the circumstances of the case. I would like to thank the Chairman for recognizing the sensitivity of this investigation by establishing the ground rules concerning discussion of these matters.

Concurrently, the Marine Corps is reviewing Marine Security Guard policies and procedures. If there are weaknesses in areas we are responsible for, we will identify and correct them. The State Department has also announced its intent to conduct a broad assessment of security procedures.

ORIGINS OF THE MARINE SECURITY GUARD PROGRAM

The present Marine Security Guard program evolved from a post-World War II examination by the Department of State of its practice of hiring local civilians to guard Foreign Service posts. Section 562 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 authorized the Secretary of the Navy to assign enlisted members of the naval

service to serve as custodians at embassies, legations and consulates under the supervision of the principal officer. In 1956 this authorization was incorporated into Title 10 of the U.S. Code as Section 5983.

Marines were first assigned to this duty in January 1949 following the 15 December 1948 signing of a formal "Memorandum of Agreement" by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Navy on the use of Marines as security guards at foreign service posts. The most recent Memorandum of Understanding on the Marine Security Guard Battalion was signed by Secretary of State and the Commandant of the Marine Corps on 15 December 1986.

#### SIZE OF THE MARINE SECURITY GUARD BATTALION

There are presently over 1300 Marine Security Guards assigned to 140 locations worldwide. The Marine Security Guard Battalion Headquarters and MSG School are located in Quantico, Virginia.

The Marines serve in MSG Detachments which are administered by five MSG Company field grade commanders: Company A in Frankfurt, West Germany; Company B in Casablanca, Morocco; Company C in Manila, Republic of the Philippines; Company D in Panama City, Panama; and Company F in Nairobi, Kenya. An MSG detachment has a staff noncommissioned officer as its commander and varies in size from five watchstanders in our smallest detachments to 36 watchstanders at our embassy in Paris, France.

#### SELECTION PROCESS

Marines must volunteer for the MSG program. Applicants are screened for Marine Security Guard duty by their Commanding Officer, who uses a criteria checklist to assist the screening process. Marines must be Lance Corporals or above with a good record of service. They must be American citizens and possess a current National Agency Check. Sergeants and below must agree to remain unmarried, because Marines live dormitory-style while on post, working up to 50 hours per week, often at night and on weekends in a rotating guard shift. Normally this arrangement ensures the availability of MSGs for reaction to emergencies from the Marine House and normally facilitates rapid transfer of personnel to support short term diplomatic security requirements at other locations.

A Background Investigation is conducted by the Defense Investigative Service on each Marine Security Guard. This investigation is initiated before the Marine transfers to the MSG School in Quantico. During the screening interview by the field commander the disciplinary record of the Marine is reviewed and his service record is examined for any indication of financial irresponsibility. A copy of the criteria is attached.

As a final check before assignment to MSG School, the Marine must be recommended for Marine Security Guard duty by his field commander; the man who knows him best. A Marine may meet all of the checklist items required by Marine Corps directive, but without this recommendation, he is ineligible for the duty.

#### TRAINING OF MARINE SECURITY GUARDS

Marine Security Guards attend a six week school at Quantico, Virginia prior to assignment to duty overseas. Detachment Commanders receive an additional two weeks of training. Training is rigorous and screening continuous, with 27% of the prospective Marine Security Guards and 31% of the prospective Detachment Commanders returned to their parent commands for failing to successfully measure up to the demanding requirements for course completion. Lack of maturity, insufficient leadership ability and failure to keep an acceptable academic average are frequent causes for failure at MSG School.

The curriculum for the Marine Security Guard School is determined jointly by the Diplomatic Security Service of the Department of State and the Marine Security Guard Battalion. The curriculum is reviewed and updated annually. The Diplomatic Security Service provides professional security officers to instruct some specific security subjects and the functioning of a diplomatic mission.

The six week school for Marine Security Guards contains 350 hours of instruction designed to prepare a Marine for duty at our diplomatic facilities overseas. The MSG students receive about 70 hours of instruction on performing security functions and coping with a foreign environment. Specific classes include: Conduct in a Foreign Environment, Reporting Contacts by Hostile Agents, Detering Hostile Intelligence Subversion, Classified Material Procedures, Conducting Security Inspections and Briefings on Soviet Bloc

Countries. Sixty percent of the program of instruction is given by MSG personnel. Thirty percent of this instruction is taught by Department of State instructors. The additional ten percent of the instruction is presented by persons from other agencies.

The remaining instruction focuses on the physical security aspects of Marine Security Guard duty such as marksmanship skills, personal protective measures and operating security-related equipment. This training is extensive in order that Marines become familiar with the Department of State security equipment and procedures and well versed and highly skilled in the application of deadly force.

The program of instruction for MSG School is attached.

#### ASSIGNMENT OF MARINE SECURITY GUARDS

Once trained, Marine Security Guards are assigned to one diplomatic post for roughly 15 months and then to a second post for a like period. This 30 month split-tour arrangement provides relief from the hardships associated with rigorous duty and assignment to isolated posts or those with restrictive environments.

The same split-tour policy applies to MSG Detachment Commanders except that because of the desire for more continuity in these billets and the additional costs associated with moving families, those Marines are assigned for approximately 18 month tours at each post.

#### DOS - USMC MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE MSG PROGRAM

The Memorandum of Understanding or "MOU," also attached, which the Secretary of State and the Commandant of the Marine Corps reaffirmed in December specifies the terms and relationships under which Marine Corps personnel are utilized in the Department of State's security program overseas. It also provides a statement of the responsibilities of the DOS and the Corps in support of the program.

The MOU states the primary mission of Marine Security Guards is to provide security services to the embassies, legations and consulates under the direction of the Chief of Mission. These services include protection of classified and administratively controlled material and equipment, United States personnel, and



property within the premises. In performing these duties the Marines are prepared to execute instructions for the protection of Foreign Service posts and their personnel in emergency situations. This will include special protection services under certain situations for the Chief of Diplomatic Mission.

Within the Department of State the Director of the Diplomatic Security Service is responsible for all operational aspects of the MSG detachments and through his professional security officers overseas, determines specific requirements for each post.

Associate Directors for Security (ADS) are the senior security representatives of the Diplomatic Security Service. Our five MSG Company Commanders work very closely with the ADS.

At each post, acting in behalf of the Chief of Mission, Regional or Post Security Officers prescribe local guard requirements, coordinate them with MSG Detachment Commanders, and operationally supervise the performance of the Marines in the execution of these duties. RSOs or PSOs write the guard orders which contain the detailed instructions and directions for the Marines. The Detachment Commander of the Marines responds directly to the security officer in the performance of these duties. The RSO or PSO is the immediate operational supervisor of the MSG Detachment.

The Commanding Officer of the Marine Security Guard Battalion screens, trains, posts and administers the Marines assigned to the program. Through his subordinate company commanders, he is responsible for maintaining Marine Corps standards and retains disciplinary authority over, his Marines.

With regard to good order and discipline, approximately one out of 11 MSGs receive some form of disciplinary action. However, the majority of disciplinary problems are due to minor infractions and result in nonjudicial punishment by the company commander.

This percentage of disciplinary actions is statistically consistent with the Marine Corps as a whole. While it might seem reasonable to expect Marines who have been carefully screened would have fewer disciplinary problems, we attribute the MSG rate to the demanding aspects of the duty and to our insistence upon the highest standards of performance.

ALTERNATIVES TO THE MARINE CORPS ROLE

IN GUARDING DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS

In your letter you asked that we address the matter of alternatives to the Marine Corps role in guarding diplomatic missions. We believe this question would more appropriately be directed to the Department of State. The Marine Corps has not undertaken a specific examination of alternatives to the security guard mission.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, Madam Chairman, distinguished members, the foregoing is an overview of the Marine Security Guard Program. I hope it has been useful in broadening your understanding of the Marine Corps' role in security of Foreign Service Posts. We know you have a number of questions concerning the matters discussed, and I and those with me are prepared to respond to them.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Do either of the other gentlemen have a statement? Mr. Ness.

Mr. NESS. No, sir, I don't.

Colonel DEL GROSSO. Mr. Chairman, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to recognize other members, but let me start out with a question that you may not be able to answer.

Have you heard of any others who have been implicated, other than the three Marines we are talking about now?

General MUNDY. No, sir. I have no information.

The CHAIRMAN. I have on very good evidence, very good sources, that two more Marines have been implicated in violation of the fraternization rules, and the concern is that the two of them might have been together on a number of duties as the Lonetree-Bracy combination.

The people I talked to late last night were discouraged by the thought that this was much bigger.

General MUNDY. I have no information on that at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Beverly Byron.

Mrs. BYRON. Is the MSG duty considered an elitist group, sought-after duty? You said it is volunteer.

General MUNDY. It is voluntary. It is usually in the top three of the highest rates of reenlistment that we have in the Marine Corps. It is a carefully screened program. If that would be appropriately termed "elitist", I would say that the MSG—

Mrs. BYRON. Would you look at it as the best of the Corps?

General MUNDY. Yes, ma'am the cream of the crop.

Mrs. BYRON. The reenlistment rate after a tour of duty with the MSG, does that come in around the same percentage that the rest of the Corps does?

General MUNDY. No, it is higher. Again, as mentioned, the MSG battalion usually stands among the top three organizations in the Marine Corps in reenlistment.

Mrs. BYRON. In the remote and hardship duty post with 15 months in one area, which is usually a remote hardship duty post, the other is a 15-month tour in what other type of post, either a smaller post, or what type of a measure do you try to come up with?

General MUNDY. I will defer to Colonel Del Grosso.

Colonel DEL GROSSO. Let me talk to that for a moment. Each year my company commanders and I sit down and review a list of 140 Embassies and consulates. We look at these in terms of austerity of the post, isolation, availability to social amenities, maybe a combat zone and we rank these.

We find that the two toughest posts are N'Djamena, Chad, followed by Kabul, Afghanistan. The list works its way down to 140 places—

Mrs. BYRON. Are both of those posts fairly small?

Colonel DEL GROSSO. Yes, ma'am, they are.

Mrs. BYRON. One of the questions that I had here, is it more difficult to serve in a smaller post in a remote area as opposed to having the larger number, which we have in Moscow, I believe it is 29 at that post—is it more difficult, do you find for the Marines serving that post of five to ten as opposed to a large post?

Colonel DEL GROSSO. I understand the question. All posts have their own challenges. Second, what normally happens as a rule of thumb at a smaller post a Marine is part of the country team. He feels part of it. His exposure to other members of the team is more frequent as opposed to a larger post.

Generally, a larger post is Paris; a large Embassy like Mexico city would be 800 people. Sometimes you have problems of alienation. But on the smaller post, it is sort of a family approach.

As you move up the spectrum toward the larger post and the things that go with a larger post in terms of numbers of people, there is some degree of alienation, but it is not a problem.

Mrs. BYRON. The age factor involved, you have a majority of Marines on their first tour, but they must have 32 months, I believe, left of service or be willing to reenlist. What is the average age—I am referring to the Marine with a first tour of duty in an Embassy post.

General MUNDY. Twenty-four years old is the average age of the Marine Security Guard watch standing force. The noncommissioned officers, I think, stand at 29 years old.

Mrs. BYRON. So, we are not really looking at the new young recruit, the 18 to 20-year-old, that a maturity factor would play a role. In that group, what is the disciplinary percentage of problems?

General MUNDY. He executes it, I will defer to him.

Colonel DEL GROSSO. Given that the average watchstander in the field today is a senior corporal, 24 years of age, his Detachment Commander averages 29 years of age with about 11 years of service—the statistics of NJP administered in the battalion for 1986 was 159 cases.

Of those 159 cases, 99 of them were disposed of at the company level in the field. The Marine remained on the program. Of the remainder, 60 were returned to the battalion for my adjudication.

Of those 60, 58 were dismissed from the program. Two were returned because the charges were dropped. Of those 58 dropped from the program, normally and traditionally over the last decade these terminations in the program come from four areas: Early marriage; the most part from infraction of Marine Corps regulations; third, financial irresponsibility, and to a small part drugs and drinking.

But I would like to qualify that. The battalion has an extremely low drug rate. It is .0053. What I mean by that statistic also, there have been twenty-two Marines in the last 2 years that somehow in the NJP cycle have been terminated for drinking-related matters.

As far as drugs, that .0053 represents seven drug cases in two years, and no hard drugs.

Mrs. BYRON. Is that low or high for the rest of the Corps?

Colonel DEL GROSSO. The NJP of one in 11 mentioned earlier by General Mundy runs about the same as the remainder of our fleet Marine forces. The drug statistic that I rendered is somewhat lower.

Mrs. BYRON. The young men that start the course, what percentage complete?

Colonel DEL GROSSO. As mentioned by General Mundy, but it bears repeating, when the trainee comes to the battalion, the attri-

tion rate for watch standers is 27 percent, and that has been a statistic over the last five years, and consistent within each year.

Mrs. BYRON. In other words, when you deploy these young Marines to duty, you feel you have screened them to the "nth" degree?

Colonel DEL GROSSO. May I respond to your question in two ways? Another statistic which may be helpful to you in your deliberations is the Detachment Commander's attrition rate and I use Commander's, because this is the only time in a staff NCO's career where he is given the full responsibilities of a Commander, is 31 percent over the last 5 years in the attrition cycle.

As far as the screening process, did you want to direct more questions to that?

Mrs. BYRON. Let's move to the screening process to look at the criteria that you are looking at as a Marine, to take the men out of a regular Marine Corps career and field to put them into a special scenario where they are by and large on their own, and in unusual and unfamiliar surroundings. What type of an individual are you looking for to handle that job, because in the remote post or the difficult post, a lot of them in the Third World nations, there are extenuating circumstances as far as pressures that you do not expect to find on the average individual.

One is basically looking at the screening process that you use to define which young Marines are going to go into that group.

General MUNDY. Well, I presume—I will continue with Colonel Del Grosso's theme here. We believe that the candidates that we put into the school are, as I have stated, about the best screened that we can get.

With regard to the screening at the school, they are there for 2 months. They are, of course, in both a classroom and then in an active environment in terms of marksmanship training, the physical training and demands of the uniform inspections, so the instructors, who themselves are experienced Marine Security Guard Marines, have an opportunity to keep a close eye on these young people going through school.

That probably contributes to the attrition rate that we have described, the 27 and 31 percent. He gets a good look at them before they are sent to the field, if that is the thrust of your question.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me follow up—what security clearances do these people go through, the people who are going to be assigned to this duty?

General MUNDY. They must have a national agency check completed as an applicant. When they are assigned to the Marine Security Guard Battalion, a background investigation is initiated on them.

When they emerge from that course, then they are given an interim top-secret clearance to be assigned to the field, and their final top-secret clearance comes through within 6 months thereafter.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you use polygraphs in the security check of the Marine guards?

General MUNDY. Not as a matter of practice for each Security Guard going in.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you conduct any periodic reviews after the person has been selected for this Marine Security Guard Detachment, and is assigned, is there any follow-up investigation?

General MUNDY. No, sir, not as a matter of practice.

The CHAIRMAN. The reason I raise these questions is that I remember when I was on the Intelligence Committee, and we were looking into this, and it seemed to me and to the Intelligence Committee that we were doing the wrong kind of investigations at the time. That what we do when we try and find people for sensitive jobs is we do a sensitive background investigation, go out and talk to their high school teachers and the whole background investigation, whereas what we have seen in certain cases is that people become spies or get involved in espionage sometime in their life, and there is nothing in their background that shows it.

In other words, they weren't born into it, they didn't take subscriptions to Pravda, but what happens is somewhere along the line, either because of revenge or money or a personal crisis, they get involved with the KGB. What we ought to do is place less emphasis on the background investigation and much more emphasis on periodic security checks with polygraphs if necessary, in highly sensitive posts like Warsaw Pact countries. That is where we ought to be putting our emphasis, rather than on the kind of background checks of going and talking to their Sunday school teacher.

General MUNDY. I take your point, and I think it is a valid one. As to the continuing evaluations, as I have stated, we have not had heretofore a standard practice of polygraph examinations.

The man is under scrutiny, supervised by supervisors, and that is the extent of the continuing evaluation in terms of security matters.

The CHAIRMAN. This is all under the Marine Corps. The State Department does not conduct any independent security checks on the guards, is that true, Mr. Ness?

Mr. NESS. That is true, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. So, the whole business of selecting the people and doing their background checks and certifying that these people are okay is left to the Marines, is that right?

Mr. NESS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Looking back on the history of people who have become involved in activities and ended up betraying their country, it doesn't show up in their early life or their history, but it might show up in a psychological profile.

Let me tell you how I think, if we were to totally reorganize the security check operation, you ought to do a background check. The check would not be as extensive as we do now, but more concerned with a psychological profile of the individual to see how susceptible they would be.

History shows us cases of people that, because of sex or money or revenge, sometimes do what they are doing just because they feel that their boss has done something to them and they are going to get even, they turn to getting involved with the KGB. That comes only with later life.

So, really, the way to do a background check is through a psychological profile, but not nearly as extensive, but then periodically polygraphs, I would say when the person is involved in the job.

General MUNDY. It is a good point, sir, and I should have mentioned that we do have a psychologist who is assigned to the Marine Security Guard Battalion. That is a recent permanent assignment. Heretofore, he has been available, assigned at Quantico and had other duties, so he has performed this on additional-duty basis.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that person now involved with the training unit as the people go through their training?

Colonel DEL GROSSO. He is a Lieutenant Commander in the Navy, a fully qualified psychologist, who has been with us for over a year. Upon entry into the school, they are administered a battery of tests—the right stuff. We are working together and have for quite a while in the program to gather that type of empirical data. We use that tool.

We also have a chaplain.

The CHAIRMAN. Charlie.

Mr. BENNETT. Thank you.

The first thing I would like to ask is what establishment things, what procedural things do you think are needed to improve the present system?

General MUNDY. Mr. Bennett, we are at the present time—as I mentioned, we are conducting really a close look into our procedures, and into the way that we do business in the Marine Security Guard program.

I must tell you that we are very proud of the program. It is perhaps possible that our lines have been penetrated, but our position hasn't been overrun, to put it in military terms at this point.

So, we want to make sure that as we look at things we might do to fix the program; we want to make sure we know what the problem is, if there is a problem, before we apply it.

I think what Mr. Aspin referred to in the screening was those sorts of things we are looking at. We are looking at things that might involve more frequent rotations or other management practices, but usually speaking, we fix most of our problems with the application of good leadership.

Mr. BENNETT. As an ex-soldier, I would say that is the best solution, good leadership. There are problems in leadership that have to be addressed.

One of them is a leader can't look too intimately into the life of the person that is under him in the sense that he is clucking over him like his daddy or something like that. On the other hand, he ought to know more about him than probably is taking place at the present time.

I have been involved in things like this during World War II. I don't know whether the systems are the same or not. I assume they are not, because you are not mentioning things that I think could be done, and I would be glad to talk to you about them if you want to talk about them. I don't hear you saying anything about them, but there were procedures used in World War II that you haven't mentioned that would be better.

It is a great thing to have psychological studies of people as they go along to see if something could have upset them, and polygraphs are very valuable, the background study is valuable, but in my

opinion, the thing that is most valuable is the temptations which occur.

A person could have been a Sunday school teacher or a wonderful guy in every way, he could be psychologically healthy, but if you allow somebody to live under certain circumstances, the numerical chances are that he will become involved, and I don't hear you addressing that.

It is fairly sensitive, therefore I don't know how much I should address here. Peer pressure makes it very difficult to get information like that. Put it this way—if you have a younger brother and he started on drugs, or heavy use of alcohol or something alike that, you would have a concern for him, and from the standpoint of an older brother, you would try to see if there was something that could be done to make it better for him.

It is not from a standpoint of getting people in trouble, it is from the standpoint of keeping people out of trouble, because a lot of these things I think occur when a person was basically a good person.

He may even be psychologically pretty well off, but he is doing things which eventually are going to lead to his own ruin and probably the lack of security of his country. And some time, I would like to talk to you, if you would phone me, and we could talk about things we did in World War II which I think were very helpful for the young person involved, and also for the security of it.

You are so young perhaps you don't remember, but you are a general.

General MUNDY. Sir, I read about you during the War.

Mr. BENNETT. What I am really trying to get at, is there any structure today to carry out the sort of things that I referred to?

General MUNDY. Well, again, Mr. Bennett, I would say that with regard to the scrutiny of the individual, in other words looking at the individual and being with the individual as Colonel Del Grosso has characterized, are in many cases easy at very small detachments. Even a detachment of 37 is a platoon in structure in the military and not difficult.

So, there are a lot of interpersonal relationships. The Marine Guards live together.

Mr. BENNETT. To what extent does that information surface? I don't see a structure in anything you have said that would keep a man from getting in trouble if he was on his way to getting into trouble, because peer pressure would keep you from saying anything about it.

People could be fouling up and nobody is doing anything about it, because they feel they are not responsible for it, don't have to report it, the commander ought to know about it.

I am afraid there is nothing being done in the modern military that protects us from being seduced by tricky people. I don't see a structure. You are telling me there is none.

General MUNDY. The answer I would give is that in the structure of the chain of command—

Mr. BENNETT. If that is all there is to it, that is not enough, so give me a telephone call.

General MUNDY. All right, sir. I look forward to the discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Blaz.



Mr. BLAZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General Mundy, don't read anything into my opening line here, but welcome to the House, a warm welcome to the House.

General MUNDY. Thank you, sir.

Mr. BLAZ. I didn't read any of the material before I came here, but based on the material before me here, I am prompted to ask some questions that I think we need to have in the record.

For one thing, I notice that the memorandum of understanding between the Marine Corps and the Department of State undergoes a revision every 10 years, according to just a casual perusal of it. One would think that given the dynamics of the situation overseas that you might want to consider changing that to every 5 years, I would even say every 2 years.

In that manner, then, you would force yourself to reevaluate every year, every 2 years, rather than look toward a 10-year revision. I am basing it on this document before me that says it was revised in 1967, 1977 and December 15, 1986.

Second, I would like to ask a question—when you mentioned that the disciplinary rate, the nonjudicial punishment, the NJP that you mentioned is much like the rest of the Marine Corps, again one would think that given the kind of mission that you have, that you would expect a disciplinary rate considerably, dramatically and spectacularly less than the rest of the Marine Corps.

Would you care to comment on that?

Colonel DEL GROSSO. Sir, many of the Fleet Marine Corps Forces NJP's occur in a continental situation here in the United States. All we are pointing out is that one in 11 parallels the Fleet Marine Forces. Please keep in mind 1,300 of my watch standers are assigned abroad, and I don't think anyone would disagree that the social distractions, the challenges of living abroad are somewhat more difficult than for most U.S. Marine troops based in the Continental United States.

The average Marine here doesn't have a curfew, but our troops have to be home back in the Marine House by a certain time. So, although the number is one out of 11, a good majority of my infractions occur from curfews abroad.

So, the nature of the infractions is somewhat different. It is very difficult to compare the CONUS-based NJP ratios with the battalion.

Congressman, I don't know if I answered that to your satisfaction.

Mr. BLAZ. You didn't, but I will ask another question, perhaps to my satisfaction next time.

General Mundy, you mentioned that the Commanding Officer is responsible for his Marines, presumably you mean the U.S. Marines.

General MUNDY. Yes, sir.

Mr. BLAZ. Then, in another context here, we see that the Foreign Service Officer in the Embassy was the immediate supervisor of the same Marines. Somewhere along the line, there is a dual responsibility.

I want to ask you this question, sir. Who is responsible for the performance of the U.S. Marine that is serving in that Embassy,

for his conduct, for his future as a Marine, for his performance—are you, or is it a Foreign Service officer?

General MUNDY. Is the question to Colonel Del Grosso?

Mr. BLAZ. It doesn't make a difference. The Department of State, I have a question for you, too, sir.

General MUNDY. OP-CON and AD-CON, I think in Marine terminology, would best describe it. I know your background, so I think that is the best answer that I could give.

Mr. BLAZ. I am concerned about that because I saw in the newspaper where the Secretary of the Navy said that in the situation in Beirut, the Commandant of the Marine Corps was not responsible.

If the Commandant of the Marine Corps is not responsible for the situation in Beirut, a few years from now perhaps somebody will tell me who was. If they say the Marine Corps is not responsible for what happened in Moscow, maybe some day, somebody will tell me who was.

Is it possible, given today's environment and the way that our young men and women are these days, that 24 years might be a little bit too young, despite the fact that they are Marines, maybe because they are so—unmarried, there is no stability, is it possible that maybe what we should have are sergeants.

I know it grates the devil out of the Marines to think of Sergeants standing guard, but how about corporals, because many of us have 24-year-old children, and I shudder at the possibility that one of my 24-year-old sons would be standing and have that kind of responsibility.

Is it possible that we might be sending Marines that are just a little bit too young for that kind of responsibility, at least in the Iron Curtain countries?

General MUNDY. Mr. Congressman, I don't believe so, because I believe that the young men are properly selected to go on this duty, as we have described in responding to Mrs. Byron's questions earlier. Our screening process is very intense, the training process is very intense, and I feel much confidence in them to perform their duty.

One could speculate and say an older person, who is more mature, more settled, and less inclined to the problems or the joys, whichever way we would express it, of youth, might be a more stable commodity.

I could not substantiate that. We believe that the quality of the individual selected for the duty is the key.

Colonel DEL GROSSO. Historically, during the Vietnam context, there was such a drawdown of Marine forces abroad, that Marines were younger then. There is more maturity today in a 24-year-old Senior Corporal who is the basic watchstander.

Mr. BLAZ. In 30 years, has anything of this magnitude ever happened before?

General MUNDY. Not in the diplomatic service, no, sir.

Mr. BLAZ. One would think that in testimony such as this, you might want to consider mentioning at least in passing the incredibly outstanding performance up to this point, so that it would give some balance to the argument.

Finally, I want to ask you a very difficult question, General Mundy. I have heard from many sources, and from my own experi-

ences, some of the other services consider themselves not only good enough, but capable of doing a much better job than the Marines. Perhaps what we could do here is have a rotational basis, give it to the Marines for 4 years, to the Army for 4 years, to the Navy for 4, the Air Force for 4.

Perhaps we could get competition, yet I hear Marines saying that nobody can do it better than they can. I would like your response.

General MUNDY. I have not specifically been involved in these discussions. I believe that that type of rotation in the program might create an instability in the program. In other words, with the adoption of one set of solutions, oftentimes you may create a different set of problems.

So I think stability is critical for the program. The consistency you have mentioned, and I appreciate you bringing that to the attention of the committee, and I will amplify on it, is that for 38 years, 15,000 Marines have done what we believe to be an extraordinary job in this assignment.

Our lines may have been penetrated, but we still feel very good at the position. I could get into football cheers here, I suppose, and say grand things about Marines, and, of course, we who wear the suit believe in that.

If you look on the heaven's scenes, you will find the streets are guarded by U.S. Marines, as a theme is pretty serious to us. I think the program is good, and I don't think there is anybody better around to do it than U.S. Marines.

Mr. BLAZ. Thank you very much. I would like to say that I don't think we could have a better witness on this subject—it is a very difficult subject—than you two today from the Marine Corps.

Thank you.

General MUNDY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Pat Schroeder.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. I thank the Chairman for calling this hearing, because I think it is important. First, I want to emphasize what the Chairman said about periodic checks. I think that is very important. When I went to college, whenever we wanted to take more than the normal load, we had to take the Minnesota multiphasic battery of tests every single quarter before we could get permission to take more than the normal load. They kept that monitoring going, and I think that kind of thing is very important, so I think the Chairman makes a very good point.

Let me ask a bit about Moscow in particular. When we did the Foreign Service rewrite, we were very concerned about allowing spouses, for example, to work whenever possible, and one of the places that used it the most was Moscow, and what we heard was what can you do in Moscow?

The climate is not terrific, you can't volunteer to work in the art museums, you can't run around with the citizens. There aren't a lot of shopping opportunities. I know the State Department has been very focused on this for their own people, and very good about trying to get husband-and-wife teams in there, both with jobs, and they found that made a big difference in morale, that is my understanding from the State Department.

Is that correct?

Mr. NESS. Yes, that is correct, that the morale has increased with the working wife as opposed to a wife who has nothing to do.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. That has been very widespread in the Moscow Embassy, you have used that as much as you can?

Mr. NESS. Yes.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Moscow is where you first put it in because, as I remember, that was really difficult. My question is, maybe you know different 24-year-old American males than I do, but you are sending 24-year-old American males to Moscow when we were having trouble with married couples even adjusting to that scene, and you have rules against fraternization and so forth.

Have you ever thought about looking for and sending married couples to those kinds of posts? It seems to me that might make sense, and give you stability and a window into the kinds of things that have gone on here that you might not find out any other way.

My guess is that if either of these guys had had a spouse, you might have heard about this earlier.

General MUNDY. Yes, ma'am, I am sure we would have. Thank you, Mrs. Schroeder. Let me be very cautious again to say that I cannot talk about Moscow, about the Embassy in Moscow, so I must relate my answer in a broad context rather than specifically to that embassy. I am sure you appreciate that.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Let's make it broader then. In difficult situations such as Moscow, have you ever looked at sending married Marines there?

General MUNDY. We have and we are with the State Department. As you know, I think, it has been in the news that Ambassador Hartman has made statements about his belief that married Marines might provide stability such as you suggest there.

Certainly in the inquiry, we are looking into the procedures and things we are doing. I should tell you that with respect to the young families, watch standers are required to respond in the middle of the night on short notice, stand overnight watches, be deployed elsewhere for support of other contingencies such as when the Secretary of State goes to another embassy or mission.

With the young wife that makes up the very solid half of that young family with perhaps babies, we would then have to screen not only the suitable Marine, we would have to screen the wife who, one, wants to work, and who is capable of working. Her level of capability might be such that in the employment that she could be given in the Embassy, she might be in the service level of employment which is probably okay, but the service people are escorted about the Embassy as they clean it up and so forth by Marine security guards.

So we now have Corporal Smith supervising Sergeant Jones' wife as she goes about cleaning up the Embassy. What I am saying to you is it does merit looking into, and we are looking into it. There are additional problems that come with that type of alternative.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. I realize there are additional problems but the nice thing about it is they are our problems, and we can work them out, and they are not security problems. I think those kinds of problems we ought to really stretch and do whatever we can to try to work those out, because it really seems to me that that may be the way to go. Maybe you have a different history with 24 year old

males, and I don't think Marine males are different than any others, but celibacy is not a big thing for them and when you put them in that scenario, I think it is really tough and that has been one of the classic ways that you breach security.

Have you ever looked at using women in security guard situations?

General MUNDY. I cannot tell you that I am aware that we have ever looked at that. There are women Marines in the Security Guard Battalion, but they are not watch standers. They are at the Security Guard Battalion in Quantico, and I know of one overseas, but she is in one of the company headquarters.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Do the Marines have any reason why you have not put them in those battalions? I know the other services have used women more extensively in security and found it to be quite satisfactory.

Mr. NESS. If I could respond. A few years ago this question was raised and it was addressed and a trial period was made with women Marines. I don't recall the exact year it was done. I believe the trial assignments included 7 posts in different regions of the world at posts of different sizes, and with different hardships.

For reasons which I was not aware of at the time, I was overseas, the use of women Marines was discontinued. It created more problems than it solved. The problems were simple problems, the housing, other problems that related to the work force, the hours, the relationships with people. It was tried and for one reason or another which I cannot tell you for certain what it was, it was discontinued.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman and Madam Chair, I think it might be good if we had that report, because I would be interested to know whether those problems were our own physical problems, i.e., segregation of housing and that type of thing; or whether there was really something that women were not able to do in performing the job per se. Whether they were the physical problems in the arrangements that had to be made or whether it was job performance.

The Army has used women extensively and the Air Force has as well. The Marines have been a little behind in this. I think the "Few Good Men" thing may ring in the ears too much. There is a few good women out there, too.

Mr. BENNETT. You are not referring to males being inferior to women, are you?

Mrs. SCHROEDER. No, but equality seems to have worked well in security forces of other places.

General MUNDY. It is a very good point, and I would be surprised if we found in the report that you have asked to be provided to you that the performance was at all in question.

I support the fact that we have women Marines who do an extraordinarily fine job.

There are problems with the administration—in a Marine House situation with six, eight or ten Marines or however many, there are problems.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Sure, but I adore the Marines because they always come in "we are ready", "we will go", but one of the problems you guys have is when you have those kinds of problems, i.e.

you may need a little more money for housing, for women to help, to help couples abroad, whatever, you pull up your sox and decide you won't do it and you stay with all men. Sometimes you get in trouble. We will do without the floors in our tent or something.

On one hand I salute that. On the other hand, we can get in a lot of trouble doing that. If we look at the overall problem, if we can sort this out, maybe we can be much more helpful in finding out what we can do abroad to make your lifestyle a little better so those kinds of things are not quite so enticing.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Madam Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mel Price.

Mr. PRICE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Richard Ray.

Mr. RAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to address my comments to Mr. Ness.

For the last 2 or 3 years we have been getting some bad reports out of the Soviet Embassy. I know just 2 or 3 years ago there was a report that the telephone operators who were Soviet citizens employed by the Embassy, were taking calls and of course when the visitors would call in, these calls instead of being referred back to the Embassy would be referred back to the KGB. Congressman Courter on this committee became so concerned about a year-and-a-half ago that he drew up legislation that would remove the Soviet employees from the Embassy.

We know now that that has been done, but not by us, by the Soviets. In doing so Ambassador Hartman came to see Mr. Courter and Congressman Courter told me that the Ambassador prevailed on him and asked him not to introduce this legislation. He said that it is true that the Soviet employees are KGB approved, that his own driver was a colonel in the KGB, and that these people were already corrupted but that the Americans coming on the scene would just be corrupted if they came.

The thing that I wonder is, of course we have heard of other problems and I wonder if the environment of the way that Embassy was run—there may be others, too—didn't create problems in this respect. I guess the question I would ask, does the Ambassador and his staff have any control or any jurisdiction over the Marine Guards?

Mr. NESS. Mr. Ray, the Ambassador is the Chief of Mission in any foreign service mission, and as such is the leader of the mission and is responsible for all actions in there. Different responsibilities are then parceled out under his general oversight. The regional security officer who worked generally for the administrative counsel or is responsible to the Ambassador for the Marine security guard program and protection of the Embassy.

Mr. RAY. But the policy of employees in that, KGB approved Soviets, and I guess that is the only ones you could employ, and the strong fight by the Ambassador not to have those people removed seems to me might be an indication that the chickens have just not come home to roost in this case and others, too.

Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. General, Mr. Ness, and Colonel, let me ask a question that I have been puzzled about in this case.

You say that the rule that the Marines that are assigned are single men, that is a decision of the Marine Corps, is that correct?

General MUNDY. Yes, sir. Well, it is a joint decision between the Department of State and the Marine Corps. It is specified in the Memorandum of Understanding. We would advocate that rule and have advocated it in the past, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They are sent abroad for two assignments, is that the usual thing, of 15 months each?

General MUNDY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any rule about being married at all. What happens if you get married while you are abroad on an assignment?

General MUNDY. You see one of the company commanders or Colonel Del Grosso.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you stay or lose your post or can you stay there in the position?

Colonel DEL GROSSO. A few points on that, Mr. Chairman. The first is a Marine watchstander.

The CHAIRMAN. A what?

Colonel DEL GROSSO. A Marine watchstander, Sergeant and below, leaving his second 15-month post is allowed to get married in his last 10 days provided that she has the citizenship process under way so when he is coming off the program to return back to the United States, he can get married. We have a number of these instances.

The CHAIRMAN. A very high percentage?

Colonel DEL GROSSO. It depends on the country, sir. Secondly, when he goes on the program he signs some very elaborate paperwork to the effect that he guarantees he will not get married during the program. If he does or, say, for example, a local pregnancy occurs, this is serious reason for nonjudicial punishment. They come back and see me and we would relieve them of that duty.

The CHAIRMAN. You would remove them from the program?

Colonel DEL GROSSO. Sir, that is the regulation. They sign this, they are aware of this, this is part of the educational process in the school, and it is keen on their minds throughout their service duty.

The CHAIRMAN. In their training period how much training is a single Marine given about the possibilities of entrapment and other possible moves that the Soviet KGB agents might make to somehow ensnare them into doing espionage for the Soviet government?

Colonel DEL GROSSO. I think an appropriate response to that is a two-part question with State, but let me answer the Marine Corps' portion of it. As we mentioned earlier in the scholastic syllabus, 60 percent is taught by the Marine Corps, 30 percent by State.

In those 254 academic hours there is a good 6 to 8 hours which talk about these very things. So they receive it in the basic framework of their education.

If they go forward in their assignment, particularly to a Warsaw Pact country, they all receive additional education and briefings at the Department of State prior to their assignment in the field.

At a third level upon arrival in post, they receive this type of education from the regional security officer. At a fourth level on a periodic routine basis, once a month, there is a guard school where

again these type themes are briefed to them, reminders given, and during that guard school the RSO coupled with the detachment commander will talk to these issues. There are periodic Embassy-type briefings on that. There are about five levels of education on these themes which you address.

Perhaps my peer at State would care to talk to that also.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ness, do you want to add anything?

Mr. NESS. I have very little to add to that, sir. There are 4 hours specific instruction given to the Marine Guards by State Department personnel at Quantico dealing with this subject. When a Marine is selected to serve in an Iron Curtain country, he is again briefed by our counterintelligence staff on specific matters concerning that country.

The in-processing arrival briefing at any post includes all Marine security guards. In a country where this is of concern, that is again brought up to the individuals specifically relating to that particular country and a statement is signed that the briefing was given and understood.

Continuing education courses and comments are given by the regional security officer and the detachment commander throughout the tour.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Let me then ask about this so-called fraternization rule. What exactly is the fraternization rule and where does it come from? Is that a State Department rule?

Mr. NESS. Mr. Chairman, that is from the State Department, and it is a policy we have had in place for many years. The specifics of the nonfraternization rule come from a classified document, and if I may I would like to paraphrase some of the unclassified sections of it.

It basically sets forth the idea that the success of the Foreign Service rests in part on the ability of our personnel to establish effective business and social relationships with officials and citizens of other countries. Experience demonstrates that an intimate social relationship between an American and a citizen of certain designated countries cannot be maintained without a risk to both parties. There is a long and successive history of exploiting foreigners based upon romantic involvement and sexual activity with nationals of selected countries. It is expected and desired that officers seek out and maintain business and social contacts with officials and citizens of the countries as may be necessary to facilitate the efficient performance of their official duties.

The extent of that contact will be determined by objectives established by chiefs of mission and the Department.

All personnel should, however, avoid one-on-one relationships which could form the basis for intelligence activity directed against the American.

As a general rule official and acceptable social contact with citizens of selected countries should only be pursued in those instances when the contact clearly supports foreign policy objectives.

This policy applies no matter where the national resides or the American is assigned.

Basically it says no one-on-one contacts for other than official foreign policy reasons.



The CHAIRMAN. That rule basically applies to all embassy personnel and applies to the Diplomatic Corps as well as the military detachment?

Mr. NESS. Yes, sir, that is true. It is a full across-the-board application.

The CHAIRMAN. How stringently is it enforced? Are we talking here about something that is in place but people routinely avoid it or does it work?

Mr. NESS. The policy is in place, it is enforced.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder about that because as we pointed out a little earlier, this applies only in certain countries, correct?

Mr. NESS. Yes, sir. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. The fraternization rule is applicable only in Warsaw Pact countries?

Mr. NESS. The specific list of countries, sir, is in a classified portion of the document.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. But it does not apply to all countries. Do they have to sign a document to that effect, that they understand?

Mr. NESS. That they have been briefed to that extent, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. When you have a situation like the Marine ball at the Embassy in Moscow, who decides who can go to the Marine ball?

Mr. NESS. The Marines.

The CHAIRMAN. The Marines?

Mr. NESS. The Marines. It is a Marine ball, the invitations are extended by the Marines. Now that is the very basics. However—

General MUNDY. I am going to link arms with my State Department colleague and we will be good friends here but—Don, I think you would support me on this—the Marine Corps birthday ball traditionally is one of the social highlights at a lot of embassies around the world. So it involves broadly most everybody, usually the Ambassador is there at the head table, the young Marines organize it and they are very proud of their Corps and of the opportunity to celebrate the birthday.

But it is an Embassy affair.

I think in the stipulation of who can go to the ball, I would have to say that there has to be some sort of policy there in the Embassy that would govern that and that anyone that was brought to the ball would be done so only with the approval of the chain of command.

To what level I don't know.

Did I dispute you?

Mr. NESS. Not at all. I was getting to that. I have a very soft spot in my heart for the Marine security ball and bearing a Marine program. The realities of it is, as the General mentioned, it is the policy of American embassies that the invitations be widespread to include a variety of members of the staff and official contacts.

The CHAIRMAN. So it is just not a United States function, you invite people from the host country to the Marine ball?

Mr. NESS. They could be invited, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that essentially the decision of the Ambassador?

Colonel DEL GROSSO. Might I add at this point in time that at the Marine ball last year around the world, we added it up to see how

we did, there were over 40,000 guests. There were no nonjudicial punishments, or incidents from it. But normally what happens, the Marines choose their guests. Some of these guests on occasion may be high ranking diplomatic persons or military officials within that government, but normally that guest list for protocol purpose sensitivities is run up through the Deputy Chief of Mission and the Ambassador. He would like to know also who the Marines are inviting. It is not a flyer-type thing where we put up posters saying "Does anybody want to go to the ball".

The CHAIRMAN. Not a Bring Your Own?

General MUNDY. No, sir, that is the way it is done in Washington.

Colonel DEL GROSSO. It is a formal event, tuxedos and appropriate pomp and circumstance so many people like to go to the balls, but what I am trying to register, sir, is the fact that in terms of protocol that list is well-scrutinized normally through an embassy.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the ground rule as to foreign nationals working in the Embassy? Does the nonfraternization rule apply to them?

Mr. NESS. Yes, sir. Any relationship on a one-to-one basis that does not have any bearing on foreign policy operations.

The CHAIRMAN. So it would apply to anybody, even those working in the United States Embassy?

Mr. NESS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But those people might also be invited to the Marine ball?

Mr. NESS. Conceivably, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Does this strike anybody as being totally inconsistent across the board? You have got people there, Marines who are single, you have got a nonfraternization rule that says you cannot have a one-to-one relationship with any foreign national; even one who works in the Embassy. Then you put on a wing ding of a ball with all the romance that you guys can gin up in a bleak post, and invite foreign nationals, women and other people there.

Doesn't it strike all of you as being out of sync?

Mr. NESS. I don't believe so, sir, in the fact that it is an open ball, a public thing as far as the public, public to the extent that it is attended by several people. You are not on a one-to-one relationship in a room full of people.

The CHAIRMAN. That strikes me as being out of sync. If you are going to put on a ball which is essentially an event that people go to as couples or meet couples—it is not a cocktail party now we are putting on, it is a ball. But at the same time you have single Marines, you have no fraternization rules, and the people who you invite depends on the local situation, it is up to the Ambassador, and in the case I guess that we are considering, foreign nationals were invited, the ones who worked at the Embassy, single women.

I don't think anybody has thought through the whole problem.

Mr. NESS. Your point is well taken. I might add that in a number of Marine balls that I have attended, both in the free world and behind the Iron Curtain, I have never seen a Marine come without his own date and his date was one of those who was a part of the Western Community.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me try and make the case here that I think Congressman Blaz was trying to make. I think we have got a number of people involved in issuing directions, and I sense that there really is nobody in charge, no one person in charge or no one organization in charge. For example, the Marines apparently do the security check of the people being sent to the Embassy. But now in the investigations that are going on when the problem arose, that is under the State Department. The State Department is doing the investigation.

General MUNDY. Sir, if I may, Mr. Chairman, the background investigation is done by the Defense Investigative Service so you are accurate in saying the Marines, it is the Defense Department. The investigations of course that are being conducted are plural, the Naval Security and Investigative Command would be conducting the Department of Defense.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't mean just the Marines. Let me rephrase it.

The DoD is responsible for the background and security clearances of the people sent there but now it is State doing the investigation of the situation if there is a, as there seems to be, a problem.

The Marines are responsible for a single's only rule that applies to the Marines assigned there. The State Department has put together the no-fraternization policy and the Ambassador—it is up to the Ambassador to decide who he does or doesn't invite with the Marines to the Marine ball. I don't get any sense there is a single line of authority thinking through all of the aspects of this problem of security—which is—who have we got, what backgrounds do we have, what periodic checks do we make, how do we do this, and what conditions do we impose on the people living there.

The Marines say you have to be single. The State Department says no fraternization, and the Ambassador may or may not allow some KGB agent who is out to lure a young Marine, or entrap somebody into the Marine ball. So I just think that you have got several agencies involved in parts of the policy and you end up with something that I think ends up putting an awful lot of pressure on people, or finding themselves in a situation where the pressure can be put on them.

General MUNDY. Mr. Chairman, I think you hit upon a good point. In other words, we have a dual, coordinated, cooperative and a dual track in the chain of command that Mr. Blaz has hit upon earlier here. But it is a coordinated chain of command. There are as we mentioned earlier, the Lt. Colonels and the two Majors who are the company commanders of the Marines in the field who are in direct association with their State Department counterparts at the local level, the regional security officer's, post security officer and Marine Security Guard detachment commander, all there with a unity of command. It is very difficult to say that in each situation the decision or the oversight goes up a specific ladder, but the ladder is pretty well put together and it is pretty tight in the coordination between the two agencies.

Thanks to Mr. Blaz, we pointed out it has worked well for a long time. I don't mean to offer that there isn't any problem, but it has worked well for a long time.

Just a point on fraternization as Mr. Ness has defined it, I would only offer that in the isolated situation and in the specific countries that he has talked about here, there are of course other alternatives for dates and things. There are other foreign nationals, there are British Embassies there and other closely allied and same language speaking points of social contact.

So the preclusion on dating or being unable to date specific foreign nationals from that country is not asking for Marines to be celibate or for no social contact.

The CHAIRMAN. It does not apply, for example, to other countries, the no fraternization rule applies to the host country, is that right?

Mr. NESS. It applies to nationals from the designated countries.

The CHAIRMAN. From the designated countries.

Mr. NESS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So if you are in another country it would apply to the same list of countries, not matter where you happen to be stationed?

Mr. NESS. Yes, sir. Going back to the policy it says this policy applies no matter where the National resides or the American employee is assigned.

The CHAIRMAN. I get it.

Let me move to a slightly different topic in this whole ongoing issue. Who is it that assigns the Marines in pairs to be in charge of the security detail? In other words, when they operate in pairs to guard the Embassy, who is responsible for assignment of the duty?

Colonel DEL GROSSO. First the Marines in these criteria countries, when we go on liberty we encourage people to go in pairs. We wouldn't want our Marines walking around by themselves. But in the course of business in an embassy or consulate, what drives it is the guard orders. As you know, at some consulates or embassies with a Marine detachment of 1 staff NCO and 5, there may only be 1 at the post. So in the context of pairing keep in mind across the 140 detachments, where you find two posts, maybe one stationary, one mobile, only comes into play if you have Marines in a density greater than ten.

So in fact many of the small African places there is only one Marine maybe on guard during the evening.

But when we get to the Guard schedule it is driven by the Department of State setting the number of posts within the building, you figure out the number of Marines you need to man them and that drives the number of Marines that are resident.

You have the number of posts, that really drives what the T/O is. Now the guard orders as they are set up, they are set up by the detachment commander considering the amount of Marines he has on board and in conjunction with the regional security officer, and it is approved and then published and the Marines go by them as sort of their routine 40- to 50-hour week.

General MUNDY. I think if I may emphasize, Mr. Chairman, I sense your question to say who makes up the duty roster. Who pairs the Marines?

The CHAIRMAN. That is part of it. Let's start with that one.

General MUNDY. The detachment commander, the Marine.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it a policy to try and mix the duty roster so that people do not serve together frequently? Do you keep rotating the duty roster?

General MUNDY. Mr. Chairman, I am advised and again very respectfully, sir, that we may be touching upon matters that relate to, or could be related to the investigation, and I would prefer not to comment.

The CHAIRMAN. OK, that is all right.

One of the things I remember when Mr. Ed Howard defected and went to the other side on an issue, I remember reading the information that came out of that. One of the things that he apparently told the Soviets we discovered at that time was exactly how the Marines assigned security people at the embassies. In other words, how they pair them up, and how you would go about getting exceptions to the rule and get people paired up.

I didn't pay a lot of attention to it at the time because it wasn't a big issue, but now in retrospect they may well have known exactly how we assigned them and exactly how people can get reassignments and shift duty because he knew how that was done, and if you get, you know that you have to have at least two cooperating in order to do anything, he perhaps provided them with enough information that they could go after two specific people in the detachment and succeed in subverting them.

Is there a rule in the battalion that requires Marines to be continually in the presence of at least one other U.S. diplomat or Marine while away from the Embassy or consulate in a Warsaw Pact country? Is that a rule?

Colonel DEL GROSSO. No, sir, but I just made mention that when Marines go on liberty, it has always been a time-tested rule no matter where the geography, we try to send the Marines out in twos.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no rule that says you have to go out in twos?

Colonel DEL GROSSO. Or in performance of his duty in the presence of a diplomat.

The CHAIRMAN. Or another Marine?

Colonel DEL GROSSO. Sir, I know of no rule.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no rule that you cannot leave the Embassy or consulate area unless you are in the presence of another U.S. citizen, either a diplomat or Marine, no?

Mr. NESS. No.

Colonel DEL GROSSO. Now, sir, standing guard orders are, and we know this in the HASC, you don't leave your post until relieved.

The CHAIRMAN. No, this is a different situation. I know that.

Colonel DEL GROSSO. I know of none, no rule, sir.

Mr. NESS. No, sir, no rule.

General MUNDY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Just asking. I heard that it was, and it seemed strange so I thought I would ask.

Do you have any other questions?

Mrs. BYRON. Yes, I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mrs. BYRON. I have a couple questions.

With the State Department security people, do they have to operate under the same rules that the Marines do in Warsaw Pact nations or posts?

Mr. NESS. With respect to fraternization or what?

Mrs. BYRON. Fraternization, and the unmarried Marine on the post.

Mr. NESS. No, ma'am. The regional security officers can either be married or single, but they do have to abide by the nonfraternization policy.

Mrs. BYRON. They have to abide by the nonfraternization policy. So really there is a different set of regs for the State Department people.

Mr. NESS. Yes. The single policy applies only to the Marine security guards.

Mrs. BYRON. Back to the Chairman's discussion on the two man rule. It was my understanding that there is a two man rule, if not written down and signed, is it considered a guideline whereby when you leave an Embassy compound you have to travel in pairs? Let's go to Central America. We spend a lot of time talking about the situation in Moscow. In Central America isn't there a guideline whereby when a Marine leaves or is off duty and leaves the Embassy compound, that they are advised or requested to, to travel in pairs?

General MUNDY. Madam Chairman, I think the answer to that has to go along with what every Marine learns in tactics, it depends on the terrain and the situation. In a situation in which we are faced with a more active terrorist threat, there will be local rules and the local detachment commander will say when you go you go in pairs, or, you know, give some local direction on that.

But I believe as Colonel Del Grosso mentioned before, there is no Marine Corps regulation or Marine Corps Security Guard Battalion directive that says you have to do that in every situation. I think I am correct on that.

Mrs. BYRON. The problem that I see coming out of this hearing is that during your initial screening when you are looking for a type of a profile, you are looking for a young person who is a little bit of an adventurer in spirit and who is willing to go to a remote post in a foreign nation and do what is basically guard duty, a lonely job. At the same time you put the constraints on that individual that he—by one criteria you look for a loner; the second criteria is the fact that this individual that sometimes would be a loner when you go off duty and you no longer are on your job, but you have to be in the company of somebody else, is that a fair assessment of the profile?

General MUNDY. No, ma'am. Perhaps I am missing your point.

Mrs. BYRON. If you have a two-man suggestion because you don't have a two-man rule, you have a two-man suggestion that if you go off the post when you are off duty you go in pairs, that would tend to make you look for somebody that was not a loner and yet the mission of the duty, standing watch duty is the type that would expect a loner to be comfortable with. Obviously none of you get the thrust of what I am trying to say.

General MUNDY. Maybe somebody else does and I better get out of it and let Colonel De Grosso answer.

Colonel DEL GROSSO. Maybe I can offer something that is helpful. I think your word was "adventurer". In the Marine Corps we state right up front, "the Don Juan type of Marine is a liability to this program."

Second, I think Marines by nature are gregarious. We talk to team work, we work well together and we believe in the team spirit. We don't seek a loner on this duty but rather to put it into the right words, "we look for people who possess maturity even though they may be young." I know a lot of young Marines that have a lot more maturity than some older people I know. So, I think, the stress word is "maturity". We try to ferret out people who have integrity and those in the screening process who demonstrate judgment.

So we don't look for a loner. In fact throughout the school he receives peer ratings of who works with a group. So I don't think the word "loner" best fits the criteria.

I would agree with you the nature of the duty is lonely. It is routine, brutal, day in and day out guard duty. So I would just offer those distinctions if that is helpful to your answer.

General MUNDY. If I may amplify, Madam Chairman only briefly, as I believe I mentioned earlier one of the primary reasons for the failure to complete the course at Quantico is the failure to exhibit the necessary leadership characteristics. An element of leadership is follower-ship in as much as both of those relate to dealing with people, with being with people, and to being an effective person with people.

So absolutely, I would support that we are not looking for a loner. We would be very concerned about trends that showed up in the general psychological reference that one might make to saying he is a loner or she is a loner. We would be concerned about that in the Marine Corps.

Mrs. BYRON. I think in every case that we have had where we have had problems you find an individual that tends to be somewhere in their background which shows up very dramatically that they have been a loner. I think that is one of the things we ought to put more emphasis on in screening, is looking back, was it the person that in high school always went to the dance alone, that didn't take someone to the Marine ball, and I think that is a criteria that should be looked at.

Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Blaz.

Mr. BLAZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Madam Chairman.

Mr. Ness, I promised I would ask you a question and I don't want you to go away thinking I was biased for the Marines so I have a question for you.

I was in Moscow at the Embassy last year and at that time, I heard there were some internal problems in the Embassy. I am referring to the spy dust and bugged typewriters and defecting spies, and eventual withdrawal of about 200 Soviet cleaners, et cetera, et cetera.

This incident involving the Marines coming as it does at this time and in view of the problems that one perceives taking place in Moscow, should one, may one, could one draw any conclusions?

Mr. NESS. Well, conclusions as to what?

Mr. BLAZ. As to that there might be more than just Marine problems involved? Supervisory problems involved? You want me to go into other examples like that?

Mr. NESS. I think that is an area, sir, that would be relevant to the investigation.

Mr. BLAZ. I know that. I shouldn't have given you that.

Mr. NESS. Until that is resolved we cannot comment on it.

Mr. BLAZ. Thank you very much. I didn't want you to go away thinking I didn't want to ask you a question.

Mr. NESS. Thank you.

Mr. BLAZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bennett.

Mr. BENNETT. One brief question. Since there seems to be a difference between the Marine Corps and State Department with respect to personnel, I believe there was testimony from the State Department that they had a one-on-one fraternization policy that excluded other nationals as well as the particular country. I believe you said that. They said to the contrary.

I wonder—

Mr. NESS. No, excuse me if I could clarify that point. It is the other nationals of the designated countries. The designated list of countries is part of the classified portion of the fraternization policy. But it does not—

Mr. BENNETT. There is a difference between your policy and the Marines'?

Mr. NESS. No, sir, there is not.

Mr. BENNETT. I thought the Marines could have a one-on-one relationship with anybody who was not in that embassy—not that country of origin.

Mr. NESS. Basically in the simplistic terms if it is from the Western world, yes.

Mr. BENNETT. That is the same with the Marines?

General MUNDY. Yes, sir, it is. I may have clouded that. If you are at another post, for example London, you would be governed by the same restrictions relative to foreign nationals from those countries. Mr. Bennett, I assume you all are working together and that you share your doubts and your policies, and you try to work out something that is mutually understood to be a good policy between both of you.

It is not very different between the Marines and State Department, is that correct?

Mr. NESS. That is correct.

General MUNDY. It is the same policy.

Mr. BENNETT. Thank you, that is all I wanted to ask.

The CHAIRMAN. Any more questions? If not, gentlemen, thank you very much for a very informative and interesting morning.

Thank you.

General MUNDY. Thank you, sir, and we will practice on the microphones and so on before we come back again. Thank you for your indulgence, sir.

Mr. NESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the panel and the subcommittee were adjourned.]





**HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
DEFENSE POLICY PANEL AND THE MILITARY PERSONNEL AND COMPENSATION SUBCOMMITTEE,**

*Washington, DC, Thursday, July 23, 1987.*

The panel and the subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:20 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Beverly Byron (chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation) presiding.

**STATEMENT OF HON. BEVERLY B. BYRON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MARYLAND, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY PERSONNEL AND COMPENSATION SUBCOMMITTEE**

Mrs. BYRON. The subcommittee will come to order.

Today we resume hearings into the Marine Security Guard system. We will deal with commanders of Marine detachments at embassies, regional security officers, ambassadors, and other assorted persons who have dealt or now deal with embassy security. In the coming week, we will be hearing from a number of those people.

The Marine Security Guard program—the MSG program—was formed 40 years ago. In that time, we have seen very little congressional oversight of the program. Even if we had not been faced with the ongoing spy scandal, I think it would be appropriate for us to reevaluate the MSG program after 40 years.

We plan to do that today by going back 40 years to the inception of the program. Our witness is Colonel Wade Jackson of Dayton, OH. Colonel Jackson was assigned to Headquarters, Marine Corps, in the late 1940's and was tasked with setting up the embassy security program. We wish to talk to him today about the rationale for the creation of the program and his perspectives on the use of Marines to guard embassies.

Next week, we will hear from other witnesses. We will hear from a panel of commanders of Marine detachments at embassies. We will hear from a panel of regional security officers, the embassy officers who are the immediate superiors of the detachment commanders. We will hear from the psychologist who now works at the Marine Security Guard School in Quantico. We will hear from a former commander of the MSG battalion.

But today, let us get a little historical perspective. Colonel Jackson, I understand you do not have a prepared statement. I would appreciate it if you would begin by describing for us your role in establishing the MSG program. And I would like you to detail why the Marine Corps took on this mission and why it felt it was an appropriate mission for the Marines.

Colonel Jackson.

**STATEMENT OF COL. WADE JACKSON, U.S. MARINE CORPS  
(RETIRED)**

Colonel JACKSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

As a bit of historical perspective, during the 1947-49 period, which immediately followed World War II, was an unusual period in the history of relationships with the Russians and establishment of the Marshall Plan in Europe. General Marshall came back from China to become Secretary of State, and it was in that general context in which this program evolved.

The State Department was having some very unusual security problems at that time. Some of these subsequently surfaced and were brought to light in the McCarthy hearings. As I remember, one of the Assistant Secretaries of State—I think it was Peurifoy, was fired. He was replaced by Carlyle Humelsine, who had been an Army Colonel on General Marshall's staff during World War II.

Humelsine took over the job of Department Security. It so happens that Carlyle Humelsine and I were personal friends. I was Commanding Officer of the Marine Barracks at Henderson Hall, and also the CO for Administrative purposes of almost all of the Marines stationed here in the Washington, D.C., area.

The State Department went to the Army first to get assistance in providing personnel as replacements for their civilian guards. I understand the Army turned them down on that. We understand why they went to the Army first, because General Marshall was Secretary of State, had been Army Chief of Staff, and of course, Carlyle's background as a Colonel in the Army.

They were turned down by the Army. Anyway, they found out that the Navy, by section 562, title X, as it was written at that time, did state to the effect that the Secretary of the Navy may upon request of the Secretary of State, provide enlisted men of the Navy and Marine Corps as custodians. So that is my belief how we had the statutory authority for setting this particular program up.

Now, if I may go back just a little bit, Madam Chairman, and I would now be quoting a portion of a current Marine Corps document about the background and history of this—this is one of their current information handouts which deals specifically with some of the problems which the State Department was having with the Security Guard Program, and quoting from that, it says:

The people the State Department had been using were of doubtful background, limited ability, and in many cases, unsuitable for a position requiring such a high degree of trust and competence. In most instances, the positions were found to be attractive only to the old and lazy.

So, for whatever that is worth—I don't know that is entirely fair for the State Department—that does represent a viewpoint. So I guess it was to replace the old and lazy with the young and virile.

Well, we had a lot of political doings and maneuvering back in the 1947-49 period and some of the things back then are comparable to—and I see the same scenario in some ways being replayed right now—things having to do with the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986.

Frankly, the reason, the principal reason the Marine Corps was interested in getting into this was a political expediency, backscratching thing to enlist General Marshall's support of our posi-

tion as a counter to President Truman and Secretary of Defense Johnson at the time. That is the real honest to goodness reason why the Marine Corps was interested in that program. It was political back-scratching.

Mr. SKELTON. Would you repeat that? I didn't quite catch the first part of what you said, colonel.

Colonel JACKSON. The real reason that the Marine Corps was interested in this—and I am talking now about negotiations, private conversations between me and Carlyle Humelsine and——

Mr. SKELTON. Between you and who?

Colonel JACKSON. Carlyle Humelsine, Assistant Secretary of State.

Mr. SKELTON. OK.

Colonel JACKSON. Who was handling this overall security problem for the State Department. Now, the real, honest to goodness reason the Marine Corps got involved in this was a political back-scratching expediency to encourage, to enlist the support of General Marshall, who was then Secretary of State, on behalf of the Marine Corps as a counter to President Truman, also Secretary of Defense Johnson.

Mr. SKELTON. President Truman and Secretary of Defense Johnson were not very pro Marine, is that what you are saying?

Colonel JACKSON. We were informed they had plans for the Marine Corps. I used the term, if that had gone through, it would have for all practical purposes emasculated the Marine Corps.

Mr. SKELTON. My history is not clear. Was there a proposal by the Secretary of Defense Johnson and President Truman to cut the Marine Corps in size at that time or what was the proposal?

Colonel JACKSON. We were getting into something comparable to what you all are going through right now in your legislation—determination of roles. This would have been something which would have tightened the reins of control over the Marine Corps and it was a denial of the concept of ourselves as being a military force, sort of a fire department state of readiness. The figures, as I remember now, we went up to about 550,000 people during World War II and here coming into this period—of course Korea wasn't really anticipated at that time—but it would have reduced us to about 73,000 men.

Mr. SKELTON. That was the proposal?

Colonel JACKSON. Yes sir.

Mr. SKELTON. In an attempt to head this off at the pass, the Marine Corps offered the Marine Guards to the Secretary of State, to get his support basically for the Marines, is that correct?

Mrs. BYRON. Would the gentleman yield a moment?

Mr. SKELTON. Yes.

Mrs. BYRON. It is my understanding that the Secretary of State had come up with a proposal to use the military as security guards at the embassy. I believe you testified that the Army was first considered for that and the Army turned it down, at which time the Marines were made aware that there was a proposal and the Marines, in their wisdom, decided if there was a proposal they would like to be in on it?

Colonel JACKSON. I follow that generally.

Mrs. BYRON. You basically had a situation where the Army had a high profile with the administration per se. The Marine Corps in

the estimation of some of the Marines did not have a high profile with the administration. This was one way to get back in the Department of Defense—I think we had a Department of War at that time—for a high profile of the Marine Corps? A usage, a dependency on the Marine Corps at a time when they were looking to cut back on the numbers?

Colonel JACKSON. Madam Chairman—

Mrs. BYRON. I just want to make sure I understand you correctly. I think you testified it was a political decision to use the Marine Corps?

Colonel JACKSON. A political decision?

Mr. SKELTON. Excuse me. It was a decision by the Marine Corps to obtain some favor through the eyes of the Secretary of State and his subordinates, is that not correct?

Colonel JACKSON. That leaves a mis-impression. When you say a decision of the Marine Corps, that implies something which is overt, open, and above board.

Mr. SKELTON. A decision by somebody that was smart enough in the Marine Corps to make this recommendation?

Colonel JACKSON. Right.

Mr. SKELTON. Is that right?

Colonel JACKSON. Right. Actually there was sort of an informal committee of which I was a part—

Mr. SKELTON. What was your rank at that time?

Colonel JACKSON. I was a lieutenant colonel.

Mr. BATEMAN. Would you yield?

Mr. SKELTON. Yes.

Mr. BATEMAN. I am getting the impression, colonel, that this was not a decision made by the then Commandant of the Marine Corps, necessarily on its merits. That you really thought that a necessary and appropriate role, but a role you were willing to assume and then to seek or cooperate in, in order to serve a larger interest of the Marine Corps. I think one of the issues in that era was whether or not the Commandant of the Marine Corps would be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Colonel JACKSON. That is correct. I like your characterization of that because the Commandant of the Marine Corps was not himself out in the forefront pushing this.

Mr. BATEMAN. Let me mention that we have a common friendship for Carlyle Humelsine, who is a friend and constituent of mine.

Mr. SKELTON. One last comment. I am sorry to interrupt you. I want to clarify the genesis of this.

This was during the time of creation of a new Department of Defense, 1947?

Colonel JACKSON. Right.

Mr. SKELTON. Things were new and there was even some discussion and proposals to eliminate the Marine Corps altogether, is that correct?

Colonel JACKSON. Sure. Always that.

Mr. SKELTON. That was part of the background as well, to keep the Marine Corps visible doing a useful job, is that correct?

Colonel JACKSON. Now, in addition to the fact that I was, because of my position, at the Marine Barracks, it also happens that I was

at that time the principal contact, not officially, but the principal contact on a working basis with Senator Millard Tydings, who was at that time Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. I was as far as I know, at that time, the only Marine Corps officer who had rapport, understanding, with the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, so as you people well know, there are a lot of things that happen behind the scenes, and not out in the papers, understandings, strategies, and so forth. I was part of that process. I was only a part of it, but that really is the background as to how this whole thing came up.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you. I am sorry to interrupt you and you may proceed.

Mrs. BYRON. I think what we will do, since you don't have a written statement, I think we will go to questions from the panel, if that is all right with you. Unless you had some more points you wanted to make.

Colonel JACKSON. Madam Chairman, I do have what was presented as a three page—

Mrs. BYRON. You have a letter to Congressman Aspin?

Colonel JACKSON. Yes, ma'am.

Mrs. BYRON. We shall submit that for the record in its entirety.

Colonel JACKSON. I was given the option of either reading this or talking, and frankly, I don't like to read statements.

Mrs. BYRON. I have read the letter to Congressman Aspin and it has provoked a good many questions that I would like to pursue and each of the other members have a copy of that letter, so we will use that as your submitted testimony.

Mrs. BYRON. You were tasked to set up the Marine Security Guard program in the late 1940's. In your letter you said, "some Marine Corps officers, including myself, advised against this proposed legislation." Later on, you say "When the Marine Corps was approached by the Secretary of State for assistance with security guard problems, I recommended its approval." We have touched on that a little bit, about how the Army was contacted and then the Marine Corps stepped in very quickly and wanted to fill that position.

Did it ever occur to you back in the late forties that forty years later, the Marine Corps would still be involved in Marine Security Guard issues? Did you originally, the concept was for a short period of time, anticipate usage of the Marine Guards for continued security? And also when you developed the program, how many embassies were you concerned with? Were you really just basically looking at the larger embassies or did you believe that it would go to the depth that it has now—140 embassies and consulates?

Colonel JACKSON. I believe I can pick up—Madam Chairman, there are two or three points which you raised.

Mrs. BYRON. We have a clock and I have 5 minutes to ask my questions. You have as much time as you want to answer them. So we get into a very bad habit here of asking all the questions at once, as opposed to getting our time cut off.

Colonel JACKSON. I am not really practiced in responding to several questions.

Mrs. BYRON. I will remind you if you forget one of them.

Colonel JACKSON. Yes, ma'am.

I believe first, it was certainly not visualized that this was to be a permanent, ongoing thing, and if it had been, I would not, as part of the decision process, have recommended approval. So I saw it as an expedient, short term solution to the State Department program and I figured that as happened on three notable occasions in the past, two of which I have been personally involved with, when the Marine Corps gets beyond its charter in helping out other Government Agencies, that they will concurrently develop their own capabilities to be self-sufficient and that marines will phase out. So I would have definitely opposed at the time the original decision was made, setting this program up permanently.

I think the time has come to cut the umbilical cord with the State Department.

Mrs. BYRON. I think in your letter to the chairman you said, "some career Marine Corps officers, including yourself, advised against the proposed legislation because it would have established for this nation a German general staff concept and because the Marine Corps would have been emasculated as a component of the national defense organization". On page 2.

Colonel JACKSON. Yes, ma'am.

Mrs. BYRON. When you originally set up the security guard program, was it to be utilized at all the embassies, or was it to be utilized only in specific areas, areas where we were having problems, areas of higher profile of our embassy personnel, or was it originally conceived to encompass just maybe the main, larger embassies with a higher number of staff—Rome, London, et cetera. Or was it to go into the entire depth of all of our embassies?

Colonel JACKSON. Well, as far as the State Department was concerned, they were I think replacing, using Marines in replacing their own civilian guards. They were using the Marines on the basis where they were needed most.

Mrs. BYRON. Where were the first embassies that had the Marine guards? Can we get that submitted for the record.

Colonel JACKSON. I only remember at the time I got out, at the time I was transferred in 1950 we had something like 26 different embassies and consuls where we had the program. The first ones were set up in Europe. I don't know where the first ones were, but one of the tough things, one of which was initially the Marines would wear civilian clothes and because of other concerns, we wanted these Marines to be assigned only to places where there were Naval or Marine Corps aides, somebody in uniform around to keep an eye on these people, although they clearly were under the jurisdiction and management of the Ambassador.

Mrs. BYRON. Under the management of the Ambassador, they did not wear uniforms on guard duty?

Colonel JACKSON. As it was originally set up they all wore civilian clothes, didn't wear their dress blues.

Mrs. BYRON. Do you remember at what time they changed to uniforms?

Colonel JACKSON. No, I don't. It has only been fairly recently, and through looking at some Marine Corps handouts I have become aware that they now seem to have gone beyond the purely

utilitarian security guard purposes into something which has some aspects of being a ceremonial function.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Bateman.

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Colonel, your view was that this was not an appropriate mission for the United States Marines and its personnel?

Colonel JACKSON. Please repeat.

Mr. BATEMAN. Your view is that this was never an appropriate, continuing role for personnel of the United States Marine Corps?

Colonel JACKSON. Correct.

Mr. BATEMAN. Would it be your view that it would be an inappropriate role for the personnel of any of the military services?

Colonel JACKSON. It would not, sir.

Mr. BATEMAN. I am not sure I understand your answer.

Colonel JACKSON. In my view, well, particularly speaking as a Marine, which as I said, I have a tunnel vision of us being a balanced force in readiness, and I don't like to see our personnel resources diverted into that sort of thing.

Mr. BATEMAN. But would it be inappropriate for military personnel of the United States Army to discharge this function?

Colonel JACKSON. Well, I think there are other people, I think there are other people that could, you know—Army, Navy, Air Force—could do the job. In my view, it is inappropriate, because you are mixing up functions.

Mr. BATEMAN. Well, what I am trying to get is a bottom line. It is clear to me that you don't believe the Marine Corps should have had this responsibility on a continuing basis.

Colonel JACKSON. That is right.

Mr. BATEMAN. Is it also your view that it is not the best allocation of resources for any of our uniformed armed services to discharge this function?

Colonel JACKSON. I agree, sir. The nearest I would come to that, and something which I could suggest as an option, not just leave the State Department suddenly without cutting everything out, what I think would be a highly acceptable option would be—this is something the Marine Corps could do on an interim basis, is to start recruiting retired military personnel for this function, but have them subject to the direction and control of the State Department as their employees.

At some point, it is quite important to me, Mr. Bateman, in response to your question but the appropriateness of military people being used for this—to illustrate the point, and with specific reference to the Marine Corps—if I were Commandant of the Marine Corps or if I were Secretary of the Navy, it would bother me to be responsible for and in a position where I have to take the flack for something going wrong with the program, but over which program I have no control over policies, procedures, supervision.

Now, that would concern me as a Secretary of the Navy, as Commandant of the Marine Corps, and that sort of thing I believe should be of concern to you people who have general oversight responsibility for the whole Department of Defense.

Mr. BATEMAN. I will bet, colonel, if you and our friend Carlyle Humelsine, had been working together over a period of time that



you would have worked out some policies and procedures you both would have been very happy with.

Colonel JACKSON. Thank you.

Mr. BATEMAN. That is all I have.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. Colonel, in your letter to the chairman, you have a paragraph entitled number 8. "Another factor for concern is the exposure of young virile Marines to the 'lifestyle of the rich and famous' and the convivial environment prevailing at some diplomatic posts. Our national defense is better served with these young Marines maturing while subject to the daily purifying influence of our irascible Sergeants Major."

Would you care to amplify on that, please, colonel?

Mrs. BYRON. Yes sir.

Mr. SKELTON. Please.

Colonel JACKSON. The general thrust of that particular statement is that—this is an excerpt from a letter of mine to the Commandant of the Marine Corps at that time, General Kelly, and he was out in Dayton, making one of his many statements defending the position of the Marine Corps, but anyway I sent him a letter and gave him a lot of background, and I recommended getting the Marines out of the State Department security business.

He came back and said—let's see what did he say—he said something to the effect that the Marines, when we get them back after they have spent 3 years in this program, that we get back a more experienced, mature Marine.

Now, I wrote General Kelly a letter responding to that which I would like to read. I am quoting from my letter of the 25th of May, to General Kelly. I said, "General Kelly, I have a problem with your statement, 'in most instances we get back a far more experienced and mature NCO'." Then I say at the inception of the program I was concerned about the exposure of young Marines to the life style of the rich and famous, also the convivial environment which prevailed at many State Department installations.

This letter to Kelley was accompanied by this infamous cartoon showing the Marines going on the obstacle course and they stop to light cigarettes or pour—make the martini—

Mr. SKELTON. Let me ask you, would your attitude be different if the Marines' tour of duty were shortened to either 6 months or a year rather than a 3-year tour at an embassy?

Colonel JACKSON. Well, it would be an improvement. I feel better about that, but I think the thing to do is make a clean break. I don't think even the State Department would want to get into this. On this 6 months basis you can spend all your time going and coming.

Mr. SKELTON. That is right.

Colonel, thank you so much.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Ray.

Mr. RAY. No questions.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Pickett. Mr. Ravenel. Mr. Dyson.

Mr. DYSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Colonel Jackson, I think your memo that Mr. Skelton referred to is very well done. I learned an awful lot from it, especially Number 3 on page 2 of the memo where you indicated in the third para-

graph, "During the World War II period, the State Department was experiencing unusual problems with the effective civilian staffing of security guard positions at overseas posts." Their request for Marines as substitutes was, in my opinion, an expedient short-term solution.

Further down, you qualify that by saying that was a political situation. Then on page three, you indicate there are a number of historical examples where Marines were used, performing actions outside of their primary functions, and I thought some of those were rather interesting. I didn't know that we actually needed armed guards for the Postal Department, but I see that Marines were asked or tasked to do that in addition to those other things that you mentioned.

Down at the end, your final item, Number 10, is a recommendation, and that estimate of active duty personnel State Department security functions phased out with the State Department assuming full responsibility for all staffing, funding, policies and procedures.

How would you do that? Would you start with the embassy in Moscow, because it is obviously the subject of a lot of concern. I think if anyone turned to the morning news this morning you probably saw that Mr. Lonetree was being marched in and out of Quantico.

Would that be the first place you would start or some Third World country?

My second question is, what kind of people would you recommend that the State Department use? Would they be young men and women, or would they be mature individuals, more mature individuals who perhaps have wives or husbands to carry with them?

Colonel JACKSON. Right. Responding not exactly on all fours, but as I understand your first question, how I would visualize the mechanics of getting started as a replacement for this—I would think in terms of a 1-year simultaneous phase out for the Marine Corps and a phase in for the State Department.

During that period of time—and I would—what I would think of which should be considered—I am not familiar with all of the details that might be involved, but I would like to think what might be feasible would be a State Department facility, administrative and support facility. Well, it could be on the FBI reservation down in Quantico, for example—something which would be comparable to what the Marines presently have.

I am saying FBI Academy reservation because they have a lot of real estate down there. The other thing that—from the standpoint of training, development and instruction of these security people, is that on things having to do with terrorism and that sort of thing, you have the CIA people, you have FBI people who know a lot more about that than the Marine Corps.

They have got plenty of space down there to do that. Let the State Department set up their own facility. During the time of phasing out of Marines and phasing in of State Department, the Marine Corps could help, assist and guide an orderly turnover and possibly initially get some retired Marines, because of the prior identification of the Marine Corps with this program and that might get them started with a cadre.

Now, on the second point I developed, I would favor older, more mature people, and as a top man, in charge of the program, at each overseas installation, I think I would strongly recommend a requirement that he be a married man accompanied by his family. I would think there might be a lot of good reasons for selecting someone, at least on top, with a good strong Christian background.

Mr. DYSON. Thank you.

Mrs. BYRON. Let me get into a couple of points, to go back to when you were originally setting up the security guard unit. What was the profile that you were looking for in the individuals that were going to be assigned this duty? Did you look at a profile of one who was unmarried or young, fairly new in his career, or one who had a fairly extensive amount of time in the career? Was any thought given to the individual per se or was it just a basic random selection?

Colonel JACKSON. Highly select. The Marines who were selected for that program—at that time all enlisted Marines—were young men. They had to have a perfect record. They had to have above average I.Q., personal appearance, everything, highly select people.

Now, I think the extension of that, to respond to something that Mr. Bateman got into—is what—and you, Madam Chairman, you previously got into this—this is not only a numerical drain or a diversion of people from the Marine Corps, more importantly it is a qualitative drain of personnel resources because—obviously, even with the Marine Corps' 190,000 people, when you go out and get NCO's and you take the cream of the crop, highly select people, actually there isn't any way but what that doesn't serve to reduce the average or the standard of those remaining who are available for regular Marine Corps jobs.

Now, these people—getting back—they were all bachelors, had to be bachelors—

Mrs. BYRON. Was that a decision that was made within the State Department?

Colonel JACKSON. I don't remember just how this came up. Carlyle and I worked together. We set up some rather broad guidelines. We worked this thing out on a day-to-day basis, but, as far as I was concerned, Madam Chairman, with two or three thousand people, for whom I had administrative responsibility, this was no big deal for me. Here was just another couple hundred men out on temporary detached duty some place.

Mrs. BYRON. I am one member who thinks that being unmarried is a good criteria for guard duty.

Colonel JACKSON. You say it was good?

Mrs. BYRON. Yes. I am one that thinks it is good.

Colonel JACKSON. Well, I don't know whose idea that was, but of course at that time, 1947, 1948, 1949, Marine Corps corporals and sergeants didn't have enough money to get married.

Mrs. BYRON. They still don't.

Did you look at the profile of the individual?

Colonel JACKSON. Did I?

Mrs. BYRON. When you were setting up the program. Right now, what I am driving at, with the situation that we have seen in the embassy in Moscow, where there have been some serious breaches of security, was that at that time, or basically when you were set-

ting this group up, it was in your mind a temporary function. As were the other three areas that you cited on page 3 of your letter where you talked about the armed guards for the Postal Department, guidance and assistance to the FBI and weapons and structure for Seabees.

You thought at that time it was basically going to be two, three, five, may be 10 years.

Colonel JACKSON. Well——

Mrs. BYRON. Type of duty.

Colonel JACKSON. Well, I definitely at no point ever thought this was a permanent accretion to the Marine Corps mission. The question you raised about profile, in addition to what I was talking about, these people did have BGI background investigation, checked them out security-wise and so forth, and as far as I know the question of disloyalty or personal profile, psychological profile, that sort of thing, just didn't come up.

Mrs. BYRON. I don't think in the late 1940's we were dealing with the problems that we have now as far as espionage and terrorism. Those areas were not high profile issues at that time.

Colonel JACKSON. Yes, ma'am, I agree with you.

Mrs. BYRON. What do you think went wrong in Moscow?

Colonel JACKSON. What do I think went wrong with Moscow?

Mrs. BYRON. In your opinion, you as Mr. Jackson, citizen on the street.

Colonel JACKSON. Well——

Mrs. BYRON. Although once an Marine always an Marine.

Colonel JACKSON. With my understanding of the responsibility relationship, it bothers me to see the Commandant of the Marine Corps on the defensive about the selection and training of Marines there. In my opinion, the major responsibility for that has to be accepted by the person in charge, the Ambassador, and these Marines were—they were under his control.

Inadequate, ineffective supervision—that is the basic problem. Now, I believe—I don't know, really know what the objective facts are, but I certainly believe that there is good basis for a public perception for this, whatever happened in Moscow, as being a part of a long continuing general hanky-panky.

Now, we briefly—we talked about bachelors, young, virile Marines out there—and boys are going to be boys, and girls are going to be girls and I don't care who you have got out there doing the supervising, you are going to have a lot of that going on and maybe——

Mrs. BYRON. There is quite a difference between a lot of that going on and absolute power and simple security violations when you turn your back and let people into an embassy. There is quite a bit of difference, I think.

Colonel JACKSON. There certainly is.

Mr. DYSON. You said ultimately the blame rests with the ambassadors. There is obviously someone in the embassy—the ambassadors don't handle those kind of problems every day. There is some civilian. By that I mean a State Department employee that basically looks over the security, watches the Marine Corps. There is no general in the Marine Corps there orchestrating all that.

I think what Mrs. Byron is trying to say is that embassies seemed to be about as open as a K Mart. People were going in and out all the time, and if nothing else, someone should have said something if it was so wide open, and to me that is out of the realm of an Marine Corps corporal, even though he realizes at some point—he must realize something was amiss.

There is someone in a higher position short of the ambassador that maybe has some oversight there. Isn't that correct?

Colonel JACKSON. Well, I think it would vary from embassy to embassy. As far as I know, the State Department doesn't really have any broad overall guidelines as to how this—I think my understanding is it is pretty much up to each individual ambassador, but someone—that determination of how many guard posts you are going to have and who is controlling access to the different spaces, would not be something which would be left up to the discretion of these individual Marine Corps corporals and sergeants.

That would be something which was determined by the State Department people, some functionary or assistant to the ambassador. Again the overall program and guidelines for that, in my opinion, and if I were the ambassador, it is something which I would review and approve the adequacy of.

Now, as far as getting into this business of security and espionage and so forth, now you have—in Moscow you have 28 young Marines out there. In aggregate. These guys know everything that is happening. They know who talks to whom and things that are happening. They probably in the aggregate know a lot more than the ambassador would give them credit for knowing.

They talk among themselves. Then maybe are out having a beer with someone and they are talking to a girl and quite innocently doing a little lying and bragging. They can pass out information which I know, and which you people know, which if overheard or being elicited by a trained professional can be very very significant. So, I think that should be—the sort of thing that needs to be considered in evaluating the total espionage aspect.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Bateman.

Mr. BATEMAN. Colonel, from the inception of the Marine role in this assignment to these duties was looked upon as being a preferred assignment, and it was sort of an elite group within the Corps. Is that a fair statement?

Colonel JACKSON. Pretty fair, sir. It didn't just catch on right at first, but you know here is a chance to—you get some civilian clothes, you get promotion benefits. It had to be publicized a little bit, but it did come to an elite concept. We had a lot of people then and still have a lot of people who don't really prefer all of this running around in the boondocks, and the harsh realities of training and leading combat troops.

Mr. BATEMAN. So it has concerned you that this represents a drain of some of the best manpower available to the Marine Corps?

Colonel JACKSON. Well, I estimate we have as many as 2,000 people, possibly as many as 2,000 people in—directly and indirectly—assigned at any one particular time, and I think it is definitely a qualitative drain on the personnel resources of the Marine Corps.

Mr. BATEMAN. Now, is there a possible offset to this, the fact that Marines are assigned this duty, that this duty is looked upon as

being a part of an elite or semi-elite component of the Marine Corps. Does that give to the Marine Corps a plus factor insofar as the morale of the Marine Corps, generally?

Does it help with Marine recruitment, the fact that the Marines have been assigned that kind of responsibility and are a select elite? Are there any positive tradeoffs, is what I am asking, for the Marine Corps?

Colonel JACKSON. I can see a positive aspect perhaps from the recruiting. But of course when you get down to it, we don't go out and recruit for the State Department. As far as recruiting is concerned, the Marine Corps has never had any trouble in getting all of the good men that they wanted and I will say, personally, that, I, as a professional Marine Corps officer resented the fact in World War II, and again in Korea that we had to take draftees. We did not need them.

Mr. BATEMAN. So, there is no tradeoff for the Marine Corps in terms of better ability to recruit?

Colonel JACKSON. I don't see—

Mr. BATEMAN. Or if it was better, it wasn't a needed ingredient.

Colonel JACKSON. I cannot see how our involvement in this particular thing in any way contributes to the primary mission of the Marine Corps, and I think we should consider the adage, "Shoemaker, stick to your last."

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Ray.

Mr. RAY. No questions.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Dyson

Mr. DYSON. No questions.

Mrs. BYRON. Colonel, let me thank you very much for your testimony today. It has been extremely helpful to set the stage of the original concept of the Marine Corps being used as a security guard. We appreciate your time.

Colonel JACKSON. I appreciate the opportunity to be seen in such good company.

Mrs. BYRON. The subcommittee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]



**HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
DEFENSE POLICY PANEL AND THE MILITARY PERSONNEL AND COMPENSATION SUBCOMMITTEE,**

*Washington, DC, Tuesday, July 28, 1987.*

The panel and the subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Beverly Byron (chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation) presiding.

**STATEMENT OF HON. BEVERLY B. BYRON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MARYLAND, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY PERSONNEL AND COMPENSATION SUBCOMMITTEE**

Mrs. BYRON. Good morning.

Today we continue our hearings into the Marine Security Guard Battalion. We have a single witness to hear this morning. Then I will ask the members to stay for an off the record briefing. That briefing will take place in room 2212 at 11:30 a.m.

This morning our witness is Lt. Comdr. Forrest Sherman. He is the clinical psychologist who was recently assigned full time to the Marine Security Guard School at Quantico—MSG. While Dr. Sherman has been at the school full time for only 3 months, he has been working with the school for 2 years.

Some people have suggested that a psychologist is just what the MSG school needs to help screen out troublemakers and possible spies from the MSG battalion. Dr. Sherman has been doing some interesting work on screening Marines for the MSG General program and can share with us some insights into what we can and cannot expect to learn from psychological testing.

Dr. Sherman does not have a prepared statement. I would like to ask you to start off, doctor, by giving the panel a one minute summary of your professional experience. Then I would like you to address the question I am most often asked: Can you design a test that will screen out spies or people who might have a tendency to become a spy?

**STATEMENT OF LT. COMDR. FORREST SHERMAN, MEDICAL CORPS, U.S. NAVY, PSYCHOLOGIST, MARINE SECURITY GUARD SCHOOL**

Commander SHERMAN. Thank you, ma'am.

I am, as you introduced, Dr. Forest Sherman. I am a lieutenant commander in the Medical Services Corps of the U.S. Navy, and I have been on active duty as a clinical psychologist since 1974. My duties have included a wide range of professional billets, including both in-patient and out-patient evaluation after screening of military personnel, their dependents, retired personnel, command consultations, and educational functions.



My duties have primarily been in support of U.S. Marine Corps. It is perhaps fitting. I was born into a Marine Corps family. I am also had to practice clinical psychology in the State of Maryland, and certified, which is the equivalent of licensure, in the State of Arizona, where I had a small private practice while stationed there.

On a voluntary basis, I have provided psychological consultative services to several police departments and other law enforcement agencies, most specifically the Yuma City Police Department in Yuma, AZ, for which I received several awards.

Since October 1985, I have been providing continuous but limited service to the Marine Security Guard Battalion at Quantico, VA.

In October 1985, the Commanding Officer, then Colonel Boomer, requested that I try to establish a program that would address the very issue that the committee is addressing—some procedure that would screen out those individuals who not only are potential for spying, but also other forms of administrative and legal difficulties.

This is in the context of the attrition rate at the school of approximately 30 percent, and approximate ten percent attrition rate for the detachment commanders per year, as high as 10 percent for the watch standard per year. However, I must amend that by stating the watch standards have had a 5 percent attrition rate over the past several years.

The services I provided include, but were not limited to, testing of the detachment commanders and participating in a screening board which was the final screening, not the final but one of the major hurdles in the school, for the detachment commanders.

This happens to be in the context of my primary duty at the medical clinic at Quantico, VA, so I didn't have a whole bunch of time, but I certainly was providing continuous services, as I say, from 1985.

In answer to your question, can we select out a spy? There is divided opinion on that. I think we can identify people who have a propensity or a chance of becoming a turncoat or a spy. However, can I select out a particular spy? No, ma'am, but we certainly can identify those individuals who statistically are more at risk, and we can identify those individuals.

Since I have come to the battalion in April of this year, I have done several I think significant projects. At the suggestion of Colonel Del Grasso, Commanding Officer of the Battalion, I hosted a conference of psychologists in May, where I had a number of psychologists from various security agencies—Air Force, Army, Army Special Services, people who had worked with Defense Information Agencies. We got together and we presented what the needs of the battalion were, what the mission of the battalion was, and in a sort of conclave, got together and shared ideas from this fairly well experienced group of psychologists how we could address the issue of identifying particular individuals who were at risk, both administrative difficulties and spying.

I have introduced all the students who have attended the Marine Security Guard school since April, both watch standards and detachment commanders. I have attended two detachment conferences, which are held at various company headquarters in Frankfurt and Panama, where I have been available to discuss both per-

sonal and personnel problems with the detachment commanders and the company staff, in addition to giving some classes on identification of people who are at risk of having mental problems, or stress related conditions that could impact on the performance of their duties.

I have organized an ongoing advisory board of imminent psychologists, one of whom was chief research psychiatrist and psychologist for the Central Intelligence Agency for a number of years. Another individual with DIA, another individual who is currently working in a selection and screening procedures with certain Special Forces in the Army, and a retired Marine Corps colonel, who has extensive experience psychology. He is a board certified psychologist. This panel or this advisory group are serving on a voluntary basis to assist me in providing a broad base of experience that can help me in many decisionmaking processes.

In addition, I have initiated plans for research and development that will clarify the psychological issues involved in selection performance and monitoring of the performance of individuals out in the school.

Basically, what I am trying to do is to clarify what makes a good Marine Security Guard and what would indicate that an individual is at risk of not being a good Marine security guard.

In addition, I have evaluated in the field at the battalion headquarters and by telephone a number of potential problems, usually of a stress related nature, out in the field.

Mrs. BYRON. Let me pursue the category of the profile of an individual that you are looking for.

Commander SHERMAN. Yes, ma'am.

Mrs. BYRON. Obviously there are some blatant histories in certain people that would eliminate them immediately. You then narrow that down. How do you define the type of profile you are looking for? When you narrow it down, what type of a pool are you drawing from to get down to the final selection?

Commander SHERMAN. Well, currently, for the final selection we have, it is a voluntary pool from the Marine Corps people who volunteer for duty and they have come through some form of screening out in the field.

This has been at my suggestion that there be two levels of screening. There would be an initial level of screening out in the field, which eliminates the people who are obvious problems, i.e., people with clear records, records that could be as you have already mentioned.

Second, then at the present time, coming to the school, where we will have a current class, for example, of around 200 watch standards and approximately 30, I believe—I could be wrong on those figures—detachment commanders who out of that group there is very little constraint on how many people we select out of that.

There are some practical constraints in terms of how many people we can then put in the field, but the actual pool that I work face to face with would be the actual students who arrive at the school.

Mrs. BYRON. You have a 30 percent dropout rate in the school?

Commander SHERMAN. Approximately.

Mrs. BYRON. When you look at the profile of an individual, what type of profile are you looking for?

Commander SHERMAN. We need to divide into two groups. The watchstander from the detachment commander. They are entirely different groups. I will address the watchstanders first. I look for an individual who comes from an intact family and sociological background. What I mean by that, I look for an individual who has essentially lived in one town, has gone to one kind of school, is known in his neighborhood. I ask, for example, the question, if you went to the local community store, the neighborhood mom and pop store, would somebody recognize you there? I want to have somebody who is accomplished in the measured from which they come.

Mrs. BYRON. The answer on that is you would rather have somebody who is recognized rather than somebody who fades back into the woodwork?

Commander SHERMAN. I want somebody who is well known, not necessarily infamous, but famous in the community but who is—

Mrs. BYRON. That could be a two edged sword.

Commander SHERMAN. But who is recognized in the community.

One, an individual who has demonstrated the ability to form connections with other individuals and to have some sense of loyalty and some sense of ethics if you want, some connectiveness to other humans from a community, have a home, in the broadest sense, to have the concept of a home.

I like an individual who has done not necessarily extremely well but certainly has not had a lot of academic problems in school.

I would like an individual who is active in extracurricular activities in school—sports, drama club, photography club.

I was really kind of surprised in one of the classes I recently reviewed, I believe out of 60 or so watchstanders, four had been involved in the photography club while in high school. Most of them had lettered in one sport, several had been involved in student government, Key Club, various other civic organizations, the kind of individual who had made some connections in the community.

Ideally, I would look for somebody who comes from an intact family. There has to be a sense of family and some connectiveness with the brothers, sisters, mother, father, grandparents, somebody who can tell somebody about his family. I don't want somebody who has never made any connection to a family, because what is going to happen once he gets out in the detachment? It is going to be a requirement for that individual to make connections with other members of the detachment. That is crucial to the morale and well functioning, good functioning of that detachment, and if we have a demonstrated pattern of interaction, and interrelations with other family members, with sports, team members, we have now been able to demonstrate this individual is, to use a military phrase, a team player.

Mrs. BYRON. I am going to ask one more question, then I will turn it over to Mr. Bateman.

By that criteria, you are not looking for loners and yet the type of duty that is required is very much a loner duty?

Commander SHERMAN. No, ma'am. I have not been to many posts, but the posts I have been to, I have talked to a number of people returning from various posts. Yes, the 8 hours of watch-

standing may well be a loner duty in some posts, where the man is alone in the post. However, that would be only 8 hours out of a day. The remaining part of the day other than sleep time is spent with the detachment involved in a number of activities.

That cohesive group, the cohesiveness comes out of what allows the individuals to continue to operate through the boring parts of duty, a sense of responsibility to the rest of the detachment.

Yes, on the one hand this individual has to have a force to stand up by himself while he is standing post one, and function for 8 hours and do his job, but the program absolutely does not want a loner or a schizoid—to use a technical term—kind of individual. They do not function out there. They become a detriment to the rest of the detachment and to themselves.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Bateman.

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Commander, you say that all of the people who serve in this capacity as security guards are volunteers?

Commander SHERMAN. Yes sir.

Mr. BATEMAN. The initial screening is in the field. I assume that circulars are distributed saying there are "x" number of positions available, where to apply, or who to apply to, and you get an application. They are screened in the field?

Commander SHERMAN. Yes sir.

Mr. BATEMAN. What percentages of those who apply at the field level are then approved and whose names are sent forward?

Commander SHERMAN. I don't know the answer to that question. I have initiated a research project which will be able to, hopefully in approximately 6 months, be able to answer that question, sir.

Mr. BATEMAN. From those who pass the screening that is done in the field, they are put on orders to report to Quantico for training?

Commander SHERMAN. Yes sir.

Mr. BATEMAN. Of all of the bodies that present themselves at an appointed time to commence a course of study, are they further screened at the time they are assembled to begin that study, or are all of them regarded as qualified subject to their performances as they go through the course?

Commander SHERMAN. The school itself serves as a screening function. It is while they are at the school that I am looking at them as closely as I can. So that serves as the stiff point. That is why some of the individuals have come into the program, come to the school, and have not even met some of the basic administrative requirements. But generally, those, they have met all the basic administrative requirements, so there is an assumption that those who show up at school are all candidates for graduation from the school.

However, as I say, approximately 30 percent don't graduate.

Mr. BATEMAN. So the attrition rate of those who survive the field screening and get assigned to the school as candidates is 30 percent?

Commander SHERMAN. Yes sir.

Mr. BATEMAN. Of that 30 percent who do not successfully complete the program, how many of those are for, shall we say, academic reasons as opposed to personal traits, quality, leadership, personality, character?

Commander SHERMAN. I would say most of the people who—we could divided the group into I think three different groups. There are some academic failures. However, as one of the instructor advisors told me, you could train a monkey to get through the academic parts of it and I don't mean to denigrate the Marine Corps by saying that. The academics requires discipline more than it does particular brilliance in an academic field. The academics are well within the capability of anyone who has the minimum GCT classification test to get there.

The character and personality and performance in the broadest sense, I think is probably the biggest reason for dropping from the school.

Then there are some other people for various administrative reasons, are dropped from the school. They may not be a citizen. For example, recently there was an individual who had been born in Canada and never actually had his American citizenship and he was dropped, although he was doing fine in every other aspect.

Mr. BATEMAN. What kind of character defects, personality defects, show up more often as reason for someone being removed or excluded from the program? Disciplinary problems?

Commander SHERMAN. Some disciplinary problems, some alcohol abuse problems, general rebelliousness, a lot of passive aggressive kinds of character traits, and inability to get along with other individuals on a day to day living basis.

General immaturity. We have a diagnostic and statistical manual that we follow in my profession and there are several pages of labels that I could apply for character behavior disorders. There isn't one that I couldn't have found on occasion in the past 3 months to have found diagnostic—I don't mean the diagnosis, but all kinds—

Mr. BATEMAN. The people who fall by the wayside, do they fall by the wayside through the process of some general comprehensive review and evaluation program, or do they fall by the wayside because someone reports them or they are observed to be a potential problem and are therefore specifically reviewed only because someone has reported or suggested the need to do it?

Commander SHERMAN. The major hurdle is the screening board consists of the director of the school, two of the senior instructor advisors, the sergeant major, occasionally the first sergeant, a representative from the State Department, and myself. I am not a voting member of the board, but I serve in an advisory capacity on the board. That, which occurs 3 or 4 weeks into the 6 week school, is the major hurdle.

During that board we look at all facts. We look at peer evaluation, which would be a formalized group for identification from their peers of people who might be a problem.

We look at their academic performance. We look at the evaluation of their student detachment commander, the instructor-advisor, and we look at their performance in front of the board itself, and so very comprehensive kind of things. All questions are open. Some of them are very shocking questions.

We do a stress interview for the individual if we think that is necessary, and some of general presentation, that the individual

has a command presence. If we want, we look at that, and that is the formal decisionmaking process.

Most observations will be held in abeyance until that board. Everybody is given a fair shake. Those who generally are dropped before the board are those who are dropped for clearly administrative difficulties. They are not eligible for top secret clearance, and that comes to light.

Mr. BATEMAN. So that process is generic for all candidates?

Commander SHERMAN. Yes sir.

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Bennett.

Mr. BENNETT. I have no questions.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Kyl.

Mr. KYL. I do have a couple of questions.

Sir, one of the suggestions has been that older married men might be better at some of those positions. As I understand, it is difficult to find a person of that category who fits the rank or the station that you want here as a Marine Security Guard. What kind of consideration, to your knowledge, has been given to that and is it simply impossible to find an older or married person who might adequately fill that bill?

Commander SHERMAN. There are a lot of policy decisions and aspects that won't be appropriate for me to address in terms of answering parts of your question, but from a psychological point of view, I think for the watchstanders, I think we are better off with a younger—when I say that, remember, we are looking at an average age of about 23 years old for the watchstanders. Usually at least a noncommissioned officer, corporal or above, so we are not looking at young teenagers. Very rarely are we looking at young teenagers who come into the program.

I think that a young man is in a better position to become a band, a gang, a group out there that is functioning together, and are able to support themselves better. They blend together and form a cohesive group of personnel in some way a lot quicker and a lot easier and a lot stronger. They are more group oriented than an individual who let's say, may be in his thirties and married with interests outside the detachment with which you would work. This is for the watchstander group.

The second part of the question, part of this group—I have alluded to this before—is the detachment commanders, and the detachment commander is the crucial, key individual. If you look at those individuals who have become spies, those are generally individual males who are in the midlife crisis, average age is approximately—so I have been told by people from the CIA—is age 38, and have had a major failure in their career, one way or another there being some setback in terms of life goals. Those are the individuals who generally become spies.

Our detachment commanders don't fit that profile, they are younger, they are in their thirties. Well started, young children, still enthusiastic, still looking forward to their career, still very much committed to the Marine Corps and to their country.

So, I think for a number, aside from the policy issues and the economic issues, trying to find housing for and having an embassy under siege and guarding the embassy and wife and kids out there

with the mob kind of issue which I think from a policy point of view, probably makes a whole bunch of sense.

I think there are good psychological reasons for choosing that kind of individual for guards. Through history, guards, any kind of guards, have been young men in their twenties, out of their adolescence and into early adulthood, seems to be based upon historical experience and in terms of group cohesiveness, makes a whole lot of sense to have that kind of individual be your guard, who is going to be asked to perform an arduous and perhaps extremely dangerous duty.

For the detachment commander in their early thirties, late twenties. The master sergeants who are in their late thirties with families that are more established, haven't had the energy to do the kind of job necessary to run the detachment. We can select the best people in the world, for watchstanders, but if you don't have a detachment commander out there who exercises, who is responsible in terms of leadership and all that means, of knowing his men, knowing their strengths and weaknesses and being actively involved on a 24 hour basis, available 24 ours a day.

Good detachment commanders have to have the energy and have to have the family that will support them in that kind of situation. The military families, by training, and the wives of staff NCO's generally are very accepting of that kind of sacrifice, and it is a tremendous sacrifice they make.

Mr. KYL. What kind of monitoring is done at the billet or station level to try to pick up what might happen. A 6 weeks course here in the United States, may be one thing, 12 months in a cooped up place like the Soviet Embassy is another.

Commander SHERMAN. Monitoring goes on on many levels. That is, the detachment commander has to be doing that monitoring on a daily basis, and has to become aware when an individual is a problem. You can have an individual who might have a drinking problem, who might have some identity crisis problems, who has some tendency toward rebellion, perhaps have some cultural problems that don't fit into the white, anglo-saxon or typical mainstream American culture. That individual is an easy target for subversion by hostile elements.

But if you have a detachment commander who is aware of that and makes allowances and monitors on an essentially daily basis, he can still function and still be safe out there.

The formal process for monitoring is a joint responsibility, as I understand the memorandum of agreement, between the State Department and the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps has a process for semiannual inspection and other visits. I will be in the next fiscal year, I put it in the budget, to allow for travel out and make visits. Any opportunity the commander has to get some feedback about what is happening to any Marine who might be visiting the embassy and give a report if there is something to report on.

You can usually get a sense of problems within 10 or 15 minutes after meeting the first couple of Marines that you see there, you know, you have an idea what should be there. So there is at least twice a year, formally, and probably once or twice more per year some kind of visitor who comes in and sees the detachments.

In addition, the State Department has—and I can't speak for the State Department—but they have responsibilities to be monitoring what is happening in the detachment and how that actually works out again as a policy, is not appropriate for me to address.

So there is a number of formal and informal ways of checking on that, plus you take a look at the kind of paperwork that comes out of the detachment, are they completing MCI, Marine Corps Institute educational courses, are the young Marines completing that.

There are a number of other administrative indices. Are Marines properly proposed for promotion—just a whole gambit of Marine Corps life, a lot of paperwork generated, you can get an idea from the administrative point of view. Not that administration is the measure, but it is a measure, so there are a number of formal, as I say, and informal ways that can be monitored.

I am not sure I answered your question.

Mr. KYL. Thank you.

My only other followup question is, since the incidents in the Soviet Embassy, we have had a heightened interest in looking at the program to see where it might be failing. Obviously, some situations that should have been caught were not caught. I am sure the answer to my question is yes sir, people have looked at and improved on the program—do you have anything to add?

Commander SHERMAN. Yes. In March 1986, well before the recent incident, a formal request for establishment of a billet for psychological Marine Security Battalion was sent forth by the commanding officer. That, I was told informally, that it would take approximately 3 years for that to come to fruition, just from budget and planning. We are short psychologists in the Navy by 20 billets for clinical positions, very, very short, and so it was a battle for billets and a battle to put a psychologist in the billet.

I think it would be naive to assume the fact the billet got filled and I got sent to the billet this spring, was completely unrelated to the events in Moscow. However, the process had been started before the end. I think it was only speeding the process rather than initiating the process, in all other looks and examinations of the battalion most of the programs that had been a matter of fine tuning rather than having to make any major changes.

I don't think there have been any major structural changes that weren't already asked for or planned to be initiated since the initiation of the Moscow kind of situation. It is a little outside of my realm of expertise.

One of the things I am planning to look into from the social science point of view, is to look at the interface between the State Department and the Marine Corps. This will be something I think that is somewhat new to as if you want a cultural and thorough apologies or a social psychology point of view, how do these two organizations which have different ways of interacting, different morays, how do they interact, how does that create roadblocks to communications and effective cooperation and how does that actually lead to some kind of increased initiative?

I think we have got the funding, I think we have got the expertise to be able to address that issue sometime in the next fiscal year.



I think that out of that process we will be able to make some relations for some civic changes as to how the State Department and Marine Corps interact in this dual headed administrative and combined role that is played out there.

That is not to say that this is only to provide an advisory and different viewpoint of an issue that has been looked at very, very closely, that will be something new coming down the pike.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Rowland.

Mr. ROWLAND. Thank you.

In the staff notes, one of the observations made is about the repeated commentary on a rash of spy cases during the 1980's. Having observed the ideological spy, and seeing that money has been the chief motivator, but for Marines, Dr. Sherman says money isn't much of a motivator, women are the main avenue of approach.

You also go on to say something to the effect that the young man looking for a meaningful relationship is just what the KGB likes to prey on. That is a very interesting observation. I haven't heard that brought out too much into the public spotlight. Would you care to comment?

I happen to believe that indeed a meaningful relationship is probably one of the stronger desires of most Americans, most people in general, young or old, male or female, that indeed it might be one of human nature's strongest desires and strongest needs.

Would you care to comment as to the difference between a Marines' desire for a meaningful relationship versus the average person's strong, I believe strong desire, for a meaningful relationship? Is it unique just to Marines?

Commander SHERMAN. No, I don't think so. I think Marines are human, like the rest of us. They have had a special kind of training, and I think there are some self-selections for people who choose the Marine Corps as a career. But, to coin a phrase, they put their pants on one leg at a time. I have known firemen to put on both pants legs at one time, but not the Marine Corps.

Mr. ROWLAND. Would you agree with my observation that American people in general, perhaps everyone in general, young or old, male or female, look to the desire of a meaningful relationship? It is probably one of our strongest needs?

Commander SHERMAN. Absolutely. Man is a social animal. That is why I was addressing earlier the fact that we try to select out the loner, schizoid kind of individual, try to select individuals where the team concept will become a meaningful relationship. Meaningful relationship has become a synonym for an affair. I don't mean it in that sense. I want to make that absolutely clear. But those Americans who come off the program and who talk in terms of the duty with enthusiasm, and who have very clearly been very diligent in the performance of their duty, talk in terms of having been part of a team that worked together, and that some of those friendships and some of those acquaintances formed during that period of time in country, have been some of the more powerful kind of relationships.

In terms of heterosexual meaningful relationships, a lot of watchstanders get married at the end of their program. They meet

young ladies out there and end up getting meaningfully involved, and I mean in much more than just a sexual sense, by becoming friends with, companions with, falling in love and all that that means.

Certainly there are some individuals out there, young men, who are out pursuing the physical pleasures—wine, women, and song for thousands of years—and armies are typically made up of young men, so that has always been, there is a whole profession named after a general who had his men billeted here in Washington, D.C. in the Civil War—Hooker's followers.

There are plenty of opportunities for that kind of, I wouldn't even call that meaningful relationship, but that kind of relationship out in the program. So I have been told. I haven't personally experienced it and I don't intend to, but there are plenty of legitimate opportunities, but there is also plenty of opportunities for development of this pairing that I think is what is the essence of humanness.

If we look at the development of man from the primate species animal, a half, two million, how long ago it was, was always in a band, he was always a social creature that functioned in a social way and that we are essentially a very weak animal. It is only when we bond together and form a team can we have any strength.

Mr. ROWLAND. I think you made a very important observation in getting down to what I think is the crux of this particular problem, and if I remember my psychology 101 course, a need to belong, that is indeed one of the strongest social ends, the social need that humans have.

I don't think it was any great discovery for KGB, the Soviets to stumble upon a weakness in human nature and that weakness being the need to belong, the need to be wanted, the need to have a meaningful relationship, and I think that your observation is very, very important.

Also, in your interviews you volunteer a statement or observation. You said you don't want to see people out there who don't have a good sense of what they are doing and why. I would pose an addition to that and ask for your observation. Would you also say you don't want an environment that does not offer good interaction and a strong set of rules and discipline?

I wish the American people as a group were as disciplined as the Marines, and I think we are making a very simplistic observation to say that all Americans or most Americans are not disciplined. It is my belief that with basic human nature and a bad environment, is the environment the key to the problems that we had?

Commander SHERMAN. I would fully agree with you. I think a recipe for disaster is to put an individual person who wasn't properly selected into a detachment where they are not valued by the community in which they find themselves, where they are not given good leadership in the community in which they find themselves, and where their detachment commander isn't providing leadership.

I suppose in very general terms to make that specific, if you have an individual who is marginal, who is in a detachment that is large where there are some ostracism by the State Department commu-

nity and you have a detachment commander who is distant and who does not know his men, you have a recipe for disaster.

Mr. ROWLAND. Doctor, thank you very much.

I think your observations are very, very important, and to the point and get past the hysteria and the superficialness of the problem. I just want to restate that I wish everyone in the United States and we as an American people had the same amount of discipline that the Marines as a group have, and I thank you for your comments, and appreciate your observations.

Commander SHERMAN. Thank you, sir.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Darden.

Mr. DARDEN. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Commander Sherman, thank you for being with us this morning. I reviewed your interview with the staff and found several very interesting concepts, and two I would like to touch on in particular.

One is the so-called forbidden fruit situation that occurs when our Americans or other soldiers stationed abroad are not permitted to have any contact with, in this case, the Soviet women. It appears to me in particular those that might be interested in casual relationships, who would not present some type of threat, and would not be reasonably predicted to be involved in some type of security risk would be better off to be allowed to fraternize with foreign nationals. Because if they are not, then they break those rules, then we might be able to use or at least the Soviets or some other group could use the fact that they violated this particular regulation against them, and use it as leverage for maybe making some type of entry or some type of compromising situation occur, which might lead to something else.

I think we all know, since the time of Adam and Eve that the forbidden fruit has a certain lure to it and it appears to me that we ought to review or at least we ought to consider—I am sure you do—whether or not this is actually counterproductive, by permitting the Americans or any soldiers and sailors for that matter, from having contact with the Soviet nationals? Would you comment on that?

Commander SHERMAN. Any solution to a problem—firstly, I have to remind, restate that I am a staff position, not a command position. Some of the things you are touching on are on policy issues, but, I would comment that any solution to problem if it is a typical solution, is going to generate other problems. The nonfraternization rule I assume was not a capricious decision at some point in history, and that it was probably an attempt to solve certain kinds of problems.

It then created another kind of problem, which is the forbidden fruit concept that I addressed earlier, i.e., if you say you cannot touch this, then you are going to tempt, some people are going to be tempted to try to achieve what is forbidden. It has become an interesting challenge, almost like collecting stamps, I suppose. You could get an example from every country that you visited.

Mr. DARDEN. Or congressional pages.

Commander SHERMAN. However, I think your comments probably are being considered on a policy level in terms of the nonfraternization policy, to answer that question.

Mr. DARDEN. It did concern me that the lure in and certainly the desire to fraternize with Soviet women would be enhanced considerably by this situation, and it seems to me this gives a certain amount of leverage that the Soviets might have against a rule, against an American who might pursue the so-called wine, women and song, would not, might not otherwise get himself in trouble.

The other thing I want to talk to you about very briefly this morning is this midlife crisis or male menopause that you touched on. Having been in that age group or just past it.

Commander SHERMAN. Welcome aboard.

Mr. DARDEN. I submit to you it is a very real thing and in practicing law before I came here, I saw it happen quite a bit with men getting to be 36, 37, 38. They start doing crazy things. They grow a beard, for example, when they never had one before, or they buy a sports car or start going out with a much, much younger woman.

In my case, I ran for Congress. But people do crazy things, men do, when they reach a certain age.

What have you done specifically to cope with this situation in the Marines?

Commander SHERMAN. Well, statistically, most of the Marines who are out of the program don't fit that category. They are not in that stage of development. So, for those individuals where that is an issue, we have not instituted any formal programs, but I have my own records on all the people since April who are going out on the program, and I will be monitoring any individual that I think that might be a problem and just following that individual in as unobstructive way as possible.

I don't want to target individuals and make them realize they are targeted for certain kinds of observation.

Mr. DARDEN. I think what I wanted to ask you, is it not true that this male menopause is a very real thing even though it might not have the same physical characteristics as the so-called female menopause, but at least it does exist and it is quite common and quite a problem?

Commander SHERMAN. There comes a period of time when an individual goes through a major reassessment of their values. Male menopause is probably as good a term for it as any other term and if that is coupled with a career setback, or career failure, it can be devastating for an individual.

Mr. DARDEN. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Spence.

Mr. SPENCE. I have no questions.

Mrs. BYRON. I do have some further questions which are basically general ones, and it goes back to the thrust of my question earlier, which was the profile of the individual. Is it a fact that many of these areas where the watchstanders are going to be serving are in remote areas? The language problem, the size of the embassy, does that make any difference in a profile of a person?

I know once you screen for duty it is out of your hands as to where the assignments are. Is that something that is noted, taken under consideration, if somebody does well in a smaller area?

Commander SHERMAN. I have initiated a system of record keeping that will allow those kinds of questions to be answered in the future. My understanding at the present time is yes, that there

probably is some kind of a mix of personality factors that we can identify with some statistical certainty that would indicate that an individual probably better suited for a certain kind of post than another. If in fact the research that I am in the process of initiating will identify those factors, we will be making recommendations to the command for those kinds of assignments.

I would hope to be able to provide some meaningful input to the assignment process in the future. At the present time, I don't, from a scientific point of view, have enough to be able to say in fact I can offer that.

Mrs. BYRON. I have watched military personnel on overseas assignment and the ones that seem to get along better are ones that have adaptability to the language, one that can fit into a situation. You were talking earlier about an individual and their ties to their family, that the fact that the stability is important—by the other token, I think sometimes you find an individual who is more of an adventurist person, somebody who is more adaptable to change, and who would handle a remote assignment with the language problem and I have to say, judgment—because I think 23 year olds, at my age, is a young man—a young man is capable of moving into a different mode.

Commander SHERMAN. It has been my observation that there are two basic coping times that the individuals have when they are faced with a different culture. One is to create a cultural island, a little America somewhere, and they do not interface. In Frankfurt, Germany, there is a Pizza Hut and a Burger King that do a roaring trade. That is where the young servicemen stationed in Frankfurt eat. I can remember asking—

Mrs. BYRON. I remember when it got there.

Commander SHERMAN. A young Army man where is a good German place to eat.

I don't know.

How long have you been here?

A year. I always eat at the Pizza Hut.

That is one adaptation style. It works.

That wouldn't be my style. There is another style of individual who goes out and meshes themselves in the culture and explores new things.

I don't know the answer to the question which one, which is the kind of individual we need in the program, or even if that is a factor. I can say, for example, for foreign students on an exchange program for teenagers—this is a study done in Belgium, so I am not sure how applicable it is to American groups—but at least for the teenagers in Belgium, those students who are more independent and more likely to seek out new experiences, don't do as well on the foreign student program as those students who are from a stick in the mud family, don't try out new experiences.

The very fact they volunteered and want out there, indicated they have some seeking out for new experiences, but in that group, if you take the people who are high sensation seekers, they are not as successful as a group, as those people who are low sensational seekers. How applicable that is to Marine Service Guards, I don't know, but my common sense answer would be the same as your

community, but there is some in certain situations, a situation where that wasn't the case. I was very surprised with that.

Mrs. BYRON. When you are looking at the overall profile, is there any difference in rules and regulations for the watch-standers and detachment commanders than the State Department's security people? Some kind of grades of people?

Another issue is when you have an embassy, a lot of times the security guards really don't feel like they belong to the embassy, and they—I think it all revolves around the Ambassador and their feelings toward them. I would think that would be a factor.

Commander SHERMAN. An absolutely crucial factor. In fact, I think there are some—maybe not on paper, but there are some around here-isms—which is around here we do things this way—that the State Department individuals operate from different sets of rules than the Marines. The Marines are used to that. They take pride in having different standards. Having what they consider higher standards, perhaps they are higher standards, greater sense of discipline, different hair cuts, different uniforms. That is part of their individuality. Although it can create problems when the rules have been stretched too far by one side or the other, where the Marines become too strict or too drill instructorish—to use their phrase—their criticism of that problem where somebody is State Department, there are extremes.

However, Marines are perfectly comfortable with an ability in tension between themselves and the State Department.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Bateman.

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you.

If I may, Doctor, let me return to some further discussion on the old elitist aspect of Marine Security Guard service—I am not using that in a pejorative sense at all—but to the career MSG. Do you sense that there is a strong feeling among those who volunteer and who are accepted for the program, that they are part of the elite, of an elite corps?

Commander SHERMAN. I think in fact they are. The current sergeant major of the Marine Corps, the previous sergeant major, are both former Marine Security Guards. Promotion very often occurs because of it.

Out of the last class, approximately out of 65 students—not the last class, the class before last—they were all high school graduates. I think the average grade completion was somewhere over 13 grades, with a grade point average of 2.8. I think 59 out of those 65—I could be wrong by one or two on my figures, I am going by memory—came from intact, functioning families. Most of them, as alluded to earlier, had been involved in student government, had been involved and lettered in sports in high school, held down jobs, if they didn't letter in sports it was because they were earning a considerable amount of money.

Mr. BATEMAN. The elitist perception is more than a perception, it is a reality?

Commander SHERMAN. Yes sir.

Mr. BATEMAN. This is a very elite group of young men?

Commander SHERMAN. Yes sir.

Mr. BATEMAN. It is also a reality that in the Marine Corps, their career performance is equal to or exceeds that of Marines assigned to other duties or those not ever having been assigned to this duty?

Commander SHERMAN. Never having looked at the actual statistics, I have been certainly led to believe that, sir.

Mr. BATEMAN. It would be interesting to know whether or not it is in fact a career enhancement assignment.

Commander SHERMAN. It would be fascinating. I believe it is a career enhancement assignment.

Mr. BATEMAN. Let me return to the thing that a number of my colleagues have focused upon and the unfortunate reasons why they have.

There is a line—I think it is in “Tommy Atkins,” a Rudyard Kipling poem—that among the ones that you heard more often in this committee, goes to the effect of “young men in war action do not conduct themselves as plaster saints.” I think that tells us something that we are dealing with, we have to relate to.

I take it from the lines in the poem celibacy among such people is not really to be expected as a norm, yet we take such people and put them in a remote environment, where the number of social contacts that they are in a position to make, if you have a fraternization rule, is very limited. So they are put in a posture of perhaps yielding to their urges and temptations even to the extent of the violation of a fraternization rule, and then find themselves, through the capabilities of the KGB, or other such apparatus, of coming under pressure that may cause them to do things which would otherwise have been unthinkable for them.

I think we need, though I understand it is a policy kind of decision, I would appreciate your insights as to whether or not fraternization, or a nonfraternization rule based upon our contemporaneous experience, is the wiser policy or whether it remains the better policy, looking at all of the ramifications of a policy of either fraternization or nonfraternization?

Commander SHERMAN. Again, essentially we are dealing in a policy issue, but I am reminded of a phrase from the movie, “Top Gun,” most of the embassies are in fact a target rich environment for a young man’s desires. Most of those targets are little targets. There is usually a healthy crowd of young women who are attached in one way or another to the whole diplomatic community, might be serving in the role of nannies for various families. The nannies from England and Scandanavia have particular attraction, so I have been told.

So the nonfraternization policy does not mean that an individual has to become celibate for the period of time they are in country. What it does mean though is that there are certain individuals no matter where you are in the world.

As a member of a battalion I cannot fraternize in any way with a Soviet citizen that I meet here in Washington, D.C. That doesn’t mean that I am particularly limited in my social contacts. There are other social contacts available that are appropriate, given the morays and the standards of barracks life.

Mr. BATEMAN. Let me, if I may, just take a moment longer to follow up on what you have just commented on. A fraternization rule in the environment of Washington, D.C., is taken in a much

different context than a nonfraternization policy in an embassy environment such as the American Embassy in the Soviet Union. But even there, you feel that there are opportunities for meaningful social involvement of the young Marine Security Guards in a community that is a legitimate area of association.

Commander SHERMAN. Yes, sir; I had the opportunity to speak with a number of young Marines returning from Moscow. If you recall, there was a shift of personnel that came through Quantico. I spent some time talking with them, and I can assure you that there are opportunities for sexual release that did not violate the nonfraternization policy. I did not experience that myself.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Kyl.

Mr. KYL. No questions.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Darden.

Mr. DARDEN. No further questions.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Spence.

Mr. SPENCE. No further questions.

Mrs. BYRON. Let me say that I appreciate very much the opportunity for your testimony this morning.

Commander SHERMAN. Thank you, ma'am.

Mrs. BYRON. There are certain things I would hope that you could do, and that is, taking a look at long term retention rate of the individuals. I think that would be an interesting study to see how many of the people that have been security guards find it beneficial to aid their careers, see what it does to the retention rate of those individuals. I think that would be a study that would be of value.

This member is only sorry that an incident that occurred in Moscow was one of the things that promoted these hearings. I think it is something that this body probably should have looked into earlier, because we have had jurisdiction in this area and review is always good.

I think we are probably divided—this is one member that feels very strongly that the profile of a young Marine should be for this duty an unmarried one, it should be one that should be retained within one branch of the services, as opposed to rotation. There are those we have, as you know, anytime something like this transpires, you will have a hundred different ways to change the system, and it never hurts to look at the system, to reevaluate, and very frequently you will come up with the fact this is probably the best system that we have operational.

It has been in operation for about a 40-year period; so it never hurts to look at it. I am sorry it is the cause or reason we are looking at it, but let me say that when you look and try to define a profile, it is very different. There are some blatant things that you can eliminate quickly. But how an individual behaves and operates in stressful situations is always difficult, as you know.

We demand a great deal of our young military personnel. We put them in very difficult situations. We put them in very remote areas. We give them jobs that on a day-to-day basis are not exciting. Standing watch is not the most exciting thing in the world, but it is an important job. It is one that I think the Marine Corps has handled with a great deal of distinction.



So I do appreciate you giving us a little bit of background on what you are trying to look at and define as a profile for an individual. Thank you very much.

Commander SHERMAN. Thank you.

Mrs. BYRON. If there are no further questions, we will have to take about a 15-minute break and in room 2212, at 11:30, we will have a briefing for members only.

[Whereupon, at 11:13, the subcommittee and panel proceeded to other business.]

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
DEFENSE POLICY PANEL AND THE MILITARY  
PERSONNEL AND COMPENSATION SUBCOMMITTEE,  
*Washington, DC, Wednesday, July 29, 1987.*

The panel and subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Beverly B. Byron (chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation) presiding.

**STATEMENT OF HON. BEVERLY B. BYRON, A REPRESENTATIVE  
FROM MARYLAND, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY PERSONNEL AND  
COMPENSATION SUBCOMMITTEE**

Mrs. BYRON. The subcommittee will come to order. Today we will continue our hearings into the Marine Security Guard Battalion. This will be a busy day with a cross-section of witnesses. We will be hearing from two panels. One is composed of former detachment commanders, who have served in Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Africa and Latin America.

Another panel scheduled for this afternoon is composed of State Department Regional Security Officers, or RSO's, the civilians who are the immediate supervisors of the detachment commanders.

But first we will be hearing from a former commander of the Marine Security Guard Battalion at Quantico. He is David Mabry, a retired Marine Colonel. Colonel Mabry helped the MSG Battalion for almost 3 years, from July, 1982 through February of 1985. Colonel Mabry doesn't have a prepared statement, and I would like to start the hearings off by asking the Colonel to go down a list of some of the common suggested changes in the embassy guard area and tell us his thoughts about those, such as replacing the Marine Guards with older civilians; using personnel from other services; a rotation, putting officers instead of enlisted men heading the detachment; allowing the Marine Watch-standers to be married; abolishing the nonfraternization rule or to modify it so the Marines need only to report any instance of fraternization that they engage in; shorten the tour to a year, or even to just 6 months.

Colonel, with those guidelines, I would like to hear your thoughts on each of those ideas, particularly I would like to know if you think any of the changes which are discussed, which are commonly discussed, get to the problems we have found in the incident in Moscow.

**STATEMENT OF COL. DAVID MABRY, U.S. MARINE CORPS  
(RETIRED), FORMER MSG BATTALION COMMANDER**

Colonel MABRY. Yes, ma'am. My answer to all of those questions is no.

Mrs. BYRON. End of hearing?

Colonel MABRY. The issue I believe is leadership. I do not think that anybody can perform this mission better, cheaper than the United States Marine Corps.

I see nothing to be gained from using older people. I think the men that we pick are carefully selected. I know that we are making some changes to improve that selection. I think it would be a very serious mistake to put officers in charge of detachments. You will hear from these three staff NCO's later today, but all three of them worked for me. There are many reasons why a staff NCO can perform well as a leader of the detachment.

One, the men will come to him readily if they have a problem, and if he has a wife who is capable of handling that kind of sometimes very severe environment, she can be a tremendous asset also; and, in fact, in many embassies she becomes almost a mother for those Marines that are part of his detachment.

I don't think an officer can replace them, particularly a young lieutenant or a captain. I believe we would just disillusion the officer, and I do not believe we would get any better leadership. I do not believe that Marines on this program, except the detachment commanders, should ever be married. When we are talking about mob disturbances, hostile threats, bombings of embassies, we do not want a Marine Guard on post 1 worrying about his wife. The other aspect of that is you would raise the cost significantly.

I would like some characterization on what you mean on the fraternization issue. When you speak only of instances where they engage in, are you saying that they should not report on other Marines who they suspect are involved in fraternization or other personnel in the Embassy?

Mrs. BYRON. Abolish the fraternization rule or modify it so they need only to report the instances they engage in, not as the term goes, rat on their friends.

Colonel MABRY. I don't agree with that. There are times when, if you want to call it ratting, is appropriate.

Mrs. BYRON. It is an old fashioned term.

Colonel MABRY. That's fine. But I believe if they know about it they report it, absolutely. I mean that's—I think to adopt a rule like that would be asking for trouble.

Shortening the Marine tour to a year or even 6 months, I think, is wrong. I know that Congressman Mica suggested reducing the tour from 18 to 12 months. There are a lot of administrative problems associated with moving these Marines around the world, and one of the things I did as the Commander was that I equalized the tour for every Marine at every post to 15 months. I think that's appropriate. Including Moscow.

If you start talking about 12-month tours, when I was the CO, for example, in terms of lineal precedence, that is severity of the post, we ranked East Berlin number 71, Belgrade was 49, Prague 46, Budapest 47. That means there were probably 45 non-bloc posts that we considered more severe than them. So, I don't think that magically making these 12-month tours solves anything.

What they need is leadership, and if they are led by the right people, I guarantee you they won't fail.

Mrs. BYRON. There was one other area that had been discussed and that was replacing the Marines with older civilians or with retirees.

Colonel MABRY. Well, I think you are faced then with the issue of costs. You have an older individual who is certainly not as ready to take on a hostile mob as these Marines, but you have older people who have wives, and that raises costs. Instead of putting them in one house, such as a Marine detachment lives in together, you are going to have a situation where you are getting residential property for up to 32, 37 guards and their families. I think that's cost prohibitive.

I think one of the great things about the Marine Corps performing this mission is that they do it cheaply. That is not a slight at their ability, it's just because they're Marines, they don't get paid as much, they can do the job.

Mrs. BYRON. I don't think we are looking at the bottom line of costs as an issue. I think the bottom line that we are looking at is the quality and the capability and getting the mission done.

This is one member that feels very strongly that the system that we have, is good. I also think that it does not hurt to reevaluate the system.

Colonel MABRY. Yes, ma'am.

Mrs. BYRON. In light of what has transpired in Moscow recently, we have had a enormously high profile on this program. With that high profile comes a large number of suggestions for alternative ways of handling the security guard issue.

Colonel MABRY. I understand.

Mrs. BYRON. The six categories that I mentioned are all ones that have been very highly profiled, highly discussed, and highly bantered about.

Frankly, I think the system we have is one that works well. It has worked well for a number of years. One of the basic problems that we are looking at is when the Marine guards were originally conceived, about 40 years ago, at that time it was not to be just a short-term interim replacement.

As it has developed, we are now finding Marine guards in almost 140 different posts throughout the world. Many of them remote, some of the remote ones are not difficult, many of them are difficult, and so I don't think it ever hurts to take a reassessment and come up with a concept that what we're doing is doing it well, maybe there are a few minor things that we can qualify on that at the same time. It always is a stronger force once it has been examined from within and from without.

Mr. Hopkins.

Mr. HOPKINS. Colonel, let me ask you a question, if I may.

First of all, I am a graduate of the Marine Corps, so I am familiar with the words of Pogy Baden, boondockers, bulkheads and that type of thing.

Your ad says "Looking for a Few Good Men." It doesn't say you are looking for geldings. Marines are a match on type and I am a fan of the Marine Corps, but it seems to me you are saying this morning you refute some of the suggestions that have been made by some of my colleagues to reduce the tour down to 12 months, to

use perhaps older men, but you go back to what they need is leadership.

What I would like to clarify, Colonel, is by who? Who are you talking about when you speak of leadership? From who? Where does this leadership have to come from? Where is it lacking?

Colonel MABRY. I am talking about from the ambassador and no other man. When I was the CO there were instances where there was no leadership, and if these men don't get leadership they will do things that are contrary to the best interests of top performance at the post.

They need leadership from their detachment commander, and it is not just 8 hours a day, it is 24 hour a day, checking on them inside the chancery.

They need leadership from the regional security officer and he has got to report to the ambassador, who must be held accountable.

Mr. HOPKINS. I think maybe we can be of assistance in that area, but we need a little bit further guidance from you, Colonel.

Could you be more specific in what countries you are talking about, which ambassadors you might have in mind.

Colonel MABRY. Well, the focus on this one was Moscow.

Now, Ambassador Brown said in his report, and I quote, "Under Ambassador Hartman, the U.S. Embassy was among the most security conscious anywhere."

I visited 108 posts and without any doubt Moscow was the worst.

Mr. HOPKINS. From a security standpoint?

Colonel MABRY. Absolutely.

Mr. HOPKINS. Worst being in what way?

Colonel MABRY. I had—12 Marines asked to see me personally, one on one, to discuss what they perceived to be a very serious problem.

Mr. HOPKINS. Could you tell us—

Colonel MABRY. I will tell you. In my entire 2½ years on that program, at all the other posts combined I only ever had three men come to me and say, "Colonel Mabry, I have got a problem that I need to talk to you about."

In Moscow the sergeant major who went with me interviewed every one of them and then I interviewed them, and the issue was there was no security at that post and the ambassador did not care.

Mr. HOPKINS. Let me interrupt.

Mrs. BYRON. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOPKINS. In just a minute, if I may finish this question, and then I would be delighted to yield.

So you are telling this committee that that is contrary to the report that was given by Ambassador Brown or Hartman that said that it was the number one?

Could you restate that?

Colonel MABRY. He said it was a very security conscious post.

Mr. HOPKINS. Who specifically said that?

Colonel MABRY. Ambassador Brown.

Mr. HOPKINS. He said that of Ambassador Hartman?

Colonel MABRY. Hartman, that is correct.

Mr. HOPKINS. Did Ambassador Hartman make any statement to that—

Colonel MABRY. I don't think he did. I never read one.

Mr. HOPKINS. In all fairness, though, Ambassador Brown had been there a relatively short period of time, but he was talking about the stewardship of Ambassador Hartman; is that correct?

Colonel MABRY. With respect to security.

Mr. HOPKINS. What you are saying, then, is in contradiction to his assessment of the watch of Ambassador Hartman inasmuch as security was not what it ought to be; is that correct?

Colonel MABRY. That is correct, sir.

Mr. HOPKINS. The number one problem by these 12 enlisted men that you interviewed was that the security was——

Colonel MABRY. All of them felt that security was not important and that there were very serious problems that were taking place that needed attention. I can give you examples if you would like.

Mr. HOPKINS. Was that information turned in to the Embassy?

Colonel MABRY. More than that; I took the State Department Marines security guard desk officer with me on my visit to the bloc countries, and I did that because we had been foretold of some fairly serious problems in Moscow by the company commander. I took the predecessor to the State Department desk officer, who is now seated in the back of the room, with me, and he observed everything I did, and he was just as concerned as I was, and he can verify everything I saw.

Mr. HOPKINS. This information was turned over to the embassy?

Colonel MABRY. It was turned over to the embassy. I spoke to the Deputy Chief of Mission, Mr. Zimmerman, in the presence of the Marine Security Guard Desk Officer and told him about the problems.

Mr. HOPKINS. When was this?

Colonel MABRY. I was there from August 7th to August 12th, 1983.

Mr. HOPKINS. Way ahead, so the record would reflect that is way ahead of the current incident that brought us together?

Colonel MABRY. That is right.

Mr. HOPKINS. My time is up. I am sorry I didn't yield.

Mrs. BYRON. My only question was: What did you do about it?

Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. Why don't you go ahead and answer the Chairman's question.

Colonel MABRY. OK.

Mr. SKELTON. What did you do about it?

Colonel MABRY. I came back and I reported it to the head of what was then called SY, Marvin Garret, Joe Little, the Marine security guard desk officer at the State Department reported it not only to his boss, Mr. Garret, but he also reported it to the technical people because there were serious technical flaws. He said he got the brush-off.

Mr. SKELTON. What were those serious flaws?

Colonel MABRY. When the construction workers came inside the new office building compound through the gates——

Mr. SKELTON. The Soviet workers, is that correct?

Colonel MABRY. Soviet construction workers. If they had a bag with them, tools, listening devices, whatever, the Marine guard was not allowed to check that man.

Mr. SKELTON. By who's orders?

Colonel MABRY. I don't know if it was the RSO's or the foreign building officer in charge. I think the RSO officer in charge from—

Mr. SKELTON. Who gave the order to the Marines not to check the construction workers—just a minute, let me ask my question. From what you found out, who gave the order to the Marines not to inspect the Soviet construction workers' tool bags, handbags, and the like?

Colonel MABRY. I don't know if it was the detachment commander or the RSO. Probably the detachment commander because that would be the chain—

Mr. SKELTON. Where would he get that order from?

Colonel MABRY. The Detachment Commander would get it from the RSO.

Mr. SKELTON. What do you mean by RSO?

Colonel MABRY. The regional security officer at the post representing the State Department.

Mr. SKELTON. So, the State Department then undoubtedly, at least in your mind, gave the order to the Marines not to inspect the handbags of the construction workers?

Colonel MABRY. It would hold up the construction if they did it. All they did was check a badge.

Mr. SKELTON. They checked a badge. What problems have and could come out of not checking those bags, Colonel?

Colonel MABRY. Well, there was, the individual construction worker had license to bring anything he wanted inside that compound and leave it.

Mr. SKELTON. Such as?

Colonel MABRY. Such as listening devices, anything he wanted to bring in. But obviously listening devices would be the best thing because he could place them anywhere he needed to in the new embassy.

Mr. SKELTON. Colonel, in listening to your testimony, it seems that there is a break down between the protection of all embassy staff which is, of course, headed by the Ambassador and the Marines who provide the security at the embassy, in this case, the Moscow Embassy. Is that correct?

Colonel MABRY. There was a break down.

Mr. SKELTON. I think you refer to the fact that it came from the Ambassador on down; is that right?

Colonel MABRY. Yes sir, I believe that. Absolutely. I think he is accountable, and I don't think that he was security conscious. There were too many problems.

Mr. SKELTON. You said a few moments ago if they are led by the right people, I guarantee you they won't fail, you said that of the Marines. You, of course, were referring to the civilian State Department leadership?

Colonel MABRY. No, I wasn't. I am referring to Marines too.

Mr. SKELTON. All right.

Colonel MABRY. I have had bad detachment commanders and if they are bad, their men will fail. The Marines are just as responsible.

Mr. SKELTON. As I understand it, then, you would not be opposed to continuing the present system to having, of course, the best Ma-

rines selected to go through the schools, receive their training, receive proper leadership from the gunnery sergeants, master sergeants, and your main suggestion is that there be leadership emanating from the State Department to the Marines in regard to security.

Is that right?

Colonel MABRY. That is correct. I am not saying that all the Marines, the State Department people are bad. I mean there are some regional security officers and people involved in that program who are absolutely tremendous.

Mr. SKELTON. Can you give us an example of an Embassy that you visited or that was under your direction that worked well and why it worked well? Let's look at the positive side for a minute.

Colonel MABRY. Well, I will take a big one: Brussels, Belgium. The individual who was the regional security officer at that post will talk to you later, I think this afternoon, his name is Greg Bujac. Greg Bujac had three ambassadors out there and a host of Marines working under his oversight. I never heard of a complaint, I never heard of a problem in Brussels and it was because of him. He made it his job to know those men, to work with them, to brief them on the threat, and to make them feel a part of the State Department community.

Mr. SKELTON. All right. But were you to transfer this same regional security officer to Moscow who gets high marks from you, how would he be able to function in that environment from what you told us earlier?

Colonel MABRY. You are talking about Mr. Bujac?

Mr. SKELTON. Yes.

Colonel MABRY. I think he would excel.

Mr. SKELTON. So as you see the Moscow problem, can you crystallize what went wrong there compared to the Brussels Embassy which you just commented on, please?

Colonel MABRY. I know you have read about it, but I am sure that part of the problem is that the CIA, DOD, NSA, and State Department at that time were not working together. So, I don't think there was any concerted approach to intelligence. I will tell you I was certainly naive about the hostile threat, and I presume the hostile intelligence threat, and I suspect our Marines there were. But if the station chiefs were briefing those men every week and the RSO was briefing those men every week, they would have known what was happening and they would have taken steps, I think, to avoid getting into the predicament that Sergeant Lone-tree got into.

Mr. SKELTON. Colonel, thank you so much.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Nichols.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you.

Colonel you paint a picture here that's very disturbing to me. If I interpret correctly what you say, I presume that Quantico or some similar location hosts these Marines who are chosen for guard duty, and they receive instructions in security. Checking the post from the Marine Corps, I would assume that there are very strict orders, regulations on how the job of a Marine guard is to be done.

Then you portray, when we get to certain embassies a laxity on the part of the State Department, they see breaches clear and



open, unmistakable breaches of security, and they are not allowed to do anything about it.

Is that the picture you painted for us?

Colonel MABRY. I think that the situation is improving dramatically. I mean, you know, we are, the Marine Corps is doing things too. One should make certain that the Marines are aware of the hostile intelligence threat. They are getting psychiatric interviews. They're being prepared for the kind of situation that exists in a bloc country. I think what has to happen between the State Department and the Marine Corps is that it has got to be recognized that the Marine Corps community constitutes 16 percent of that foreign mission community and that we have a very vital support role to play and that these Marines are not just there to stay in that post and not become involved in what's going on.

They have got to be a part of the community, there's got to be caring, there's got to be belonging, and they have got to be made to feel important and they have got to be certain, the embassy, that the Marine knows his job is important. If he feels that way, he won't fail.

Mr. NICHOLS. Colonel, this experience you have had with the particular embassy in Moscow took place in August 1983, exactly 4 years ago.

Do you have reason to believe the situation has improved since then? I recognize you are out now; it's not your watch so to speak. Would you comment on that?

Colonel MABRY. Well, I know from my 15 months at the State Department following MSG duty, there has been a more concerted effort between CIA, State, and Defense to mutually come to grips with this security problem and that there is a sharing.

The State Department and the Marine Corps are doing a lot more interchange, the regional security officers now come to the Marine security guard battalion for 3 days to find out how these men are trained.

There is a lot more counter-intelligence training, so there are good things happening. But I believe that absolutely it is imperative that the State Department accept the Marine Corps in a support advisory role, and when we give advice on security, it is not telling them that they are doing bad, it is just saying: have you thought about this? If he wants to think about it and dismiss it, fine, but at least listen.

Mr. NICHOLS. You talk about State Department people frequently checking the embassy at night when one of the master sergeants is on duty. Marines are very reliable you see, but they need to know people are going to check on them. Is this routine? I presume you have—I am an old Army type, if you will excuse me, Colonel, and what I presume is you have a sergeant of the guard and somebody changes that guard and some sergeant is checking on these people doing the guarding, a Marine sergeant rather than the State Department.

Is what you are saying that it is good for the State Department to come around sometime at 1 or 2 o'clock in the morning and see that that man is on his post and is doing his duty? Is that what you are saying?

Colonel MABRY. I absolutely agree with that, yes. The regional security officer should be there at 2 a.m., at 3 a.m., at whatever time he wants, unannounced. The Marine Detachment Commander should be there in the middle of the night unannounced. If he doesn't do that, he is not doing his job. Any good one I can guarantee you does that. That is when mistakes don't happen.

Mr. NICHOLS. Don't you think a man pulling guard duty on that third shift at night, don't you think he would appreciate that, the fact that somebody is monitoring his situation?

Colonel MABRY. I said belonging, caring, and feeling, they are important, is critical.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Badham.

Mr. BADHAM. Thank you.

Colonel, I don't want to disparage or impugn Ambassador Hartman for whom I have a great deal of respect, but I visited with other members of Congress the embassy in Moscow. Strangely we were ushered into the living room at Spasio House and we had our country team briefing by the Ambassador there and we wondered why in the Soviet Union, unlike other Pact countries, we had visited, the briefing took place right in the living room and the Ambassador told us why.

He said there really isn't much that goes unescaped around here. There were no security precautions taken in our meeting. You know what I am talking about. He said the best way I can communicate with the Soviet leaders is to have conversations in my own house here, in Spasio House.

Colonel MABRY. It doesn't surprise me.

Mr. BADHAM. That is part of the game. I assume that the rules such as nonfrat and so forth, are difficult for Pact countries even other countries. Is that correct?

Colonel MABRY. Yes sir.

Mr. BADHAM. In the proposal to cut the tour from 18 months to 12 months, are you suggesting that it is easier for a Marine to be celibate for 12 months rather than 18?

Colonel MABRY. No, I don't agree with an 18 month tour at any post. I think they should be equalized at 15 months at every post.

Mr. BADHAM. 15?

Colonel MABRY. 15. The Marine comes on—

Mr. BADHAM. A Marine is tough enough to be celibate for 15 months?

Colonel MABRY. No. They need—he

Mr. BADHAM. We are getting laughter out there.

Colonel MABRY. No, I don't believe they should be. It is crucial at Moscow, Leningrad, that they be afforded the opportunity to escape for a week, maybe two weeks during their tour. That is not too much. But to keep a man in Moscow for 15 months can drive them crazy.

Mr. BADHAM. OK.

Colonel MABRY. In Leningrad, I know that the Consul General, Mr. Chen, made it a point to put the Marines on courier duty so they could get to Helsinki, Finland.

Mr. BADHAM. I want to get this on the record. The staff interview notes where we have alluded to your comment that the limitations

imposed upon them by the embassy, Marines couldn't check workmen's bags as they were going in and out of the new construction site. At night, if the Marines saw a stranger inside the new complex, they couldn't apprehend him but only file a written report.

Colonel MABRY. That is correct.

Mr. BADHAM. They couldn't screen any of the people entering the Embassy to attend church services there on Sunday.

Colonel MABRY. That is correct.

The only control was what the Soviet guards did. If they didn't want somebody to go to church, they could keep them out.

Mr. BADHAM. At the Embassy warehouse site, the closed circuit TV was often on the blink, but MSG's were unable to patrol the ground even when they heard noises.

Colonel MABRY. That is right.

Mr. BADHAM. There was a Marine post in the office outside the Ambassador's office, but they were told not to stop strangers to ask for ID's.

Colonel MABRY. They were sad—yes, that is essentially correct.

Mr. BADHAM. I again, not like Sergeant Hopkins, I was not a Marine, I was a Navy man, and there is a kinship there, I guess, between them and the Marine Corps., but I agree with you, Colonel, that officers and enlisted men have to be made to feel a part of what they are doing in that—it is important that they are important to the mission and the mission itself is important, and it is almost like on a war-time status. I agree with that.

If that hasn't been done, I regret that and I think we should have some better cooperation with the State Department, because it is essential for any human being and someone who wears the uniform of our country to at least know what he is doing, so he can be proud of it, and I think that is part of the failure.

Do you have any other suggestions that we might take through this committee to other parts of government to, perhaps, alleviate some of these problems?

Colonel MABRY. I just want to reenforce what you said.

Ambassador David Miller, before he went to Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, made a point to come to the Marines Security Guards School and go through the course and fire every weapon the Marines fired, and then he brought his family down to do it.

That man cared and he cared for the entire duration of his tour, and the men would have done anything for him.

Mr. BADHAM. In the hearings that are going on in another part of this Capitol complex, I take a certain amount of umbrage at some of the questions that are asked, but let me ask you one of these kinds of questions: In your opinion, Colonel, do you think that the attitude of the State Department might be that there is no hope for security in the Moscow Embassy or that kind of embassy because it is so rife with leaks and lack of security and espionage anyway, that why bother?

Colonel MABRY. I certainly hope that is not their attitude. I can tell you though that in 1983 dollars were short for security. It was not a popular item.

Having served in the State Department for 15 months, I can understand some of their inabilities to get things done that were needed because there just was not funding to cover it until we had

two Embassies blown up in Beirut and one in Kuwait and the Inman Panel said you had better get hot.

Mr. BADHAM. Thank you, Colonel.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you.

Colonel, I too am astonished at your testimony and I want to follow up on something Mr. Nichols said. He said that in the Marine Security Guard Corps, and in the Corps, itself, you must have a series of basic rote procedures that you drill into your officers and men.

Is that not true?

Colonel MABRY. We train these Marines to react promptly and properly under extreme pressure. That is the primary goal of MSG School.

Mr. DAVIS. Aren't there codified some place in your battalion or in the Corps. or in the Department of Defense, certain routine procedures that are followed by every MSG in every out post in the bloc nations, in the Pact nations? Isn't there just a basic stop and search procedure?

Colonel MABRY. Sure there is.

Mr. DAVIS. A crypto procedure, all kinds of procedures?

Colonel MABRY. Yes.

Mr. DAVIS. Are you saying then the State Department overrides those and directly countermands the orders given to that detachment by yourself or your officers?

Colonel MABRY. No sir, I am not saying that.

Mr. DAVIS. Well then, where does the break down occur from, to basically break down security guard procedures in the Pact nations?

Colonel MABRY. Let me---

Mr. DAVIS. Like examining bags in and out of a construction site or apprehending strangers at night. Those would seem to be—I don't mean to be combative. What in the heck are you teaching those folds before you send them out?

Colonel MABRY. We teach them the right thing. That is why 12 Marines came to me and said, we need you to do something.

Mr. DAVIS. Somebody directly countermanded those orders. Those are standing orders that the guard has, somebody directly countermanded those orders.

Colonel MABRY. That is correct.

Mr. DAVIS. Did you report that to your superiors, sir?

Colonel MABRY. I reported it, I reported it to the State Department and I reported it to the Marine Corps. It is in writing.

Mr. DAVIS. Did you report it to the Commandant of the Marine Corps., or to your direct superior?

Colonel MABRY. I reported it to my direct superior.

Mr. DAVIS. Do you know what he did with it?

Colonel MABRY. To the best of my knowledge, the report was filed.

Mr. DAVIS. Does that mean filed in a circular file or was it bucked upstairs? What other actions did you take, sir, at that point? Did you talk to the RSO in Moscow, did you tell your Marine detachment at that point, boys shape up and here are your orders, here, sir, are your orders, sergeant?

Colonel MABRY. I talked to the acting regional security officer because there was a switch taking place between the primary RSO and the oncoming one. I talked to a representative from the Foreign Buildings Office, and I talked to the Deputy Chief of Mission, and I made a plea to all of them to do something.

When we came back Mr. Little—

Mr. DAVIS. May I interrupt you a moment. Did you or did you not have the authority to countermand the RSO and to shape up your own detachment?

Colonel MABRY. No.

Mr. DAVIS. Or to relieve that detachment and leave them security less, if that be the case, or tell them you will stop and search strangers at night, you will walk your post?

Colonel MABRY. I had no such authority.

Mr. DAVIS. You had no such authority?

Colonel MABRY. The Marine Corps is not in the operational chain. Now, we would like to give, and we want the State Department to accept our advice that pertains to operational matters, but they are the operating entity.

Mr. DAVIS. The Marine Corps on the strength of your information that was filed or bucked upstairs, has come up with no set of procedures or the Department of Defense negotiated no set of routine or standard procedures in Pact countries for Marines security guard units with the State Department. To the best of your knowledge, is that correct?

Colonel MABRY. No, no. The Marine Corps is making some dramatic changes and I know the new commandant is meeting with Secretary Shultz next week.

Mr. DAVIS. On the basis of Sergeant Lonetree's experience in the Marine Corps, not on the basis of your report.

Colonel MABRY. There was a dissent in security, sir, primarily because it wasn't a popular item. There were not bucks, dollars to apply to it.

Mr. DAVIS. That has created a relatively severe morale problem for you, did it not?

Colonel MABRY. It was bad enough for 12 Marines to come to me. I mean that was 400 percent of all the others combined that ever came to me and said, Colonel Mabry—

Mr. DAVIS. Would you furnish this committee with the names of the State Department officers who were directly countermanding Warsaw Pact Security arrangements that were routine in your view and were directly involved in countermanding the gunnery or the Marine security guard detachment's orders or procedures? Could you furnish us with those names?

Colonel MABRY. I don't know the name of the foreign building officer chief who was at the site, but I think he was the one that was primarily running the show. He had to have license from the Ambassador to do it.

We keep getting away from the issue of ultimate accountability, and that is the Ambassador.

Mr. DAVIS. I find it astonishing that this testimony has gone unheeded for years and that it took the scandal that occurred with Sergeant Lonetree and his detachment to bring about some attempt to rectify this situation.

But I think that the Corps, is certainly not without blame in this point, Colonel, because when you perceive that you probably are aware of that problem and the security of the United States of America is threatened in any nation of the world and nothing is done about it, then a whole lot of people are at fault.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Bateman.

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Colonel, I want to follow up on the same line of questioning just pursued by my colleague, Mr. Davis.

It is one thing in my view for there not to be nonfeasance and for proper security precautions and procedures not to be followed. It is very much different and a much more grave situation if it is a matter not of nonfeasance but of misfeasance or malfeasance where proper procedures in place are deliberately and directly being superseded by someone's direction.

You have indicated that you made a report following your inspection, and we have this catalog of things that Mr. Badham recited which were being directly contravened. Could this committee have a copy of the written report that you made contemporaneously with or immediately following your inspection so that we can establish where that report was directed, what the person to whom it was directed did with it and what discussions and corrective actions, if any, took place thereafter.

Because I think it is vitally important to our oversight in this matter that we be able to trace the chain of responsibility as high up and as far up as it may go.

It is nice to say that the person in overall responsibility was the Ambassador and I don't disagree with that statement, but we need to know who did and did not, who tried and failed at least, to rectify this situation. Because again this is not a matter of nonfeasance from what you have had here, it isn't a report that certain proper procedures weren't being followed, it is an indication, an assertion that someone was directing people not to do that which was proper and which was the regular ordained procedure.

We need to know who that was and who they were accountable to and to whom this failure, to whom's attention this failure was brought. Can you furnish us with your report? Do you have a copy of it?

Colonel MABRY. I can not, sir. Headquarters Marine Corps has it, I am sure.

Mr. BATEMAN. Madam Chairman, I would like to ask that all reports and responses to it be provided to the committee.

Mrs. BYRON. We will take care of that.

Colonel MABRY. I reported all of this to the Station Chief also who was also on duty there; in the presence of the State Department officer who said, reaffirmed everything I said.

Mr. BATEMAN. Madam Chairman, to conclude and for the record, the concern here is not just of some nonfeasance, not something that suggests a shortage of funding for security purposes, because the kinds of things not done here don't relate to a budgetary crunch, it relates to personnel in place not being permitted to discharge their function properly on the direction of someone.

Colonel MABRY. That is correct, sir.

Mr. BATEMAN. We need very definitely to determine who those persons, who that person or persons may have been.

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Ray.

Mr. RAY. Thank you.

Colonel might be good to have you here this morning and I realize this is probably a uncomfortable situation for you and I certainly understand that. I noticed in this morning's news that there was a report which indicated that in the beginning of the construction of our new embassy in the Soviet Union, the instructions were to examine the materials, open up the boxes to be sure there were no bugging devices or other situations that might get built into the building. But along the way, the Marine guards received instructions to discontinue this policy. Technically I suppose from previous hearings, we have heard that the Ambassador is responsible and in charge and although he may not issue those specific orders sometime they technically found their way back to him in the instance of where Marine guards set policy and do certain things. Is this correct?

Colonel MABRY. Absolutely.

Mr. RAY. I would like to refresh even the memory of our committee here. In 1985, Congressman Courter introduced legislation at a hearing, a great amendment of controversy, a couple of years after the probe of the situation in the Soviet Embassy. We had a complete full employment of KGB approved employees who were working there. When Congressman Courter introduced this legislation which I was a co-sponsor of, shortly thereafter Ambassador Hartman came and visited him in his office and prevailed upon him and asked him if he wouldn't withdraw this legislation. He said it would be very damaging, they knew these people were corrupt, even mentioned that his driver was KGB personnel. It was much easier to watch corrupt people who they knew were spies than to bring Americans in who might be converted to spies by the Soviets.

Now, the State Department, the Secretary of State, became involved at this point and ordered the reduction of about 50 percent of Soviet personnel at that time. I wanted to put into the record a good strong statement indicating to you that there are Marines under the direction of the Ambassador and his personnel and that it is kind of difficult, I imagine, from time to time to operate around there.

Just a minute, Mr. McCurdy.

Colonel MABRY. The Marine Corps, make no mistake, sir. We are not in the operational chain of command, but we play a supporting role and we do believe our advice should be heard and listened to.

Mr. RAY. This is a point this panel—

Colonel MABRY. It is a crucial point.

Mr. RAY. This panel should begin to concentrate on at the present time. There is a perception in the minds of the American people or has been up until the time the Iranians took our embassy employees and staff people hostage, that Marines were there to fight to the death to prevent the embassy from being invaded and taken over in any way or an incident happening such as happened in Iran.

I think you have seen the standoff in France right now between the Iranians and the French Government, which may indicate they have a little bit different attitude than we have in our own embassies. But that perception, I think, has been moved out and taken away and we now understand that the Marines are there to check passports, follow the instructions of the Ambassador and his chain of command and really I assume they don't even carry a weapon.

Colonel MABRY. They better be. If the Marine is not carrying a weapon, he should not be on the post.

Mr. RAY. Let me yield to Mr. McCurdy.

Mr. McCURDY. I appreciate the gentleman yielding.

Colonel MABRY. Can I say one other thing in answer to—

Mr. McCURDY. Go ahead.

Colonel MABRY. It is important, I think, that somehow there has got to be a movement—and I believe it is happening, that it is not we and they. It is not the Marine Corps and the State Department, but it is us, us in there together. It can't be a clash like that.

Mr. McCURDY. If the gentleman will yield just on that point, I was going to support a statement that my good friend from Georgia made. As a member of the Intelligence Committee, at the time you were introducing your bill in 1985, we had held a series of hearings with FBI counterintelligence and other people regarding the security at the embassy in Moscow and at that time the serious allegation which led to the introduction of legislation regarding the number of Soviet citizens that were working on the first three levels of the embassy—I think it was the first three—and a disturbing number was brought to light.

We had at that time high ranking officials from the State Department come and make a concerted effort to persuade us not to adopt the very stringent proposals that many of us in the Intelligence Committee were suggesting.

As a matter of fact, I flew to Moscow in September of 1985 to look at the new building and long before this came out, to discuss some various details, serious allegations made by counterintelligence personnel regarding the old building primarily and some of the problems in the new building that have come to light since then.

I must state it was the State Department's insistence that we not make the drastic cutbacks—and it was not just Ambassador Hartman, who I have a great deal of respect for, but I think it was above him, that were resisting those efforts.

It was not a question of just resources either. It was not a question of funding. It was not a question of how much money it would be.

Colonel MABRY. By 1985, there was some funding.

Mr. McCURDY. Again, this is the time frame many of us—there were considerable funds moving in that direction.

Colonel MABRY. Sure.

Mr. McCURDY. I again wanted to raise that. I think it is important perhaps the panel at some point might even want to call the counterintelligence expert from the FBI and others that did some of the inspection or the inspections and get some of those early reports.

I yield back. I appreciate the gentleman yielding.



Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Montgomery.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

To follow up on Mr. Ray and Mr. McCurdy's thoughts and for my own information, Colonel—I am sure this question has been answered—the host countries we have our embassies in, they hold the primary responsibility for security of that embassy; is that correct, the host country?

Colonel MABRY. That is correct.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. You made the statement that all Marines carry weapons when they are in the embassies. In the back of my mind, I had the idea in Iran when that started, the weapons were taken away from the Marines and in certain other hot spots the weapons were taken away also from the Marines. Are you sure that they always carry weapons in the different countries?

Colonel MABRY. Sir, I believe that there were about two posts where Marines were not allowed to carry weapons while I was the CO and they were eventually changed. One was Beijing, China, and I can't remember the other.

If there are posts that that policy prevails, I don't know about it.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. In some embassies that I have been in, they have an enclosure where the Marine, you can hardly see him. He is in a—

Colonel MABRY. It is a public access control booth.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. You really can't see them and, of course, I like the idea of having a Marine standing when we come into our embassy. I think it adds protocol, which I like very much.

My question or point is what good does it do to have him in this enclosure where they can't really fire out, they can't really do much and I am wondering if the mission of the Marines has passed us by now with all the problems we are having in these embassies.

Colonel MABRY. Well, the state of the art today is to have a public access control booth wherein the Marine Security Guard can control, monitor the closed circuit television, monitor the hard-core doors and prevent any penetration into the embassies except by authorized personnel.

An issue that persisted for a long time was that these booths were being built without firing ports, which meant that the Marine Corps in a real—the Marine in a crisis situation could not defend himself or fire upon an adversary.

That is being corrected, to the best of my knowledge.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Well, did you support these booths, as you call them, when they were put into the different embassies?

Colonel MABRY. I supported the concept. I did not support the concept that the Marine was never consulted on his ideas on how to make it a booth where he could do his job effectively.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. My problem is, Madam Chairman, when you go into these embassies they have these booths and you really don't know where you are. Maybe that is good, but it is a lot of confusion, of clearance, what the Marine is actually doing there and I hope we can get this cleared up in these hearings.

Thank you.

Mrs. BYRON. Let me pick up on a few things that have been brought out in the questioning. The Marines feel if they see lax security they should do something about it.

The State Department people resent the free advice. One of the things that concerns me is that you said when you arrived in Moscow, 12 of the guards asked to speak to you versus three in any other areas in the entire time you were the commander of detach.

Colonel MABRY. Yes, ma'am.

Mrs. BYRON. The issues that were all discussed with you basically were security issues.

Colonel MABRY. They were just that. Morale was bad. We had a good detachment commander.

Mrs. BYRON. Were there any complaints about the detachment commander?

Colonel MABRY. None. There were complaints about the assistant detachment commander who was a weak staff sergeant. I will acknowledge that.

Mrs. BYRON. Were there complaints they were having to pull duty at remote sites as opposed to embassy duty?

Colonel MABRY. No, ma'am. That is not the issue. The Marines don't care where they work at if it is required and if the job is made to feel essential.

Mrs. BYRON. Did they have problems with the fact that the people that they were screening, when they saw strangers inside the complex at night and they had to file a written report, did they ever find out what happened to those written reports?

Colonel MABRY. No.

Mrs. BYRON. What did happen to those written reports, and was there ever anything done on those reported?

Colonel MABRY. No. They specifically stated that.

Mrs. BYRON. OK.

Colonel MABRY. There was another situation where the Muscovites did not like the lights that were on that compound at the new office building. They said it was too bright.

So the embassy turned them off.

Mrs. BYRON. You said, I believe, that the State Department officer that you took with you was shocked by what he heard. Ambassador Hartman was not there when you were there although he was in charge at the time. We have asked for a copy of your report. I asked earlier when Mr. Badham was questioning you on the issues that were transpiring at the embassy what you did to the report.

Obviously the report was filed and is still sitting where it was originally filed.

Colonel MABRY. I know it has been viewed because I was called by headquarters, Marine Corps, several months ago.

Mr. SKELTON. Will the gentlelady yield at that point?

Did you not make two reports, one to the Marine Corps and one to the State Department?

Colonel MABRY. The one to the State Department was not in writing, it was verbal. I went to the senior security representative at the State Department.

Mr. SKELTON. In Moscow or here?

Colonel MABRY. I went to the senior person present in Moscow who is the Deputy Chief of Mission, Mr. Zimmerman. I went to the senior station chief in Moscow whose name I cannot remember.

When I came back, I went to the senior security representative at the State Department.

Mr. SKELTON. Do you remember his name?

Colonel MABRY. Mr. Garret, Marvin Garret.

Mr. SKELTON. I would suggest, Madam Chairman, we get a copy of Mr. Garret's report that he undoubtedly made to his superior. Thank you.

Mrs. BYRON. Was that the name of the State Department individual that accompanied you?

Colonel MABRY. The individual from the State Department who accompanied me was Mr. Joe Little, L-i-t-t-l-e.

Mrs. BYRON. Did Mr. Little, to your knowledge, file a report when he returned?

Colonel MABRY. I believe he did, but I am not positive.

Mrs. BYRON. They changed—

Colonel MABRY. He told me the other day he remembers talking to the technical people and he got the brush off.

Mrs. BYRON. Talked to the technical people and got the brush off. Are there occasions in your estimation where the Marine guards should stand duty without weapons or without uniforms?

Colonel MABRY. Never. I think one thing, just the uniform sometimes prevents a nut from doing something that could be very, very serious.

Mrs. BYRON. Do you think we need to move toward a two-man watch within embassies in order to minimize the risk of security violations or is the single-man watch still enough?

Colonel MABRY. Well, at large posts you do have more than one post. So you automatically have more than one man. But where you have a small post, where you have a total of five watch standers and a detachment commander, it is impossible to have two men on guard at one time.

Mrs. BYRON. We haven't touched on this and that is the two-man rule when off-duty outside the embassy compound in a communist country. Would the risk, do you think, of security violations be lowered if they were required to conform to that rule?

I know it is requested, but not required.

Colonel MABRY. I think it is a good rule. I know it has been practiced at some of the bloc countries. It was when I was the commander and it worked well.

Mrs. BYRON. I think it has been practiced not just in the bloc countries, but other high profile posts for their own benefit and security.

Colonel MABRY. Yes.

Mrs. BYRON. Let me follow up with one final question. Do you have a problem with the Ambassador being the commander of the Marine detachment at his embassy?

Colonel MABRY. None whatsoever. I think if he is the senior officer present, which he is, he is the guy that should be operationally responsible. I believe every Marine feels the same way.

Mrs. BYRON. I think basically what we are looking at is embassy duty and embassy duty is United States citizens representing the United States in a foreign nation.

Colonel MABRY. That is correct.

Mrs. BYRON. They are all United States citizens.

Mr. Skelton?

Mr. SKELTON. I have one last question, Colonel.

Would you be kind enough, in your opinion, based upon what you have experienced over the years as colonel in charge of this operation, would you be kind enough to give your understanding of the responsibility and authority of, A, the detachment commander; B, the regional security officer; and C, the Ambassador in regard to security?

Colonel MABRY. The detachment commander is responsible for everything his detachment does or fails to do, period, the Marine detachment.

The RSO is responsible for all security matters at the foreign mission, including oversight of the Marine Security Guard detachment. The Ambassador is the responsible, accountable officer for it all.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Bateman.

Mr. BATEMAN. I have no further questions, Madam Chairman.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Ray?

Mr. RAY. No further questions.

Mrs. BYRON. Colonel, thank you very much.

Your testimony has been extremely helpful to us to set the stage and to put into proper perspective many of the questions that have been bantered about by members of Congress and I appreciate your candid views this morning.

Colonel MABRY. Thank you.

Mrs. BYRON. We will now call a panel of three former Marine Security Guard detachment commanders, Master Sergeant J.D. Coombs, who has served in Bonn, Germany and Warsaw, Poland; Gunnery Sergeant D.F. Rosario, who has served in Lisbon, Portugal; and Gunnery Sergeant D. Singleton, who has served in Somalia, East Berlin and Guatamala City, who have been very patiently waiting.

Your tours of duty span from, Gunnery Sergeant Singleton, December 3 of 1981 to June, 1986, so we have had a five year experience in embassy work. I appreciate the three of you being here today and we will start off with Master Sergeant Coombs. If you will give us a brief description of what your feelings are as far as the proposals that have been discussed before us on replacing the Marines with older civilians, putting officers instead of enlisted men in ahead of the detachment and allowing Marine watch standers to be married.

**STATEMENTS OF M.S. J.D. COOMBS; GUNNERY SERGEANT D.F. ROSARIO, AND GUNNERY SGT. D. SINGLETON**

Master Sergeant COOMBS. I will take the one with the older civilian security guards. One of the items you will lose and is very important to this program is the camaraderie you have among the Marine detachment. You have a young group of individuals working for the same goal. They come from the same background.

They are trained the same. They have a lot of pride in what they do. If you take the older, as you put it, civilian sector and put it in there, I think you lose that. You lose the gung-ho-ness that Ma-

rines have having their own program, that ability to go one step further.

If they see something that needs to be done, that young man is going to do it. He is going to ask for guidance. If there is no guidance, he is going to do something, right, wrong or indifferent, he is going to do something. He is not the type of person who is going to sit around.

The question of married personnel on the program I think is opening up a can of worms.

You are taking one series of problems and replacing them with a greater number of problems. I think the young Marine has other interests to take up his spare time.

It seems everybody is talking about his personal life, what he does off-times, like his companionship with the opposite sex. That is to the British and some of the other embassies in the countries they furnish that outlet for the Marines.

They have younger secretaries that are over there that are looking for the same type of companionship. They do not have to go out into town or into the—

Mrs. BYRON. I believe yesterday it was described as a meaningful relationship.

Master Sergeant COOMBS. Yes, ma'am. But I think this is something that there is entirely too much emphasis put on. You have the young Marine who is athletic, does a lot of running. He has got other things he has to do. He is assigned other assignments other than standing eight hours of duty, patrolling the embassy, looking for violations.

He may be in charge of the kitchen, the Marine Fund for the mess, supply, maybe in charge of the vehicles. He has other responsibilities to do, plus he is assigned classes to give to the other Marines.

So he is just not standing eight hours of duty and then the rest of the time he spends out chasing young ladies or visiting the local discotheques. I think the young Marine is doing a good job out there. It all lays down, comes to his moral upbringing, whatever his family, whatever he feels.

If he wants to go out and break the rules and regulations and go break the non-frat policy, he is going to do it no matter who is around.

He is going to find a way to do it.

Mrs. BYRON. Gunnery Sergeant Rosario, do you think we should shorten the tour of duty to one year or six months or do you feel the current tour of duty is one that is adequate?

Gunnery Sergeant ROSARIO. Yes, ma'am. I believe the tour of duty is adequate for the following reasons: number one is if the Marine on any post is doing a good job and is having an acceptable time, a good time there, not only will he do a good job for any length or period of time, but he will gladly extend, as we have seen in the past. Marines have finished two tours of duties on two different embassies, very oftentimes asked for a third post, indicating that they will go anywhere the Marine Corps needs them to go.

Mrs. BYRON. It seems to me that cutting the tour of duty down to six months, it takes you one to two months to really get acclimated first of all to your post, your mission, your duty. At the same time,

the country you are dealing with, in many cases you have got a language problem within the community.

I think this is one member that thinks the 15 months is an adequate length of competent tour of duty. But let me ask you, since you have been in Portugal, the fraternization rule, was there a problem there? There was no problem in that post?

Gunnery Sergeant ROSARIO. There was not a problem. It was not a problem at all. However, when it is a hardship post in terms of being an iron curtain country, the watchstanders still stand the same. The fraternization policy, they are still aware who they can fraternize with and who they cannot fraternize with.

Mrs. BYRON. Gunnery Sergeant Singleton, let me follow up and ask you—you have served in three different and varied posts all of them different posts for one formula or another. Have you found in your post areas where written reports have been filed by your watchstanders, turned into the State Department and then no action taken on those? Have you had some complaints from your watchstanders in that category when a RSO has handed in a written report and then the perception is by the Marine watchstander that it hasn't been looked at or it hasn't been corrected or it hasn't been addressed?

Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. Yes, Madam Chairman. At one of my posts in Somalia, that was the only post that I had a problem out of. That was due to the fact that there was not a regional security officer there. There was a post security officer, which was the administrative office.

He had problems, which I would rather not discuss, concerning the reason why he did the things he had done. As far as the violations are concerned, the Marines found out that they were not being processed and they were being what you call circular-filing it within his desk drawer.

When the roving security officer came aboard, which came out of Nairobi, Kenya, the situation was brought to his attention. The roving regional security officer collected the unprocessed violations and processed them himself.

He also, I guess, reprimanded the post security officer.

Mrs. BYRON. It seems to me that if I were a detachment commander and the situation was similar to that we had recently in Moscow, and the written reports that my watchstanders were turning in and they were being turned into the RSO, which is what I assume the chain of command is, and then nothing was being done on those, it would be very difficult for morale, it would be very difficult for me to keep my men aware of the requirements to continuously file those reports.

You tend to think what difference does it make if I file it. No one is going to pay any attention. This is a very serious syndrome I think to get in.

Do any of you have any comment on that?

Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. That is true, Madam Chairman. However, it is up to the detachment commander to instill the motivation and the desire and self-esteem within his men to continue to carry out that operational need as far as security, and just convince them that something will be done, maybe not at that appro-

appropriate time, but it will be taken care of as soon as the appropriate representative within the State Department arrives.

Taking it to the same individual, which is the post security officer, as I stated before, there was no regional security officer there. However, it was his responsibility, however, it alleviated the overall responsibility off of his shoulders because he could always say I am the administrative officer. I was not trained in this area.

Mrs. BYRON. You served in three different posts. Did you find all three of those posts similar in your duties or did you find them different in light of your responsibilities?

Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. Madam Chairman, you stated "similar" as in what? The threat or—

Mrs. BYRON. There are three different posts you served in as detachment commander. Did you find working with the embassy personnel and your responses the same, about the same in those three different posts or did you find a better working rapport with one of the embassies versus the other two.

Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. Madam Chairman—

Mrs. BYRON. You had the responsibility in Somalia for how many watchstanders under your jurisdiction?

Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. In Somalia I had five watchstanders, ma'am.

Mrs. BYRON. In East Berlin you had how many?

Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. In East Berlin I had six.

Mrs. BYRON. And Guatemala City?

Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. In Guatemala City I had 11.

Mrs. BYRON. Guatemala City was a little hot when you were there?

Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. Yes, ma'am, it was.

Mrs. BYRON. I would assume the working conditions in those three different posts, your responsibilities, did you find them in the structure about the same or was there one that was more lax than the others?

Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. Somalia as far as security-wise was more lax. East Berlin, it was lax in the sense that the Marine Guard had the opportunity to leave his post due to the fact that the Marine House was within the embassy on the second floor.

Mrs. BYRON. In East Berlin was the Marine House located in West Berlin?

Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. No, ma'am, it was not.

Mrs. BYRON. It was located in East Berlin?

Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. Yes, ma'am. To answer your question about the laxness as far as in East Berlin, post one was given the authority to go up to the second floor, which is the Marine House, and have a snack and then come back down to post one and continue to stand his post. That was improper. Later on I changed that.

Guatemala was not a lax post.

Mrs. BYRON. You felt comfortable with the assistance from the RSO and the embassy people in Guatemala?

Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. Yes, ma'am.

Mrs. BYRON. You got good support there?

Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. Yes, ma'am. Outstanding support.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

In the military you are always judging fellow Marines by their actions, giving them good marks, bad marks. You are doing this of your peers. You do it of your officers either subconsciously or intentionally. Let's talk about what some ambassadors that you have worked for did right so we will have it for the record as something to compare Colonel Mabry's testimony against.

Master Sergeant Coombs, you have served in both Warsaw Pact—no, no. One of your duties was in Warsaw, Poland, one was in West Germany. Would you tell us what the ambassadors that you worked with did right and that you would commend, were you writing an officer efficiency report on him, please?

Master Sergeant COOMBS. Yes, sir. I will take the late Mr. Burns was my ambassador in Bonn, Germany. Outstanding man to work for, very concerned about not only the Marines, but the whole embassy's personnel, local foreign service nationals and State Department personnel, attached units. He was concerned that we work as a family.

He wanted to be a family. He would do small things like promote, give promotion warrants to my Marines.

Mr. SKELTON. Promotion what?

Master Sergeant COOMBS. Promotion warrants. When a Marine would get promoted out there from Lance Corporal to Corporal, he would want to present to the Marine his promotion warrant to show him he did care, the embassy was concerned about his welfare. He would talk to him. He knew each one of the Marines by their first names and would talk to them as the Marine would escort him up to his office every day.

He would invite us to his residence for just a social occasion, if nothing else, just to come over and have a chitchat with him and his wife. It didn't have to be any big formal occasion, just he would invite the Marines over because he knew they were over in a country without their loved ones so he would more or less take them under his wing.

That is the type of ambassador he was. He was constantly concerned about their welfare, their morale and their discipline.

Mr. SKELTON. Gunnery Sergeant Singleton, if I were to ask you the same question, could you answer that for us? Let's look on the positive side.

Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. Sir, starting from Mogadishu, Somalia, I had Ambassador Peterson, I believe, during the time I was there and later on Ambassador Oakley came in. Ambassador Peterson, on the positive side, there is really not anything basically I could say positive about Ambassador Peterson. However, Ambassador Oakley was an outstanding ambassador. He made every effort to visit the Marine House on occasions.

During Saturday mornings, he use to come over and play pool with the Marines. He used to invite them over to his house for lunch. He was very enthusiastic with the detachment itself.

In East Berlin, Ambassador Ridgeway, she was an outstanding ambassador.

Mr. SKELTON. She didn't play pool with you, did she?



Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. No, sir. She made every effort to be available at all of the happy hours, all the functions that the Marines hosted and she recommended that her staff be there also.

In Guatemala, Ambassador Piedra, outstanding, very outstanding ambassador. He supported the Marine detachment in every way possible that he could provide assistance and that goes as far as having functions over at his residence for the Marines, being at all the functions that we hosted at the Marine House and his door was always open for the Marines.

Mr. SKELTON. Tell us about Lisbon, Gunnery Sergeant Rosario.

Gunnery Sergeant ROSARIO. Yes, sir. During my watch in Lisbon, Portugal, I worked under two ambassadors. The first one was Ambassador H. Allen Holmes and the second one was Ambassador Frank Shakespeare. Ambassador Holmes was a former Marine Corps captain and could relate—

Mr. SKELTON. I bet that was tough.

Gunnery Sergeant ROSARIO. Actually, it helped us quite a lot. Both ambassadors and their wives were very, very supportive of the detachment and the quality of life that we had there at Lisbon once they knew about certain problems.

They would bend over backward for us.

Mr. SKELTON. Let me ask one last question of each of you. Should it come up again in your career, would you be interested in being the detachment commander once again?

Master Sergeant COOMBS. By all means, sir.

Mrs. BYRON. Sergeant Singleton?

Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. It would be a pleasure, ma'am.

Mr. SKELTON. Sergeant Rosario?

Gunnery Sergeant ROSARIO. Any time, sir.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you so much.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Bateman?

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

In the aftermath of the problems that the Soviet—our embassy in Moscow, do you feel it has had any substantial impact upon the morale of the personnel who were in the Marine Security Guard Battalion?

Master Sergeant COOMBS. Yes, sir. It has.

Mr. BATEMAN. I take it it has not been a positive impact?

Master Sergeant COOMBS. Yes, it has.

Mr. BATEMAN. It has been positive?

Master Sergeant COOMBS. Yes. It has motivated them to the fact we have got a black eye. We are going to overcome this. We are not going to let it get us down.

They work harder. The school puts forth a bigger effort now. We train them better and they are willing to go that extra mile to overcome this problem we had.

Mr. BATEMAN. Do you have any suggestion for the committee as to whether or not the selection process within the Marine Corps for those assigned to this duty is a good process, one that needs to be improved or is it an excellent screening process already?

Master Sergeant COOMBS. The process, as I see it from my side, is adequate. It works if it is used properly.

To improve it, that is a policy decision that is way out of my realm. It goes to somebody higher than that, sir. How we are screening them now works.

It is a good policy.

Mr. BATEMAN. Is it the general perception within the Marine Corps that people assigned to this duty are a part of the elite of the elite?

Master Sergeant COOMBS. Yes, sir.

Mr. BATEMAN. So it is a duty assignment that is sought after by your best people in the ranks?

Master Sergeant COOMBS. Yes, sir. It is sought after, but not all of them can get here because of other reasons. Commanders won't let them go because you are taking their best people, but then most of them, the top ten percent, want to be here.

Mr. BATEMAN. Is there a limit to the number of postings for people in the Marine Security Guard units as to how long they can remain in that kind of duty?

Master Sergeant COOMBS. Yes, sir. We do not like to keep them on the program any longer than three years, but once again, the needs of the duty may have an individual extend for another year, another post. Once they have served their time on the duty, we like to send them back out into their MOS into the Marine Corps to get our money out of them.

Then they can come back at a later date.

Mr. BATEMAN. Are waivers of the three-year tour frequent?

Master Sergeant COOMBS. They are requested but not always granted. I would say depending on the situation once again of what we need out there, new post openings.

Mr. BATEMAN. Within the realm of your experience there at the table, which is very significant, is it your observation that Marines who have served tours in the Security Guard units are advantaged in their career in the Marine Corps by virtue of having had that assignment?

Master Sergeant COOMBS. Yes, sir.

Mr. BATEMAN. The last question that I would ask is as you reviewed for Mr. Skelton your ratings of the ambassadors at the posts where you have served where you are less than positive about their performance as it relates to the units you were in charge of, was it your observation perhaps they were less capable in other areas as well or does something show where they may have been superb in some areas, but lacking in the area of your primary concerns?

Master Sergeant COOMBS. I wouldn't say lacking. I would say their order of importance for security was not high on their list. Not that they didn't want to do it, it was just not a high priority or they had a lot of other things to do and were not getting fully informed of what was the problem.

Mr. BATEMAN. So it was a matter of the emphasis they placed upon a particular function that you were most particularly involved in, not something that sort of permeated their attitude or their effectiveness and their job generally.

Master Sergeant COOMBS. The ones I dealt with, yes, sir.

Mr. BATEMAN. The gunnery sergeants, would you concur in that?

Gunnery Sergeant ROSARIO. The ambassadors I worked under, sir, I feel they were very, very competent in all areas of their functioning. If there was any negative areas in relationship to the Marine detachment, it was due to delegation of their authority to somebody else and they were not kept fully aware.

Mr. BATEMAN. Gunnery Sergeant Singleton, do you have any—

Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. No, sir. I concur with Gunnery Sergeant Rosario, sir.

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. That is all I have.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Ray?

Mr. RAY. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Gentlemen, it is a pleasure to have you here this morning. You have served in embassies around the world, a number of different embassies, as I understand it. My earlier questions to the Colonel indicated that it was my opinion that the rules and regulations and the philosophy of the ambassador who is in charge of the embassy and his subordinates pretty well dictated the strictness, or either the slackness, we would say, of how we emphasized and supported our security; is that generally correct?

Master Sergeant COOMBS. Yes, sir.

Mr. RAY. Would you say—either one of you can answer this or all of you—would you say as you have gone from different embassies you have found different philosophies, some strict, some non-caring situations as you moved around?

Master Sergeant COOMBS. Yes, sir.

Mr. RAY. Is there a Marine policy that is generally given to the embassy that sets out the responsibilities of the Marine Guards that the embassy should be following but sometimes did not follow?

Master Sergeant COOMBS. That is a hard question to answer, sir. I think how I would put this in perspective is each post is post specific. There are no two posts run or operated the exact same out there in the program.

Each one has different responsibilities and orders. We have basics, but those basics can be changed due to the situation within that particular country or embassy or ambassador.

The RSO can change those basics.

Mr. RAY. Detachment commanders go into any new embassy expecting their normal operating procedures to be adjusted by the ambassador and his subordinates?

Master Sergeant COOMBS. That particular post, yes, sir.

Mr. RAY. Would either one of you other sergeants like to make any comment?

Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. Well, sir, the guard orders, which are the operational security orders for the Marine detachment, they are written by the RSO with the concurrence of the detachment commander and then they are later forwarded to the company for the company commander's signature.

The regulations are formed from the Five FAM. That is the security manual that the regional security officer has.

So the basics are still there. It just depends what country that you are in. As far as changing the procedures, as far as if you are in an eastern bloc country, they are focusing more into sort of

counterintelligence. If you are in a high-threat country as far as terrorism, then they are focusing more in that area.

Mr. RAY. Do you have any comments?

Gunnery Sergeant ROSARIO. Yes, sir. I believe from post to post there are unique problems that will come up. The key word when arriving at a new post is flexibility.

If there are any security problems, the first thing you need to do is simply ask the collective detachment members what can be done to alleviate the problem. Who else is better than the guy standing watch or doing the job at two o'clock in the morning. Ask him what can we do to make it a safer place. They will come up with ideas that are super.

Mr. RAY. Is there good communication between the detachment commanders and the hierarchy of the embassy? Do you meet periodically and discuss concerns that the embassy might have about security?

On the other hand, does that give you an opportunity to exchange concerns that you have about the philosophy or the slackness which you see operating within the embassy?

Master Sergeant COOMBS. Once again, it is post specific. The individuals at that particular post, they may be used to a large post. The community is not quite as close as a small community in a bloc country or an African country. The meetings right now, the detachment commander is a member of the country team, but yes, we can put forth our bits of wisdom. Whether it is taken to heart or not, we do that daily with the RSO. We stop in daily, a couple of times a day and see our security officer and say these are the problems we have or what have you got for us.

Mr. RAY. It would seem that there should be some rather firm rules and regulation of policy issued by the Marine Corps from the State Department which should be complied with, that should be communicated to the embassy if there are problems of breaking down and if they aren't corrected, it should bounce back through your system to be sure that several people are alerted if things break down.

Master Sergeant COOMBS. There are three manuals we call our bibles that we basically go by. One is the Five FAM 900, which is the State Department security regulation manual.

The other is the MSG handbook which is a composite of all the duties and responsibilities between the Marine Corps and the State Department. The other one is the MOU, memorandum of understanding, between the Marine Corps and the State Department.

These are all just guidance. The Five FAM 900, which is the security regulation manual, has regulations on the do's and don'ts for domestic and overseas.

But like we said before, that particular policy in that manual can be changed at post by higher echelon.

Mr. RAY. So you think we have got plenty of rules and regulations so enforcement is what is needed on both sides, the State Department side, embassy side and the Marine Corps side?

Master Sergeant COOMBS. Yes, sir.

Mr. RAY. Thank you.

No further questions.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Hertel.

Mr. HERTEL. No questions, Madam Chairman.

Mrs. BYRON. Let me ask a few final questions.

First of all, most people think Marine Guard duty is very glamorous, it is exciting and in reality oftentimes it is very lonely, very remote, not quite as glamorous or as exciting as it is perceived.

If you had a watchstander under your jurisdiction, you were concerned about that watchstander, did you have the authority to remove him from duty?

Master Sergeant COOMBS. Yes, ma'am. We could take him out, send him back to the company if we felt we had to, if we felt there was a problem with this individual.

Mrs. BYRON. Would you have to go to the RSO or would you have that jurisdiction in your own—

Master Sergeant COOMBS. We would go to the RSO any time we would remove somebody like that. We keep him informed. He is our boss.

Mrs. BYRON. Was there ever a problem of working with them?

Gunnery Sergeant ROSARIO. With the RSO I worked under—I believe his relationship with the detachment and myself changed within the two years I was there from a very positive one to one where it was nonchalant and we were put on the back burner due to his concern with his local guard force, which he primarily devoted most of his time to during the second year.

Mrs. BYRON. They have the jurisdiction for not only the locals that handle the embassy duty from the outside, but also the ambassador's security force, too, don't they?

Master Sergeant COOMBS. Yes, ma'am.

Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. Yes.

Mrs. BYRON. So really they have three jurisdictions of security forces?

Gunnery Sergeant ROSARIO. Yes, ma'am.

But if they have all three, the RSO that I was with really didn't have a security force for the ambassador other than the local police officer with the ambassador. They have an adequate assistant to assist them.

They are not by themselves. They have got assistance or staff.

Master Sergeant COOMBS. They will usually have an assistant RSO, also someone that is in charge of the principal protection of the ambassador. They are not doing all these jobs by themselves.

Mrs. BYRON. Gunnery Sergeant Singleton, you were in three different posts. The working relationship that you had with the RSO in those three, granted, in Guatamala you had local Guatamalan security guards around the embassy. The ambassador had, I think, if I recall correct, his own State Department security force, did he not?

Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. Yes, ma'am.

Mrs. BYRON. Then you had your unit of watchstanders. Did you feel that your requirements and requests were met without any problem?

Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. Yes, ma'am. My requests were met and at times they weren't. That is all I guess in agreeing upon what priorities take place or precedents, I may say. However, later on down the road the things that I requested, let's say in February, were basically I would get accomplished in June.

Mrs. BYRON. In June. That is fairly rapid.

Let me thank the three of you. I know it is not always easy to testify before a congressional panel, but unless we have the help of the individuals that we sent out to report back to us, it makes it very difficult for us on this side to understand your missions and the responsibilities that you have of the watchstanders working under you.

I do appreciate your time and your candor this morning.

Mr. BATEMAN. Madam Chairman, could I be indulged just to ask about three questions that will just require a yes or no?

Mrs. BYRON. Absolutely.

Mr. BATEMAN. I am sorry they didn't come to my mind earlier.

Do you agree with the statement that 15 months is the optimum period of time for an assignment?

Master Sergeant COOMBS. Yes, sir, I agree.

Mr. BATEMAN. Each of you agree that would be the optimum tour of duration?

The RSOs, is this their sole duty, a primary duty or just some ancillary duty along with others in the experience that you have had?

Master Sergeant COOMBS. No, that is not their only duty. They have other—local investigations. There is a lot of other jobs that a security office has to take care of at an embassy.

Mr. BATEMAN. But are all of those duties security related?

Master Sergeant COOMBS. For an RSO, you would have to ask this afternoon to make sure. They go through a lot of schooling.

Mr. BATEMAN. Okay. Last question. We have a Marine security detachment in East Berlin. Do we have any stationed in West Berlin at a consulate or any facility?

Master Sergeant COOMBS. That is run by the Army, sir.

Mr. BATEMAN. I see. OK. Thank you.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Hertel?

Mr. HERTEL. Thank you, Madam Chairperson.

This is kind of a hard question, but I ask it because I think it is important.

We try to understand the State Department and how they make decisions and where they are coming from. Recently the State Department made a recommendation that fortunately was denied by the Justice Department that Polish refugees should be sent back to Poland. We did get an extension and that State Department idea was totally rejected because it would be so harmful.

We have trouble understanding why they were so lax in the creation of the building of the new embassy and also some of the things that you have told us about security lapses of such serious natures at the current embassy. I am reading the staff interview notes.

It is clear that the State Department personnel have had trouble even getting along with the Marines more than cooperating with them in working on these very serious responsibilities with the Marines. The hard question is can you give us some insight as to why these people in the State Department have a different mind-set than we would expect, whether it is cooperation or being concerned about security, being concerned about protecting in some cases human rights?

Master Sergeant COOMBS. I think it is unjust to use the word "State Department." It is not all the State Department. It is not all security officers.

Mr. HERTEL. I appreciate that. Some of the personnel in the State Department. I appreciate you qualifying that.

Master Sergeant COOMBS. That is going to have to be, I guess it is a personality, something the way they are brought up or something, a leadership trait or something. That is the only way I can explain it.

Each individual you meet out there has a different personality. He will relate to you in a different way. You have to learn to adjust.

Some we can get along with, some, no matter what position we are in we are not going to get along with them.

Mr. HERTEL. Is there a problem? Their background isn't well-rounded enough?

Master Sergeant COOMBS. I don't know, sir.

Gunnery Sergeant ROSARIO. I would like to add my observation, sir, in that State Department personnel in relationship to detachment will vary depending on whether it is a hardship post or a non-hardship post. An example is if it is a hardship post where normally the Marine House is the focal entertainment center for everyone at the mission, everything surrounds the Marine House.

There is no other place to go. You are forced, you have a contained location to have social activity. In Lisbon, where that is not the case, relationships with the Marines and the foreign service individuals was very, very lax in that there were so many other things that everybody could do, why go to the Marine House to socialize.

I can go out in town. So when you have watchstanders that have come from very tight, close-knit embassies to Lisbon, where it is very open and nobody gives you the time of day, they feel very unimportant. That relates to possible morale problems.

Mr. HERTEL. Thank you.

Mrs. BYRON. Thank you very much.

The committee is adjourned until two o'clock.

[Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon the panel recessed, to reconvene the same day at 2 p.m.]

#### AFTERNOON SESSION

Mrs. BYRON. This afternoon's hearing is a continuation of this morning's session where we heard from a former Marine Security Guard Battalion Commander, and three of the Detachment Commanders on station. This afternoon we are going to be hearing from former regional security officers. We have Mr. Fred Brandt, who has served in four overseas posts, and currently is Division Chief Officer of Standards and Facilities Security; Mr. Greg Bujac, who has served in three overseas positions; Mr. Mark Mulvey, who has served in five overseas positions and—the other sheet, please.

Mr. NESS. I am Donald Ness. I am Deputy Assistant Secretary for Resource Management. I am also a former security officer who served in five overseas posts.

Mrs. BYRON. Let me start with Mr. Fred Brandt first who had served in Addis Adaba, Moscow, Manila and Cairo. Were the Marine Security Guard detachments at various embassy posts stepchildren or were they an integrated part of the embassy? Was there a differentiation with the RSO as far as their duties, working with the detachment, a commander and the watchstanders. Were there different rules, regulations for those groups versus the security force of the Army, the State Department security force?

**STATEMENTS OF FRED BRANDT, OFFICE OF STANDARDS AND FACILITIES SECURITY, BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; MARK MULVEY, DIRECTOR FOR OVERSEAS OPERATIONS, BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; GREG BUJAC, DIRECTOR OF PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; AND DONALD NESS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Mr. BRANDT. Well, in each case, each of the missions that I have served at, there has been a good relationship with embassy staff, the ambassador, and the security officer with the Marines.

Mrs. BYRON. Can you speak a little louder.

Mr. BRANDT. In each case there were good relationships with the Marines. I can't think of any assignments I had where the Marines were considered at all as stepchildren. Throughout my tours of duty there were several instances when two and in some cases three different ambassadors served during a tour, each supporting the Marines.

Mrs. BYRON. Was there a difference in style? Obviously there was a difference in style with each of the ambassadors. Did you find each of them put a different emphasis on working with the Marine Security Guards?

Mr. BRANDT. Not so much a different emphasis but as you noted a different technique or style. In some cases you would have an ambassador who was very personable. His wife, too, may have been very personable. They would participate in the Marines' functions, such as their Friday receptions, the TGIFs that are a commonplace occurrence at the missions overseas. The Ambassador may be invited and participate in breakfasts at the Marine house. The Marines may be invited on a regular rotation basis to hail and farewell receptions at the Ambassador's residence. In each case, as you have stated, the relationship is very personable and it depends upon the ambassador himself. In all cases, all my experience, the Marines were accepted and drawn into the community. They were not segregated from the community. They didn't follow separate regulations and rules.

Mrs. BYRON. You served for a little over a two-year period in Moscow. Granted things are never the same year to year or in a timeframe. But in the July 1975 to the August 1977 timeframe, when you were in Moscow, were you aware of various problems within the detachment? Were there problems that—

Mr. BRANDT. I would say we had no more problems there than I had experienced at other missions. The problems, it was my experi-



ence, were very dependent upon the individual Marines. The Post had no prescribed solutions but addressed them as they come up. A Marine might party too much. The RSO would address that matter with the individual and working with the NCOIC attempt to correct it. The potential for problems in Moscow, compared to a Cairo, Egypt assignment, for example, are increased because of the extreme limitations in Moscow for outside activities the Marines might be able to engage in.

In Egypt there were certain restrictions that they could or couldn't do within that foreign community, but Moscow was even more restrictive. The closed restrictive environment, served to draw upon the community, the American community and the foreign community, diplomatic community, as well as business community, to pull the Marines in. Again it was an individual, very personal matter as to how certain Marines would fit into the business community and activities and the diplomatic and activities.

Mrs. BYRON. I guess what bothers me is one of the statements that came out this morning in Colonel Mabry's testimony that one of the things he said was at night if a Marine saw a stranger inside the new complex, they could not apprehend them but only file a written report, and by and large many times those written reports were not acted upon. I think that I have a great deal of difficulty in assessing that.

Mr. BRANDT. I am sorry, I can't speak to those specific time frames or those incidents. I am not even aware of them. There were times—if I might add, there were times when I was in Moscow when the Marines would encounter strange goings on or noises in the attic during their patrols. In all cases, the orders were that the Marine was to call the security officer. There was a response team that would do the search or investigation the incident rather than the individual Marine on duty or on patrol.

As to incidents involving the new building, I am sorry, I can not speak to that.

Mrs. BYRON. I was just trying to get a parameter of the past and to find out how things changed or when they changed. Colonel Mabry also said that the State Department officer that he took with him was, and I quote, shocked by what he heard from the goings on. This was in the 1983 timeframe, and now we are dealing with the 1987 timeframe.

Let me hear from one of the other three witnesses.

Mr. MULVEY. I just might start off by saying in general I think at the posts that I have served, the five, that the relationship between the Marine Security Guard detachments and the rest of the embassy staff was a very good relationship. Obviously when you take a post like Saigon versus Cyprus, it is going to be somewhat of a difference. Saigon actually for the Marine detachment was almost like a regular military command. There were 152 Marines at the time I was in Saigon. The relationship in Cyprus for example was an especially good one given the fact the Marines actually saved the building from being burned down and probably saved some lives in the process.

When I served in Abidjan, I covered 13 posts and out of these 13 I think we had 7 Marine Guard detachments. I think for the most part there was some cohesiveness lacking because of the lack of

professional security officer, although I think in general the relationships were still very good.

We have taken steps to correct that. For example we have placed since 1977 when we had 8, I am not sure if the figures are accurate but 7 or 8 professional security officers covering all of the posts in Africa whereas now we have close to 27 or 28, so you can see the considerable difference and the improvement on the oversight of the detachments.

Mr. BUJAC. I would say from my experience overseas the Marines were, I would consider, part of the security team at the embassy; that they were an integral part of that team, had to be in order for the security program to work, and that the regional security officer's role was really one of exerting an operational and supervision over the Security Guard detachment. At the same time because they were overseas and because they were away from sort of what I might term "mainline military authority", that my involvement with the detachment was a professional one but on some occasions I would have a personal involvement with some of the Marines in terms of going to their weddings, counseling them.

I think most of the regional security officers in the world would do just those kinds of things and my relationship with the detachments were positive and rewarding.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Bateman.

Excuse me, I am sorry.

Mr. NESS. That is quite all right. I could add a few things. The countries I served in were Brussels, Warsaw, Santo Domingo, Mexico and London. I was instrumental in opening the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba and established the Marine Guard detachment there Cuba. In each one of those countries, there was a different relationship with the Marines vis-a-vis the other people in the embassy. We were all alike. In London there is a very large embassy, a large community and a lot to do outside the embassy. The Marines were no more or no less included or excluded than anyone else. In Warsaw it was a very small, tight knit, close community, closely related to all of the other Western embassies and the Marines were extremely integrated into our community, they were an integral part of it. As Greg said each of us looked out after the Marines, they were part of our family, they were part of our team.

I can remember many Christmases that our kids had to share their toys because it was fun having the Marines over. They were part of us, they were part of the team, they were part of the embassy and they were looked upon as such.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Bateman.

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Do any of you have a view that the selection of the Marines or other military personnel is inappropriate for the security function that they are presently and for the last 40 years have been discharging? Is that the preferable pool of manpower to accomplish the security mission that they have been assigned or do you think there would be some other, some institutional change that would better the program?

Mr. NESS. If I might address that, the idea of the Marine Security Guard detachment providing our security overseas to me is the best opportunity and the best option that we have available. In the

past months we have looked at other options, and each was discounted in turn. The Marines provide us a pool of young men, physically fit, strong, interested, active, participating and used to taking orders and following directives. I don't think we could beat them anywhere in the world.

I might add that several of our colleagues in other embassy security, who do not have a military guard service look upon us with envy, saying how can we get what you have?

Mr. BATEMAN. Is there any different view from any other member of the panel?

OK.

Mr. Ness, your present position is what?

Mr. NESS. I am Deputy Assistant Secretary for Resource Management.

Mr. BATEMAN. My next question, I don't know really who it should be addressed to other than potentially Mr. Mulvey as Director for Overseas Operations, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, or you, Mr. Brandt, as Division Chief, but our testimony this morning was that following an inspection visit by Colonel Mabry and someone from the State Department to the Moscow Embassy, they came back and filled out official reports as to certain problems which came to light in the course of their visit. I do not recall specifically the names of those to whom they reported, either of them, orally, but certainly the colonel did file a report which he says was lodged with Headquarters, Marines.

Are you all, any of you, cognizant of the reports that were brought back by Colonel Mabry and the State Department Security Officer or functionary following their visit to Moscow?

Mr. MULVEY. Mr. Bateman, if I could, we are aware of the reports; however, at that particular time, none of us was in a position to act upon those reports.

Mr. BATEMAN. Let me interrupt to say I am happy to hear you say that, because I would be very concerned if you had been. Please go ahead.

Mrs. BYRON. Would the gentleman yield? Were you aware at the time the reports were coming in? I mean you are aware now but how about—

Mr. MULVEY. We now are aware of the specific report. As background, the office that I am in is the same office where the Marine Security Guard office is, and it is routine for the reports to come back from company officers overseas; we review these reports for any recommendations, inconsistencies, discrepancies, what have you, and we take whatever action we deem appropriate on them, usually with the cooperation and in coordination with the Marine Corps.

Obviously there are often, not often times but sometimes, recommendations made that probably are more of an operational concern; for example maybe a physical security recommendation. We do pass those on but they are not necessarily acted upon. If the recommendation is in line with what our standards are, and that is really an operational decision for professional security officers to make, we do take action.

But in general, we do review the reports, they are done semi-annually, and action is taken upon the recommendations.

Mr. BATEMAN. Well, the disturbing aspect of the testimony this morning was that based upon the observations and the interviews and special requests of the Marine Guard detachment members, some 12 or 14, asked for a special session—

Mr. MULVEY. It is 12.

Mr. BATEMAN. All right. The testimony was that not as a matter of nonfeasance but by direction Marine guards were asked not to do things which would be ridiculous, I think in the mind of any security-minded person for them to be instructed not to do, and which routinely their orders and regulations call for them to do. The one example that comes first to mine is not inspecting lunchboxes of people going onto the construction site, being directed not to stop—make inquiries of people in certain places and times; that this was reported upon Colonel Mabry's return.

I would like to know if you can tell me who would have had official cognizance of that report, who should be held accountable for not having countermanded any such directives as might have been mandated upon the detachment in Moscow?

Mr. MULVEY. I think you will understand my answer when I say that it is very difficult for any of us to comment on those specific items. There may have been follow-up meetings as a result of those reports, there may have been other reports that were developed after these initial inspection reports. So I think until such time as we had time to discuss the specific allegations, if you will, with possibly people who were there at the time or to conduct a review of the file to see if any additional material is available on this subject, we cannot comment.

Mr. NESS. If I might add, sir, the, all four of us became aware of this report about two hours ago. Up until that time none of us had seen the content of it. In reviewing it, it is a report that says certain things took place. We don't know what it is based on, we don't know the extent of the problem that the Colonel raised at that time, nor do we know what precipitated it, nor do we know what action was taken on it.

Mr. BATEMAN. Do I understand you to say that you learned of the existence of the report within the last two hours?

Mr. NESS. Yes, sir.

Mr. BATEMAN. Have not had a chance to even read the report?

Mr. NESS. We have read the report.

Mrs. BYRON. Can you give us a synopsis of the report? We have requested a copy of it.

Mr. NESS. All I can say, as I recall it, there was about a one paragraph cover memo from then Colonel Mabry, who outlined—what I saw was a copy of a report that was made by the company captain who did the review of semi-annual inspection of a missing Moscow Marine detachment, put in his report, the cover letter from the company commander, Major Kris, and the cover memo that came from Colonel Mabry. Colonel Mabry's cover memo was the one that raised the points you just outlined. Without any real foundation, basis, background or further amplification.

Mr. BATEMAN. Of course my recollection is that in addition to whatever formal report or documents he had, he did have discussions with people at his headquarters as well as with State Department, whoever was in charge at that time—do you know whether

or not that is correct, that beyond the written report there were discussions about what underlies, what was in the written report?

Mr. NESS. No, sir, I do not. All I saw and all I know was the synopsis of what I just gave you.

Mr. BATEMAN. Well, this is not a very desirable game to play or exercise, but had you received that report when it was fresh, would it have cried out for some corrective measures?

Mr. NESS. I don't know if it would cry out for corrective measures, but it would have cried out for questions what is it all about? I would like to see both sides of the story before I made any judgment.

Mr. BATEMAN. In other words, it was something that needed very seriously to be addressed with all of the facts in hand, and since it was simply a summary document the appropriate thing for a response official to have done would have been to make more deep inquiries and then to have taken whatever action then seemed to be necessary.

Mr. NESS. Yes.

Mr. BATEMAN. But you would have looked upon it as a significant document requiring some study and action.

Mr. NESS. Yes, sir.

Mr. BATEMAN. All of you are or have been intimately involved in the State Department's security function. Do any of you have military service records?

[Show of hands.]

Two.

Do you go through in the Department of State a specialized training program in security matters? Is there a formalized school of some kind, or how are people in your position selected for that duty?

Mr. NESS. Our office, our profession is a profession, I started in 1966 in this business; at that time, and the training I have had is far different than the training we give our people now—a new security officer, and we have hired some 240 this year under undergoes an extensive screening process even before the application is processed, must be 21 years old, must be an American citizen, must have a degree from an accredited 4-year college, pass an interview, pass an oral interview plus a written examination, and then go through the background investigation and medical clearance program.

Once hired on the officer will then go through a 16-week intensive training program for a basic security officer course. Following that, in subsequent years of experience and when selected to be a regional security officer, there will be another 16-week school. It is a new program, relatively new, and it is a good program.

Mr. BATEMAN. The regional security officer, does he have any other duties other than the security function?

Mr. NESS. No, sir.

Mr. BATEMAN. Where you don't have a regional security officer I assume that whoever has the security responsibility is probably designated other duties as well.

Mr. NESS. That is correct.

Mr. BATEMAN. Does that trouble you, or is that just one of the practical necessities of life?

Mr. NESS. I think that is closer to it. It is a practical necessity. Each one of us when we are security officers had a region of responsibility. As Mark said, in one particular place he had nine posts, I had in one place—you had 13, I had nine. At those posts there was an officer assigned to interface in the security matters with—not necessarily with Marine guards, maybe there weren't any, but to interface with the security program.

We would rotate and visit these posts to conduct professional security input.

Mr. BATEMAN. The Marine security guard detachments, they have an NCOIC who is their military supervisor, but he is supervised and directed by the regional security officer.

Mr. NESS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. BATEMAN. So the State Department really is the policy maker and they determine rules, regulations, and procedures that shall be implemented.

Mr. NESS. The State Department security office provides the operational instructions and guidance to the Marine guards.

Mr. BATEMAN. Does the State Department security office have any input into the nature of the training program that the Marine security guard personnel go through?

Mr. NESS. Yes, sir, we do. Do you want to discuss that?

Mr. MULVEY. We work very closely with the Marine Corps. on that. In fact, we have a State Department security officer assigned down to the battalion. While I think there is always room for improvement, very recently we have been making some improvements. The training has been very good. Like any particular job, much of what the Marines learn here developed. Further when they get to the post; because while we have basic rules and regulations, certain things are done differently at given posts because of a specific threat.

But I think, in general, I think we have a very good working relationship with the Marine Corps on the training program.

Mr. BATEMAN. That is all I have, Madam Chairman.

Thank you.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Ray.

Mr. RAY. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Gentlemen, we are pleased you have come before us today to give us information about your particular responsibilities. We have heard in other testimony by witnesses who have come before us that the different ambassadors have different priorities about security.

Some ambassadors put it in a very high position where they are very cognizant of the problems, concerns, and dangers, others put security at the bottom of the list. And the Marines who were testifying indicated they never knew what regulations or what procedures might be in place or put in place when a new ambassador came on board or when they went to a new embassy. I am not sure I understand your responsibilities exactly, but I assume it is kind of a liaison security person from the State Department to the embassy.

Is that correct, you went in and recommended or inspected the security and requested that it be updated, mandated it be updated, or give a good report or whatever?

Mr. NESS. Regional security officers are assigned at embassies.

Mr. RAY. I see.

Mr. NESS. It depends. Some places nowadays with the problems we are encountering overseas, it is not just one security officer, in some places now, we have ten. It is a professional full-time job.

Mr. RAY. I see. The ambassador technically is responsible for everything that takes place at his embassy, I understand.

Mr. NESS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RAY. This morning's news indicated during the course of building the new embassy, the procedures to begin with were that all items entering, construction items, boxes, tools, and so forth were inspected by the Marine Corps as designated by the security officer. Somewhere along the way, in a certain phase of construction, the Marine guards got instructions to not check anything else; let boxes go through, not hold up the construction and so forth.

Would it have been someone in your capacity that might have given that order, or allowed that to happen?

Mr. NESS. I can't address that, sir. It is a hypothetical question that can't be addressed.

Mr. RAY. I understand then, I guess. But we do have a situation where the Marines are there serving under the direction of someone, the security officer in that embassy. I hate to say that I am beginning to think from all of the testimony that I am hearing that we have got Marines sitting in the position of being scapegoats in some areas simply because they got off track, they were not given direction. There was no set policy from the State Department which mandated that an embassy follow certain rules and regulations. Therefore, they had no incentive to do so. Ambassador Hartman came and lobbied to kill a piece of legislation that had been introduced which in effect mandated that 50 percent of the KGB employees approved employees who are working there be withdrawn. He said his own driver was a KGB colonel. They were already corrupt and he didn't want Americans taking chances that they might become corrupted too.

It seems to me the whole problem and I don't want to prejudge this, comes from the State Department through the chain of command. The security officers, and so forth did not endorse the rules and regulations of security that ought to have been endorsed.

That is the impression I am getting and I may be incorrect and you can help straighten me out, if you can.

Mr. NESS. I can't address it, sir. I was not there. It was not at a post of—

Mr. RAY. I have used the Soviet embassy as an example. That is not the only place we are having problems. We are having problems around the world.

There are some serious problems there with those who are in charge of the embassy. Some of the Marine security people say they don't have any authority to go beyond rules and regulations or directions handed to them by the embassy, appropriate embassy people.

Mr. NESS. That is correct.

Mr. RAY. Do any of the rest of you have any statements to make regarding my comments?

Mr. MULVEY. I just might add while basic rules and regulations are set down to be followed and throughout the chain of command from the ambassadors down to the deputy chief of the mission, probably the admin counselor to the RSO and down to the Marine detachment sometimes there are differences of opinions.

In cases where the ambassador may disagree with what security offices are recommending that Marines do, in these cases I would say in every case I know about these instances are brought back to Washington for review and for some a decision or further discussion with the ambassador.

They are not—they don't die at post, in other words.

Mr. RAY. My understanding is the ambassador has the right to make those changes himself, regardless of whether they are good changes or not.

Mr. MULVEY. It is a gray area, however, the matter does not die at post. These things can be brought up at the Washington level for further discussion and oftentimes with an ambassador, his original decision is turned around.

Mr. RAY. I am not opposed to ambassadors, but some are appointed politically. Some are career-type people. Some of the career-type people, in my opinion, have the worst records. It does appear to me that the problem lies not so much in the Marines, who are there serving at the pleasure of the embassy and the ambassador and his hierarchy and are given the proper directions or sometimes cannot follow the directions that they normally would.

Madam Chairman, thank you for the time.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Pickett.

Mr. PICKETT. Thank you Madam Chairman.

In this chain of command on the issue of security, the regional security officer works under the direction of the ambassador; is that correct?

Mr. NESS. Every one assigned at the embassy works under the direction of the ambassador, not necessarily under the direct supervision of the ambassador.

Mr. PICKETT. Are there any channels of communication to allow the security officer to report back to some other authority if he believes that the security at the embassy is not adequate?

Mr. NESS. Yes, sir. Those do exist.

Mr. PICKETT. Would you explain that, please?

Mr. NESS. Yes, sir. The regional security offices have a direct channel of communication back to the new Bureau of Diplomatic Security Headquarters and we may use that channel for any information security-wise that is pertinent to the protection of the post or security matters at hand.

Mr. PICKETT. Does the ambassador evaluate the performance of the security officer or is that done by some other sources?

Mr. NESS. It depends. At a variety of posts, at most posts it is the regional security officer who will work directly under the supervision of the administrative counselor and have the efficiency report reviewed by the deputy chief of mission. Some posts have changed this and the deputy chief of mission is the direct supervisor and the ambassador is the reviewing officer.

In every post that I have ever been at—I have worked for the administrative counselor, was reviewed by the deputy chief of mis-



sion or the associate director of security, but I always had a direct access link for any security problem to the ambassador.

Mr. PICKETT. Then if the ambassador was one of those who was not too concerned about security, he may not agree with what you would want to do; is that right?

Mr. NESS. That is correct, sir. The security officer at an embassy is the security advisor to the ambassador.

Mr. PICKETT. Then if that security officer exercised his prerogative to go directly to his superior outside of the chain of command through the ambassador, I suspect that would put him in pretty bad light with the ambassador, wouldn't it?

Mr. NESS. I don't think you are going to find too many security officers who would worry so much about that and forego the opportunity to do right things.

Mr. PICKETT. But that could in all likelihood result in an unfavorable fitness report from the ambassador, couldn't it?

Mr. NESS. I would rather have an unfavorable fitness report and good security, sir.

Mr. PICKETT. I am sure you feel that way strongly, but I am talking about possible problems with the system we now have. If someone was looking to the service for a career and felt he was going to get a bad fitness report because of his insistence on some security procedure, wouldn't that sort of lead him to side with the ambassador as opposed to going directly up the chain of command?

Mr. NESS. I would be reluctant to say it has never been done but I think it has probably been done less than people would think.

Mr. PICKETT. I don't mean this as a criticism of anyone. We are just trying to figure out what is the best way to ensure security at the embassies.

Just as a matter of information, are the Marine Guards assigned automatically or are they requested by the respective ambassador?

Mr. MULVEY. It would be very rare. I don't know of any instance where the ambassador might request the assignment of a particular Marine. I am not saying it has not happened, but the assignments are made out of battalion. In the past we have had an ambassador ask that a particular Marine leave post, but this also has been very rare.

As far as the assignments, no, the ambassador does not get involved.

Mr. PICKETT. My question is, are the Marines assigned to the embassies regardless of whether the ambassador wants them there or not or is that automatic?

Mr. MULVEY. In the past ambassadors have had basically sort of the final decision whether a Marine Guard detachment was established or not. This goes back, say, ten years ago.

Right now I know of no case where we have an ambassador who does not want a detachment. It is quite the opposite. We have posts who desperately want Marine Guards assigned. At the present time we do not have enough Marines or the Marine Corps does not have enough Marines to fill all the desired billets.

Mr. PICKETT. So, number one, we don't have Marines at all embassies throughout the world?

Mr. MULVEY. No, we don't.

Mr. BATEMAN. Will the gentleman yield on that point?

Mr. PICKETT. Yes, I would.

Mr. BATEMAN. Could we have a follow-up as to the number of pending requests for Marine detachments which have not been fulfilled so we could quantify what demand is that has not been met, at least as perceived by the ambassadors currently in the field?

Mr. NESS. We will be happy to provide that, sir.

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you.

Mr. PICKETT. Following up on that again, I take it if there were an ambassador that wanted to rely just on his security office without Marines being assigned, they would not be assigned unless he wanted them there; is that correct?

Mr. MULVEY. Well, there is still the existence of ambassadorial prerogative. I would not want to comment either specifically yes or no at this particular time.

I think if we had a particular ambassador that didn't want a detachment that we would certainly open up a dialog with that ambassador and try to convince him/her otherwise. But as I said, I know of no ambassador at a post overseas now that does not want or has put in writing that he does not want a Marine Security Guard detachment at his post.

Mr. NESS. If I might add, sir, the climate now and in the last several years for Marine security guards and regional security offices has been a demanding one. There is not a post out there that is going to say I don't want one.

Far to the contrary, there are more posts that say I need them than we can supply.

Mr. PICKETT. I was under the impression, perhaps mistakenly, that the host country provided the actual security for the embassy and the Marines were there more or less as sort of just a comfort factor for the embassy people.

Mr. NESS. The diplomatic conventions provided that the host country is responsible for the welfare and protection of all assigned diplomats and their families and household staff. We are, if you were, at the mercy of any host government and their willingness and ability to protect us.

The Marine security guards provided protection internally for the personnel, property and national security information contained therein. Our property ends at the property line. We cannot go outside that line and do any protection.

Mr. PICKETT. I take it then that if the Marines were not assigned to perform this function that the Department would handle security throughout the system the way it does now at those posts where there are no Marines; is that correct?

Mr. NESS. That is a very difficult question to answer. It is a very broad question. The Marines are assigned to embassies where we do have needs. Those needs are growing. At one point about 4 years ago we made the judgment that we would like to have Marines at every embassy that has 35 Americans or more, every embassy or mission. We have some consulates that have larger numbers of Americans than we do have embassies.

We are interested and we are expanding the programs.

Mr. BUJAC. If I might add, sir, if we were to remove the Marine security guards as part of our security service overseas, we would

certainly have to replace them with some other force. No two ways about it.

I can't imagine a security program that operated overseas without a large security force of some sort.

Mr. PICKETT. Have you had any more incidents of security problems at those posts where there are no Marines than you have at the posts where there are, proportionately?

Mr. NESS. That is a hard question. You would have to define what is a security problem. Is it a violation? Are people leaving things out?

Do we have attempts of theft, do we have people wandering astray in their personal lives that are our problems? What do you mean security problems?

Mr. PICKETT. Presumably the Marines are there for some security purpose and at the posts where there are no Marines, someone else is performing this function. My question is is the type of activity that the Marines are there to prevent or to enforce, is that activity any more prevalent at the bases or embassies where they are not located than it is at those where they are?

Mr. NESS. In the locations where we have no Marine security guards have a definitely less standard of security. The Marine guards do provide an onsite, 24-hour American presence that significantly increases the security to the premise and the national security information and the personnel.

Mr. PICKETT. My question, though, is is there any statistical data to back that up that you have more security breeches at the locations where there are no Marine guards than where they are not?

Mr. NESS. To the contrary. I think the stats would back it up that there are no security violations where there are no Marine security guards because nobody looks.

Mr. PICKETT. Do you have hard data to support that?

Mr. NESS. Yes, sir.

Mr. PICKETT. Madam Chairman, I would like them to submit that to the committee for the record.

Mr. NESS. Certainly.

Mr. PICKETT. That is all I have. Thank you.

Mrs. BYRON. Let me follow on a couple of things.

This morning we had testimony from Colonel Mabry who stated that—he mentioned several people that he thought would be absolutely ideal RSOs. Mr. Bujac, you were one of the two that were mentioned.

I am delighted to have an opportunity to ask you some questions this afternoon on some of your views. Do you feel that as you well know, there are an enormous number of concepts flying around here of changing of the Marine Guards, replace them with older civilians, use personnel from other services, officers instead of enlisted men, using or eliminating the watchstander's major scenario. Do you feel that the fraternization, the major issue, the officers in charge, would any of those changes be to the advantage of the watch station individual?

Mr. BUJAC. I have thought about it a little bit since the controversy over Moscow has come out and tried to evaluate each one of those as they came up, the married Marines, the possibility of—at

one time I remember someone mentioning maybe female Marines going off to posts.

What is the idea of replacing them with some other force. In each case, after I really analyzed it, I found myself dismissing it for another reason.

If we were to include married Marines, are we simply introducing another problem into the equation. If we introduce female Marines—I happen to have served at a post when we had females in the program—were we, in fact, introducing another problem? Did we have enough older retired policemen, for instance, that we might go out and recruit to go through the rigors of living overseas in sometimes hostile environs.

Would that become a very viable way to run an efficient, effective security program. In each case, I dismissed it. I think my earlier comment was I don't know how we would get along without the Marine security guard detachment. We would certainly have to replace them with some other kind of guard force. I am not here to talk specifically as a propagandist for the Marine Corps either, but I do think the relationship we have had with the Marine Corps has been a good one and I would not like to see that change at this particular time.

Mrs. BYRON. One other issue that was debated is the change in the length of the tour of duty. It is currently 15 months. There are some proposals to cut it down to 12, some down to six. I am one member that has problems with cutting it to a 6-month term.

Mr. BUJAC. We believe now we are looking at a 12-month tour for the Marines in the eastern bloc. I think part of the problem with life in the eastern bloc—and I am speaking here somewhat speculatively—is they need—Marines need outlets. They are like anyone else in that age group and certainly in a hostile environment like we have in Eastern Europe and if we can have a tour where they are serving for 12 months, we still have a cost effective operating part of a security team for that year and give them an opportunity to leave for training or for other purposes to give them the chance to go to the western part of Europe, I think we can still have a good program in those areas.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Mulvey, you testified that you currently are in an office that the Marine security guard information goes through and consequently you see a lot of the traffic as it comes by. Having read the report that we were talking about this morning, would it have contained anything in it that would have jogged your mind to look into it a little bit further?

Were the accusations routine in your estimation or were they a little more highlighted?

I think the testimony was that when Colonel Mabry arrived at the embassy in the time that he was battalion commander, he had only had, on touring his various areas, he had only had three other Marines come up to him, watchguards come up to him with a problem in various embassies.

When he arrived in Moscow, 12 of them came up to him with problems. Most of them were things that they had been reporting for one reason or another, which indicated to him that obviously there was something wrong in that area.

Was there anything in that report that would have highlighted or rang a bell or red-lined the problems?

Mr. MULVEY. To be perfectly honest, while Mr. Ness indicated we have all read the memorandum, I did not get it in time, so I am sorry.

Mrs. BYRON. I have a feeling you will when you go back.

Mr. MULVEY. I think in general, obviously, like other reports, if there is a complaint or allegation of something that is not correct, then the obvious course of action would be to look into it.

Mrs. BYRON. I think in our business a lot of times we will get a complaint about one issue or another. If you get one complaint about procedure you kind of put it back in your mind. But if you get two or three complaints, then obviously there is something there that needs to be looked into a little bit further.

I gather that the complaint that Colonel Mabry drafted and the complaint that the State Department RSO that was with him put in was probably not the first time that that issue had been brought forward.

Mr. MULVEY. As I mentioned before, there may well be, as a result of those memoranda, a follow-up by the State Department. We have no way of telling whether any follow-up documents exist or not.

Mrs. BYRON. I think we are going to try to find out. Let me ask, there is talk—we are talking about hiring American citizens to staff the embassy in Moscow. Is there any problem with the threat of replacements?

I think the criteria is being a Russian language specialist in that area. Should there be a problem with that type of an individual who has been a student of Russian history or a student of the Russian language being hired to operate in the environment in Moscow with the security aspects?

Mr. MULVEY. I am sure my other colleagues will want to comment as well, but the obvious downside is the counterintelligence problem that will exist introducing an unaware person into a very hostile environment.

It will be the Department's job, before these people go overseas, to make them as aware as possible in a very short time.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Brandt, when you were serving in Moscow, the majority of the people that were in the Marine detachment I would assume were not terribly fluent in Russian?

Mr. BRANDT. That is correct.

Mrs. BYRON. They would pick up a small smattering, but not fluent?

Mr. BRANDT. That is correct.

Mrs. BYRON. Do you see any problem in introducing U.S. citizens to embassy duty there in a capacity other than a State Department capacity that have a background in Russian?

Mr. BRANDT. It is my understanding that in the sixties and early seventies American employees who were not U.S. Government employees, but were single Americans and possibly unaccompanied Americans did serve as staff. They were housed away from the embassy, I don't know whether it was a hotel or renovated apartment complex, but I am aware there were many instances that were quite often repeated, many instances of problems with counterintel-

ligence matters. Recruitment incidents are a matter of record and this group of staff personnel were vulnerable to such attempts.

The Marines are located on the embassy compound. They are trained to be a more disciplined group than individually hired or contracted staff would be. I think discipline is the critical factor for individuals in a hostile environment like Moscow. The fact that the Marines are disciplined, can control themselves and follow orders is important.

Mrs. BYRON. I think one of the things that bothers me is the fact that we have been assigning Marines to guard offsite facilities out of the compound, such as the warehouse and other facilities without giving them the flexibility to do what I think is supposed to be their job. Should the guard protection of any new compound-style embassy begin at the perimeter of the compound or should it be limited just to the embassy structure itself?

Mr. BRANDT. The memorandum of understanding basically limits the application of their services to the facility, the chancery itself an official diplomatic mission. There are cases where Marines have been stationed at perimeter points for access controls. In most of those instances there are specific reasons for that posting. For example, a specific threat situation may require and warrant a reliable American person be present as oversight to the foreign national guard force normally controlling perimeter access posts.

Mrs. BYRON. But if you tie their hands it is very difficult, isn't it?

Mr. BRANDT. Their hands aren't tied as far as I am concerned.

Mrs. BYRON. If you report violations and you continually see those violations aren't being addressed.

Mr. BRANDT. That depends upon the specific guard orders which detail what the Marine is there for and what actions he may take. I don't think that in the norm a Marine is not authorized in his guard orders to conduct the full, broad aspects of access control.

Mrs. BYRON. What do you think happened at the embassy in Moscow?

Mr. BRANDT. I can't begin to comment on that. I am sure the records, as we dig into this issue, may indicate another side to the story.

Mr. BUJAC. Could I add something about the offsite locations, Madam Chairman?

Mrs. BYRON. Yes.

Mr. BUJAC. We are currently involved in a program that would involve the security warehousing of materials to be involved in the construction of new embassies. Specifically, I personally see an application where Marines could be very beneficial in guarding those security warehouses.

If, in fact, the warehouses contain those materials that are going to be part of the embassy itself, when it is finally finished, they are as sensitive, while not necessarily considered secret or top secret—this could have the same importance as a top secret or secret document and, therefore, an American presence is certainly going to be necessary in those areas.

We have been involved with a number of ways how we might do that and we are currently looking at using contract American guards. But we are also going to explore other methods.

One of the ways would be using Marines. So far we haven't been able to come to an agreement on their use, but that is just one application where I see they could be useful.

Certainly they need to have specific guard orders and what their response might be. But if I could comment on something that I said here this morning, that is someone says that, gee, maybe the Marines should have had weapons at the warehouse and I would submit that in looking at that do we really want to have a Marine guard shooting someone who was intruded into a warehouse space?

I am not so sure that would call for the use of deadly force. Today we have specific rules and regulations by which the Marines use their weapons. In the context of a secure warehousing facility for embassy construction, I am not so sure that it would be a standard practice to have Marines armed.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Bateman.

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

First, might I address the comments just made about the Marines with or without weapons. I think you are absolutely right that we wouldn't want Marines shooting people just because they might have trespassed.

I would take that as a given, but I am not sure that really would drive your decision that they shouldn't have arms of some kind. What about a scenario in which somebody wants in badly enough that they might try to inflict some bodily harm upon a Marine Guard who was unarmed?

Mr. BUJAC. Yes, sir.

Mr. BATEMAN. You don't persuade me it wouldn't be a good idea to give them arms as long as they were properly trained and indoctrinated as to under what extreme circumstances they were unauthorized to use them.

Mr. BUJAC. Yes, sir. I would agree with you in the context that in my mind it would be country specific. In other words, if I was charged with protecting a particular warehouse in a high terrorist threat post, certainly the Marines should be armed. But in other places where the threat of armed aggression would be considered very, very low, I am not so sure I see the necessity.

Mr. BATEMAN. OK. We have talked about certain practices at the Moscow embassy, our embassy in Moscow, the construction site and the inspection of workers' tool boxes and so forth in another area. Can any of you tell me whether or not today, now, people would be coming to and from the embassy or construction site without any inspection of what they are bringing on to the site?

Mr. BUJAC. No, sir. Our procedures today call for inspection of those materials as they come on to the site.

Mr. BATEMAN. I take it there is a level of confidence at the table that that is not only the procedure, but that is now the practice.

Mr. BUJAC. At the present in Moscow I don't believe we have any foreign workers working.

Mr. BATEMAN. The remaining question I have, you indicated that while the ambassador is, so to speak, the commander, the captain of the ship, that if there is a security problem that has been addressed to the ambassador and the security officer feels is not being reasonably dealt with, that you do have a channel of communica-

tions to the security division or headquarters, so to speak, here at the State Department. How often is that necessary to use?

Mr. NESS. That vehicle is there and it is used very rarely. Ambassadors nowadays are very reluctant to go against a solid, well-thought-out recommendation for security improvement. I can't bring to mind any particular instance in my last post where it was necessary to document something that I wanted to get done and couldn't.

I was always able to go to the ambassador, to sit and talk with him, to discuss it and pretty much come to a reasonable—either I won or we had a mighty fine compromise, something that I was satisfied with that met the needs of the security of the post.

Mr. BATEMAN. So the security function at the State Department is looked upon as being a professional assignment with specific professional skills and knowledge which are called upon. There is a hierarchy within State Department security, and if there were some egregious problem that an ambassador was not solving or creating there is a channel of communication which is open and which can and would be used and you would agree with that?

Mr. NESS. Yes, sir. To the contrary, I think you would be remiss if you didn't use it and it was necessary.

Mr. BATEMAN. It would be an enhancement and not a denigration of your career in this profession in the State Department, I take it, if you did have a problem and you addressed it to Washington notwithstanding the ambassador.

Mr. NESS. That is correct.

Mr. BATEMAN. It would enhance your career in that aspect of the department's activities.

Mr. NESS. I would prefer that I made the noise rather than made no noise.

Mr. MULVEY. Mr. Bateman, if I might add, the security office isn't alone in this effort. Each post has an emergency action committee which is chaired by the deputy chief of mission. The security office usually serves as the executive secretary.

The representative includes all the foreign affairs community represented at that mission and for the most part security issue that cut across agency lines are of importance to raise to the ambassador. Most of these are first raised in the emergency action committee to develop some type of consensus or plan to bring before the ambassador.

So you have other people with certain experience adding to a recommendation that will be given to the ambassador.

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you.

That is all I have, Madam Chairman.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Ray.

Mr. RAY. Nothing further.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Pickett.

Mr. PICKETT. Nothing further, Madam Chairman.

Thank you.

Mrs. BYRON. I have just a few more questions and they are ones that I would like to get on the record, if we can.

The problem in Moscow that Colonel Mabry felt—and having looked at 104 of the detachments of the 140 that were under his jurisdiction, he felt that—we talked about the workman's bags—at



night, if the Marines saw a stranger inside the complex, they could not apprehend him; they could only file a written report. Mr. Ness.

Mr. NESS. In Moscow?

Mrs. BYRON. Yes.

Mr. NESS. I do not know.

Mrs. BYRON. They couldn't screen any of the people entering the embassy to attend church services there on Sunday?

Mr. NESS. I do not know.

Mrs. BYRON. At the embassy warehouse site, the closed circuit T.V. system often was on the blink, but they were forbidden to patrol the grounds even when they heard a noise?

Mr. NESS. They aren't at the warehouse site anymore.

Mrs. BYRON. There was a Marine position in the corridor outside the ambassador's office, but they were told not to stop strangers to ask for I.D.'s.

Mr. NESS. I cannot comment on that.

Mrs. BYRON. Can you, for the record, get the answers to these?

Mr. NESS. I certainly can.

Mrs. BYRON. They said the State Department officer he took with him was shocked by what he heard and we have already talked about the report that they sent in which you have read and we are going to get a copy of that for the committee for the record.

Mr. BATEMAN. Would the Chairman yield on that?

Mrs. BYRON. Yes.

Mr. BATEMAN. You have read Colonel Mabry's memorandum, or at least some of you have. Did you see a memorandum, a contemporaneous memorandum from the State Department official who accompanied him on his inspection?

Mr. NESS. I did not, sir.

Mr. BATEMAN. Madam Chairman, I think one of the things that we need is to make sure that whomever at the State Department provides us with copies of both memorandums—

Mrs. BYRON. We get copies of all of the reports, not just the ones we are asked for and have asked for.

Mr. BATEMAN. What action, if any, was taken; and if none, why not?

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Mrs. BYRON. Let me wind up the hearings, since there seem to be no more questions, and say that—I think it has come out this afternoon that you, as regional security officers, have testified that the Marine security guard is an integral part of the State Department operation. It is one that you value.

It is one you feel is necessary and you rely upon. I think it always is helpful to reevaluate the criterias of the young men in this case that we send out to very remote duty spots, all volunteers, who sometimes have a difficult assessment of handling lonely duty in a foreign nation on a very low monetary scale of pay, with a very important mission. I think the cloud that is currently on the Marine Corp is one that we need to remove and I think that is one of the reasons we are holding these hearings. Because it seems to me that they are a very valuable source to our American community that is serving with distinction overseas and representing our Nation.

As soon as we can get the issues that have been raised about changing the criterias, changing the profile, the better off we are going to be.

I appreciate the fact that you have been here this afternoon. You have been extremely helpful from your professional standard as professional foreign officers.

Thank you very much.

Mr. NESS. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Mr. BUJAC. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m. the panel adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.]



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
DEFENSE POLICY PANEL AND THE MILITARY  
PERSONNEL AND COMPENSATION SUBCOMMITTEE,  
*Washington, DC, Wednesday, August 5, 1987.*

The panel and the subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:15 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Beverly Byron (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

**STATEMENT OF HON. BEVERLY B. BYRON, A REPRESENTATIVE  
FROM MARYLAND, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY PERSONNEL AND  
COMPENSATION SUBCOMMITTEE**

Mrs. BYRON. Let me, first of all, start with an apology. I was in another hearing, and was assured someone else was going to begin this one.

This hearing is likely to be the conclusion in a series we have been holding on the Marine Security Guards at Diplomatic Missions Abroad. We have heard from State Department officials, from officers and men of the Marine Security Guard Battalion, both past and present, and we have heard several descriptions of what ails the Marine Security Guard, Battalion.

We have heard many descriptions of what is good in that battalion. We have also heard a number of prescriptions for how to cure what ails the battalion, and today we are going to hear the Marine Corps prescription. Our witness is Major General Carl Mundy, Director of Operations Division at Headquarters, Marine Corps.

We will have a lot of questions for you, General Mundy, but I think I can fairly well predict that they will all fit into two categories after several months of analyzing the matters. First, what do you think the problems are, and the second issue is how do we plan to cure those problems.

You may proceed as you wish.

**STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. CARL E. MUNDY, JR., DIRECTOR OF  
OPERATIONS DIVISION, HEADQUARTERS, MARINE CORPS**

General MUNDY. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

I thought when you were mentioning all the prescriptions that I would just come and engage your thanks and then leave or something.

Mrs. BYRON. You are right, Doctor. We may have made the diagnosis, you will add the prescription.

General MUNDY. I appreciate being here today. I have a prepared statement for the record, that I think was passed out to all the members. I will omit the reading of it with your permission, Madam Chairman, and just request that it be inserted in the record, and then I will make a few remarks to summarize that and to amplify a few points in it.

With that permission, let me say, as you have very accurately summarized this morning, that for about the past 4 months—in fact I think it was April 3rd that I was last over here—during those four months that have occurred between then and now, there has been a great deal of introspection and external examination of the Marine Security Guard program. We have literally turned the program inside out in that timeframe. We have looked at all the aspects. We have taken it apart piece by piece, and we found some rough edges. We have found some cracks.

We have polished those up, shored them up, and put them back together, and for the most part I would say that it is back together, but we will continue to make fixes, fine tune refinements as we go along. I have alluded to some of those in my statement.

What I would like to focus on for just a moment is to tell you in broad terms what we have done. I don't propose to enumerate each one of the fixes that have been made. Mrs. Byron has accurately pointed out that Dr. Sherman, who is again here this morning, came over and spent a great deal of time telling you about our psychological program and that sort of thing, so I will omit that.

What we did in addressing this, was to convene within the Marine Corps basically three review groups. The first one was the Headquarters Marine Corps Review Group. It was chaired by a colonel who has very fine credentials—a former Marine Security Guard company commander. We gave him the best we could come up with out of the headquarters in terms of the experts in training, in personnel assignment, personnel management procedures, security matters.

He put together a working group that comprised about 25 people. We brought in State Department representatives, we brought in the NIS representatives, and we had them then look at the various aspects of the program generally in the framework that I talked to you about the last time I was here—the selection, training, assignment and the supervision of Marine Security Guards and then any other areas that they wanted to look into.

That took about 6 weeks. In concurrence with that, we selected 11 former Marine Security Guard officers, and working with the State Department and the intelligence community, we identified 11 embassies which we thought were key and were particularly representative of the types of situations that we would want to look at. Most of those were in the Warsaw Pact countries—the term we have used before, the criteria countries—and we dispatched these officers, after a training session down at Quantico, under Colonel DelGrosso.

We sent them to the field, with a list of questions. We left a lot of questions unasked so they could go out and make their own judgments and we told them to essentially just go out and look and watch and listen and see what their best opinions and estimates were of ways we can improve the program.

They did that. They were out there, with the exception of one officer in Moscow, who was there for 2 weeks, because of limitations on the amount of time that we could have an excess American in Moscow, for 30 to 45 days each and they came back and put together their thoughts for us and their ideas, and they have been tremendously useful.

We convened during this same time frame under our Director of Intelligence, a Counterintelligence Study Group that looked at all aspects of the intelligence problem, the intelligence threat against the Marine Security Guards. That was comprised not just of Marines, although it was certainly heavily laden with our counterintelligence people. It included representatives from NIS and from the Department of State counterintelligence people as well.

Their job was to try and assess what the threat was to enable us to train our Marines better and then to discuss such subjects as debriefings for returning Marines, and the flow of information within the intelligence community to ensure that we were in fact conducting the right types of debriefs, and that that information was getting out.

Now, those are the three, if you will, large scale things that we did. In addition to that, as I know this committee is well aware, there were no less than four, or depending on who counted, four or five external groups that looked at matters of diplomatic security and at the Marine Security Guard program as an element of that. We have taken all of the recommendations and ideas that have come from these internal and external reviews. We have weighed them. We have implemented a great number of them. We are in the process of implementing others, and some of them are long range, taking more time to do. We are looking at those hard, with the intent to implement them if they appear to warrant that.

There were some recommendations that did not appear to be feasible or did not appear to contribute to the operational effectiveness of the program, which is what we are after, but for the most part, we have implemented those that seem reasonable.

Now, the details of what we have done in each of those categories to date, is enumerated for you in the statement that I prepared, so I won't reiterate them here. Suffice it to say that we have tightened our screening and our selection process through a variety of different policies and procedures.

We have tightened our assignment process to preclude the ability of a Marine to volunteer for duty in one of the Warsaw Pact countries, and to preclude his ability to extend there. That is now strictly controlled by the commanding officer of the Marine Security Guard Battalion, together with a number of other things that I have enumerated for you.

We have strengthened our training program. We are not through with that yet. We still have a way to go in the sense that we know that we want to refine—particularly the counterintelligence training that the Marine receives, so we are working on that.

I think the major thing we have done with regard to the Marines themselves is the emphasis on leadership and on the attitude of the Marines that serve as the Watch Standers, as the key ingredient in a successful program. If Marines are properly led, if they understand clearly what they are to do, they will do it. That is our history. We feel very confident in that.

Where we have situations that occur like the situation that is alleged to have occurred in Moscow, we view that as clearly a break in the leadership function; I know a lot has been said about that here, so I will pass on beyond it.

Now, those are the things that we could do inside the Marine Corps, and that we have done. In a broader context, I would like to focus for just a minute on a higher level. As we have looked at diplomatic security, and have become better educated through our intelligence sources, we realize now more clearly that there is in fact a distinct hostile intelligence effort against our diplomatic posts overseas, not just against Marines. They are an obvious target. They are dressed uniquely and their hair tells who they are. They are young and there are a lot of reasons for that, but the threat is against the entire structure.

We need to move our focus up beyond where it has been since the inception of the program, and that I would offer to you as probably the biggest step that has been taken with regard to what the Marine Corps can do about this program.

Just to do a moment of background, I know you have had Colonel Wade Jackson appear before you. He was the originator of the program, the Commanding Officer of the Headquarters Battalion of the Marine Security Guards program when it came into existence. I think he probably told you that there were about 200 Marines associated with the program when he stepped out of it. Since that time, the program has increased in size eightfold. There are now in round numbers about 1,600 Marines that are associated with it.

Because it had run well, and because it seemed that things were going right, we have over the years left generally the same level of interface between the State Department and the Marine Corps that has existed since Colonel Jackson set it up. That is, the Commanding Officer of the Marine Security Guard Battalion, himself certainly an effective officer and a respected officer, has been the point of interface with the State Department for the Marine Corps. And on the State Department side, generally speaking, we were working at about that same level. In other words, to put it in context, down at battalion level.

There certainly has been from time to time an exchange involving the headquarters and higher levels in the State Department structure, but not on an established basis. We have taken steps to establish that interface. I can tell you that if General Gray, our new Commandant, were here today, he would say to you, "I am the Chief Marine Security Guard in the Marine Corps," and he would tell you that I am the number two Marine Security Guard, and then we go down from there.

The significance of this is that we will establish with the State Department a clear higher echelon structure for handling policy matters, for dealing with matters like the fraternization issue or the habitability of the Marine houses—where the Marines live—and those sorts of things that heretofore have by and large been handled by a battalion commander trying to run his battalion, and at the same time, trying to handle problems that really should be handled for him by higher level staff.

And so, I can tell you that we have recognized a fault in the program and we are stepping out to correct it.

I can tell you that as recently as the day before yesterday, General Gray, our Commandant, went over to see Secretary Shultz. It was a working meeting. It was not tea and crumpets. He took with him a list of issue papers and they sat down on a one on one basis

and talked these things out. They addressed a number of issues. I can recite some of them for you.

For example, if there is to be a higher level of Diplomatic Security Agency or a higher level focus within the State Department, within the entire national community, we believe that the Marine Corps must be a player on that, and we will play at whatever level that has to be. If it is the Commandant going to meetings that are chaired by the Secretary, then-so shall it be, or if it is at a lower level it will come down to me or to whomever in our chain should be there. We will also establish higher level contact between the State Department and the Marine Corps that has heretofore been through Colonel DelGrosso and his predecessors at the Marine Security Guard Battalion. We will establish a representative of the Commandant of the Marine Corps at the State Department.

Probably we will have a colonel over there that will operate in that role. We will look at other areas in the State Department and, in consultation with State, will try and fit Marine officers into key areas.

For example, we will assign one of our very best counterintelligence officers to work in conjunction with the Naval Security and Investigative Command representative working in the State Department counterintelligence effort. We will look at other areas within the State Department, and if we need to add officers, my guidance from General Gray is: pay whatever price is necessary to do that.

We have looked closely at the command structure for the Marines in the field, and we find that we don't have sufficient command structure out there. For example, focusing on the European area, there are 39 detachments under that one company commander. Now, he has additional officers in his company that assist him in going out to visit and to inspect these detachments, but that is a pretty thin spread when we charge one commander with that amount of oversight. We think that probably somewhere in the neighborhood of about 25 or so should be the maximum that we give to a company commander, so we are going to adjust that. We are either going to establish another company and take half of those detachments under his cognizance, or put in a mechanism, a structure, where there will be more officer association with and supervision of fewer numbers of embassy detachments.

Mrs. BYRON. Let me interrupt you there, because one of the proposals was to put a commissioned officer in charge of the detachment. The decision has been made not to do that, is that correct?

General MUNDY. Well, yes ma'am. Right now we are working out the details probably of putting an officer into Moscow. That is a unique situation, a very special situation, and we think that he can contribute. Putting an officer into each detachment just doesn't appear warranted in terms of what the requirement is.

The requirement in Moscow of the detachments is for troop leadership. By putting a gunnery sergeant with 10 to 14 years experience in there, we probably get, in terms of day to day troop leadership, a product that we would have to equal by putting say a senior captain or a major in there, so we don't believe that is warranted.

We think that an officer should be placed in those assignments where he can contribute from the executive standpoint rather than



from what sergeants traditionally do, and have done through the history of the Armed Forces.

Mrs. BYRON. Have you looked at requiring the men to have prior experience in another post before going into a high espionage threat area?

General MUNDY. As you know we replaced the detachments completely in Moscow and Leningrad and all those Marines assigned there were hand selected from former Watch Standards. Having said that, let me tell you that there is a wide disparity in view.

For example, the 11 officers that we sent out were asked to assess that question for us. They came back unanimously and stated what many of us feel—let me not say many of us, I will say what I believe, along with them, and that is that perhaps the tightest disciplined, the most regimented and perhaps thereby the most operationally effective Marine we might be able to assign is the young type that comes right out of the Marine Security Guard school and goes out on his first tour, having formed no lax habits or laziness in the performance of his duty.

But to answer you directly, in those two detachments currently, they are all second termers. That is something we are still working on for policy.

Did you have any other questions?

Mrs. BYRON. I have a lot of other questions. I think the members have questions too.

General MUNDY. Let me proceed rapidly, and I am almost through at this point. We believe strongly that we must have a joint inspection system in which the Marines are participants to go out and look at the operational aspects of diplomatic security. We believe that should not just be Marines and the State Department. At a minimum it should be the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, whatever agencies are involved, that can take that broader look at the intelligence threat, and that that would be a joint effort that would report back to the Secretary of State on the operational effectiveness.

We have proposed to the State Department, and Secretary Shultz seems completely supportive of this, to include ambassadors in, at a minimum, a one day orientation by the Marine Security Guard commander or by others of us involved, and with the Commandant to get the ambassador attuned to what the Marine Security Guard detachment does for him, what the limitations and constraints are and how he might best employ it.

You may know already from previous testimony that we have established a 3 day course for all of the regional security officers that are now going out to the field. They go down to the Marine Security Guard Battalion and undergo a course of instruction there. So we are pleased with that, and I might tell you that the first reviews from the first class—I read the critique sheets that came from them—were superb. "I never understood this much about Marines before." "This is going to be tremendously useful to me," and all those sorts of accolades, indicating that they felt they got something from the course.

We think that we need to have the Marine Corps take a role in the establishment of posts and in the determination of the post or of the security to be stood within that post. We have not done that

in the past. Good people have worked on that, but generally speaking we have been tasked to provide a detachment of six Marines to go to someplace, and that was the establishment of the security detachment.

In the future, just as we do in the Navy Security Force, we will ask the State Department to let us work with them in evaluating the posts, evaluating the threat, bringing the intelligence community in to determine that there is a requirement there, and then in fixing the number of Marines required to support that adequately so we will be players in the post establishment and validation, we hope.

There are a number of other things that I might enumerate. You have mentioned, Madam Chairman, that you have a number of questions, and perhaps it would be best to let me stand aside from rambling comments here and to address the specific questions that you have. My bottom line would be I think, that there has been some suggestion in various hearings that have gone on, or from other quarters, as to whether Marines should continue in this mission; is this an appropriate mission for Marines?

I think when I was over here before, I probably said to you something about the fact that it is an assigned mission. If the Marines are told to do it, why we will go do that, but as we have looked at and studied the diplomatic security mission, I don't think that there is anybody that could do it any better than young American servicemen, and of course, as a Marine, I would tell you that I don't think anybody can do it better than the Marines, looking specifically at what we expect those security detachments to do.

Thank you for your indulgence, ma'am and I am ready for your questions.

**PREPARED STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. CARL E. MUNDY, JR.**

Mr. Chairman, Madam Chairman, and distinguished members of the Defense Policy Panel and Military Personnel and Compensation Subcommittees:

Since I spoke with you in early April, there has been considerable focus on the support provided by the Marine Corps to the Diplomatic Security Program of the Department of State. Internally, we have dissected the Marine Security Guard Program, piece by piece, to determine where corrections were needed and where improvements should be made. I would venture to say that few programs in our Corps have received the introspection and scrutiny the MSG program has experienced in the past four months. Our review revealed weaknesses. Our procedures for screening Marines for assignment to the program, our assignment policies affecting their reassignments once in the program, and our training--particularly in the critical area of counterintelligence/counterespionage training--needed strengthening. We have done that; and I will enumerate those changes for you shortly.

We found that we also need to be especially attentive to the leadership we assign to these detachments. From the standpoint of what the Marine Corps can do to ensure our program is effective, this area is the most critical. In the vast majority of cases, we have been assigning some of our finest staff NCOs to command these detachments. In the Moscow incident, it is apparent that leadership was not what it should be. You have heard considerable testimony that may have contributed to this failure. The bottom line, however, is that we must ensure that our detachment commanders

continue to be the strong leaders that most of them have been in the past. We will do that.

Beyond our fairly extensive internal review, at least five other external agencies--including your Subcommittees--have reviewed the program. Each of these groups has, in one form or another, offered opinions or recommendations relative to change. For the most part, these have been useful recommendations, and we have implemented a number of them. In a number of cases, in fact, our implementation began before we even received the recommendations. These were matters such as the commencement of a broad program of psychological testing, on which you have been briefed by Lieutenant Commander Sherman, from the MSG Battalion; a program of random polygraphing of Marines assigned to Criteria Countries; shortened tours for Marines assigned in Warsaw Pact countries; and similar quickly-implementable programs. We have considered carefully all of the recommendations made, and while not everyone has been considered feasible in the light of more thorough examination, I believe it accurate to say that each one has been given fair assessment and where there was merit, they have been implemented, or are in the process thereof. We are continuing to make changes as we go, and you may rest assured that whatever course-changes are needed to refine the Program further will continue to be made.

When I last appeared before you, my remarks were organized into the broad areas of selection, training, assignment, and supervision of Marine Security Guards. I will again use that format, and will detail for you in each category, those changes and changes under consideration, to which I have alluded above.

SELECTION PROCESS

In my initial testimony, I described for you our screening process for applicants for the MSG Program. Essentially, certain criteria of personal qualification and performance were established, a Marine volunteered, was interviewed by his Commanding Officer, and then was sent to the MSG School. On 8 April, we revised our screening procedures to include the requirement for all applicants to appear before and be recommended by a board of experienced officers and staff noncommissioned officers. Additionally, we required applicants to undergo a psychological evaluation for indicators of inability to serve in positions of high responsibility, under high stress, and in isolated, small group settings. These new requirements will improve the Commanding Officer's ability to screen candidates to ensure that those nominated for MSG duty are better suited, and are felt to meet the important criteria of the Program by a group of critical senior officers and NCOs.

We next assigned a Navy Clinical Psychologist--Lieutenant Commander Sherman--full-time to the MSG Battalion staff. This enables us to continue psychological screening throughout the period of instruction at the MSG School as well as to establish a program for follow-on scrutiny of MSGs after they are on post.

To assist the Battalion psychologist in designing the best suited program for evaluating and training our MSGs, on 10 April we convened a Panel of 12 expert psychologists and psychiatrists from both within and outside government, to identify those

characteristics required for successful performance of MSG duties. The Panel included representatives from the Navy Clinical and Forensic Psychology in Bethesda; the Naval Academy research psychologist; the DOD Personnel Security Research and Education Center in Monterey, California; the Office of Air Force Special Intelligence; the Army Intelligence Command; and Army Special Operations Center in Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and a highly-credentialed retired Marine Reserve Colonel-psychologist with over 20 years of extensive experience in dealing with Marine Corps selection and training processes for a variety of personnel programs. As Lieutenant Commander Sherman described for you, these subject-matter experts consulted on profile research, validation of screening tests, and compiled an empirical data base for screening screening purposes. This Program will continue to evolve and will be periodically evaluated as we build data to improve it. However, we believe we have put into place the best psychological screening and follow-on evaluation program possible at the moment.

A second important factor relates to my point to you in April, that only detachment commander trainees were fully evaluated at the MSG School because of constraints on resources, and candidly, because of our lack of recognition of the need for so extensive an evaluation program. Now, however, all Marines undergoing training at the school--both detachment commanders and watchstanders--undergo the same psychological evaluation.

A second grassroots element of our screening program is the establishment of a MSG Screening Team which will visit major

commands throughout the Marine Corps to identify, interview, and screen applicants in the field. We will continue to accept volunteers for the program, but we will expand the selection market by identifying Marines, through service record screening, who possess the apparent qualities desired in the program, and then calling them for an interview when the screening team makes its visit. Over a period of time, this will add yet another screen in the application process.

#### TRAINING

We have conducted a thorough review of the training program at the Marine Security Guard School. We found, for the most part, the curriculum to be solid. I might remind that this course of instruction is not only developed jointly by the MSG School and the Department of State, but that it is reviewed for quality and content and is validated annually by the Director of the Marine Corps Education Center at Quantico. Our critical review focused primarily on courses dealing with counterintelligence matters. We found the courses' content to be generally adequate, but the effectiveness of instruction was not satisfactory in delivery. We intend to enhance the quality of counterintelligence and counter-espionage instruction provided by Department of State instructors and to add instruction by the Naval Security and Investigative Command. We will also establish an on-site security refresher training course employing pre-recorded vidoes to detachments in the field, and through the use of mobile training teams. We will give additional, specially-focused instruction to those Marines

being assigned to the Soviet Union. In conjunction with the extensive random-polygraph program, which I will discuss shortly, we have included orientation and awareness training on the general subject of polygraphing. We will describe the purpose of polygraphing and will inform all guards that they can expect to be randomly polygraphed during their tenure, or upon conclusion thereof, as a deterrent measure. Finally, we have included stress management training to better enable our young Marines to deal with the pressures not only of lonely duty, but also the stresses imposed by the necessity for constant alertness to the hostile intelligence system threat against them.

Expanding our training beyond Marine Security Guards, the Marine Security Guard School has initiated a three-day training program for prospective Department of State Regional Security Officers. The initial program brought extremely favorable remarks from the in-training RSOs relative to their perceptions of a significantly increased awareness of and understanding of the employment of Marines in the Diplomatic Security Program. We have proposed to the Department of State that this Program be expanded to a full week.

Also, in conjunction with the Department of State, we are prepared to conduct a similar orientation program for all ambassadors-designate. We believe such a program will go far in ensuring that the role and functions of Marine Security Guards within the broader context of diplomatic security will be better understood and thereby more effectively applied.



ASSIGNMENT CRITERIA AND POLICIES

With regard to assignment criteria and policies, tour lengths in Warsaw Pact and other countries with a high security vulnerability have been shortened to not more than 12 months, with authority given the Commanding Officer of MSG Battalion to reduce tour lengths further or to institute variable tour lengths at posts which might require such action. Moscow will be an exception. Tour lengths there will be six months. Assignments to these countries will be controlled strictly by the MSG Battalion. Volunteers for duty within Warsaw Pact nations will not be accepted. Repeat tours and extensions in these countries will be prohibited.

The Department of State has incorporated into its FY88 budget a routine Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Program to provide MSGs relief from duties in Warsaw Pact and other countries with high security vulnerability. Two R&Rs of five days each will be scheduled near the fourth and eighth months of those assignments. Additional respite from duty will be provided through temporary duty at other locations for purposes of short-term security assignments, weapons proficiency training, courier missions, and a random polygraphing program, which will be addressed later.

In our earlier hearing, three additional assignment-related issues we discussed were: Assignment of older, more senior Marines; assignment of married Marines; and assignment of women Marines in the program. In our scrutiny of ways to improve the program, we considered each of those options, but have decided that none of the three offer significant gain in improving the effectiveness of

our operations. Older Marines in the age groups we would be able to assign, would be, in fact, only a few years older than those currently assigned, and would offer little increase in assurance that they would be a more stable, reliable, or alert guard force. Moreover, they would be performing duties not commensurate with the rank or experience they have achieved or with the responsibilities normally assigned more senior NOCs. Married Marines might be less prone toward youthful liberty pursuits, but would inhibit our ability to assign them for short periods because of the resulting family instability, would likely have young families, might be distracted from full dedication to their duties by family needs or problems at home, and if compromised, might be even more vulnerable to blackmail than an unmarried Marine. While respecting the performance and capabilities of women Marines, our experiences in Tehran, Islamabad, El Salvador, and other places around the world continue to impress upon us that MSG duty is potentially combat duty. This, coupled with the physical limitation of facilities at many posts, and other constraints in the program, together with the non-assurance that women Marines would be less vulnerable to the hostile Soviet intelligence threat, leads us to the conclusion that their assignment to the program offers no significant benefit over the routine assignment of a male Marine.

In sum, in reviewing any of the above alternatives, while one or more may appear reasonable, they are offset by the probability that a well-orchestrated Soviet campaign aimed at suborning MSGs will be tailored to whichever selectively profiled group is chosen. We believe the key to countering this hostile threat remains the

assignment of well-trained, highly disciplined Marines under close, effective leadership and supervision.

#### SUPERVISION

As we have discussed earlier, supervision is a joint responsibility shared by both the Department of State and the Marine Corps. Operationally, the State Department prescribes the mission to be accomplished; the Marine Detachment Commander is responsible for the performance of his Marines in achieving that mission. This is a critical nexus in the involvement of MSGs in an overall program of diplomatic security. We believe that in order for it to be effective, there must be close, continuing involvement of both the RSO and Detachment Commander in an integrated program of security at each embassy. This, in turn, flows from the integration of efforts throughout the State Department-Marine Corps structure, starting at the top. I will have more to say on this subject in a moment. Addressing these "bottom" issues first, however, I have mentioned already the three-day training program instituted for RSOs at the Marine Security Guard School, and our proposal to the State Department for an extension of this course and establishment of an orientation course for Ambassadors. Both of these will enhance understanding and integration between the two agencies.

A second, and badly needed, aspect of the program is the establishment of a joint operational security inspection process involving, at a minimum, both State Department representatives and Marine Corps representatives. This type inspection has not occurred in the past. In the past, Marines have inspected Marine

aspects of the program, and the State Department has focused on its responsibilities. The twain have not met, and they must. We have advanced this proposal to the State Department and the Secretary has indicated his desire to implement such a program.

I have alluded earlier to extensive polygraph testing in conjunction with our assignments. All Marines currently serving inside the Soviet Union have undergone polygraph testing. In the future, this policy will continue as a screen prior to assignment. Random polygraphs will be given throughout the period of assignment of Marines at various posts throughout the world, as both a deterrent and a counterintelligence screen, and Marines returning from assignment in selected sensitive areas will be given exit polygraphs.

Although it lacks the specificity we in Washington like to attach to dimensions of programs, and to numbers of all sorts, the most fundamental element in the supervision equation of MSGs is grassroots leadership. Marine leaders--whatever their grade--are expected to do exactly what that generic title implies: lead, look after, and supervise the Marines in their charge. The one thing that any Marine officer or NCO will tell you is that young Marines will follow if they are properly led. I cannot quantify for you the specific ingredients that will go into our assuring that those Marines assigned as Detachment Commanders throughout the program will be in the future what the vast majority of them have been in the past: some of the finest staff NCO-leaders we have in our Corps. We will assure that is so through our selection,

screening, and training process for them. Their clear understanding of the hostile threat against them and their Marines, and their clear understanding of the mission they are to perform, together with their increased involvement with their State Department counterpart in the conduct of operations, will result in the most effective fix to the program we can apply.

In that regard, we have given thorough consideration to the requirement for assigning officers as detachment commanders. Our strong conviction remains that officers are not required to oversee small detachments of Marines as a general policy. Troop leaders are required, and we have no more effective or appropriate leaders to perform those duties required of an MSG detachment commander than experienced Staff Noncommissioned officers. Because of its uniqueness, and the intensity of Soviet intelligence efforts there, Moscow may be an exception, wherein the executive abilities of an officer might be put to effective use as an augmenting executive in the overall diplomatic security effort, as well as in providing officer-leadership presence at one of our larger detachments. We are currently discussing this assignment with the State Department, and are prepared to implement it if such augmentation would be of value in an overall revamping of the diplomatic security structure there.

A non-quantifiable ingredient in the performance of Marines is our pride in our Corps -- Esprit de Corps -- as we choose to term it. The lessons learned in the Moscow incident and the black eye on the front of Time Magazine have not been lost on those of

us responsible for ensuring that our young Marines approach their duties is no less than what they expected to do when they became Marines. Nor have they been lost on the proud, young Marines themselves. From our Commandant down, you can rest assured that every Marine in the MSG Program will do what is expected of him.

As a concluding note, let me apprise you that as recently as day before yesterday, our new Commandant, General Gray, called on Secretary Shultz to discuss some of the recommendations made above, and to recommend other initiatives which will more closely integrate the Marine Corps Command Structure with that of the Department of State, in an effort to ensure more closely integrated operations from the top down in the flow of information and integration of effort. The Marine Corps recognizes better now the significant threat against not just Marine Security Guards, but against our diplomatic security as a whole, from hostile intelligence services, and is eager to provide whatever support is necessary in enhancing our national defensive structure.

Thank you for your attention, and I am ready to answer your questions.

Mrs. BYRON. Let's talk about the report and the testimony of Colonel Mabry, who said that when he was checking on the security guards when he was head of the battalion in 1983, he visited in Moscow, came back, wrote a fairly in depth report; there were some areas that he was gravely concerned about. He sent it through State Department channels, and it is our understanding that it sat there for a while without any activity on it at all, until it was brought out in hearings last week with the RSOs that came over to testify and who had read the report between the morning session and the afternoon session.

Have you looked into any way of getting a better chain of command, a chain of communication between the Marine Corps and the State Department?

General MUNDY. Yes, ma'am.

Mrs. BYRON. To make sure that when these reports come through they are addressed in a more timely fashion.

One of the issues that was bothering many of the young men on duty in Moscow was the fact that there was no active supervision when they were on night duty as watch standers, away from the regular embassies, where they were out at the warehouse or those types of things. The fact that people were told within the embassies not to check badges, that type of reaction.

General MUNDY. The report that you refer to I have read, Madam Chairman.

Mrs. BYRON. It seems like everybody has read it but us. We have asked for a copy but we have not been able to get one yet.

General MUNDY. I was informed that one was sent over. If you don't have it, I have one right here.

Mrs. BYRON. I take that back. I have just been told by staff it came in last night.

General MUNDY. I have read that report too. I can tell you as far as the disposition of the report at the time it came in, the reports go to the State Department, an information copy of that report is forwarded to the Marine Corps Inspector General. Generally there are notations endorsed on it saying these matters have been addressed within the State Department and so on, and as a general rule, at that time those reports then were read by the Inspector General, were noted by him, and there frankly was presumption that there was action taken on them by the action agency to which addressed. Clearly there was not.

Now, in the future, the reports from the Marine Security Guards will come to me or to my successor, whoever is sitting in my chair, and those will then be endorsed, worked by my staff and endorsed over to the State Department, and we will do the follow-up. So I believe, again, as I have attempted earlier to outline to you, we really had no structure beyond the Marine Security Guard Battalion dealing almost directly with the State Department. You will now have an interface of the Commandant's staff in handling those matters.

Was that your total?

Mrs. BYRON. Yes. I am concerned that the report which obviously we have not read, but obviously contains some fairly definite reactions, sat languishing around with no notification from 1983 until currently?

General MUNDY. Well, I can only answer the Marine Corps part and say that it came to us and we didn't do anything on it.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS. No questions.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Nichols.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

First, I want to express my appreciation to General Mundy for being here, and to call to the attention of the members of the committee that General Mundy happens to be a graduate of my institution, Auburn University, commissioned at Auburn University. He has a distinguished military record, having served as Operations Officer and Executive Officer, Third Battalion, the 26th Marines, Third Marine Division in Vietnam. He is a recipient of the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star and Purple Heart.

I want to welcome you personally, General.

General MUNDY. War eagle, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you, sir. I was in on some of the testimony last week and I was disturbed to learn some of the restrictions, I would term them, that Marine Guards may be serving under in State Department official capacity here. Obviously your people are trained at Lejeune and Quantico, and they understand security. They are security officers, and they come into situations in which they are told by somebody in a pinstriped suit don't check these badges and don't bother these workmen, to look in their brief cases and so forth, and everybody who comes in on Sunday is really coming to worship with the Baptists, and don't bother them either.

I am delighted to learn that Secretary Schultz and the Commandant have had a meeting of the minds on this thing and I hope something good comes out of it.

You mentioned that you thought inspection and supervision, the monitoring of the Marine Guards ought to go beyond that of the United States Marine Corps or State Department. You mentioned CIA and you mentioned some other security agencies, DIA and so forth. In open session can you discuss this with us as to what may be in the making or proposed by inspections along that line?

General MUNDY. Mr. Chairman, let me clarify what I said earlier perhaps, and then I will address your question. I think that what I was attempting to say is I think the matter, the serious threat to our diplomatic security in general, and that is to the diplomatic post officers, not just the Marine Security Guards, warrants the highest level effort among the national agencies involved, those that are represented in the embassies, and I was mentioning DIA, CIA, things like that.

On the other hand, we need the very best intelligence. We need the very best counterintelligence effort that we can put together to counter what we now know to be a very significant threat against the security of the United States overseas.

Marine Security Guards are one small element of that in ensuring the special security of the embassies, but the threat against hostile agents, that sort of thing, we need to approach from a higher level standpoint.

Mr. NICHOLS. General, having just returned from the Persian Gulf, and having read in the newspapers and so forth the threats that are being made by Mr. Khomeini and others, I just can't be



too cautious as to what direction this violence may take. I think it will go far beyond Silk Worm missiles, and I would just caution, as one who has returned from that country and who knows something of the situation and particularly with the incident that happened in Jidda with the Moslem pilgrims, has added fuel to the fire. So it is extremely important I think that our Marine people all over the world in all of our embassies, including the one here in Washington, D.C., be on a 24 hour alert.

General MUNDY. Yes sir. Your concerns are well grounded, Mr. Chairman, and we certainly share those. I believe that what I was advocating and what the Commandant and Secretary Shultz talked about was this joint inspection that would be not for the purpose of keeping tabs on one another, but rather that would bring in the experts from all of those agencies to look at the entire diplomatic security effort within that foreign post—that is, embassies overseas—and to make sure that somebody doesn't know something that the other fellow doesn't, or that we are not exchanging intelligence information, to make sure that our integrated defensive mechanisms there are well put together and functioning properly.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. General, I welcome you today. Of course, we are all saddened by the occurrence that brought us here. I would hope, being the eternal optimist, that there is a silver lining that comes out of this that not just for now or next year or 2 years, but for all the future, that we will have the finest and the best security system for our embassies abroad. I know that under your leadership that will be started.

General MUNDY. Yes sir.

Mr. SKELTON. I would like to ask and you referred to it on page 7 of your prepared text, this question. You are going to have Warsaw Pact tours of duty for 12 months. In Moscow for 6 months. Will those shortened tours, particularly the Moscow tour, lead to either turbulence, unsettledness on the one hand, or on the other hand, have a constant flow of inexperienced brains in the Moscow Embassy? It troubled me and that is why I asked the question. Why did you do that? Have you thought of those two aspects?

General MUNDY. I believe I would answer your question, we have thought about it, and we certainly made the decision to do that with some conscious addressing of all aspects of the problem.

We believe that we had previously had a post whereby the Watch Standers in the Security Guard detachment were assigned for 15 months—I think we brought that out—and detachment commanders were there for 18 months, 3 months longer. That split contingency was a very nice management structure to be able to operate in, certainly minimized turbulence in the sense that people were there for a longer period of time.

All of the intelligence community input that we have received indicates that there is an element of the longer you are there, the more likely the possibility—

Mr. SKELTON. Susceptible?

General MUNDY. Yes sir. We have, therefore, in conjunction with, for example, the shortened tours, the 12 months and the 6 months in Moscow—and let me say a little bit more about Moscow

for a moment—we have included periods of what we call R&R—rest and recuperation—trips out of the country to London or someplace like that, where the young man can shake himself out, if you will, so that breaks up the tour for him.

We need to state we could not manage the program effectively by putting a 6 month policy everywhere. We would just have people moving all the time.

Mr. SKELTON. Why don't you accept volunteers for the Warsaw Pact embassies?

General MUNDY. One of the cases which I believe you are aware, and again I should not talk about it in too much detail here, because it is still under investigation, but one of the cases we learned that the Marine in question had volunteered, had in fact extended at the end of the program, had volunteered and asked for an assignment to Moscow. It should have been a red flag to us somewhere in there.

There is an interesting phenomenon, Mr. Skelton. You would appreciate this as a soldier yourself. Interestingly, part of the motivation, in fact, I would like to think that much of the motivation for why young men, young Marines in this case, ask for that type of assignment is the challenge. If you tell him it is the toughest place to go generally speaking, that is where a young Marine is going to say "send me into the teeth of the gale," so there is some aspects about people asking for that duty.

We believe that we can more effectively screen records, we can do pre-entry polygraph examinations, we can just better screen the population that we are assigning to those posts.

Mr. SKELTON. Let me ask this. We all know that everything seems to boil down to leadership—the leadership coming from the top, the ambassador, the State Department security officer, and of course your gunnery sergeant, master sergeant, whoever happens to be in charge, and I compliment you on offering courses to the regional security officer and to the ambassador.

What assurances do we in Congress have that they are going to take these courses? Have you discussed this with the State Department?

General MUNDY. Well, yes sir. The RSOs now, as a part of their I think some 24 week curriculum, that they undergo in their State Department training, three days of that is currently allocated to the Marine Security Guard Battalion for training.

Mr. SKELTON. What about the ambassadors?

General MUNDY. The ambassadors? Again that was an issue which General Gray took up with Secretary Shultz. We believe it should be done.

To answer as to how we think we will implement that, the thing that I didn't mention here earlier, and it would be a good one, is we intend to address with the State Department—I will be going over tomorrow with my counterpart to propose to him a revision of the Memorandum of Understanding between State and the Marine Corps to specify a number of things—this, for example being included among that—that we would propose to do that, and we proposed to have that done in 60 days from now.

Mr. SKELTON. One last comment along this line. I would certainly hope—of course, we don't confirm here in the House, the Senate

does—I would certainly hope that our friends on the other side of the building over in the Senate, would make an inquiry of every ambassadorial appointment in this regard, because you get them early on and they understand the need for security, because evidently this lack of security in the Moscow Embassy went all the way to the top insofar as the lack of leadership.

Thank you, General.

General MUNDY. Thank you, sir.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Pickett.

Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

General, I just have a couple of questions.

First of all, has the command structure in the Marine Corps changed with respect to the Marine Security Guard program following the recent incidents?

General MUNDY. It has not in the sense that the Marine Security Guard Battalion, as it existed at the time and preceding the incident, still remains intact as it is. The difference I think in terms of command structure has been what I was attempting to emphasize—the movement of the interface between the State Department from the battalion level up to my level, or the Commandant's level, so up into the Headquarters Marine Corps staff, and General Gray's terms from his standpoint. It is the Marine Corps now, not just the Marine Security Guard Battalion but the Marine Corps that is in support of the State Department for diplomatic security matters.

Mr. PICKETT. The next question is how many personnel on a full time equivalent basis are required now to carry out this commitment to the State Department for security?

General MUNDY. Again, on a given day there are about 1,600 Marines that are involved in one degree or another, either on foreign posts, at the Marine Security Guard school, in the command structure, on my staff and in the headquarters, 1600 would be a round number.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Ray.

Mr. RAY. General, glad to have you here this morning.

As we have listened to testimony over the last several weeks, the impression that I myself have is that the Marine Security Guards are assigned to an embassy and they are well trained and qualified in the area of security and the protection of that embassy. But once they arrive there, the ambassador or his security people, State Department security people sometimes don't have a very strong priority on security and sometimes security is at the bottom of the list, and I think evidence of what we have here about the Moscow Embassy would indicate that security was not a very strong priority there.

In your talks and conversations, the meetings with the State Department, has there been any thought or any indication that the Marines might be held and kept separately from the hierarchy of the embassies, under the direction of the Marine Corps. Going to the embassies, in other words, charged with the security and the rules and regulations of a good safe security program, which could not be intercepted or changed by the state security police, the security people or the ambassador?

General MUNDY. Mr. Ray, I would not advocate that. I believe that the fix to the problem should come from fixing the problem that you have identified. In other words, the inattentiveness or the unawareness or whatever it might be to security. I believe that starting from the top down, the flow from the Secretary of State down through the State Department chain, through his ambassador, say security is important and setting up a mechanism to ensure that that security is being implemented. It is not the charter of the Marine Corps, and I think we would complicate the problem by trying to put in, if you will, a commander of security, because he is only charged with one element, only the internal security that the Marines would do.

To put in a man from outside to come in and do that, I think would complicate the ambassador's authority. There are some very fine ambassadors who are aware of security and who are doing fine jobs.

I believe that we need to correct exactly what we have set in motion, the joint inspection system to look jointly at it, not to fault each other, but again to make sure that security is being properly implemented and then let the Marines play their part in that.

Mr. RAY. I understand that. We do have ambassadors who are career people, we have ambassadors who are appointed, we may as well say it, we have political appointees for a period of time. I have some friends in that category who don't know, and I think we have had testimony from State security people, State Department security people here, who obviously were in the loop that allowed a lot of this to happen.

Now, in minor dealings with private guard forces that look after air bases, nuclear areas and so forth, their security procedures, I am told, cannot be compromised by the person who is in charge of that facility. They are charged with the responsibility of protecting that facility and nothing interferes with that. They have that responsibility, and so it seems to me that we have got a situation that is going to be very hard to correct worldwide, simply because of the makeup of the State Department and the exchanging of course from time to time of our Secretary of State. So it is a problem that I just want to raise at this meeting here and one that is of concern. You have abandoned it?

General MUNDY. Well, thank you, sir. It is a valid concern and again, we recognize that. I believe that State—in fact, what I can say is that all of us who have gone through this, and certainly yourself not excepted, you know the lessons that we have learned in this have not been lost on us and I believe that that will come all the way down through both of our structures.

We hope to see, for example, maybe the security officer, whoever he may be, whatever level, advanced a little bit in the chain within the State Department, and advanced for that matter within each embassy up to a direct plug to the ambassador.

Mr. RAY. I would say that the Marines are experts in security. I don't see that existing in other hierarchies of embassies. If you had the city of Atlanta, a large city, the mayor and council trying to in some sort of way intercept the authority of the security of that community, the police force, they wouldn't be in office very long.

It just seems to me we ought to have rules and regulations that ought to be unwaiverable when Marine trained security inspection lists, so to speak, are sent to embassies to provide that security.

General MUNDY. I agree with you. One of the things we will propose to the State Department is that each foreign post should have a jointly agreed upon security plan that would be implemented by the ambassadors, that would describe who does what to whom, what those rules are, what the rules of engagement, to put it in military terms, would be for Marines or for anyone involved with security. I think that is a step in the right direction.

Mr. RAY. Thank you.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Darden.

Mr. DARDEN. Thank you.

I have no questions for the witness except simply to say to General Mundy, we appreciate your presence and your testimony today, and look forward to working with you toward improving what we all consider to be a very significant problem and one that I think we will meet, address and resolve.

Thank you very much.

General MUNDY. Thank you, sir.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Bateman.

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you.

Welcome, General, we are glad to have you before the committee, and what you have told us has been very helpful. It is my understanding that a part of the routine when Marine Security Guard personnel are exiting a post, or maybe it is just Soviet Bloc embassies, that there is a structured formal debriefing of such personnel, is that correct?

General MUNDY. That is correct.

Mr. BATEMAN. I want to make a suggestion to you, that may have already been done, if not done that the process and the kinds of questions and inquiries and follow-ups that are made, might well need to be evaluated or reevaluated.

Having said that, I think there is something else that is necessary to improve on that process of debriefing. I shouldn't get at it in this meeting, but it is my understanding that the debriefings memoranda on certain of the Marine Security Guards contained information that would have been extremely important to a Marine Security Guard Battalion Commander and other interested persons, but they never saw or read or, had it brought to their attention these debriefing memoranda until long thereafter, and after adverse kinds of things that we have heard too much about happened.

My suggestion is that you take up with the State Department or whoever conducts the debriefing, a procedure whereby the appropriate person in the Marine Security Guard detachment or battalion is furnished all debriefing memoranda which is highly pertinent which are not put into your loop or which escape your people's attention.

Would you give some consideration as to how we might make sure that you have the benefit of routinely seeing the debriefing memoranda?

General MUNDY. Yes sir, we will do that and that is underway now, Mr. Bateman, through the assignment, as I mentioned earlier.

er—excuse me—of the Marine Counterintelligence Officer within the State Department. Counterintelligence, that is where the debriefings are done, and NSIC, Naval Security Investigative Command Agent, they will work together as a team with State Department so we will have that flow of information.

Mr. BATEMAN. You have worked out a process where we won't have to be concerned that things that are pertinent, germane, highly interesting to you, will not escape your attention?

General MUNDY. We intend that they will not.

Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Rowland.

Mr. ROWLAND. Thank you very much.

General, again welcome, and I am pleased to have you here and I think I speak for many of my colleagues in saying that we think you have done an excellent job in moving forward trying to rectify some of the problems that have come up and it is my opinion that we are all going to be better for it, State Department, Congress, and the American people. I want to compliment you on that.

I was a little late getting to the hearings, perhaps you have covered some of these issues. I want to bring up one question.

I know you touched on it in your testimony. You make reference continuously to the fact that there was no integration, for lack of a better term, between the Marine Corps and the State Department in the security department, in the security process, and that the Secretary and the Commandant will be working out procedures to follow through on that.

If you can—I know it is in the preliminary stages, would you just mention or point out to us how you plan to oversee that process? In other words, as you set up the process that each department wants to follow, how do we make sure it is going to be integrated, how do we make sure things don't fall between the cracks? Are you going to have a czar on each side or what is the process?

General MUNDY. Well, as I mentioned earlier, I think General Gray would tell you that he is the chief in this, so we have a czar on our side, and I believe that Mr. Shultz similarly will move into czarism, if he is not already there, on his side.

We will have, Mr. Rowland, the most effective way that two organizations can work together. In the military we always do it. If we are coming side by side with an Army unit or with an allied unit to operate, we both assign liaison officers that go over and stand in the other fellow's command post and listen to his plan of maneuver and watch his support fire. We will do that. We have means of working in the State Department, not watching the State Department, but helping the State Department.

Mr. ROWLAND. You can do that?

General MUNDY. Helping them to implement those aspects of diplomatic security that affect the Marine Corps and that the Marine Corps should participate in. It is our intent not to find fault, well really this has been a problem for all of us and we had no reason whatsoever to do a finger pointing drill. In other words, if there are cracks in our structure too, we want to get on with making it better and it is the Marine Corps' intent to do whatever must be done to assist the State Department in this very important undertaking. I think that we will frequently, probably through

progress reviews, discuss those sorts of things and our respective czars probably together will be briefed on how we are coming, how it is going and so on.

Mr. ROWLAND. I think we are going to be better, and again, I appreciate your testimony today and look forward to working with all of you, and I think that the process is going to be much better.

It always shows, even in the private sector, that when a problem occurs, people usually work twice as hard to make sure it doesn't occur again, and I have to believe that that is going to be the case in this instance. We appreciate the efforts that you have made and many of your colleagues in the Marine Corps.

General MUNDY. Thank you, sir.

Mrs. BYRON. Since we have a vote, an important vote on the floor, which is the Journal, I am going to try to in the next 5 minutes, wrap up the hearings so we don't have to come back, and unless there are other questions, I do want to pursue a couple of things.

We had tried to find out from the State Department if there had been any changes in the Embassy in Moscow. To your knowledge, can the Watchstanders now check the ID of strangers seen inside the Embassy?

General MUNDY. I don't know that. I would speculate that they could on the point Mr. Rowland made, lessons learned, if you will, but I don't personally know that.

Mrs. BYRON. Following that, can they check those entering the Embassy for Sunday morning church services, and also can the patrol on the warehouse grounds respond to a strange sound or sight or can they only continue to file a report? Can you get those answers for us?

General MUNDY. For the record, yes, ma'am, I could do that.

Mrs. BYRON. The other thing, I know there have been changes, more psychological input in selecting the Marine Guards—there has been a change. Have there been any changes using incentives to get quality detachment commanders to return to the Marine Security Guard battalion or is it usually just one or two assigned?

General MUNDY. The best information I have is probably about ten percent of our detachment commanders are returnees to the program, if you will. We have nothing with specific incentives at this time.

Mrs. BYRON. One of the other changes that was discussed, and that was locating the detachment commanders residences in closer to the Marine houses. Is that under consideration?

General MUNDY. We support that fully.

Mrs. BYRON. Require active duty supervision of Marine Security Guards at night by the detachment and RSO, requiring them to visit the embassy in the middle of the night, just to show concern and—

General MUNDY. I would say that there is a guard structure. In other words, there are sergeants of the guard and people like that who oversee it. At small detachments where there are four or five Marines, certainly there is very minimal structure in the detachment.

Mrs. BYRON. I think we are all really talking about the high espionage threat areas, which is not just the Warsaw Pact nations.

General MUNDY. Certainly, yes, ma'am.

Mrs. BYRON. You have done some changes in the training of the current Marine Security Guards, a more realistic training profile?

General MUNDY. We have, as I mentioned, we are working still on perfecting the training. We have added some training, we have brought in other agencies on the counterintelligence training that had been given heretofore by the State Department. We have added some to that and we will make further refinements on that.

Mrs. BYRON. One of the other issues is do we need as many Watchstanders as we have or can we use more electronic surveillance so as to minimize the number of active individuals?

General MUNDY. Well, I think that would be post dependent. In other words, some posts may have more assets of one type than another.

I believe you could use an increased electronic surveillance and mechanisms of various sorts. Whether or not that could stand in for what the Marine Security Guards do, which would basically be to watch the electronic surveillance equipment and read out on it, I don't know whether that would reduce the number of Watchstanders or not.

Mrs. BYRON. I think the final one was the two man role, which has been applicable in some areas but not followed in others, and is that going to be strengthened?

General MUNDY. Well, I think that is situation dependent. If there is a need for it, for example, I would address that in two areas. If we are talking about liberty pursuits, Marines are always encouraged to go on liberty with a buddy when in a foreign port. I think that would continue to be done. As far as requiring that they go on liberty in pairs, we have not done that and would again prefer to leave that to the judgment of the local commander.

Within the guard structure, as far as two man rule of guard to watch the guard, we just don't support that. We believe that one of the things that needs to come out of all of this at this particular time, is a statement of trust and confidence in the thousands of young Marines that are out there doing a heck of a good job. So a two man rule as far as it becomes a rule of mistrust, we don't trust you, we would not be supportive of that.

Mrs. BYRON. Well, let me close the hearing by expressing our appreciation for your coming over today. Once again, I think these discussions have been extremely beneficial, to reassess the mission within our State Department, and I think from the testimony in my estimation, we have come up with the best system we have in the one that is currently in place, but a system currently in place can always be little bit better. I think those individuals that have had Watchstanders in the past, the selection process that you have utilized has had a few flaws, but I am sure that we are going to get that put back together again, and I appreciate your time.

With that, I adjourn the hearings, and hope I can make the vote.

Thank you very much.

General MUNDY. Thank you, ma'am.

[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the joint panel and subcommittee was adjourned.]

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