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Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before
Committee on Foreign Relations

HEARING REGARDING SUMMIT CONFERENCE
OF MAY, 1960
and Incidents Relating Thereto

Afternoon Session

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AFTERNOON SESSION

2:30 p.m.

(Present: Senators Fulbright, Carlson and Lausche)

The Chairman. The Committee will come to order.

Mr. Secretary, there are one or two statements in your own statement I would like to have developed a bit, for clarification.

On page 12, at the bottom of the page of the mimeographed statement you say as follows:

"Proponents within the Communist bloc of an aggressive course must not be encouraged by signs of weakness on our part. Proponents of a peaceful course should be encouraged by our readiness to get on with outstanding international business in a sober and rational manner."

Into which of these groups do you include Mr. Khrushchev?

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE CHRISTIAN A. HERTER

SECRETARY OF STATE (RESUMED)

Secretary Herter. That I think would be very difficult to answer categorically.

(At this point, Senators Gore and Hickenlooper entered the hearing room.)

There have been a good many estimates made as to whether or not he really means some of the things that he has said with regard to peaceful coexistence, with regard to disarmament and other matters. There is another group that feels that this is a front for the same power line

that Stalin used to take.

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I don't think it is possible yet to answer that categorically.

I think that events are likely to show which of those groups he belongs to.

The Chairman. Who did you have in mind when you wrote that? Maybe you can't categorically for all time designate him, but what has been your view and the view of the Department as to which group he belongs in. I think that is rather important as to how we treat him. Is it in our interest to discourage him? If he was a member of the aggressive course, I suppose it would be. If he is a member of those who are proponents of the peaceful course, then it would be to our advantage to encourage or be cooperative within limits. I wondered why you put that in there if you didn't have some idea of who does belong to these groups or how it is constituted.

(At this point, Senator Mansfield entered the hearing room.)

Secretary Herter. What I was trying to describe here was in effect a middle course. Insofar as Mr. Khrushchev is concerned, I think those who have dealt with him directly are convinced that he is genuinely in favor of a disarmament program, that he genuinely wants, for the sake of developing the economy of Russia, a reduction both in expense from a monetary point of view and from a human point of view, of

the great burden of armaments.

(At this point, Senator Lausche entered the hearing room.)

Secretary Herter. Certainly there I would put him in the second category. His more recent behavior, however, has shaken my belief that this is entirely genuine, and, as I say, I think that only the events of the next few months and possibly even of the next few years can give a final answer to what you have asked.

The Chairman. Can you identify any other members or any people you had in mind in these groups?

Secretary Herter. No. I would rather have those who are real Russian experts do that kind of identification, those who are familiar with the individuals, more familiar than I am.

There is no question but what there are still --

The Chairman. Would you care to have Mr. Bohlen comment on this question?

Secretary Herter. I would be very glad to have him, if you wish to.

The Chairman. It would be very good to have him comment. He is recognized, is he not, as one of our best Russian experts?

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Would you care to comment on this, Mr. Bohlen?

Mr. Bohlen. Mr. Chairman, my experience has been it is not always possible to identify trend in the Soviet Union with individuals. As the Secretary said earlier we literally know nothing of what goes on in the hierarchy. My impression of the statement the Secretary made is that it is possible to detect trends. You cannot identify people with them. My experience with the Soviet officials is that they follow whatever the agreed line is, whether it is hard or whether it is soft, with great consistency, and they just do not reveal sufficiently to any foreigner what their inner thoughts are to identify one individual with one trend or another. But I think the indications are that both trends exist.

The Chairman. Well, don't you think we know more about Mr. Khrushchev than any other one. More of us have seen him. He has been about more than any other. Don't you have any view as to which of these groups Mr. Khrushchev would be identified with?

Mr. Bohlen. Well, my acquaintanceship with Mr. Khrushchev was when I was in there as Ambassador when he was not quite as prominent as he is now. I would merely say that he, along with them are excellent actors,

and are able to maintain whatever the common line is in their dealings with foreigners. I think

also there is a question of time. I think as the events of Paris showed, that there have been certain shifts of emphasis inside the Soviet Union which were manifested in part by what they did in Paris.

(At this point, Senators Williams and Wiley entered the hearing room.

Therefore, it is conceivable that Mr. Khrushchev would have been entirely serious in the line he was pursuing prior to Paris, and be equally serious in pursuing one diametrically opposite to it.

The Chairman. If I may interpolate, do you mean that prior to the U-2 incident that Mr. Khrushchev may have been identified with the second group, that is proponents of a peaceful course.

Mr. Bohlen. I would not segregate out the U-2 incident alone, Mr. Chairman. I think as put in the Secretary's statement there seemed to us to be three elements involved in this matter and I think it is difficult to assess the value of each. But certainly I would say his doubt as to the success from his point of view of the summit conference, the fact that I feel a logical deduction that some of the views voiced by the Chinese Communists had supporters within the Soviet hierarchy and the U-2 incident brought about this change.

I have no difficulty --

The Chairman. I didn't wish to make you review all that was said there. I was merely trying to find the inner meaning of this particular statement. I thought that I could elicit some clarification since many of us don't know about these proponents of these courses or any groups of people.

Mr. Bohlen. The answer, Mr. Chairman, is that I think we don't know. That you cannot tell whether X, Y, or Z in the Soviet hierarchy, what particular line he advocates because he never takes any difference, even a shade of difference publicly, with what is the agreed line. It is quite impossible, I believe for anybody to tell who, within the leading group stands for one trend or the other. You can only detect from external evidence that there appear to be certain divergent trends and the individuals may not remain the same.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. One other statement, Mr. Secretary, on page 5, point 2: "The decision not to suspend this program of flights, as the summit meeting approached, was a sound decision."

Can you tell us who made that decision and when and of the circumstances?

Secretary Herter. That is a decision that I think has been a decision that has carried over the whole four year period. Here, sir, we get into certain technical aspects of when these flights would properly be conducted and could not be conducted, but I think for technical reasons

had better be kept in executive session.

The finding of a good time of a flight of this kind in relation to current events is almost impossible if you know in advance that it is going to fail.

The real issue was how urgent was the information and is there any one time that is more favorable than another? From a technical point of view it was our time was more favorable at that time than another. From a diplomatic point of view, it seemed to me that with the President scheduled to go to Russia later, with the fact he had the same difficulty, when you had Khrushchev here you had the same difficulties, in effect you would run into one time after another where diplomatically it would have been a bad time.

The Chairman. I don't think I make myself clear. I understood from your previous statement and others that the program was agreed upon, and it was running along without being suspended. But this statement seems to leave the implication that a specific decision was taken not to suspend them in view of the conference approaching.

Was such a decision taken?

Secretary Herter. That I can't tell you. I was not a party to that.

The Chairman, Well, this says "The decision not to suspend this program of flights, as the Summit meeting

approached, was a sound decision."

Was there any decision taken not to suspend it?

Secretary Herter. I know that when the matter came before me, which was some time previous from the point of view of the continuation of the program, when conditions were appropriate, I did not interpose any objection to it because of any diplomatic event that was coming up.

The Chairman. Is it fair to say then no specific decision not to suspend them was taken? It was allowed to go along without any decision being taken to suspend them.

Secretary Herter. I think that is correct.

The Chairman. Therefore, the other way around is that no positive decision was taken not to suspend them, is that correct?

Secretary Herter. That is right.

The Chairman. That statement, I think, needs clarification. I think to me, it means that at some point prior to May 1, a specific decision was taken not to suspend them in view of the summit. Isn't that a legitimate interpretation of that sentence?

Secretary Herter. I think that is correct. May I read what the President said on that subject: He said "As to the timing, the question was really whether to halt the program and thus forego the gathering of important information that was essential and that was likely to be

unavailable at a later date. The program went forward."

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The Chairman. Then that decision was made by the President.

Secretary Herter. Oh, he was certainly consulted with regard to the continuation of the program.

The Chairman. Do you know when that was made?

Secretary Herter. No.

The Chairman. Was it prior to May 1st?

Secretary Herter. I couldn't tell you.

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, do you know whether there was a moritorium on these flights during the meeting at Camp David?

Secretary Herter. No. As far as I know, that question never arose.

The Chairman. So that there was not, as far as you know?

Secretary Herter. As far as I know, there was not.

The Chairman. I believe that with regard to this matter about Mr. Lincoln White did not know that Powers might be alive, that would be with regard to the last question before we recessed. Did Mr. Hagerty know whether or not he was at that point?

Secretary Herter. That I will have to ask Mr. Dillon to answer. I have no direct information.

Mr. Dillon. I have no way of knowing whether Mr. Hagerty knew or not. In the ordinary course of business, a telegram

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such as the one which informed us of this rumor -- its only a rumor that we had received through other diplomats in Moscow -- such a telegram would have been transmitted for information to the White House staff.

Whether Mr. Hagerty knew about it or not, I don't know.

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, was any effort made on the part of our Ambassadors or anyone from the Department after the incident, to pursue Mr. Khrushchev's feelings?

Was anyone instructed to approach him and express any regret or in any way to reconcile him, to forgive or overlook this incident?

(At this point in the proceedings, Senator Morse enters the hearing room.)

Secretary Herter. No, I don't know of any such thing.

The Chairman. No approach was made?

Secretary Herter. No.

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, what were the considerations which led to the decision, not only to assume responsibility for the flight, but to imply that the flights would continue in the future?

Secretary Herter. I have to take responsibility for the statement that was interpreted and if I may, I would like to read you exactly what was said on that score.

This is a statement that was interpreted that we were

going to continue the flights:

"The Government of the United States would be derelict to its responsibilities, not only to the American people, but to free people everywhere if it did not, in the absence of Soviet cooperation, take such measures as are possible unilaterally to lessen and to overcome this danger of surprise attack.

"In fact, the United States has not and does not shirk this responsibility."

That is the statement that was interpreted that we were going to continue the flights, and it seems to me it was a pretty far-fetched interpretation.

The Chairman. Then do you mean that that statement, that you did not intend to convey the view or the possibility that the flights would be continued, is that correct?

Secretary Herter. No, what I was saying there was just what I have testified to today; that from the point of view of our own interests and that of the whole free world, it is essential for us to do whatever we properly can in order to acquire information to avoid surprise attack or to be prepared for it.

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The Chairman. But in view of that statement, do you think that Mr. Khrushchev could accept it and continue the conference?

Secretary Herter. Yes, I certainly do if he had wanted to.

The Chairman. Do you think our President would accept such a statement from any other power?

Secretary Herter. If he wanted to go to a conference? Certainly.

The Chairman. My time is up.

Senator Wiley?

Senator Wiley. Now in relation to that last question, the President suggested time and time again open skies arrangement, hasn't he?

Secretary Herter. Yes.

Senator Wiley. That means that planes would be flying over our country and over every other country where it is necessary. Again, I go to the subject that I think is most important, because some quoted and I quoted on the floor of the Senate the other day the biblical verse that a little child shall lead them. I had a group of children from Oshkosh, Wisconsin, that I was talking to. After I talked to them, I opened myself to questions. One of these girls said, "Senator, if we stop taking these flights, how are we going to get the information that is going on back of the Iron

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Curtain?"

Well, I think all America is asking that question, and I am satisfied that if we realists, as I think we are becoming more and more, that we are not going to go up a lot of blind alleys about this and that, and about what was or what wasn't said, we are going to face the situation head on and simply say we want to be adequate and alert and we want the Kremlin to know the facts as they have now for, I think about, three and a-half years, as I think the facts are that we have been putting these planes over. Khrushchev knew it at the time that he was up at Camp David, and certainly knowing could have interfered with him holding the meeting if he wanted to, having the knowledge then. Do you think my conclusions are correct in that respect?

Secretary Herter. I do.

Senator Wiley. I didn't get the import of the questions when I came in that apparently referred to some different groups. What is the name of the young man that defected the other day? I guess that is what you call it. He testified on one of the --

Senator Lausche. Meet the Press.

Senator Wiley. Meet the Press. It is a long Russian name. I put what he said into the record today. But one of the important things he brought out, and I would like to get the former Ambassador's attention on this, was that

3 there is a group of young people growing up in Russia that have different ideas, and he was about to go into detail on it when time ran out. But among other things, he is the one that said, and this is important, he said some two years ago that he didn't think -- well, the time I haven't got, but some months ago he said that Khrushchev and the powers in being would not permit the President to come to Russia. They would find some excuse.

Now, that is all in what he said over the wire here a couple of weeks ago. That confirms, I presume, your own idea that when Khrushchev came to Paris, it was already decided that he was going to throw the bombshell, and he would refuse the invitation and so forth, is that right?

Secretary Herter. That is right.

Senator Wiley. So this is something that didn't result from the shooting down or the downing of the plane.

I want to ask you a question. Have you any definite information as to whether or not this young Powers is alive?

Secretary Herter. No, sir. We have no information other than that which the Russians have furnished to us.

Senator Wiley. If that plane had been shot down, do you think the instruments that he had with him would have remained intact?

Secretary Herter. There, sir, I am not skilled enough in the technique of shooting down planes. But I should think

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it is very doubtful if he was hit by a rocket whether either he or the plane would have come down intact.

Senator Wiley. Is there any thought that perhaps they have the plane? They claim they have the instruments and they have shown something which wasn't the plane. Do you think they have that intact?

Secretary Herter. They have shown a later photograph of a plane which those who built the plane feel is the plane itself. They have also shown pieces of the plane in Gorky Park in Moscow when they invited all the diplomats to come and look at it, and I think our people feel that that is a genuine part of the plane.

Senator Wiley. I want to ask the former Ambassador -- is it true that the youth in Russia, the new class of youth is growing up like this fellow said, that someone said if he were privileged to carry on that answer he would have said they are not satisfied with their standard of living, they are not satisfied with the little opportunity they have to express themselves in the political life of Russia? Do you know whether that would be true or not?

Mr. Bohlen. I think it is a fair assumption, Senator. Of course, as you know, the possibilities for contacts in there during the period I was there were considerably less than they are now. The country is still totally controlled by the mechanism of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

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They control all modes of expression by press, meetings, or anything else, so it is very difficult to get any overt signs of the feelings of the youth or any other section of the population.

But there are certain indications that the youth are looking forward at some time in the future to considerably different circumstances. They hope for better material conditions and also undoubtedly hope for a period when they will have more freedom of expression and more ability to participate in the political life of their country.

But this is very hard to document because people do not talk openly and freely in the Soviet Union.

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Senator Wiley. Well, you know that the ferment generally is all over this world. You know that the President of Turkey has been kicked out. You saw that today, and you know what is happening elsewhere. Is there any reason why that yeast or ferment should not be operating in Russia among the youngsters?

Mr. Bohlen. There is no reason why it should not be and it is a logical assumption it is. But I should also say that the controls in a society like the Soviet Union are very tight indeed and I have seen no sign that those controls are breaking down or weakening to the point where the party is not in complete control of the situation. They are able to stifle, if you will, or hold in check this ferment due to the nature of their system.

Senator Wiley. Out of the two hundred million Russians how many of them do you think belong to the Communist Party?

Mr. Bohlen. I think the latest figure is somewhere in the neighborhood of 8 million.

Senator Wiley. Thank you. That is all.

The Chairman. The Senator from Montana?

Senator Mansfield? Mr. Secretary, it has been reported that at the House hearings, you said there were indications that even before May 6 the Russians planned to scuttle the conference.

Now, it seems to me if we are going to estimate the importance of the U-2 incident in the collapse of the summit, we need to fix the date when these indications in any significant fashion began to appear. I would appreciate then in the interest of saving time, yes or no answers to certain questions which I am about to ask unless there is a need of an elaboration.

The first question: Are you aware whether any member of the Cabinet or the President had any reason to believe on May 15 when Khrushchev made his demands for an apology and so forth, that he would come to Paris and leave as he did.

Secretary Herter. No.

Senator Mansfield. Were there any indications that Khrushchev planned to scuttle the conference before the U-2 plane was shot down on May 1?

Secretary Herter. No.

Senator Mansfield. Did Khrushchev's Baku speech precede or follow Mr. Dillon's speech to the AFL-CIO Convention?

Secretary Herter. It followed it.

Senator Mansfield. Would you classify Mr. Dillon's speech as very much in the spirit of Camp David or would you say it was an excellent, forthright and anti-Communist statement somewhat oblivious to the spirit of Camp

David, the kind of speech which any official of the State Department might have made before that historic meeting?

Secretary Herter. That I can't qualify with a yes or no answer, Senator.

Senator Mansfield. You can go into detail there.

Secretary Herter. I would say this, that Mr. Dillon's speech was almost a requirement as an answer to the allegations that had been made by Mr. Khrushchev against Adenauer and the Germans and his continued repetition which I have given the chronology of, of the fact that they were going to take this unilateral position sooner or later without its being an absolute ultimatum on the subject of Berlin, Germany.

Senator Mansfield. In other words, Mr. Secretary, speeches which you and Mr. Dillon made were a counteraction to the gradual hardening of Mr. Khrushchev's speeches in the period preceding that?

Secretary Herter. Entirely.

Senator Mansfield. Did Secretary Dillon propose that a U-2 flight be undertaken prior to the summit conference?

Mr. Dillon. No.

Senator Mansfield. Mr. Dillon, as acting Under Secretary, were you aware beforehand of the scheduling of the U-2 flight over the Soviet Union on May 1?

Mr. Dillon. No, I was not aware of it.

I was aware that there was a program of flights that might take place at some time when the weather was right but I think I was informed of that maybe a month or two before this actual time, and I had nothing to do with it afterwards because I didn't in the ordinary course of my duties.

Senator Mansfield. Your knowledge was, in effect, general knowledge?

Mr. Dillon. Yes.

Senator Mansfield. Mr. Herter happening to be out of the country at the time was, I assume, unaware of any specific flight but perhaps had general knowledge that these flights were being undertaken and had been over a period of years.

Secretary Herter. The first knowledge I received was when I was in Ankara, I didn't know there was a flight under way. All I heard was this same report that a plane was down.

Senator Mansfield. Now, both of you have had general knowledge of this: Would it be a fair assumption to say, despite the fact that the President undertook, in a certain sense, personal responsibility for this particular flight, that he, too, likewise, had only general knowledge but that because of his position as the Chief of State, he would be held responsible under any circumstances because of his position of responsibility?

Secretary Herter. That is correct.

... Might I just qualify one thing? When you say he was familiar with this particular flight and his timing, so far as I know all of us were familiar with alternate possibilities of flights but not this particular flight as such.

Senator Mansfield. That would apply to the Department of State and the President.

Secretary Herter. That is correct.

Senator Mansfield. From what legislation or executive orders or both, was the authority for these flights of deep penetration derived?

Secretary Herter. Well, presumably from the act that I have here before me -- I am told that this applied to two specific acts. The one that I am particularly familiar with, that I had a moment ago is the one creating the Central Intelligence Agency. The other is the National Security Act.

Senator Mansfield. Would it be possible to have copies for the record at this point?

Secretary Herter. Yes.

Senator Mansfield. Mr. Chairman, I ask that they be included in the record at this point.

The Chairman. Without objection it is so ordered.

Senator Mansfield. Mr. Secretary, by what authority have these flights now been suspended?

Secretary Herter. Senator, I have now got before me the

National Security Act of 1947, and if you wish me to read the pertinent paragraph I will be glad to do so.

Senator Mansfield. No, I would just like to have the pertinent parts incorporated in the executive record.

Secretary Herter. Right.

Senator Mansfield. Now the question to repeat, by what authority have these flights now been suspended?

Secretary Herter. By direction of the President.

Senator Mansfield. By a presidential directive.

Could we have a copy of that for the record?

Secretary Herter. Yes, I assume so. I don't know whether it was given in writing or whether it was done by word of mouth.

Senator Mansfield. Well, will you look into it and see what you can do to comply with the request?

Secretary Herter. Yes.

Senator Mansfield. Will this order suspending the flights automatically remain in force after President Eisenhower leaves office and until it is superseded by another order of some future President?

Secretary Herter. It could be. The President's responsibility as Commander in Chief which gives him the right to give an order of this kind would, of course expire with him. It would only be through some treaty obligation that there would be a binding commitment on the

part of the United States to carry beyond his term.

Senator Mansfield. Do I understand you correctly then, to state, that this order would automatically die with the leaving of office by President Eisenhower, and become effective again would have to be once again initiated by the next President?

Secretary Herter. I think so. I believe another President would be free to do as he sees fit.

(At this point, Senator Humphrey entered the hearing room.)

Senator Mansfield. Have Russian experts in the executive branch suggested the possibility that Khrushchev's position at home may have become seriously undermined?

Secretary Herter. Yes.

Senator Mansfield. Do you believe that the U-2 may have been a contributing factor to this undermining?

Secretary Herter. It may have been. May I elaborate on that?

It may have been in the sense that it must have been a great shock to both the military and to the civilian leaders in Russia to find that they had been as open as they were for such a long period of time.

Senator Mansfield. And to him as well.

Secretary Herter. To him as well.

Senator Mansfield. If Khrushchev should be forced out of

power, is it their thinking that his successor, the Russian experts in the Department, that his successor, is likely to be a man more amenable to friendly and peaceful dealings with the West?

Secretary Herter. That, sir, I cannot answer categorically. I think that that is a pure matter of guesswork.

Senator Mansfield. All right.

What, in the view of our Russian experts is the most probable coalition of influential forces in the Soviet union and in world Communism that could bring about Khrushchev's downfall?

Secretary Herter. There, sir, I am afraid of my own knowledge I could not answer that. If you would like for Mr. Bohlen to answer that, he is as good an authority as we have on the subject.

Senator Mansfield. If you will, Mr. Bohlen, but before you do, I would like to throw out indications that perhaps the military, the Chinese Communists and forces of that kind might be considered.

Mr. Bohlen. Senator, I honestly in all sincerity it is not possible to answer that question. I think in events dealing with the Soviet Union in view of the secrecy and general secrecy prevailing in the Communist Bloc it is only after the events that you can hope to trace them back and see what particular influences have seemed to

have brought about given decisions.. There is literally no way in which a foreigner can ascertain what the varying degrees of influence of all factors which go into the making of any particular event. If I might I will give you one illustration of secrecy. I was not there but in June 1957 for ten days the Presidium of the Central Committee and the Central Committee itself met in a violent inner row which resulted in the expulsion from both of those bodies of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov and several others.

This went on for ten days in Moscow and no foreigner in the Capital and mighty few Russians knew anything about it.

We had trained observers there. There was an extremely alert U.S. press corps and not one of them got any inkling of this major development. This I merely cite to show the degree of secrecy and if you are trying to get these things you are in truth looking into a crystal ball and a very cloudy one at that.

Senator Mansfield. What you have said, Mr. Bohlen, is a reinforcement of thoughts you have previously stated in response to questions propounded to you by the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. Bohlen. That's right, sir.

Senator Mansfield. And once again that secrecy is so great there that it is impossible for a Westerner to find out

what goes on in many instances until after the fact is accomplished.

Senator Mansfield. . . Is it the view of the experts in the Department, the Russian experts, that Khrushchev, even if he remains in power will now take a harder line, a reversion to cold war type tactics in dealing with the Western nations.

Mr. Bohlen. The indications at present are, and I am speaking at present, that this not necessarily will be so.

I think we can expect a propaganda campaign. The indication from his own statements and from such information as we have received from Moscow, is that there seems to be no determined policy to return to the depths of the cold war at this time.

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Senator Mansfield. Would you say that if that reversion does take place, taking the opposite tack from what you have just said, and is pushed by the Kremlin or Khrushchev or his successor, that it will make more difficult the maintenance of peace?

Mr. Bohlen. It would if it returns to a line that we would call the lowest phase of the cold war, it most certainly would, Senator. However, there are degrees in this thing of return to the cold war situation which are impossible to assess and which might not materially increase the danger of war. But if it went all out, sealed off the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc from contact with the outside world, attempted to exert pressures wherever they thought they could do so, I think undoubtedly a much more dangerous world situation would be created.

Senator Mansfield. Mr. Chairman, I have other questions but I don't want to take too much time.

The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator Hickenlooper. I don't have any questions at this time.

The Chairman. Senator Humphrey, did I overlook you?

Senator Humphrey. I came in late, Senator. If any other Senator wants to go, it is all right.

The Chairman. Senator Morse, are you ready?

Senator Morse. I will yield to Senator Humphrey.

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— Senator Humphrey. If the question I ask, Mr. Secretary, has already been asked, just brush it aside. I don't want to take any of your time on that.

Did anyone ask as to whether or not you had any personal knowledge of the U-2 flight?

Secretary Herter. Of the program?

Senator Humphrey. No, of the particular flight.

Secretary Herter. It was included, I said it was included -- I am sure it was included in a group of flights that I had been asked whether I had any objections to them.

Senator Humphrey. If you wanted to, could you have effectively vetoed such a policy?

Secretary Herter. No, I could only have given my advice to the President.

Senator Humphrey. Would the Vice President be aware of these decisions?

Secretary Herter. I think that in the matter of the National Security Council, he was aware of the program in the larger sense. I doubt if he was familiar with any of the individual flights as such, but he may have been.

Senator Humphrey. The reason I asked that question was that the Vice President intimated on a television program, I believe the day before the President announced in Paris, that the flights should continue, and the next day the President announced that he had already cancelled them.

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The Vice President said they would continue, and the next day the President announced that they had been suspended.

What I am asking is, would the Vice President, as a member of the Security Council, have any opportunity of knowing the decision that had been made by the President?

Secretary Herter. There, the days followed so quickly one on another that I just couldn't answer that, whether that opportunity would have been offered or not.

Senator Humphrey. Let me see if I can -- what I am trying to get at is the policy making machinery.

We have a Subcommittee, as you know, that is studying the policy making machinery of the government, the Jackson Subcommittee.

I am a member of that Subcommittee. We had, recently before the Subcommittee, Mr. Kendall. We have had many of the prominent officials of government and former officials of government.

The program of the flights, the reconnaissance flights, was an established program, apparently was agreed upon by the Security Council, is that correct?

Secretary Herter. The Security Council was aware of it, yes.

Senator Humphrey. The Vice President is a member of the Security Council?

Secretary Herter. Yes.

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Senator Humphrey. If the Vice President states on a television program that he understood that the flights would continue, yet the President announced the next day in Paris, that as of the previous Thursday they had already been suspended, do you think there was any lack of communication between the responsible officials of this government?

Secretary Herter. There, sir, I am trying to think of the dates.

The Thursday on which the President gave that order was the day that I went to Paris. I went to Paris that night.

The President followed two nights later and whether or not in that two day interval anything had been distributed with regard to that order, I just don't know.

Senator Humphrey. Do you have any changed views, Mr. Secretary, as to the value of the so-called Summitry diplomacy as a result of this recent meeting?

Secretary Herter. I think as a method of carrying out negotiations it has taken a hard knock.

Senator Humphrey. Have you any idea as to how we are going to proceed in the months ahead? I heard the President's address. It was a good address. He gave a good accounting. He talked about the necessity of maintaining our -- I believe the word was business like relationships, or at least normal relationships insofar as we can -- with the Soviet Union.

Is there any projected plan as to how we will proceed with

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our contacts with the Soviet Union?

For example, we have the Geneva Conference still in session on the nuclear testing. I suppose the Disarmament Conference is still a reality.

Is there to be any adjustment in these conferences, any changes? Are they to proceed according to the past?

Secretary Herter. Yes, the President, I think made that very clear in his statement.

Senator Humphrey. Are there any plans for any type of a high level Foreign Ministers' Conference of Sub-Cabinet officers?

Secretary Herter. As of now, there is not. I may add this with regard to the Summit; that the four nations that were involved in the Summit were the four nations who, as a result of the decisions and agreements reached after the war, were the four nations that have the responsibility for Berlin and for the final settlement of the whole German question and that is the reason for those four, essentially getting together.

It is possible that again they will have to get together. Whether normal diplomatic changes would make progress or Foreign Ministers' meetings in advance would make program so that it would be worthwhile for them to come together, I just can't tell you. That is always a possibility. But almost any other subject, there are many other nations that are involved beside those four, and it is a great question in my mind whether or not

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that method of coming together for the resolution of problems would be fruitful in the future.

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Senator Humphrey. In other words, what you are indicating is that a Summit Conference ought to merely be the ratification, essentially the ratification of decisions that have been tentatively arrived at at the normal diplomatic levels.

Secretary Herter. In my opinion, that is the most desirable thing.

Senator Humphrey. I agree. How do you explain, or is there any explanation for what appears to be a contradictory bit of evidence of Gromyko's blustering up at the United Nations on the Soviet Resolution and yet, the Soviets apparently conciliatory behavior in recent days with respect to the quick release of our plane and flyers who strayed into East Germany and the recent broadening of Soviet-American exchange projects?

Secretary Herter. There again, you have got one of those contradictions. As I was saying earlier, the fact that the attitude of the people in Moscow and even the officials with whom our Embassy officials have to deal, have been entirely normal since this incident.

It is very hard to reconcile with the very harsh words that both Khrushchev and Gromyko have uttered.

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Senator Humphrey. Do you lay any credence to the doctrine, or at least an observation that has been made, that while the Soviet tactics may change for awhile, that insofar as their general over-all strategy is concerned, that it will remain pretty much the same as it has?

Secretary Herter. Certainly as far as their objectives are concerned. I think it was quite clear from some of this documentation that will be put into the record, that is the speeches that were made by Mr. Khrushchev, that he had laid greater and greater emphasis on the eventual triumph of Communism over the world, and that he put particular emphasis on that in recent months before the Summit.

(At this point, Senator Case, of New Jersey, entered the hearing room.)

Senator Humphrey. I have a letter from a gentleman who is a professor emeritus of a university up at Bennington College, who has had an uncanny record in my years of acquaintanceship with him in understanding what goes on in the Soviet Union. His name is Dr. Bernard Tauer. He is a former social Democrat of some 35 years ago from Austria, a professor of political economy, now retired. He monitors Soviet broadcasts, studies Soviet literature, particularly photographs and what-have-you. Just to give you a little background, he predicted to me some three weeks, I guess it was before it happened, the removal of Beria. I have a letter

2 here from him right before me, and it is a letter telling how Mr. Khrushchev was going to scuttle the Summit Conference, written on April 25th, this letter is. And I also have a letter from him here which indicates that this -- he says, "The Soviet leader will now do everything possible to prove that Eisenhower is a war-monger and an imperialist aggressor and not a man of peace, in action not merely in words. We must, therefore, prepare ourselves for all kinds of provocations all around the world."

His thesis is that Khrushchev had been selling the Soviet people upon the idea that President Eisenhower was a man of peace and man with whom he could deal. I don't mean deal in the sense of the crudeness of that word, but one with whom he could conduct reasonably good negotiations, and that when the President accepted the responsibility for the flights and didn't accept the opportunity, at least what some people say was an opportunity of removing himself from that responsibility that Mr. Khrushchev took this as a very personal matter, since he had staked his reputation in the Kremlin and in the consuls of the Communist Party upon the fact that he could work with Eisenhower, and that Eisenhower had in a sense not merely upset the diplomatic applecart by referring to -- this is Mr. Khrushchev, the explanation that is given to me here that Mr. Khrushchev felt that Eisenhower had not only upset the diplomatic applecart. But, more importantly, from a

3 subjective point of view of Khrushchev put Khrushchev in a very difficult position with Communist Chinese, with the Right Wing Stalinists in the Soviet Union, so that Khrushchev is now making a personal crusade out of attacking the President.

What is your view of this? I am going to give you this letter. I have a whole series of these, and this is a very remarkable man, may I say.

(At this point, Senator Aiken entered the hearing room.)

Senator Humphrey. For example, I have a letter from him two weeks before the recent shake-up in the Soviet Union which was not too fundamental, but indicating some of the changes that were going to be made, by a very careful analyst of broadcasts and meetings and literature. I had this man down to see the late Senator Walter George some of you may recall, and he was very helpful at one time. What is your view of Mr. Khrushchev's reactions lately to the President, the personal venom that he seems to exhibit?

Secretary Herter. I am particularly interested in two things, Senator, in the letter that you have just read; one, the fact that it was written before the U-2 incident.

Senator Humphrey. Yes.

Secretary Herter. In which this authority cites the fact that Mr. Khrushchev was going to scuttle the conference.

4 Senator Humphrey. I think that substantiates essentially what you were saying this morning, your own observations on this.

Secretary Herter. Yes. The second has to do with the fact that the President didn't accept the way out which Mr. Khrushchev appeared to offer him. My own feeling with regard to that second matter is that it was very much of a trap. That what Mr. Khrushchev thought might happen is that the President would disclaim personal responsibility and that then Mr. Khrushchev would say, "The situation is even more dangerous than I thought, because this means that that same little frantic group in the Pentagon" -- and that is the phrase that he used in his press conference -- "is running the Government of the United States without the President knowing about it, and that makes our situation even worse" and he would have inveighed in exactly the same terms and asked the President for exactly the same apologies and punishments which he asked for later.

I think that the element of personal pique certainly played a part in the whole show.

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The Chairman. The Senator's time is up.

The Senator from Kansas.

Senator Carlson. Senator Aiken --

The Chairman. I am sorry, the Senator from Vermont.

Senator Aiken. I won't take long.

Speaking of the reaction of the rest of the world, have you made any analysis of the reaction of the other countries of the world relative to the collapse of the Summit meeting?

Secretary Herter. Yes, I think we have. It isn't, of course, complete. This will mean a study from a great many nations and bring this altogether in one place.

I think that, perhaps, the best indication has been the attitude among the representatives at the United Nations where you have got a cross-section from the rest of the world. From the very outset of the Russian complaint there it was very obvious they weren't going to be able to get any votes from their calling this an aggression, except Soviet bloc votes.

Some of the smaller countries, two of them, abstained in the final vote for reasons that were of a rather different nature.

But, by and large, we have heard no sympathy from the point of view of what you might call the uncommitted nations or the free nations of the world for the attitude that Mr. Khrushchev took.

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Senator Aiken. Are you satisfied we have not lost the prestige throughout the world, as a result of or lost more than Russia has.

Secretary Herter. May I say, sir, that in my opinion our alliances are firmer than they have ever been.

Senator Aiken. What was the significance of the shake-up in the Russian government prior to the U-2 incident, I believe, last April, was it not, when Mr. Kozlov was promoted, and coupled with that question, why don't we hear anything about Mr. Mikoyan any more? Has he been isolated or just got out of the news, or what has happened with him?

Secretary Herter. Mr. Bohlen, who is our expert, is also the censor of the document, so I am afraid he has gone out of the room at the moment.

With regard to the disappearance of Mr. Mikoyan, we have been told this is just a normal vacation he has taken down to the Black Sea. It is true in years gone by he had taken rather extended vacations there, and whether this is true or not we can't say.

With respect to the shake-up, I think the only significance that it had were that two of the strongest members of the Central Committee were sent to other responsibilities and this may have been a personal strengthening of Mr. Khrushchev's power within the Committee itself. But it was not considered very highly significant.

Senator Aiken. That is Mr. Kozlov's promotion, is not significant?

Secretary Herter. I don't think so. I didn't know that he as such had been promoted.

Secretary Herter. Well, a long time ago, I think when Mr. Averill Harriman was visiting in Russia.

Senator Aiken. Yes.

Secretary Herter. He reported that Mr. Kozlov had been pointed out to him by Mr. Khrushchev as his successor, saying that he and Mikoyan were too old to carry on and that Kozlov was the number two man. But there was no telling whether he was saying that seriously or whether he was being flattering about it because Mr. Kozlov was there at the time.

Senator Aiken. I thought he made the best impression of any of our Russian visitors last summer. At least when he came before this Committee, I thought he did.

I have no further questions.

The Chairman. The Senator from Oregon.

Senator Morse. Mr. Secretary, I think it would be helpful for this record if you made a statement in regard to the functions of NASA, and the part that NASA played in connection with the U-2 flight.

I don't think the record is very clear what the functions of NASA, and what jurisdiction, if any, the State Department has over NASA and what the relationship between NASA and the Security Council is, and the State Department.

Secretary Herter. NASA, as you know, is an agency devoted entirely to the peaceful development of satellites and outer space vehicles of one kind or another.

Its operations have now been separate out from what were called purely military operations, although it is always inevitable in the development of boosters that there should be an interrelationship between the two, because the military vehicle and the peaceful vehicle have got the same problems of propulsion to get up into the air.

The witnesses of NASA, of course, will be before the Committee.

most of the U-2's
are used by NASA in connection with purely scientific work,

meteorological work. Actually, the Japanese Government found them tremendously valuable in tracing the course of tornadoes last year, and I think that NASA put out at least three publications on their findings from the U-2 weather observations.

With respect to the actual development of events in relation to NASA, I am sorry to say that I can't give you first-hand information.

Perhaps Mr. Dillon can supplement that as it occurred while I was overseas and when Mr. Dillon was in charge.

Mr. Dillon. All I can say is as far as I know the State Department didn't have any direct relationships with NASA on this matter, and the relationships that there were, were handled by the Central Intelligence Agency

so either Mr. Dulles or the NASA witnesses themselves will be able to inform you on that.

Senator Morse. Why would NASA make a statement in regard to this plane if it was under the jurisdiction of CIA.

Mr. Dillon. On the cover story it was in the open, it was under the jurisdiction of NASA, the plane was. Actually for this operation it was under the jurisdiction of CIA

Senator Morse. Therefore, NASA, in your opinion, was acting within the proprieties when it issued the statement that it issued.

Mr. Dillon. I think so, yes.

Senator Morse. You think it had cleared that statement with CIA or had authority from CIA to issue it.

Secretary Herter. I think so.

Mr. Dillon. They should have, as I understood the matter, these guidelines to answer questions were prepared by CIA. They were gone over with State Department people a day or two before. We had thought that NASA was going to handle this in the way of answering questions, which we knew they would get, because this was a NASA plane, and they apparently chose instead to forestall the questions just by putting it all out in the form of a statement.

Senator Morse. I raise the question because I want to

do what I could in order to clarify the record in regard to the allegation made that there is not the best of coordination between the State Department, CIA, Pentagon Building and now NASA, and that there may be a need for a centralization in the State Department of the authority to authorize any statement by any of these agencies in regard to a situation such as this, because of some possible reason to believe that if this had been centralized more we would not have been having different statements coming from different agencies.

Mr. Dillon. We were not aware, actually of the fact that NASA was going to make as formal a statement as this, and it was somewhat of a surprise.

The Chairman. I could not hear that answer.

Mr. Dillon. I say we were not aware of the fact that NASA was going to make such a formal statement as this, and I am not sure that the Central Intelligence Agency was either.

All the relationships -- as I said in my original statement, there was coordination, there was a decision that the statements were going to be made by the State Department.

That decision was taken and made known to the other agencies concerned, which were the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency then on the morning of May 5th.

The Central Intelligence Agency had the relationships

with NASA and undertook to pass that on which we had no relationships so far as NASA was concerned. They didn't know we were in this thing, and somehow this statement was put out by NASA somewhat more complete than we expected but it was along the lines of the material that they had been furnished.

Senator Morse. Turning to a question that Senator Humphrey asked and may I assure you that I am quite non-political in raising that, I am only seeking to find out who had knowledge of what in regard to the matter, I refer to the May 27 issue of the Washington Post, in this article by Mr. Roberts in the course of which he said "Nowhere in the three and a half hour television program did Nixon refer to any presidential direction in the U-2 crisis other than his approval of the flights some years earlier. Nor was there any reference to his own part in the affair. Nixon, of course, sits in the National Security Council. Nixon did say that he was privy to the U-2 reconnaissance policy, and I do endorse it, and he also said 'I knew about this flight.'"

Now, my interpretation, Mr. Secretary, of your testimony is that neither you nor the President knew of this specific flight going to be taken at the time that it was taken, but that you did know that there was a general program for such flights and that this flight could be considered as a part

of that program.

Now I ask you do you have any reason to believe that Nixon knew anything that you and the President did not know and that maybe just an unfortunate use of language when he says "I knew about this flight", and that he probably means that he knew about the general program of reconnaissance.

Secretary Herter. I would assume it was about the general program rather than about the particular flight.

Senator Morse. But as far as you know the National Security Council did not brief its members in regard to any particular flights without also notifying the President in regard to specific flights.

Secretary Herter. No, I think the National Security Council was only aware of the general program.

Senator Morse. Are you a member of the National Security Council?

Secretary Herter. Yes, I am.

Senator Morse. One final question at this round, Mr. Secretary: As you know I, along with everyone else, I think, who has the interest of peace at heart, am very much concerned about long continuation of this nuclear armament race.

Do you think that the United States and the Western Powers on the one hand, and Russia, on the other, can

continue this nuclear armament race with its constant increase and acceleration for another ten years, and not create the great probability of war.

Secretary Herter. I don't know about the great probability of war, Senator, but I would say certainly increase the chances of war.

Senator Morse. I know we are of one mind but I want the record to show it, this particular one mind: Do you agree with me that our generation simply has the responsibility in history to find some honorable way to end this nuclear armament race?

Secretary Herter. I agree with you completely on that.

Senator Morse. Do you think that we ought to do everything that we can to try to get the United Nations to exercise greater jurisdictional authority in connection with this whole matter of armament race than we have been able to get it to do so far?

Secretary Herter. Senator, some time ago, I made a speech in connection with disarmament in which I stated my views as to the great necessity in the following years to finding some answer to this, and at the same time finding an answer within the framework of the United Nations of an authority which could maintain the peace with law and I still feel that just as strongly as I did at the time I made that speech.

Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, my time is up and I want

to make a request for data if I may.

The Chairman. Certainly.

Senator Morse. This morning we talked about the cases that we had offered to take to the World Court.

Senator Wiley. A little louder, Senator.

Senator Morse. This morning you talked about the cases that we were willing to take to the World Court. I wonder if the State Department can compile for the committee the record in regard to the World Court's operation, both on the cases it has handled and the cases that we have offered to have it handle that have been rejected by Russia or any other power.

Secretary Herter. Yes, we will be very glad to do that.

The Chairman. The Senator from Kansas.

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Senator Carlson. Mr. Secretary, recently one of our Nation's financial writers, writing on the conditions of Russia, wrote that Mr. Khrushchev was proposing a devaluation of the currency as of January 1st, and he stated that no nation tampers with its currency unless they are in financial difficulty.

What do we know about the financial and economic condition of Russia that would lead us to believe or do we know that he is planning on devaluating the currency?

Secretary Herter. This, I hadn't heard at all. I hadn't seen that particular statement and I have seen no where in any report any indications that they were planning to devalue their currency.

There is no question but what their foreign exchange rate, their official rate, don't correspond with reality. They have got two rates, one an official rate and one a tourist rate. They are very far apart. One is four rubles to the dollar and one is ten rubles to the dollar. But from the point of view of their internal financial situation, I have heard no reports they were planning to devalue the ruble.

Senator Carlson. We have had evidence that there is social unrest among the people, thinking that they are entitled to better living conditions, better homes and housing.

Do we have any evidence of that?

Secretary Herter. Yes, I think there is. But this is a matter that Mr. Bohlen testified to a few moments ago.

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Senator Carlson. That there is?

Secretary Herter. There is evidence of that. As Mr. Bohler said, it is impossible to get documentary evidence as such, because of the secrecy and the discipline in their society, but I think that every visitor to Russia who has had a chance to talk with the workmen or the students at the university and so on, have come back with that feeling.

After all, Mr. Khrushchev has made a good many statements about the necessity of increasing the standard of living of their people.

In their incentives that they offer from the point of view of their workers, better living conditions in these housing projects is one of the principal incentives that they have been offering in the past, giving people priority if their particular sections of a plant do particularly well from the point of view of production, they will be advanced to better living quarters.

I think that the urge for better living quarters and a better standard of living, more consumer goods, is a very real one.

Senator Carlson. Does the State Department have any evidence of a labor shortage in Russia based on a statement that was recently made that Mr. Khrushchev reduced his military strength because it was necessary to get some of the people back into the labor market?

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Secretary Herter. Yes. Very recently there has been a study that I think will be made available to you, made on the whole question of the labor problem in Russia.

It is an extremely interesting one from the point of view of the present situation and the relationship of women at work compared with men and the very large excess number of women over men that exists in Russia today.

There is certainly every reason to believe that Mr. Khrushchev's announced reduction of the Armed Forces was an effort to increase the male labor force by taking the extra men out of the Armed Services when he said he was planning to reduce from some three million, six hundred thousand down to two million, four hundred thousand; that the principal purpose of that was to get a larger working force.

Senator Carlson. Is it not reasonable to assume then, that Mr. Khrushchev does have some problems, internal problems, and that that may have some effect on his actions and his decision at Paris?

Secretary Herter. That undoubtedly is true. He has had some other internal difficulty that you undoubtedly know about, Senator, in connection with the new land that was planted, an area that has not been too successful and this was something on which he had backed very heavily to increase the food supply of Russia and I think he had been rather heavily criticized because it hadn't worked out as planned.

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Senator Carlson. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Gore?

Senator Gore. Returning, Mr. Secretary, to the examination of whether there was a breakdown in coordination and administrative procedure, I would like to inquire when you personally first learned of the President's order that the U-2 flights would be discontinued?

Secretary Herter. At the time that he gave it.

Senator Gore. When did he give it?

Secretary Herter. My recollection is that it was immediately after a meeting at the White House on Thursday morning at about noon.

Senator Gore. Did he give the order to you?

Secretary Herter. No, he did not give the order to me. I think it was through General Goodpaster, but I am not quite certain.

Senator Gore. How did you know that it was given?

Secretary Herter. I heard him.

Senator Gore. You heard him give the order?

Secretary Herter. Yes.

Senator Gore. And this was on Thursday?

Secretary Herter. This was on Thursday.

Senator Gore. Then you do not know whether this information was communicated to the Vice President?

Secretary Herter. I have no idea.

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Senator Gore. He was not present?

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Secretary Herter. He was not present.

Senator Gore. Was this at a meeting of the Security Council?

Secretary Herter. No, I don't think it was the Security Council. I think it was at the meeting immediately after the Security Council at which there were three of us present. Allen Dulles was not present and I have forgotten -- I think Gates was present after a Cabinet meeting it was.

Senator Gore. I didn't understand.

Secretary Herter. After the Cabinet meeting.

Senator Gore. After the Cabinet meeting?

Secretary Herter. Right.

Senator Gore. That settles that. You heard the order issued, and I will have no further question as to where it was issued and to whom. If you heard it issued to Secretary Gates, that settles one question specifically.

But you do not know whether the Vice President was informed about it?

Secretary Herter. Excuse me --

Senator Gore. Did you wish to add something?

Secretary Herter. No, no.

Senator Gore. You do not know then whether the Vice President was informed about it?

Secretary Herter. No, I do not.

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Senator Gore. On this question of coordination or lack thereof, in addition to NASA and the State Department, to which Senator Morse referred, there is the State Department, NASA, Mr. Hagerty and officials within the Department and perhaps others.

Did Mr. Hagerty operate in this field strictly as Press Secretary or did he undertake some Executive function?

Secretary Herter. I know of no Executive function that he assumed.

Senator Gore. I would like to ask Mr. Dillon when -- well, I will ask you.

Was Mr. Hagerty present when the President issued the order that the flights would stop?

Secretary Herter. No.

Senator Gore. Do you know if he knew about it?

Secretary Herter. I can't tell you.

Senator Gore. Are you aware of the fact that the New York Times carried a story the next day that such an order had been issued?

Secretary Herter. No, I didn't even know that. I left town that night. I went to Paris that night.

Senator Gore. Do you know, Mr. Dillon, if Mr. Hagerty knew about the order?

Mr. Dillon. I am not aware whether he knew about it or not, no, sir.

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Senator Gore. Are you aware of the fact that he, in press parlance, knocked down the New York Times' news story that such an order had been issued?

Mr. Dillon. I was not aware of that, no.

Senator Gore. You were not aware of that?

Mr. Dillon. I assume it is correct since you say so, but I was not aware of it.

Senator Gore. And neither of you know whether or not Mr. Hagerty, like Mr. White, was speaking without knowledge?

Secretary Herter. Senator, may I ask you is the New York Times story a quotation from Hagerty?

Senator Gore. I don't have the exact quotation. Does the staff have it?

I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, that the staff may find the reference to Mr. Hagerty and Mr. Reston's story and insert it at this point in the record.

The Chairman. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The quotation from the New York Times is as follows:)

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Senator Gore. Mr. Dillon, on May 5th Mr. Hagerty told a press conference that the State Department and NASA would issue statements. Were you aware of this?

Mr. Dillon. I have very recently learned that he indicated that NASA would issue a statement as such.

It was decided that the State Department would issue a statement. I hadn't been aware that he had said we were. But it had been decided and he knew it had been decided that we were going to do it.

Senator Gore. You say you very recently learned this. How recently?

Mr. Dillon. I think a day ago or two days ago that someone from the press said that he had told the press when they were there that NASA would issue a statement, so that they could get their information from NASA.

Senator Gore. Did Mr. Hagerty suggest to you that the State Department issue a statement?

Mr. Dillon. No, it was decided when we first heard of this, this news, as I said earlier this morning, at this National Security Council meeting or right after it that was held outside of Washington, that the State Department would handle the publicity on this, and that we would make any statement that would be made, and it was known at that time that we would make a statement.

Now, Mr. Hagerty was not at the Security Council meeting,

but he was at that area out there where this exercise was taking place and so he was aware of the fact that the State Department would be making a statement at noon that day at our regular press conference time.

Actually, the statement was delayed forty-five minutes. It was made at 12:45 when our regular daily press conference took place.

Senator Gore. Was it decided there that NASA would make a statement also?

Mr. Dillon. It was not to my knowledge, no. It was not decided there that NASA would make a statement.

Senator Gore. Who made that decision?

Mr. Dillon. I think that you have to ask NASA. I don't know who made any such decision.

The fact is, as I have said earlier, I thought that NASA would answer questions.

I didn't know they were going to make a statement until I saw it.

Senator Gore. You don't know whether NASA or whether Mr. Hagerty made that decision?

Mr. Dillon. I have no idea, no. I would assume NASA made it because we did know that NASA would have to answer questions because this was a NASA plane that was lost and the reporters were going to find out how high the plane flew, what kind of a plane it was, anything they knew about it and we had

given them -- the Intelligence Agency had given them good answers on how to answer such questions.

Senator Gore. You say you assume this. You did not know it?

Mr. Dillon. I knew they had given them that material. I knew that as a fact, but we did not know that they were going to use that and put it into the form of a statement as it actually came out.

Senator Gore. But Mr. Hagerty did know that a statement by NASA would be made?

Mr. Dillon. I don't know that what he said meant that he knew they were going to make a formal statement or whether he was just using that as a phrase, indicating that they would answer questions.

He may have thought they were going to make a statement. I just don't know that. He may have called them up and asked them. I don't know.

Senator Gore. Did, in fact, both the State Department and NASA make statements subject to Mr. Hagerty's notice to the press that they would do so?

Mr. Dillon. The State Department made its statement and NASA made one about three quarters of an hour later, yes.

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Senator Gore. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Williams?

Senator Williams. No questions.

The Chairman. The Senator from Ohio.

Senator Lausche. When did the Camp David meeting take place with Khrushchev?

Secretary Herter. I am terribly sorry --

Senator Lausche. When did the Camp David meeting take place with Khrushchev?

Secretary Herter. That was in September as I recall it.

Senator Lausche. Did Khrushchev since May 1st, make any statements indicating that the Soviet had knowledge of American reconnaissance planes over their territory?

Secretary Herter. None.

Senator Lausche. Based upon his statements and upon the knowledge which he claims the Soviet possess what day was it that he understood the first American plane flew over the Soviet?

Secretary Herter. I can't identify that. My recollection is that when he was in Paris he made the statement that he knew about these overflights at the time that he was at Camp David and that he thought there was something fishy about

President Eisenhower at that time.

Senator Lausche. Well, then at Camp David he did state that at that time he knew that our planes were flying over the Soviet.

Secretary Herter. That is what he said later when he got to Paris.

Senator Lausche. When he got to Paris?

Secretary Herter. When he got to Paris. He never mentioned it at Camp David or at any time between Camp David and Paris.

Senator Lausche. Well, if he knew at Camp David that our reconnaissance planes were flying over the Soviet, and he said nothing about it, can you give any reason for him remaining silent on the subject?

Secretary Herter. He was asked that question in a press conference in Paris?

(At this point, Senator Hickenlooper left the hearing room.)

I haven't got here the exact words of response but I think we could dig them out for you, and tell you just what he said in answer to that himself, but as I recollect, he said he felt that this was an inappropriate moment to bring it up but that he did think there was something fishy about the President at that time.

Senator Lausche. Then at Camp David, when he knew that our planes were flying over his land, he was discussing what

was to be the summit conference, is that correct?

Secretary Herter. What he hoped would be the summit conference.

Senator Lausche. And if we take him at his word at that time he hoped to have a summit conference although he knew then that we were supposedly committing a flagrant transgression against his rights.

Secretary Herter. That is correct, from his own later testimony.

Senator Lausche. Can you reconcile those two positions as both being true, one that he honestly intended to attend a summit conference and, two, that he knew our planes were flying over his land.

Secretary Herter. No, it would be very difficult to reconcile the two. It is very difficult particularly to reconcile the tremendous issue that he made of it later when he knew about it all the time, according to his own statement.

Senator Aiken. Will the Senator yield? You will find it on page 16 of Khrushchev's statement that Twining, then Chief of Staff sent a plane over Russia the day after he left, went into Kiev or whatever it is, it is the third paragraph on page 18.

Senator Lausche. Yes.

Your recollection is that the meeting took place last

September. ...

Secretary Herter. Yes, sir.

Senator Lausche. Now then, from September to May 14,
was that the day he came to --

Secretary Herter. May 15 he came to Paris.

Senator Lausche. He came to Paris, he said nothing about
this knowledge that he had, supposed to have had while he
was at Camp David.

Secretary Herter. That is my recollection. I would
want to check on that. It is possible that he may have
said something at the Presidium meeting before he left
Moscow. My expert here tells me he did not, and
that was my recollection that he had never mentioned it
until he got to Paris.

Senator Lausche. Can one rationalize the furor of
his resentment in May of 1960 compared to his admitted silence at
Camp David about similar flights?

Secretary Herter. No, one cannot.

Senator Lausche. Now then, last January 18, Dulles
appeared. Allen Dulles appeared before our committee, and
at that time he merely on the surface scratched what I
thought was a very vital question: The comparative ease
with which the Soviet gets information in the United States
and the impregnable wall that bars us from getting us in
the Soviet.

I ask you the question, Mr. Herter, to give your understanding of the facility with which we get the information out of the Soviet, and that which they get out of the United States.

Secretary Herter. Senator, as you know, we have what we call an open society. We are very proud of it in which we have complete freedom of the press, in which except for matters of highest security, very freely talked about, and a great deal is published.

Our technical magazines publish a great deal from the point of view of vital military information. Our installations in this country, while no direct overflights are permitted, can be photographed with comparative ease from an angle of one side.

Generally speaking we have had no restrictions at all on travel in the United States except for a few very small circumscribed areas, like the Atomic Energy Agency plants, and we have had restrictions on Soviet citizens traveling in this country which have been taken entirely as a retaliatory measure because of the limitations put on the travel of Americans in Russia.

Senator Lausche. Right.

Secretary Herter. The Soviet Society, as you know, is a closed society, where one moves and goes only where they tell you you can go or when they tell you you can go.

Senator Lausche. This morning in answer to a question, assuming that a Soviet plane was over the United States, what we would do about it, you said that there is no need of them sending planes for reconnaissance purposes because they can get that information without going through that effort.

(Senator Williams left the hearing room.)

Secretary Herter. That is quite so.

Senator Lausche. That is they can go to Cape Canaveral and pretty simply see what is going on there.

Secretary Herter. Well, sir, there are newspaper men down at Cape Canaveral all the time and a good many visitors.

Senator Lausche. Now the fact is that "The Soviets still consider that secrecy and the security of everything relating to their military operations is one of their great assets, and they have no intention whatever of changing that." Those are the words of Dulles.

"Moreover they have no intention of letting us into areas of military importance."

That is, there is a difference between the Soviet getting information here and our getting it in the Soviet.

Secretary Herter. Oh, a very great difference. It is the whole difference between an open and a closed society.

Senator Lausche. You had been asking for this Congress

to pass a bill that would give the State Department some limited control over Communists going to the Soviet Government. Is that correct?

Secretary Herter. That is correct.

Senator Lausche. And why have you asked that?

Secretary Herter. Because we felt that we ought to have some control -- these are American citizens traveling abroad -- that we ought to have some control over those who may be going to various parts of the world in interest inimical to those of the United States.

Senator Lausche. And you asked that because you have in mind the grave dangers that lie in the ability of a Communist to distribute information in the Soviet when he makes the visit, if he so desires.

Secretary Herter. Yes, sir.

Senator Lausche. That bill has not been acted upon, is that correct?

Secretary Herter. That is correct.

Senator Lausche. Is there any type of legislation that you feel that we ought to pass with respect to the curtailment of the duties of the powers of the Central Intelligence Agency or the expansion of them. If you have given that subject no thought you can state it.

(At this point, Senator Aiken left the hearing room.)

Secretary Herter. I have given it no thought. I hope there would be no change so far as the activities are concerned.

Senator Lausche. That is all I have.

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, there was one statement that I was told when I was in Paris that an account of overflights of the Russian territory had been carried in the French newspaper some 30 to 60 days prior to that.

Have you ever heard of such account?

Secretary Herter. I think I heard the same reports in Paris but I never saw any documentary proof of it.

The Chairman. Have any of your people tried to confirm it?

Secretary Herter. Yes, but I have not heard it mentioned by anyone except when I was over in Paris too, I had not heard a word before that.

The Chairman.

In his speech of May 5, Mr. Khrushchev referred to the U.S. overflight of July 2, 1956, April 9, 1960, and May 1, 1960. He said that the April 9 flight caused concern within the Soviet Government and resulted in admonishments

to the Soviet military not to let it happen again.

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3 The Chairman. This, again, raises this point that puzzles me very much. The evidence is quite clear that Mr. Khrushchev, if he didn't know positively, he certainly suspected that it was our planes that were going across his territory, didn't he?

Secretary Herter. That is what I assume.

The Chairman. And it comes back to this point that he hadn't raised such a terrible fuss about it until this one, that is the May 1st flight which he shot down. And, again, it occurs to me that -- you said you couldn't reconcile his difference in his attitude toward the prior flights to the attitude toward the May 1st flight. But isn't the reconciliation, if it is explainable at all -- I am just asking you if there is one -- does it not lie in the fact that our Government did take the position regarding the May 1st flight and this program, that this is a deliberate program which we, the President, takes responsibility for, and which we intend to continue?

Secretary Herter. Not which we intend to continue. That has never been said.

The Chairman. He interpreted it as such. Mr. Khrushchev in his statement, which I have a copy of here -- this is his language. He says -- this is a quote from part of our documents which says: "At his press conference, Herter made an outrageous statement. Far from feel guilty and ashamed of

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aggressive actions, he justifies them and says that he will continue in the future. Only countries which are in a state of war can act in this way. Herter's statement has made us doubt the correctness of our earlier conclusions that the President and the American Government did not know about the flights. Herter's statement says that this intelligence plan was endorsed by the Government."

At least that is the way he interpreted it, and, as we said before --

Senator Lausche. Who is he? Who interpreted it?

The Chairman. This is a quote from Mr. Khrushchev's statement. He is interpreting what Mr. Herter said as speaking for the Government. But is this not at least a possible reconciliation of the difference in attitude between the prior flights and the May 1st flight?

Secretary Herter. It might be if one wanted to interpret the words that I spoke that way. There was no need of his interpreting those words that way. Certainly from what I said, that is a very far-fetched interpretation. I think he was interpreting it for his own purposes that way. I think that the one reconcilable feature between those two things is that in one case he had specific evidence and in the other case he did not.

The Chairman. Then it is your position that neither your statement or the President's press conference can

5 legitimately be interpreted as an endorsement and justification of the flights and a policy of pursuing them in the future?

Secretary Herter. Certainly not the policies of pursuing them in the future. The President's statement that was made in Paris said it was perfectly clear from what I had said and from what he had said that there was nothing that allowed that inference.

The Chairman. Did you in your background news conference in Paris on Sunday, May the 15th -- I repeat the same statement that you had made prior thereto in Washington.

Secretary Herter. I was asked at that background press conference whether or not I had made a statement that we would continue doing this. I repeated the very words that I had used in my statement. I said I stood on those. That did not imply that we would continue.

The Chairman. Prior to that second statement, Mr. Khrushchev had so interpreted it. Were you aware that he had so interpreted it in his statement to the Presidium?

Secretary Herter. I think I may have been, but if one took cognizance of every interpretation of his of everything that happens in this country one would be spending all one's time trying to correct his statements.

The Chairman. You believe that it is an unreasonable and far-fetched interpretation of your statement or the President's in his press conference that these would be

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continued, is that correct?

Secretary Herter. Yes, I do.

The Chairman. Is it or is it not a fact that the press in this country interpreted it in that same fashion?

Secretary Herter. I am told that some did and some did not.

The Chairman. It might have been wise for us to clarify at that time so that we both interpreted it properly, don't you think?

Secretary Herter. That, as I think I have indicated earlier, referred to the cessation of the flights and not resuming the flights. The President had reserved to state in Paris in conjunction with the fact that he was going to offer at the United Nations his plan for aerial supervision of all nations that would be willing to submit to it.

The Chairman. Do you believe that any head of State of any important nation at least could proceed with negotiations at a conference under the situation at least as he interpreted it, that is that we intended to continue such flights?

Secretary Herter. After all, Mr. Khrushchev arrived in Paris and made an arrival statement there the Saturday before the conference saying that he expected to proceed and have fruitful results.

The Chairman. For the record, in order that it is clear

7 what is involved here, I would like to read one sentence, the one which I think you clarified that is referred to by Mr. Khrushchev, and I quote from the statement that was made by the Department of State on May the 7th.

"The necessity for such activities as measures for legitimate national defense is enhanced by the excessive secrecies practiced by the Soviet Union in contrast to the free world."

I think that is the statement that led to the interpretation, do you not?

Secretary Herter. I am sorry, sir, I have got before me now the statement of May 7. Which were those words?

The Chairman. It occurs on page 12 of the background documents prepared by the staff, the first paragraph at the top of page 12.

Secretary Herter. That does not in any way intimate that they would go on.

The Chairman. You do not believe that that could reasonably be interpreted as meaning that they will continue?

Secretary Herter. No.

The Chairman. My time is up.

Senator Wiley?

(At this point, Senator Gore withdrew from the hearing room.)

Senator Wiley. Mr. Secretary, I have listened to this examination, and as you brought out, Mr. Chairman, I think

8 that what we had better do is get down to what I think is the basic issue, not what was said or particularly done, but let's see what Khrushchev did.

On April 28th, in what has been called the speech at Baku, an examination of that speech shows clearly that the Soviet Government had come to the conclusion that it would get nowhere at the Summit Conference. Now, listen to this: "Overnight all the government-controlled radio stations" -- and get the date, May 25th -- "all the controlled radio stations and newspapers in the Soviet Union began to prepare the people for a summit failure, and flatly blamed the west. The same bitter tones which Khrushchev used in Paris is to be noted in what he said at Baku."

And Baku was days before.

"In a violent attack in Baku on Secretary Herter and under Secretary Dillon, on that same day, the Soviet Premier intimated that he planned to use military power to enforce the prospective seizure in the West."

I am quoting him.

"If the Western Powers refuse to sign a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic, they will not retain the rights and preservation on which they are insisting. They naturally will forfeit the right of access to West Berlin by land, water and air."

In another portion of his speech, the Soviet Premier

9 practically admitted that he had no hope of reaching any agreement at the Summit Conference.

He said: "The nearer the day, May 16th, the heads of Government are to meet, the more one-sided is the approach of certain statesmen of the Western powers of problems before the conference."

Then he goes ahead and gives examples attacking Herter and Dillon.

(At this point, Senator Carlson withdrew from the hearing room.)

Senator Wiley. Now, I want to quote this. This morning I called your attention to this young Russian that stepped out from the intelligence department of the Russian Government, that was heard. He said, and I quote, "The Soviet Communist regime is in no way interested in allowing so popular a man as the American President to come to the Soviet Union. They are definitely afraid of the impact such a visit can make on the people."

Now, if the issue is what caused Khrushchev to shoot his wad, so to speak, I think it is very clear that when he found out, one, that he couldn't make and impress upon his associates that were to be at the conference, two, that Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese were ready and Mao Tse-tung laced him up and down before this conference, as the record shows, when he found out that they didn't want it; and, three,

10 that he was having trouble with his own gang in Russia; and, four, that the youth of Russia were simply getting all fed up, he decided before he went to Paris that he was going to let the balloon go up.

(At this point, Senator Gore entered the hearing room.)

Senator Wiley. It wasn't the question of U-2. That may have given them the ostensible opportunity to blow his top, but, as a matter of fact, he was already to go days before. Now, if that is the fact, and I think it is sustained by the people who weigh the evidence, then there is no need of our inquiring into what some folks feel. They may be a little remiss hither and yon in our own public service. They were laboring under deep pressure. When you put yourself in the President's boots and go over there and see what he took, you have got to say, "God bless him. He held his temper and he handled himself so that he made all America and all the world proud," and the result was as suggested, that the record now shows. Look at the UN, look at Britain, what they say about it. And the answer is that I think we should just about stop our investigation and not try to ball up further the issue.

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The Chairman. For the record I will say that the President on yesterday morning, he heartily endorsed this inquiry.

Senator Wiley. That what?

The Chairman. The President himself said in my presence that he heartily endorsed this inquiry, and if the Senator wishes to take issue with the President, why I suggest he talk to him about it.

Senator Wiley. Oh, no. I heard him say that. I am not disputing his saying it. I am just simply saying that where do we go from here now?

Are we going further, are we going to try to ball up the agency that gets the information, that has done such a tremendous job that three and a half years has given us the information.

The Chairman. I think the Senator misunderstands the purpose of this meeting. It is not to ballup anything. It is to try to clarify a situation for the benefit of the committee and the Senate and the country. And I know of no one who has the slightest purpose in balling up anything.

Has the Senator completed his questions?

Senator Wiley. Yes, but I am sorry that I probably used that expression. What I meant was confuse, and if there is going to be further evidence would you mind telling

me who the next witness is?

The Chairman. There will be no other witnesses this afternoon.

Senator Wiley. Well, do you expect to call some later on?

The Chairman. Yes, Mr. Dulles is coming on Tuesday.

Senator Mansfield -- is the Senator through?

Senator Wiley. No, that is the point I am making. I want to state in all sincerity, gentlemen, it is your responsibility if you want to call this man who has created this agency under the mandate of the Congress, that we have appropriated money for, and have not tied his hands and he is the one who brought about this, let us be frank.

(Discussion off the record.)

The Chairman. The Senator is misinformed if he thinks that is going to go in the public record. There was no intention at any time of putting this in the public record.

Senator Wiley. Did you hear yesterday when the distinguished Senator from Ohio very plainly and bluntly said that the leaks, and I belong to a committee where I have seen them go right from the committee room right out in front of the fellows who have got the mechanisms for retaining the -- for giving the news -- now to me this is the first time I have blown my top but I am simply telling you in the interests of my country, I think you should not call in this

other agency. I think that these gentlemen have told what the public know now, it is all public, but to bring in this other agency, I think would be a mistake.

The Chairman. Does the Senator say, that he knows Senators who have gone out of executive sessions before the microphone and repeated what has been said here?

Senator Wiley. I am not putting my finger on any Senators. If you want to know what is going on what have they got the television out there for and you are quoted every day as appearing before it.

Let's be frank and this is not the only committee where they spill over the beans. But I am talking about the Central Intelligence Agency, gentlemen, I happen to know something about it, and I know what it means, and people over in the House know what it means, and I sincerely hope that you will not bring Dulles before you, that is all I have to say.

The Chairman. Senator Mansfield.

Senator Mansfield. Mr. Secretary, in an attempt to clarify some of the confusion which exists in some of our minds I would like to ask some questions:

What is your present official interpretation of international law as regards the extension of national sovereignty skyward.

Secretary Herter. What?

Senator Mansfield. What is our present official interpretation of international law as regards the extension of national sovereignty skyward?

Secretary Herter. I don't think we have any.

Senator Mansfield. We have no international law in that field as yet.

Secretary Herter. That I know of. There is no definition as to what is considered the atmosphere above the air. There is no accepted interpretation or verbiage when they are talking about the atmosphere.

Senator Mansfield. Would you think it advisable to have an international conference or conferences to decide the question of Sovereignty in the air over a country and also the possibility of regulating the seas in a more orderly fashion.

Secretary Herter. Well, as you know, we have tried for over a year to get the United Nations to get the outer space committee organized and under way.

Senator Mansfield. At our suggestion.

Secretary Herter. At our urging. We have been urging that this be done. We have been pressing it. We have not been able to make any headway because it was refused continually by the Russians who refused to go along, first of all on the principles of the thing. There have been further discussions of the thing but we have been unable

to agree on who should carry it out. I think we are making progress but it is still one of those things where there is a constant dispute as to what should be done.

Not only that but we hope to get it adjusted in time so that this year there can be a great international scientific Congress because you're dealing with now matters that the scientists are expert in that the layman is not, and they were unable to even allow the calling of that Congress.

Senator Mansfield. No, in other words, as yet there is no clarification of this particular matter.

Getting back to my statement concerning regulation of the seas, we, of course, operate under the doctrine of freedom of the seas. But what I have in mind is the fact that it is my understanding that the Soviet Union can launch missiles anywhere it wants to up within, say, three miles of our coastline if it is in our vicinity, and we have the same right under international law to fire missiles up to three miles, say, of Valdivostok, is that correct?

Secretary Herter. Yes, and it depends again on what one takes as the territorial waters. Three miles have been the generally accepted territorial limit. The Soviet Government has claimed 12 miles and, as you know, the recent Geneva Conference failed in reaching agreement among the

nations as to what should constitute the territorial water of different nations.

Some nations have gone much farther than that, particularly with regard to fishing rights.

Senator Mansfield. That's right, but what I have in mind is that times have changed considerably, even in our generation.

Mr. Chairman, may we have order in the committee?

The Chairman. It is difficult to have order.

Senator Mansfield. In view of the fact we have these satellites going skyward hundreds of miles and we have these missiles going thousands of miles into the ocean, 9,000 miles was the limit, it was because of these new factors that I offered the suggestion that it might be well to have international conferences to take heed of changed conditions in this modern day.

We have also advocated as you are aware of, peaceful uses of outer space and we have made no headway.

The Chairman. Senator Gore?

Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, the first question I wish to pursue leads to a question of Mr. Bohlen, since others have asked him questions and I wonder if I might ask if he return.

Mr. Secretary, Secretary Dillon testified this morning that he did not know of this particular flight, and to the best of my memory you said you were away at a time and did not know of this particular flight.

Secretary Herter. I knew of the program, I made that clear in which the flight was included but not that particular flight.

Senator Gore. I was specifying this particular flight. Did I correctly understand both of you?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, Senator. I had heard that there was a series of flights about -- that would be undertaken about six weeks earlier is when I heard of it, and I had not heard anything since that time but it was not in my regular order of business.

Senator Gore. Would you repeat what you said, I didn't quite catch it.

Mr. Dillon. I said I was informed about six weeks before the date of this flight, I say, that there was a program of particular flights of which this one could have been a part, and I did --

Senator Gore. It could have been but you did not know of

this particular one.

Mr. Dillon. No, I did not know any more than that of this particular flight.

Senator Gore. The President, in his statement to the American people, the other night, said this:

"As to the timing, the question was really whether to halt the program and thus forego the gathering of important information that was essential, and that was likely to be unavailable at a later date. The decision was that the program should not be halted."

Now, as I understood your reply to the Chairman of the Committee, you did not participate in the making of a decision to halt or not to halt this particular flight.

Secretary Herter. I had approved of it.

Senator Gore. On this particular program.

Secretary Herter. And approved of it as a part of the program. The question of the halting of it was not in issue at that time although I know that the Summit Conference was coming.

Senator Gore. Well, my specific question is this: Did you participate in a conference or were you aware of a decision, did you make a decision? What is the full extent of your knowledge of a decision that the flight would not be discontinued.

Secretary Herter. I know of no conference at which that matter was discussed.

Senator Gore. Then would it have properly been --

Secretary Herter. The only matter that came before me was the approval of this program.

Senator Gore. How long ago did you approve the program?

Secretary Herter. I can't tell you exactly but it was some time prior to the time I went abroad.

Senator Gore. Is it a matter of weeks?

Secretary Herter. A matter of weeks.

Senator Gore.

Would such a decision have been properly within the province of the State Department?

Secretary Herter. No. The State Department would not have a final decision in the matter. The State Department would have an advisory position in the matter, and the CIA and

that have been made here today either before noon or since imply the opinion of any of our colleagues that we are doing other than performing our duty as we see it.

I understood the purpose of this hearing was to develop the facts insofar as we were capable of doing so, and to the extent that security would permit, to make available the facts to the American people.

Do I correctly understand the purpose of the hearing?

The Chairman. The Senator from Tennessee understands it as I understand it in spite of the opinion of the Senator from Wisconsin.

Senator Lausche. May I ask, is it --

Senator Wiley.

You might as well just now.

Senator Lausche. Is it confined to what our government has done or are we concerned about what the Soviet has done?

The Chairman. I certainly am concerned about what the Soviet has done.

Senator Lausche. It hasn't been manifested here today.

The Chairman. The Senator from Tennessee has the floor.

Senator Wiley. May I just say one thing?

The Chairman. Does the Senator yield to the Senator from Wisconsin?

Senator Wiley. As long now the storm is over, I realize when I hit the ceiling before, that I was probably not as coherent as I should be. I want to say to you with the conviction of a man who has lived long, that the business of

a committee like ours is to develop facts for legislation. Develop facts that are necessary to bring out curative legislation, or if you please, if you want to investigate an individual, that is another thing. We had the McCarthy hearings. We know what that did, but here is another angle.

It is not the business of this committee to expose to the people of this country, a mechanism that is so important to preserve the life and integrity of this country, and I mean the CIA, I know what it means, I happen to know something about what it has done,

and to me, at least, and as I say, as a young man of past 70 summers, please remember that when you go into this thing, as you are going into it, you are going to expose a mechanism that is as vital to the life of this country as anything you can think of.

It is that mechanism that made possible this series of three and a half years of exploratory missions over the Soviet Union.

If that is what you are going into, just count your words.

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Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. The Senator from Tennessee.

Senator Gore. Dealing with the CIA is not a new experience for me. I happen to have handled in the House of Representatives the appropriation Bill for the Atomic Energy Commission, for five years before I was elected to the United States Senate.

I was party to the appropriation for the Atomic Energy Program when the Atomic Energy bomb was being built in my State. No one ever heard those secrets from my lips and every year for the past fourteen, every year I have listened to the testimony of the CIA from one to two or three or more times. I don't think that it is necessary that we violate the security of this country in order to hear Mr. Allen Dulles' testimony.

The Chairman. Will the Senator yield? Mr. Dulles said to this Committee when he was asked if he would appear, that he would be very pleased to appear. He thought it would serve a useful purpose. He had no objection.

Senator Gore. I will not continue this dialog. I didn't want any implication to rest that because I was pursuing some of the very important questions that reflect upon the effectiveness of our country and the prestige of our country, that there was something unpatriotic or partisan in the purpose.

I thought this was the purpose of the hearing, to develop the facts, and so far as they could be revealed to the public, to do so.

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The Chairman. The Senator is quite right.

Senator Gore.

To return to the question, insofar as either of you know or any official of the Department, no actual decision to proceed with the flight or not to proceed with the flight was made.

If such a decision was made, it was beyond your knowledge. Is that a correct statement?

Secretary Herter. Yes, I think that I ought to say this. When the matter came before me, I had an opportunity of disapproving it and did not do so. Not it, but the program.

Senator Gore. But this particular flight did not come before you?

Secretary Herter. As one of a group.

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Senator Gore. When did you first learn of its misfortune?

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Secretary Herter. I received word in Ankara, Turkey that a plane was down. That is all.

Senator Gore. From whom did you receive it?

Secretary Herter. It was handed to me from a slip of paper that Mr. Livingston Merchant had. He was sitting behind me at a NATO meeting and he handed me a slip of paper, "word has come that

a plane is missing.

I don't think he said in Russia. I didn't know which one of the flights it was.

Senator Gore. Is it your presumption that this was communication within the Department?

Secretary Herter. Oh, yes. I assume it was either in the Department or from CIA sources with whom we are constantly in touch overseas.

Senator Gore. I believe my time is up. I will return to this.

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The Chairman. You had one question of Mr. Bohlen. He was called back at your request.

Senator Gore. Yes. If I may digress a moment, I have been told several times, Mr. Bohlen, that in your press briefing at Paris, I believe on this 16th, that you expressed the view that except for the U-2 plane, there would have been a Summit Conference.

Will you relate to us what you said at this briefing in this regard?

Mr. Bohlen. I don't recall, Senator, honestly that I made that statement --

Senator Wiley. A little louder, please.

Mr. Bohlen. I don't recall that I made that statement. The press briefing that I held on the 16th was an open press

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conference on the record, and I do not recall any statement of that kind because my view then as now is that the U-2 was one of the factors that may have led to the particular Soviet behavior at Paris.

I really do not recall any such statement of that kind. Its all on the record. This was an open press conference.

Senator Gore. You did not hold an off the record background briefing?

Mr. Bohlen. I held a background later in which I outlined at that conference the three factors that I believed and still do entered into the formulation of the Soviet position.

Senator Gore. Was a transcript made of that background briefing?

Mr. Bohlen. I would have to check on that, sir. I think there probably was.

Senator Gore. Would you supply it to the Committee if there was?

Mr. Bohlen. If there is one, I would have no views on it.

Secretary Herter. I would have no objection.

Mr. Bohlen. If there is a transcript of it, but I recall the circumstances very well in this, in that three factors that I mentioned earlier, the Soviet pessimism as regards the outcome of the Summit from their point of view; the possible opposition or questioning of its conduct and the U-2 matters were the three factors that appeared to me to have entered into Soviet

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decision to torpedo the conference.

I might add, Senator, for clarification on this, we have used the words "scuttle the conference" quite often

There are various ways of scuttling a conference. You can scuttle a conference before it begins or you can sabotage it from within,

Senator Gore. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

The Chairman. Does the Senator from Ohio have any further questions?

Senator Lausche. Mr. Herter, I have in my hand the National Security Act of 1947, and I have read from page 5 that part of the material which deals with the duties of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Are the duties enumerated in this section complete?

Secretary Herter. Yes, I think those are enumerated in that section.

Senator Lausche. This section didn't place any directions on how intelligence is to be obtained.

Secretary Herter. No.

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Senator Lausche. Based upon the questions that have been asked here today, one set implied that the President should not have told the truth. The next set implied that one of the men lied. And the third set implied that there was an inability to coordinate the views.

Now, my question is -- off the record.

The Chairman. Take it off the record.

We will make a special dispensation. Whatever the Senator wishes, does he wish it on or off?

Senator Lausche. Let it on. Has anyone given any thought about the peculiar position that the President of the United States is placed in in connection with the paradoxical situation that he is supposed to be a man of truth, and moral character, and yet requested to lie about these matters, if they are within his knowledge?

Secretary Herter. I am not sure whether that is a rhetorical question or whether you are asking me that question.

Senator Lausche. Well, take it both ways.

(Laughter.)

Senator Gore. Rhetorical or oratorical.

(Laughter.)

Senator Lausche. Well, let's assume that you were the President, Mr. Herter, and you were faced with the dilemma of telling a lie about what happened or telling the truth. In either event you are hooked. What course would you follow?

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Secretary Herter. I can answer that one so far as I myself am concerned.

The Chairman. He followed both.

Senator Lausche. I don't know. I am beginning to wonder what the Central Intelligence Agency is doing ought not to be a matter left with them and without the knowledge of the President.

I have no other questions.

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I just want to make a comment. The Senator from Ohio has put his finger on the very point that perhaps I didn't make clear to him earlier in my inquiry. This is in my opinion a central important question about this whole matter. Is the wisdom of the policy of involving the President in this kind of business, that is espionage, which traditionally involve lying and cheating and murdering and violating the sovereignty of countries with which you are not at war and all of this, and what the Senator has said -- is perhaps, I didn't make it clear, but this is exactly the point that I was seeking to raise and to elucidate in the first line of questions that I asked. And I agree with him this presents a very difficult dilemma, and the question is the wisdom of departing from the traditional historical practice of not involving the head of the state in any espionage responsibilities, that he is above and apart from. We follow that in the Congress, as

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you have just stated.

We treat it differently, and I was suggesting and raising the question of whether it is wise to depart from the traditional practice that all important states throughout history, without exception in accordance with the Secretary's testimony have followed, and this is the very point. I don't think the Senator understood what my point was.

Senator Lausche. I knew if I were President --

Senator Wiley. You would tell the truth.

Senator Lausche. I would tell the truth.

Senator Wiley. So did he.

The Chairman. He did and this is the answer.

Senator Lausche. And could you not expect him to do anything else?

Senator Wiley. That is right.

Senator Lausche. And the only way you could enable him to perform his duty to his country was not by having him know what was done and if he didn't know the questions would be pursued why didn't he know.

Senator Wiley. He taught the world a lesson in 1960, new diplomacy, by telling the truth, and I think that it will echo down through the years.

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Senator Lausche. So I don't know which group to follow.

The Chairman. It is echoing down the years already. This is the principal echo that has arisen from this whole matter.

Senator Lausche. The tragedy is that this is made the principal echo but all of the misdeeds of the Soviet are looked upon as inconsequential.

The Chairman. Well, the Senator is entirely incorrect in that statement. He draws conclusions that are not justified by the record or any statement that I have heard before the Committee.

Senator Lausche. Well, I can --

Senator Mansfield. Can I ask a question?

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The Chairman. Do I understand Mr. Allen's statement on the television program was not approved by you or by the Acting Secretary?

Secretary Herter. No. As I understand it, this was in answer to a question on a TV program.

Senator Mansfield. Yes. I think we have the program here. But could somebody on the staff find it right away so that I could read it just as it is?

The Chairman. Well, Mr. Secretary, while they are looking for it, is it or is it not the policy of the Department of State that its employees clear public statements with regard to delicate international relations before they make them?

Secretary Herter. Yes, sir.

6 The Chairman. It is the policy?

Secretary Herter. It is. Any statement dealing with foreign affairs should be cleared with the State Department.

The Chairman. Then when they are made in this fashion without clearance, it is not in accord with your policy, is that correct?

Secretary Herter. Well. as I say, this had not been cleared with us.

The Chairman. He is an employee --

Secretary Herter. I think it is very possible that a prepared statement had been cleared, but not an answer to a question. There is no way of clearing that, until one knows what question is asked.

The Chairman. What I asked this for is because later on it seems to me one of the important things that might come out of this Committee hearing is a tightening of the policy which gives the Department of State and the Secretary of State a much closer control over public statements by other agencies, and it strikes me that we would get in much less trouble if all these people would clear with you or with whoever is secretary of state or the department, we will say. Don't you think that would minimize the chances of inconsistent statements being made by members of the Government?

Secretary Herter. Yes, that is so. But I think that anything that he may have said in a prepared statement on that

7 TV program at that time had been cleared. Insofar as answers to questions are concerned, there is no way of clearing them without knowing the answer and in that way he was on his own.

The Chairman. It is his responsibility, then, when he goes beyond anything that had been cleared?

Secretary Herter. Yes.

Senator Mansfield. Mr. Chairman, on page 35 of the background document on the Summit Conference, about 7 or 8 lines up from the bottom of the page, Mr. Allen, in response to a question from Miss Dodd states the following: "There are a lot of different definitions of 'spying' and I don't want to try to quibble, but I do think I ought to point this out and that more people ought to recall it: When he went down he told exactly what his mission was and exactly what he was expected to do, and he was under instruction to do that."

Now, the Secretary's answer to the question, I just thought it ought to be in the record, because there was some confusion about this statement in view of information which had been given to a group previously in the Capitol. Again, I want to say, Mr. Chairman, that I am through with my questions of Mr. Herter, but I want to express my thanks to Secretary Herter, to Secretary Dillon and to Ambassador Bohlen for their candor and frankness today and to assure them

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that I, for one, appreciate what they had to say, and I think they have made a real contribution to clearing up a confused situation which confronted the Committee as a whole.

Secretary Herter. We are very grateful for that, Senator.

Senator Wiley, Of course, on this side of the aisle, I have praised your statement in the beginning and I will praise your conduct in the conclusion. You all did very well.

Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Senator Gore.

Senator Gore. I do not wish to unduly tire the Secretary, but I am perfectly willing to come back after dinner or to come back tomorrow. I do have many more questions.

The Chairman. Well, it is my understanding the Secretary, he looks very well to me, if he prefers to go on tonight -- He does not wish to run over to next week.

Secretary Herter. I prefer to go on, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Gore. I don't think it will take very long tonight.

The Chairman. The Senator may proceed.

Senator Gore. Fine.

(At this point, Senator Lausche withdrew from the hearing room.)

Senator Gore. I wish to resume my inquiry with respect

9 to this particular flight. I am perturbed that you say it would not be within the province of the Department of State to make the decision to discontinue these flights; that this would be the decision, a decision for Mr. Dulles to make.

Secretary Herter. No, I never said that at all.

Senator Gore. I beg your pardon?

Secretary Herter. I never said that at all. I said he was the operational man who had to plan things, and then submit them for approval.

Senator Gore. Well, who would make -- who would be the proper agency to consider whether these flights should or should not be discontinued?

Secretary Herter. If the question of discontinuance had come up, if that was a decision to be made, we would have been asked advice on it. We were not asked for advice on it. We gave approval to carry on with the routine planning that had been done from the point of view of flight.

Senator Gore. Some weeks prior?

Secretary Herter. Yes, and had given that approval.

Senator Gore. Did that approval --

Secretary Herter. That approval, as I say, is advice.

Senator Gore. Was advice?

Secretary Herter. Is advice. The President himself took the responsibility for any final decision.

10 Senator Gore. Was your approval -- did your approval
involve continuation of the flight through and during
the period of the Summit Conference?

Secretary Herter. Not specifically as such. The approval
constituted going ahead when conditions were appropriate
for carrying them out.

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Senator Gore. Did you give no consideration to discontinuance at a time prior to the Summit meeting or during the Summit conference?

Secretary Herter. Senator, I answered that question before when I said that there is no good time for a failure, that if the Summit conference had debarred carrying out these flights the President's visit to Russia may have been the next thing that might have debarred them.

It may have been debarred when Khrushchev was at Camp David; it may have been debarred when Mr. Khrushchev was visiting in France.

There may have been any number of diplomatic reasons why they shouldn't be conducted at a given period of time.

In my opinion, the value of the information and the necessity of carrying out these flights under given conditions warranted their going ahead.

Senator Gore. I am trying to be specific in my questions, and I am trying to elicit from you whether at the time you gave your approval for the general program some weeks prior to this particular flight, you gave specific consideration to the question of continuance or discontinuance during or near the time of the Summit conference.

Secretary Herter. Certainly. The Summit conference was very much on my mind as it was on everybody's mind, at that time.

Senator Gore. And you gave your approval then?

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Secretary Herter. I did.

Senator Gore. To their continuation throughout the Summit conference?

Secretary Herter. That was never specified as such.

Senator Gore. In other words, you are saying then that there was no decision to discontinue?

Secretary Herter. That is right.

Senator Gore. Then if any decision to discontinue or if any decision was made not to continue, to use the words, you are not aware of it?

Secretary Herter. No. The only decision that I know of at any stage of the game was to go ahead.

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Senator Gore. That is fine. Another statement which the President made, I would like to read:

"Of course, we had no indication or thought that basic Soviet policy had turned about. But when there is even the slightest chance of strengthening peace, there could be no higher obligation than to pursue it."

Now, on page 4 of your statement here today, I would like to read. This is on page 4, beginning "On the Summit Prospects."

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the second, third, fourth and fifth paragraphs on page 4 be printed, reprinted at this point in the record.

The Chairman. Without objection it is so ordered.

(The paragraphs referred to are as follows:)

In the first weeks after the Khrushchev American visit there was a general improvement of atmosphere and people began talking, partly in hope, partly in some confusion, about "detente". There were comparatively conciliatory speeches on each side; there was progress in the test-ban talks at Geneva; a new Soviet-US cultural agreement was signed November 21, and on December 1 the US, the USSR and other powers signed the Antarctic treaty.

But clouds began to gather even then. One of the earliest signs was the strong Soviet protest on November 11 against West German plans to build a broadcasting station in West Berlin. Another was the Khrushchev speech on November 14 which was harder in tone, boasted again of Soviet missile prowess, and began a concentrated attack on Adenauer and the German Federal Republic which later increased and seemed to be a central feature of Soviet pre-Summit tactics. The reason for this attack is still a matter for speculation. Perhaps they thought it would undermine the Western position on Berlin by helping to divide the Western Allies. It had no such effect of course, but naturally rallied us to speak out in defense of our German ally.

Khrushchev as early as December 1 also began repeating his threats to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. He repeated these threats in his speech to the Supreme Soviet on January 14 and in his remarks during his visit to Indonesia and other countries in January. On February 4, the Warsaw Pact powers issued the first formal bloc-wide commitment to sign a separate GDR peace treaty. Thus Khrushchev's threatening Baku speech of April 25, though it was the most sweeping since February 1959, was only a harsher version of what he had been saying for months before. I shall make full documentation on his speeches available to the Committee.

Not until April did we reply at length to this mounting crescendo of Soviet statements. We did so in order to keep the record straight -- notably in the speeches of April 4 and 20, which Khrushchev attacked for starting arguments that he in fact had begun.

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Senator Gore. You will see from this statement, Mr. Secretary, that you contradict the President's statement, do you not?

The President says:

"We had no occasion or thought that basic Soviet policy had turned about."

You say from what I have just read, you list one, two, three, four occasions that the Soviet policy had, in fact, changed.

Do you wish to comment?

Secretary Herter. Yes, I would be very glad to comment.

I don't think that there is any essential disagreement in the two points of view.

I am talking primarily in my statement in regard to Berlin and Germany.

The President was talking about a series of things in which he spoke of disarmament, mutual inspection, atomic control, and then he added Germany and Berlin.

As I testified earlier in the day, I think we all had hopes that there might be a possibility of making some progress, even though not in the German-Berlin situation, but in the disarmament field, and as a correlary possibly in the nuclear testing field where it was not a Summit problem, but it would have been a three power problem that could have been discussed in Paris.

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For instance, so long as there was any hope of making any progress, the President was willing to go.

Senator Gore. I didn't question the President being willing to go so long as there was any hope of progress.

What I was asking you to comment on was what appears to me to be a contrast between the President's statement that there is no indication that basic Soviet policy had turned about, and you give almost a full page, indicating that they had turned about. But you have finished your comment on that.

Secretary Herter. Yes, there was some talk here about basic policy and tactics in connection with the Summit. I don't think the President felt it necessarily that basic policy had changed.

I think as he said after Camp David, he hoped that there was a mutuality of interest, particularly in the disarmament field, which would allow the great powers getting together in order to make progress in disarmament.

That had always been the area in which he hoped, because of the mutuality of interest, that we might make progress.

I don't think that there is anything fundamentally opposed in these two statements.

Senator Gore. Now, I want to ask a few questions which relate to the first of the three questions which I wish to examine your opinion; that is whether the diplomatic failure in Paris represented a failure in policy.

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You recall that I submitted certain questions to you here on March 22nd. At that time I asked you:

"Do you think it would have been more prudent to have had an understanding about the subjects to be considered at a Summit conference before agreeing to have one, or do you think this is the proper way to keep the store?

"Secretary Herter. It is a gamble. I don't know.

"Senator Gore. You are gambling with high stakes, and it seems to me in a reckless manner. I am disturbed to have the Secretary of State make the statements that you have made today about the Summit conference; that there is no plan, no purpose, no understanding as to what will be discussed and what we hope to attain there.

"Secretary Herter. Mr. Senator, I view this as essentially a matter of exploration. We have the situation where an individual, Mr. Khrushchev, is the man who makes the decisions so far as we know, for the Russians."

Later on, I asked you:

"Is there any reason why the Russian dictator could not delegate the same power to his Foreign Minister as President Eisenhower should or does delegate to you?

"Secretary Herter. None.

"Senator Gore. Then isn't that a fallacious argument?

"Secretary Herter. Not necessarily, because you are dealing with an individual personality who many believe wants

s9 to be the negotiator."

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Now, I read those things because one of the principal, if not the principal justification for going to the Summit and for the exchange of visits was that Mr. Khrushchev and he alone spoke for the Russian people, but today you tell us on page 7:

"I might digress here to observe that it had been our experience at previous conferences with the Soviets, at least since the death of Stalin, that the Soviet representative, no matter how highly placed he may be, was bound by the collective decisions and basic policy matters made prior to his departure from Moscow.

"Any substantive changes in those positions apparently required reference back to Moscow before they could be undertaken," and then on page 8, you say:

"This meeting completely confirmed our conclusion of the flight before that Mr. Khrushchev was operating within the fixed limits of a policy set before his departure from Moscow."

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Secretary Herter. There appears to be an inconsistency in those two statements.

When I was testifying here before, the visits of Mr. Khrushchev in which sometimes he had an important person with him and sometimes he did not --

Senator Gore. In which, what, sir?

Secretary Herter. Sometimes in which he had an important person with him and sometimes he did not, indicated that his situation at home was such that he had a great deal more leeway than had previously been the case.

When he went to Paris, and I think this has been brought out, he had with him Gromyko and Malinovsky, General Malinovsky, Marshal Malinovsky, who never left him for one moment at any time. This was a departure from previous occasions. This is why we said they had gone back to their standard policy of taking directions from home.

Prior to that time I had believed he had greater leeway than was clearly indicated here in Paris.

Senator Gore. So the assumption proved to be erroneous.

Secretary Herter. It is.

Senator Gore. I believe you testified before the House, according to press reports yesterday that summitry as a diplomatic method had had some hard knocks.

Secretary Herter. Yes, I did.

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In answer to a question from Senator Humphrey, I repeated the same thing today.

Senator Gore. And in recommending, which I certainly endorse, continuing businesslike negotiation with the Soviets, you have in mind the more usual processes and procedures of diplomacy.

Secretary Herter. That is correct.

Senator Gore. Negotiations.

Secretary Herter. The one thing that I did point out, however, is that with regard to the Berlin situation there that is Great Britain, France, the United States and Russia. This is the carry-over from the war.

Senator Gore. Yes.

Secretary Herter. And that there, there must be agreement. This is a thing we have been fighting all the time, that unilateral action by the Russians cannot take away those rights and obligations which they as well as ourselves had acquired as a result of the war.

That it must be done by the consent of the four.

So that whether or not in the future the discussions to bring the four together should take place through diplomatic channels, through Ambassadorial level, through foreign minister or not, I would not say which would be the level, but I think that it is much better to see if we can not, as we did in the foreign ministers' conference, and failed, try to come together prior to the meeting of a summit

conference so that there might be one or two small unresolved issues that could be resolved there rather than trying to negotiate when you know that you are very far apart at a summit conference.

Senator Gore. Well, I hope that you will persist, and that the President will persist in the businesslike undertakings. I will not ask you to say that summitry apart from diplomacy failed. I am content with your statement in that regard. I am sorry that I think it did fail.

Secretary Herter. I would differ with you, sir, on the question of personal diplomacy as against summitry. I think that visits, are, on the whole useful things.

I wouldn't say that that was something that should be discarded completely. I think it is particularly true that visits of ministers of foreign affairs, and visits of heads of state from time to time can accomplish a great deal of good. But I believe very strongly that insofar as heads of state are concerned that is not the place to begin negotiations. It is the place perhaps where there should be the culmination of negotiations.

Senator Gore. I will agree with you in that statement. The exchange of visits offers opportunities. But for the formalization of a head of state conference, where severe international tensions are involved, without precise planning, without assurance that at least limited agreements can be reached, is, in my view, a dangerous process, and a

policy upon which we should never have embarked.

Of course, it is easier to say that now than it was before.

Hindsight, of course, we learned a longtime ago, is better than foresight.

The Chairman. Would the Senator yield for a moment? I have one or two questions and then he may come back to it.

Senator Gore. Good.

The Chairman. These I think have been covered but for clarification, I might ask them again. Was there ever a time when the President authorized each flight in this program, that's never been the practice.

Secretary Herter. It has never come up to the President.

The Chairman. Nor of the National Security Council.

Secretary Herter. No.

The Chairman. It has always been under a blanket authority understood?

Secretary Herter. That is my impression.

The Chairman. Is this blanket authorization under review, either constant review or periodic review?

Secretary Herter. In my experience the CIA has planned a number of alternate flights at a time.

The Chairman. When the Department brought Mr. Bohlen back from Manila and he was well known as an expert on Soviet behavior, and this was, I thought, in anticipation of these summit meetings which had been discussed a long time, did he or any other of our Russian experts advise you or the President to wait and see what Mr. Khrushchev knew about the U-2 flight before making the NASA statement?

Mr. Dillon. The people in the Department who were familiar with Soviet policy took part in discussions with the CIA which led to the coordination and the agreement on the guide lines which were given to NASA, and those included the people who were familiar with all aspects of our policy.

However, as we said before, we did not know that there was going to be a full statement by NASA.

The Chairman. Mr. Bohlen was not consulted about the NASA statement.

Mr. Dillon. Nobody in the State Department was consulted about the statement as a statement.

The Chairman. Nobody.

What puzzles me about this is why was there such compulsion, if there was, to make such an immediate reaction? I have wondered why there was any necessity for immediately

reacting to the first Khrushchev statement.

It would seem to me much more normal to wait a while and see what developed.

Was there anything that was compelling you to answer almost immediately?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, I would say so. It was such an unusual and remarkable statement when Mr. Khrushchev said that American plane had been shot down over the Soviet Union, that we were not in the position to not make any comment whatsoever.

As a result we had to make some comment, and we made the very bland statement which was put out on the 5th.

The Chairman. I didn't mean that. You misunderstood me. I accept the necessity for the cover story, the statement.

Mr. Dillon. Yes.

The Chairman. It is the second one that went into such detail. It would seem to me that order, it would be common sense not to follow up too quickly in the matter of typing. What was the reason for that?

Mr. Dillon. The State Department's second statement was innocuous too. It didn't go into any detail, any more detail than the original cover story did. There was great -- if any detail, that was the statement that was put out

by NASA.

The Chairman. Is it not true that the NASA statement itself is what put you in a position of having to make a further statement?

Is that true?

Mr. Dillon. The further statement, I think, was the next statement in this series, was the one that was put out on Saturday which was made only at the time when we knew that the Soviets probably had the pilot, which was new information, and then the Soviets had already said they had him, and had said where he was shot down, and we knew they had certain, the probability was that they had certain parts of the airplane because the picture which they had first put out turned out to be a fraudulent picture.

The Chairman. I perhaps don't understand the timing of it.

It seems to me, if I do understand it, that you could have stood upon the cover story for some time before the necessity of any further statement, await developments.

Mr. Dillon. You mean, your question is why we made the statement on Saturday May 7, which was the first time we departed from the cover story.

The Chairman. Yes, sir.

Secretary Herter. That, as I think I have testified

before, was a decision that was made in the light of the very full revelation of Mr. Khrushchev in giving out, both as to the pilots' testimony, and as to the parts and equipment that had been recovered. That was when we had to make the decision were we going to keep on lying about this or were we going to tell the truth?

The Chairman. Why wasn't there a third alternative is what I am trying to get at?

Why didn't you just be quiet and say nothing? You don't have just the alternatives of either continuing to lie or tell the truth?

You could have said nothing. I was just curious, was this ever considered that you didn't have to react?

Secretary Herter. A good many statements were already being made in Congress, a good many statements were already being made or required of us almost.

The press was hounding everybody, "What do you say now after what Mr. Khrushchev had said", it was a very difficult time in our society, our form of society to have said nothing.

The Chairman. I believe that was the statement in which you said "It has been established that insofar as the authorities were concerned in Washington there was no authorization for such flights", is that correct?

Secretary Herter. That is right.

The Chair~~man~~. Which was not a truthful statement at that point, was there?

Secretary Herter. No, this was still partly cover.

The Chairman. Still partly cover?

Secretary Herter. Still partly cover. It was not until Monday, after the briefing had taken place before the Congressional leadership here on the hill that the full statement was made.

The Chair~~man~~. It was after that statement that the full statement was made.

Secretary Herter. That is correct.

The Chairman. Was that full statement if I understood it, I think you have testified, was only after complete and thorough consultation with everyone concerned, and had the unanimous support of state and the President, is that correct?

Secretary Herter. It is, yes.

The Chairman. Senator Gore, go ahead.

Senator Gore. Well, when you made the final statement that the President did approve, he was responsible, I am not undertaking to quote you exactly, you also made it plain that he did not approve specific flights?

Secretary Herter. Yes.

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Senator Gore. I will wait until his testimony.

Now, I wish to make my own feelings explicit. I have not intended to suggest, nor do I believe the Chairman or anyone else has intended to suggest, that the President or any other official of the United States Government tell a falsehood. I don't know of any requirement in Anglosaxon jurisprudence or any other jurisprudence stemming from Roman law that a citizen is required to incriminate himself. I know of no requirement that a nation is required to incriminate or denigrate or defame itself. I do not claim any sense of morals or sensitivity to moral standards greater than the average American, but I want the record to show that I was humiliated with official falsification, and I think millions of Americans were humiliated. I can agree with you that our alliance stood firm. I am happy that it did, but I think we would be deluding ourselves if we did not realize that this unfortunate incident has dealt a severe blow to the moral position of the United States. I think we should begin to mend it. The way to mend it is to ferret out our errors and our mistakes, correct them, and thereby demonstrate to the world our will and our capacity to survive this kind of blow, and I hope be stronger thereafter.

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, there was one point that I overlooked. I had heard that Chairman Khrushchev had directly or indirectly made some inquiry about the

2 possibility of meeting Mr. Eisenhower before the Summit meeting. Do you know whether or not that is so?

Secretary Herter. No. I know of no such effort.

The Chairman. No effort?

Secretary Herter. Actually, Mr. Khrushchev, when he came to Paris, or just before he came to Paris, sent a note to the British and to the French, I think, largely on a procedural matter, no such note to us. When the President arrived in Paris, there was just as much opportunity for Mr. Khrushchev to seek a meeting with him as with Macmillan or de Gaulle, and no such effort was made from any Russian source.

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, have you drawn any inferences from this whole event relative to the military preparedness of the Soviet Union?

Secretary Herter. Of course my judgment would not be as good as that of experts. And here, again, I wouldn't want to give my judgment as a considered judgment from the point of view of the record. There is no question but what the Russians are very active in certain directions, and that the intelligence that has been gained with regard to that activity has been of very great value to us. And I think that is as far as I should go.

The Chairman. Any further questions?

Senator Wiley. Is the cold war still on or is it over?

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Secretary Herter. It remains to be seen.

Senator Wiley. Then we had better give primary attention to the main issue, instead of quarreling about who is who and what is what in relation to handling situations. It was your judgment, it isn't my judgment. It isn't the business of every little one in the Senate to tell you what you should do. It is your business, sir.

The Chairman. Senator Mansfield, do you have any questions?

Senator Mansfield. No.

Senator Gore. Off the record, Mr. Chairman.

(Discussion off the record.)

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The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, one last thing. Do you think we have learned, not just we but all of us including you and the Administration, anything from the U-2 incident?

Secretary Herter. Not to have accidents?

The Chairman. Is that all we have learned?

Senator Gore: Not what?

Mr. Macomber. Not to have accidents.

The Chairman. Do you think that is the only lesson we can draw from these events?

Secretary Herter. Mr. Chairman, I think that anyone would be foolish to say that with hindsight one couldn't have done better than when one is faced with certain events at a given

5 time. I think obviously we should be giving serious consideration to the very best method of the handling of anything of this kind that might happen in the future, and I think from that point of view, as the President said, we welcome this inquiry. We welcome a full disclosure as far as we could, from the point of view of responsibilities and coordination. I thank you for your patience here today.

The Chairman. I want to thank you for your patience and your frankness and candor. I think you and your associates, Secretary Dillon and Mr. Bohlen, have been most cooperative in this whole hearing. I like to think that out of this one, as you know, rather pet project of mine is that the State Department itself be given greater prestige and authority in controlling and coordinating all matters relating to our foreign relations.

As I have tried in the case, for example, one recent example was the control of the black market in Turkey. I think your Department, the Department of State, ought to have more authority than we have in the past accorded it. I am sure that some of our troubles do not relate to any fault on your part, but to the sort of institutional practices that have grown up and people assuming authority to make statements without you or without consulting you and the Department. I feel at this stage of the proceedings that this may be one

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of the good things that will come out of these hearings, that the prestige and authority of the State Department will be enhanced.

Secretary Herter. Thank you.

The Chairman. Thank you very much.

Senator Gore. Could I join you in commending the Secretary and his assistants for their candor and their patience and their diligence here today.

Secretary Herter. Thank you.

Senator Wiley. May I also join you the third time by saying in my humble opinion the evidence and the statement you made and the statement that Dillon made and the President's speech shows conclusively that the break-up of the Summit Conference was due to Khrushchev and no other cause.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

The Committee is adjourned until next Tuesday.

(Whereupon, at 5:55 p.m., the Committee recessed, to reconvene at 10:00 a.m., Tuesday, May 31, 1960.)