

15 April 1983

NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM: Director, Office of External Affairs

For your information, here are positive public statements by  
Goldwater/Moynihan and Huddleston re the Chairman and Vice  
Chairman's offer of the SSCI to review and report on Soviet  
compliance with SALT II.

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# news release

## Senate Select Committee

### on Intelligence

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#### PROPOSE PUBLIC REPORT ON SALT II SOVIET COMPLIANCE

In a letter to the President today, Chairman Barry Goldwater and Vice Chairman Daniel Patrick Moynihan, of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence offered the services of the Intelligence Committee to work with the White House in reviewing the relevant data and preparing a bipartisan public report on Soviet compliance with the unratified SALT II Treaty.

In their letter to the President, the Senators expressed their concern about the implications of recent Soviet test activity with regard to Soviet observance of the SALT II accord. Senators Goldwater and Moynihan wrote that a "firm" approach with the Soviets on compliance issues was essential to "preserve U.S. national security and to preserve the viability of the arms control process."

Noting that some of the media were reporting that the President might make a highly public charge of Soviet noncompliance with the SALT II Treaty, the Senators told the President, "We are confident that you recognize the pitfalls in such a course." Senators Goldwater and Moynihan observed that such charges would have to be supported by detailed intelligence information whose release might trigger further disclosures of information that could compromise sensitive sources and methods.

Senators Goldwater and Moynihan wrote the President:

"We would like to offer our services to help you keep the United States on the path of firm, but effective diplomacy. The Senate Select Committee could work with you to review available intelligence data and the results of confidential discussions with the Soviets to determine the facts of this test activity. Having made this determination, we could then prepare a public report in such a manner that sensitive sources and methods are protected, and the bipartisan nature of this important issue would be preserved."

In its 1979 report to the Senate on The Capabilities of the United States to Monitor the SALT II Treaty, the Select Committee on Intelligence conducted a comprehensive review of Soviet compliance with the SALT I accords. In accordance with the law, the Select Committee on Intelligence has been kept "fully and currently informed" of all intelligence concerning Soviet compliance with the existing arms control agreements. The Committee has also kept the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services apprised of any significant information in this regard which affects their mandated duties.

Senator Walter (Dee) Huddleston (D-KY) has issued the following statement regarding the letter from Senators Goldwater and Moynihan to President Reagan offering the services of the Intelligence Committee to review relevant data and prepare a bipartisan public report on Soviet compliance with the unratified SALT II Treaty. Huddleston, a member of the committee, endorses the effort by the chairman and the vice chairman.

The offer today by the chairman and vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee to work with the President to review intelligence on recent Soviet ICBM activity is an important bipartisan step towards getting to the bottom of allegations that the Soviets have violated the unratified SALT II Treaty. I wholeheartedly support this effort to avoid politicizing the Intelligence Community on the vital issue of arms control verification.

Control of strategic weapons is the greatest challenge we face as a nation in this generation. Any agreements reached by the United States and the Soviet Union must, however, be verifiable. Therefore, as a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I have worked for many years to ensure that our intelligence capabilities will continue to be able to monitor Soviet behavior effectively.

I agree completely with the Chairman and Vice Chairman, Senators Goldwater and Moynihan, that we must be firm with the Soviets on compliance with arms control agreements and that these questions must be pursued vigorously in confidential channels. I share the concern that selective release of intelligence to promote a partisan viewpoint on this issue could compromise highly sensitive intelligence sources and methods.

In 1979 the Senate Intelligence Committee issued a unanimous report on "Capabilities of the United States to Monitor the SALT II Treaty." That report stated that "the Soviet Union will push to the greatest extent possible any advantages which the provisions or ambiguities of the SALT II Treaty might permit." Indeed, that is why we maintain a sophisticated verification system.

The report concluded that "the United States must expect that unanticipated Soviet activities may occur during the course of the SALT II Treaty and be willing to raise and aggressively pursue questions of Soviet compliance with the Treaty in the Standing Consultative Commission." The report noted that "the Standing Consultative Commission is a valuable forum for resolving compliance issues, and possible ambiguities in intelligence information and Treaty interpretation, when the United States aggressively pursues them."

Recent experience demonstrates that we were correct in 1979 and that it is necessary for the United States both to monitor vigorously and extensively and to aggressively pursue questions of Soviet compliance. The latest events indicate that the U.S. Intelligence Community has the capability to monitor Soviet conduct in order to provide the intelligence needed to challenge Soviet behavior. Now we must make the judgment on how best to deal with the information our capability has provided. The letter lays out the proper course of action.