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
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EO 12356 : DECL: 12/12/89  
TAGS : OREP, PREL, NU  
SUBJ : SENATOR MOYNIHAN'S MEETING WITH TOMAS BORGE

REF : MANAGUA 5587

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: INTERIOR MINISTER BORGE TOLD SENATOR MOYNIHAN THAT THE GRN DESIRED AN AGREEMENT WITH THE U.S. AND HAD DONE EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. HE ADDED THAT THE GRN'S RECENT CONCILIATORY MEASURES WERE NOT A SIGN OF WEAKNESS IN THE FACE OF U.S. PRESSURE BUT DEMONSTRATIONS OF SANDINISTA STRENGTH AND DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE WITH THE REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM. MOYNIHAN STRESSED THE U.S. STRATEGIC CONCERNS ABOUT AVOIDING NUCLEAR WAR AND STATED THAT THE U.S. COULD NEVER ALLOW A RECURRENCE OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS. BORGE ASSURED MOYNIHAN THAT THE GRN WOULD NOT PERMIT A SOVIET OR ANY OTHER MILITARY BASE ON ITS TERRITORY. RESPONDING TO MOYNIHAN'S CALL FOR A HALT TO THE MILITARIZATION OF THE REGION, BORGE STATED THAT THE GRN WAS READY TO ENTER INTO AGREEMENTS DEALING WITH THE SIZE OF ARMIES AND THE SUPPLY OF ARMS TO INSURGENTS. BORGE ALSO ESCORTED THE SENATOR TO A LOCAL MARKET PLACE FOR A TYPICAL LUNCH. END SUMMARY.

3. ON DECEMBER 9, SENATOR DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN AND SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE STAFF MEMBER DR. GARY SCHMITT, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR QUANTON, CALLED ON INTERIOR MINISTER TOMAS BORGE. ALSO PRESENT ON THE NICARAGUAN SIDE WAS AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. ANTONIO JARQUIN, MINISTRY OF THE EXTERIOR DIRECTOR OF NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS SAUL ARANA AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE FSLN'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT JOSE PASOS.

4. BORGE WELCOMED THE SENATOR AND SAID THAT HE HOPED THEIR CONVERSATION WOULD NOT BE RESTRICTED TO PROTOCOLARY NICETIES BUT WOULD DEAL WITH SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. HE INSISTED THAT THERE WAS A GREAT NEED FOR SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE GRN AND THE USG. BORGE NOTED THAT NICARAGUANS APPRECIATED THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, IN SPITE OF THE INJURIES WHICH THE USG HAD INFLICTED ON NICARAGUA OVER THE YEARS. MOYNIHAN RESPONDED THAT HE

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SHARED BORGE'S INTEREST IN HAVING A SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION.

5. FOLLOWING THE DEPARTURE OF THE PRESS CORPS, WHO HAD FILMED THESE PRELIMINARY SESSIONS, MOYNIHAN COMMENTED ON HIS EARLIER MEETING WITH JUNTA MEMBER SERGIO RAMIREZ, IN WHICH RAMIREZ HAD EXPLAINED THE BASIC GOALS OF THE REVOLUTION AND THE GRN'S DESIRE FOR DETENTE (SEPTEL). BORGE PICKED UP ON THE SECOND POINT AND ASSERTED THAT THE GRN HAD PUT ALL THE ELEMENTS IN PLACE FOR IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE US: HE URGED MOYNIHAN TO TAKE THAT MESSAGE BACK TO THE CONGRESS. BORGE EXPLAINED THAT SOME PEOPLE WANTED PROOF THAT THE GRN WAS SERIOUS ABOUT AN UNDERSTANDING AND HAD CHARGED THAT THE FSLN HAD FAILED TO FULFILL ITS PROMISES. BORGE ARGUED THAT THE FSLN HAD NEVER GONE BACK ON ITS WORD (SIC). HE REFERRED TO THE PUNTA ARENAS MEETING IN 1979, WHEN THE ALLEGED PROMISES WERE MADE, AND ASSURED MOYNIHAN THAT THE NATURE OF THE REVOLUTION WAS DISCUSSED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS. THUS, THE FSLN COULD NOT HAVE RENEGED ON PROMISES WHICH HAD NEVER BEEN MADE.

6. BORGE INSISTED THAT THE REVOLUTION HAD FULFILLED ITS PROMISES AND WAS CONTINUING TO DO SO DESPITE AGGRESSION COMMITTED BY THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION. HE STRESSED THAT THE GRN'S RECENT CONCILIATORY GESTURES WERE NOT THE RESULT OF U.S. PRESSURE OR U.S. TROOPS IN HONDURAS. THEY WERE MERELY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FSLN'S LONG STANDING REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM. HE CITED AS EXAMPLES THE MOVEMENT TOWARD ELECTIONS IN 1985 AND THE AMNESTY FOR MISKITO INDIANS. BORGE EXPLAINED THAT IN 1980, THE GRN HAD ANNOUNCED ELECTIONS FOR 1985. THE DELAY IN HOLDING ELECTIONS WAS MANDATED BY THE DESIRE TO CREATE THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR ELECTIONS. THE RECENT ANNOUNCEMENTS WERE A NATURAL PART OF THIS PROCESS. SIMILARLY, THE AMNESTY WAS SIMPLY ANOTHER IN THE REVOLUTION'S LONG RECORD OF ACTS OF GENEROSITY. AFTER THE REVOLUTION, THE GRN HAD RELEASED HUNDREDS OF FORMER NATIONAL GUARDSMEN, ONLY TO HAVE MANY OF THEM JOIN THE COUNTERREVOLUTION. AS A RESULT, THERE HAD BEEN A PUBLIC OUTCRY TO SUSPEND RELEASES. NEVERTHELESS, THE GRN HAD DECIDED TO GRANT AMNESTY TO THE MISKITOS. BORGE EXPLAINED THAT THE GRN COULD AFFORD TO BE SO GENEROUS BECAUSE IT WAS STRONG. IT HAD NEUTRALIZED THE CONTRA THREAT, AND IT REALIZED THAT THE CIA DID NOT CONSTITUTE A REAL DANGER TO ITS POWER.

7. BORGE MOVED ON TO THE AREA OF FOREIGN RELATIONS AND ASSERTED THAT, HERE TOO, THE GRN HAD KEPT ITS WORD. THE SANDINISTAS HAD PLEDGED TO BE NON-ALIGNED, AND BORGE RHETORICALLY ASKED WHO SERIOUSLY COULD SAY THAT NICARAGUA WAS A SATELLITE OF THE SOVIET UNION.

8. MOYNIHAN ADVISED BORGE THAT HE RELATED THE AMNESTY AND ELECTORAL PROCESS AS INTERNAL NICARAGUAN MATTERS. HE NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT THE U.S. WAS A COUNTRY GIVEN TO ELECTIONS, HAVING HAD THEM REGULARLY FOR OVER TWO CENTRIES. BORGE INTERJECTED THAT IN THE U.S., THE ELECTORAL PROCESS DID NOT BEGIN UNTIL 15 YEARS AFTER THE REVOLUTION. MOYNIHAN CORRECTED THE COMANDANTE BY POINTING OUT THAT ALTHOUGH THE FEDERAL SYSTEM WAS NOT INITIATED IMMEDIATELY, EACH STATE HAD AN ELECTED LEGISLATURE. HE THEN STATED THAT BOTH THE U.S. AND NICARAGUA HAD LONG HISTORIES ABOUT WHICH THE OTHER WAS UNAWARE. THE HISTORY OF U.S. INTERVENTION IN NICARAGUA STUCK IN THE MINDS OF NICARAGUANS, BUT FEW AMERICANS EVEN KNEW OF IT. THE U.S. WAS AWARE THAT IT HAD ERRED IN ITS PAST RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA AND HAD TRIED TO MAKE CORRECTION. FOR EXAMPLE, SUCCESSIVE ADMINISTRATIONS FROM EISENHOWER TO CARTER HAD RECOGNIZED THAT THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY VIOLATED PANAMA'S SOVEREIGNTY AND LABORED TO HAVE IT REVISED. NOW, EVEN THOSE WHO HAD OPPOSED THE NEW ACCORD ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEY HAD BEEN WRONG.

9. MOYNIHAN THEN REMARKED THAT, LIKE IT OR NOT, ALL HAD TO

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ACCEPT THE FACT THAT THE U.S. WAS A WORLD POWER. SINCE WORLD WAR II, IT HAD THE RESPONSIBILITY OF DEFENDING WESTERN EUROPE AND JAPAN. ALSO, SINCE THE ONSET OF THE NUCLEAR AGE, THE PRIMARY GOAL OF THE U.S. HAS BEEN TO AVERT A NUCLEAR WAR. SUCH A DISASTER ALMOST HAD OCCURRED WHEN THE SOVIETS PUT MISSILES INTO CUBA. THE CRISIS WAS RESOLVED WHEN THE SOVIETS WITHDREW THE MISSILES, WITH THE UNWRITTEN UNDERSTANDING THAT CASTRO COULD REMAIN IN POWER. MOYNIHAN DROVE HOME THE POINT THAT THE USG COULD NOT ALLOW ANOTHER SUCH CRISIS TO ARISE, AND HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE U.S.'S ALLIES COMPREHENDED THIS.

10. BORGE ASSURED THE SENATOR THAT THE GRN HAD NEVER CONTEMPLATED ALLOWING SOVIET BASES IN NICARAGUA. THE SOVIETS HAD NOT REQUESTED ANY, AND THE GRN CERTAINLY HAD NEVER PROPOSED IT. BORGE STATED THAT THIS IDEA HAD ORIGINATED IN THE U.S. AND THE WAY IT KEPT REAPPEARING DESPITE NICARAGUAN DENIALS LED HIM TO BELIEVE IT WAS A DELIBERATE ACT OF DISINFORMATION BEING SPREAD TO ALARM THE AMERICAN PUBLIC. THE GRN, AS A SIGNATORY TO THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO, WAS PROHIBITED FROM ALLOWING NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO BE BASED ON ITS TERRITORY. IT COULD ALLOW A NON-NUCLEAR SOVIET BASE, BUT WOULD NOT DO SO SINCE IT HAD UNILATERALLY RENOUNCED ANY FOREIGN MILITARY BASES ON ITS TERRITORY. MOYNIHAN POINTED OUT THAT ANY SOVIET BASE, WHETHER NUCLEAR OR NOT, WOULD BE OF GRAVE CONCERN TO THE U.S.

11. MOYNIHAN, ADDRESSING THE REGIONAL SITUATION, STATED THAT EACH NATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA SHOULD LEAVE ITS NEIGHBORS ALONE. HE PERCEIVED A TROUBLING PROCESS OF MILITARIZATION THROUGHOUT THE AREA. U.S. TROOPS IN HONDURAS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN, BUT THEY COULD EASILY RETURN AND EVENTUALLY BECOME A PERMANENT FIXTURE. THEREFORE, AN AGREEMENT WAS SORELY NEEDED TO ARREST THIS DANGEROUS TREND. NICARAGUA HAD HAD ITS REVOLUTION, AND IT WAS PREPARED TO DEFEND IT, MOYNIHAN SAID, BUT IT NEEDED TO DEVELOP ECONOMICALLY, AND COULD NOT DO SO BY SENDING ARMS TO EL SALVADOR OR BY BUILDING A HUGE ARMY. BORGE ASSURED THE SENATOR THAT THE GRN WOULD ACT RESPONSIBLY. THE GRN HAD EXPRESSED ITS CONCERNS ABOUT FOREIGN MILITARY BASES IN THE REGION AND HAD PROPOSED THAT THEY BE BANNED. BORGE CHALLENGED THE U.S. TO RESPOND.

12. MOYNIHAN AGREED THAT THE U.S. SHOULD RESPOND TO THE GRN'S PROPOSALS. HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY BORGE HAD NOT BEEN GRANTED A VISA TO VISIT THE U.S. THE SENATOR THEN MENTIONED TWO AREAS WHICH HE FELT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS: THE CUBAN PRESENCE IN NICARAGUA AND THE SIZE OF THE GRN'S ARMY. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE CUBANS WERE NOT ORGANIZED INTO COMBAT UNITS, BUT HE AVERRED THAT THERE WERE FAR MORE OF THEM THAN NICARAGUA NEEDED. HE ADDED THAT THE SANDINISTAS' RAPIDLY GROWING ARMY GREATLY DISTURBED NICARAGUA'S NEIGHBORS WHO HAD TURNED TO THE U.S. FOR ASSISTANCE. MOYNIHAN STRESSED THAT THE GRN SHOULD DEVELOP NICARAGUA, NOT MILITARIZE IT. HE ADDED THAT THE U.S. FOR ITS PART SHOULD NOT THREATEN THE GRN'S SECURITY AND COMPEL IT TO DIVERT RESOURCES FROM DEVELOPMENT TO DEFENSE.

13. BORGE RESPONDED THAT SOME THINGS WERE DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND. NICARAGUA'S REGULAR ARMY WAS NO LARGER THAN ITS COUNTERPARTS IN THE REGION. MOST OF ITS SOLDIERS WERE IN THE MILITIAS, WHICH HAD GROWN AS A CONSEQUENCE OF EXTERNAL AGGRESSION. BORGE CLAIMED THERE HAD BEEN PLANS TO FOMENT A COUNTER-REVOLUTION USING THE EX-NATIONAL GUARDSMEN IN HONDURAS EVER SINCE THE GRN SEIZED POWER IN 1979. BORGE STATED THAT IF THE GRN HAD NOT PREPARED TO DEFEND ITSELF, "WE WOULD NOT BE HERE TODAY!" HE SAID THAT BY ARMING THE PEOPLE, THE GRN WAS STRENGTHENING ITSELF AND ASSERTED THAT THIS DEMONSTRATED THE TYPE OF DEMOCRACY THAT EXISTED IN NICARAGUA. HE

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CONTRASTED THIS SITUATION WITH THAT IN HONDURAS, WHERE IF THE GOH ARMED 200,000 PEOPLE, ITS GOVERNMENT WOULD BE IN DANGER. MOYNIHAN POINTEDLY REMINDED BORGE THAT HONDURAS HAD AN ELECTED GOVERNMENT. THE SENATOR ADDED THAT HE BELIEVED THE HONDURAN ARMY WAS LARGE ENOUGH AS IT WAS.

14. BORGE REMARKED THAT AN AGREEMENT WAS NEEDED WHICH WOULD LIMITE THE SIZE OF ARMIES. HE STATED THAT HONDURAN FEARS OF AN INVASION BY NICARAGUA WERE TOTALLY UNFOUNDED. IF GRN FORCES CROSSED INTO HONDURAS, THE U.S. WOULD INTERVENE; THE GRN WOULD NOT DO SOMETHING SO STUPID AS TO PROVOKE AN INTERVENTION. MOYNIHAN RESPONDED THAT IN THIS AGE, ARMIES SELDOM CROSS BORDERS, BUT ARMS OFTEN DO. HE REFERRED TO THE RECENT CASE IN WHICH HONDURANS WERE RECRUITED FOR TWO YEARS TRAINING IN CUBA AND THEN INFILTRATED BACK INTO HONDURAS VIA NICARAGUA. BORGE ACKNOWLEDGED HAVING HEARD OF THE OLANCHO AFFAIR AND HE SAID THE SENATOR HAD TOUCHED ON THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM. THE ISSUE WAS NOT TANKS BECAUSE EVEN IF NICARAGUA HAD 100 TANKS, IT COULD NEVER USE THEM AGAINST HONDURAS. THE PROBLEM WAS SHIPPING ARMS TO INSURGENT GROUPS IN OTHER COUNTRIES. HE STATED THA THAT THE CONTRAS WERE ARMED AND TRAINED IN HONDURAS AND THEN SENT INTO NICARAGUA. NICARAGUA WAS READY TO HAVE A TREATY TO END THIS TYPE OF ACTIVITY, AND HAD EVEN TAKEN UNILATERAL STEPS TO END ARMS SHIPMENTS TO EL SALVADOR AND HONDURAS IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH A BASIS FOR THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. MOYNIHAN RESPONDED THAT IN THAT CASE, NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE. BORGE REITERATED THAT THE GRN WANTED A DIALOGUE AND WAS PREPARED TO DEAL WITH THE ISSUE OF ARMS TRAFFICKING.

15. FOLLOWING THE MEETING, BORGE ESCORTED MOYNIHAN TO THE MARKETPLACE IN CUIDAD SANDINO, A WORKING CLASS SUBURB SOME 10 MILES FROM MANAGUA. BORGE, FLANKED BY HIS ENTOURAGE OF BODYGUARDS AND PRESS AGENTS, STROLLED THROUGH THE MARKET AND DREW A SMALL CROWD OF CURIOUS SHOPPERS AND VENDORS. BORGE TREATED MOYNIHAN TO A "TYPICAL" LUNCH AT THE LOCAL DINER, WHICH, TRUE TO HIS DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND, THE SENATOR ACCEPTED WITH OUTWARD GRACE. A SMALL FSLN CLAQUE ATTEMPTED TO PROMPT THE CROWD INTO RECITING SANDINISTA CHANTS, BUT ONLY A HANDFUL RESPONDED. A FEW MARKET WOMEN APPROACHED THE COMANDANTE AND PROTESTED THE SCARCITIES OF STAPLES AND THE INADEQUACIES OF THE WHOLESALE SUPPLY SYSTEM. BORGE LATER COMMENTED THAT THIS TYPE OF CRITICISM DEMONSTRATED THAT NICARAGUA WAS INDEED A DEMOCRACY.

16. COMMENT: THE CONVERSATION WAS FRANK AND CORDIAL WITH BORGE EXHIBITING HIS IMPRESSIVE CHARM. HE REPEATEDLY STRESSED THAT THE GRN WANTED NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE U.S., BUT NOT BECAUSE OF U.S. PRESSURE. HE OBVIOUSLY WISHED TO CONVINCED THE SENATOR THAT THE GRN WAS DEALING FROM STRENGTH, NOT WEAKNESS. BORGE FULLY GRASPED THE SENATOR'S STATEMENTS ABOUT OUR SECURITY CONCERNS AND DID NOT HESITATE TO RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET BASES IN NICARAGUA. SCHMITT LATER COMMENTED TO POLOFF THAT HE HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT SURPRISED BY THE LACK OF ENTHUSIASM FOR BORGE AMONG THE PEOPLE AT THE MARKETPLACE.

QUAINTON

END OF MESSAGE

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