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HEARINGS

Before the

Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere And Peace Corps Affairs

of the

Committee on Foreign Relations

UNITED STATES SENATE

S. 1614

U.S. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO PANAMA

Washington, D.C.

October 22, 1987

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S. 1614

U.S. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO PANAMA

Thursday, October 22, 1987

United States Senate

Subcommittee on Western

Hemisphere and Peace Corps

Affairs

Committee on Foreign Relations

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2:33 p.m. in Room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Christopher Dodd (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Dodd (presiding), Cranston, and Helms.

Senator Dodd: The Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs of the Foreign Relations Committee will come to order.

For the record, I want to state in preparation for these hearings, the subcommittee extended an invitation to both the State Department and the Defense Department to testify on the legislation before us today. I regret that for their own internal bureaucratic reasons, they have decided not to avail themselves of the opportunity.

With that, I have a short statement I would like to make,

1 and then I understand Senator D'Amato is on his way over
2 here. We will hear from Senator Kennedy and Senator D'Amato
3 and other members before we hear from our additional
4 witnesses.

5 Today the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere will
6 hear testimony concerning recent events in Panama and the
7 appropriate U.S. policy response to those events.

8 Four months ago, charges by a former member of the
9 Panamanian Defense Forces against General Noriega and certain
10 other Panamanian authorities sparked massive demonstrations
11 and demands for General Noriega to step aside pending an
12 independent investigation into those allegations. Despite
13 efforts by Panamanian authorities to stifle dissent,
14 demonstrations and general strikes have continued, as
15 evidenced by the march and general strike planned for today.

16 Were any of these charges new? Not really. Many of
17 these allegations had long been rumored in Panama and
18 abroad. However, it is clear that the announcement by Diaz
19 Herrera, the former Chief of Staff of the Panamanian Defense
20 Forces, came at a moment in time when Panamanian businessmen
21 and politicians, students and housewives had become fed up
22 with the pervasive official corruption, fed up with the
23 military establishment which has forgotten what its primary
24 mission is, namely, the national defense of the nation, and
25 not intimidation of its citizenry, and fed up with a regime

1 which talks about democracy while undermining freedom.

2 It seems clear to those of us who have watched events
3 unfolding over the past several months that the Panamanian
4 people have said loudly and clearly, enough is enough. They
5 are not going to buy attempts by General Noriega to wrap
6 himself in the Panamanian flag to deflect legitimate
7 criticism against him. They do not believe, as he has
8 asserted, that foreign intervention by the United States is
9 responsible for the current unrest in Panama, or that this is
10 all a plot by the United States to take back the Panama
11 Canal. The Panamanian people know that the United States is
12 not the problem. They know that we stand fully prepared to
13 carry out our obligations under the terms of the 1977 Panama
14 Canal Treaties, and that we expect the Panamanian government
15 to do likewise.

16 The United States Senate has expressed its concerns on
17 two separate occasions with respect to recent developments
18 in The House has taken similar action. The United States
19 must demonstrate firmly and publicly that we will not stand
20 idly by while Panama's transition to democracy is derailed.
21 General Noriega cannot continue to expect the United States
22 to provide economic and military assistance to a government
23 which is not representing the interests or desires of its
24 people.

25 Today we have pending in this committee legislation

1 introduced by Senators D'Amato, Kennedy and others to
2 terminate assistance to Panama unless concrete steps are
3 taken by the Panamanian authorities to restore Panama to the
4 democratic road. Time is running out for the Panamanian
5 authorities. They know what must be done to reverse the
6 certainty of congressional action. More importantly, they
7 know what must be done to preserve the possibility and
8 promise of democracy in Panama. I only hope that these
9 individuals have the courage to do what must be done. If
10 not, the real losers are the Panamanian people.

11 Our lead-off witnesses this afternoon are Senators
12 Kennedy and D'Amato, both of whom have followed recent events
13 in Panama closely over the past several months and have
14 sponsored legislation which is the subject of today's hearing.

15 I welcome both of you to the hearing, and I will first
16 turn to my colleagues here, Senator Helms and Senator
17 Cranston, for any opening statements they may have, and then,
18 Senator Kennedy, we will go right to you.

19 Senator Helms: Mr. Chairman, Senator Kennedy was here
20 for the morning session, and I am almost obliged to say we
21 have got to stop meeting like this.

22 It is always a pleasure to see you.

23 Senator Kennedy: I think we are going to have more
24 agreement this afternoon than we had this morning.

25 Senator Helms: Exactly.

1 Mr. Chairman, I am glad that we are finally getting
2 around to holding a hearing on the legislation offered by
3 several of us. Senator D'Amato and I are the principal
4 co-sponsors of one bill, and then we are co-sponsors of the
5 other, and we are all in the mix, so to speak.

6 Our bill, the D'Amato-Helms bill, was introduced last
7 August, and the crisis in Panama has grown increasingly worse
8 since. Now, our bill would cut off all military and economic
9 aid to Panama until the President certifies various
10 conditions regarding democracy and human rights in Panama.

11 Since June of this year, Mr. Chairman, the people of
12 Panama have been in the streets almost daily, as you have
13 mentioned, demanding democracy and the resignation of General
14 Noriega, the de facto dictator of that country. Even today,
15 as we hold this hearing at this moment, the people of Panama
16 have taken to the streets again in what was to have been the
17 largest rally ever against the dictatorship of Noriega.
18 However, as in the past, this rally was declared illegal by
19 the Panamanian government, and the people are risking their
20 lives by attending, let alone participating in it.

21 The government of Panama has become more repressive than
22 ever. Even American citizens have now become targets. In
23 the last month an American CNN journalist was expelled from
24 Panama for reporting on opposition rallies, and last week a
25 retired U.S. colonel was expelled from the country because he

1 was known to have been critical of Noriega.

2 And last week, ten American military personnel in Panama
3 were arrested. They were beaten and held incommunicado
4 overnight. And prior to that, the economic counselor at the
5 U.S. Embassy was detained and held incommunicado for eight
6 hours.

7 Just two nights ago, the largest department store in
8 Panama City was burned to the ground. The employees believe
9 that they were being punished for having announced that they
10 would participate in the opposition rally today.

11 Two days ago, in anticipation of the opposition rally
12 today, the government of Panama arrested approximately 100
13 people who were known to be participating in the activities
14 of the opposition in one form or another, to one degree or
15 another.

16 So, Mr. Chairman, the government of Panama has thus far
17 taken no positive steps which would make them eligible to
18 receive American aid furnished by the U.S. taxpayers. For
19 years, some of us have been warning about the serious
20 problems in Panama involving human rights and international
21 drug trafficking and money laundering and so forth and so on.

22 Around this hemisphere, Mr. Noriega is seen as a threat
23 to the stability of the entire region. One month ago the
24 Inter-American Human Rights Commission of the Organization of
25 American States publicly condemned the government of Panama

1 for being responsible for the brutal murder of Dr. Hugo
2 Spadafora. But that government will not even appoint a
3 commission to investigate that murder.

4 So it is obvious, at least to this Senator, that the
5 American taxpayers should not under any circumstances be
6 financing a government which we know is involved in the kind
7 of activities I have just mentioned. I believe it is unwise
8 to wait any longer to pass the D'Amato-Helms bill or any one
9 of the other pieces of legislation which are related. These
10 pieces of legislation have wide, bipartisan support, and I
11 trust that the Senators will work together to bring this to
12 the floor as quickly as may be possible.

13 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

14 Senator Dodd: Thank you, Senator Helms.

15 Senator Cranston?

16 Senator Cranston: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

17 Senator Dodd, as chairman of the Western Hemisphere
18 Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee, and our
19 first two witnesses, Senator Kennedy and Senator D'Amato,
20 have provided strong and very effective leadership in
21 pressing for passage of Panama-related legislation. I
22 believe personally that it is urgent for the Senate to act
23 now in support of efforts to speed the departure of the
24 bandit regime being headed by Colonel Noriega. It is in the
25 U.S. national security interest, and it is our moral and

1 humanitarian obligation to use our limited influence to
2 hasten the restoration of democracy in Panama where today a
3 truly vile, sinister band has hijacked the instruments of
4 democratic government.

5 The continued stalemate in Panama is accelerating
6 radicalization tendencies. Witness the killing of a
7 demonstrator last month, the shooting of Ambassador Gabriel
8 Lewis's son, and the repeated threats and intimidation
9 against professional U.S. diplomats and American soldiers by
10 Noriega's thugs.

11 I joined with Senators Kennedy, D'Amato and Helms to
12 introduce two Panama bills last August. One formalizes the
13 suspension of U.S. aid and establishes clear human rights
14 democracy conditions for its resumption. The other suspends
15 imports of sugar under Panama's quota until the some human
16 rights democracy conditions are met.

17 The purpose here, today, is to zero in on the Noriega
18 crowd, which has a virtual monopoly on exports from the cane
19 plantations, and that is the purpose of this legislation.
20 Under the Dodd amendment, which I wholeheartedly supported,
21 these measures may take effect 45 days after enactment of the
22 Department of Defense bill unless changes take place in
23 Panama. But I would like to see these sanctions take force
24 immediately, and I think we should take steps to that end.

25 For reasons wholly unrelated to Panama, we do not know

1 when or if the Defense bill will be come law. Clearly it
2 will not for some time. We need to act on Panama now.

3 Let me say that I am not wedded to any specific proposal,
4 but I do feel strongly that we should move effective
5 legislation on this subject now, this month, to sustain
6 moderates in Panama and to keep up the nonviolent pressure.

7 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

8 Senator Dodd: Thank you, Senator Cranston.

9 Senator Kennedy, we welcome you to the committee. We
10 know you are busy, and appreciate your patience in listening
11 to these opening statements.

12 We will be glad to include your entire statement in the
13 record, and to receive your testimony in any way you would
14 like to present it.

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1 STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD M. KENNEDY, A UNITED STATES
2 SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS

3 Senator Kennedy: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
4 the members of the committee.

5 I want to first of all commend you, Mr. Chairman, for
6 commencing these hearings, and I think it sends a very clear
7 message to the Panamanian people our very deep concern about
8 the human rights issues affecting the people of Panama and
9 our strong commitment to democracy in Panama. At a time when
10 the Senate of the United States has been debating the war
11 powers issues, the whole questions of our policy in the
12 Persian Gulf, at a time when we are facing significant
13 economic challenges, this committee, under your leadership,
14 is focusing the attention of the Senate of the United States
15 on the whole issues of democracy and human rights in Panama,
16 and I think it is an extremely important message for those
17 that are attempting to deny the Panamanian people their basic
18 and fundamental rights, General Noriega, that he understands
19 the power of this particular message and the importance of it.

20 Just a few brief items, Mr. Chairman. Only a few moments
21 ago I left the Defense Authorization Conference where the
22 Dodd resolution was being considered, and I can indicate to
23 you that in the panel on which I was representing the Senate
24 as a member of the Force Projection Subcommittee of the Armed
25 Services Committee there was broad and wide support for the

1 Dodd resolution among the members of the House committee, the
2 Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives.

3 So I think our friends again should understand that we
4 are seeing not only here in the Senate, not only here in the
5 formulation of legislation, but we saw again as the Senate is
6 marking up that extremely important piece of legislation,
7 that there is broad, wide, bipartisan support.

8 I think another factor that is interesting and
9 significant today is the fact that the Majority Leader as
10 well as the Minority Leader have agreed to the
11 recommendations of the Senator from Connecticut and Senator
12 from North Carolina and Senator from California, and my
13 colleague, the Senator from New York's request for having a
14 conformed group travel to Panama, and staff members who are
15 experienced and knowledgeable and have a breadth of awareness
16 of the situation there and then report back to this committee
17 and to the Senate generally. That is an extremely unique
18 step that is taken under only the most extraordinary
19 circumstances. I think it may be something that is just
20 looked at in terms of procedure, but usually these kinds of
21 staff investigations are only available in the most
22 significant priorities established by the Senate. So I think
23 that message ought to be understood.

24 Mr. Chairman, these hearings occur at a moment of
25 extraordinary significance for Panama. I understand that

1 Panama City today is an occupied city. Five thousand troops
2 in combat outfits, armed to the teeth, weapons at the ready,
3 are effectively occupying that city and resisting the
4 peaceful demonstrations of men and women, and even children,
5 whose only desire is to be able to express what we take for
6 granted here in this country, and that is an ability to
7 express their dissent at the government of General Noriega.

8 So it is in that climate and atmosphere that we hold
9 these hearings, why these hearings are so extremely
10 important, and why the message that should go from these
11 hearings to General Noriega, that the group that has been
12 mentioned here today are in for the whole war. We are not in
13 for just the one battle. And we are going to follow this
14 step by step, every step along the line until General Noriega
15 himself is going to step aside, and democracy is restored in
16 Panama.

17 Mr. Chairman, in the face of unprecedented repression and
18 intimidation, the people of Panama are in the streets today
19 calling on their government to cease its dictatorship, and
20 the arrests and detentions, to allow the people of Panama
21 once again to be free. The whole world is watching, and we
22 wait with hope, but also with a certain trepidation, to see
23 what the answer will be.

24 Mr. Chairman, I fear the worst. I fear that the events
25 of today in Panama will write one more sad and tragic chapter

1 of bloody repression in a national history already filled
2 with stories of murder, corruption, drug smuggling, gun
3 running and fraud. And at the heart of the problem is
4 General Manuel Noriega, the Chief of Staff of the Panama
5 Defense Force.

6 The causes of the crisis in Panama are, of course, much
7 more profound than the tyranny of one individual. But
8 because of General Noriega's own history, the allegations of
9 criminality and corruption, because of his resort to
10 repression rather than reconciliation, those causes cannot be
11 addressed so long as General Noriega remains in power.

12 This is not just my own personal view or the view of the
13 United States Senate. It is, more importantly, the view of
14 the overwhelming majority of Panamanian citizens, as
15 reflected in the statements of dozens of civic and
16 professional and political organizations.

17 Let me recount briefly the most significant events that
18 have led to the crisis that afflict Panama today. The event
19 that triggered this crisis occurred on June 7, Sunday, when
20 Retired Chief of Staff, Colonel Robert Diaz, granted an
21 interview to the independent newspaper, La Prensa, and in
22 that interview Diaz accused his former friend and colleague,
23 General Noriega, of murder, extortion, corruption, fraud and
24 various other high crimes and misdemeanors. Among the other
25 things, he accused Noriega of rigging the 1984 presidential

1 election and ordering the slow torture, murder and beheading
2 of Hugo Spadafora.

3 Two nights later, on the evening of June 9, the people of
4 Panama made history when they formed the National Civic
5 Crusade. This extraordinary organization, originally
6 composed of 29 civic and professional groups, was established
7 outside of the traditional political parties for the purpose
8 of conducting a campaign for decency and justice in Panama.
9 Another 39 organizations joined the crusade during the next
10 few days, and since then, the National Civic Crusade has led
11 all Panama to an unprecedented effort to restore the rule of
12 law, to revive democratic institutions, and to return Panama
13 to popular government.

14 Since those earliest days, the people of Panama have been
15 subjected to unrelenting repression and brutal subjugation.
16 Hundreds have been arrested and detained for no reason other
17 than the honk of a horn or a wave of a white handkerchief.
18 Hundreds more have been assaulted and beaten. And in
19 response, the government of Panama imposed a state of
20 emergency, suspended all fundamental freedoms; freedom of the
21 press, freedom of expression, freedom of association are now
22 things of the past in Panama.

23 General Noriega and his armed shock troops known as
24 Dobermans, have kept all Panama under the iron fist of total
25 control and arbitrary terror.

1 Recent evidence of the repression. I would like to
2 include in the record two news articles by Julia Preston,
3 dated October 17 and October 20. In the first article Ms.
4 Preston catalogues instances of brutality by the Panamanian
5 riot police. She reports that at least three Panamanians
6 have been killed since the crackdown began, and that more
7 than 1000 have suffered significant injuries from bird shot
8 used by the riot police. Six of these individuals were
9 blinded. She also reports the opposition newspaper La Prensa
10 remains occupied by soldiers who have blocked its staff from
11 entering the building since it was raided on July 26.

12 In the second article, Ms. Preston reports that the
13 Panamanian government has apparently targeted U.S. diplomats,
14 servicemen, other U.S. citizens for harassment. The former
15 head of the U.S. Embassy's Military Group, Colonel Charles
16 Stone, has been deported. The PDF agents recently conducted
17 a nighttime prowl of the U.S. Chief of Mission John Meista.
18 For his own security, Mr. Meista has been forced to move to
19 an apartment house.

20 In addition, our economic counselor, David Miller, was
21 detained at the scene of an antigovernment demonstration on
22 September 13 and held for eight hours.

23 More recently, when protesters erupted the night of
24 October 7, the PDF picked up nine out-of-uniform U.S.
25 servicemen who were held for six hours before U.S.

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authorities were notified.

[The information referred to follows:]

[SUBCOMMITTEE INSERT]

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1 Senator Kennedy: In the face of such repression, the
2 Congress cannot remain passive. We cannot be in favor of
3 human rights in the Soviet Union and in Cuba and be silent
4 about human rights abuses in Panama.

5 On August 5, under the leaderships of Senator D'Amato and
6 Senator Cranston, we introduced S. 1614 which called for a
7 halt of U.S. economic and military assistance to Panama
8 unless the President could certify that the government of
9 Panama had demonstrated concrete progress in the efforts to
10 assure civilian control of the armed forces, and unless the
11 government of Panama had established an independent
12 investigation into the allegation of criminal wrongdoing by
13 members of the PDF, and unless other constitutional
14 guarantees were restored.

15 Then on September 24 the Senate, by a vote of 97 to
16 nothing, unanimously adopted the Dodd resolution which
17 pledged that all U.S. assistance would be terminated unless
18 those conditions were satisfied within 45 days.

19 I would ask permission to include these two pieces of
20 legislation at this point in the record.

21 Senator Dodd: Without objection.

22 [The information referred to follows:]
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1 Senator Kennedy: I appear before you today to testify in
2 support of S. 1614. The Senate should keep its solemn pledge
3 to the people of Panama. Before this Congress adjourns this
4 year, we should send an unmistakable signal to all the people
5 of Panama that the American people will have nothing to do
6 with a military dictatorship that clings to power by
7 systematically abusing the human rights of its people.

8 As a government and as a people we should say nothing, we
9 should do nothing that could in any way be construed as
10 providing aid or comfort to the Noriega regimes. In passing
11 this legislation, we should also make it clear that we do not
12 mean to interfere in the internal affairs of the nation of
13 Panama. We are only responding to the pleas of the
14 Panamanian people. We do not seek to abrogate the Panama
15 Canal Treaty. That treaty is the law of the land today, and
16 the United States of America will abide by its commitments.
17 We do not seek to destroy the Panamanian Defense Forces. We
18 understand that there is an appropriate role for a
19 professional military in democracy.

20 The issue is not the PDF. The issue is the rule of law
21 as opposed to the rule of one man.

22 I congratulate the Chairman for his leadership on the
23 issue. I am proud to appear here before this subcommittee
24 with Senator D'Amato, who has played an important role in the
25 struggle, and I urge my fellow Senators to join with us in

1 keeping our pledge to the people of Panama.

2 We are with you today. We will be with you until you are
3 victorious in the struggle finally to bring freedom and
4 justice to your land and to your people.

5 [The prepared statement of Senator Kennedy follows:]

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1 Senator Dodd: Thank you very much, Senator Kennedy.

2 Senator D'Amato, we are delighted to receive your
3 testimony.

4 Your statement will be included in the record. Please
5 proceed as you see fit.

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1 STATEMENT OF HON. ALFONSE M. D'AMATO, A UNITED STATES
2 SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

3 Senator D'Amato: Mr. Chairman, first let me commend you
4 for taking the time to hold these important hearings, and
5 indeed they are important because people's lives are at
6 stake, and the destiny, I believe, of the Panamanian people
7 is closely linked to what we do, what actions we take, and
8 whether or not we are perceived as really standing for
9 democracy and saying that we place a value on human rights,
10 that we are going to stand for the principles of democracy
11 wherever, and that is the test.

12 Let me say, Mr. Chairman, I am going to ask, as you have
13 indicated, that my testimony be accepted into the record as
14 if read in its entirety. Let me touch on the fact that this
15 is an effort that has brought together Democrats,
16 Republicans, liberals and conservatives, and that while we
17 talk, and there has been much consideration as it relates to
18 another area in Central America, that area which divides
19 people in terms of how or where and what we should or should
20 not be doing, Nicaragua, that it would seem to me that we
21 would make a grave error in not recognizing that our policy
22 here in Panama is at least as important as the issues
23 confronting this nation in Central America vis-a-vis
24 Nicaragua, and that it is vital that the world know about the
25 courage of the Panamanian people and the reprehensible

1 actions of their leader.

2 Let me underscore the fact that while some of us may have
3 had certain feelings as it relates to the Panama Canal, that
4 that is not an issue. Mr. Noriega would attempt to make it
5 the issue, but the issue here is the rights of the people.
6 We have to be vigilant in our government that we not do
7 anything which directly or indirectly would appear to
8 sanction Noriega's hold or his power.

9 In fact, it is incumbent upon us to do everything to
10 demonstrate to the Panamanian people our unwavering support
11 for the principles of democracy. And that is what is at
12 stake, our credibility, if any Panamanian people are watching
13 us, and indeed, they are acting at this present time, as
14 Senator Kennedy has testified.

15 The conditions are growing worse, and as we press forward
16 to see to it that S. 1614 becomes implemented -- and I
17 believe it will have to be implemented because I do not think
18 it would be reasonable for us to feel that those conditions
19 that must be met within the 45 day period pursuant to your
20 resolution, Mr. Chairman, will be undertaken, that the people
21 will not be given democracy, that the armies will be used
22 against the people, that indeed, hostilities have now even
23 been carried against citizens of the United States with
24 regularity, and it is rather troubling to see that instead of
25 moving to an accommodation with respect to the legitimate

1 rights of the people, Noriega has taken an attitude of
2 toughing it out, so to speak.

3 So it becomes important that we do not have our military
4 even appear that they are countenancing as a result of
5 cooperative efforts in terms of drills -- there is a very
6 important drill that will be coming up in January. If that
7 drill is undertaken, I am very much concerned that we will be
8 creating the appearance that we are with Noriega. That would
9 be a great blow to our credibility as it relates to the
10 people.

11 I think as it relates to the cutoff of sugar, Senator
12 Cranston's legislation, it is absolutely paramount that we
13 push forward with that. That was a brilliant stroke, and
14 again, an effort joined in by Senator Helms, Senator Kennedy,
15 and I believe yourself, Mr. Chairman, because we find that
16 those dollars enrich the very people who are part and parcel
17 of this effort of subverting democracy and subverting the
18 true wishes of the Panamanian people, none less than the
19 President himself receives a substantial, the President of
20 Panama receives a substantial portion of those incomes, and
21 the government of Panama receives a substantial part of those
22 incomes.

23 So I commend you, Mr. Chairman, for your holding this
24 hearing.

25 I would like to say that it has been a pleasure, in the

1 seven years I have been in the Senate, to see the way we have
2 come together, as I mentioned, from all sides of the
3 political spectrum, Senator Helms working with Senator
4 Cranston and Senator Kennedy, you and I, Mr. Chairman,
5 together in this effort, and it is important that we continue.

6 And I thank the Chairman.

7 [The prepared statement of Senator D'Amato follows:]

8 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

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1 Senator Dodd: Well, we thank you, and let me commend
2 both for very fine statements.

3 I could not agree with you more, Senator D'Amato, that
4 the sense of coming together around this particular issue is
5 a message that certainly cannot be lost either, one, on
6 General Noriega and the people, the few who are supporting
7 him, but just as importantly, in fact, more importantly I
8 think, as Senator Kennedy pointed out, on the average citizen
9 in Panama today who wants to know whether or not this country
10 stands with them and behind them in an effort to bring
11 democracy to that country. I think that joining together, as
12 you say, is extremely important and sends a very clear and
13 strong message.

14 So we are appreciative to have both of you here.

15 Senator Helms, did you have a question?

16 Senator Helms: Mr. Chairman, I want to join you in
17 expressing your appreciation for two excellent statements by
18 two capable Senators.

19 May I ask unanimous consent, sort of a personal
20 privilege, Senator Kennedy alluded to the civic, professional
21 and business groups who got together to form the opposition,
22 and I have just noted the arrival of the Directors of the
23 National Civic Crusade, which is exactly what he was talking
24 about.

25 Would it be appropriate -- they cannot testify because

1 they are not U.S. citizens, but would it be all right if they
2 stood to be recognized?

3 Senator Dodd: Certainly. I see no objection to that.

4 Senator Helms: I see one, two, three, four, five.

5 Senator Dodd: The record should note that we welcome
6 these people.

7 Senator Kennedy: Mr. Berea, I think, is the chairman of
8 this group.

9 Senator Dodd: Yes. We welcome you here today, and we
10 appreciate your being here.

11 Thank you, Senator Helms.

12 Senator Helms: Thank you very much, gentlemen, and I
13 thank you, Mr. Chairman.

14 Senator Dodd: Senator Cranston, do you have any
15 questions?

16 Senator Cranston: No, I have no questions, but I do want
17 to thank both Senators for very fine statements and very
18 effective and hard work on this.

19 Senator Dodd: I would tell you that I know Senator Pell
20 is strongly supportive of this effort as well, and we will
21 try at the earliest possible date to move forward.

22 You will note that one of the bills here, involving the
23 sugar quotas, could not be referred to this committee. The
24 Parliamentarian referred that to the Finance Committee. So
25 we only have one bill before us today, the one that does not

1 specifically include the quota. But that does not preclude
2 this committee from amending that legislation to include the
3 sugar issue.

4 I am going to explore that question of sugar because I
5 think it is an extremely important one with the witnesses we
6 have coming after our two colleagues here are completed,
7 because I think, as Senator D'Amato pointed out, the effect
8 on the government, I think the government is one of the major
9 beneficiaries of the quota rather than private individuals in
10 that country. So the impact of that particular decision
11 could be maybe the most direct.

12 Senator Cranston: If you can incorporate the sugar
13 matter in this bill, it would be appreciated.

14 Senator Dodd: We will try to do that.

15 Senator Kennedy: May I just mention one point?

16 As Senator D'Amato mentioned, the military operation, and
17 it is called KENDALL LIBERTY, and it is supposed to take
18 place in January. There has been a historical set of
19 maneuvers related to the security of the Canal which one year
20 is done jointly and then another year is done independently.
21 It can be done independently by the United States without the
22 joint cooperation and support.

23 I have already raised that issue with General Werner of
24 the Southern Command, as the Armed Services Committee in
25 charge of the Force Projection Subcommittee, and that is in

1 the jurisdiction of that committee. So I will raise this
2 again with General Werner, who is here in Washington this
3 week.

4 I would welcome any of your comments on it. It seems to
5 me that we ought to be guided by what the Democratic Forces
6 in Panama would believe. There is one opinion that
7 association between Americans and the PDF in this situation
8 strengthens General Noriega. There is another feeling that
9 if they demonstrate they work with the PDF, that the efforts
10 that we are trying to undertake in the restoration of
11 democracy would demonstrate to the PDF that they are not a
12 part of our effort, and it is just General Noriega.

13 So to whatever extent members of this panel have on this
14 issue, and to the extent that the Democratic Forces have in
15 Panama I think should be counseled, and I would hope that we
16 could work in concert together in making a recommendation to
17 the Defense Department on that question. I would welcome a
18 chance to counsel with all of the members as well as the
19 Crusade members, on what is an appropriate step to take.

20 Senator Dodd: I think that is an excellent suggestion,
21 and we will certainly do that.

22 I think it would be worthwhile at this juncture to
23 mention as well, we are fortunate indeed to have as our
24 Ambassador in Panama, Ambassador Davis, who I think has done
25 a remarkable job, tireless. I spent two or three days with

1 him a month or more, or two months ago I guess now, and he
2 has worked tirelessly on behalf of the people of not only our
3 own country but the people of Panama. And much of what we
4 know, we know because of his hard work and good efforts. We
5 will be in touch with him as well.

6 I think he has been a tremendous source of advice and
7 counsel on what is the best way to proceed in all of this.

8 Senator Helms. Mr. Chairman.

9 Senator Dodd: Yes.

10 Senator Helms: Mr. Chairman, before the two Senators
11 leave, this is sort of a leading question but I think it
12 ought to be placed on the record.

13 All of us have met many, many times with various leaders
14 of the Panamanian opposition to Noriega. I would just ask
15 the two Senators, Mr. D'Amato and Mr. Kennedy, and Mr.
16 Cranston who is down there now, have you found all of these
17 leaders with whom you have met to be democratic and
18 pro-American?

19 Senator D'Amato: I think, Mr. Chairman, the Senator puts
20 his finger on a central theme. With all of us in the
21 administration who are very much concerned about the
22 departure of Noriega, with those elements who are today in
23 the streets, that Senator Kennedy referred to, who have come
24 together, were somehow less than or would create a situation
25 where people -- and a vacuum would be created that would be

1 less than supportive of the legitimate interests that the
2 United States has as it relates to its own security, the
3 Panama Canal in particular.

4 That is the farthest thing from the truth. Be it some of
5 the operatives in the CIA who are attempting to create that
6 situation or some very legitimate concerns, as Senator
7 Kennedy has pointed out, coming from the military; we are
8 talking about people who have a great affection for the
9 United States, and they want democracy. And indeed, if there
10 is a threat to the United States and its relationship with
11 the people of Panama, it would be to create the appearance
12 that in any way, shape or place we are supporting Noriega.

13 So I would say, Senator, the people who have come to the
14 fore, the leadership, the totality of that leadership has
15 strong, strong support for democracy and are good friends,
16 and look upon the United States as close allies.

17 Senator Helms: That has certainly been my experience,
18 and I am sure.

19 One final question also just for the record.

20 Is there any doubt in the minds of any of us that Noriega
21 and other high ranking Defense Force members are involved
22 personally in international drug trafficking and money
23 laundering?

24 Senator D'Amato: Well, I will say that as Chairman of
25 the International Drug Caucus, or co-Chairman with Senator

1 Biden, let me say that the facts are clear and overwhelming,
2 and the testimony that has been produced from very reliable
3 sources, various sources is clear and convincing that General
4 Noriega has not only been involved in drug running, but a
5 whole episode in terms of money laundering associated with
6 the drug trafficking, associated with providing protection,
7 sale of visas, et cetera, all those things that go hand in
8 hand with the international drug cartel.

9 He has become, I will not say one of the major, but
10 certainly a significant force as it relates to the
11 international drug trafficking of the drugs themselves, and
12 more particularly, the money.

13 Senator Helms: I thank the Senator.

14 Senator Kennedy: It is my understanding that there has
15 been evidence that has been submitted to the Grand Jury, that
16 an indictment itself has not been returned as yet, but I
17 would be glad to provide those particular facts to you.

18 [The information referred to follows:]

19 [SUBCOMMITTEE INSERT]

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1 Senator Helms: We have had executive sessions of the
2 Foreign Relations Committee. We cannot discuss what we have
3 heard, but the evidence is very clear.

4 I thank the Senator.

5 Senator Kennedy: Thank you very much.

6 Senator Dodd: Thank you both very, very much for being
7 here.

8 Our first public witness is the Honorable William Jorden,
9 former Ambassador to Panama.

10 Ambassador Jorden, why do you not join us?

11 In fact, why do we not bring up all three witnesses
12 together. That way we might expedite things.

13 We will also hear from Dr. Robert Cook-Deegan, National
14 Advisory Committee of Physicians for Human Rights, and
15 Colonel Charles B. Stone (Ret.), former Head of Military
16 Assistance Advisory Group to Panama.

17 We would appreciate all three of you joining us at the
18 witness table.

19 Dr. Cook-Deegan, I understand you have a plane to catch.

20 Dr. Cook-Deegan: I have another lecture to give in about
21 an hour.

22 Senator Dodd: Well, if so, then why do we not let you go
23 first, and then we will hear your comments. If you have to
24 skip out on us, we will understand that. But nonetheless, if
25 you would proceed, then we will go to you, Ambassador Jorden,

1 and then to you, Colonel. If it is all right with you, we
2 will let you be clean-up.

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1 STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT COOK-DEEGAN, NATIONAL ADVISORY
2 COMMITTEE OF PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

3 Dr. Cook-Deegan: Thank you. I will stay as long as I
4 can. I hope to stay long enough to answer a few questions.

5 My name is Robert Cook-Deegan, and I am here in the
6 capacity as a member of the Advisory Committee of Physicians
7 for Human Rights. This is an organization that was founded
8 in October of 1986 and represents about 200 physicians and
9 health professionals across the United States. The primary
10 mission of Physicians for Human Rights is to investigate the
11 medical aspects of human rights abuses around the globe.

12 We undertook a mission to Panama from the 23rd to the
13 27th of August of this year at the invitation of the
14 Panamanian Medical Association, the doctors and dentists and
15 other health professionals of Social Security and of the
16 Panamanian Committee for Human Rights. They had called us in
17 response to the events of late June and early July and had
18 asked us to come down and investigate the degree, and
19 actually to document the human rights abuses that were taking
20 place in Panama.

21 We went down for a five day visit, and during that visit
22 we interviewed approximately 70 victims of human rights, we
23 met with the Archbishop, we met twice with officials at the
24 U.S. Embassy, met with the Panamanian Minister of Health and
25 several other officials.

1 Our principal findings were, number one, that the human
2 rights situation in Panama had been sporadically bad for a
3 long period of time but got suddenly much worse in June, and
4 that trend has continued to the current day. It has been
5 getting worse and worse.

6 We documented six serious eye injuries that had led to
7 partial or complete blindness. Doctors that we spoke with
8 estimated there were another 20 injuries that we could not
9 see directly. And they also estimated that approximately 100
10 people had been injured by bird shot in the month and a half
11 period before we visited Panama. I do not know what those
12 figures would be now.

13 There were three distinctive aspects of the human rights
14 abuses in Panama City. The first was the widespread and
15 indiscriminate use of bird shot. The second was widespread
16 use of tear gas. But there was a funny way that tear gas was
17 being used in Panama that we are not familiar with. Tear gas
18 canisters can be used in many, many forms. They are all
19 marked on the outside very clearly saying that they are toxic
20 gases and should not be used indoors, and that people should
21 be treated immediately after exposure. We documented many,
22 many, many cases of shooting these into classrooms, into
23 people's homes, into cars and into other enclosed spaces. In
24 several instances this tear gas was shot in to induce people
25 to leave the buildings, and then people were shot with

1 shotguns when they left those buildings.

2 This obviously is a major source of injuries, both
3 because of the tear gas itself, which is quite toxic to
4 people who have asthma or other medical conditions that
5 affect their lungs, and it is also exposing them to the bird
6 shot wounds as soon as they leave the buildings.

7 A second very significant set of human rights abuses was
8 connected to the violations of medical neutrality. Following
9 the street violence in June and July, particularly on July
10 10, we were able to document that there was a process of
11 medical screening that was being done not by medically
12 trained personnel, but instead, by Panamanian Defense Force
13 personnel. That is, if somebody was injured during those
14 days, they would show up at the emergency room of several
15 hospitals in Panama City and would be either turned away from
16 treatment or were screened by the Panamanian Defense Forces
17 and were followed in to the hospital, in some cases later
18 taken away before their treatment was complete.

19 These are very serious breaches of international
20 covenants to which Panama is party.

21 A third major aspect that we documented but not as
22 thoroughly as we would have wished, there were many
23 allegations of torture in the Panamanian prisons when people
24 were taken in. We actually had direct documentation of two
25 such cases. In one case a man was hung by his wrists for

1 approximately nine hours, leading to serious injury of his
2 hands and arms. And in another case a man was, while in
3 prison, was burned on his testicles and other places on his
4 body.

5 I will just talk about two specific cases very briefly to
6 give you a flavor for the kinds of things that we found. One
7 case that we ran into was in one of the two rural provinces
8 that we visited. We talked with a Senator Bortillo Mejia,
9 who is a National Senator from that province, the province of
10 Chiriqui. He was at one point taken out of his car where he
11 was driving with his family, was beaten in front of his
12 family, and was taken into prison and held incommunicado for
13 several hours. This is a member of the national legislature.

14 A second case that received a great deal of press in
15 Panama at the time were two girls who were playing on the
16 streets on June 11, and in their own words, this is in the
17 words of the nine year old girl: we were playing school.
18 Someone said the police are coming. We ran away. I fell
19 down. The police shot me.

20 And Heidi, an eleven year old girl, ran to the aid of
21 this nine year old girl, and trying to pick her up, was
22 herself shot. These two girls were taken to the emergency
23 room, went into major surgery to evacuate blood from their
24 lung cavities and from their abdominal cavities. The eleven
25 year old girl had injuries to her stomach, to her small

1 intestines, and to her left kidney and had to have her spleen
2 removed.

3 These are two of the cases. We actually have
4 documentation of approximately 70 cases. I will not disclose
5 any of the names because we are trying to handle this in a
6 responsible manner, but more details will be made available
7 to the committee if there are further questions.

8 Thank you.

9 [The prepared statement of Dr. Cook-Deegan follows:]

10 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

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1 Senator Helms (presiding): Doctor, thank you very much.
2 We will hear the Ambassador and Colonel in a few moments,
3 but before you proceed, Mr. Ambassador, Colonel, you had
4 planned to retire in Panama, had you not?

5 Colonel Stone: Yes, sir. I retired on 31 July in Panama.

6 Senator Helms: But were you not expelled from Panama
7 during the past week?

8 Colonel Stone: Yes, sir.

9 Senator Helms: When it comes to your time to testify
10 after the Ambassador, I hope you will go into some detail
11 about the events that led up to your expulsion.

12 Well, Mr. Ambassador, we are glad to see you again.

13 You may proceed.
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1 STATEMENT OF THE HON. WILLIAM JORDEN, FORMER U.S.
2 AMBASSADOR TO PANAMA, MC LEAN, VIRGINIA

3 Ambassador Jorden: Mr. Chairman, nine years and a few
4 days ago I was meeting with the Senator Foreign Relations
5 Committee which was then considering the recently concluded
6 Panama Canal Treaties. For most of us, it was an exciting
7 time, filled with high expectations. We knew that we were on
8 the threshold of a new era in relations between our country
9 and the small nation of Panama.

10 The problem that had troubled those relations for more
11 than 70 years was about to be solved. And indeed, I am bound
12 to say, our expectations were fully justified. The treaties
13 have worked well and to the advantage of both countries.

14 Above and beyond the treaties themselves, there was an
15 additional reason for hope in Panama and among her friends.
16 By then, in 1978, Panama had functioned under a de facto
17 military rule for almost ten years. But during the treaty
18 negotiations, Panama's military leader, General Omar
19 Torrijos, announced his intention to return his country to a
20 more democratic system. There would be, he said, a proper
21 civilian government, and he would see to it that the military
22 forces under his command would withdraw from governmental
23 functions and return to their proper role defending the
24 country against any external threat and providing an honest
25 and effective police force.

1 Those pledges, by the way, Mr. Chairman, were given in
2 person and directly to Majority Leader Byrd and Minority
3 Leader Baker and to others.

4 That process of restoring democracy was fairly well
5 advanced by the time General Torrijos was killed in a plane
6 crash six years ago. One of his successors who had decided
7 to enter the political arena quite correctly resigned his
8 military command to seek office as a civilian. Then, in
9 1983, General Manuel Antonio Noriega became the military
10 ruler.

11 What has happened since is nothing short of a disaster.
12 The Torrijos line was reversed 180 degrees. Instead of the
13 military role diminishing, it increased. One after another
14 of Noriega's cohorts was placed in key positions, in charge
15 of customs, the railroad, the nation's ports, the airports,
16 the immigration. Noriega followers were placed in
17 controlling posts in the government ministries and in the
18 courts. Many in private enterprise faced the unhappy choice
19 of contributing to the Noriega political machine or being
20 harassed and intimidated.

21 Finally, in June of this year, one of Noriega's closest
22 military colleagues blew the whistle. General Roberto Diaz
23 Herrera had been Chief of Staff of the military forces. We
24 have heard the charges made by Colonel Diaz from you, Mr.
25 Chairman, and from Senator Kennedy, so I will not repeat

1 them. But the Diaz revelations of broad corruption, drug
2 dealing and so on, set off a revolution in Panama.

3 Most Panamanians had, of course, heard these allegations
4 over the years and were inclined to believe most of them, but
5 they never had been aired publicly, especially from a source
6 who had been so close to Noriega for so many years. When the
7 Diaz charges were published, thousands of Panamanians poured
8 into the streets in protest. The opposition covered the
9 broadest spectrum of groups and individuals, businessmen,
10 students, teachers, housewives, professional people, workers.

11 A loosely knit organization of more than 100 civic and
12 professional groups took shape in the Civic Crusade in
13 Panama, and it is indeed a pleasure to see members and
14 leaders of that crusade in this room today. They are
15 courageous, honorable, decent people who are fighting hard
16 for their country.

17 A series of peaceful public demonstrations took place and
18 continues to this day. The people of Panama were voting in
19 the only way that was available to them, with their feet and
20 their hands, with banners and handkerchiefs and honking
21 horns. Their message was loud and clear: Noriega must go.
22 Panama wants democracy, justice and freedom.

23 Many of those demonstrations were brutally suppressed, as
24 we have heard. People have been shot and beaten. Hundreds
25 have been jailed. Leaders of the opposition have been

1 hounded, forced underground, imprisoned or, as our friends in
2 the back testify, forced into exile.

3 Members of this committee should be in no doubt that what
4 is taking place in Panama is a truly popular movement, one
5 that reflects a widespread consensus among all shades of
6 opinion. Not long ago, the Gallup International organization
7 carried out a public opinion poll in Panama. It was a very
8 comprehensive poll. It found that 75 percent of the people
9 wanted Noriega to step down. Their goals were clear,
10 restoration of real democracy, honest elections, evenhanded
11 justice, and removal of the military from normal civilian
12 activities inside the government and out.

13 In that poll, approximately 13 percent of the respondents
14 were not eager to have Noriega leave. I reckon that is about
15 the number who are dependent on him, who have government
16 jobs, are in the military and in the whole network that he
17 has established of support and cooperation. Twelve percent
18 either had no opinion or were unwilling to say what it was.

19 The goals that have been stated by the people in this
20 poll, by the Civic Crusade, by every decent politician in
21 Panama, are demands that I think should hearten us
22 Americans. We should also admire the courage with which
23 these demands of the Panamanian people are being expressed
24 every day.

25 What should the United States do in the face of this

1 crisis? First, I think it is clear to all of us and to our
2 many friends in Panama that this is, at heart, their
3 problem. It must in the end be solved by them in their way.
4 It is not for us to supply blue prints or rigid
5 prescriptions, but we must not stand aloof and look the other
6 way. We have a deep and longstanding interest in the safety
7 of the Panama Canal. We have a significant military presence
8 in Panama, one that is important to our security posture in
9 the entire region. We Americans also have a historical
10 commitment to the proposition that democracy and freedom
11 should prevail, and that dictatorship and repression should
12 be eliminated wherever our influence can be effective.

13 Finally, we have an abiding concern for the well-being,
14 the prosperity, and yes, the happiness of the Panamanian
15 people, our longstanding and probably closest friends in
16 Latin America.

17 The Senate resolution calling for restoration of civilian
18 rule and urging General Noriega to step aside was received
19 with enthusiasm by the Panamanian people. Even more
20 impressive and effective was the cutoff of military and
21 economic assistance to the Noriega regime. That signal went
22 from one end of Panama to the other, and its meaning was
23 unmistakable.

24 I have no hesitation in endorsing the spirit and the
25 letter of Senate Bill 1614 and of Senator Cranston's

1 proposal, which I think is 1615. This mandates a cutoff
2 until certain conditions are met. Its passage will have, I
3 believe, a healthy impact on the Panamanian people and on
4 Norlega and his cohorts.

5 Let me quickly say that I am not usually a proponent of
6 efforts to fine tune policy by committee or congressional
7 action. I know --

8 Senator Dodd (presiding): Spoken like a good guy from
9 the State Department.

10 Ambassador Jordan: Most members of this committee are
11 aware of the many pitfalls that lie down that road.

12 In this case, I think the situation fully justifies the
13 action, but I would suggest that one of the problems that
14 attends this kind of action is the occasional difficulty we
15 have in altering or reversing it when circumstances have
16 changed.

17 One of these days General Norlega is going to step
18 aside. When that happens, his dictatorial regime will be
19 replaced, let us hope by one that is more open and honest and
20 democratic. I think the committee will agree that we would
21 want to help such a new government put Panama back on its
22 feet again. We might want to quickly restore the assistance
23 that is being severed, or even augment that cooperation.

24 Panama has suffered economic devastation during these
25 recent months, and a democratic government is going to have

1 its hands full in eliminating the chaos that Noriega and his
2 cohorts have created.

3 So I merely say, by all means, let's help cut off aid
4 that helps make Noriega strong, but let us be equally quick
5 to act in support of a successor regime that will have to
6 sweep up all the broken crockery.

7 I would like to make one final point, Mr. Chairman. As
8 the crisis in Panama has deepened, a beleaguered General
9 Noriega has looked desperately for scapegoats to blame for
10 his plight. In the process, he has found it convenient to
11 claim that the United States has caused his problems. It is
12 all a plot hatched in Washington to destabilize his
13 government and to hold on to the Panama Canal forever. I
14 frankly do not think that that Noriega play causes a warm
15 reaction in Panama City. Still, 75 years of mistrust and
16 suspicion do not disappear in the twinkling of an eye. If
17 there were not at least a few customers, Noriega would not be
18 trying to sell that line.

19 The Panama Canal Treaties were negotiated in good faith.
20 They were approved by the required two-thirds of the Senate.
21 They were ratified by our government. And they are, as
22 Senator Kennedy said, the law of the land. In acting against
23 Noriega in cutting off aid, we should make it unmistakably
24 clear that we have no intention of abrogating or diminishing
25 the treaties in any way. There should be no room for doubt

1 about our intentions in this matter.

2 To do otherwise I think would be to court a disaster far
3 greater than the one that now besets the good people of
4 Panama and their friends.

5 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

6 Senator Dodd: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, very much for
7 your statement.

8 Colonel Stone, we welcome you, and I should point out to
9 my colleague that Colonel Stone retired in July this year,
10 and was just deported from Panama, having married a
11 Panamanian woman and sought and received permission to spend
12 his retirement years in Panama, but was just asked to leave
13 the country by General Noriega.

14 I am sure you will want to comment on those situations.
15 But we are sorry to hear that. But we welcome you here today
16 and look forward to your testimony.

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1 STATEMENT OF COLONEL CHARLES B. STONE (RETIRED), FORMER
2 HEAD OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP TO PANAMA

3 Colonel Stone: Thank you, sir.

4 I might say I appear today with a little bit of
5 trepidation because my family is in Panama, my wife, three
6 daughters and a granddaughter, to be exact. I might say that
7 last night they did not sleep in our house, they slept in a
8 neighbor's house because there was some fear on their part
9 for what was happening in Panama yesterday and today. So I
10 am somewhat concerned.

11 On the morning of the 15th of October I arrived in Miami
12 a somewhat shocked individual, to put it bluntly. I arrived
13 with no baggage. I had been detained for six hours prior to
14 being put on an airplane at 3:15 in the morning, 3:45 in the
15 morning. The Customs inspector, as I went through, asked me
16 where my baggage was. I told him I had none. He said, where
17 did you come from? I explained. Then his next question was
18 how much money are you carrying? I was not carrying very
19 much, I might add.

20 I left Panama without any communication with my family,
21 without a chance to pack any bags. I was put on an
22 airplane. And I think I will just tell you how that all came
23 about.

24 I have lived in Panama off and on for 14 years. The most
25 recent tour in Panama started in 1979 when I initially was

1 assigned as the Deputy Commander of the U.S. Army Security
2 Assistance Agency for Latin America. In 1983 I went to the
3 U.S. Embassy and became the Military Group Commander, working
4 directly with the Panama Defense Force. For five years I
5 have worked very closely with the Panama Defense Force to
6 implement U.S. Army, U.S. Government security assistance
7 programs in that country.

8 I have had very close relationships with the Panama
9 Defense Force. I have worked hard to create an atmosphere of
10 cooperation between our countries and to facilitate the
11 activities of USSOUTHCOM in Panama through this cooperation.
12 I have been involved in the force development of the Panama
13 Defense Force and in the training of personnel and officers
14 in order to assist in their professionalization and to assist
15 them in a transition towards democracy where their military
16 would be able to perform a military function and withdraw
17 from some of the activities that have been previously
18 mentioned.

19 This long period of cooperation has come to somewhat of a
20 screeching halt, as you can imagine. It happened in June
21 when the Panama Defense Force, particularly General Noriega,
22 was accused of General Diaz Herrera of various crimes that
23 have already been stated, and Panamanians went into the
24 streets. During that early period in June I spent time
25 observing the activities of the Panama Defense Force, and

1 particularly observing their use of U.S. military equipment
2 that I had been responsible for providing them.

3 This caused a great problem for me in what I had
4 rationalized during five years of why I was performing my
5 mission.

6 As that month went on, I had talks with embassy officials
7 concerning my concerns but had no chance to state my concerns
8 to the Panama Defense Force.

9 On the 10th of July there was to be a very large
10 gathering of people at a Catholic Church called El Carmen in
11 Panama City as part of the Civil Crusade. This activity was
12 repressed by the opinion Panama Defense Force. They were
13 never able to assemble. The people returned to their barrios
14 and reacted by building barricades.

15 I spent the day on the road again observing the
16 activities of the Panama Defense Force and was shocked with
17 the excess use of force, the indiscriminate use of fire, use
18 of tear gas and shotguns, the destruction of people's
19 property, and decided at that time that I had to state my
20 concerns not only to the Ambassador, which I did, but also to
21 the Panama Defense Force.

22 Unfortunately, the next day two of my daughters, who were
23 driving in my car down the road, one of them with a white
24 handkerchief outside the window, were stopped and arrested
25 and detained. During the four hour process during their

1 detention, as I was trying to effect their release, I had the
2 opportunity to talk to a senior member of the Panama Defense
3 Force, and I critiqued him rather severely as to the
4 activities that I had observed by the Force. I told him that
5 what I had observed had destroyed the rationale that I had
6 used during a long period of time to provide the kind of
7 support that I was providing. I told him their actions
8 convinced me that their statements on making a transition to
9 democracy were simply talk, and there was no basis in their
10 actions to support that.

11 I was told by this officer that no, they were in a
12 transition to democracy, but there were bad people, people
13 who were trying to destabilize Panama, and I might say,
14 Senator Helms, your name was mentioned in that discussion.

15 Senator Helms: I am sure.

16 Colonel Stone: And some of the people in the back of the
17 room here, their names were mentioned also.

18 I asked him then what democracy was in Panama, to define
19 it for me, and he was not able to do that. So I said to him,
20 well, if there are elections in 1989 and the Christian
21 Democrat leader, Arios Calderon, if he were the party's
22 nominee for that election and he won, would he become
23 president? And I was told Arios Calderon will never be
24 President of Panama.

25 Then I said your definition of democracy is a democracy

1 where there are elections and your candidate always wins. I
2 got no response to that.

3 But as of that day, my contact with the senior members of
4 the Panama Defense Force ended.

5 When I returned to my car that day there was about \$2,000
6 worth of damage done to it. The headlights were broken, it
7 had been hit with a blunt object on the hood and side of the
8 car. There was damage to the rear lights and things of that
9 nature.

10 My next experience which may have caused me even more
11 problem than this one, happened on the 30th of August, after
12 I retired. I, my wife and one daughter were having lunch at
13 the Panama Golf Club, and on the way home we observed a large
14 march of Crusada people marching along the road that goes to
15 the airport towards San Miguelito, and they were to assemble
16 at the Roosevelt Monument as you enter San Miguelito.

17 We decided to drive by another route around this march to
18 go to the Roosevelt Monument where my wife wanted to walk
19 forward and meet the people who were coming towards the
20 monument. I parked my car about 30 meters from the monument
21 and was waiting there locking the car when two cars pulled up
22 behind my car. I saw some really tough characters get out of
23 those cars that did not seem that they were here to observe a
24 nonviolent manifestation. So I walked towards the cars,
25 since my wife and daughter were there.

1 All of a sudden I heard a voice say Colonel Stone, you
2 are not involved in this. I looked down, and I saw the
3 legislator from San Miguelito, Lucho Gomez. I told him that
4 I am not involved in this, I am just here observing. He
5 said, well, you cannot be here. You cannot be part of this.
6 And I said I am not part of this, I am here observing. And
7 he looked me in the eye and he said, well, I am not involved
8 in this, and he drove off.

9 The people that he had brought then crossed the road,
10 they started a fight, I ran towards my family to try to get
11 them out of there, I looked back, saw pistols drawn and the
12 shooting started.

13 I got my family out of there. By the time I was able to
14 return to my car, about an hour later, the same car, I might
15 add, all the windows were broken in the car, other damage was
16 done to it with rocks that had hit it. That time it was only
17 \$3,800. The car still ran, I might say.

18 I am very popular, Senator, with my insurance company in
19 Panama.

20 But initially, right after that started a series of
21 attacks upon me in the legislative body and also in the
22 government press saying that I was involved in the political
23 movements in Panama, that I had brought the villains to this
24 manifestation that had started the violence, I was
25 responsible for the injuries and the one death that took

1 place at this event, I was, if you say threatened with
2 criminal action against you. I kept my mouth shut, went
3 about my business, and it slowly died away.

4 Unfortunately, when things are going bad, sometimes they
5 get worse. On the 13th of September, two weeks after this
6 particular event, my wife and I driving in my daughter's car,
7 were caught in a shootout in San Miguelito. It was a
8 peaceful manifestation coming down the highway which was in
9 honor of the anniversary of the death of Hugo Spadafora. The
10 manifestation, the marchers were attacked by a group of
11 people, gunfire started. My wife was in that march. I
12 happened to be back sort of trying to keep an eye on her.

13 By the time I got her and we were trying to get out of
14 there, the armed people were in front of us and behind us,
15 and we were forced out of our cars at gunpoint. Our car was
16 stolen and later burned. That was my daughter's car. She
17 has not forgiven me on that one yet.

18 That, I might say, was an event that nobody recognized
19 me, nor was I ever accused of being there by the government,
20 but it did have an impact on my family.

21 On the 9th of October I took my wife to a manifestation,
22 a small one, let her off. I parked my car across the road in
23 a parking lot. Within a short period of time I was arrested
24 by a number of officers. They charged me with not having a
25 license plate on my car. When all the windows in my car were

1 broken, they also stole the license plate.

2 I told them that I had talked to a lawyer in Panama. He
3 had informed me that I need not get a license for my car
4 because I had a plastic license they put on your windshield
5 which showed that my car was registered and was licensed.
6 They said that is not the case. They gave me a ticket. They
7 hooked my car to a tow truck and impounded it, where it sits
8 today, impounded by the Panama Defense Force.

9 That is the one that had the total of \$6,000 worth of
10 damage. So it is not in bad shape right now, it is just
11 unusable.

12 On the 13th of October I was called by Immigration. I
13 was told that I was in Panama on what is called a turista
14 pensionado, that there had been allegations made against me
15 by the G-2 of the Panama Defense Force, that I had been
16 involved in political manifestations contrary to public
17 order, and as of that moment, at that time, on that day, my
18 visa was withdrawn. I therefore was in Panama with no
19 authority, and I must leave immediately that afternoon or the
20 next morning. That was about 3:30 in the afternoon.

21 I informed the Inspector from Immigration that that was
22 impossible, that I had a family here and that I had certain
23 things to do, but that I would leave as soon as I could
24 appropriately do that.

25 On the next morning, the 14th, I was called back to

1 Immigration and I was shown the resolution of Immigration,
2 which essentially said the same thing, asked to sign it,
3 which I did not, and said we remind you that you must leave
4 immediately.

5 I started to make steps to leave. That evening I was
6 called back to Immigration and trapped there and told that
7 they had orders to take me directly to the airfield. I said
8 I would not go, that I wanted to make a phone call to the
9 U.S. Ambassador, and that I wanted to make a phone call to my
10 wife. They said we have orders to take you; you will go. I
11 said no, I will not. I want to drive my car home, I want to
12 pack my bags, and then I will go. And they said, you will
13 go. I said no. And then as the eight people gathered around
14 me, I decided I would go.

15 They took me to the airport, held me there until a 3:45
16 flight, put me on the airplane with a ticket, I might say, to
17 Washington, D.C. I thought that was awfully nice. And lo
18 and behold, I found my -- they allowed me to make one call,
19 and that was at 3:30, they came in with a telephone, plugged
20 it in, and handed it to me, and my wife was on the phone, and
21 calling me a knucklehead and where are you, and I found
22 myself in Miami sort of wondering what my next step would be.

23 That is my story. I guess I represent to them someone
24 who has supported them very, very strongly for five years and
25 then apparently turned against them. I might say I did not

1 turn against them. I did criticize the way they were
2 applying force. I did criticize the way they were using
3 U.S.-provided equipment, and I showed concern that they were
4 not making a transition to democracy.

5 Senator Dodd: Colonel, is that the end of your statement?

6 Colonel Stone: Yes, sir.

7 Senator Dodd: I thank you very, very much, and that is a
8 compelling story.

9 Unfortunately, it is obviously not an isolated story. It
10 is unique in your case because of your relationship with the
11 PDF over the years, and the deportation, obviously, but as
12 you are obviously aware from what you witnessed firsthand,
13 Panamanians do not have the luxury of being asked to leave
14 the country when they are caught in this situation; they are
15 treated in a far less gentle way, obviously.

16 I wonder if I could just address some questions to you,
17 Mr. Ambassador, and to you, Colonel, as well. And Doctor,
18 feel free to jump in if you have some observations quickly.

19 And if you have to leave, we will understand that as well.

20 Dr. Cook-Deegan: I will take off in just a few minutes.

21 Senator Dodd: One, Mr. Ambassador and Colonel, in light
22 of the recent events in Panama, do either of you still
23 believe that it would be possible to hold free elections in
24 Panama if General Noriega remains as Commander-in-Chief of
25 the Panamanian Defense Forces.

1 Is that possible?

2 Ambassador Jordan: I think that with Noriega in charge
3 of the Defense Forces, a free election is totally impossible.

4 Senator Dodd: Do you agree with that, Colonel?

5 Colonel Stone: Yes, sir. I stated my belief to the
6 Ambassador after the experience I had on the 13th of
7 September, that elections were not in the cards for 1989.

8 Ambassador Jordan: Might I just add, Mr. Chairman, if
9 elections were held and Noriega were in, even if they were
10 free, the Panamanian people would not believe they were free.

11 Senator Dodd: We have been told that there are elements
12 within the military who are receptive to democratic reform,
13 but that for the obvious reasons they are unwilling to step
14 forward to be heard.

15 I wonder if that is still the case.

16 Colonel, maybe this would be more correctly addressed to
17 you.

18 Did you see any change prior to your departure in a
19 willingness on the part of those elements that apparently
20 exist to begin to take matters in their own hands?

21 Colonel Stone: I do not think I have seen that. I think
22 the Panama Defense Force is a rather cohesive organization.
23 The Panama Defense Force is characterized by a very strong
24 chain of command. It is characterized by strong orientation
25 and indoctrination of people throughout the chain of

1 command. They periodically hold meetings for different
2 officer groups in order to explain their positions and to
3 gain support to their positions.

4 In this kind of an atmosphere, it is very difficult for
5 one to become someone who might disagree with the party
6 line. And though I personally feel that there are people,
7 awfully good people in the Panama Defense Force -- I mean, we
8 have characterized this organization pretty badly today --
9 there are some very outstanding people in that force, and
10 there is no doubt in my mind that there is concern on their
11 part for the reputation that their Commandant and their force
12 is getting not only nationally but internationally. But it
13 is hard for them to express that kind of a feeling.

14 So I have seen nothing that would indicate to me
15 personally that there is dissent.

16 Senator Dodd: Mr. Ambassador, have you been close enough
17 to the situation to comment on that?

18 Ambassador Jordan: No, because the military forces in
19 Panama have changed significantly since I left.

20 I do know that there are members of the Defense Forces
21 who are at least suspect in General Noriega's eyes, and those
22 individuals are under very close surveillance.

23 Senator Dodd: All right.

24 Colonel, you heard the Ambassador comment how important
25 it was for the United States to restate its commitment, not

1 that it necessarily needs to be restated, but I think for the
2 purposes of being understood in Panama since General Noriega
3 is making such an issue of the fact that he believes this is
4 an effort to undermine the Panama Canal Treaties.

5 Since he has tried to make that case, I and others have
6 suggested that we ought to at least be willing to restate the
7 principle that we intend to live up to our international
8 obligations, in this case specifically the treaties.

9 Do you agree that that is important for the United States
10 to be saying at this juncture?

11 Colonel Stone: That is essential to be said at this
12 juncture because it is part of the party line that this is an
13 attempt by the U.S. government to destabilize them with the
14 goal of not living up to the treaty agreement. So it is
15 exceptionally important to do that.

16 Senator Dodd: Again for both of you, the Panamanian
17 people do not have a history of violence, unlike many of
18 their neighbors in the region; in fact, it is a history of
19 the absence of violence at all. Nor have they been what you
20 would call aggressive politically over the years. And yet we
21 see with the Crusade, the Civic Crusade, many thought it was
22 merely going to be sort of a one time event, it might last a
23 few days, a week, a couple of weeks maybe, but that given the
24 absence of any history of political activism on the part of
25 the Panamanian people, that this would probably not last very

1 long.

2 Obviously that has not been the case. It seems to be
3 growing stronger.

4 How credible is the Crusade in terms of its ability to
5 really put the kind of pressure on General Noriega to create
6 some change?

7 Ambassador Jordan: I think you are quite right, Mr.
8 Chairman. What has happened in these last four months is
9 quite unique in Panamanian history. God knows there have
10 been demonstrations and riots and all the rest of it in the
11 past, but never I think have we seen this kind of sustained,
12 regular, dally repetition of popular sentiment, feeling and
13 emotion, and it is quite incredible to many people. I must
14 say that when it started I had the fear that it would not
15 last and that people would get tired.

16 But the feelings in Panama are so deep at this point, and
17 they have lived under military rule for 19 years, and
18 everybody, especially in dealing with the excesses of the
19 last four of five years, everyone is so fed up that I think
20 no one in Panama is going to be content until General Noriega
21 departs the scene.

22 Senator Dodd: Let me ask you, too, two suggestions
23 made. One in the bill here has to do with the sugar quota,
24 and Ambassador, let me address this to you. I do not know,
25 Colonel, if you were in the room when Senator Kennedy raised

1 the issue of having these joint maneuvers and the issue of
2 whether or not it made good sense to have the joint maneuvers
3 or not to have them, what the effect or impact would be.

4 You could make a case, as he tried to point out, for them
5 or for not having them. But the sugar quota thing, let me
6 address that first, if I may, Mr. Ambassador.

7 What would be the effect on the government of Panama? I
8 am told that the quota that the government, because of the
9 government's involvement in the sugar industry so directly,
10 that to reduce that quota would have an immediate and direct
11 effect on the government as well as, obviously, on some
12 private individuals who are operating, but unlike many other
13 places around the world, this would have an immediate and
14 direct effect on the government.

15 Is that the case? How much of an effect would it have,
16 and do you think it is a wise decision?

17 Ambassador Jordan: Well, I think it surely would have a
18 direct and immediate effect on the government in that the
19 President of the Republic is one of the biggest sugar
20 producers in Panama, and a colleague of his in the government
21 is the second biggest sugar producer. So there is no
22 question there will be an impact on the government.

23 In terms of the government's finances and so on, it would
24 surely have an effect because they have been selling their
25 sugar far above world prices and reaping the benefits, and

1 those benefits in the Panamanian system are shared with the
2 hierarchy.

3 So it would directly and immediately impact on the
4 economy.

5 Senator Dodd: Colonel, you may want to comment as well
6 on the effectiveness of the Crusade. I did not give you a
7 chance to respond to that.

8 Colonel Stone: Well, I agree with what Ambassador Jordan
9 said. I think the Crusade is a rather unique type of
10 movement. It is made up of a tremendous amount of
11 organization. It is a moral force, and it appears to me to
12 be nonstopable. I just hope they stay in the same type of
13 activity that they are in right now, a nonviolent activity,
14 because I think they will win quicker in that kind of
15 strategy.

16 Senator Dodd: Now would you comment on the question of
17 the advisability of joint maneuvers?

18 Colonel Stone: This is a very difficult item. It is
19 difficult because of the presence of SOUTHCOM and a large
20 number of U.S. forces with families in Panama. General
21 Noriega has fired a shot across the bow recently a couple of
22 times warning that he has a lot of cards. When he has
23 accused us of intervention recently, when some Air Force
24 officers visited the U.S. Embassy, he I thought was telling
25 the United States that I can make things very difficult for

1 you, military people who are here in Panama.

2 There is a quality of life problem that has to be thought
3 about for U.S. families, for U.S. personnel. Our people in
4 Panama shop in Panama City, they must leave their military
5 bases to go to the commissary which is on another military
6 base, and things can be made a little bit difficult for them,
7 I think.

8 That is a concern, but I might also say that it is my
9 observation and opinion that the relationship between the
10 Panama Defense Force and the U.S. military in Panama is very
11 important to them. It not only provides credibility to them
12 locally, they use it for credibility, but it provides
13 credibility for them internationally when they can show that
14 they are in a close relationship with the United States and
15 doing things such as exercises.

16 I think this is very dangerous for us at this time. I
17 think, it is my opinion that we should not be participating
18 in these exercises during this very critical period. If we
19 were to participate in these exercises, I would not be
20 surprised to see some members of the Crusada out in front of
21 the Embassy. I think they are seriously concerned about the
22 support of the United States to a continuation of Noriega in
23 Panama.

24 Senator Dodd: Thank you very much, Colonel.

25 Senator Helms.

1 Senator Helms: Mr. Chairman, thank you, sir.

2 Mr. Ambassador, let me get into this business of the
3 question of if and how much money General Noriega has
4 received in the past and may be receiving now from the U.S.
5 government in the form of some payment from the United States
6 government.

7 What do you know about that?

8 Ambassador Jordan: I do not know anything about the
9 amounts or extent of money payments. I know that he has been
10 closely associated with the United States for a long time.

11 Senator Helms: Would you tell me what agency was paying
12 him?

13 Ambassador Jordan: Well, as I say, I cannot testify that
14 he has been paid. He has had a close relationship with the
15 Central Intelligence Agency for many years. As you and I
16 know, the Agency in operating abroad generally has close
17 contacts with the existing intelligence service in many, many
18 countries. Panama, in this case, was General Noriega as far
19 as intelligence was concerned.

20 So it is no strange that there would be that
21 relationship, but what the inner workings were and how much
22 money changed hands, I really do not know. I have no idea.

23 Senator Helms: But you do know there was that
24 relationship.

25 Ambassador Jordan: Yes, I do.

1 Senator Helms: And the fair presumption is that he did
2 not do it for nothing.

3 Ambassador Jordan: That is a fair presumption I think,
4 Senator. On the other hand, intelligence people, as you
5 know, often operate on the basis of I will tell you something
6 if you tell me something.

7 Senator Helms: Well, here is a man who is clearly, who
8 has been and still is clearly on the make and clearly on the
9 take. I cannot get into classified testimony that Senator
10 Dodd and I and others have heard, but this has got to be one
11 of the most corrupt fellows that I have even heard about.

12 Ambassador Jordan: In recent history.

13 Senator Helms: Well, I will go back a little beyond that.

14 There is some talk, not a whole lot, particularly since
15 the Senate has acted so decisively about resuming some sort
16 of military and economic aid to Panama, suppose this were to
17 be done -- and I promise you, Senator Dodd, that I will use
18 whatever parliamentary notions come to mind to prevent it if
19 it comes up in the Senate suppose this should happen, and aid
20 to Panama were resumed? What kind of signal would that send
21 to Noriega?

22 Ambassador Jordan: If aid were resumed?

23 Senator Helms: Yes, sir.

24 Ambassador Jordan: Well, I think the signal would be
25 loud and clear that the United States had capitulated.

1 Senator Helms: Was that a good leading question?

2 Ambassador Jorden: Yes.

3 Senator Helms: Well, let's talk about his relationship
4 with Mr. Castro. I remember when I first started disclosing
5 what I could lawfully and properly disclose that not only did
6 the Panamanian government controlled press in Panama get on
7 my case, but so did a lot of the media up here. But tell me
8 what you know about the political ties and business dealings
9 with Castro.

10 Ambassador Jorden: I think I have to point out, Senator,
11 that, you know, I left Panama at the end of 1978. I have
12 retired from government. I am not reading the cables. And
13 when I was there he was the G-2 of the Guardia Nacional. He
14 had clear contacts with Cuba. As a matter of fact, he
15 performed a service for the United States in connection with
16 Cuba in getting an American out of jail. So --

17 Senator Helms: He has referred to that many times.

18 Ambassador Jorden: So it is only fair to cite that one
19 instance of cooperation as opposed to a long catalogue of
20 other more personal activity.

21 Senator Helms: That is right. There was that one act of
22 gallantry.

23 Ambassador Jorden: He did it because General Torrijos
24 told him to do it.

25 Senator Helms: Exactly.

1 Ambassador Jordan: Loud and clear, you know. It was not
2 any altruism or friendship for the United States that brought
3 it on except in the sense that Torrijos was friendly to me
4 and to the United States and wanted to do something for us
5 and did it. And Noriega did what he was told.

6 Senator Helms: Let me ask you the same question that I
7 asked three Senators. Senator Cranston, by that time, had
8 joined Senator Kennedy and Senator D'Amato.

9 Is there any doubt in your mind about the drug
10 trafficking activities, and now I am asking both of you
11 gentlemen, is there any doubt in your mind about the drug
12 trafficking activities and money laundering of General
13 Noriega?

14 Ambassador Jordan: There is no doubt in my mind, Senator?

15 Senator Helms: Colonel?

16 Colonel Stone: I really do not think I could comment on
17 that, Senator. In my activities with them I worked very
18 close with them at a tactical level for exercises that were
19 to impede drug trafficking along their coast. These were
20 exercises with the U.S. Coast Guard. So I really have no
21 information other than they were very helpful to me.

22 Senator Helms: All right.

23 Well, one question that needs to be moved to the front
24 burner a little bit in terms of our own interests, suppose
25 the PDF under Noriega continues and continues and continues.

1 Then some real threat to the Panama Canal should occur, can
2 the PDF as now constituted under Noriega, can they protect
3 the Canal?

4 I guess, Colonel, you would need to answer.

5 Colonel Stone: Well, I think that is also difficult in
6 that we would have to define what protection is. I am not
7 sure that U.S. forces stationed in Panama can protect the
8 Canal. I think that the Panama Defense Force, which is, the
9 military side of it is a well trained force and they work
10 very hard, and they have the capability of providing the
11 limited kind of protection at the national level that we
12 could provide, putting troops at vital installations, keeping
13 angry mobs away from installations or the Canal. They can do
14 those kinds of things very effectively, I would think.

15 Ambassador Jordan: Senator, if I might just interject.

16 Senator Helms: Please do.

17 Ambassador Jordan: I recall two men who should know that
18 subject quite well. One is General Torrijos and the other
19 was General George Brown, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
20 Staff, and both of them said the Panama Canal could not be
21 protected against a small, aggressive, well organized
22 terrorist force.

23 Senator Helms: Yes. And you know, we are losing sight
24 of that ball more and more here. We are focusing on other
25 things. But it is paramount in my own interest.

1 Last month or maybe earlier this month, recently, the PDF
2 detained and rather brutally beat up ten military personnel.

3 Do you know about that, Colonel?

4 Colonel Stone: Yes, sir.

5 Senator Helms: Did the United States send a protest,
6 official or otherwise, do you know?

7 Colonel Stone: I believe that occurred, sir. I was out
8 of the Embassy at the time, thought, but I was under the
9 impression that occurred.

10 Senator Helms: Do you happen to know anything about that?

11 Ambassador Jordan: I do not know.

12 Senator Helms: Mr. Chairman, I have only one other
13 question. I am sorry Dr. Cook-Deegan had to leave.

14 Incidentally, let me say right now that all three of
15 these gentlemen have been very helpful to me. The testimony
16 has been superb, and I personally appreciate your giving the
17 time to come.

18 Dr. Cook-Deegan was describing two little girls who were
19 shot, and I wanted to ask him a question, were the police
20 provoked by these children? Why did they pick them out to
21 shoot?

22 Do you know anything about the case?

23 Colonel Stone: No, sir, I do not.

24 Ambassador Jordan: No, sir, I do not.

25 Senator Helms: I am very sensitive. I have a couple of

1 granddaughters, and I know you translate into how you would
2 feel about their being treated like that.

3 But the question has been suggested to me, and I think it
4 is a good one, if General Noriega were to step down or be
5 forced out, what would, in your judgments now -- I ask both
6 of you this question -- would be a reasonable timetable for
7 conducting free and open elections in Panama?

8 Ambassador Jorden: Well, that is a question, Senator,
9 that of course the Panamanians would have to answer.

10 Senator Helms: Right.

11 Ambassador Jorden: I have talked to many of them about
12 that, you know, how long it would take. The thing is that
13 there is an Augean stable as regards the electoral process
14 that needs to be cleaned out here. They would have to get a
15 new electoral tribunal because the present one is loaded with
16 Noriega cronies.

17 Their best estimate, talking now about the Panamanian
18 politicians who know most about it, is that it would take
19 about a year.

20 Senator Helms: About a year.

21 Ambassador Jorden: Yes.

22 Senator Helms: Here is a question you can answer.

23 Supposing such an election were ultimately to occur, and
24 I hope it will, would you be willing to assist in serving as
25 an impartial international observer at those elections?

1 Ambassador Jordan: I certainly would.

2 Senator Helms: We will recommend you.

3 Gentlemen, thank you very much.

4 Mr. Chairman, thank you.

5 Senator Dodd: I just have one more question for the
6 Colonel.

7 Just, you were talking about your feelings as someone who
8 had worked so closely in military training, and I do not
9 recall you being before this committee, but I am sure had you
10 been asked a few years ago, you would have been here and been
11 petitioning or strongly recommending that we provide
12 additional military assistance, and yet I had this sense
13 while you were talking about your own personal experience,
14 your sense of chagrin seeing people and equipment that you
15 had helped provide and helped train being used in an abusive
16 way.

17 It is a constant, it is a growing problem. Just this
18 year, for instance, I supported police training funds for El
19 Salvador. For year that had not been done, and because I
20 felt you have to try. The absence of it almost has a
21 predictable response. So you keep at it. But yet it is a
22 constant cry we get all the time that this kind of training,
23 this kind of assistance, and then you turn around and you see
24 the very forces that you were working with use our own
25 equipment and engage in tactics for which we are in no small

1 measure responsible.

2 How do you account for this, or can you? What are your
3 own suggestions in this regard?

4 Colonel Stone: Well, as I looked at my Panama
5 experience, I was counting on going the whole long run to the
6 year 2000 to be able to have a long time to try to change
7 behavioral habits, and I think that is one of the problems we
8 have. We train and equip and we make them better at being a
9 soldier or a sailor or an airman and working with our
10 equipment, but we do not do well in changing their behavior
11 and changing their attitudes, and this is a very difficult
12 thing. We found this in our experience with Nicaragua and
13 with Somoza, and we trained so many of his troops for so many
14 years. But the institutions that they return to are very,
15 very strong and regimented, and have their values, and if
16 they do not fall into those values, it is very difficult for
17 them in terms of advancement in their organization.

18 So this is an extremely difficult question, Senator, and
19 I have thought about it an awful lot over the years, and I
20 must admit that I have not resolved this. I sometimes think
21 that the experience of the military in the Philippines might
22 be worth documenting to see how these groups of reformers
23 tended to form. I know we did a lot of West Pointers out of
24 the Philippines, sent a lot of people to West Point, and that
25 may be --

1 Senator Dodd: Such as General Ramos.

2 Colonel Stone: Yes, and that may be a way to effect
3 these kinds of behavioral changes over a long period. But in
4 the short term it is highly impossible.

5 Senator Dodd: Well, I appreciate your response, and
6 there is not really a simple answer to it, but I was struck
7 by your own comment earlier as you said you watched those
8 things occurring.

9 Well, first I want to thank my colleague Senator Helms
10 for staying here. I know that he is deeply interested in
11 this subject, obviously. It is always a pleasure to work
12 with him. We spend a lot of time disagreeing, but we also
13 spend a lot of time agreeing on things, more times than
14 people think, I suspect.

15 We are grateful to both of you and to Dr. Cook-Deegan as
16 well, and maybe we will submit some questions to Dr.
17 Cook-Deegan.

18 Senator Helms: May I ask just one final question of the
19 Colonel?

20 Senator Dodd: Certainly.

21 Senator Helms: This is personal.

22 Have you made any judgment about whether you are going to
23 bring your family to the United States?

24 Colonel Stone: I have some very important decisions to
25 make in the near future, Senator, and I am not sure what

1 those decisions are going to be.

2 Senator Helms: Okay.

3 All I was going to say is if you decide to bring them
4 here, if you need any help, let us know.

5 Colonel Stone: Yes, sir. Thank you very much, sir.

6 Senator Helms: You are welcome.

7 And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

8 Senator Dodd: Thank you.

9 Senator Helms: I would like for the Director of the
10 National Civic Crusade not to scoot out the door. I would
11 like to say hello again and to shake hands, and if you would
12 just sort of come forward as we adjourn here, I would
13 appreciate it.

14 Senator Dodd: Thank you both very much again.

15 This subcommittee stands adjourned.

16 (Whereupon, at 4:18 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.)

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